EXCONDEV.

CAPUNO
101Phil843 TortsandDamagesLiabilityofParents FACTS: DanteCapunowasa15yearoldboywhowasapupilofBalintawakElementarySchool. InMarch1949,heattendedaboyscoutparadeforDr.JoseRizal.Whiletheywereinside ajeep,hetookcontrolofthewheelswhichhelaterlostcontrolofcausingthejeeptogo turtle thereby killing two otherstudents, Isidoro Caperina and one other. Isidoros mother sued Dante Capuno for the death of her son. Pending thecriminalaction, the mother reserved her right to file a separate civil action which she subsequently filed againstDanteandhisdad,DelfinCapuno. ISSUE:WhetherornotDelfinCapuno,asthefatherofDanteisliablefordamages. HELD: Yes.Thecivilliabilitywhichthelawimposesuponthefather,and,incaseofhisdeathor incapacity,themother,foranydamagesthatmaybecausedbytheminorchildrenwho livewiththem,isobvious.Thisisnecessaryconsequenceoftheparentalauthoritythey exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the duty ofsupportingthem, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them inproportionto their means, while, on the other hand, gives them the right to correct and punish theminmoderation.Theonlywaybywhichtheycanrelievethemselvesofthisliability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to preventthedamagewhichDelfinfailedtoprove. On the other hand, the school is not liable. It is true that under the law, teachersor directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody, but this provision only applies to an institutionofartsandtradesandnottoanyacademiceducationalinstitution. JUSTICEJ.B.L.REYESDissenting: DelfinCapunoshouldberelievedfromliability.Thereisnosoundreasonforlimitingthe liability toteachersof arts and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial difference is there between them in so far as, concerns the proper supervision and vigilanceovertheirpupils?Itcannotbeseriouslycontendedthatanacademicteacheris exempt from the duty of watching do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons,solongastheyareinapositiontoexerciseauthorityandsupervisionoverthe pupil.

CUADRAV.MONFORT
35SCRA160 TortsandDamagesLiabilityofParents FACTS: Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort were both classmates in Mabini ElementarySchoolBacolodCity.InJuly1962,theirteacherassignedtoweedtheschool premises. While they were doing so, MT Monfort found aheadbandand she jokingly shouteditasanearthwormandthereaftertosseditMTCuadrawhowashitinhereye. MT Cuadras eye got infected. She was brought to the hospital; her eyes wereattemptedtobesurgicallyrepairedbutsheneverthelessgotblindinherrighteye. MTCuadrasparentssuedAlfonsoMonfort(MTMonfortsdad)basedonArticle2180of theCivilCode.ThelowercourtruledthatMonfortshouldpayforactualdamages(cost ofhospitalization),moraldamagesandattorneysfees. ISSUE:WhetherornotMonfortisliableunderArticle2180. HELD: No.Article2180providesthatthefather,incaseofhisincapacityordeath,themother, isresponsibleforthedamagescausedbytheminorchildrenwholiveintheircompany. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is fault or negligence, which is presumedfromthatwhichaccompaniedthecausativeactoromission.Thepresumption is merelyprima facieand may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inferencethatmaybedrawnfromthelastparagraphofArticle2180,whichstatesthat the responsibility treated of in this Article shallceasewhen the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to preventdamage. In thecase atbar there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the Alfonso Monfort could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he wasinanywayremissintheexerciseofhisparentalauthorityinfailingtoforeseesuch damage, or the act whichcausedit.On thecontrary,hischildwasatschool,whereit washisdutytosendherandwhereshewas,ashehadtherighttoexpecthertobe, under thecare andsupervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injurywasconcerned,itwasaninnocentpranknotunusualamongchildrenatplayand which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much lessguardagainst.Nordiditrevealanymischievouspropensity,orindeedanytraitin thechildscharacterwhichwouldreflectunfavorablyonherupbringingandforwhich theblamecouldbeattributedtoherparents.

JUSTICEBARREDODissenting; MT Monfort is already 13 years old and should have known that by jokingly saying aloud that she had found anearthwormand, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossedtheobjectather,itwaslikelythatsomethingwouldhappentoherfriend,asin fact, she was hurt. There is nothingin the recordthat would indicate that he had properly advised his daughter to behave properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her classmate and playmates, he can be liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Thereisnothingintherecordtoshowthathehaddoneanythingatalltoeventryto minimizethedamagecauseduponbyhischild.

SOLIMANV.TUAZON
Facts:OnMarch22,1983,petitionerSolimanfiledacivilcomplaintfordamagesagainst privaterespondentRepublicCentralColleges,theRLSecurityAgencyIncandoneJimmy Solomon,asecurityguard,asdefendants.ThecomplaintallegedthatonAugust13, 1982,whiletheplaintiffwasinthecampusgroundandpremisesofthedefendant, RepublicCentralColleges,asheisaregularenrolledstudentandtakinghismorning classes,thedefendantSolomon,withoutanyprovocation,inawanton,fraudulent, reckless,oppressiveormalevolentmanner,withintenttokill,attack,assault,strikeand shoottheplaintiffontheabdomenwitha.38CaliberRevolver.Theplaintiffwastreated andconfinedatAngelesMedicalCenter,AngelesCity,andasperdoctorsopinion,the plaintiffmaynotbeabletoattendtohisregularclassesandwillbeincapacitatedinthe performanceofhisusualworkforadurationoffromthreetofourmonthsbeforehis woundswouldbecompletelyhealed. PrivaterespondentCollegesfiledamotiontodismiss,contendingthatthecomplaint statednocauseofactionagainstit.Privaterespondentarguedthatitisfreefromany liabilityfortheinjuriessustainedbypetitionerforthereasonthatprivaterespondent schoolwasnottheemployerofthesecurityguardcharged,JimmySolomon,andhence wasnotresponsibleforanywrongfulactofSolomon.Privaterespondentschoolfurther arguedthatArticle2180,7thparagraph,oftheNCCdidnotapply,sincesaidparagraph holdsteachersandheadsofestablishmentofartsandtradesliablefordamagescaused bytheirpupilsandstudentsorapprentices,whilesecurityguardwasnotapupilor apprenticeoftheschool. InanorderdatedNovember29,1983,respondentJudgegrantedprivaterespondent schoolsmotiontodismiss,holdingthatsecurityguardSolomonwasnotanemployeeof theschool.Petitionermovedforreconsideration,withoutsuccess. InthisPetitionforCertiorariandProhibition,itiscontendedthatrespondenttrialjudge committedgraveabuseofdiscretionwhenherefusedtoapplytheprovisionsofArticle 2180,aswellasthoseofArticles349,350and352oftheNCCandgrantedtheschools motiontodismiss. Issue:Whetherornotpetitionerisentitledtodamagesandthejudgecommittedgrave abuseofdiscretionwhenherefusedtoapplyprovisionsofArts2180,349,350and352. Held:TheCourtresolvedtograntduecoursetothepetition,totreatthecommentof respondentCollegesasitsanswerandtoreverseandsetasidetheorderdated November29,1983.Thecasewasremandedtothecourtaquoforfurtherproceedings consistentwiththeResolution. UnderArticle2180oftheCivilCode,theobligationtorespondfordamageinflictedby oneagainstanotherbyfaultornegligenceexistsnotonlyforone'sownactoromission, butalsoforactsoromissionsofapersonforwhomoneisbylawresponsible.Thefirst paragraphofArticle2180offersnobasisforholdingtheCollegesliableforthealleged wrongfulactsofsecurityguardJimmyB.SolomoninflicteduponpetitionerSoliman,Jr.

PrivaterespondentschoolwasnottheemployerofJimmySolomon.Sincethereisno questionthatJimmySolomonwasnotapupilorstudentoranapprenticeofthe Colleges,hebeinginfactanemployeeoftheR.L.SecurityAgencyInc. Personsexercisingsubstituteparentalauthorityaremaderesponsiblefordamage inflicteduponathirdpersonbythechildorpersonsubjecttosuchsubstituteparental authority.Intheinstantcase,asalreadynoted,JimmySolomonwhocommitted allegedlytortiousactsresultingininjurytopetitioner,wasnotapupil,studentor apprenticeoftheRepublicCentralColleges;theschoolhadnosubstituteparental authorityoverSolomon. Inthecircumstancesobtaininginthecaseatbar,however,thereis,asyet,nofinding thatthecontractbetweentheschoolandBautistahadbeenbreachedthrutheformer's negligenceinprovidingpropersecuritymeasures.Thiswouldbeforthetrialcourtto determine.And,eveniftherebeafindingofnegligence,thesamecouldgiverise generallytoabreachofcontractualobligationonly.UsingthetestofCangco,supra,the negligenceoftheschoolwouldnotberelevantabsentacontract.Infact,that negligencebecomesmaterialonlybecauseofthecontractualrelationbetweenPSBA andBautista.Inotherwords,acontractualrelationisaconditionsinequanontothe school'sliability.Thenegligenceoftheschoolcannotexistindependentlyofthe contract,unlessthenegligenceoccursunderthecircumstancessetoutinArticle21of theCivilCode. TheCourtisnotunmindfuloftheattendantdifficultiesposedbytheobligationof schools,abovementioned,forconceptuallyaschool,likeacommoncarrier,cannotbe aninsurerofitsstudentsagainstallrisks.Thisisspeciallytrueinthepopulousstudent communitiesofthesocalled"universitybelt"inManilawheretherehavebeen reportedseveralincidentsrangingfromgangwarstootherformsofhooliganism.It wouldnotbeequitabletoexpectofschoolstoanticipatealltypesofviolenttrespass upontheirpremises,fornotwithstandingthesecuritymeasuresinstalled,thesamemay stillfailagainstanindividualorgroupdeterminedtocarryoutanefariousdeedinside schoolpremisesandenvirons.Shouldthisbethecase,theschoolmaystillavoidliability byprovingthatthebreachofitscontractualobligationtothestudentswasnotdueto itsnegligence,herestatutorilydefinedtobetheomissionofthatdegreeofdiligence whichisrequiredbythenatureofobligationandcorrespondingtothecircumstancesof person,timeandplace. InthePSBAcase,thetrialcourthaddeniedtheschool'smotiontodismissthecomplaint againstit,andboththeCourtofAppealsandthisCourtaffirmedthetrialcourt'sorder. Inthecaseatbar,thecourtaquograntedthemotiontodismissfiledbyrespondent Colleges,upontheassumptionthatpetitioner'scauseofactionwasbased,andcould havebeenbased,onlyonArticle2180oftheCivilCode.AsPSBA,however,states,acts whicharetortiousorallegedlytortiousincharactermayatthesametimeconstitute breachofacontractual,orotherlegal,obligation. Respondenttrialjudgewasinseriouserrorwhenhesupposedthatpetitionercould havenocauseofactionotherthanonebasedonArticle2180oftheCivilCode.

Respondenttrialjudgeshouldnothavegrantedthemotiontodismissbutrathershould have,intheinterestofjustice,allowedpetitionertoproveactsconstitutingbreachofan obligationexcontractuorexlegeonthepartofrespondentColleges. Inline,therefore,withthemostrecentjurisprudenceofthisCourt,andinordertoavoid apossiblesubstantialmiscarriageofjustice,andputtingasidetechnicalconsiderations, weconsiderthatrespondenttrialjudgecommittedseriouserrorcorrectiblebythis Courtintheinstantcase.

MERRITTV.GOVERNMENT
34Phil311 TortsandDamagesLiabilityoftheStateforactsofspecialagents FACTS: The facts of the case took place in the 1910s. Meritt was a constructor who was excellent at his work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped by agovernmentambulance. Thedriverof the ambulance was proventohavebeennegligent.Becauseoftheincident,Merittwashospitalizedandhe wasseverelyinjuredbeyondrehabilitationsomuchsothathecouldneverperformhis jobthewayheusedtoandthathecannotevenearnatleasthalfofwhatheusedto earn. In order for Meritt to recover damages, he sought to sue thegovernmentwhich later authorized Meritt to sue thegovernmentby virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against theGovernmentof thePhilippineIslands and authorizing the AttorneyGeneral of said Islands to appear in said suit). The lower court then determined the amount of damages and ordered thegovernmenttopaythesame. ISSUE:Whetherornotthegovernmentisliableforthenegligentactofthedriverofthe ambulance. HELD: No.Byconsentingtobesuedastatesimplywaivesitsimmunityfromsuit.Itdoesnot thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extenditsliabilitytoanycausenotpreviouslyrecognized.Itmerelygivesaremedyto enforceapreexistingliabilityandsubmitsitselftothejurisdictionofthecourt,subject toitsrighttointerposeanylawfuldefense.Itfollowstherefromthatthestate,byvirtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by itsemployeesin the discharge of the functions pertaining to theiroffice, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumedonthepartofthestateintheorganizationofbranchesofpublicserviceand in theappointmentof its agents. The State can only be liable if it acts through aspecialagent(andaspecialagent,inthesenseinwhichthesewordsareemployed,is one who receives a definite and fixed order orcommission, foreign to the exercise of thedutiesofhisofficeifheisaspecialofficial)sothatinrepresentationofthestateand beingboundtoactasanagentthereof,heexecutesthetrustconfidedtohim. In the case at bar, the ambulancedriverwas not aspecialagent nor was agovernmentofficer acting as aspecialagent hence, there can be no liability from thegovernment.TheGovernmentdoesnotundertaketoguaranteetoanypersonthe

fidelity of theofficersor agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversiveofthepublicinterest.

SPOUSESFONTANILLAVSHON.MALIAMAN
GR#55963and61045,Feb.27,1991(ConstitutionalLawGovernmentAgency, ProprietaryFunctions) FACTS: NationalIrrigationAdministration(NIA),agovernmentagency,washeldliablefor damagesresultingtothedeathofthesonofhereinpetitionerspousescausedbythe faultand/ornegligenceofthedriverofthesaidagency.NIAmaintainsthatitisnot liablefortheactofitsdriverbecausetheformerdoesnotperformprimarily proprietorshipfunctionsbutgovernmentalfunctions. ISSUE:WhetherornotNIAmaybeheldliablefordamagescausedbyitsdriver. HELD: Yes.NIAisagovernmentagencywithacorporatepersonalityseparateanddistinctfrom thegovernment,becauseitscommunityservicesareonlyincidentalfunctionstothe principalaimwhichisirrigationoflands,thus,makingitanagencywithproprietary functionsgovernedbyCorporationLawandisliableforactionsoftheiremployees.

Amadoravs.CA
160SCRA274 Facts:Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencementexerciseswherehewouldascendthestageandinthepresenceofhis relatives and friends receive hishigh school diploma. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. While they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon,firedagunthatmortallyhitAlfredo,endingallhisexpectationsandhislifeas well. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the herein petitioners,asthevictim'sparents,filedacivilactionfordamagesunderArticle2180of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two otherstudents, through their respective parents. Thecomplaintagainst thestudentswas later dropped. After trial, the CIF of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decisionwasreversedandallthedefendantswerecompletelyabsolved. Issue:Whether or notteachersor heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liableforthedeathofAlfredoAmadora. Ruling:TheCourthascometotheconclusionthattheprovisioninquestion(Art.2180) shouldapplytoallschools,academicaswellasnonacademic. Following the canon of reddendo singular singuli, where the school is academic, responsibilityforthetortcommittedbythestudentwillattachtotheteacherincharge ofsuchstudent.Thisisthegeneralrule.Reason:Oldacademicschools,theheadsjust supervisetheteacherswhoaretheonesdirectlyinvolvedwiththestudents. Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the head and only he who shall be held liableasanexceptiontothegeneralrule.Reason:Oldschoolsofartsandtradessawthe mastersorheadsoftheschoolpersonallyanddirectlyinstructedtheapprentices. Therefore, the heads are not liable. The teacherincharge is not also liable because theresnoshowingthathewasnegligentinenforcingdisciplineagainsttheaccusedor thathewaivedobservanceoftherulesandregulationsoftheschool,orcondonedtheir nonobservance.Also,thefactthathewasntpresentcantbeconsideredagainsthim becausehewasntrequiredtoreportonthatday.Classeshadalreadyceased.

Amadoravs.CA
GRNo.L47745,April15,1988 FACTS: AlfredoAmadora,whileintheauditoriumoftheschool,wasmortallyhitbyagunby PablitoDaffonresultingtotheformersdeath.Daffonwasconvictedofhomicide throughrecklessimprudence.Thevictimsparents,hereinpetitioners,filedacivilaction fordamagesagainstColegiodeSanJoseRecoletos,itsrectors,highschoolprincipal, deanofboys,thephysicsteachertogetherwithDaffonand2other students.Complaintsagainstthestudentsweredropped.RespondentCourtabsolved thedefendantscompletelyandreversedCFICebusdecisionforthefollowingreasons: 1.Sincetheschoolwasanacademicinstitutionoflearningandnotaschoolofartsand trades2.Thatstudentswerenotinthecustodyoftheschoolsincethesemesterhas alreadyended3.Therewasnoclearidentificationofthefatalgun,and4.Inanyevent, defendantsexercisedthenecessarydiligencethroughenforcementoftheschool regulationsinmaintainingdiscipline.Petitionersonotheotherhandclaimedtheirson wasunderschoolcustodybecausehewenttoschooltocomplywitharequirementfor graduation(submissionofPhysicsreports). ISSUE:WONCollegiodeSanJoseRecoletosshouldbeheldliable. HELD: ThetimeAlfredowasfatallyshot,hewasinthecustodyoftheauthoritiesoftheschool notwithstandingclasseshadformallyendedwhentheincidenthappened.Itwas immaterialifhewasintheschoolauditoriumtofinishhisphysicsrequirement.What wasimportantisthathewasthereforalegitimatepurpose.Ontheotherhand,the rector,highschoolprincipalandthedeanofboyscannotbeheldliablebecausenoneof themwastheteacherinchargeasdefinedintheprovision.Eachwasexercisingonlya generalauthorityoverthestudentsandnotdirectcontrolandinfluenceexertedbythe teacherplacedinchargeofparticularclasses. Intheabsenceofateacherincharge,deanofboysshouldprobablybeheldliable consideringthathehadearlierconfiscatedanunlicensedgunfromastudentandlater returnedtohimwithouttakingdisciplinaryactionorreportingthemattertothehigher

authorities.Thoughitwasclearnegligenceonhispart,noproofwasshownto necessarilylinkthisgunwiththeshootingincident. CollegioSanJoseRecoletoscannotdirectlybeheldliableundertheprovisionbecause onlytheteacheroftheheadofschoolofartsandtradeismaderesponsibleforthe damagecausedbythestudent.Hence,underthefactsdisclosed,noneofthe respondentswereheldliablefortheinjuryinflictedwithAlfredoresultingtohisdeath. Petitionwasdenied.

SalvosaandBCFv.IAC
Facts: PetitionersinthiscasewereimpleadedinthecivilcasefordamagesfiledagainstAbon. Salvosabeingthe(ExecutiveVicePresidentofBCF).JimmyAbonwasacommerce studentoftheBaguioCollegesFoundation.Hewasalsoappointedas armoreroftheschoolsROTCUnit.AsarmoreroftheROTCUnit,JimmyB.Abonreceivedhis appointmentfromtheAFP.HereceivedordersfromCaptainRobertoC.Ungos,the CommandantoftheBaguioCollegesFoundationROTCUnit,concurrentCommandantof otherROTCunitsinBaguioandanemployee(officer)oftheAFP.On3March1977,at around8:00p.m.,intheparkingspaceofBCF,JimmyB.AbonshotNapoleonCastroa studentoftheUniversityofBaguiowithanunlicensedfirearmwhichtheformertook fromthearmoryoftheROTCUnitoftheBCF. Asaresult,NapoleonCastrodiedandJimmyB.Abonwasprosecutedfor,andconvicted ofthecrimeofHomicidebyMilitaryCommissionNo.30,AFP. Issue: whetherornotpetitionerscanbeheldsolidarityliablewithJimmyB.Abonfordamages underArticle2180oftheCivilCode,asaconsequenceofthetortiousactofJimmyB. Abon. Held: Teachersorheadsofestablishmentsofartsandtradesareliablefor"damagescaused bytheirpupilsandstudentsorapprentices,solongastheyremainintheircustody."The rationaleofsuchliabilityisthatsolongasthestudentremainsinthecustodyofa teacher,thelatter"stands,toacertainextent,inlocoparentis[astothestudent]and [is]calledupontoexercisereasonablesupervisionovertheconductofthe[student]." Likewise,"thephraseusedinArt.2180'solongas(thestudents)remainintheir custodymeanstheprotectiveandsupervisorycustodythattheschoolanditsheads andteachersexerciseoverthepupilsandstudentsforaslongastheyareatattendance intheschool,includingrecesstime." InlinewiththecaseofPalisoc,astudentnot"atattendanceintheschool"cannotbein "recess"thereat.A"recess,"astheconceptisembracedinthephrase"atattendancein theschool,"contemplatesasituationoftemporaryadjournmentofschoolactivities wherethestudentstillremainswithincallofhismentorandisnotpermittedtoleave theschoolpremises,ortheareawithinwhichtheschoolactivityisconducted.Recessby itsnaturedoesnotincludedismissal. Likewise,themerefactofbeingenrolledorbeinginthepremisesofaschoolwithout moredoesnotconstitute"attendingschool"orbeinginthe"protectiveand supervisorycustody'oftheschool,ascontemplatedinthelaw.

 Upontheforegoingconsiderations,weholdthatJimmyB.Aboncannotbeconsidered tohavebeen"atattendanceintheschool,"orinthecustodyofBCF,whenheshot NapoleonCastro..Logically,therefore,petitionerscannotunderArt.2180oftheCivil CodebeheldsolidarityliablewithJimmyB.Abonfordamagesresultingfromhisacts.

Vestilv.IAC
G.R.No.74431 PURITAMIRANDAVESTILandAGUSTINVESTIL,petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATEAPPELLATECOURT,DAVIDUYandTERESITAUY,respondents. CRUZ,J.: FACTS: OnJuly29,1915,Thenesswasbittenbyadogwhileshewasplayingwithachildofthe petitionersinthehouseofthelateVicenteMiranda,thefatherofPuritaVestil,atF. RamosStreetinCebuCity.ShewasrushedtotheCebuGeneralHospital,whereshewas treatedfor"multiplelaceratedwoundsontheforehead"1andadministeredananti rabiesvaccinebyDr.AntonioTautjo.Shewasdischargedafterninedaysbutwas readmittedoneweeklaterdueto"vomitingofsaliva."2Thefollowingday,onAugust 15,1975,thechilddied.Thecauseofdeathwascertifiedasbronchopneumonia.3 Sevenmonthslater,theUyssuedfordamages,allegingthattheVestilswereliableto themasthepossessorsof"Andoy,"thedogthatbitandeventuallykilledtheirdaughter. TheVestilsrejectedthecharge,insistingthatthedogbelongedtothedeceasedVicente Miranda,thatitwasatameanimal,andthatinanycasenoonehadwitnesseditbite Theness.Aftertrial,JudgeJoseR.RamoleteoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofCebu sustainedthedefendantsanddismissedthecomplaint.4 ISSUE: Intheproceedingsnowbeforeus,PuritaVestilinsiststhatsheisnottheownerofthe houseorofthedogleftbyherfatherashisestatehasnotyetbeenpartitionedand thereareotherheirstotheproperty. RULING: PursuingthelogicoftheUys,sheclaims,evenhersisterlivinginCanadawouldbeheld responsiblefortheactsofthedogsimplybecausesheisoneofMiranda'sheirs. However,thatishardlythepoint.Whatmustbedeterminedisthepossessionofthe dogthatadmittedlywasstayinginthehouseinquestion,regardlessoftheownershipof thedogorofthehouse. Article2183readsasfollows: Thepossessorofananimalorwhoevermaymakeuseofthesameisresponsibleforthe damagewhichitmaycause,althoughitmayescapeorbelost.'Thisresponsibilityshall ceaseonlyincasethedamagesshouldcomefromforcemajeurefromthefaultofthe personwhohassuffereddamage. Thus,inAfialdav.Hisole,6apersonhiredascaretakerofacarabaogoredhimtodeath andhisheirsthereuponsuedtheowneroftheanimalfordamages.Thecomplaintwas

dismissedonthegroundthatitwasthecaretaker'sdutytopreventthecarabaofrom causinginjurytoanyone,includinghimself. Whileitistruethatsheisnotreallytheownerofthehouse,whichwasstillpartof VicenteMiranda'sestate,thereisnodoubtthatsheandherhusbandwereits possessorsatthetimeoftheincidentinquestion.ShewastheonlyheirresidinginCebu Cityandthemostlogicalpersontotakecareoftheproperty,whichwasonlysix kilometersfromherownhouse.13Moreover,thereisevidenceshowingthatsheand herfamilyregularlywenttothehouse,onceortwiceweekly,accordingtoatleastone witness,14anduseditvirtuallyasasecondhouse.Interestingly,herowndaughterwas playinginthehousewithThenesswhenthelittlegirlwasbittenbythedog.15Thedog itselfremainedinthehouseevenafterthedeathofVicenteMirandain1973anduntil 1975,whentheincidentinquestionoccurred.Itisalsonoteworthythatthepetitioners offeredtoassisttheUyswiththeirhospitalizationexpensesalthoughPuritasaidshe knewthemonlycasually.16 ISSUE: Thepetitionersalsoarguethatevenassumingthattheywerethepossessorsofthedog thatbitThenesstherewasnoclearshowingthatshediedasaresultthereof. RULING: Onthecontrary,thedeathcertificate17declaredthatshediedofbronchopneumonia, whichhadnothingtodowiththedogbitesforwhichshehadbeenpreviously hospitalized.TheCourtneednotinvolveitselfinanextendedscientificdiscussionofthe causalconnectionbetweenthedogbitesandthecertifiedcauseofdeathexcepttonote that,first,Thenessdevelopedhydrophobia,asymptomofrabies,asaresultofthedog bites,andsecond,thatasphyxiabronchopneumonia,whichultimatelycausedher death,wasacomplicationofrabies.ThatThenessbecameafraidofwateraftershewas bittenbythedogisestablishedbythetestimonyofDr.Tautjo. Onthestrengthofthetestimony,theCourtfindsthatthelinkbetweenthedogbites andthecertifiedcauseofdeathhasbeepsatisfactorilyestablished.Wealsoreiterate ourrulinginSisonv.SunLifeAssuranceCompanyofCanada,20thatthedeathcertificate isnotconclusiveproofofthecauseofdeathbutonlyofthefactofdeath.Indeed,the evidenceofthechild'shydrophobiaissufficienttoconvinceusthatshediedbecause shewasbittenbythedogevenifthedeathcertificatestatedadifferentcauseofdeath. Thepetitioner'scontentionthattheycouldnotbeexpectedtoexerciseremotecontrol ofthedogisnotacceptable.Infact,Article2183oftheCivilCodeholdsthepossessor liableeveniftheanimalshould"escapeorbelost"andsoberemovedfromhiscontrol. Anditdoesnotmattereitherthat,asthepetitionersalsocontend,thedogwastame andwasmerelyprovokedbythechildintobitingher.Thelawdoesnotspeakonlyof viciousanimalsbutcoverseventameonesaslongastheycauseinjury.Asforthe allegedprovocation,thepetitionersforgetthatThenesswasonlythreeyearsoldatthe timeshewasattackedandcanhardlybefaultedforwhatevershemighthavedoneto theanimal.

AccordingtoManresatheobligationimposedbyArticle2183oftheCivilCodeisnot basedonthenegligenceoronthepresumedlackofvigilanceofthepossessororuser oftheanimalcausingthedamage.Itisbasedonnaturalequityandontheprincipleof socialinterestthathewhopossessesanimalsforhisutility,pleasureorservicemust answerforthedamagewhichsuchanimalmaycause.21 WesustainthefindingsoftheCourtofAppealsandapprovethemonetaryawards exceptonlyastothemedicalandhospitalizationexpenses,whicharereducedto P2,026.69,asprayedforinthecomplaint.Whilethereisnorecompensethatcanbring backtotheprivaterespondentsthechildtheyhavelost,theirpainshouldatleastbe assuagedbythecivildamagestowhichtheyareentitled.

MALAYANINSURANCEV.CA
Facts:Malayan Insurance Co. Inc. (MALAYAN) issued aPrivate CarComprehensive Policycovering aWillys jeep. The insurance coverage was for "own damage" not to exceedP600.00and"thirdpartyliability"intheamountofP20,000.00. Duringtheeffectivityoftheinsurancepolicy,,theinsuredjeep,whilebeingdrivenby one Juan P. Campolloan employeeof the respondent San Leon Rice Mill, Inc., (SAN LEON) collided with apassenger busbelonging to the respondent Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. (PANTRANCO) at the national highway in Barrio San Pedro, Rosales, Pangasinan,causing damageto theinsured vehicleand injuries to the driver, JuanP.Campollo,andtherespondentMartinC.Vallejos,whowasridingintheillfated jeep. MartinC.VallejosfiledanactionfordamagesagainstSioChoy,MalayanInsuranceCo., Inc. and the PANTRANCO before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The trial court rendered judgment holding Sio Choy, SAN LEON, and MALAYAN jointly and severallyliable.However,MALAYANsliabilitywillonlybeuptoP20,000. Onappeal,CAaffirmedthedecisionofthetrialcourt.However,itruledthatSANLEON has no obligation to indemnify or reimburse the petitioner insurance company for whateveramountithasbeenorderedtopayonitspolicy,sincetheSanLeonRiceMill, Inc. is not a privy to the contract of insurance between Sio Choy and the insurance company. MALAYANappealedtotheSCbywayofreviewoncertiorari. Issues: (1)WhetherornotMALAYANissolidarilyliabletoVallejos,alongwithSioChoyandSAN LEON

(2) Whether or not MALAYAN is entitled to be reimbursed by SAN LEON for whatever amount petitioner has been adjudged to pay respondent Vallejos on its insurance policy. Held: (1) Only Sio Choy and SAN LEON are solidarily liable to Vallejos for the award of damages. Sio Choy is liable as owner of the jeep pursuant to Article 2184, while SAN LEON is liable as the employer of the driver of the jeep at the time of the accident pursuanttoArt2180. MALAYANs liability, however, arose only out ofthe insurance policywith Sio Choy. Petitioner asinsurerof Sio Choy, is liable to respondent Vallejos, but it cannot, as incorrectly held by the trial court, be made "solidarily" liable with the two principal tortfeasorsnamelyrespondentsSioChoyandSANLEON. (2) MALAYAN is entitled to be reimbursed. Upon payment of the loss, theinsureris entitledtobesubrogatedprotantotoanyrightofactionwhichtheinsuredmayhave against the third person whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss. When the insurance company pays for the loss, such payment operates as an equitable assignmenttotheinsurerofthepropertyandallremedieswhichtheinsuredmayhave fortherecoverythereof.Thatrightisnotdependentupon,nordoesitgrowoutofany privity of contract or upon written assignment of claim, and payment to the insured makestheinsurerassigneeinequity. MalayanInsuranceCorpvsCAG.R.119599March20,1997 J.Romero Facts: TKCMarketingimported3,000metrictonsofsoyafromBraziltoManila.Itwasinsured byMalayanatthevalueofalmost20millionpesos.Thevessel,however,wasstranded onSouthAfricabecauseofalawsuitregardingthepossessionofthesoya.TKCconsulted Malayanonrecoveryoftheamount,butthelatterclaimedthatitwasntcoveredbythe policy. The soya was sold in Africa for Php 10 million, but TKC wanted Malayan to shouldertheremainingvalueof10millionaswell. PetitionerfiledsuitduetoMalayansreticencetopay.Malayanclaimedthatarrestby civil authorities wasntcoveredby the policy. The trial court ruled in TKCs favor with damages to boot. The appellate court affirmed the decision under the reason that

clause12ofthepolicyregardinganexceptedriskduetoarrestbycivilauthoritieswas deleted bySection 1.1 of the Institute War Clauses whichcoveredordinary arrests by civilauthorities.FailureofthecargotoarrivewasalsocoveredbytheTheft,Pilferage, andNondeliveryClauseofthecontract.Hencethispetition. Issues: 1.WONthearrestofthevesselwasariskcoveredunderthesubjectinsurancepolicies. 2.WONtheinsurancepoliciesmuststrictlyconstruedagainsttheinsurer. Held:Yes.Yes.Petitiondismissed. Ratio: 1.Section12 or the "Free from Capture &SeizureClause" states: "Warranted free of capture,seizure, arrest, restraint or detainment, and the consequences thereof or of any attempt thereat Should Clause 12 be deleted, the relevant current institute war clausesshallbedeemedtoformpartofthisinsurance. This was really replaced by the subsection 1.1 ofsection 1of Institute War Clauses (Cargo) which included the risks excluded from the standard form of English Marine Policybytheclausewarrantedfreeofcapture,seizure,arrest,restraintordetainment, and the consequences thereof of hostilities or warlike operations, whether there be a declarationofwarornot. The petitioners claim that the Institute War Clauses can be operative in case of hostilitiesorwarlikeoperationsonaccountofitsheading"InstituteWarClauses"isnot tenable. It reiterated the CAs stand that its interpretation in recent years to includeseizureor detention by civil authorities seems consistent with the general purposes of the clause. This interpretation was regardless of the fact whether the arrestwasinwarorbycivilauthorities. The petitioner was said to have confused the Institute War clauses and the F.C.S. in Englishlaw. Itstatedthat"theF.C.&S.Clausewas"originallyincorporatedininsurancepoliciesto eliminate the risks of warlike operations". It also averred that the F.C. & S. Clause applies even ifthere be no warorwarlikeoperations. Inthe same vein, itcontended that subsection 1.1 ofSection 1of the Institute War Clauses (Cargo) "pertained exclusivelytowarlikeoperations"andyetitalsostatedthat"thedeletionoftheF.C.& S. Clause and the consequent incorporation of subsection 1.1 ofSection 1of the InstituteWarClauses(Cargo)wastoinclude"arrest,etc.evenifitwerenotaresultof hostilitiesorwarlikeoperations." Thecourtfoundthattheinsuranceagencytriedtointerpretexecutiveandpoliticalacts asthosenotincludingordinaryarrestsintheexceptionsoftheFCSclause,andclaims that the War Clauses now included executive and political acts without including ordinaryarrestsinthenewstipulation. A strained interpretation which is unnatural and forced, as to lead to an absurd conclusionortorenderthepolicynonsensical,should,byallmeans,beavoided.

2. Indemnity and liabilityinsurance policiesare construed in accordance with the general rule of resolving any ambiguity therein in favor of the insured, where the contractorpolicyispreparedbytheinsurer.Acontractofinsurance,beingacontractof adhesion,meansthatanyambiguityshouldberesolvedagainsttheinsurer.

CITYOFMANILAV.TEOTICO
22SCRA267 TortsandDamagesLiabilityofmunicipalcorporationsincertaincases FACTS: In January 1958, at about 8pm, Teotico was about toboarda jeepney in P. Burgos, Manila when he fell into an uncovered manhole. This caused injuries upon him. ThereafterhesuedfordamagesunderArticle2189oftheCivilCodetheCityofManila, themayor,thecityengineer,thecityhealthofficer,thecitytreasurer,andthechiefof police.CFIManilaruledagainstTeotico.TheCA,onappeal,ruledthattheCityofManila shouldpaydamagestoTeotico.TheCityofManilaassailedthedecisionoftheCAonthe groundthatthecharterofManilastatesthatitshallnotbeliablefordamagescausedby the negligence of the cityofficersin enforcing the charter; that the charter is aspeciallaw and shall prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law; and that the accidenthappenedinnationalhighway. ISSUE:WhetherornottheCityofManilaisliableinthecaseatbar. HELD: Yes.Itistruethatincaseofconflict,aspeciallawprevailsoveragenerallaw;thatthe charter of Manila is aspeciallaw and that the Civil Code is a general law. However, lookingattheparticularprovisionsofeachlawconcerned,theprovisionoftheManila Charter exempting it from liability caused by the negligence of itsofficersis a general lawinthesensethatitexemptsthecityfromnegligenceofitsofficersingeneral.There is no particularexemptionbut merely a generalexemption. On the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code provides a particular prescription to the effect that it makes provinces,cities,andmunicipalitiesliableforthedamagescausedtoacertainpersonby reason of thedefectiveconditionof roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and otherpublicworksundertheircontrolorsupervision. Theallegationthattheincidenthappenedinanationalhighwaywasonlyraisedforthe first time in the Citys motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals, hence it cannotbegivendueweight.Atanyrate,eventhoughitisanationalhighway,thelaw contemplatesthatregardlessifwhetherornottheroadisnational,provincial,city,or municipal,solongasitisundertheCityscontrolandsupervision,itshallberesponsible for damages by reason of the defectiveconditionsthereof. In the case at bar, the City admittedtheyhavecontrolandsupervisionovertheroadwhereTeoticofellwhenthe Cityallegedthatithasbeendoingconstantandregularinspectionofthecitysroads,P. Burgosincluded.

Nakpil&SonsvsCA
Facts:ThePhilippineBarAssociationwantedtoerectabuildinginitslotinIntramuros. TheywereabletoobtainacontractwiththeUnitedConstructionCompanyIncforthe construction of the building and the design was obtained from Juan M. Nakpil & Sons and Juan F. Nakpil. The Building was completed in June 1966. On August 2, 1968 a massive earthquake hit Manila with anintensityof about 7.3. This earthquake caused damage to the building and caused it to lean forward dangerously which led to thevacationof the building. United Construction Company in turn shored up the building and incurred 13,661.28 php as costs. The PBA then instituted a case against UCC for damages due to its negligence regarding the construction of the said building thru its failure to follow thedesignscoming from thearchitects. UCC then filed a complaintagainstthearchitects(Nakpil&Sons)allegingthatitwasthedesignsthatare flawed and that caused the buildings inability to withstand an earthquake. UCC also included the president of PBA for including them in their petition. Nakpil & Sonsanswerthatthepetitionersneednottochangethedefendantsintheirpetitionas UCCdeviatedfromtheplanswhichcausedthedamagestothebuilding.Inthecourseof the trial a commissioner was appointed by both parties to give a reportregarding the technicalaspectsofthecase.Hisreportconcludedthatindeedtherewerefaultsarising fromthenegligenceofbothdefendants.Thereportstatedthatthedesignwasflawed andthatUCCdeviatedfromthedesignswhichaggravatedtheproblem.Thedefendants thenputuptheActofGoddefense. Issue:Whetherornotthedefendantscouldescapeliabilityfromthebuildingduetoa fortuitous event which is unforeseeable and inevitable even if their negligence is established Held:The defendantscannot validlyinvokethe Actof Goddefense.Thisisbecauseof thereportsubmitted by the appointed Commissioner which established their negligence.Acceptanceofthebuilding,aftercompletion,doesnotimplywaiverofany ofthecausesofactionbyreasonofanydefect.Toexempttheobligorfromitsliability theserequisitesshouldfirstconcur:(a)thecauseofthebreachoftheobligationmust beindependentofthewillofthedebtor;(b)theeventmustbeeitherunforseeableor

unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to thecreditor. The reportof the Commissioner established that the defectsthat occurredto the building could be attributedtotheactofmanspecificallythatofthearchitectsandtheengineersaswell as the builders. This was because of the fact that UCC deviated from the plans submitted by thearchitectsand their failure to observe the required marksmanship in constructing the building as well as the required degree of supervision. Nakpil & Sons arealsoliablefortheinadequaciesanddefectintheirsubmittedplanandspecifications. These circumstances are the proximate causes of the damages that the PBA building incurred.Thecostsaretobepaidbythedefendantsamountingto5Mwhichincludesall appreciabledamagesaswellasindemnityplus100,000phpfortheattyfee. One who negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot escape liability for the naturalandprobableconsequencesthereof,althoughtheactofathirdperson,oranact ofGodforwhichheisnotresponsible,intervenestoprecipitatetheloss.

BienvenidoGelisanv.BenitoAlday
G.R.No.L30212September30,1987 Padilla,J. FACTS: -Gelisanownerofafreighttruck;heenteredintoacontractwithRobertoEspiritu underwhichEspirituhiredthesamefreighttruckofGelisanforthepurpose ofhaulingrice,sugar,flourandfertilizerprovidedtheloadsshallnotexceed200 sacks;itwasagreedthatEspiritushallbearandpayalllossesanddamagesattending thecarriageofthegoodstobehauledbyhim -thetruckwastakenbyadriverofEspirituonthedaythelossofthegoodsoccurred -BenitoAldaytruckingoperatorwhohadacontracttohaulthefertilizers oftheAtlas FertilizerCorp.fromPier4,NorthHarbor,toitsWarehousein M a n d a l u y o n g ; h e m e t EspirituatthegateofPier4andthelatterofferedtheuse ofhistruckwiththedriverandhelperforaconsideration;theofferwasacceptedby AldayandheinstructedhischeckertoletEspirituhaulthefertilizer;Espiritumadetwo haulsof200bagsoffertilizerpertrip.Thefertilizerwasdeliveredtothedriverand helperofEspirituwiththenecessarywaybillreceipts;Espiritu,however,didnotdeliver thefertilizertotheAtlasFertilizerbodegaatMandaluyong(crime:qualifiedtheft) -AldaywascompelledtopaythevalueofthebagsoffertilizertoAtlasFertilizerCorp.; hef i l e d a n a c t i o n f o r t h e r e c o v e r y o f d a m a g e s s u f f e r e d b y h i m t h r u t h e c r i m i n a l a c t s committedagainsthim ISSUE: WONGelisanisliablefortheactcommittedbyEspiritu HELD: Yes.Theregisteredownerofapublicservicevehicleisresponsiblefordamagesthat mayarisefromconsequencesincidenttoitsoperationorthatmaybecausedtoanyof thepassengerstherein.Theclaimofthepetitionerthatheisnotliablein viewoftheleasecontractexecutedbyandbetweenhimandEspirituwhichexempts himfromliabilitytothirdpersons,cannotbesustainedbecauseitappearsthat theleasecontracthadnotbeen approvedbythePublicServiceCommission.Ifthepropertycovered b y a f r a n c h i s e i s transferredorleasedtoanotherwithoutobtainingtherequisite approval,thetransferisnotbindinguponthepublicandthirdpersons. Ratio:Sinceafranchiseispersonalinnatureanytransferorleasethereof shouldbenotifiedtothePSCsothatthelattermaytakepropersafeguardstoprotect theinterestofthepublic.Thelawrequiresthat,beforetheapprovalisgranted,there shouldbeapublichearing,withnoticetoallinterestedparties,inorderthatPSCmay determineiftherearegoodandreasonablegroundsjustifyingthetransferorleaseof

thepropertycoveredbythefranchise,orifthesaleorleaseisdetrimentaltopublic interest. -Gelisansrightofrecourse:hehasarighttobeindemnifiedbyEspiritufortheamount thathemayberequiredtopayasdamagesfortheinjurycausedtoAlday sincetheleasecontractisvalidandbindingbetweenthecontractingparties.

VELAYOV.SHELL
100Phil168 TortsandDamagesObligationsarisingfromhumanrelations FACTS: Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell and CAL offered its C54 plane aspaymenttoShell Company(the plane was in California) but Shell at that time declined as it thought CALI had sufficientmoneyto pay its debt. In 1948 however, CALI was going bankrupt so it called upon an informal meeting of itscreditors. In that meeting, thecreditors agreed to appoint representatives to a working committee that would determine the order of preference as to how eachcreditorshouldbepaid.TheyalsoagreednottofilesuitagainstCALIbutCALIdid reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay them up.Shell Companywas represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three man workingcommittee.Later,theworkingcommitteeconvenedtodiscusshowCALIsasset shouldbedividedamongstthecreditorsbutwhilesuchwaspending,Fitzgeraldsenta telegraphmessagetoShellUSAadvisingthelatterthatShellPhilippinesisassigningits credittoShellUSAintheamountof$79k,therebyeffectivelycollectingalmostallifnot theentireindebtednessofCALItoShellPhilippines.ShellUSAgotwindofthefactthat CALIhasaC54planeisCaliforniaandsoShellUSApetitionedbeforeaCaliforniacourt tohavetheplanebethesubjectofawritofattachmentwhichwasgranted. Meanwhile,thestockholdersofCALIwereunawareoftheassignmentofcreditmadeby Shell Philippines to Shell USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALIs asset to thePhilippine Airlines. In September 1948, the othercreditorslearned of the assignment made by Shell. This prompted these othercreditorsto file their owncomplaintofattachmentagainst CALIs assets. CALI then filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the Philippines from being attached. Velayosappointmentas CALIs assignee was approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding.InorderforhimtorecovertheC54planeinCalifornia,itfiledforawritof injunction against Shell Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with theattachment and in thealternativethat judgment be awarded in favorofCALIfordamagesdoubletheamountoftheC54plane.TheC54planewasnot recovered.ShellCompanyargueditisnotliablefordamagesbecausethereisnothingin the law which prohibits a company from assigning its credit, it being a common practice. ISSUE:WhetherornotShellisliablefordamagesconsideringthatitdidnotviolateany law.

HELD:Yes.Thebasisofsuchliability,intheabsenceoflaw,isArticle21oftheCivilCode whichstates: Art.21.Anypersonwhowillfullycauseslossorinjurytoanotherinamannerthatis contrary to morals, good customs orpublic policyshall compensate the latter for the damage. Thusatonestroke,thelegislator,iftheforgoingruleisapproved(asitwasapproved), wouldvouchsafeadequatelegalremedyforthatuntoldnumbersofmoralwrongswhich is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensatedbydamages.Moraldamages(Art.2217)mayberecovered(Art.2219).In Article20,theliabilityfordamagesarisesfromawillfulornegligentactcontrarytolaw. Inthisarticle,theactiscontrarytomorals,goodcustomsorpublicpolicy.

FILINVESTvs.CA
G.R.No.115902.27Sept1995. PetitionforcertioraritoreviewthedecisionoftheCA Davide,Jr.,J.: Facts:OnAug26,1978FILINVESTawardetothedefendantPACIFICthedevelopmentof theresidentialsubdivisionconsistingoftwolandslocatedinPayatas,QC.PACIFICissued twosuretybondsissuedbyPHILAMGEN.PACIFICfailedtofinishthecontractedwork, FILINVESTintendstotakeovertheprojectandholddefendantliablefordamages. OnOctober26,plaintiffsubmitteditsclaimagainstPHILAMGENunderitsperformance andguaranteebondbutPHILAMGENrefusedtoacknowledgeitsliabilityforthesingle reasonthatitsprincipal,defendantpacific,refusedtoacknowledgeliabilitytherefore. Defendantsaidthatthefailuretofinishthecontractedworkwasduetotheweather, andthegrantofextensionoftheworkisawaivertoclaimanydamages.PHILAMGEN contendsthatthevariousamendmentsmadeontheprincipalcontractandthe deviationintheimplementationthereofwhichwereresortedtobyplaintiffandPACIFIC w/oitsconsenthaveautomaticallyreleasedthelatterfromanyliability.Thetc dismissedthecomplaint,basingonthecommissionerreport.CAaffirmed. Issue:WONtheliquidateddamagesagreesuponbythepartiesshouldbereduced. Held:DecisionofCAAFFIRMED. Ratio:Art.1226inobligationswithapenalclause,thepenaltyofshallsubstitutethe indemnityfordamagesandthepaymentofinterestsincaseofnoncompliance,ifthere isnostipulationtothecontrary.Nevertheless,damagesshallbepaidiftheobligor refusestopaythepenaltyorisguiltyoffraudinthefulfillmentoftheobligation. Asageneralrule,courtsarenotatlibertytoignorethefreedomofthepartiestoagree onsuchtermsandconditionsastheyseefit,aslongastheyarenotcontrarytolaw.But thecourtsmayequitablyreducethepenaltyintwoinstances,first,iftheprincipal obligationhasbeenirregularlycompliedwithandsecond,whenitisiniquitousor unconscionable.

HermosisimavsCourtofAppeals
103Phil629 FACTS: An appeal by certiorari, on October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referredtoascomplainant,filedwiththesaidCFIacomplaintfortheacknowledgment of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as a natural child of said petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. Petitioner admitted thepaternityof the child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry complainant. Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917, since 1950,Soledadthen ateacherand petitioner who wasalmosttenyearsyoungerthanherusedtogoaroundtogetherandwereregarded as engaged, although he made no promise of marriage thereto. In 1951, she gave up teachingandbecamealifeinsuranceunderwriterwhereintimacydevelopedbetween herandpetitioner,sinceoneeveningin1953whenaftercomingfromthemovies,they hadsexualintercourseinhiscabinonboardMVEscanotowhichhewasthenattached asapprenticepilot.InFebruary1954,Soledadadvisedpetitionerthatshewaspregnant, whereupon he promised to marry her. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendantmarriedoneRomanitaPerez. ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promisetomarry. HELD: It appearing that because of the defendantappellants seductive prowess, plaintiffappelleeoverwhelmedbyherloveforhimyieldedtohissexualdesiresinspite ofherageandselfcontrol.Inthepresentcase,thecourtisunabletosaythatpetitioner ismorallyguiltyofseduction,notonlybecauseheisapproximatelytenyearsyounger butalsobecausetheCourtofFirstInstancefoundthatcomplainantsurrenderedherself tothepetitionerbecauseoverwhelmedbyherloveforhimshewantedtobindhimby havingafruitoftheirengagementevenbeforetheyhadthebenefitofclergy.

GasheemShookatBakshvs.CA
219SCRA115 FACTS: Privaterespondent,MarilouGonzales,filedacomplaintdatedOctober27,1987for damagesagainstthepetitionerfortheallegedbreachoftheiragreementtoget married.ShemetthepetitionerinDagupanwherethelatterwasanIranianmedical exchangestudentwholatercourtedherandproposedmarriage.Thepetitionereven wenttoMariloushousetosecureapprovalofherparents.Thepetitionerthenforced therespondenttoleavewithhiminhisapartment.Marilouwasavirginbeforeshe livedwithhim.Afteraweek,shefiledacomplaintbecausethepetitionerstarted maltreatingandthreateningher.Heeventiedtherespondentintheapartmentwhile hewasinschoolanddruggedher.Marilouatonetimebecamepregnantbutthe petitioneradministeredadrugtoabortthebaby. PetitionerrepudiatedthemarriageagreementandtoldMariloutonotlivewithhim sinceheisalreadymarriedtosomeoneinBacolod.Heclaimedthatheneverproposed marriageoragreedtobemarriedneithersoughtconsentandapprovalofMarlious parents.HeclaimedthatheaskedMariloutostayoutofhisapartmentsincethelatter deceivedhimbystealingmoneyandhispassport.Theprivaterespondentprayedfor damagesandreimbursementsofactualexpenses. ISSUE:Whetherbreachofpromisetomarrycangiverisetocausefordamages. HELD: Theexistingruleisthatbreachofpromisetomarryperseisnotanactionable wrong.Thecourtheldthatwhenamanuseshispromiseofmarriagetodeceivea womantoconsenttohismaliciousdesires,hecommitsfraudandwillfullyinjuresthe woman.Inthatinstance,thecourtfoundthatpetitionersdeceptivepromisetomarry ledMariloutosurrenderhervirtueandwomanhood. Moraldamagescanbeclaimedwhensuchpromisetomarrywasadeceptiveployto havecarnalknowledgewiththewomanandactualdamagesshouldbepaidforthe weddingpreparationexpenses.Petitionerevencommitteddeplorableactsindisregard ofthelawsofthecountry. Therefore,SCsetasidethedecisionofCAawardingdamagestotherespondent.

PONCEVS.LEGASPI
FACTS: PetitionerPonceandhusbandManuel,owned43%ofthestockholdingsofL'NOR MarineServices,Inc.(L'NOR).48%ofitwasownedbythespousesPorter.The allegationsofpetitionerstatesthatduringthetimewhilerespondentLegaspiisthelegal counselofLNOR,thereoccurredfraudulentmanipulationsbyspousesPorterandother officers;thatwiththeaidofLegaspi,theyincorporatedtheYrasportDrydocks,Inc. whichwasdonetocompetewithLNORbutstillusedtheofficespace,equipmentsand goodwillofLNOR.OnaccountofflagrantfraudscommittedbyPorter,achargefor estafawasfiledwhereLegaspiappearedascounselforPorter;thatcomplainantasked LegaspitotakestepstoprotectLNORbutthelatterrefused.Complainantfiledfor disbarmentagainstLegaspiwhichwasdismissed.Legaspisubsequentlyfiledacomplaint fordamagesagainstpetitionerwhichwasgrantedbythelowercourtandaffirmedby CA. ISSUE:W/NthecomplaintfordamagesbyLegaspiisjustified. RULING:Decisionreversedandsetaside. RATIO: Whilegenerally,maliciousprosecutionreferstounfoundedcriminalactionsandhas beenexpandedtoincludeunfoundedcivilsuits,thefoundationofanactionfor maliciousprosecutionisanoriginalproceeding,judicialincharacter.Adisbarment proceedingis,withoutdoubt,judicialincharacterandthereforemaybethebasisfora subsequentactionformaliciousprosecution.However,maliceandwantofprobable causemustbothexistinordertojustifytheaction.Inthecaseatbar,inthemindof petitioner,theactoftherespondentinappearingascounselforPorter,whohad allegedlyswindledL'NOR,theinterestofwhichhewasdutyboundtoprotect, constitutedgravemisconductandgrossmalpractice.Sincethepetitioner,however,was ofthehonestperceptionthatYRASPORTwasactuallyorganizedtoappropriateforitself someofL'NOR'sbusiness,thenwefindthatshehadprobablecausetofilethe disbarmentsuit. Atty.Legaspimayhavesufferedinjuryasaconsequenceofthedisbarmentproceedings. Buttheadverseresultofanactiondoesnotpersemaketheactionwrongfuland subjecttheactortomakepaymentofdamagesforthelawcouldnothavemeantto imposeapenaltyontherighttolitigate.Onewhoexerciseshisrightsdoesnoinjury.If damageresultsfromaperson'sexercisinghislegalrights,itisdamnumabsqueinjuria.

PEDROP.PECSONv.COURTOFAPPEALS,SPS.NUGUID
FACTS: PedroPecsonwastheownerofacommerciallotonwhichhebuilta4door2storey apartmentbuilding.HefailedtopayrealtytaxesamountingtoP12ksothelotwassold atpublicauctiontoMamertoNepomucenowholateronsoldittotheSps.Nuguid. PecsonchallengedthevalidityoftheauctionbeforetheRTCbutwasdismissedbutthe RTCheldthattheapartmentbldgwasnotsubjectofthelitigation.Onappeal,theCA appealedintotothedecisionoftheRTCthattheapartmentbldgwasnotincludedinthe auctionsale. Afteranentryofjudgmentwasmade,theSps.NuguidfiledamotionwiththeRTCfora motionfordeliveryofpossessionofthelotandtheapartmentbldgcitingArt.546ofthe CC.TheRTCissuedanorderdeclaringthattheownerofthelotandapartmentbldg weretheSps.Nuguidandtopaytheconstructioncostoftheapartmentbeforeawritof possessionwouldbeissuedandtopayrenttothespouses.Pecsonmovedfor reconsiderationbuttheTrialcourtdidnotactonit,insteaditissuedawritof possession.TheCAaffirmedinpartthedecisiondeclaringthecostofconstructioncan beoffsetfromtheamountofrentstobecollectedandthatsinceSps.Nuguidoptedto appropriatetheimprovement,Pecsonisentitledtobereimbursedthecostof constructionatthetimeitwasbuiltin1965whichisatP53kandtherighttheretainthe improvementuntilfullindemnityispaid. Thusthecaseatbar. ISSUE: WhetherornotArt.448and546appliesinthecaseatbar HELD:YES >WithregardtoArt.448,theprovisiononindemnitymaybeappliedinanalogy. Whoeveristheownerofthelandmayappropriatewhateverhasbeenbuilt,plantedor sownafterpayingindemnity.However,itdoesnotapplywhentheownerofthelandis

alsothebuilderoftheworksonhisownlandwholateronlosesownershipbysaleor donation. >Art.546referstothenecessaryandusefulexpenseswhichshallberefundedtothe possessoringoodfaithwithrightofretention.However,itdoesnotstatehowto determinethevalueoftheusefulimprovement.Therespondents[courtandprivate respondentsalike]espousesassufficientreimbursementthecostofconstructionin 1965,however,thisiscontrarytopreviousrulingswhichdeclaresthatthevaluetothe reimbursedshouldbethepresentmarketvalueofsaidimprovementssoasnotto unjustlyenricheitheroftheparties.[thetrialcourterredinorderingPecsontopayrent sincetheSps.NuguidhasyettopaytheindemnitythereforePecsonhastherightto retaintheimprovementsandtheincomethereof.Thecasewasremandedtothetrial courtfordeterminationofthecurrentmarketvalueoftheapartmentbldgandordered theSpstopayPecsonotherwiseitshallberestoredtoPecsonuntilpaymentof indemnity.]