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CML, Army Chemical Review is prepared twice a year by the U.S. Army Chemical School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. CML presents professional information about Chemical Corps functions related to nuclear, biological, chemical, smoke, flame field expedients, and NBC reconnaissance in combat support. Objectives of CML are to inform, motivate, increase knowledge, improve performance, and provide a forum for exchange of ideas. This publication presents professional information, but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other U.S. Army publications. Use of news items constitutes neither affirmation of their accuracy or product endorsement. Articles may be reprinted if credit is given to CML and its authors. All photographs are official U.S. Army photos unless otherwise noted. CML reserves the right to edit material. PERSONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS: Available through the Superintendent of Documents, PO Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Army Chemical Review, 320 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 210, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8929. By Order of the Secretary of the Army: ERIC K. SHINSEKI General, United States Army Chief of Staff Official:


DIRECTORATE of COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS Chemical Division Chief MAJ Lary Chinowsky 563-4078

Managing Editor, Lynne M. Sparks

573-563-4104 573-596-0131, 35267 573-596-0131, 37726

Editor, Mattie E. Kirby

Graphic Designer, Kathryn M. Troxell

JOEL B. HUDSON Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 0212812

Front cover: The Changing Face of the Chemical Corps is a computer composition by Specialist Milagros Laura of the Personnel Proponency Office, U.S. Army Chemical School. Back cover, top: Two Louisiana Army National Guard soldiers on duty in front of the Superdome; see article, page 13. Bottom: Decontaminating responders, see article, page 17.


PB 3-02-2 July 2002


4 9

Officer Education System in the Transforming Army Time to Act Reconnaissance and Decontamination Support to Civil Authorities

Mr. Mike Sheheane

Captain Patrick S. Daulton

13 17 22 27 34 39 42 45 49

62d Civil Support Team (CST) Supports the Secret Service in a National Special Security Event (NSSE) Lieutenant Colonel Mark E. Kerry Biological Terrorism: Practical Response Strategies Army Aviators Mask for Chemical Warfare Defense

Dr. Mohamed Athher Mughal

Chemical Branch Accident Analysis

Ms. Jana Brooks and Mr. Fred Fanning Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Walk

A Platoon Leaders Guide to Inventory and Accountability

Eulogy to a Friend Dr. Burton Doc Wright III (1945-2002)

Departments 2 3 12 24 25 26 48 Chief of Chemical Regimental Command Sergeant Major Second and Third Place Winners, Chemical Corps Regimental Association Annual Writing Contest2001 Submitting an Article to CML Book Review The Chemical Corps Regimental Association Annual Writing Contest2002 Subscription Page

July 2002

Keys to Good Leadership

Chemical Depot Command: A Primer

Lieutenant Colonel Tom Woloszyn The Chemical Officer in the Digitized Artillery Battalion Captain Obert Cantave Captain Jennifer L. Bomark Captain Timothy C. Herd Captain Mike Ladd

Chief of Chemical
Cant believe we are just finishing of regimental activities such as the our third year at Fort Wood, Missouri, Regimental run, Sibert Award ceremony, and what a year it has been. It certainly Regimental picnic, fishing tournament, and has been a time of challenge for all of golf tournament. This was a fun and us, but I am proud to say that the relaxing time, and we had a chance to Chemical School and the Regimental get to know all of the new personnel Corps have met the challenge and coming to the school. continue to move forward with great The theme for this years Worldinitiative and momentum. I cannot fully wide Chemical Conference is The express how proud I am of the work Changing Face of the Chemical Corps, and effort I see across the Corps. I am and it is most appropriate based on the constantly approached by our leaderchanging times of our Army and our ship across the Army with stories of nation. It alludes to my intent to prepare how their chemical personnel are the the Corps for its changing role in the BG Patricia L. Nilo backbone of their organization and defense of our nation. The conference so adaptable to the changing environment. Keep up will present an excellent opportunity for professional the great work; it is paying big dividends for our development and discussion on the wide variety of Corps, Army, and nation. topics affecting our Corps, and I truly hope you will The tragedy of 11 September and the great be able to attend and participate. As always, this is losses we suffered at the World Trade Center and the preeminent chemical and biological conference in our Pentagon shocked us all and will not be forgot- the world, and it will expose and engage its attendees ten. Since that time, the Chemical School and Corps to some of the glimpses of where we are going in near have been key and essential players in many of the and midterm future capabilities and organizations. ongoing Homeland Security and Installation/Critical Some of you have become very much engaged Infrastructure Force Protection forums, and many in preparing for our future. I call your attention to more are planned in the near future. Last year, we the proposed creation and organization of a Joint completed our strategic plan for the Chemical Requirements Office in the J8 Section of the Joint School and have established a working team for the Staff and some of the articles published in the last creation of the strategic plan for the Corps. As the Army Chemical Review. There are no easy, clear-cut Army continues to adapt to Transformation and solutions, and it will take all of us fully engaging and fights the war on terrorism, so will our school and participating to be prepared for the future. I challenge Corps, and you can look with anticipation to those each and every one of you to get just as engaged changes as well. and share your thoughts and ideas. We need each This summer marks the 84th Anniversary of the and every one of you to do your part. Challenge what Corps and the 19th annual Worldwide Chemical does not make sense. If it is truly a good idea, it will Conference here at Fort Wood. This year we separated stand the test of debate. the Regimental week activities (24 through 28 June) As a Corps, we have a lot to look forward to in the from the Worldwide Chemical Conference (7 through coming months and years. Army Transformation and 13 September). During Regimental week, we celebrated force protection initiatives present great opportunities the 60th Anniversary of the 84th Chemical Battalion. and potential for our Corps in support of our nation As such, we unveiled and dedicated a Memorial and Army. We must continue to leverage these opporStone in the Garden and celebrated with a Battalion tunities to provide the best protection possible for Anniversary Ball, in addition to the full, fun week our force.

ELEMENTIS REGAMUS PROELIUM! Dragon Soldiers . . . Rule the Battle


Regimental Command Sergeant Major

My year as the Chemical Regisend a personnel gram (PERSGRAM) mental Command Sergeant Major has to the soldier to confirm the assignment been challenging and rewarding. Ive or will contact the soldier to discuss seen the Army, as well as the other alternatives if the original assignment services, go through many changes in location is no longer available. recent months. These changes will As ALWAYS, mission is first. We affect all soldiers. Dragon Soldiers are working diligently to build a delicate must be prepared to come online and balance using ASK to also accomtake care of a number of personal modate soldiers desires. The desires matters themselves. of the individual will not only be With the recent changes in our considered but will also be an integral Armed Forces, the need for Transpart of the assignment process. We are formation plays a key factor. For fully aware that content soldiers are a CSM James A. Barkley many years, we had the assistance better attribute to our Corps. of personnel advisors, but now soldiers will have I also would like to take this opportunity to to make their own choices. In an attempt for congratulate the 11th Chemical Company at Fort soldiers to be more involved in their own careers, Lewis, Washington, for its annual Dragons Joust. This PERSCOM implemented the Assignment Satisfac- competitive event tests the skill level of Dragon tion Key (ASK). With this system, soldiers log on Soldiers, individually and as a squad. This years using their Army Knowledge Online (AKO) competition was significant because 3d Brigade had accounts and then pick where they would like to be a squad from 2/3 Infantry Battalion compete in which stationed, thereby providing direct input to the only two of the seven soldiers in the squad were assignment managers. ASK makes it possible for Dragon Soldiers. These soldiers entered the soldiers not only to express their desires for future competition with very little knowledge about most of assignments but also to volunteer for certain the equipment. However, the squad tied for first place, assignments. A soldier can volunteer and ultimately and four of the squad members earned the title of be reassigned for duty as a drill sergeant or recruiter DRAGON MASTER. and/or at the airborne schoolall without using Congratulations also to 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry a Department of the Army Form 4187. Division (IBCT) which was selected by RavenWorks, In the aftermath of 11 September, many units Incorporated, to provide materials for a new E-learning deployed on short notice, resulting in soldiers project for the Reserve, National Guard, and Active being operationally deleted from assignments. Army components. RavenWorks is a team of proHowever, the Enlisted Personnel Management fessional educators and developers, both military Directorate (EPMD) has initiated a new procedure and civilian, dedicated to creating advanced distribufor those soldiers who were on assignment before tive E-learning programs. If your unit is interested being deployed and deleted from the assignment. in the products and tools used in the design of the If the soldier still desires to go to the original assign- IBCTs NBC Training and Readiness Program, conment location after returning from deployment, tact CPT Klenske at he/she can call 1-800-255-ARMY. The EPMD will or SFC Garris at verify, via confirmation of key information, that the Dragon Soldiers continue to rise to the occasion. soldier was deleted based on deployment and With these kinds of advancements, accomplishments, coordinate with the branch to place the soldier back and dedication, Im proud to say that the reputation on assignment to that location. The EPMD will and the heritage of our great Corps are in good hands.

Hooah Dragon Soldiers!

July 2002 3

Officer Education System in the Transforming Army

By Mr. Mike Sheheane
n the August 2001 issue of Army Chemical Review, I attempted to set the stage for major changes that are pending in the way soldiers across the force structure are trained. I ended the article by stressing that patience and flexibility would be essential to the transformation process. These words are even more applicable today than I ever imagined when writing that article. The Chief of Staffs Leader Development Campaign Plan (LDCP) sets the pace for the transformation of traditional Army institutional training and education systems for officers, warrant officers, and NCOs. This plan is the result of studies that identified problems with the current systems. As a result, training in the transforming Army will be significantly different from past training. Todays one-size-fits-all training must change to provide training that is personally designed for the soldier and his future assignments.1 Less time away from the unit as a student and training for specific jobs will be the primary considerations behind developing the curriculums and programs. Short, job-specific resident courses supplemented by prerequisite and sustainment computerbased products will be the norm. The Officer Education System (OES) will be the first of the three training programs to transform. The basic complaints about the present OES are extensive, but a few of them are Instruction from officer basic through Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) is not meeting officers needs and expectations. The Army is not fully exploiting new and highly effective methods for training and leader development. Lieutenants lack common leadership competencies and field-craft skills upon arrival at first unit. Captains training is not synchronized with next assignment. They are often trained for jobs already held or jobs not likely to hold. CGSOC selection policy excludes 50 percent of majors, affects morale, and is a negative discriminator. General Abrams, TRADOC commanding general, has a clear perspective of how he wants the OES to change.

He wants emphasis on lieutenants training for their first unit assignment, captains training for their next assignment, and all majors training for their next 10 years of service. His stated objective is to develop competent and confident leaders. There are two specific components that will drive the training transformation process: experiential learning and lifelong learning. Historically, training programs have been knowledge-based rather than experiencebased. Knowledge-based training is derived from reading books, sitting in a classroom, student discussions, or some form of presentation. Experiential learning comes from performing a task under conditions as close to actual combat as possible to standard with enough repetition to master proficiency. 2 Lifelong learning encompasses the concept that institutional-, self-, and unit-based training must be packaged in such a way that it keeps soldiers current, interested, and prepared while not impeding their work schedule or burdening their family life. Asymmetric, Web-based training that provides prerequisite and supplemental training in support of assignment-oriented resident training will provide this lifelong learning component.

Basic Officer Leader Course Train for First Assignment

he Officer Basic Course as it exists will be transformed. Lieutenants from all branches will be attending the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC). The first phase of this two-phased course has undergone several pilot courses at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. The latest version of Phase I consists of 35 days of training in a 6-week period (see Figure 1). This phase is designed to establish a common Army standard for small-unit leadership and teach common platoon leader skills and officership through the use of hands-on, performance-oriented field training. The be-know-do principle will be the basis for the course. The methodology used to design and develop the course includes Building individual confidence and overcoming/ controlling fear of heights, water, and darkness in a tactical setting.


Chemical Basic Officer Leader Course

Phase I
Fort Benning, Georgia
6 weeks

Phase II
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri
13 weeks 19 weeks

Technically and tactically competent and confident officer

Small-unit tactics Leadership Officership Common platoon leader skills Fieldcraft

Chemical tactics, techniques, and procedures Combined-arms staff operations Chemical unit operations Figure 1

Maximizing mastery of small arms. Focusing on physical readiness over simple Using rigorous field training rather than classrooms
to instill the toughness to endure. Phase I of the new BOLC provides basic Army ethos, officership, and small-unit combat and leadership skills to newly commissioned lieutenants and standardized entry-level competencies for newly assessed officers regardless of their precommissioning source. Upon completion, lieutenants will proceed to Phase II at their designated branch school to receive technical/tactical training in their branch specialty. Phase II BOLC (chemical) will consist of 13 weeks of resident technical and tactical training to prepare the officer for assignment as a platoon leader in a chemical unit or as a battalion staff officer. Experiential training of branch-specific skills will be the focus with continued emphasis on preparing for the first unit of assignment.3 Obviously there are positive and negative aspects to this new training strategy. The opportunity for Chemical Corps lieutenants to go through 6 weeks of intensive training with peers from other branches will build confidence and mutual respect while it establishes a common standard of small-unit field-operations competence. Unfortunately, this 6-week training comes at the expense of time that was formerly used by the Chemical School to teach technical subjects in an increasingly technical career field. The Chemical School piloted its Phase II course March through June 2002; the results will be used to make adjustments to the Phase II course structure in preparation for full implementation in FY04. physical fitness.

assignment rather than a lengthy resident course, much of which could be inapplicable to a follow-on assignment or inappropriatesince the officers already have done the job for which they are being trained. Resident courses, in particular, must be leadership and battle-command centric. The new captains OES will consist of two assignment-oriented courses (see Figure 2, page 6). Captains selected to command will attend the CombinedArms Battle-Command Course (CABCC). his course is designed to provide training on combined-arms operations and branch-specific tactical and technical skills for company/team command and/or company grade branch-qualifying assignment. The CABCC will have three phases (see Figure 3, page7). Phase I is completed via distance learning (DL) at the home station. It consists of about 160 hours of preliminary technical and tactical branch-specific tasks necessary to prepare captains to command units in a combined-arms-operating environment. It also contains the captains common core. CABCC Phase II is a resident phase. The objective is to instill leadership and battle-command skills and attributes through experiential, battle-focused scenarios as well as critical technical, branch-specific tasks necessary to prepare captains for commanding chemical units in a combined-arms-operating environment. To ensure that this training is experiential will require developing new training aids, devices, simulations, and simulators which create conditions that accurately replicate the fear, confusion, and intensity found on the battlefield. Simulations in constructive and virtual settings need to be emotional experiences.4 This resident phase will be about 4 weeks long. Phase III is an entirely new concept in preparing for command. Students will attend this phase contiguous with

Combined-Arms Battle-Command Course

Captains OESTrain for Next Assignment

aptains training has been evolving for several years. The latest strategy is based on the desire to provide the officers with training for their next

July 2002

Captains Officer Education System Structure

Combined-Arms Staff Course Combined-Arms Battle-Command Course Distance Learning
1 Week 1 Week 1 Week Resident CASC Focus: Technical staff duties and responsibilities 1 Week

Distance Learning
1 Week 1 Week 1 Week

1 Week 1 Week

1 Week 1 Week 1 Week 1 Week

1 Week 1 Week

Common-Core CASC Focus: Staff core competencies

Staff Functional Modules Focus: Primary/special staff officer skills Aggregate: 7 weeks distance-learning instruction 8 weeks resident instruction

Combat Training Center Train the trainer Focus: Training doctrine and skills and how to fight TRADOC Common Core Focus: Leader development and company command Preresident Company Commanders Course Focus: Company command Company Commanders Course Focus: Company command Figure 2

the previous phase. The Phase II graduate will proceed to a designated combat training center to gain firsthand experience in the most realistic training environment available. This phase is still being developed, and the exact length (probably 2 to 4 weeks) and manner of execution are being worked. However, the objectives have been identifiedwhen completed, the student will know how to effectively assess and develop training and correct deficiencies. Individuals completing CABCC will be well-grounded in the skills and knowledge associated with leading and training soldiers in full-spectrum operations.


Combined-Arms Staff Course

he second component of the revised captains OES is the Combined-Arms Staff Course (CASC) (see Figure 4, page 8). This course, for all practical purposes, replaces the Combined-Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3). Captains selected for staff position assignments will attend this course to prepare for their next assignment. This 5-week, two-phased course will

be tailored to accommodate the train-for-nextassignment objective and will teach basic as well as technical staff skills. DL Phase. This phase of the CASC consists of two modulesa 2-week common-core module followed by a 1-week module focused on the primary or special staff position the student will assume. For example, an officer selected to be a primary staff officer (S1, S2) will complete the module specifically developed to train the skills associated with that position. Likewise, a special staff officer (brigade chemical officer, battalion/ brigade signal officer) would complete the appropriate module for that position. This phase is a prerequisite to the resident phase. Resident Phase. This 2-week phase emphasizes branch-specific staff warfighting skills. It will be an intensive training experience focused on mastering critical technical, branch-specific tasks with virtual and constructive training environments used as the preferred training medium. As with the CABCC resident phase,


Combined-Arms Battle-Command Course Description

Purpose: To provide captains with training on combined-arms operations and branch-specific tactical and technical skills for company/team command and/or company-grade branch-qualifying assignments
Common Core/Branch Technical Distance Learning, Phases IA/IB Planning collective training Planning how to fight the platoon/company/battalion/ brigade operational context Planning warfighter support Branch Resident, Phase II Combat Training Center, Phase III

Command Preparartion

How-to-Fight Laboratory
Immersion training Command and leader experiences Warfighting excellence; leadership; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and sustainment

Train the Trainer

How to assess training How to develop training How to correct deficiencies

Battle-Command Knowledge

Battle-Command Experience

Platoon/Company Master Trainer

Through contiguous distance learning, resident, and Combat Training Center leader development, captains master the art of battle command through a just-in-time training strategy.

End State: Captains, experienced in battle command, ready to be successful company/team commanders who can visualize, describe, and direct combined-arms operations and plan, prepare, assess, and correct training at the company level
Figure 3

new simulations are required to ensure that training is as experiential as possible. TRADOCs intent is that the design and development of CASC be totally completed by DL no later than 2008.

Intermediate-Level Education (ILE) Train Officers for Their Next 10 Years of Service

ossibly the most significant change in the OES is the implementation of ILE. This course replaces the current CGSOC. The concept that all field-grade officers attend the resident course rather than the current 50 percent selected to attend is a significant change. The structure of this course is still being reviewed. Current proposals center around a two-phased course a 3-month common-core phase (probably some form of DL) followed by a 6- to 7-month resident phase. Implementing ILE will eliminate the perception of inequity between the 50 percent currently selected for attendance at resident CGSOC and the other 50 percent who must complete the course through nonresident means. This doubling of student requirements will require considerable increases in resource requirements at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The requirement for all majors to attend will also impact units in the field since the increased

numbers of attendees will limit or eliminate the current practice of deferring course attendance if the officer is serving in a critical or sensitive position. Eliminating the inequities associated with selectee versus nonselectee will certainly be viewed as a plus by those officers who have traditionally had to sweat out the process, knowing that nonselect for resident CGSOC was a discriminator for promotion. The question that arises is whether the Army can adjust to the loss of an increased number of majors from field units while they attend ILE. here is no doubt that the Armys leadership is committed to changing the way training has been done. It is imperative that future training focuses on teaching leaders how to think rather than what to think. The technology and skills officers in todays Army bring with them, or have acquired, demand that training programs adjust to take advantage of the highly effective training methods that have emerged and institutions and universities are now using. Maximizing the use of DL, where appropriate, allows the officer to be a student while remaining at home station and reduces the time required at a resident phase.


July 2002

Combined-Arms-Staff Course Description

Purpose: To prepare captains to serve as primary or special staff officers at all echelons of command.
Common Core CASC, Phases IA Functional Modules, Phase IB Resident Experience, Phase II

Core Staff Knowledge Coordination and planning skills Problem solving Communication skills Army organizations and operations

How to be a ... Primary staff officer Special staff officer

Assignment-SpecificTraining Technical/digital Staff skills, practical application

Basic Staff-Officer Knowledge

Specific Staff-Officer Knowledge

Focused Staff-Officer Experience

Through Web-based distance learning and resident training, captains learn the basic skills to function as part of staffs at all levels.

End State: Captains who can manage large amounts of information, make recommendations based on reason, and then translate command guidance and intent into well-developed staff products that subordinate organizations can act on
Figure 4

Emphasizing leadership in training lieutenants will inevitably better prepare junior officers for their first assignment and ensure that they are imbued with the warrior ethos right out of the training base. Designing captain courses around specific job requirements narrows the scope of the course and inevitably shortens the length of institutional training required. It also ensures that officers are trained to do their next job and do not waste time on redundant or unnecessary training. Giving all majors an opportunity to attend intermediate-level training will ensure that they have the training required to serve effectively in those jobs that majors perform. Undoubtedly, there will be some pain and consternation as changes are implemented. Several factors will directly impact how and when these new courses begin. As with most actions, money and personnel resources will be a key. Timelines have been developed with BOLC, probably being fully implemented in FY03 and CABCC and CASC in FY04. Considerable effort is being expended on BOLC to achieve the current implementation date, and it is very realistic to believe that this will be achieved. Since the time spent in training is no longer than any current officer basic course, implementing BOLC will have no impact on Reserve Component (RC) officers. Implementing ILE, on the other hand, faces several difficulties associated with personnel issues. The manner in which RC officers

will be trained is still unresolved. The way captains train will have challenges related to personnel issues and RC training to overcome. Suffice it to say that those of us responsible for putting together the programs of instruction and training materials to support the OES see this system as an opportunity to make a significant impact on the development of the Chemical Corpss leadership through the quality of training. It will be considerably different from the traditional training system with which we are comfortable and familiar. When I wrote the article a year ago, little did I realize just how much patience and flexibility would be required as transformation continues to not only impact the way the Army looks but also the way it trains.
Endnotes 1 Major General R. Steven Whitcomb, Training Changes, ARMOR, MarApr 2002, p 6. 2 Whitcomb, p 7. 3 Transformation of the Officer Education System; Army Commanders Conference, 12 Feb 2002. 4 Whitcomb, p 7. At the time this article was written, Mr. Mike Sheheane was serving as Chief of Warrior Department, DOTD, MANSCEN. He is a career civil servant and a retired U.S. Army Reserve officer. Sheheane is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College, the Senior Training Managers Course. He holds a masters in both education and criminal justice.


First Place, Chemical Corps Annual Writing Contest

Reconnaissance and Decontamination Support to Civil Authorities

By Captain Patrick S. Daulton Pushbutton war has its place. There is another kind of conflictcrusade, jihad, holy war, call it what you choose. It has been loosed before, with attendant horror but indecisive in results. In the past, there were never means enough to exterminate all the unholy, whether Christian, Moslem, Protestant, Papist, or Communist. If jihad is preached again, undoubtedly the modern age will do much better. -T.R. Fehernbach, This Kind of War
While the war on terrorism continues to escalate, we as a nation are fighting a defensive battle on American soil for the first time since the Civil War. As the list of anthrax-contaminated people and facilities grows larger with each passing day, it is apparent that now is the time for the Chemical Corps to execute the mission it has been preparing for since its inception. It is time for us to get moving. This article focuses on three specific areas that the Chemical Corps has the ability to act on or influence immediatelyconsequence management, first responders, and emergency response vehicles. Providing NBC reconnaissance and decontamination support to civil authorities will mitigate future terrorist acts using weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Emergency Management Agencies (SEMAs) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for decades to respond to other disasters. The Federal Response Plan, on paper, is an intimidating mass of line charts and timetables that begins 4 hours after an attack and does not culminate (in the amount of personnel and resources brought to bear) until nearly 48 hours following an attack. Based on the time required for even the most streamlined federal units to effectively respond to an attack, our doctrine generally accepts that first responders are on their own through the initial 4 hours of any terrorist WMD attack.1 Unfortunately, most local and state agencies are not trained to deal with such an attack. Thats where the Chemical Corps comes in. Chemical officers and noncommissioned officers are in a unique position because most of their training deals with NBC defense at the tactical level of war. That same training could become a huge multiplier if it were passed on to civil agencies and civilians. Certainly, the concept of educating all levels of the public is not a new one. FEMAs introductory correspondence course, The Emergency Program Manager, notes that educating and informing the public is a necessary component of emergency management. The same course also states the truism that the biggest challenge in any public education program is getting public support for it.2 Presently, we have the publics support. Fears of WMD terrorist attacks are at an all-time high; Internet sites that deal with NBC-related topics have suddenly become overwhelmingly popular.

Time to Act

Consequence Management
Managing the consequences of a WMD event is a civil responsibility. We (the Chemical Corps) must focus our efforts on preparing civil authorities to conduct reconnaissance and decontamination. In any terrorist attack that involves WMD, the primary combatants will be first responders, health-care providers, and utilityservice personnel. Federal responseto any incident or eventis triggered as the third tier of response. It follows by request, after the commitment of state resources, which are themselves a follow-on response to the commitment of local resources. Though the planning and resource allocation for response to WMD terrorist attacks is barely past its initial birth, the system is based on the response sequence that has been used successfully by State
July 2002

All we need to do, as a Corps, is to act on this public concern and start teaching basic NBC-defense measures at the local leveland we need to do so on a grand scale. Just as military installations are terrorist targets, the communities that surround those installations are also targetsand much more tempting and accessible ones at that. So, our hometowns seem to be the best, and quickest, places to start. A small team of instructors from a division NBC school or a brigade chemical officer and chemical NCO could easily set up classes in their local community center and, on the weekends, educate hundreds of citizens and responders alike in just a few hours. Imagine the impact we could make if every post in the United States started a program like this right outside its main gates! A common argument against public education is that the material is too technical, an assumption that is totally false.3 A basic, NBC-defense course targeted at first responders and civilians does not need to include any technical or classified blocks of instruction. The standard rundown of first and second generation chemical and biological agents, the signs and symptoms of exposure, and common first-aid measures are as easy for the average citizen to grasp as they are for the average private in advanced individual training as a chemical operations specialist. The principles of decontamination and basic decontamination techniques copious amounts of water/5 percent solution of household bleach and waterare understandable to anyone, and the materials necessary to accomplish that task are likewise readily available. Starting with the basic program of instruction (POI) used in division NBC schools as a point of departure, the blocks of instruction that deal with military decontamination apparatus and decontamination agents can simply be omitted in favor of the garden hose, fire hydrant, and swimming pool cleaning chemicals. Classes that focus on chemical protective equipment (battle dress overgarment, Saratoga suit, M40 mask) can be changed easily to reflect field-expedient measures for personal protectionrain suits and duct tape, the $5.00 quick mask, in any of its commercial variants. The shelter inplace kits (plastic sheeting, duct tape, and a towel), made available to people who live near the various chemical depots, could easily be substituted for training in militarygrade collective protection. Another key in a public education program is to correct mistakes that were made in the past. The Domestic Preparedness Program (DPP), as originally executed by the Department of Defense, often ignored state and federal emergency management officials and dealt directly with city officials at the designated locations. Doing so forced

emergency management agencies to play catch-up, despite the fact that the Federal Response Plan designated those agencies as having the initial lead in any consequence management operation. Bypassing SEMA and FEMA offices also created an isolation effect where the first responders in a target city were trained in WMD operations, but the responders in neighboring communitiesones with standing mutual-aid agreementswere neglected. 4 In starting a public education program, we can correct earlier mistakes simply by working through the local SEMA offices, letting SEMA coordinate times and places and assemble a target audience that includes a network of response agencies that takes advantage of mutual-aid agreements and prevents interagency confusion.

First Responders
First responders must be able to conduct chemical and biological reconnaissance. This ability must be powered down, wherever possible, to the level of the individual responder. We can train responders and citizens to react to WMD attacks, but training itself is of limited value if there is no ability to quickly detect the presence of an agent and determine the limits of contamination. Here, the difference between chemical and biological agents is most profound. As previously discussed, biological reconnaissance usually takes the form of alert and properly trained health-care providers. Through an aggressive outreach training program, we can dramatically increase the odds of early detection in terms of bioterrorism. We also can avoid repeats of the situation that recently occurred in Washington, D.C., where two postal workers died of pulmonary anthrax because doctors misdiagnosed their symptoms in the early stages.5 A trained and alert public health system is vastly superior, both in terms of dollars and timeliness, to any other biological reconnaissance methodfor example, attempting to field a biological identification detection system (BIDS) platoon in each of the 120 cities trained under the DPP. Even though the media has lumped chemical and biological agents into the same category, detecting the presence of a chemical agent is something that occurs at the first-responder level. Chemical detection has to happen immediately to be of any use, as opposed to the incubation window that occurs with biologicals. The exact type of chemical agent detector fielded to civil agencies doesnt really matterthe bottom line is that when a chemical attack occurs, the first people to respond to the call for help will be the ones who detect its presence. They will either detect it with equipment they have been trained to operateenabling them to take protective

actionor they will detect it using the canary method, causing casualty figures to skyrocket while consequence management declines. A lot of firefightersa lot of public safety personnelwere in there Anonymous New York Fighter, CBS News Broadcast, 11 September 01 The threat has changed and so has our nations need to increase the capabilities of first responders. Police, fire, and rescue personnel now have to be able to conduct (limited) chemical and biological reconnaissance. The training and equipment required to recognize, survive, and operate in a chemical environment must be present in the individual patrol car and fire engine. To fail to do so is to gamble against a repeat of the 11 September tragedy, when hundreds of New Yorks emergency workers who responded to the first plane crash were caught in the second crash because they lacked the capability to differentiate between accident and attack. We have entire companies who are just missing Head of NYC Firefighters Union, CNN Broadcast, 11 September 01 Although developmental and future technologies will undoubtedly improve the first responders ability to recognize a chemical or biological agent, currently fielded military equipmentsuch as the individual chemical agent detector (ICAD), the M8 and M21, and (perhaps the most cost effective, most reliable) the M256 kitcan supply this need for the interim. Regardless of costs or relative imperfection, chemical and biological reconnaissance must be placed in the hands of those who can use it quickest and with the greatest effectthe local-area first responder.

Emergency Response Vehicles

Emergency response vehicles are the tactical center of gravity for first responders. Those vehicles, or at least a portion of them, must be hardened against chemical contamination to prevent losing them during an attack. The first vehicles to respond to the blast were incinerated by the second blast CNN Broadcast, 11 September 01 In purely military terms, the four-man crew of an M1A1 main battle tank is a highly (and expensively) trained, extremely close-knit team that exists for one purposequick and efficient destruction of enemy tanks. When you combine that crew with its tank, you have a partnership of skill and technology that can roam the modern battlefield with near impunity. Without its tank, however, those same four individuals are a poorly trained, woefully under equipped infantry fire team with no communications, limited mobility, and (other than blatant
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acts of God) absolutely no chance whatsoever of accomplishing their mission of destroying enemy tanks. Now, apply that same analogy to the first-responder community. A policeman with no patrol car is less effective than a policeman with one. A paramedic without an ambulance and the equipment it carries is only marginally more effective at saving and preserving life than the average Boy Scout. Firefighters without the ability to deliver water to a fire are merely groups of people in raincoats. In all cases, when we discuss the ability of first responders to do their job in a WMD environment, their vehicles are their absolute centers of gravity. Though the past 6 years have seen significant upgrades in training local responders to conduct mass casualty decontamination and treatment, how first responders will decontaminate their vehicles is a critical area that is still overlooked. Currently, no police or fire department in the nation has vehicles that are painted with chemical-agent-resistant-coating (CARC) paint. Exterior decontamination alone (the reduction of gross chemical contamination to negligible risk standards) would be a nightmare. Decontaminating those same vehicles to the Occupational Safety and Health Administrations standards is impossible. The interiors of these vehicles are made primarily of absorbent cloth stretched tightly over still more absorbent foam rubber. As Mark DeMier, (deputy director, Analytic Services Incorporated [ANSER] Institute for Homeland Security) states, There is a significant gap in terms of interior chemical decontamination, especially with respect to rubber-based and similar materials. 6 In a WMD (particularly chemical) attack, most or all emergency vehicles that initially respond to the scene will become contaminatedthe exterior simply by entering the area and the interior shortly thereafter as personnel relocate and attempt to evacuate contaminated casualties. As follow-on units arrive, the presence of contamination could easily result in a paradox, as what occurred in the hours following the second attack on the World Trade Center (WTC). Row upon row of ambulances waited to go in, while the WTC complex was considered a hot zone until sometime on 12 September.7 Incident commanders will have the grim choice of rushing with the purpose of immediately saving livescreating additional casualties while losing the majority of their resources in the processor waiting it out, preserving resources at a staggering cost to the population. As we have seen, most likely both choices will be made though each at different times.8

To effectively manage a WMD event, incident commanders must have the capability to mass and then disperse resources of all types within the zones of contamination. Emergency response vehicles must be hardened against chemical contamination. Getting there from here does not have to be a multibillion dollar exercise involving advanced, vehiclemounted chemical-biological filtration systems. Its enough to have vehicles with interiors that consist of removable seats, CARC-painted dashes, and rhino liners instead of carpet and foam rubber. All of these modifications can be accomplished at local body shops. The operant theory is, if a vehicle has to get dirty to be of any value in the situation, then let it get dirty. During the emergency itself, personnel can operate in protective posture, and casualties can be moved using contaminated casualty bags. But those vehicles need to be useful after the first few hours of an attack, as well. Another way that the rules have changed is more than one population center may be hitquite possibly two or even three large cities, stretching local and state resources to the limitwith all simultaneously needing the full support of a finite amount of federal material and personnel to reinforce them.

knowledge of tactics, techniques, and procedures to the people who need it most, regardless of the uniform they wear. We need to understand that the 5 minutes of protection a firefighter gets from taping down his rain suit with duct tape is infinitely better, now, than the 24 hours of protection he will get from a Kevlar-impregnated, self-contained, self-sealing, biologically monitored suit 5 years from now. Twenty-five hundred years ago, Sun Tzu wrote, Though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been associated with long delays.9 Technology or no, some things never change.
Endnotes 1 Eric R. Taylor, Policy Analysis #387, ANSER Institute for Homeland Security, 2000, p.7. 2 Federal Emergency Management Agency, IS-1, Emergency Program Manager, an Introduction to the Position, FEMA, 1998, p.2. 3 Taylor, p.15. 4 Taylor, p.11. 5 Steve Twomey and Avram Goldstein, Anthrax Cited in Two Postal Deaths, Washington Post, 23 October 01, p. A1. 6 E-Mail interview with Mark DeMier, Deputy Director, ANSER Institute for Homeland Security, 9 October 01. 7 CBS News Broadcast, 1905 E.T., 11 September 01. 8 Authors noteCommon to both the 1995 Tokyo Sarin attack and the 11 September 01 World Trade Center attack was the fact that the first responders to reach the scene rushed in with little regard for personal safety. In both cases, after a significant number of fire, rescue, and police had became casualties, incident commanders held back further rescue attempts to preserve their capabilities. 9 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Roots of Strategy Volume One, Pennsylvania, 1985, p. 42. Captain Daulton is the commander of Delta Company, 82d Chemical Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. His previous assignments include battalion chemical officer, platoon leader, and assistant brigade operations officer. He also served as an infantryman in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Captain Daulton received a bachelors in English from the University of Kentucky and was later commissioned a chemical officer. He is a graduate of the Chemical Officers Basic Course, the Captains Career Course and CAS3, the Basic Airborne Course, Advanced Airborne School, and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Installation Responders Course.

Throughout this article, low-tech, low-cost solutions have been the chief recommendation. At the time of this writing, concepts in biological and chemical detection that several months ago were shelved for one reason or another are being dusted off; development of new technologies in the fields of detection and decontamination is going ahead quickly. Eventually, our technological superiorityone of Americas greatest strengthswill make itself felt in this arena. And when this war on terrorism is ended, no doubt our nation will come out of it stronger and better prepared than it was when it started. But all of that is in the future. Another theme that runs throughout this article is rapid action. We have to deal with the here and now; in the here and now, people are opening letters with biological weapons inside them. If we as a Corps are to accomplish our mission of protecting the force, we must start now. We need to pass on our

Second and Third Place Winners, Chemical Corps Regimental Association Annual Writing Contest2001
The second and third place articles were published in the February 2002 issue of the Army Chemical Review. The second place winner was Captain John F. Fennell with his article entitled, Military Decision MakingA Process (page 42). Captain DeAnna Miller won third place with her article entitled, Patient Decontamination (page 45).



62d Civil Support Team (CST) Supports the Secret Service in a National Special Security Event (NSSE)
By Lieutenant Colonel Mark E. Kerry

Two Louisiana Army National Guard soldiers on security patrol in front of the Superdome

The World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks and the Oklahoma City bombing signaled a change in the character of terrorism in the United States. Most of the previous domestic terrorist acts have not involved mass casualties. However, recent incidents indicate an apparent desire of terrorists to injure or kill large numbers of innocent people. Large gatherings of U.S. citizens could potentially become targetsespecially when the terrorists plan to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Because of this possibility, the National Security Council and the President designated Super Bowl XXXVI in New Orleans, Louisiana, as an NSSE.
When an event is designated an NSSE, the Secret Service assumes its mandated role as the lead agency for designing and implementing the operational security plan according to Presidential Decision Directive 62. With this designation, coordinating all local, state, and federal assets can be planned and managed under one agency. The governor, along with the adjutant general of Louisiana, appointed a National Guard (NG) task force commander and instructed him to give utmost support to the Secret Service in protecting this NSSE. The adjutant general also emphasized that the threat of terrorism using WMD be given the highest priority in the plan. To carry out the commanders intent, the Super Bowl task force commander and I (62d CST commander) had to accelerate and intensify working relationships with numerous federal, state, and local agencies since the designation of NSSE was made only a little more than 60 days before the event. We also had to integrate the
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Louisiana NGs expertise and assets across the entire spectrum of agencies and capabilities to comprehensively address the threat of WMD terrorism. The Louisiana NG has the expertise, trained manpower, and equipment that can support a response to chemical, biological, radiological, and high-yield explosives attacks in communities. The 62d WMD CST of the Louisiana NGa full-time unit manned with Army and Air Guard personnelhas the capability to rapidly deploy to a WMD incident site and provide support to an incident commander. Support includes the ability to conduct reconnaissance; provide medical advice and assistance; provide technical advice concerning WMD incidents and agents; and perform detection, assessment, and hazard prediction. Members of the 62d accompanied the task force commander from the very beginning and played a major role in planning WMD countermeasures, defense, and

incident response. We started with a mission analysis where we gathered facts; made assumptions; and identified limitations, constraints, restrictions, and tasks. We then issued a warning order to the soldiers and airmen in the unit and gave specific instructions on what was expected of everyone, in the joint agency planning process and in actual WMD response actions. An important aspect of our association with the New Orleans Super Bowl was that the entire effort could be divided into two areas. One area included all the planning and advising that we did for the Secret Service; NG task force commander; New Orleans Fire Department; and other federal, state, and local agencies. The other area was the actions we would take if an actual WMD incident occurred.

regularly deployed throughout the United States on behalf of USCG and EPA on-scene coordinators (OSCs). Further, the strike teams are key tactical response units for the EPA to call on when responding under the Federal Response Plan Emergency Support Function #10.

Planning a response to a WMD event is different than for a traditional military tactical mission. For starters, most civilian agencies do not publish an operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD), which is contrary to FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, and the military decision-making process (MDMP). This was the case for the Secret Service. They simply collected all the local, state, and federal agencies completed plans and consolidated them. This method posed some problems for planners at lower levels because task and purpose for subordinate agencies could not be determined until the last minute. This forced OPORDs to be published late, allowing little time for part-time traditional soldiers (NG) to plan and react. It also caused disruptions in training plans for units. However, there are some similarities in planning a response to a WMD event and a traditional military tactical mission. For example, both should be planned from the objective backward. In a traditional tactical scenario (non-terrorist-centered), the planner starts at the objective by arraying the proper amounts and types of forces needed to accomplish certain tasks, such as block, support by fire, breach, and clear. In a WMD event, the objective is both the contaminated or affected area and its victims. A WMD event is by its very nature a mass-casualty event. Our response actions are therefore directed towards the tasks that must be accomplished. The potential number of casualties must be estimated to effectively plan backwards to handle a mass-casualty situation. Estimating casualty count helps us to determine the amounts and types of antidotes, treatment, or prophylaxis; the number and types of decontamination sites; the number of security personnel needed; and the number of bags needed to collect personal items at decontamination sites. We also group casualties into categories: True casualtiesThose who are either deceased or symptomatic or have delayed symptoms. Psychosomatic vice symptomatic casualties Symptoms induced psychologically. These most likely would have to be treated the same as the true victims because health-care professionals may not be able to differentiate between patients with actual WMD symptoms and the psychogenics. Worried wellShow no symptoms, but fear that they may have been exposed.

The Secret Service organized the planning members into subcommittees and one executive-level committee where the heads of the organizations were expected to participate. I, along with the task force commander and/or his S-3, usually attended executive committee meetings. Members of the CST, along with task force representatives, attended various subcommittee meetings depending on the specific subject being addressed. Some of the subcommittees were consequence management, crisis management, fire/life/ safety, and communications. We used information from the meetings along with our research and coordination to conduct an estimate of the situation. In the estimate, we gave priority to the prevention of terrorist attacks. Even though we emphasized the importance of prevention and deterrence in the operational security plan, we also were prepared to respond tactically to a WMD situation, if it arose. We also assessed the local, state, and federal agencies abilities to accomplish certain tasks. Our analysis and that of the task force commanders concluded we needed more assets to perform certain critical tasks. One was to monitor the air in and around the Superdome to detect biological or chemical agents along with the ability to don protective clothing to gather samples of hazardous materials or to assist with the mitigation of a hazardous incident. We had two optionsbring in more WMD CSTs from other states or bring in some additional federal assets. The Secret Service opted to use the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) strike team headquartered in Mobile, Alabama, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Using the USCG strike team and EPA to perform critical tasks eliminated pulling valuable resources from states such as the NG WMD CSTs. Cost was always an overriding factor. Super Bowl XXXVI was designated an NSSE but labeled a Tier III event, which meant it got no fundingunlike the Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah. The USCG National Strike Forces capabilities and responsibilities lie beyond port areas, and strike teams are

AmbulatorySymptomatic yet able to walk. Nonambulatory (litter)Symptomatic and unable to DeceasedDeath occurs from WMD-agent
exposure. This further affects how and where decontamination is conducted, how triage is performed, who gets transported to holding areas, who gets immediate attention, and how security and crowd control is provided to accomplish the mission. Another similarity between traditional tactical military operations and planning and WMD-response planning and operations is the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs) usefulness for planning and synchronizing subordinate element operations. I identified the following as operating Staff Sergeant Todd Hollenbaugh and Major James systems for the 62d: Knotts discuss security in front of the Louisiana Administrative/logisticsSame for a traditional Superdome. operation and unit but positioning and stockpiling of anticipated supplies is the primarily supply technique. CST activities towards accomplishing the incident Hazard modelingDeals with downwind hazard commanders objectives and ensuring his objectives plume predicting and translating this information in a are appropriate. way to assist in decision making. BOSs were used in an execution matrix that was OperationsIncludes tracking incident activities, included in Annex C, Operations. The OPORD and planning future operations, and coordinating with the entire plan underscored the principle that domestic other agenciesmilitary and civilian. disaster relief is fundamentally a state mission falling Reconnaissance and surveyIncludes activities within the borders of the states broad authority/ related to physical reconnaissance and survey of responsibility for public safety and welfare but that the the contaminated area along with the collection of state may not have all the needed assets. Recognizing samples and evidence to identify the agent, these basic principles, the plan focused on filling the problem, or situation. void in the states initial assessment capability and the AnalyticalDeals with all scientific efforts to U.S. ability to assist by staging assets forward and analyze unknown substances from information rapidly facilitating required assistance in excess of the learned and samples taken from the contaminated states capability to respond. area. Also includes gathering information on the Another similarity between traditional military tactiproperties and characteristics of the agent after it cal missions and a WMD event is planning and operating has been identified. with common operational graphics. We made an operations Communications/reach backConcerns the ability graphic that identified locations of all assets, such as to use satellite communications to connect to expert decontamination locations, extra fire trucks, ambulance advice from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. staging points, security perimeter, hospitals, cart collection Additionally, it refers to the ability to assist the point, stationary and roving command and control locations, incident commander in managing disparate and triage sites. Among the numerous agencies involved, communication systems. this was the only operations graphic made for the event. Medical operationsRefers to the ability to assist It proved so useful that it was used by all agencies to and advise the incident commander on medical brief everyone from Senator John Breaux to the head of issues and to provide health care to 62d CST the Secret Service. The importance of a common soldiers and airmen. operational picture that can be depicted with a picture Command and controlIncludes all activities and a map cannot be underestimatedsame as a related to controlling the WMD CST in performing traditional military tactical operation. its mission along with all liaison with the incident WMD Planned Actions commander. This BOS includes the commanders ability to take into account the entire picturesense The potential for mass panic following a WMD the level of expertise of the incident commander incident would have overwhelmed the local hospitals and other civilians on the scene and make ability to function effectively without additional personnel adjustments. Finally, it also relates to directing all to control access to the facilities. NG troops, under the
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control of the task force commander, were called on to augment law enforcement and hospital security personnel to maintain efficient access control to the hospitals. Because arriving victims could be contaminated, the personnel assigned to this function required both WMD-awareness knowledge and training in performing security operations in mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear. The units assigned this responsibility had ready access to MOPP gear which allowed them to rapidly transition to MOPP4 or rapidly mobilize from a local armory to an incident site. In the event of a WMD situation, the limits of the contaminated area would be initially established and the NG task force commander would cordon the area to prevent anyone from entering. Because this mission would be performed outside the hot zone (contaminated area) and NG units regularly perform this type of mission in other disaster situations, no additional training beyond basic awareness was required. Planning for decontamination was addressed according to who was being decontaminated. We created three types of decontamination sites. The first site was technical decontamination. Two of these sites were plannedone on each side of the Superdome. Their function was to decontaminate hazardous-materials responders who had entered the hot zone. This was to be a detailed decontamination site to perform a thorough cleaning. The planned decontamination solution was a soap and water mixture, but other substances like hypochlorite (bleach) would be used, if required. The second decontamination site was the mass decontamination site (ambulatory). At this site, individuals who were potentially exposed but still able to walk would be decontaminated. Since four hospitals were within walking range of the Louisiana Superdome, this decontamination site was set up on all the streets leading from the Superdome to the nearest hospitals. This ensured that all people en route to the hospital would, as a minimum, have gross decontamination performed on them. This site consisted of fire trucks with hoses manned by firefighters. NG soldiers who were on perimeter security would be used to control traffic throughout the decontamination operations. The third decontamination site was to be for the nonambulatory. The site was to be manned by NG medics, nurses, and physician assistants. If a mass casualty situation had occurred, responders dressed in personalprotective equipment would have entered the hot zone to extract these victims and bring them to the concourses throughout the Superdome. NG medics were prepared to evacuate these patients to a nonambulatory decontamination point just outside the Superdome using special carts. These carts belonged to the National Football

League and Superdome maintenance personnel and were positioned at a collection point before the start of the event so they could be easily accessible when needed. Civilian ambulances were stationed at this decontamination site to transport the nonambulatory (litter) victims to local hospitals. This site was not set up before the event, but all the assets were positionedready for rapid assembly. Planning also included emergency shelter for disaster victims who were ambulatory and low priority after triage. A nearby small park was designated as an initial collection point where these victims would then be bussed to a pre-identified shelter site. Military installations and facilities, such as armories and reserve centers, were chosen for use, if needed. Emergency first aid and nerve-agent antidote (if a nerve agent was used by terrorists) were to be administered to victims who were unable to walk and who were still inside the Superdome. Mark I nerve-agent antidote kits were cached at various locations and were also distributed to responders. Blankets provided by the American Red Cross were cached near the end of the decontamination lines since it was February and the victims would become wet when decontaminated and could have gotten hypothermia. Upon reaching the far side of the decontamination lines, all victims would have been triaged.

This article provides soldiers and civilians involved with homeland security and homeland defense some insight into planning large-scale events including those designated as NSSEs. It also provides some useful tactics, techniques, and procedures for planners and leaders. The former leader of the German terrorist group, Bader Meinhoff, said when referring to how they attack when faced with a vigilant enemy, If we have a free path, we go forward. If we meet an obstacle, we go around it. If the object cannot be overcome, we retreat. When the enemy is unprepared, we surprise him. If he is alert, we leave him alone. The words should remind us that vigilance, preparation, and defense should be taken seriously and should be our motto. With this is mind, as we protect and defend our nations most valuable resourceher peopleour responsibilities are to do all we can to prevent and defend against terrorism in this new security environment. We can only do this by sharing our ideas, knowledge, and lessons learned. This will strengthen our ability to prevent and defend against terrorism.
Lieutenant Colonel Mark E. Kerry is the commander of the 62d Civil Support TeamWeapons of Mass Destruction with the Louisiana National Guard. He has served in various assignments from infantry platoon leader to infantry battalion commander both on active duty and with the National Guard. He is a graduate of Louisiana State University and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.


Biological Terrorism:
Practical Response Strategies
By Dr. Mohamed Athher Mughal
n his 6 November 2001 testimony before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, the deputy assistant director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBIs) Counterterrorism Division, J.T. Caruso, stated, The bioterrorism threat has risen to a new level.1 Biological terrorist incidents involving anthrax have resulted in 22 confirmed cases and 5 deaths since 3 October 2001. Since then, the FBI has responded to more than 8,000 reports of use, or threatened use, of biological agents. Clearly, biological terrorism is a real and growing threat in the United States.2 Response to such incidents is not limited to civilian authorities. Soldiers will be involved through a variety of venues. Physicians and medical experts from the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases will likely be called on to assist. The Soldier and Biological Chemical Commands (SBCCOMs) Chemical/Biological Rapid Response Team (CBRRT) has the mission to coordinate and synchronize the Department of Defenses (DoDs) technical assistance, both medical and nonmedical, to support civilian-led federal agencies in responding to domestic weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents.3 Defense Planning Guidance published in April 2000 states that the Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) will plan and integrate DoDs support to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for WMD events in the continental United States.4 Finally, the National Guards 32 regionally deployed civil-support teams (CST) have the mission to assist local first responders in determining the nature of a WMD attack and then provide assistance in identifying and coordinating the arrival of follow-on state and federal military response assets. 5 Clearly, soldiers, and more particularly, the Chemical Corps, will be involved in civilian responses to domestic biological terrorism.


spectrum of potential consequences is much broader than medical casualties. A well-conducted biological terrorist attack will strain our countrys public health medical-surveillance systems. It will also require responders to make quick, accurate medical diagnoses and disease identifications. By definition, a bioterrorist event is a criminal act that requires a complex criminal investigation. Depending on the agent used in an attack, such an incident could also result in residual environmental hazards that would require mitigation. Considering the potential magnitude of casualties, a significant portion of a metropolitan areas population may have to be medically managed and physically controlled. The aforementioned medical treatment, criminal investigation, environmental hazard mitigation, and population control activities will require a coordinated and integrated command and control effort extending across federal, state, and local jurisdictions. In short, the full spectrum of consequences requiring management encompasses multiple professional disciplines and functional areas of responsibility spanning three levels of government.6

Biological Terrorism: What It Would Look Like

he primary consequence of a large-scale biological terrorist attack will be a catastrophically large number of casualties. Response systems must be capable of providing the appropriate types and amounts of medical treatments and services. However, the full

hrough a series of analytical workshops, SBCCOMs Military Improved Response Program (MIRP) team identified a myriad of emergency functions necessary for bioresponse.7 To be useful and understandable, these functions needed to be organized into a logical and integrated response system. Thus, the MIRP team formulated a generic biological-response template. The template identifies, organizes, and integrates the essential emergency-response functions necessary for a city to respond effectively to biological terrorism. This generic template (see figure, next page) can serve as a useful starting point for cities and states to prepare their own customized local emergency response plans. Medical surveillance, the first component of the template, should operate continuously to improve the chances of quickly detecting unusual medical events in the local population. Several communities are currently monitoring hospital admissions, 911 calls, and unexplained deaths as part of their medical surveillance systems.

Response Strategies for Biological Terrorism

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Once an anomaly is detected, medical diagnosis is necessary to identify and confirm its cause. Rapid and accurate disease identification is essential to initiate appropriate and timely medical treatments for many biological-warfare agents. Preliminary medical diagnoses should be sent for verification to preidentified and qualified local, state, federal, or academic laboratories. When a specific disease is confirmed, the public health community will likely begin an epidemiological investigation to determine the distribution of cases and the sources of the disease outbreak. This information is necessary to control disease propagation and identify and treat the population at risk. Concurrent with these medical investigations, the law enforcement community will begin a criminal investigation

to assess the ongoing threat, safeguard evidentiary materials, and identify and apprehend suspects. In the case of biological terrorism, the criminal and the epidemiological investigations couldand likely shouldcomplement one another. For instance, once epidemiologists identify the location of the disease source, criminal investigators could visit the site to collect evidentiary materials and other data pertinent to law enforcement concerns. Local communities should develop sampling protocols for law enforcement personnel investigating biological terrorist events. These protocols should not only protect personnel and evidentiary materials, but they should also be coordinated with recipient laboratories to ensure appropriate specimen collection and handling. Additional

procedures should be established for baseline and postincident medical screening for all personnel involved. While the criminal investigation is in process, and pending the specific disease agent, local officials may begin a mass prophylaxis campaign to prevent disease and death in exposed victims. This involves the largescale distribution and medical application of appropriate antibiotics, vaccines, or other medications. The speed at which medical prophylaxis is implemented effectively is key to the campaigns success. For instance, giving antibiotics to people shortly after exposure to Transporting contaminated patients anthrax can significantly reduce the occurrence of disease and hotline, providing information to the media and distributing death; delayed administration could be ineffective. Further, self-help fact sheets to the affected population. because the population at risk cannot be verified The local medical infrastructures patient capacity will immediately, medical prophylaxis will likely have to be have to be rapidly expanded to accommodate the high expanded to include a much larger number of people than volume of patients. Alternative health-care centers will those actually exposed. have to be established within the affected area. Because The rapidity and magnitude of medical prophylaxis of resource constraints, victims will likely have to accept necessitates a well-functioning and preplanned strategy. subtraditional levels of care. Appropriate fatality Early coordination on decision making regarding management strategies will have to be put into place to prophylactic treatment among all agenciesespecially manage the potentially large number of fatalities. The local public health, medical and law enforcement, and community will need to stand up family support services emergency managementis essential for a successful to provide information, nonmedical assistance, and crisis mass prophylaxis campaign. Federal and state counseling to victims and their families. assistance most likely would be needed to support local For an effective response to bioterrorism, the described response planning for mass prophylaxis. emergency functions will need to happen at a rapid pace Depending on the attack agent, residual hazard and in high volume, all while ensuring continuous operation assessment and mitigation may be necessary to assess of critical infrastructure such as communications, power and protect the population from further exposure to generation, and water and sanitation services. The local potential environmental hazards. Assessment and emergency operations center (EOC) and, likely, a joint mitigation may include environmental sampling of air, local, state, and federal EOC will be necessary to lead water, and soil, as well as swipes and insect and animal and manage the multitude of participants and resources screening. Vector control may be used as appropriate.8 involved.9 In the case of a contagious disease, physical control Fine Tuning and Validating of the affected population may be necessary to control the BW Response Template and minimize secondary infections. Strategies could include he original template was derived through intensive controlling ingress and egress points, such as bridges and analysis of five credible biological threat scenarios. tunnels, and providing security for vital sites such as By design, these scenarios were confined to airports, hospitals, pharmaceutical distribution points, and infectious but noncontagious agents. Once a practical, utility sites. Quick dissemination of accurate, authoritative comprehensive strategy for response to a noncontagious medical information is essential to maintain control and agent was developed, this strategy was modified to facilitate an organized emergency response. The local accommodate the more complex case of a contagious community could look to establish and operate a city

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agent. Response to a communicable disease is substantially complicated by the possible diverse sources of infection and reinfection. To analyze and develop solutions to this problem, the Improved Response Program (IRP) partnered with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to conduct an analytical workshop in April 2000. The workshops goal was to refine the CDCs Smallpox Control Plan/Strategy by applying it against a credible contagious bioterrorist attack scenario. Using a panel comprised of biological warfare experts, medical/public health practitioners, law enforcement officials, and emergency responders and managers, the workshop focused on the areas of vaccination, quarantine/isolation, and medical surveillance. The panel found that the response template, with certain modifications, was a practical strategy for minimizing the consequences of a bioterrorist attack using a contagious agent. Some of these modifications include Adding contact-tracing to the epidemiological investigation. Implementing protective measures for criminal investigators. Establishing community outreach teams to implement mass immunizations at private homes rather than convene potentially contagious persons at public facilities. Limiting public gatherings and mass transportation functions. Implementing geographic isolation/quarantining and establishing more stringent handling, burial, and disposition requirements for fatalities. Although the response template was derived by a multidisciplinary group of responders from various jurisdictions around the nation, the IRP wanted to validate and demonstrate the templates applicability to differentsized communities in different regions of the country. To do so, the IRP team assembled and conducted investigational workshops with local first responder and emergency management teams in three communities: Wichita, Kansas; Pinellas County, Florida; and Dover, Delaware. In each community, the template proved a valuable and applicable starting point for development of customized emergency response plans.

Operating in a hot zone


Bioresponse: Some Practical Insights

number of salient insights are embedded within the structure of the template. Most notably, a biological event would primarily represent a catastrophic medical emergency. The most critical consequence will be the huge number of medical casualties that, in turn, will require a timely and focused medical response. Health-care management systems, independent

hospitals, clinics, and others in the medical community need to be willing to function as a crucial and integrated component within the larger emergency-response system. To this end, the local medical and public health communities need to be intimately involved in the localitys efforts to plan, implement, exercise, and test their bioresponse strategy. The local community must lead the response to a major biological incident. Local preplanning before the event and rapid implementation of the plan following an incident are required to effectively cope with a major incident. The emergency-response functions that comprise the response template already exist. The best strategy for preparedness is to effectively manage and realign existing resources to accommodate the complexities of a bioattack. Entirely new systems and bureaucracies are neither necessary nor desirable. City officials must be prepared and willing to quickly make difficult decisions regarding mass prophylaxis and initiation of emergency-medical operations. These decisions may need to be made on a presumptive basis to reduce fatalities and to keep pace with the onset of casualties. City officials should take the time to understand the issues and options surrounding these decisions before the event to be prepared to make these life-impacting judgments under stress. Control of the affected population under conditions of extreme fear and possible panic is necessary for effective response. Physical control and security at medical facilities and vital installations such as airports, hospitals, and other places need to be considered in advance. A greater challenge is that public information and rumor control will be needed to keep the public accurately informed and to quell potential panic. Preplanning public announcement approaches could help local officials obtain public cooperation with the response. Speaking with a unified voice through a joint information center will be vital. Co-opting and partnering with the media could be key.


A competently conducted bioattack against a domestic target would constitute a nationaland not a localcrisis. The full magnitude and diversity of the required response will necessarily draw from and stress state-, regional-, and national-level assets. Nontraditional response approaches, such as state and national calls for volunteers, may be needed. The ensuing social, political, economic, and psychological effects will be national in scope. The templates structured response approach would be substantially strengthened if cities adopted similar configurations and functions for their emergency response plans. Then personnel from state and federal organizations, as well as help from other cities and regions, could be familiar with the overall response strategy. This familiarity would help provide quick, uniform, and effective augmentation of the affected citys assets. The response template concentrates on response to and mitigation of the immediate consequences of a geographically focused attack spanning the first 3 weeks following the attack. Long-term problems, such as chronic ailments among casualties and economic disruptions in affected areas, were not within the scope of the MIRPs analyses. It may be prudent for another interagency group to analyze and develop strategies to mitigate these longterm effects. Further analyses of response measures for announced attacks and multiple and simultaneous attacks distributed around the country are needed. The military, especially, needs to develop contingency response plans one for when our nation is actively at war and the other during nonwartime. Finally, although the MIRPs mission is to develop strategies to mitigate the consequences of an actual biological incident, we believe that the effective prevention of or protection from such events is a vitally important area for our government to concentrate on as well. The costs in terms of suffering, death, and economic loss from a biological attack, even with the best response, would be unacceptable. Efforts to determine ways to protect buildings and other structures from biological attack seem warranted. Immediate detection of an attack would allow for rapid distribution of prophylaxis, which would save many lives in the case of a lethal disease such as anthrax. Efforts by the law enforcement community to prevent such attacks are of inestimable value.

herded to evacuation points and refugee camps. Stripped of everything, my family spent our first 2 weeks in the United States in the attic of a Lutheran church. Military and paramilitary terrorist acts against civilian targets have been a fact of history for centuries. It is unfortunate that last September, this practice crossed an ocean to become a component of our American experience and psyche. Biological terrorism, particularly, has the potential to test our mettle as a people and as a nation. A well-reasoned, preplanned, coordinated, and teamed response is our only hope to survive and overcome such an attack.
Endnotes 1 Congressional testimony before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, J.T. Caruso, November 6, 2001. 2 Congressional testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Dale L. Watson, February 6, 2002. 3 See SBCCOM Web site: 4 See Web site: 5 Defense Link. DoD Announces Plans for 17 New WMD Civil Support Teams. January 13, 2000. 6 Mohamed Mughal and Paul Fedele, The Improved Response Program. Army Chemical Review, February 2001, pp 12-16. 7 Mohamed Mughal, The Biological Weapons Improved Response Program. Army Research, Development and Acquisition Magazine, January/February 2000, pp 44-45. 8 Vectors are insects that can carry and transmit a disease. For instance, fleas can carry plague, ticks can carry tularemia, and mosquitoes can carry Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis (VEE). 9 SBCCOM, Improving Local and State Agency Response to Terrorist Incidents Involving Biological WeaponsInterim Planning Guide, August 1999. Available: Dr. Mohamed Athher Mughal has more than 17 years experience researching and analyzing chemical and biological warfare and terrorism. He has published articles on bioterrorism preparedness in the Army Research, Development & Acquisition Magazine, the Army Chemical Review, the Chemical/Biological Quarterly and National Defense Magazine. He has coauthored two DoD technical reports on bioterrorism preparedness and coedited Dartmouth Colleges Medical Disaster Conference Report with faculty members of the Dartmouth Medical School and the C. Everett Koop Institute. His research papers and findings have been presented at conferences nationwide, at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, and at the International First World Congress on Chemical and Biological Terrorism, held in Dubrovik, Croatia, in April 2001. Dr. Mughal holds a bachelors in chemical engineering, a masters in engineering management, and a doctorate in public policy. He is also a branch-qualified Army chemical officer and an honor graduate of the U.S. Army Chemical School.

A Final Thought

n 1972, government forces attacked a nearby home on our block in Kampala, Uganda. After a 30-minute firefight, soldiers used tanks and shoulder-fired rockets for their final assault. The earth literally shook. With mounting unrest, large segments of the population were

July 2002


Chemical Branch Accident Analysis

By Ms. Jana Brooks and Mr. Fred Fanning Introduction
of the overall fatalities for the 3 years. Investigations show that the leading causesfor the Army as well as the Chemical Corpsof these accidents were Following too close behind a vehicle for the size and weight of the vehicle. Failure of leaders to enforce standards. Untrained and unlicensed drivers. Driver fatigue. Inattention. Distracted driving. Failure to maintain control of the vehicle. Excessive speed. Failure to conduct proper risk. Army combat-vehicle accidents involve the operation of combat vehicles such as an M93 Fox reconnaissance vehicle. This is not a prevalent area for Chemical Corps accidents as there were only five Class C accidents during the period analyzed. Four of the five accidents involved the M93 and were caused by the inexperience or inattention of
Table 1Army accident classes Class AProperty damage is $1,000,000 or more; an injury or occupational illness results in a fatality or permanent total disability. Class BProperty damage is $200,000 or more but less than $1,000,000; an injury or occupational illness results in permanent partial disability; five or more personnel are hospitalized as inpatients as a result of a single accident. Class CProperty damage is $10,000 or more but less than $200,000; a nonfatal injury causes lost time from work, other than on the shift on which the accident occurred; a nonfatal occupational illness causes lost time from work or disability at any time. Table 2Three-year comparison of accidents Accident Categories Army Motor Vehicles Army Combat Vehicles Privately Owned Vehicle Personal InjuryOther Other Total of All Types of Accidents FY99 FY00 3 1 3 17 0 24 1 2 8 18 3 32 FY01 3-Year Total 8 2 2 13 1 25 12 5 13 48 4 82

ach year, Army personnel are involved in accidents, many of which can be prevented. The key to preventing these accidents is for each of us to understand where they occur and learn what we can do to prevent them or lessen their effect. The U.S. Army Safety Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama, maintains a database of Army accidents. Each time an accident occurs, a report is submitted through the installations safety office to the U.S. Army Safety Center where it is included in the database. Any soldier or civilian employee can access this database by going to http:// After being assigned a password, you can access your unit or organizations accident history and do some analysis of your own. This article provides a quick analysis of the Chemical Branch statistics in four accident categories for fiscal years (FYs) 1999, 2000, and 2001. any types of accidents are discussed in the Department of the Army Regulation 385-40, Accident Reporting and Records. The four most common categories are Army motor vehicles, Army combat vehicles, privately owned vehicles (POVs), and personal injury-other. Army accidents are also classified by their severityClasses A through E. Our discussion focuses on Classes A through C (see Table 1).



Accident Analysis

able 2 provides an overview of the accidents involving chemical soldiers in the four major categories during the three fiscal years. Accidents increased slightly in FY00 and then reduced in FY01 to around the same number of accidents in FY99. This data provides a rank order based on occurrence and does not take into account the severity or accident class. Table 3 shows an overview of the severity of these accidents based on classification. Table 4 is an overview of accidents classes by fiscal year. Table 5 is a comparison between the rate of the Army and the Chemical Corps. The rates are fairly consistent between the two except for POV accidents. Army motor-vehicle accidents, which involve operating a tactical Army wheeled vehicle, are the number one killer of chemical soldiers. Twenty-five percent of the motorvehicle accidents were fatal and contributed to 60 percent

July 22 2002

Table 3Three-year comparison of accident class vs. accident category Accident Categories Army Motor Vehicles Army Combat Vehicles Privately Owned Vehicle Personal InjuryOther Other Total of All Types of Accidents 1 1 (Fire) 5 1 2 0 3 Class A Class B Class C 3-Year Total 12 3 9 5 11 46 3 74 5 13 48 4 82

Table 4Three-year comparison of accident class Class A B C FY99 2 1 21 FY00 2 2 28 FY01 1 0 24

the driver. The fifth accident involved an M58 smoke track and resulted in a personal injury. POV accidents involve an individual operating a personal motor vehicle that is not being used for official business. For the Army as a whole, POV accidents result in more fatalities than any other type of accident. However, the Chemical Corpss POV fatality rate is about onequarter of the overall Army POV fatality rate (see Table 5). About 66 percent of all Army Class A accidents are POV fatalities, while 20 percent of all Chemical Corps Class A accidents are POV fatalities. If we consider the total number of POV accidents (13) involving chemical soldiers, 8 percent were fatalities, 8 percent were permanent partial disabilities, and 84 percent resulted in lost workdays for the soldier. Investigations show that driver fatigue, inattention, distracted driving, failure to maintain control of the vehicle, and excessive speed are the top causesagain the same causes as Army motorvehicle accidents that remain the same year after year. Personal injury-other was the highest number of accidents involving Chemical Corps soldiers (59 percent). These accidents involve injury to Army personnel not covered by any other accident type such as slips, trips and falls, sports injuries, being struck by an object other than a vehicle, or injury from a tool. These accidents are very common and can result in a wide-range of injuries

with severities ranging from lost time to death. Although these accidents constituted the greatest number of accidents, they were generally less severe than the other accidents types with 96 percent classified as Class C. These accidents occurred both on and off duty and ranged from minor injuries from a fall to a severed finger that resulted in a permanent partial disability. The cause of these accidents is normally failure to follow procedures, using the wrong tool or the right tool improperly, and housekeeping hazards such as tripping. These accidents occurred during airborne operations, physical training, recreational activities, and various other events.

nalyzing motor-vehicle accidents raises the issue of whether or not training or the lack there of may have been contributing factors. There are lesson plans and training circulars that units or organizations should use to properly train drivers. However, no amount of classroom instruction, reference materials, or lecturing can replace the hands-on training needed to adequately understand a vehicles abilities and limitations. Hands-on training can supplement any training program and assist instructors in teaching all the hazards that exist in driving. Properly training drivers and enforcing standards can significantly reduce the number of factors that lead to accidents and injury of Chemical Corps soldiers. Personnel must be reminded to take measures to ensure their own safety, such as being defensive drivers. Being in the right is no longer enough! Operators must also learn to anticipate the actions of other drivers and be prepared to take evasive actions. In the case of vehicle Table 5Accident-rate comparison of the convoys, field operations, or other exercises, keeping Chemical Branch and the rest of the U.S. Army a watchful eye on the actions of other vehicles can U.S. Army Accident Chemical Branch Accident Type A-C prevent many accidents. If an operator is unsure of Rate 1, 2, 3 Rate 1, 2 correct procedures or is not performing to standard, leaders must take the time to correct the problem. 3.84 3.90 All Class A-C Accidents We still see POV accidents involving personnel who 0.30 0.24 Class A Accidents have consumed alcohol and/or were not wearing seat 0.6 0.57 Army Military Vehicles beltsconditions that have contributed and still 0.73 0.62 Privately Owned Vehicle contribute to accidents. Leaders must continue emphasizing the importance of not drinking and driving 0.2 0.05 POV Fatalities and of wearing seat belts. 1 Average for FY99, FY00, and FY01 2 Rate of accidents per 1,000 soldiers Personnel not following procedures also cause 3 Based on Chemical soldier strength of 7,000 soldiers per year most personal injuries. Improper training or failure to enforce standards can cause this lack of attention.
CML 23

Leaders Responsibilities

These accidents, called near misses, can occur numerous times in a unit or organization without an injury or damage. If the units safety officer and noncommissioned officer, in conjunction with supervisors, identify these near misses and correct the hazards that cause them, they can prevent an actual accident from occurring. One important resource that leaders have in their toolbox to prevent accidents is risk management. If properly conducted and effectively used, risk management can help identify and reduce or eliminate unnecessary hazards. However, if it is not conducted or is conducted only as a paper-work drill, accidents will occur, and we all lose.

better job at preventing POV fatalities than the Army as a whole. However, the Chemical Corps should continue to strive for continued reduction in all accident rates. The Chemical Corps and the entire Army benefit from an across-the-board reduction in accidents. Each unit and organization can, and should, do an accident analysis of its accident rates. It will be an eye-opening experience and will help stop unnecessary accidents in the unit. For additional assistance in accident prevention measures, please visit the Maneuver Support Centers Safety Web page at
Ms. Jana Brooks is a safety specialist for the U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center Safety Office at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. She is the safety specialist for the U.S. Army Chemical School and branch. Ms. Brooks has a bachelors in geology from Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas, and a masters in environmental science and engineering from Colorado School of Mines, Golden, Colorado. Mr. Fred Fanning is the safety director of the U. S. Army Maneuver Support Center at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He serves as the senior professional and consultant for safety to the U.S. Armys Chemical, Engineer, and Military Police Schools at Fort Leonard Wood and branches worldwide. He has a bachelors from Excelsior College at Albany, New York, and a masters in education from National-Louis University at Heidelberg, Germany. Mr. Fanning is a certified safety professional in comprehensive practice from the Board of Certified Safety Professionals.


t takes everyone in a unit or organization working together to identify hazards and take steps to eliminate them. This article only touched the surface. There is much more that can be learned by analyzing a particular unit or organization and then taking positive steps to reduce or eliminate the hazards, thereby reducing the potential for accidents. As this analysis has shown, Army motorvehicle accidents cause more deaths to Chemical Corps soldiers than any other type of accident. This more than justifies the time commanders take to ensure that soldiers are properly trained and that standards are enforced. The analysis also shows that the Chemical Corps is doing a

Submitting an Article to CML

Articles may range from 2,000 to 4,000 words. Send a paper copy along with a disc in Microsoft Word to CML, Army Chemical Review, 320 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 210, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8929 or email to Any article containing information or quotations not referenced in the story should carry appropriate endnotes. Contributors are encouraged to include black-and-white or color photos, artwork, and/or line diagrams that illustrate information in the article. Include captions for any photographs submitted. If possible, include photographs of soldiers performing their missions. Hard-copy photos are preferred, but we will accept digital images in TIF or JPG format originally saved at a resolution no lower than 200 dpi. Please do not include them in the text. If you use PowerPoint, save each illustration as a separate file and avoid excessive use of color and shading. Please do not send photos embedded in PowerPoint or Microsoft Word documents. Articles should generally come from contributors with firsthand experience of the subject being presented. Articles should be concise, straightforward, and in the active voice. Include your full name, rank, current unit, and job title. Also include a list of your past assignments, experience, and education; your mailing address; and a fax number and commercial daytime phone number. Include a statement with your article stating that your local security office has determined that the information contained in the article is unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable to the public. We do not require a hard copy of the clearance. All submissions are subject to editing.

July 2002 24

Book Review
By Dr. Burton Wright III, USACMLS Command Historian (Deceased) Living Terrors: What America Needs to Know to Survive the Coming Bioterrorist Catastrophe By Michael T. Osterholm, Ph.D., and John Schwartz Living Terrors has the aura of Armageddon. The authors tell it as they see it, and it doesnt look good. At the time this book was written, the 11 September tragedy was inconceivable. Today, the authors would find a different audience than when they wrote the book. Living Terrors is easy to read and understand, and it doesnt have a great deal of complicated information in it. Dr. Michael Osterholm is a recognized expert on bioterrorism and has spent two decades studying the issues. He once worked for the state of Minnesota in biological defense and handled attacks, such as those on 11 September, on a mass scale. The book is much like an Army training manualthe idea of crawl, walk, and then run. You learn the basics of bioweapons and terror and advance to more complicated ideas on how to deal with the threat. Each chapter starts with a fictional scenario that reads much like Richard Prestons The Cobra Event. Each scenario deals with a different type of biowarfare system but is directly related to what follows in the chapter. Unlike Preston, Osterholm and Schwartz follow up with nonfictional information. The authors believe that smallpox and anthrax are the greatest threats in the biowarfare field. The book deals with other types of bioweapons, but it focuses on these two as the ones most likely to be used. In the catastrophic event of biowarfare, the authors believe that the greatest danger is a single individualsupported by the spread of anthrax-laced letters. The FBI and scientists suspect the anthrax is a homegrown product made by a single individual. It may be, as the authors believe, an individual who is angry at society or doesnt get the recognition desired and lashes out. The characters portrayed in Living Terrors could possibly be like the real-life perpetrator of the anthrax attacks that occurred after 11 September. Living Terrors covers various potential targets of individuals who have the knowledge and the ability to create bioweapons in their own home, like the engineer in The Cobra Event. Another similarity of these characters is that all are trained in biological research. In one scenario, a fictional terrorist uses a small plane equipped with a spray tank to infest an entire city with anthrax. Those at a ball game pay no attention to the small plane flying overhead; they never connect the plane to the mass sickness. The ending is the most disturbing part of the book. The authors use a direct experience with local, state, and federal programs in handling mass casualties that could be caused by a single terrorist using biological weapons; thus, the final several chapters are painful to read. The authors depict the United States as not being remotely ready to handle a real-life situation of massive biological weapons contamination. In one situation, a doctor takes evidence obtained from a patient exposed to inhaled anthrax and asks emergency room doctors and other health-care professionals to diagnose the illness. Nobody comes close to realizing the culprit as anthrax. The ability to accurately detect bioweapons use is the key to dealing successfully with it. In one chapter, the opening fictional scenario sites a terrorist attacking Chicago with smallpox. In the next chapter, the same terrorist hits Milwaukee. The authors then describe how the two cities handle the situation. Chicago doesnt do well because state, federal, and local health leaders resort to squabbling as to who does what. Nearly 500,000 deaths occur because they never get a handle on isolating the disease and treating it nor vaccinating those not infected. In contrast, Milwaukee casualties were only in the hundreds because of a better handling of the problem. Dr. Osterholm doesnt mince words about preparedness. He is clearly an advocate of preparationstack the vaccines, train first responders to recognize bioweapons attacks, and clear and identify potential
CML 25

hospital space. If these precautions are taken and frequent training exercises conducted on handling such a situation, a medical team (not individuals) will be ready to take over and handle it, when and if a real event occurs. Reading Living Terrors will give you the understanding of the immensity of the work that has to be done to prepare for a bioterrorist attack. A bio attack by a single terrorist or a terrorist group could cost the United States not only its best citizens but also its freedom. If preparation is done

now, American can survive with far less casualties than if we do nothing. Read this book and then pass it on to others. The drumbeat of preparedness needs to be kept working. Eventually the aftermath of 11 September will fade into memory, but the threats of bioweapons attacks will not. Prepare now and millions of lives can be saved; put off until tomorrow what must be done now and millions of lives will be lost. Whats your choice?

The Chemical Corps Regimental Association Annual Writing Contest2002

Each year, the Chemical Corps Regimental Association sponsors a writing contest. The contest is open to military personnel in all branches and services, including allied nations, and civilian personnel of any nationality. The purpose of the contest is to stimulate thinking and writing on issues of concern to the Chemical Corps. The winners of the 2001 writing contest are the following: Captain Patrick S. Daulton, first place award of $500 with his essay Reconnaissance and Decontamination Support to Civil Authorities; Captain John F. Fennell, second place award of $300 with his essay Military Decision MakingA Process; and Captain DeAnna Miller, third place award of $150 with her essay Patient Decontamination. The themes for the 2002 writing contest are Hazardous Materials and the Chemical Corps: How Should the Corps Adapt? What Role Should MTOE Chemical Force Structure Play in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Consequence Management? The Chemical Corpss Relevance in the Contemporary Operational Environment. Chemical Corpss Role in Full Spectrum Operations. Homeland Defense, Consequence Management and the Chemical Corps. Transforming the Chemical CorpsFull-Spectrum Operations and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats. Each article should be submitted as a double-spaced paper-copy manuscript accompanied with a disc in Microsoft Word format. The article should be between 500 and 2500 words in length and supported by appropriate footnotes, bibliography, and graphics/photos. Hard-copy photos are preferred; however, if digital photos are submitted, they should be saved at a dpi/ppi of 200 or more and at 100 percent of actual size. In addition to the manuscript, submissions should include a cover sheet with the authors name, title, organization, complete address, email address, and a short biography. To ensure anonymity in the selection process, the authors name should not appear in the manuscript itself. The selection panel will rank submissions on the 100-point scale with up to 40 points assigned for writing clarity, 30 points for relevance to chemical soldiers, 20 points for general accuracy, and 10 points for originality. The deadline for submissions to the 2002 Writing Contest is 31 December 2002. Please forward your submission to LTC Amy Ehmann Executive Officer, U.S. Army Chemical School 401 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 1041 Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8926 Phone: DSN 676-8052; Commercial (573) 563-8052 FAX: (573) 563-7682 E-mail:

July 2002 26

Army Aviators Mask for Chemical Warfare Defense

By Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Walk Army aviators must be able to safely operate a highly complicated and expensive piece of equipment under all conditions. This includes operating the aircraft in a nuclear, biological, and chemical environment. Adding the protection required to defend against chemical warfare agents restricts aviators and hinders their ability to fire and maneuver safely. The perfect aviators mask is one that provides the needed protection, does not limit peripheral vision, adds no stress to breathing, and causes no heat stress. The search for this mask has been a long one. As time and technology advanced, better and better protection was devised. This article discusses the history of the Army aviation mask development. World War I
With the onset of chemical warfare and the United States entry into World War I, Army leadership ensured that all soldiers and working animals were given basic protection. However, masks had not reached the stage where special ones could be developed. If an airplane pilot needed a mask, he wore the same small box respirator (SBR) as the foot soldier. The first mask, the SBR (and its derivatives the Corrected English [CE] mask and the Richardson, Flory, and Kops [RFK] mask), provided the necessary protection, but did so at the cost of comfort, vision, and heat stress. One can only imagine how well a young pilot could fly with a clamp on his nose, mouthpiece in his mouth, and tunnel vision through yellowing eye lenses. Fortunately, pilots were kept away from gas attacks and only needed masks if their aerodromes were attacked. By the end of the war, the Chemical Warfare Service had an outstanding mask ready for the soldiers the Model 1919 (later the Mark I or MI). The Model 1919 was the finest mask constructed for American soldiers during the war. Unlike the earlier SBR, CE, or RFK masks, it used the mask facepiece to keep agents out of the lungs instead of a noseclip and mouthpiece. This resulted in a more comfortable mask which was less fatiguing for the wearer. This innovation was first issued in the French Tissot mask and used in the American Akron-Tissot and KopsTissot-Monro masks during the war. The Model 1919 used the best design features of all the masks. The facepiece was designed to fit the majority of soldiers whose faces had been measured during wartime research. With a superior mask for general use, the Chemical Warfare Service scientists could start designing masks for specialized uses. wear the mask without the canister, except when actually entering a contaminated atmosphere, when, as he flew the biplane through the sky, he could attach the hose to his facepiece for protection. This same connector could be used to connect to his oxygen tank when necessary. To eliminate the complicated hand movements to attach the hose, the Chemical Warfare Service developed a fourway valve to allow the pilot to wear his mask and choose his air sourcefresh, filtered, or onboard oxygen. Never adopted or procured in quantity, this mask remained a curiosity. The first airplane pilot mask solved the protection problem and made progress on comfort, but it still limited vision and increased breathing resistance and heat stress. Sensing the need for a true aviators mask, a formal requirements document was issued in 1933. In 1934, a project specification for an airplane pilots gas mask was approved. This specification was forward-looking: a molded or semimolded facepiece with pilots goggles for eye lenses and a canister with a four-way valve, an air scoop to obtain forced air to filter and prevent lens fogging, and connecting tubing. Most of the masks system (canister, valve, scoop, and connections) was to be permanently mounted on the airplane. To meet the product specification, many mask modifications were tried, but none were fully successful. Problems encountered included mask fit, eye lens fogging, mask complexity, vision clarity, communications, and oxygen supply. Designers tried lining the mask with chamois to solve the fitting problem. Unfortunately, this modification made no conclusive improvements to the mask fit or protection. Eye lens fogging was a major problem, and designers made numerous attempts to solve the problem in the early experiments. Finally, in 1941, the nosecup was introduced. This isolated the nose and mouth from the eyes, and fogging was prevented down to 8 degrees Fahrenheit. A nosecup
27 CML

The Army Air Corps/Forces Era (1920s to 1940s)

Edgewood Arsenal developed an airplane pilot mask in 1923. It had a standard Mark I facepiece with a quick detachable union on the hose and an angle tube (where the filter hose connected to the mask). The pilot could

was used in all future models of the airplane pilots gas mask. The nosecup was also added to infantry masks, starting with the M3. To solve the mask complexity problem, engineers at Edgewood Arsenal tested a mask fitting the 1934 specifications against a lightweight service mask and a training gas mask. Both masks were altered to allow a rubber hose attachment. The specification required the pilot to have an escape canister available for emergencies and a quick-disconnect attached to the four-way valve. It is not surprising that pilots preferred the training mask assembly because of its simplicity and light weight. Pilots must be able to see clearly with a wide field of view. Under normal circumstances in the 1930s, they were issued pilots goggles. These ground-glass lenses worked well in the standard goggles but not in their gas mask. This was due to the mask design. Designers tried flat lenses to increase the field of view but had no success. Use of optically ground goggle-shaped lenses was not an improvement over standard triangular-shaped lenses. So, tests continued. The three methods tested to provide communications capability were diaphragm facepieces, throat microphones, and integral microphones. Neither a diaphragm facepiece nor a throat microphone was fully

successful. By the end of World War II, an integral microphone was still not developed. The original specification for a pilots mask included a four-way valve for various types of air supplyfiltered air, unfiltered air, and oxygen mixtures. This added weight and bulk to the mask system. It was ultimately replaced with a small tube that was part of the inlet valve to the filter. Masks with the filter inlet tubes included modified training and service masks. In World War II, designers modified a lightweight service gas mask with standard Air Corps oxygen-mask couplings so that it could be used as an oxygen mask. During the war, 50 modified lightweight service masks (E41R182-M10-6) were developed and sent to the 8th Air Force in England for field trials. Pilots also tested an unmodified M5-11-7 assault gas mask. Tests showed that the M5 worked. However, some pilots found side vision restricted, the side canister uncomfortable, and mask carrying an annoyance. The test report recommended halting further development of a pilots gas mask because of its limited use to the aircrew. The Army Air Force felt that pilots would use the mask when boarding the aircraft and taking off but not during flight because the standard oxygen mask was available. In 1945, the military characteristics were revised attaching to an oxygen supply was eliminated. In fact, the revised characteristics focused primarily on protection, weight, size, visibility, and comfort. These characteristics were similar to other programs, so the military requirement was cancelled in 1946. The Air Force became a separate service in 1947, and Army interest in an airplane pilots (later termed aviators) gas mask diminished for a time.

Enter Army Aviation (1950s)

In the 1950s, the Transportation Corps (that had proponency for aviation at the time) identified the need for an aviators protective mask. The Corpss leadership recognized the need to protect the aircrew if they were forced to land on contaminated terrain. Searching for a quick solution from procured and developmental masks, they found the M14-series mask (then under development) to be the best solution to their problem. The original M14 mask, modified to allow use of an appropriate microphone, was not acceptable in its original configuration but showed potential. The developmental aviation mask was called the E75 (Experimental Mask Number 75). Further research introduced refinements to the M14 mask such as a nosecup and wider eye lens. Exchanging the microphone for one compatible with the AN/ARC-44 aircraft radios produced an acceptable aviators mask. The E75R5 was adopted as the M24 mask in 1962 after the fifth revision (R5).
The E28R31 mask: the pilot is holding the inlet funnelair scoopin the position where it normally projects through the fuselage. July 2002 28

The 1960s
The M24 mask was the first true aviators mask the United States Army issued. It was adopted 28 years after

the formal requirement document was issued. The mask was issued with an M7 hood, M3 winterization kit, M1antifogging cloth, M1 waterproof bag, M8 adapter (to attach mask to an oxygen system), and M13 carrier. It was very similar to the M25A1 protective mask (adopted in1963). Some M25A1 masks were converted to the M24 standard in the 1990s. An easy way to tell the M24 mask from the M25A1 mask is that the microphone connector of the M24 was a two-prong male and the M25A1 was a two-hole female. The M24 mask fit the bill and protected the aviators; however, research to find a better mask continued.

The 1970s
Entering the 1970s, the Army had four standard protective mask types: M17/M17A1 (general purpose), M9A1 (special purpose), M14A2/M25/M25A1 (armored vehicle), and the M24 (aviators). Using a common mask system for all would simplify logistics and save money. Thus, the Army sought to develop a common mask systemthe XM-29. This one mask used a common facepiece for all variations. It was a one-piece, injectionmolded silicone-rubber construction with a protective coating for scratch and agent resistance. It used a screwmount filter canister that mounted on either the mask cheek (right or left side) or on a hose. There were two voicemittersone on the side opposite the filter attachment and one on the front. It also had a hose permanently attached to a separate filter fastened to the belt or chest of the aviator. The XM-29 eye lens had a tendency to frost but could be corrected by scrubbing it with a mild cleanser. However, problems with the lens coating led to the Army focusing on the XM-30 series development. The XM-30 was effectively an XM-29 with a separate glued-on lens.

The M24 mask

The 1980s
The XM-30-series masks used separate designations for each mask variant. The XM-33 was the aviation mask designation. The XM-33 differed from the basic XM-30 in that it had an external outlet valve, cover-mounted microphone and a hose-mounted filter. There were some developmental problems with attaching an eye lens to the silicone facepiece, but work progressed until 1981, when Senator William Proxmire bestowed one of his famous Golden Fleece Awards for a perceived waste of taxpayers money. Shortly thereafter, the Army determined that the XM30-series masks were unacceptable and initiated the minimum-change, minimum-risk XM-40 program. The M40 program was initiated to modernize the Army mask as quickly as possible. The objective of the M40 program was to combine the best elements of the M17 and XM-30 programs into a new mask for the military. Several versions were called for, including an aviation maskthe XM-41. Scott Aviation, ILC Dover, and Avon submitted

The XM29 mask


The XM41 mask

Adopted in 1986, the M43 aviators protective mask was a radical departure from previous masks; it was unique among the Army masks. It had a form-fitting bromobutyl/ natural rubber face-piece with lenses mounted close to the eyes and an integral chemical-biological hood. The mask was held on the aviators face by a skull-type suspension system. A powerful, portable 4-cubic-feet-perminute (cfm) blower unit forced air through two C-2 filter canisters and a hose to an inhalation air-distribution-system assembly. This assembly regulated the flow of air to the oral-nasal cavity, lenses, and hood. The aviator could adjust airflow to his head, keep the eye lenses clear, and still get enough air to keep the mask at overpressure. By including a blower unit, this mask became a powered air-purifying respirator and had a higher protection factor than many negative-pressure respirators (standard masks). The blower unit was designed to mount on the aviators seat while in flight and draw power from the aircraft. In an emergency egress, the dual filters could be pulled out of the cockpit-mounted motor blower. A pressurecompensated exhalation valve assembly helped the aviator maintain overpressure in the mask/hood and had a builtin electronic microphone. Finally, for the first time, the aviator had drinking capability. The M43 was developed into two types: Type I for Apache aviators with a notched right eye lens (for compatibility with the AH-64 Integrated Helmet and Display Sighting System [IHADSS]

masks for the program. Unlike the XM-33, the XM-41 had an internal nosecup-mounted microphone. Scotts design won the competition, but the XM-41 was eliminated because the mask lacked the necessary field of view the aviation community required and could not be used with night-vision goggles. The engineers, scientists, and technicians within the Individual Protective Division of the Chemical Research and Development Center were continuing with technological research to prepare for just a contingency. They created a new program, eventually designated the XM-45 mask program, to develop a new general aviators mask. Another mask program was already in place to develop a special mask to fulfill the requirements for the new and exciting Apache programthe XM-43 Apache mask.
July 30 2002

The M43 Type 1 mask: inset shows the notch in the right eye lens.

and optical relay tube) with the M171/AIC microphone. Type II for non-Apache aviators without the notch and the M133/U dynamic microphone.

The 1990s
The M43A1 (adopted in 1991) was a preplanned product improvement and included an auxiliary motor blower (1 cfm), which could be used in lieu of the standard blower for escape or short-term use. Other user requested items included a second skirt on the hood to improve protection, a standard Army battery for the blower, and a universal microphone adapter for easy switching between the two microphones. The durability of the mask interpupillary distance (IPD) staple was also improved. The IPD adjusted the masks eye lenses to the users eyes. The M43A1 even took prescription lenses by using frontserts (like spectacles) mounted on the IPD staple. The M43A2, planned but not adopted, was to use a lightweight blower unit to lessen weight. A few lightweight motor blower units were procured for use in the Gulf War. While an effective marvel of modern technology, the M43/M43A1 mask system had problems. The M43A1

was briefly considered by the user as an immediate and temporary general-purpose aircrew mask to accelerate the replacement of the M24. Unfortunately, the masks were bulky (the carriers were large and VERY popular for carrying equipment and books), heavy, and the aircraftmounted blower unit was difficult to remove from the aircraft in an emergency. Attachment and detachment of the M43A1s auxiliary blower unit limited its use in egress and thus minimized its use. Finally, Apache aviators needing prescription lenses had to use contact lenses or have eye surgery because the frontsert interfered with the helmet display unit of the IHADSS. Unfavorable user comments on the heavy aircraft-mounted mask and an unfavorable Department of Defense Inspector Generals audit on this piece of equipment led to the development of the M48/M49 masks. The M48 and M49 masks (adopted in 1996) were essentially M43A1 Type I and Type II masks, respectively, with a lightweight motor blower. The new 4-cfm blower was as powerful as the M43 blower unit but much lighter and pilot-mounted. The aviator wore the blower somewhere on his/her body. Escape from a downed aircraft was theoretically easier with this blower unit than with the M43 blower unit because the escaping aviator did

The M48 mask CML 31

not have to dismount the blower from the aircraft. Also, the 8-hour battery was the same Army standard battery used in the chemical agent monitor. Other government agencies and our allies, including Israel, used the blower. The carrier was still large, but the overall weight was less. The M49 was adopted as an interim standard mask and was not fielded, because the M45 mask was adopted about the same time. While they looked similar, the original M48 had a notched eye lens and a 2-foot-long hose with an elbow connector to attach to the blower. The M49 had two normal eye lenses and a 2-foot-long hose without the elbow connection. As good stewards of taxpayers money, the Soldiers Biological and Chemical Command (SBCCOM) researched modifying the M49 facepiece to the M48 standard. This modification would save our nation hundreds of thousands of dollars in procuring replacement M48 masks. The M48 and M49 masks, refurbished to the new M48 standard, used a new 3-foot hose without the elbow connector, and all M49s had the right eye lens replaced with a notched one. The M48 Apache mask program, like the earlier M43 series, continued to be controversial. The Apache cockpit area was very cramped. The mask blower was still large, and the question remained, Where did it go? The aviation community initially desired an aircraft-mounted blower unit, which was delivered by the M43. The blower was designed to survive a severe crash and ease operator dismount for emergency egress. Because of difficulties encountered with the aircraft-mounted blower unit, the

aviation community opted for an aviator-mounted system, which was adopted as the M48 in 1996. Concerns about the aviator-mounted blower unit halted the M48 mask fielding close to the initial unit fielding date. There still was a problem with the blower unit interfering with aircraft operations. Advancements in blower technology had not yet produced a low-power consumption unit that was small enough to fit on the aviator without compromising compatibility with aircraft subsystems and survival gear. The projects engineers, working quickly, developed a way to mount the blower on the aircraft in the same location as the M43 blower. In an emergency, the blower could be dismounted in seconds to facilitate the aviator s egress from the aircraft. Minimal modifications were required for the blower unit. The new M48 is undergoing testing and has passed every requirement so far. If fully funded, fielding to the full Army Acquisition Objective will occur in 2003. Until the M48 is fielded, Apache aviators continue to use the M43-series masks. The M43s are reaching the end of their service life. In fact, SBCCOM engineers are visiting units in the Army Reserve, National Guard, and Active Army to check on the masks. Their results show that aviators (like most soldiers) are not conducting preventive maintenance checks and services and correcting or reporting deficiencies. Cracked motor blowers and badly maintained masks abound. The M45 aircrew protective mask was also adopted in 1996. This mask would replace any M24 masks and

Two views of a transparent mock-up of the M45 mask; the standard version is black. July 32 2002

M43 Type II masks in the system. The M45 took lessons learned from the M40 mask and was designed using modern plastics. It was Virtually all injection-molded composite and silicone rubber. Assembled using modern production methods and ultrasonic welding. Designed to fit under the aviators helmet and allowed the use of night-vision equipment. Lightweight and available in extra small, small, medium, and large with replaceable nosecups for a customized fit. The filter could be attached to the mask either on the cheek or on a hose attached to the belt or body. With front and side voicemitters, the mask can be used for face-toface and phone communications. To eliminate lens fogging, the design forced the air from the filter over the eye lenses before entering the mouth area to be inhaled. To ensure a good seal, the mask used an in-turned periphery on the mask. While a blower unit could be attached, it was not required because of the excellence of the design. This was the first aviation mask that could be used as a universal general-purpose mask. It is currently in use in the Land Warrior program. Because of this adaptability, aircrew was dropped from the designation in 1997. This mask is quickly replacing the M24 mask as the standard mask for non-Apache aviators.

The 2000s
Current aviator masks work extremely well, but they are built for the low-level Army aviator. They cannot be attached to the Navy and Air Force oxygen systems and are not fully tested for high-speed flight use. In the continuing interest of standardization, a joint projectthe Joint Services Aircrew Mask (JSAM) Programto design a standard mask for aviators is ongoing. JSAM will provide maximum compatibility and the best protection for all aviators, while easing the Armed Forces logistical burden. The Army is a full partner in this program. Expect to hear much about this mask in the future.

The aviation protective mask has undergone continuous development. As technology changes, the masks became more effective in protecting the aviator and less burdensome to wear. The original masks provided the requisite protection but were not completely adequate for long-term performance. The current masks represent the latest in military technology. They provide the best possible protection against chemical and biological agents while reducing aviator fatigue. Future masks will provide the best protection for all services and lessen impacts on the supply system.

References Aviation Gas Mask Development, Request for Clarification of Military and Technical Characteristics, Office of the Chief, Chemical Warfare Service, 29 June 1943. Cancellation of the Aviation Gas Mask as Service Test Type and Cancellation of the Military Requirement Therefore, Item 1621, Chemical Warfare Technical Committee, 13 July 1946. Cancellation of the Aviation Gas Mask as Service Test Type and Cancellation of the Military Requirement Therefore, Item 1692, Chemical Warfare Technical Committee, 24 September 1946. Decker, Richard. (Project Officer), Test Report Development Test II (PQT-G) of XM33 Protective Mask, Hood, and Combat Spectacles, Systems Test Division, U.S. Army Aviation Development Test Activity, Fort Rucker, Alabama, December 1982. Edgewood Quarterly Issue 5, March 1995, ATTN: SCBRD-AIC, APG, Maryland 21010-5423. Edgewood Quarterly Issue 10, January 1997. Final Engineering test of Mask, Protective, Helicopter, E75R2, with the E34 Protective Hood Engineering Test Branch, Test Design and Analysis Office, Tech Operations Directorate, Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah, August 1960. Final Report on Test of Assault Type Gas Mask for Use by Airplane Crew Members, Proof Department, AAF Proving Ground Command, Eglin Field, Florida. 16 December 1943., opened 0750 hrs, 28 December 2001. Letter, CMLPD-CE, DA Office of the Chief Chemical Officer, Washington 25, DC, Item 3312, Subject: Report of Project Nr AVN 1155, Evaluation of Gas Mask for Helicopter Aviators (DA Proj Nr 480-12-007-02; RDB Tech Obj CW-46), 23 April 1957. Memorandum, Edgewood Arsenal, Mechanical Division, Subject: The Gas Mask, 26 March 1927. M45 Aircrew Chemical-Biological Mask System, Edgewood Enterprise, January 1997. M48/M49 C-B Aircraft Mask Edgewood Enterprise, May 1997. Revised Military Characteristics for Aviation Gas Mask, Item 1280, Chemical Warfare Technical Committee, 22 March 1945. Smart, Jeffrey, History of the Army Protective Mask Powerpoint Presentation, ATTN: AMSSB-PM-RNN E4465, U.S. Soldiers Biological and Chemical Command, Edgewood, Maryland, October 1999. TM 3-4240-280-10, Mask, Chemical-Biological, Aircraft, M24, March 1976. TM 3-4240-312-12 & P, Mask, Chemical-Biological, Aircraft, M43, June 1988. TM 3-4240-341-10, Mask, Chemical-Biological, M45, May 1998. Lieutenant Colonel Walk is an Active Reserve chemical officer currently attending the Army War College. He previously served as WMD training officer and executive officer in the G-3, United States Army Reserve Command. Other assignments included chemical officer positions in the 84th Ordnance Battalion and 60th Ordnance Group; acting battalion commander, 1st Battalion 377th Regiment; commander, HHC, 59th Ordnance Brigade; and commander, 184th Chemical Detachment.

CML 33

By Lieutenant Colonel Tom Woloszyn

Umatilla Chemical depots chemical limited area

Looking for a unique and rewarding leadership experience? Commanding a chemical depot or chemical storage facility may be just what youre looking for. Current force structure removed junior officers from the table of distribution and allowances (TDA) several years ago. Company-grade officers soon may find themselves in such an organization for the first time when they assume battalion-level command. My goal, therefore, is two-foldoffer an introduction to depot operations and discuss some challenges a commander might face, based on my command experiences at the Armys Umatilla Chemical Depot (UMCD) near Hermiston, Oregon. Introduction
MCD is in northeastern Oregon. The 20,000-acre depot with its 1,001 concrete, steel-reinforced, earth-covered igloos plus other buildings opened in 1941 as a conventional ammunition and warehouse facility. During World War II, the Army transferred and temporarily stored chemical weapons at the depot. It received its current chemical weapons stockpile between 1962 and 1969. The stockpile includes 3,717 tons of chemical weapons and bulk containers with the warfare agents GB (sarin), VX, or HD (mustard). The depot has about 12 percent of the countrys original stockpile, which includes more than 220,000 itemsM55 rockets, bombs, projectiles, land mines, and mustard stored in bulk ton containers. Between the 1940s and 1970s, the United States manufactured and ultimately stockpiled massive amounts of chemical warfare agents as a deterrent against attacks. But times changed; the stockpiles were never used, and in 1986, Congress legislated that the Defense Department destroy all chemical warfare agents. Further, the U.S. Senate ratified the international Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Treaty in 1997, which prohibits manufacturing, selling, or using chemical weapons. The treaty requires that all chemical weapons stockpiles be destroyed by 2007. It also permits regular unannounced inspections by
July 2002 34

teams from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)headquartered in The Hague, Netherlandsto ensure treaty compliance. These inspections usually occur annually and include escorts from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Many normal depot operations are suspended when the team arrives and while it conducts a 100 percent inventory of the depots stockpile, which could take up to 5 days. Ultimately, the OPCW will have offices on UMCD to observe and verify chemical weapons disposal operations. The first congressional Base Realignment and Closure Commission realigned UMCD in 1988. Expecting the depot to ultimately close, the Army moved all its conventional ammunition out by 1994. Today the depots primary mission focuses on safely and securely storing its chemical weapons while awaiting its ultimate demilitarizationdisposalin the depots new Umatilla Chemical Demilitarization Facility (UMCDF). The depots mission involves security operations, ammunition monitoring, and emergency response functions. In addition, its mission-essential task list includes supporting the chemical demilitarization program, CWC inspections, and routine installation support operations. UMCD is currently authorized 178 civilian employees to accomplish its mission. That number will increase to more than 320 to support the demilitarization project. There are four directorates on the depots TDA: chemical operations, security, risk management, and public works

plus the headquarters staff. The depot also has its own fire department and is supported by an occupational health clinic staffed by an Army doctor and six Army medics assigned to Madigan Army Medical Center, Fort Lewis, Washington, with duty at Umatilla. While the Oregon National Guard and American Red Cross use a few depot buildings and igloos, the UMCDF is the depots major tenant. The facility will ultimately destroy all of the depots chemical weapons and waste resulting from the disposal and storage operations. Employees from the U.S. Army Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization (PMCD); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; Washington Group, International (its prime contractor); and numerous subcontractors such as Southwest Research Institute work at the facility. After 4 years of construction, the focus at UMCDF is now on supporting plant systemization and ramping up personnel, equipment, and real property to support the $1.3 billion project. When fully operational, about 650 contract employees will operate and maintain the facility for daily, round-the-clock operations. It will probably take another 4 years to destroy the depots chemical weapons stockpile. Again, the depots primary mission is safe and secure static storage of its chemical weapons. Moving the weapons is deliberately minimized to maximize workers safety. A stringent monitoring program is key to ensuring safety.

A typical GB chemical bunker operation with RTAP and M-21A1 decontamination apparatus

Depot Operations

onitoring and alarm systems are somewhat different than in the field. The depots systems are commercially available and can detect agents at more precise and sensitive levels than in the field Army. The depot uses nine real-time analytical platforms (RTAPs), more simply described as mobile airmonitoring laboratories. These vehicularmounted, mobile air-monitoring systems use a combination of commercially available HewlettPackard gas chromatographs and mini, automatic chemical agent alarms to detect chemical agent vapors in a real-time mode. For example, an RTAP can detect agent vapors down to 17 parts per trillion of GB. Igloo headwall monitoring is a routine procedure. It is performed either daily or weekly, depending on the propensity for a weapon type or production lot to leak. In addition, headwall

8-inch GB projectiles

Enhanced on-site container designed to transport agents on the depot CML 35

monitoring using an RTAP is done before anyone opens and enters a storage igloo. Enhanced surveillance monitoring inspections (ESMIs) involve randomly sampling the air inside the M55 rockets fiberglass shipping and firing tubes. About 1,200 ESMI samples are processed monthly and tested in the depots laboratory. A positive reading indicates vapor leaks within the shipping and firing tube and is identified as a leaker. Quarterly visual igloo inspections complement the program. This program helps ensure that leaks are identified long before they are visible as liquid and hazardous to the workforce, public, or environment. Since 1984 when the depot initiated its current monitoring procedures, its crews have detected about 185 leakers. Overpacking is the standard procedure for handling most leaking weapons. Leaker containment for nerve agent-filled weapons is a somewhat regular operation involving power filtering a structure, followed by entry wearing full protective gear. The leaking weapon must be identified and then overpacked in a larger container. Finally, the overpacked weapon is moved to one of two storage igloos housing other overpacked munitions with the same chemical agent. These structures are monitored daily. Similar to tactical mission-oriented protective posture levels, there are several protective levels for the chemical weapons workers. However, instead of battle-dress overgarments, agent workers use a full range of protective gear from rubber, toxicological-agent protective suits to Trelchem self-contained suits. Personnel also use the M40 mask and are issued nerve agent antidote kits. The depots operations center (OC) is staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week with at least two trained specialists to help ensure workers safety and monitor operations. It functions as the depots tactical operations center (TOC) and monitors all depot operations. The OC also serves as a critical communications node for notifying off-post jurisdictions of depot events and emergencies that may have community impacts and/or media attention. Umatilla is unique as it sits astride two counties and is five miles from the Columbia River, a major waterway, and Washington State. This requires a communications capability to not less than 10 county- and state-level emergency operations centers (EOCs). UMCDs OC performs chemical hazard analysis, such as monitoring, inventory, and overpack before chemical weapons operations. This is done using realtime weather data from up to five depot meteorological towers and the Emergency Management Information System (EMIS), which employs a computer-based graphic hazard-plotting program called D2-Puff. This system plots agent hazards at three levels: 1 percent lethality for unprotected personnel, no deaths, and no
July 2002 36

effects. Furthermore, EMIS sends this information and the plots to the surrounding community EOCs and interfaces with their federal EMIS. Thus, information and hazard plots are shared almost instantaneously with community emergency-management officials. They use the data to track the depots daily operations. During exercises and for depot emergencies, community officials use the depot recommendations to direct the public to either shelter in place or evacuate. The OC also activates depot sirens and has the emergency capability to activate community sirens. Force protection requires constant vigilance. Government civilian employees perform security operations, which is a 24-hour task and includes access control to the depot and active patrols within the restricted chemical-limited area. However, since the events of 11 September, a National Guard infantry company has augmented this civilian force. Electronic surveillance is a major component for chemical weapons security. A specially trained and equipped reaction team augments the security contingent within the chemical weapons storage area. Security exercises are conducted frequently and often at night. Public affairs plays a major role in depot operations. The depot makes every effort to bolster public trust in its operations and the future demilitarization process. Public interest in the depot is high, and contact with the media occurs daily. This is one area that can easily be overwhelming and an area in which the average chemical officer has the least amount of real experience. A new or inbound commander can expect to take one or two communications courses to prepare for the job. Regular public meetingssuch as the governors chemical demilitarization Citizens Advisory Commission (CAC), the communities Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) governing board, and public awareness and environmental permit meetingskeep the commander and public affairs staff more than busy. Emergency response operationsthe Armys Chemical Accident/Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) programbear many similarities to tactical decontamination and hazard response tasks. Training plays a major role at UMCD. There are frequent CAIRA exercises, monthly no-notice command post exercises for the EOC/staff crisis response team, and an annual largescale evaluated exercise. The depot also participates in an annual communitywide exercise supporting the CSEPP. These externally evaluated events are similar to a tactical external evaluation and include using simulated weapons, moulage kits, helicopter medical evacuation, and a commanders press conference at the community joint-information center using real and mock reporters. Evaluators include representatives

from the Department of the Army, FEMA, contractors, and augmentees from other chemical depots or activities. The exercise closes with a comprehensive depot and community after-action review. State and county CSEPP officials are key to the depots success. There must be interface and communication with these groups. The officials report to their elected officials and, in many cases, have been with the local CSEPP for several years and are an important information source.

s UMCDs commander, this disposal project required much coordination and obtaining at least a working knowledge of Trelchem protective ensemble training for chemical workers the demilitarization process. The U.S. Army Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization (PMCD), Edgewood Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, is responsible for the demilitarization program, which is administered locally by an on-site PMCD project manager and support staff. The Corps of Engineers has also been a significant presence with overall UMCDF contract management responsibilities. Add contractor personnel to the equation and the picture gets more complex. As UMCDs commander, I have had a role in the projects Fee Advisory Board, which determines contractual success and awards the prime contractor as part of the costplus contract. In addition UMCDs commander is co-signatory on the waste permits that state Chemical limited-area warning environmental regulators issue. I found the PMCD site manager a key player and team member. Ultimately, the depots success is intertwined with the demilitarization project. With different reporting commands SBCCOM for the depot; PMCD for the UMCDF; Corps of Engineers in Huntsville, Alabama,the relationship demands cooperation and teamwork. I found meeting regularly with site government and contract managers facilitated communications and working relationships. Environmental permits are mandatory for disposal operations to start. State regulators, in our case the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (ODEQ), have authority from the Environmental Protection Agency to oversee disposal operations and hazardous-wastestorage permits and ensure compliance with federal and state regulations. The ODEQs Security special-reaction team practices on depot range local regulator is a key individual who requires
CML 37

coordination and expects to be kept informed. For the Umatilla weapons disposal project, the ODEQ also maintains a physical presence on the depot totally focused on demilitarization and chemical weapons storage. Often, the relationship with the ODEQ has been difficult. For example, Oregon recently modified a statute and now regulates the depots entire stockpile as waste. This means the stockpile falls under their oversight and that of the Resources Conservation Recovery Act. The depot is now working with the ODEQ to finalize storage and monitoring changes to meet the new requirements, which will involve filtering igloos. The depot workforce are mature and qualified experts in their fields, especially those working with chemical weapons. At UMCD, for example, many chemical operations workers have more than 20 years ammunition experience. As with the entire federal workforce, many are eligible to retire within the next few yearsbefore disposal operations are complete. Hiring and maintaining a qualified civilian workforce will continue to present challenges. So, what does this all add up to for a depot commander? First, leadership as I know it and have practiced throughout my Army career still applies. Unions, a mature infrastructure, the absence of peers, and distance from the flagpole are new challenges. But, in the end, treating people fairly and with respect still works well for the organization. I found typical chemical officer technical skills easily transferable to the depot command experience. My experience with a TOC gave me insight into the depots OC. I also found many things in common with depot security operations and what I experienced in past assignments. Teamwork, cooperation, and communication are critical skills in dealing with the many disparate organizations on and off the depot, each with its own agenda. The local communities have played, and will continue to play, an important role in the depots life. Communities certainly can impact a commanders success. Proactive personal involvement, presence, and persistence with local communities and elected officials are essential. In general, the public here respects this leadership position

and its responsibilities. I believe in such command positions as this one; the commander needs to be seen as supporting the community and as an Army representative. Answering queries about depot issues is a given with the general public and elected officialsfrom local mayors, to state and U.S. congressmen and senators, to the governor. In small communities such as those surrounding UMCD, the public and elected officials look to the depot commander as a spokesman for the depot, for expertise, and for answers to their questions. They also look to the commander for reassurance that the depot is safe and prepared for an emergency. Again, their support for the depot and the demilitarization program are instrumental.

ommanding a chemical depot command is a challenge, but it has afforded me the opportunity to exercise leadership in a truly public environment. I gained a wealth of experiences, not the least of which has been leading thousands of miles from headquarters. Command at Umatilla has meant much learning in a very short time. This leadership role required trusting my instincts. While the communities do not get a vote on a depot commanders efficiency report, they are an important constituency with which the Army expects commanders to work. This article gives some ideas of a chemical depots operations and what a commander might experience. Future commanders will no doubt find this type command assignment deeply rewarding and, like company command, ending way too soon.
Photos courtesy of Mr. Scott Barton, Umatilla Chemical Depot Lieutenant Colonel Tom Woloszyn is currently the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) chemical officer. At the time of this writing, he was commander of the Umatilla Chemical Depot in Hermiston, Oregon. He has served in leadership and staff positions in tactical units such as the 83d Chemical Battalion and 3d Infantry Division and the 82d Airborne Division, where he served as the division chemical officer prior to command. He has a masters in analytical chemistry from Pennsylvania State University.

July 2002 38

The Chemical Officer in the Digitized Artillery Battalion

By Captain Obert Cantave Digitization did not change the role of the chemical officer (ChemO) in the digitized artillery battalion. It enhanced the ability of the ChemO to plan and conduct nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) operations. Although many pieces of equipment were not designed with the ChemO in mind, most of the Army Battle Command System (ABCS), the Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS), and the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) can be used to plan and process NBC information.
This article covers the Concept of ABCS. Structure of digitized artillery units. Changes in the tactical operation center (TOC). Distribution of ABCS equipment and capabilities. Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN). Application of equipment by the ChemO. Required personal development and unit training. Scenarios illustrating the concept of ABCS. consists of general support to the division and direct support to an aviation brigade.

Changes in the TOC

The MLRS and Paladin battalions have different missions and weapons systems; although not interchangeable, their TOCs configuration and equipment are very similar. They both have an operations section, an intelligence section, a fire-direction-control section, and an automations section. The automation section, which falls under the S6, is a key addition to the artillery battalion. It is responsible for digital connectivity of the TOC. It ensures that all the ABCS and other supporting equipment can communicate to both subordinate and higher commands. The digitized artillery battalion cannot accomplish its intended missions or use its digitized advantages without communication; therefore, the automation section is a vital addition to the TOC. The automation section, along with all other sections in the TOC, is responsible for managing the Tactical Internet that links all the systems in the TOC to subordinate units and higher command. The Tactical Internet is designed to provide real-time, shared situational awareness. It consists of tactical radios linked with routers that allow digital systems to interoperate in a dynamic battlefield environment. Each section has primary means of communication to this Internet.

The ABCS Concept

ABCS integrates the command and control systems found at each echelon from ground force commanders at the theater or joint task force level to the individual soldier or weapons platform. The ABCS and software use broadcast battlefield information, as well as information from other sources, and integrates that information (including real-time friendly and enemy situations) into a digitized image. This image can be displayed graphically in increasingly mobile and heads-up display. With this concept, the Army decreased manpower and weapon systems in the artillery battalion and increased the combat capabilities of the systems through quick information relay with minimal operator interaction. What do the [new] digitized artillery units look like?

The Digitized Artillery Units

The digitized division artillery (DIVARTY) consists of a multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) battalion comprised of three batteries of six launchers each and a target acquisition battery and three Paladin battalions with three batteries of 18 Paladins each. Each Paladin battalion, although falling under the DIVARTY, supports a maneuver task force. The MLRS battalion mission

Distribution and Capabilities of Equipment

Each section in the TOC, except the automation section, has an Advance Field-Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). Its main purpose is to process fire mission and other related information that coordinates

CML 39

and optimizes the use of all fire-support assets. AFATDS is the heart of the artillery; therefore, it is distributed down to platoon level in the artillery battalion. It is used for different functions by the other sections in the TOC. The intelligence section mainly uses its AFATDS to process counterfire missions. Its primary intelligence processing system is the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS). This system was designed to pass intelligence information from higher echelon down to the battalionlevel intelligence section. It has a tremendous library of information on threat equipment and provides information on the employment of these assets. Although the ASAS and AFATDS can quickly pass information from system to system, they are not distributed at the soldiers level. The FBCB2 connects the individual soldier to the TOC because it is included in the crew vehicles. The FBCB2 is not just a glorified plugger. It allows the soldier to automatically send and receive positionlocation reports and command-and-control message traffic, to include graphical overlays. The Tactical Internet [network] provides the linkages to connect the myriad FBCB2 platforms across the unit. None of the systems described so far were designed solely to process NBC information. JWARN is one of the few systems introduced for this purpose.

JWARN consists of software and hardware components that link NBC detectors to tactical communications for NBC warning, reporting, and battlefield management. JWARN [hardware] is not available at the battalion level; however, ChemOs can obtain the software for use in the TOC. The software is available in the Maneuver Control System (MCS) but not in the AFATDS; therefore, the ChemO has to install the software on a laptop. On the laptop, the JWARN software is simply a planning tool. The ChemO can use its predicting ability to show a visual representation of NBC effect on the battlefield during the military decision-making process. ASAS is the best way to receive JWARN messages from higher headquarters. The brigade has to send the information received from their MCS to the ASAS. There are many other tools in the fully digitized artillery units, but the ones previously mentioned are the primary ones that the battalion ChemO will encounter.

pass NBC information up to higher command and down to the platoon level. AFATDS contains preformatted NBC reports to facilitate disseminating NBC information on the battlefield. Although AFATDS can communicate some information with the MCS, it cannot process the NBC data from the MCS. ASASs ability to communicate with the MCS makes it important to the ChemO. This system is not available in the artillery battalion TOC, but it is the heart and soul of the maneuver units TOC. Maneuver units pass most of their NBC information through the MCS. ASAS is the artillery battalions primary link to NBC information from maneuver units; therefore, a good relationship with the intelligence section is necessary to obtain critical NBC information in a timely manner. The ChemO can always rely on the intelligence section to obtain chemical downwind messages if he is not receiving them from the brigade combat team or the DIVARTY. ASAS also provides the ChemO with the enemy situation, which enhances his situational awareness of the battlefield. With the information, the ChemO is able to disseminate important NBC information to subordinate units and analyze the enemys course of action to prevent NBC contamination of the battalion. The information passed by the ASAS and AFATDS is transparent to most soldiers in the unit; the FBCB2 is the ChemOs direct link to the soldier. The FBCB2 possesses all of the NBC reports. It allows the ChemO to view the battlefield at the soldiers level and, therefore, increases the accuracy of the NBC reports. He can look at an FBCB2 screen and eliminate duplicate NBC reports. Everyone within the network is able to see and respond to information passing via the FBCB2.

Personal Development and Unit Training

Personal development and unit training are two tools the ChemO needs in the digitized artillery battalion. His job is to advise the unit on smoke and NBC defense operations on the battlefield and to properly use these added assets to enhance NBC defense operations in the TOC. Personal development is training ones self to understand the capabilities and applications of the different types of equipment. There will not be enough time to attend most of the training scheduled for the equipment operators; however, participation in unit-level training events is highly recommended to become familiar with the equipment. Another way to train on the equipment is to practice preparing, sending, and receiving NBC information during field-training exercise. The ChemO, with the help of

ChemOs Application of Equipment

AFATDS is one of the most important tools for the ChemO in the TOC. The ChemO can use AFATDS to

40 July 2002

operators, can prepare NBC situations involving preparing, sending, and receiving NBC information to subordinate batteries. Unit training includes training the equipment operators to send and retrieve NBC information on their systems. Training these operators starts at garrison and continues through field-training exercises. Train operators to identify NBC information on the systems, and show them what an NBC 1 report is. They need to know what it is to quickly identify and pass the information to the ChemO upon receiving a report on their system. Show them how to send NBC reports on these systems. The reports are there. They just have to input the information and send it wherever it is required.

The information gathering for both of these scenarios can occur in a timely manner without interrupting fire-support operations.

NBC contamination analysis is easier because everyone on the battlefield can see the contaminated areas and is able to bypass them, when necessary, without overestimating manual NBC reports. The FBCB2 shows the contaminated area after the operator inputs the location in the systems. The AFATDS operator can visually see the contaminated areas on his AFATDS and prevent his units from moving into a contaminated area. The ChemO must understand the capabilities of the ABCS and apply these capabilities to his advantage.
References Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (draft), U.S. Field Artillery School, and Fort Sill, Oklahoma, 1996. Cantave, Obert, personal experience, 4ID DIVARTY, Fort Hood, Texas, April 1999 to October 2001. Digital Operators Guide (DOG) Company and Platoon Level for FBCB2 version 3.1, Fort Hood, Texas, 1999. Fires, for the Digitized Brigade (draft), U.S. Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, 1996.

Using the ABCS (Scenarios)

First situation: Upon contact or observation of an NBC attack, the operator sends an initial NBC report to the unit using his FBCB2. The platoon operation center sends the information through its AFATDS to the battery operation center, which then sends the information to the TOC. The ChemO knows the location of the attack from the observers information gathered on the FBCB2. He sends an initial report to all subordinate units and higher headquarters. On receiving the NBC 1 report, he needs to verify the information and forward it to higher headquarters and subordinate units. Second situation: Q37 radar observes a large volume of rocket fire; the Q37 sends the targets to the S2. The S2 informs the ChemO on the Q37 radars observation. He instructs the S2 analyst to send an initial report of possible contamination and location from his AFATDS, or sends one himself using the AFATDS in the operations cell, to all subordinate units and higher and awaits the observers reports. On confirmation of a chemical attack, the ChemO sends out the NBC report.

At the time this article was written, Captain Cantave was a student in the Chemical Captains Career Course (Class 102) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. His previous assignments include platoon leader, 62d Chemical Company (heavy decon), Republic of Korea; battalion chemical officer, 2-20 Field Artillery Regiment (FAR) (MLRS); HHB 2-20 FAR executive officer; and DIVARTY chemical officer, 4ID DIVARTY.

Due to the world events of 2001, CML, Army Chemical Review is no longer available online. The table of contents pages for the last few issues are shown at the professional bulletins Web site, http://www default.htm. If you are interested in a particular article listed, send your request to: pbd@ mil. Type Army Chemical Review in the subject line and list the article(s) requested in the body of the message.

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By Captain Jennifer L. Bomark

Situation 1. A platoon leader (PL) makes a decision involving the platoons training. Afterwards, the commander criticizes the PL because he doesnt agree with the decision. However, if the commander had given his guidance beforehand, the problem could have been avoided. Situation 2. An executive officer is preparing for a brigade-level training exercise that the company will be supporting. The commander decides to have an officer work in an area in which she has no experience. She does her best to get the job done. When she shows the commander the finished product, he chastises her for not doing the job to his standard. Situation 3. A lieutenant arrives at her first duty station. She receives no formal initial counseling; her predecessor is clearing the unit and hands her the keys to her new office. The rest of the staff is senior ranking to her and are busy doing their jobs. She never really gets a good idea of what her role in the unit is, and none of the senior officers seem to care. The above scenarios happen to junior officers all too often. They are not given the guidance they need to succeed in the positions they are working in. The leadership around them does not take the time to develop these officers. Senior leaders need to improve their leadership skills to successfully develop junior officers. There are many effective keys to good leadership, but none is more essential than counseling, teaching, and mentoring. Together, these skills enable leaders to develop their subordinates both professionally and personally. This article covers basic Army doctrine and ideas regarding counseling, teaching, and mentoring to help leaders improve their leadership skills. company commanders or PLs entrance into the company. This gives the commander an opportunity to provide guidance to the PL regarding the platoons missions. Later, counseling is conducted on a quarterly basis for the commander to assess the PLs performance. This session also provides a time for discussion and feedback (that is, what the commander can do to help the platoon complete its mission successfully) about past, present, and future missions. The commander must look at the PLs successes and failures, as well as strong and weak areas. Looking at failures or weaknesses will help improve and strengthen these areas for the PLs development and the Armys benefit. There are two types of counseling: performance and event-oriented. The previous paragraph refers to performance counseling. However, at times, counseling may have to be conducted outside the initial and quarterly sessions. This is regarded as event-oriented. This counseling can be given for both positive and negative circumstances, such as specific instances of superior or substandard performance.

Counseling (Between a Company Commander and a PL)

Counseling is subordinate-centered communication that produces a plan outlining actions necessary for subordinates to achieve individual or organizational goals. From my experiences, the first counseling session normally takes place within the first 30 days of either the
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Conducting Effective Counseling

Effective counseling begins with preparation. FM 22-100, Army Leadership, provides step-by-step guidance for preparing for counseling, conducting a counseling session, and conducting follow-up counseling. Using this manual not only ensures that leaders cover all bases, but it also sets the example for their PLs, giving them a model to use for counseling their subordinates. For effective counseling, a commander must show respect for his PLs, have self-awareness and cultural awareness, display empathy, and have credibility. According to FM 22-100, he can show these attributes by Allowing PLs to take responsibility for their own ideas and actions (respect). Being aware of personal values, needs, and biases (self-awareness). Being aware of the similarities and differences between individuals of different cultural backgrounds and how these factors may influence values, perspectives, and actions (cultural awareness). Being understanding of and sensitive to the feelings, thoughts, and experiences of [PLs] to the point that [the commander] can almost feel or experience them himself (empathy). Being honest and consistent in [his] statements and actions (credibility). During the session, the commander must remain focused on the PLs performance. He must not stray into stories of his own days as a PL. This removes the counseling session from being subordinate-based.

Teaching (By a Company Commander to a PL)

Teaching gives knowledge or provides skills to others, causing them to learn by example or experience. It is a continuous process that provides PLs personal and professional development, which ultimately adds to the growth of the company and the Army. Without this skill, PLs cannot ensure that they are giving their platoons, as a whole or as individuals, what they need to perform their collective tasks to standard; develop themselves for positions of greater responsibility within their platoons; or even reach military or civilian educational goals. Teaching Requires Understanding A commander cannot assume that his PLs will know how to do everything he asks of them. If he discovers that there is something they dont know, he must not attack and criticize them. Anger and frustration will not make PLs suddenly know how to do it. There has to be a first time, and its the commanders job to teach them. Also,

an effective leader doesnt anger quickly at something done incorrectly; instead, he helps his subordinates find the mistake and teaches them how to correct it. The commander must understand that everyone learns in different manners and at different speeds. What comes easy to one person may be harder for another. Four methods of learning are watching others, visualizing, absorbing information, and doing it hands-on. The commander must observe and interact with his PLs to determine which method works best for each person. He must also be tolerant; the PL may need practice to become proficient at a specific task. The commander cannot allow a zero-defects mentality to take control. However, some situations require zero defects: for example, a life or death task such as proper maintenance on an aircraft. Teaching Takes Support For PLs to learn, the commander needs to actively support both personal and professional education inside and out of the workplace and fight for opportunities for them. These opportunities not only include schooling but also training resources and time. The commander has a direct link to the companys higher headquarters and must be willing to fight for the time and resources needed to prepare his unit for its wartime missions. The commander cant train his PLs or his company if the company is always bombarded with miscellaneous tasks. Teaching Requires Techniques There are many ways to teach and train, some are Officer professional development (OPD) programsThey should focus on the companys missions. Programs can range from how the military decision-making process works, to how to properly write an operations order, to how the Uniform Code of Military Justice works for specific instances that may be seen at company level. OPD programs are effective ways a commander can mold and shape PLs. Task listingsTasks the PLs must complete within a set time (i.e., a leader certification program). These tasks should be related to things pertaining to the companyfor instance, becoming licensed on the M12A1 decontamination apparatus; conducting a sensitive items inventory; commanding a longdistance, tactical-vehicle convoy; or learning how to place snow chains on a 5-ton truck. Commanders involvementHe should be involved in the PLs planning and executing. This is especially true if it involves a task the PL has never done. The PL is expected to prepare herself for the task to ensure the commander doesnt do everything. Knowing the Armys and the commanders standards will enable the PL to know
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what is expected of her. After the PL performs the task one or two times with assistance, the commander should assess the PLs ability to perform the task alone. Therefore, a commander must be open to new and better ways of completing a mission. He shouldnt dismiss the opportunity to learn ideas and techniques from PLs that could benefit the company. These ideas and techniques could range from ways of setting up the companys assembly area or command post to reorganizing the agenda for a training meeting. No leader knows everything; there is always room to learn more.

Mentoring (By a Senior Officer to a Lieutenant)

Mentoring is the proactive development of each subordinate through observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, developmental counseling, and evaluating that results in people being treated with fairness and equal opportunity. Continuous mentoring develops junior officers into the leaders of tomorrows Army. It can be done from inside or outside the unit or chain of command. The mentor nor the mentoree has to be from the same branch. Mentoring Inside the Unit or Chain of Command, Different Branch This can be helpful to a new lieutenant; for example, a chemical officer working in an aviation battalion. The mentor is able to inform the lieutenant about the aviation battalions mission, how her role aids the battalion, what the other sections in the unit are and how they relate to one another, and other basic officer-related topics (i.e., OPD). However, this mentor cannot give specific guidance on how to be the battalions chemical officer. Mentoring Outside the Unit, Same Branch A brigade or division-level chemical officer would be a more suited mentor when referring to the duties and responsibilities of being the battalion chemical officer. This person can better guide a lieutenant who is the only one of her branch in her unit. He can provide assistance and advice on conducting branch-related tasks and discussing issues and concerns relating to the chemical branch; for instance, what to do as a battalion chemical officer during a division warfighter exercise. Female and other minority-group lieutenants in the Army might also seek role models from outside the unit to fulfill important personal needs and concerns. Having someone to relate to in terms of gender or culture or other backgrounds that has successfully reached a

higher rank or position can play a major role in influencing and inspiring lieutenants to set and achieve high goals. Another benefit of outside-unit mentorship is having someone to turn to that is not in the lieutenants chain of command. Someone in the chain of command could be more stressful to the lieutenant than helpful. A mentor should be someone the lieutenant is comfortable talking with. Mentors Responsibilities A mentor is concerned and interested in the lieutenants potential career paths, daily challenges, and new work experiences. Good mentoring is part of developing the leaders of tomorrow. It begins with senior officers setting the right examples, and it requires a person who is willing to spend the extra time and effort away from his own schedule and duties to focus on someone elses job to develop that person. A mentor can also help guide a lieutenant on how to conduct a successful interview when competing for a company-command position or just be present during her briefing to show support and provide feedback. Wrapping It Up An effective leader must give as well as gain respect and have good two-way communication with his subordinates. Having an optimistic view of subordinates can cause them to flourish and excel in whatever they are asked to do. Leadership is influencing peopleby providing purpose, direction, and motivationwhile operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization. To achieve these goals and to develop future leaders that can excel require a leader who will take the time to mold subordinates through proper and thorough counseling, meaningful teachings, and endless mentoring.
References Department of the Army, Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 31 August 1999. Department of the Army, Field Manual 25-101, Battle-Focused Training, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 30 September 1990. Captain Bomark was a student in the Chemical Captains Career Course (Class 1-02) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, when this article was written. Her previous assignments include brigade chemical officer, 4th Aviation Brigade, and decontamination platoon leader and executive officer, 69th Chemical Company, Hanau, Germany. Captain Bomark has a bachelors in biology from the University of Arkansas, Pine Bluff, and was commissioned branch chemical through its Army Reserve Officers Training Corps program. She attended the Chemical Officer Basic Course at Fort McClellan, Alabama.

July 2002 44

A Platoon Leaders Guide to Inventory and Accountability

By Captain Timothy C. Herd The Importance of Accountability
Property accountability is one of many challenges chemical officers face when assuming the role of platoon leader. Upon arriving at a chemical company, incoming platoon leaders are inundated with learning many new systems, capabilities, and personnel. Although the system of property accountability has not changed much, it is an important process for leaders and soldiers to know. The reason is that these individuals are about to become handreceipt holders, which is a huge responsibility. This article discusses the importance of Establishing yourself as an organized leader with a thorough inventory. Learning about and employing the equipment that you are becoming responsible for. Avoiding pitfalls, which could jeopardize your accountability. Accepting responsibilities before, during, and after inventories. Possessing the resolve to account for equipment on a regular basis. As a leader, becoming familiar with the basics of these regulations is imperative. With this basic knowledge, you can avoid accountability errors and paying for items that could have been accounted for.

Getting to Know Your Equipment

As a platoon leader, learning the capabilities and how to employ your platoon and its equipment is achieved through training. It is also necessary to know what the actual equipment consists of. Thus, it is important to know the types of components and sets, kits, and outfits (SKOs) that exist within the platoon. The components of end items usually can be found in the technical manual (TM), and SKOs can be found in the supply catalog (SC) that covers a specific piece of equipment. You are probably asking, How will I find the current publications that cover the equipment in my platoon? DA Pam 25-30, Consolidated Index of Army Publications and Blank Forms, lists the equipment by national stock number or line item number. If the TM or SC for an item is not listed in DA Pam 2530, document it and locate a component hand receipt that identifies everything that should be on hand. Understanding what the platoon is composed of will allow a leader to employ all assets to maximum capability.

Learning the Regulations

Before arriving at a chemical company, most lieutenants were either assigned to staff positions or came straight from the Chemical Officers Basic Course. The bottom line is, they have little or no experience in inventory or property accountability. Learning how to access the appropriate regulations regarding property accountability will be of great assistance during a platoon leaders tenure. AR 735-5, Policies and Procedures for Property Accountability, outlines the responsibilities in terms of the types of property, hand receipts, and change documents and the frequency of inventories to be performed. Other key regulations that can assist in understanding accountability are DA Pam 710-2-1, Using Unit Supply System. Update 2-14, Unit Supply Update 14. FM 10-27-4, Organizational Supply and Services for Unit Leaders. FM 10-14-1, Commanders Handbook for Property Accountability at Unit Level. TB 710-5, Unit Commanders Supply Handbook.

Avoiding Pitfalls and Covering Yourself

Your goal is to avoid accountability pitfalls. Before starting inventories, research the platoon and the equipment for which you are responsible. If possible, talk to fellow platoon leaders, including the one you are replacing, to learn about the problem areas that they encountered as platoon leaders. Learning their pitfalls can help you avoid them during your leadership. Be sure to talk to the commanding officer (CO). He or she can enlighten you on the importance of accountability and give you some pointers based on experience. In most cases, your platoon sergeant and squad leaders will still be in their positions. They will be the continuity you will need to maintain accountability of all of the equipment during the transition. In addition, they can provide valuable feedback on methods that have and have not worked within the platoon. Most importantly, talk to your unit supply sergeant. He or she will be the most valuable asset

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regarding your hand receipt and ensuring that it reflects exactly what your platoon has on hand. If possible, conduct a review of the hand receipt with the unit supply sergeant so that he or she can answer any questions you might have. When conducting inventories, be sure to annotate any deficiencies. Keep detailed notes because often the equipment may be present but unserviceable. This will save you from having to conduct a damage statement or report of survey. Also, ensure that the items you sign for are present. Remember, an inventory is the physical count of supplies and equipment on hand in the unit (DA Pam 735-5, Survey Officers Guide). So, you should recall any equipment that is signed out. During an inventory, you may have missing items. If this happens, prepare a shortage annex. This annex documents shortages when issuing items to the supervisors of end users, and it lists only what is short from an end item that has components. Leaders will issue equipment or property to the subhand-receipt holders on sub-hand receipts. Use DA Form 2062, Hand Receipt/Annex Number, to list all major end items for which a sub-hand-receipt holder will sign. According to DA Pam 710-2-1, The sub-hand-receipt holder becomes financially responsible for all of the components, except those listed as short on an accompanying shortage annex or that are signed for using component hand receipts. A component hand receipt is a more specific method of accounting for items. One caution when using component hand receipts: the person issuing the property accepts responsibility for any items that are listed as short. So, be sure to have an accompanying shortage annex for component hand receipts. Also, all sub-hand receipts must be updated every 6 months.

DA Form 2062

Responsibilities Before, During, and After Inventory

There are several things that both the outgoing and incoming platoon leaders must do before starting an inventory. First, the outgoing platoon leader should recall all property loaned out and update his hand receipt to reflect any changes that occurred (that is, any unserviceable equipment). Together, both platoon leaders create
July 2002 46

an inventory schedule, keeping in mind the sub-hand-receipt holders, soldiers, and the companys training schedule. Try to have maximum participation from the platoon during the inventory. Schedule an open day for make up in case there is an issue with a certain piece of equipment. In addition, the incoming platoon leader should get a copy of the hand receipts and shortage annexes from the unit supply sergeant. There are many ways to avoid a long and painful inventory. First, keep track of who signed for what. One method to accomplish this is to write the name of each NCO next to the piece of equipment that will be subhand receipted. Write the TM/SC number and date so you can prove what reference was used for the inventory. This is important because the person who replaces you may have a more recent publication that lists components different from the one you used, which could make it appear as though you are missing items when you are not. If a TM or SC is missing, try to find a copy of it. Usually, the unit supply room or another platoon will have a copy. If so, make a copy of the cover and the pages that include the components of end items and basic issue items. The local military occupational specialty library may be another place to check. References may also be available online via General Reimers Library Web site. Once again, if a TM or SC cannot be found, inventory to the best of your ability and document that you did not have the proper references to verify components. Keep a list of the missing TMs and SCs and have your unit publications NCO order them for you.

Ensure that items with serial numbers are checked by serial number. Annotate any deficiencies or different serial numbers. If a serial number is different, inform the unit supply sergeant so he can check it. Remember, when sub-hand receipting property with serial numbers, ensure that the serial numbers appear on the sub-hand receipt. Most of all, during your inventory, stay organized. Create a filing system that will help you keep track of everything from the inventory. Once you have finished accounting for everything, verified all serial numbers, and documented all deficiencies, this phase is complete. After the inventory, you can hand receipt the equipment down to your sub-hand-receipt holders and users. Remember to create shortage annexes for any shortages. After all of this is done, you can sign your hand receipt. However, it is important to take your time and point out any errors to your unit supply sergeant before you sign. It is also a good idea to bring your files, from the inventory, with you when signing your hand receipt.

DA Form 3161

for a leader to keep a copy of the most current hand receipts in his possession. By doing so, a leader will know the equipment his platoon is responsible for, at all times. Conclusion Inventory and accountability seem like menial administrative tasks. But peers, subordinates, and superiors will value a junior leader who can account for equipment and personnel. The keys to keeping accountability are conducting regular inventories, updating the hand receipt, and maintaining organized files. Accountability can be a hefty task, especially in units with high OPTEMPO and high turnover. I hope that you will take something from my experience that will help you during this process and allow your unit to remain combat ready at all times.
Additional Reference Flanders, P. (2000), Change of Command Inventory 101: Tips on Counting Your Stuff Before You Sign, Armor, July/August 2000, pp. 25-44. Captain Timothy Herd is currently attending the Chemical Captains Career Course at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. His assignments include battalion chemical officer with 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, and dual-purpose platoon leader and executive officer with 71st Chemical Company (Smoke/Decon), 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.

Keeping Accountability
As a platoon leader, you will perform many missions. You will use the equipment that you just signed for to accomplish those missions. So each time your platoon concludes an exercise or mission, conduct a thorough inventory during the recovery stage. Usually, each company will have a recovery plan that documents the schedule of events. If there is no recovery plan, develop one and inventory your equipment. This makes it easy to update shortage annexes and fill out field loss and damage statements in a timely manner. Ensure that a DD Form 362, Statement of Charges/Cash Collection Voucher, is completed for all lost or damaged equipment. It is important to requisition replacement equipment to maintain unit readiness. Remember to update your sub-hand receipts. One way to do this is through your recovery plan. Another way is to conduct 10 percent inventories in conjunction with the companys 10 percent inventories. Plan to conduct these inventories by putting them on your platoon training schedule or calendar. It is important

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Eulogy to a Friend

Dr. Burton Doc Wright III (1945-2002)

By Captain Mike Ladd
Once in a great while, an individual actually becomes a foundation, a pillar, a vital part of a given institution. That person seems to embody the very ideals that the institution holds dear. I think its safe to say that if ever such an individual walked the halls of the United States Army Chemical School, it was Dr. Burton Wright III (fondly called Doc). As many of you already know, Doc died suddenly from a heart attack on Friday, 8 February 2002, while hospitalized in Springfield, Missouri. His passing was unexpected and shook not only the Chemical School family here at Fort Leonard Wood but also Dragon Soldiers across the Corps. Doc touched so many folksenlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers, commissioned officers, and civilians. His concern was always genuine and his aim true. His wealth of knowledge and ability to convey that knowledge was unmatched. Docs life was much like the fine cigars he sported so often. With every draw, with every breath, he savored life. He embraced every nuance, every sensation, and every enjoyment. Every memory I have of Doc was truly at his pace, at his pleasure, and always to our benefit. I remember asking a question in passing like, Hey Doc, hows business? only to wind up listening to the unabridged explanation of the subtle details of the Battle of Chickamauga. I remember, as a new lieutenant, briefing Doc on my Civil War personality and wondering if he was still awake as he listened, eyes closed, in sort of a trance. Of course, in true Doc fashion, he suddenly became animated when I strayed from the proper sequence and, complete with forced southern drawl, and impersonating some historical southern general, put me back on course. Lets face itDoc knew his business. It was during the last 2 years, here at the Schoolhouse, that I really got to enjoy the Doc. I cant honestly tell you how many students I sent to him for his special brand of historical mentoring. I would smile as they walked down the hallway towards his office, knowing that Doc would do everything humanly possible to answer all questionsasked and unasked. Doc was the 6th Renegade, our make-up call sign for the small-group leaders (SGLs). He was complete with SGL mug in hand and stogie in his grin and the first to
July 2002

join the ranks of the violators at every dining outs Grog Bowl. I can still see Docface red, body rocking in uncontrolled laughter, silly string hanging from his dress messas the mess president had us sing yet another chorus of the Chemical Corps song. Dr. Burton Doc Wright III was a consummate teacher, staunch American patriot, warrior, historical icon and, above all, a trusted friend. He will be missed. Dr. Burton Wright III became the command historian for the U.S. Army Chemical School in May of 1994. He received his B.A. in history from Creighton University in 1966 and his M.A. in modern U.S. history in 1972 and Ph.D. in modern European history in 1982 from Florida State University. Dr. Wright also did graduate work for an M.S. in communications at the University of Central Florida. As an Army officer, he graduated from the Infantry Officers Basic and Advanced Courses, Armored Officer Advanced Course, the Command and General Staff College, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Dr. Wright served as an infantry officer, administrative officer in the weapons department, mortar committee, U.S. Army Infantry School; assistant professor of military science and acting professor of military science, ROTC Department, Missouri Western State College, St. Joseph, Missouri; and instructor, Command and General Staff College, 2071st USARF School, Owings Mills, Maryland. Dr. Wright retired as a lieutenant colonel in June 1994. His military awards include the Army Commendation Medal and the Ranger tab. He was inducted as a member of the Order of the Dragon in 1998. Editors Note: Dr. Wright was a prolific writer, too. He had a sincere interest in the Chemical Corps and shared his vast knowledge of history through his writings for all its members. From the time he became the schools historian, Dr. Wright wrote numerous articles and book reviews for this bulletin, many of which he saw published. This bulletin, its readers, and I will miss him dearly.

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