Conversational Maxims and Some Philosophical Problems Author(s): A. P. Martinich Reviewed work(s): Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.

30, No. 120 (Jul., 1980), pp. 215-228 Published by: Wiley for The Philosophical Quarterly Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2219243 . Accessed: 16/01/2013 14:36
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CONVERSATIONAL MAXIMS AND SOME PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

BY A. P. MARTINICH

H. P. Gricehas made much of the fact that most conversation more is or less organizedand structured.In any conversation, the participants must co-operateto some extentin orderto achieve theirpurpose,which, is and hard bargainmoreover, a sharedpurpose.Even in fierce arguments needsto understand whattheother means;thebitterest ing,each participant disputantsmust agree to disagree. Grice capturesthese facts in what he calls "The Co-operative contribution Principle":"Make yourconversational such as is required, the stage at whichit occurs,by the acceptedpurpose at or direction the talk exchangein whichyou are engaged".1 We might of is to paraphraseit thus: do whatever necessary achievethe purposeof your it. at frustrate Although each stageofa conversatalk; don't do whatmight tion the fullweightof the Co-operative Principleis on the speakerbecause he has the leadingrole, the Principlealso applies to the hearer. There is, forexample,the generalrequirement that a hearershouldtryto understand what the speakermeans,even if he has to ignorethe literalmeaningof the words actually used. This principleexplains why defective utterancesso oftensucceed in communicating. deep and pervasiveis this principle So thathearers seldomrealizetheyare usingit. Grammatical errors ('One ofthe trees are blooming'),solecisms ('This is an alternate course'), and misof ('The current descriptions president Englandis Margaret Thatcher')often succeedin communicating speaker'sintentwithout havingto correct the his the defect. as Revealingand important the Co-operative Principleis, it is not very informative, just because of its abstractness. What we need to know in order to understandthe structure conversation what specificrules of is observein the conversation.Gricementions least eightsuch at participants rules,which,in tributeto Kant, he terms"maxims", and dividesinto the fourcategories Quantity, of Quality,Relationand Manner. Since Grice'sconversational maximsare embeddedin a moregeneralset of elements the total contentof what a speakermeans whenhe comprising intendsto communicate I something, shall beginin Section I witha sumof his generalview. In Section II, I shall explain and criticizethe mary conversational maxims in the firstthree categories. I shall defend the maximsof Quantityagainstsome objections;thoseof Qualityand Relation willbe criticized and replacedby others. If Grice'stheory conversational of
l"Logic and Conversation", in Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts, ed. Peter Cole and JerryL. Morgan (New York, 1975), p. 45.

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maximsmerelydescribedhuman talk accurately, mightwell be of little it in interest philosophers; in factit has manyapplications philosophy. to but how his theory in Gricehas suggested mightbe applied to a problem philosophical logic.2 I have applied the theoryto a problemconnectedwith to de and between dicto referring;3 I believeit is also relevant the distinction to and de re belief. In SectionsIII-V, I use the theory solve threeproblems in philosophy: Moore'sParadox, the Liar Paradox, and the supposedattributiveuse of definite descriptions. MEANS OF I. THE TOTALCONTENT WHATA SPEAKER the total signification Grice says that "for a large class of utterances, of an utterancemay be regardedas divisiblein two different ways: first, betweenwhat is said (in one may distinguish, within total signification, the a favouredsense) and what is implicated;and second,one may distinguish betweenwhatis part ofthe conventional force(or meaning) the utterance of and what is not. This yieldsthreepossible elements-what is said, what is conventionally implicatedand what is non-conventionally implicated".4 the Griceunderstands notionof what a speakersays to be "closelyrelated to the conventional meaningof the words (the sentence)he has uttered".5 What is said consistsof the references (physical,temporaland spatial), and illocutionary force,as determined (partially)by the conpredications the ventions governing wordsused. conventional Grice'sterminology thetwotypesofspeaker for implication, and non-conventional, misleading. It wrongly is suggeststhat only conbut he does not mean ventionalimplication governedby conventions, is this. By "conventionalimplication"he means implicationthat depends the upon the conventions governing use of the words; or, as we mightcall Grice them, "linguisticconventions". By "non-conventional implication", means implication that does not depend upon linguistic conventions.The is mostprominent kind of non-conventional implication whathe calls "conwhichdepends upon the conversational versationalimplicature", maxims, conventions. whichare themselves maximsare important The conversational because it is in virtueof them
20p. cit., pp. 41-3. 3"Referring",Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch,40 (1979), 157-72. 4"Further Notes on Logic and Conversation", in Syntax and Semantics 9: Pragmatics, ed. Peter Cole (New York, 1978), p. 113. Grice firstsummarized his general view of the elements of speaker-meaningin 1968 when he said that he wanted to make a distinction "within the total significationof a remark: a distinction between what the speaker has said (in a certain favoured, and maybe in some degree artificial,sense of 'said'), and what he has "implicated" (e.g., implied, indicated, suggested, etc.), taking into account the fact that what he has implicated may be either conventionally implicated (implicated by virtue of the meaning of some word or phrase which he has used) or non-conventionally implicated (in which case the specification of implicature falls outside the specificationof the conventional meaning of the words used" ("Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning,and Word-Meaning", in Philosophy of Language, ed. John Searle (London, 1971), p. 54). ""Logic and Conversation", p. 44.

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that some, possibly most, of the contentof what a speaker means gets with the assumption communicated.What a speakersays, in conjunction that the speaker is observingthe conversational maxims,entails certain which Grice says are conversationally implied. That is, a propositions, in speaker,in sayingsomething, impliescertainthings, virtueof his adherence to the conversational maxims. If in answerto the questionof how Jonesis doing at his bank job a speakersays, 'Oh quite well, I think;he likeshis colleagues, and he hasn't been to prisonyet', the speakermightbe but not saying,that Jones is larcenous. All conversationally implying, conversational maxims, and these depend on conversational implicatures maximsare the centralthemeof this paper. A. The Category Quantity. Grice lists two conversational maxims of under the categoryof Quantity: Al. Make your contribution informative is required (forthe as as current purposesof the exchange) A2. Do notmakeyourcontribution than moreinformative is required. Maxim Al sets a lowerlimiton what a speakershould contribute; sets A2 the upper limit. As with your car, you will not appreciatehow much you Al, dependupon thesemaximsuntiltheybreakdown. Concerning suppose Mr Plume, needingto writeto Mr Topic, asked Mr Speaker whereexactly Topic lives; and that Speaker in answerto this questionsays 'Somewhere in the south of France'. In this case, Speaker has failedto contribute as much information Plume requires. Concerning as A2, suppose Speaker in the same situation had said 'He lives in Lyon, France,in a quaint L-shaped from main the flat;the addressis 453 Peugeot St, whichis about 50 metres and from parking his post office a mere7 metres space'. In thiscase, Speaker morethan Plume requires. You mightthinkthat bothmaxims contributed of Quantitycould not go unfulfilled But that is obviously simultaneously. not so. If Speaker omits 'the addressis 453 Peugeot St' fromthe last exboth too much and too little. ample he communicates to Beforeproceeding the next category maximswe need to consider of two objectionsthat Griceaired-I do not knowif he was speakingin proto maxim. pria persona-against A2's right be a conversational The first objectionis that A2 does not expressa conversational requirement. Being over-informative,is claimed,"is not a transgression the it of Co-operative Principlebut merelya waste of time".6 One reply to this that is admittedly"a waste of objection is that contributing something time" is itselfa violation of the Co-operativePrinciple,since one of its principal purposes is to make conversationmore economical and more Hence A2 does indeedexpressa conversational efficient. Grice requirement. also suppliesa justification A2: "such over-informativeness be confor may
6"Logic and Conversation", p. 46.

II. CONVERSATIONAL MAXIMS

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in fusing that it is liable to raise side issues; and theremay also be an indirecteffect, that the hearersmay be misledas a resultof thinking in that thereis someparticular of pointin the provision the excessofinformation".7 The secondobjection thatit is superfluous, is giventhemaximofRelation: C. Be relevant. If a speaker'scontribution relevant, moreinformais thenhe willnotprovide tionthan is necessary; if he does, thenthe information and, providedis not relevant. This objectionis defective at least two counts. First,even with on conversational contributions C, A2 is not superfluous; manyover-informative are nonetheless relevantcontributions. The above exampleof a breakdown in A2 is a case in point. The mentionof the quaint L-shaped flat,etc., is relevant sayingexactly to Mr where Topic lives;and yetit is over-informative. One mightfeel uneasy with this example, since though strictly speaking relevantthe description the flatis not apt. Thus, it may be helpful of to an exampleof a remark in additionto beingconversationally which, provide over-informative relevant, also apt. FrancoisMauriac's Vipers'Tangle and is the bitterrecollections an unlovingand unlovedold miser. At of concerns one point,recalling deceased grandson, his Luc, the misersays, "Everyone loved him,even I". Now the phrase 'even I' is over-informative, the since factthat everyone loved Luc entailsthat the miser, particular, in loved him. Yet the phrase is relevantand apt. It indicatesmany things:that Luc is lovable,that the miseris not obliviousto his own lack of lovingness, highly that he is not whollyunable to love. Withoutthe over-informative phrase 'even I' the forceof the miser'sremarkwould be diminished.The upshot is that the objector'sclaim (if a speaker'scontribution relevant, is thenhe will not providemoreinformation than is necessary, is false. Thereis etc.) stilla secondand, forus, moreimportant, replyto thisobjection. If C and A2 are jointlyde trop,one could just as easily argue that C is superfluous. moreinformation than is necessary, then the For, if a speakercontributes if excess information his contribution irrelevant; of is and, conversely, his is it contribution relevant, is not moreinformative than is necessary.What is wrongwiththe objectionagainstA2 is that it assumesthat C is a more valuable maximthanA2; that,facedwitha choicebetween one should them, A2. But nothing sacrifice that choice;all maximsare createdequal. justifies whether and A2 together redundant not,we can choose are or C Nonetheless, betweenthem. I prefer to C fortwo reasons. First,A2 is a naturalcomplement A2 to Al. If there is a conversational for a speaker to make his requirement contribution strongenough,it seems natural to requirethat it should not be too strong. We mightthen combineAl and A2 to forma supermaxim of Quantity: A. Contribute much as, but not more than, is required(forthe as current purposesof the exchange).
7Ibid.

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than C; A2 A2 The secondreasonforpreferring is that it has morecontent is specific, whileC is vague and approximate.I suspectthat one reasonC as has encroachedon A2 is that, ill-defined it is, C has no strictborders. I prefer eliminate to this marauding maxim. Does anything recommend C? preserving If C goes, the entirecategory of Relationdoes. Fortunately thosewho wishto retainthe analogywith for the of Kant, thereis good reasonforpreserving category relation fleshing by we maxim. But first need out the vague "Be relevant"with some specific to discussthe maximsof Quality. B. The Category Quality. Grice's maxim of Quality is: of one B. Try to make yourcontribution that is true whichhe dividesintotwo sub-maxims: B1. Do not say what you believeto be false B2. Do not say that forwhichyou lack adequate evidence. of Both are defective becausetoo narrow. Cast as theyare in terms "truth", and "evidence",theyapply onlyto thosespeechacts that attempt "falsity" and the like. They to say how the worldis, that is, to statements, assertions on disease of fixating seriousfactual suffer fromthe typical philosophical when people oftendo otherthingswith language. Perhaps B statements, can surviveas a supermaxim BI and B2 as maximsof constative and speech at in acts, but for conversation generalB1 and B2 are minimaxims best, of and B a superminimaxim. What the category Qualityneeds are maxims of broad enoughto cover the entirespectrum speech acts. is That themaximsofQualityneedto be broadened clear;howto broaden we them is not; nevertheless, have some clues. The notionof truthcould perhapsbe extendedto that of genuineness.However,a proposedmaxim one like "Try to make your contribution that is genuine" would be unacceptableforbeingtoo broad; it applies,as Gricesays,to any contribution of any reason-governed activity. "Genuine" is also too broad co-operative to in that it does not apply specifically rationalagents. What we need is a the or termthat expresses at least suggests kind of genuineness appropriate or and to communication, a supermaxim set of maximsthat specify exactly amountsto; theywill have to prohibit diswhat genuineness speakersfrom in fromthe semblingand dissimulation speech. Can we draw inspiration "Be Should we requirespeakersto observethe supermaxim existentialists? authentic"? It seemsthat thereshouldbe a sense in whichwe should,but himin his canonization the of it is not the sensewhichSartrethinks justifies This is just thiefand liar,Jean Genet,as a saintof authenticity. notorious we thekindofauthenticity cannotallow. We wanta bourgeois authenticity, and condemns one that celebrates We sincerity impersonation. mighteven maximsout of them: be temptedto elevate these qualitiesand form Be sincere Have the statusyou need in orderto ensurethat the speechact you will perform be non-defective.

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But we mustresistthe temptation.Although is sincerity requiredforsome it speechacts, such as promising, is not requiredforall. The same holdsfor for and status;it is required somespeechacts,suchas marrying inaugurating, but not forall. We shouldnot,however, and wholly despairof sincerity status;although and non-defective they are not universally requiredforthe successful perof formance speech acts, they are requiredformany,and this fact points us towards the truth. All speech acts impose on the participantssome essentialto theirgenus. Sincerity and status are just two of requirements these. Some speechacts requirethe speakerto be able to do certainthings or to be in a certainposition:promise do onlywhatyou can do; apologize to foroffences only actuallygiven;forgive onlypersonswho have injuredyou. in The kind of authenticity then,is requiredof participants a discussion, one that applies distinctively the requirements to by the speech imposed in acts to be performed the conversation.We can formulate this point as follows: B'. Be authentic. That is, do not knowingly in participate a speech act forwhichthe conditions its successful for and non-defective are performance not satisfied. The supermaxim Qualityis notable,and perhapsunique,in thatit applies of as much to hearers to speakers. For thereare requirements hearers, as for as well as speakers;a heareris requiredto make an effort understand to what the speakermeans,whatever wordsthe speakerhappensto utter,and he oftenmust have a certainstatus. For example, only the duly elected candidatecan be inaugurated; onlyadult, baptizedpersonscan presidential be ordainedto the Catholicpriesthood. C. The Category Relation. In my discussion the maximsof Quality, of of I criticized Grice'smaximof Relation, C. Be relevant forbeingtoo vague. This does not meanthat thiscategory shouldbe abandoned. Rather,it needs to be supplemented withtwo othermaxims. The first is: one C1. Make your contribution that moves the discussiontowards its goal. Discussionmovesin ways whichmay be eithernormalor abnormal. contributions affect normalmotionof a discussion the (a) Conversational in basicallythreeways: theybegina discussion, theyend it, and theycontinue it in the directionin which it has been proceeding. The first two contributions typically are conventional typesofconversational (e.g., 'Hello', 'Once upon a time', 'Goodbye',and 'That's it, then')or theyare explicit('I want to begintoday's lecture. . .', 'I want to concludemy lecture. . .'). We can call such conversational moves "starters" and "stoppers". The starters rationaleforincluding amongCl mightseem clearenough,but why do stoppersenhancethe chances that the goal of the disstoppers? Why cussionwillbe achieved? The answeris that it is not enoughthat the inter-

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locutorsat some pointreach the goal: theyneed to know whentheyhave reachedit. contributions conversational that In contrast withstarters and stoppers, not are continue discourse the same direction normally explicitbut are a in the implied.Consider following dialogue: H: Hello, how are you today? bad. S: Not too well. I feelpretty H: What seemsto be the problem? S: My throatis sore and I ache all over. H: Sounds like the 'flu. is S: I saw my doctortoday; he says it's whatever goingaround. the exchangeproceedswithoutany mention Notice that afterH's starter, ties of how the next speaker'scontribution in withthe previousones. For S does not need to explainhow his visitwiththe doctoris relevant example, to H's judgementthat S has the 'flu and his own earlierreportof a sore contithroat and achiness. Gradual topic-shifts guaranteeconversational nuity. affect the motionof a discussionabcontributions (b) Conversational either not accept a contribution, in severalways. First,one might normally rejection('You're a liar', 'That's not true') or by demurring outright by one 'I'm not sureabout that'). Second,whether rejects ('I'm not convinced', of one can eitherchangethe direction discussion or demurs, ('Let's consider a different ('Let's consider stop its advance eithertemporarily possibility'), that fora moment')or permanently don't want to talk about it'), or ('I retracethe path ('Let's go back to the point where. . '). The secondmaximof Relationis: in C2. Express yourself termsthat will allow yourhearerto tie your context. into contribution the conversational context includes the speaker and the conversational Broadly construed, theirpreviousutterances, environment, hearer,their commonperceptible and all of theirrelevantbeliefs. two let conversational tie-ins, us distinguish types: contextConcerning The former and context-independent. type is more obviously dependent in connectedto C2 and is illustrated H and S's briefdialogue about S's health. For the generaltopic of S's healthholdsthe conversation together, move in the exchangeties in withsome previousmove. and each particular tie-inswhen conversational P. F. Strawsonanticipatedcontext-dependent he wrote: or Statements, the pieces of discourseto which they belong,have subjects,not only in the relatively precisesensesof logic and grammar, but in a vaguer sense with which I shall associate the words and random 'topic' and 'about'. . . . For statingis not a gratuitous directisolatedand activity. We do not, exceptin social desperation, but on the contrary at unconnected pieces of information each other, about what is a matter intendin generalto give or add information interest concern. There is a great variety or of standingor current

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8"IdentifyingReference and Truth Values", Theoria, 30 (1964); reprintedin LogicoLinguistic Papers (London, 1971), p. 92. 9Op. cit., p. 76. 100p. cit., p. 78.

of possibletypesof answerto the questionwhat the topic of a statementis, what a statement "about"-about baldness,about what is have bald rulers,about great men are bald, about which countries France, about the king,etc.-and not everyanswerexcludes every otherin a givencase. This platitudewe mightdignify withthe title, the Principle Relevance.8 of use are unflattering of 'platitude',his remarks important Despite Strawson's and correct.Indeed,whathe says about statements to all illocutionapplies ary acts; it appliesto talk in general. conversational tie-ins concern thosebeliefs required Context-independent of the interlocutors successfulconversational for exchange. These beliefs includeall that are necessary perform entirespeechact. Thus, given to the a competent but not sophisticated speakerof English,one should express one's thoughtin such termsas 'I say that Jonesis a nasty old man who does not like people', ratherthan as 'I aver that Jonesis a misanthropic curmudgeon'.The stricture againsta speaker'susingtermsthat the hearer does not understandshould not be confusedwith anotherinjunctionon a thatis, avoid obscure conversation, maximofManner:eschewobfuscation, For what is involvedis not style,but how certainbeliefsare expressions. in requiredforcontinuity conversation.We can again findan anticipation ofthisin Strawson's underthetitle"The Principle the Presumption of work, of Knowledge",whichis: whenan empirically is assertiveutterance made withan informative thereis usually or at least oftena presumption the intention, (on (in part of the speaker)of knowledge the possessionof the audience) of empirical factsrelevantto the particular point to be impartedin the utterance.9 Strawson holdsthat whena singular termis used to identify particular, a "it is used to invokeidentifying knowledgeknown or presumedto be in of as understands possession an audience".10Noticethatinvoking, Strawson this point,conit, calls forth existingknowledge. To illustrate presumed, sidera case in whichC2 is not satisfied: H: I thinkWhitewas the one jilted,not Black. Who do you think it was? S: I thinkthe one withmorehair was jilted. If we supposethat H has no beliefabout whether Whiteor Black has more context. hair, then S's remarktherebyfails to tie into the conversational For H's lack of a beliefabout whether White or Black has morehair prevents the non-context-dependent tie-infromworking. This example also illustrates fact that a hearercan be vividlyacquainted with an object the and yetlack the beliefs to the necessary understand speaker'sconversational contribution. Finally,even if we do suppose that H has a relevantbelief, say, that White has morehair than Black, then S still failsto satisfyC2;

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but nowthefailure tie in is a context-dependent to matter. For,givenwhat S and H are talkingabout and how they have been talkingabout it, it is not clear how 'The one that has morehair' ties into the exchange. or in Thereis, however, additionto invoking another knowledge beliefs, beliefs. One can convoke themin the sense that in calling way to call forth makes themobjects of belief. This is in credibleobjects one thereby forth fact a commonstylisticdevice. Since it would be tedious to introduce each new pointthat one wants to discuss,a writer to prefers predicatively use a descriptionreferentially, which therebyconvokes the appropriate sentencedrawnat randomfromMarvinR. beliefs. Considerthe following The Counter-Reformation O'Connell's (1559-1610): "The Treaty of CateaubetweenFrance and Spain was signedthe following Cambresis day, April3, the 1559".1 It is clearthat the authordid not presume readerknewofthis treaty;yet thereis no previousassertionthat therewas any such treaty; there is only an earlier mentionof "substantivediscussionsat Cateaubetween Cambresis". However,the phrase'The Treatyof Cateau-Cambresis France and Spain' convokesthe beliefexpressedby the assertion that there was a treatyof Cateau-Cambresis. If mydefence the maximsof Quantity of of and myrevisions the maxims of Qualityand Relationare accepted,thenthe complete ofthe Conversalist tionalMaximswilllook like this: QUANTITY A. Contribute much as, but not morethan, is required (forthe as current purposesof the exchange). as Al. Make yourcontribution informative is required(for as the current purposesofthe exchange). A2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. QUALITY B'. Be authentic:that is, do not knowingly participatein a speech act forwhichthe conditions successful of and non-defective performance not satisfied. are RELATION C. Be relevant. one that moves the discourse C1. Make your contribution towardsits goal. in C2. Express yourself termsthat will allow yourhearerto tie yourcontribution the conversational into context. MANNER D. Be perspicuous. of D1. Avoid obscurity expression. D2. Avoid ambiguity. D3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). D4. Be orderlv"New York, 1974, p. 35.

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it Moore's Paradox is easy to state. Although is not self-contradictory, of thereis something odd about sayingsomething the form'p and logically I don't believe that p', such as 'It is rainingand I don't believethat it is raining'. the I thinkthat Grice'stheoryof conversational maxims,in particular can maximof Qualityand his theory conversational of implication, be used to solve Moore's Paradox. Briefly, solutionconsistsof an explanation the of of how it is the case that anyonewho uttersa sentence the form'p and I don't believethat p', and means it, attemptsto communicate something in whose contentis in fact contradictory.The contradiction what the speakermeansinvolvesnotonlywhatthe speakersays,but whatthespeaker with what he conversationally says in conjunction implies. The maximof Qualityis: in Do not knowingly participate a speechact forwhichthe conditions are of successful non-defective and performance not satisfied. is for One of the conditions a non-defective speechact of assertion that the of content what he says. In general, speakermustbelieve the propositional a speakerwho assertsthat p conversationally impliesthat he believesthat a and I do not believethat p. In particular, speakerwho says 'It is raining it is raining'assertsin part (A) It is raining and, by the maximof Quality,conversationally implies (B) I believeit is raining. But (B) contradicts otherpart of whathe asserts, the namely, (B') I do not believethat it is raining. And hencethe contentof what the speakermeans is contradictory; and, in this straightforward logicallyodd. way, it. as Attractive this line of reasoning Gricerebuffs He says "On my is, account,it willnot be truethat whenI say thatp, I conversationally implithisview? cate that I believethatp".12 What is Grice'sreasonforrejecting He says "for to suppose that I believe that p (or ratherthinkof myself the maxim as believing that p) is just to supposethat I am observing first of Quality on this occasion".l3 I think Grice's reason must be mistaken. of 'S For it can be shownthat a proposition the form believesthatp' can of be derivedfromS's assertionof a statement the form'p' in accordance conversawith the patternof reasoningthat Grice set out for computing tional implicatures: for out A generalpattern the working of a conversational implicature be givenas follows:'He has said that p; thereis no reasonto might the suppose that he is not observing maxims,or at least the CP; he thatq; he knows(and knows couldnot be doingthisunlesshe thought that that I knowthat he knows)that I can see that the supposition
12"FurtherNotes on Logic and Conversation", p. 114. 18Ibid.

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to he thinksthat q is required;he has done nothing stopme thinking that q; he intendsme to think,or is at least willingto allow me to thatq; and so he has implicated thatq.14 think, we In particular, can reasonas follows:He has said that it is raining;there the is no reasonto supposethat he is not observing maxims,or at least the thatit is CP; he could not be doingthis unlesshe thoughtthat he believed etc. raining; thereis no moreforme to say in directrefutation Grice's of Although it may be illuminating speculate about the reason why he holds to view, to the view he does. I believehis view has nothing do withConversational or their computations.Rather it concernsGrice's particular Implicatures view about the indicativemood. In "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, Grice presentsthe view that the indicativemood and Word-Meaning",16 to "corresponds believing". Thus, Grice's view is that when someoneexthat personis thereby his a proposition indicatively expressing belief presses of in that proposition.If this treatment the indicativemood were correct, one mightbe moved to accept Grice'srejectionof our solutionto Moore's Paradox. But his treatment does not seem to be correct. To provideonly asks a questionby uttering indicative an one counter-example, whensomeone at sentencewith a risinginflection the end of the sentence(e.g., 'That's a the of moodto signify speaker's cat?'),it cannotbe thefunction theindicative of mood cannot in belief the proposition.Thus,Grice'stheory the indicative be true in generaland cannot providea good reason fordenying that the assertionthat p conversationally impliesthat the speakerbelievesthat p. Also, Grice'sview of the indicativemood has an untowardconsequence. It entailsthat a personwho assertsa sentenceof the form'I believethat p' is both asserting that he believesthatp-this is immediate-and somehow, a the in virtueof the sentence'sindicativemood,further expressing belief, that he believes that p. But surelythis second supposed belief,perhaps, of expression a beliefis otiose and not in factpart of what the speakerhas signified.
IV. THE LAR PARADOX

sentences As I shall use the term "the Liar Paradox", many different can be used to give rise to this paradox,e.g., 'I am lying','All Cretansare held liars' (spokenby a Cretan),and 'This sentenceis false'. It is generally containsthe essenceof a that a solutionto the paradox in one of its forms solutionto its otherforms. I shall discuss the paradox as it arises fromthe use of the sentence 'What I am sayingis false'. This sentenceis paradoxical because, if the thenhe would be speakingfalsely. And if he speakerwere speakingtruly, were speakingfalsely, then,given what he says, he would not be speaking falsely.
14"Logic and Conversation", pp. 49-50. 15In Searle (ed.), The Philosophy ofLanguage, p. 59.

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As its name suggests, semanticparadoxes are thought arise from the to somequirk,defect mystery or about the meanings certain of wordsinvolved, with a certain e.g., 'this' or 'true', or fromthose meaningsin conjunction structure.Numerous semantic solutions the semantic to syntactic ingenious paradoxes exist.l1 Virtuallyall the proposed solutionsto the semantic based; and all, despitetheirtechnicalsophisticaparadoxesare semantically in tion, are eitherlogicallyflawedor highlycounter-intuitive some aspect or other. These proposedsolutionssuffer these ways, I believe,because in the nature of the problemhas been mistaken. These paradoxes arise,not because of some problemwith what the words mean, but with what the mean or are trying communicate. to speakersmightlead one to believethey is but pragmatic; The problem not semantic, and hencethe solutions to are be soughtwithina theoryof linguistic not semantics. communication, One might thinkthat the solution the liar paradoxesis strictly to analoto Moore'sParadox and wouldgo like this: gous maxim of Quality, a speaker conversationally By the conversational that he is observingall the conditionsfor a successfuland nonimplies defective a a speechact. In particular, speakerwhoutters typicaldeclarative as part of what he means that what he sentenceconversationally implies is sayingis true. So, if he says that what he is sayingis false,thenwhat he In means is contradictory. particular, speaker who says a What I am sayingis false (A) conversationally impliesby the maximof Quality What I am sayingis not false. (A') And (A) and (A') are explicitly contradictory. I do not thinkthissolutionis correct.UnlikeMoore'sParadox,in which the speaker mightsucceed in communicating albeit something something, I do notthink in thatthespeaker theLiar Paradox can succeed contradictory, in communicating for anything.The reasonis that the condition assertions, that a speakermust believe what he says, is not a condition the success for of assertion, a Searle calls this condition sinonly forits non-defectiveness. condition.If the sincerity condition werealso a condition success for cerity in makingan assertion, then lyingwould be impossible. Just as insincere are promises, insincere so are assertions assertions. promises The situationis different withthe Liar Paradox. The condition that is unfulfilled the condition is that the speakerintendsthat his statement going be true. Searle calls this condition"the essentialcondition", and the name is instructive.The essentialconditionspecifies the goal, point or purpose of the act, in the sense of an Aristotelian telos;and ifthe verypointor purof the act is inherently the frustrated, act is not achieved; and the pose if frustrated the verysayingis inconsonant purposeof the act is inherently witha condition the saying. In short, for the solutionto the Liar Paradox is to denythat any successful speechact of assertion(or of any othertype.
"1See, e.g., The Paradox of theLiar, ed. Robert L. Martin (New Haven, 1970).

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forthat matter)has been performed. reductio absurdum A ad can argument be givenforthis: supposethe speakerdoes succeed in makinga statement in uttering the sentence'What I am sayingis not true'. Then he would state that (B) What he said is not true. he But, further, the maximof quality,as it appliesto statements, would by also conversationally implythat (B') What he said is true. since (B) and (B') are contradictory, supposition the must be false; But, that is, the speakerdid not succeedin makinga statement.
V. THE ATTRIBUTIVE USE

maximsconcerns maxim a My last applicationof Grice'sconversational of Relationand the supposedattributive of definite use Keith descriptions. Donnellanclaimsthat in additionto the philosophically familiar referential use ofdefinite thereis another use, the attributive ofwhich use, descriptions a paradigmcase is the following:"Suppose . . . that we come upon poor murdered.Fromthe brutalmannerof the killingand the fact Smithfoully that Smith was the most lovable personin the world,we mightexclaim, is 'Smith's murderer insane' ".17 Donellan claims that, in the scenario "no other description would have done the same job" as the described, 'Smith'smurderer'.Donnellan'sclaimis not correct. Thereare description numberof descriptions that the speaker many other,possiblyan infinite could have used to the same effect.Thus, insteadof 'Smith'smurderer', S have used 'Smith'storturer', destroyer thisgood man', or 'the 'the of might with 'Smith's personwho did this to Smith',none of whichis synonymous Nor are thepossiblesubstitutes restricted definite to murderer'. descriptions. If we fleshout our scenarioto includethe factthat etchedin blood on the wall of the roomin whichSmithis foundare the words'I servethe devil. I am Jones',then S mighthave said withequal effect 'Jones (whoeverhe is insane'. is) behindDonnellan's claim that has Despite all this, thereis something to be accountedfor. Thereis a difference between cases whichhe claims the use involve an attributive and those whichhe claims involve a referential is comes use, althoughthe difference nota difference use. The difference of will thereis a limitas to what remarks from the factthat in conversations at countas relevantto the conversation any givenpointand what will not thereis a limitas to what descriptions countas relevant. Moreparticularly, will countas relevant. This is contained the maximof Relation in in C2. Express yourself termsthat will allow yourhearerto tie your context. contribution the conversational into use The reasonwhythe speakerin the scenarioof the supposedattributive like of cannotuse a description 'the mostrecentwinner the daily double at
"7"Referenceand Definite Descriptions", Philosophical Review 75 (1966), 285.

OF DEFINITE

DESCRIPTIONS

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Del Mar' to refer Smith'smurderer that that description to is providesno in tie-into the conversation. (Of course,scenarioscould be constructed whichit would; in general,forany description thereis a contextin which it is relevant.) use The upshotis that Donnellan'sparadigmcase of the attributive of definite can be accommodatedwithinthe general theoryof descriptions conversation withoutmultiplying maxims,in paruses; the conversational for ticularC2, can be used as part of a completeprogramme economyin a use can theoryof conversation.All the supposed cases of the attributive is one tool be shownto be referential uses. Any definite description merely fordoinga certainjob and in generalany otherdevice,anotherdescription or name, would do as well withinthe limitsset down by C2. Deviations use fromclear-cut cases of the referential can be explainedin termsof the conversational maxims. These solutionsto paradoxesillustrate just one use of Grice'stheoryof conversational maxims and implicatures.As I have indicated,his theory can be applied to a great varietyof problems;hence its importance for philosophy. University Texas at Austin of

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