PHIL FISHERIES vs.

CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS FACTS: Petitioner owned the Iloilo Fishing Port Complex which was on reclaimed land and consisted of a breakwater, landing quay, water and fuel oil supply system, refrigeration building, market hall and a municipal shed. Petitioner then leased portions of the IFPC to private firms engaged in the fishing business. Iloilo city then assessed the entire IFPC for Real Property Tax. ISSUE: Is the entirety of the IFPC subject to the Real Property Tax? HELD: NO. The Real Property Tax liability of the IFPC is only on portions leased out to private entities. PFDA is not a GOCC but is actually an instrumentality of the national government exempt from Real Property Tax. Given this, it will only be subject to Real Property Tax on the portions of the IFPC which is leased to private entities. It is not a GOCC since a GOCC must satisfy two requirements: (i) capital stock divided into shares and (ii) authorized to distribute dividends/profits. PFDA does have capital stock but the same is not divided into shares and neither is it a non-stock corporation because it does not have members. (Note: This was the same decision reached in MIAA vs. Paranaque (July 20, 2006) and again in MIAA vs. Pasay (April 2, 2009) where the property in question was the airport premises. In those cases, the Court additionally provided that other examples of government instrumentalities vested with corporate powers or what are know as government corporate entities are Philippine Ports Authority, BSP and University of the Philippines.)

IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by Presidential Decree No. 272 dated August 9, 1973 in order, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a term of 5 years, and when ISAs original term expired on October 10, 1978, its term was extended for another 10 years. The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation, which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines on November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land located in Iligan City and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSCs. Since certain portions of the public land subject matter of Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant owned by private respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also dated 16 November 1982, was issued directing the NSC to negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFCs present occupancy rights on the subject land. LOI No. 1277 also directed that should NSC and private respondent MCFC fail to reach an agreement within a period of 60 days from the date of the LOI, petitioner ISA was to exercise its power of eminent domain under P.D. No. 272 and to initiate expropriation proceedings in respect of occupancy rights of private respondent MCFC relating to the subject public land as well as the plant itself and related facilities and to cede the same to the NSC. Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail. ISSUE:

CRISOSTOMO VS. CA, 258 SCRA 134 (1996) FACTS:

Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA's term. HELD:

Crisostomo was appointed the President of the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC) by the President of the Philippines. During his incumbency, two administrative charges were filed against him for illegal use of government vehicles, misappropriation of construction materials, oppression and harassment, grave misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty before the Office of the President. Likewise, he was also charged with violation of Anti-Grant and Corrupt Practices Act with the Tanodbayan. As such, he was preventively suspended and Dr. Mateo was designated as the officer-in-charge in his place. Meanwhile, Pres. Marcos passed PD 1341 converting PCC into PUP with Mateo as President. Crisostomo was later acquitted and his administrative charges were dismissed. ISSUE: Did PD 1314 abolish PCC? HELD: PD 1314 did not abolish, but only changed the PCC into what is now PUP. What took place was a change in the academic status of the educational institution, not in its corporate life. Hence, the change in its name, the expansion of its curriculum offerings and changes in its structure and organization. As a general rule, when the purpose of the lawmaking authority is to abolish the office and create a new one, he says so. In the instant case, PD 1314 merely states that PCC is converted into the PUP. In addition, the law does not state that the lands, buildings and equipment owned by the PCC were being transferred to the PUP but only that they stand transferred to it. Stand transferred simply means, for example, that lands transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred to the PUP as the new name of the institution.

Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally associated with juridical personality but did not possess general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the Government. The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. ISA may thus be properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the Philippines. When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof such as, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties, functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines. When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be looked for in the charter of that agency and, by way of supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic. In the instant case, ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under P.D. No. 272. From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA's statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.
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US v ANG TANG HO FACTS In 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868. The Act 1) makes unlawful the monopoly and hoarding of palay, rice or corn and provides penalty for such violations; and 2) authorizes the GG to fix the quantities of sais products that a company or individual may acquire, and the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand. The GG thus issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold. A complaint was filed against the Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price. Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment and to pay a fine. Hence this appeal. ISSUE WON Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the GG to fix the price at which rice should be sold, is unconstitutional. HELD. YES. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the GG, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgated temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the GG. The Legislature does not undertake reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued " for any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the GG. The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to the discretion of the GG. The Act also says that the GovernorGeneral, "with the consent of the Council of State," is authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say the Legislature itself has no in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgment and discretion of the GG to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purpose of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the GG issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, but, if the GG found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime. By the Organic Law, all legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the GG, or any one else. The Legislative cannot delegate the Legislative power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the GG to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define a crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the GG, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void. Supreme Court of Wisconsin: "That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other department of the government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government established by the constitution. "Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may be provided that it shall become operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended.

The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend." It must conceded that, after the passage of Act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were promulgated by the GG, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was not crime. When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the GG which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the GG to say what was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn." Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the GG issued the proclamation.

PELAEZ v AUDITOR GENERAL FACTS: From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders. Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain from the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned. ISSUE: Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President does not have the authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department. RULING: Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Such control does not include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution.

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The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.

HELD: SC held that there was valid delegation of powers. In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no authority to promulgate the regulation, and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power

YNOT VS. IAC FACTS: Petitioner was charged of violation of EO 626 when he transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. Petitioner raised the issue of EOs constituitonality and filed case in the lower court. However, the court sustained the the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the petitioner. Therefore, petitioner appealed the decsion to IAC with the following contentions: 1. EO is unconstitutional as confiscation is outright 2. Penalty is invalid as it is imposed without the owner's right to be heard before a competent and impartial court. 3. Measure should have not been presumed 4. Raises a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President. ISSUE:

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative. Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception. Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power

Whether Executive Order No. 626-A is constitutional or not. HELD: Petiton is GRANTED with the following justifications: 1. Right of the petitioner to question for constitutionality is valid as theres no exigency showing to justify the exercise of this extraordinary power of the President 2. Properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destrcution 3. Case involved roving commission and invalid delegation of powers and invalid exercise of police power 4. Due process is violated because the owner is denied the right to be heard in his defense and was immedeiately condemned and punish The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to reasonably comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields. Power of Subordinate Legislation The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the power of subordinate legislation. With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute by filling in the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS. POEA FACTS: Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The widow filed a complaint for damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, based on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the latter which stipulated death benefits and burial expenses for the family of an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity of the memorandum circular. Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case. ISSUE: W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers

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EDU v ERICTA FACTS Galo, on his behalf and that of other motorists, filed on May 20, 1970 a suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the Reflector Law as an invalid exercise of the police power, for being violative of the due process clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970 with a manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent Judge would hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power. On May 28, 1970, respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed against the enforcement of such administrative order. SolGen filed MFR On June 9, 1970, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of injunction, hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition ISSUE WON Admninstrative Order No. 2 is invalid for being contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. HELD No. It is not to be lost sight of that under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an amendment, petitioner, as the Land Transportation Commissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, issue rules and regulations for its implementation as long as they do not conflict with its provisions It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability. To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.

The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. ustice Laurel: The principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: "It is well establish in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and proved for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect. All that is required is that the regulation should germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes ... " Chief Justice, Concepcion: "It is one thing is to delegate the power to determine what the law shall be, and another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in the execution of enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second category, if the law authorizing the, delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which "sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will." The Reflector Law, construed together with the Land Transportation Code, Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo. Disposition Petition is granted. The constitutionality of the Reflector Law and the validity of Administrative Order No. 2 issued in the implementation thereof are sustained.

ALEGRE v COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS FACTS The petitioner for a number of years has been and is now engaged in the production of abaca and its exportation to foreign markets. November 8, 1927, he applied to the respondent for a permit to export one hundred bales of abaca to England, which was denied, and advised that he would not be permitted to export the abaca in question without a certificate of the Fiber Standardization Board. He then filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the provisions of the Administrative Code for the grading, inspection and certification of fibers and, in particular, sections 1772 and 1244 of that Code, are unconstitutional and void. Section 1244. A collector of customs shall not permit abaca, maguey, or sisal or other fibrous products for which standard grades have been established by the Director of Agriculture to be laden aboard a vessel clearing for a foreign port, unless the shipment conforms to the requirements of law relative to the shipment of such fibers.

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Section 1772. The Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official standards for the various commercial grades of Philippine fibers that are or may hereafter be produced on the Philippine Islands for shipment abroad. Each grade shall have its proper name and designation which, together with the basis upon which the several grades are determined, shall be defined by the said Board in a general order. Such order shall have the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and for the dissemination of information, copies of the same shall be supplied gratis to the foreign markets, provincial governors, municipal presidents, and to such other persons and agencies as shall make request therefor. If it is considered expedient to change these standards at any time, notice shall be given in the local and foreign markets for a period of at least six months before the new standards shall go into effect. Section 1788. No fiber within the purview of this law shall be exported from the Philippine Islands in quantity greater than the amount sufficient to make one bale, without being graded, baled, inspected, and certified as in this law provided. CFI held that sections 1722 and 1783 of the Administrative Code, as amended, are unconstitutional and void. Hence, this appeal by defs. ISSUE/S 1. WON the law in question delegates to the Fiber Board legislative powers or administrative functions to carry out the purpose and intent (details) of the law for its more efficient administration HELD The act in question, is not a delegation of legislative power to the Fiber Board, and that the powers given by the Legislature to the board are for an administrative purposes, to enforce and carry out the intent of the law. The law provides in detail for the inspection, grading and bailing of hemp the Fiber Board with the power and authority to devise ways and means for its execution. In legal effect, the Legislature has said that before any hemp is exported from the Philippine Islands it must be inspected, graded and baled, and has created a board or that purpose and vested it with the power and authority to do the actual work. That is not a delegation o legislative power. It is nothing more than a delegation of administrative power in the Fiber Board, to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. In the very nature of things, the Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale the hemp, and from necessity, the power to do that would have to be vested in a board of commission. The petitioner's contention would leave the law, which provides for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp, without any means of its enforcement. The criticism that there is partiality or even fraud in the administration of the law is not an argument against its constitutionality. Disposition The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the petition is dismissed.

provided for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person, partnership, association or corporation a certificate or permit reciting that such person, partnership, association or corporation has complied with the provisions of this act, and that such person, partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or agents are entitled to order the securities named in said certificate or permit for sale; that said Treasurer shall furthermore have authority, when ever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or permit, and that an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance. Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional because no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which can guide said official in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby making his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result that, legislative powers being unduly delegated to the Insular Treasurer, Act No. 2581 is unconstitutional. ISSUE Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Internal Treasurer. HELD The SC is of the opinion that the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person, partnership, association or corporation applying therefor has complied with the provisions of this Act, and this requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied with. Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation is in the public interest. In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581 to protect the public against speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky and against the sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations, we incline to hold that public interest in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits. And the term public interest is not without a settled meaning. Rosenthal insists that the delegation of authority to the Commission is invalid because the stated criterion is uncertain. That criterion is the public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determinations. The purpose of the Act, the requirement it imposes, and the context of the provision in question show the contrary .

CERVANTES v. AUDITOR GENERAL This is a petition to review a decision of Auditor General denying petitioners claim for quarters allowance as manager of the National Abaca and other Fibers Corp. (NAFCO). FACTS Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of NAFCO with annual salary of P15,000.00 NAFCO Board of Directors granted P400/mo. Quarters allowance to petitioner amounting to P1,650 for 1949. This allowance was disapproved by the Central Committee of the government enterprise council under Executive Order No. 93 upon recommendation by NAFCO auditor and concurred in by the Auditor general on two grounds a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting managers salary to P15,000/year. b) NAFCO is in precarious financial condition. ISSUES 1. 2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over Government Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCC) implemented under R.A. No. 51 is valid or null and void. Whether or not R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control over GOCCs is Constitutional.

PEOPLE V. ROSENTHAL & OSMENA FACTS Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmea were founders and shareholders of the ORO Oil Company. The main endeavor of the company is to mine, refine, market, buy and sell petroleum, natural gas and other oil products. Rosenthal and Osmea were found guilty of selling their shares to individuals without actual tangible assets. Their shares were merely based on speculations and future gains. This is in violation of Sections 2 and 5 of Act No. 2581. Section of said law provides that every person, partnership, association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the Insular Treasurer the various documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-pesos. Sec 5, on the other hand, provides that whenever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is satisfied, either with or without the examination herein provided, that any person, partnership, association or corporation is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and
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DECISION 1. 2. 3. R.A. No. 51 is constitutional. It is not illegal delegation of legislative power to the executive as argued by petitioner but a mandate for the President to streamline GOCCs operation. Executive Order 93 is valid because it was promulgated within the 1 year period given. Petition for review DISMISSED with costs

BALBUNA VS SEC. OF EDUCATION FACTS: The action was brought to enjoin the enforcement of Department Order No. 8, series of 1955, issued by the Secretary of Education, promulgating rules and regulations for the conduct of the compulsory flag ceremony in all schools, as provided in RA No. 1265. Petitioners appellants who are members of the "Jehovah's Witnesses" assail the validity of the above DO, for it allegedly denies them freedom of worship and of speech guaranteed by the Bill of Rights; that it denies them due process of law and the equal protection of the laws; and that it unduly restricts their rights in the upbringing of their children. Since the brief for the petitioners-appellants assails RA No. 1265 only as construed and applied, the issue ultimately boils down the validity of Department Order No. 8, s. 1955, which promulgated the rules and regulations for the implementation of the law. ISSUE: WON Dept. Order No. 8 has no binding force and effect, not having been published in the OG as allegedly required by CA 638, Art. 2 of the NCC, and Sec. 11 of the RAC. RULING. NO. The assailed Department Order, being addressed only to the Directors of Public and Private Schools, and educational institutions under their supervision, can not be said to be of general application. Department Order No. 8 does not provide any penalty against those pupils or students refusing to participate in the flag ceremony or otherwise violating the provisions of said order. Their expulsion was merely the consequence of their failure to observe school discipline which the school authorities are bound to maintain.

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