1

Breaking from the Dialectical Method: The Trinitarian Structure of St.

Gregory of Nyssas Contra Eunomium
Daniel Photios Jones
University of Dallas
Patristic and Byzantine Theology

I. Introduction
St. Gregory of Nyssa, the youngest of the three great Cappadocian Fathers, wrote not
less than four treatises against Eunomius.
1
Three of these dogmatic treatises were defenses of
his deceased brother St. Basil of Caesarea. The latter fourth book was written in response to
Eunomiuss Confession of Faith (Ekthesis Pisteos). Gregory neither possessed the
administrative monastic qualities of his brother Basil, nor was he an articulate orator and poet
like his friend Gregory of Nazianzus, but as Fr. David Bals notes, Gregory was gifted with an
outstanding ability of speculative thought and was better acquainted with the Greek
philosophy of the day, especially, Middle and Neoplatonism.
2
It is this locus of thought that we
wish to investigate in this paper concerning Gregorys refutation of Eunomius, including an
evaluation of the dialectical structure of Eunomius doctrine of God, in which to use as a spring-
board to discuss Gregory of Nyssas own Trinitarian structure with a special emphasis on the
procession of the Spirit through the Son. Though the phrase dia tou Yiou usually having a
connotation associated with the debates that surround the question of the filioque,
3
this paper
proposes a fresh approach in examining the structure of Contra Eunomium and the bearing that
dia tou Yiou has for Gregorys Triadology.
We will first trace the underlying metaphysic of Eunomius and its inherent
subordinationism and internal dialectic, Gregorys aphophatic and non-dialectical approach to
the simplicity of God and co-equality of the Persons of the Trinity, and finally conclude with the
meaning that the phrase dia tou Yiou has for Gregorys Triadology in theContra Eunomium
corpus.
II. The Neo-Platonic Structure of Eunomianism

1
Johannes Quasten, Patrology III, p. 257
2
David Bals, cited in Encyclodpedia of Early Christianity, Second Edition, p. 497
3
Filioque: Latin meaning and the Son as later added in the Latin Creed by the Carolingian Theologians.
2
Gregory, being the subtlest of the Cappadocian Fathers in his analysis of Eunomianism,
detects what are two simultaneous subordinationist structures.
4
The first typelike Arianism
subordinates the Spirit to the Son to the Father,
5
that is, the Son and the Spirit cannot be of the
same essence as the Pro-Nicenes maintained since the divine essence is defined by the Personal
Feature of the Father, that being oytvvqo,:
[T]he one name [of the essence] is Unbegotten it cannot be [also called] Son, and if
[properly called] Son it cannot be Unbegotten.
6

And as summarized by Gregory in his own terms,
[T]he essence of the Only-begotten was not before its own generationfor he [Basil] did
not venture to say that He was before that supreme generation and formation, seeing
that he is opposed at once by the Nature of the FatherHe Who is without generation
needs not generation in order to His being what He is.
7

Unbegotten, for Eunomius, becomes the characteristic of the highest Being in the hierarchy of
Being, and he identifies divinity with this feature. The Father is identified with the essence, and
only the essence is ingenerate. Every other name that is used of God in Scripture both implies
and is synonymous with ingeneracy.
8
As with Plotinus conception of the One, where Being,
Activity, and Will are wholly indistinguishable
9
and identical, so are the divine names identical
with the divine essence in the structure of Eunomius and all convertible with the term
ingenerate. The very simplicity of God takes on a very dialectical
10
approach for Eunomius. The
One term oytvvqo, stands over against the Many terms for God. The reconciliation of this
One-Many dialectic, or rather their synthesis, is done by all terms being synonymous or
identical with oytvvqo, if applicable. Since any product of the divine essence must have this
one characteristic of oytvvqo, to be divinity itself, the lack of this characteristic indicates that
the product is not from the essence.
11
Since it is agreed on by all sides that the Son and the Spirit
do not share this feature, Eunomius argues that they cant be co-essential and co-equal with the

4
Photios Farrell, God, History, and Dialectic: The Theological Foundations of the Two Europes and Their Cultural
Consequences, p. 175
5
CE I, NPNF II, 5, p. 50: The whole account of our doctrines is summed up thus; there is the Supreme and
Absolute Being, and another Being existing by reason of the First, but after It though before all others; and a third
Being not ranking with either of these, but inferior to the one, as to its cause.
6
Apology 11:13-14; Extant Works p. 46-47.
7
CE III VI, NPNF II, 5, p. 203; c.f. CE III VI, NPNF II, 5, p. 200: If He was, He has not been begotten, and if He
has been begotten, He was not.
8
Michel Ren Barnes, The Power of God: Luvoi, in Gregory of Nyssas Trinitarian Theology, p. 175
9
Jon Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 77, 79: The nature of the One and its acts as the One must be wholly
indistinguishableIn fact the will of the One and its essence (ouoio) are identical.
10
Here I mean dialectic of opposition.
11
Barnes, op. cit., p. 178: Since Gods essence is ingenerate, any product of His essence must also be ingenerate.
But what is generated cannot have as its essence to be ungenerated; such an essence would include a contradiction.
(emphasis mine)
3
Father. Hence, Eunomius conception of divine simplicity as definitional and dialectical takes on
the following form:
(1) The Father is identified with the essence, which is identified as ingenerate.
12

(2) The essence of the dialectic with respect to the many divine names is the
reconciliation of their distinctiveness, or rather their reduction to absolute synonyms
and sameness with ingenerate. Simplicity operates as the great metaphysical (=)
sign.
13

(3) Any real distinctions are other than the essence. This is tantamount to the same
metaphysical paradigm given by Plotinus who stated that distinction is
opposition.
14
This means that any term that does not imply ingenerate is in
dialectical opposition to it. Ingenerate Generate
(4) Since the Son and the Spirit are distinct from the Father by their characteristic of
being generated, the first having one distinction and the latter having two
distinctions, they by definition cannot be co-eternal with the Father.
15

The second structure that is inherent in Eunomius is actually a five tiered structure that
compliments the first:
We recognize that the divine essence is without beginning, simple and endless, but we
also recognize that its tvtpytio is neither without beginning nor without ending. It
cannot be without beginning, for, if it were, its tpyo would be without beginning as well,
On the other hand it cannot be without ending, since, if the effects come to an end, the
action which produced them cannot be unending eitherThere is no need, therefore to
acceptthe opinionsand unite the tvtpytio to the essence.
16

We notice here that there is an interposition of energy between each essence that is produced.
Each essence has an energy that follows after it in the logical sequence of producing each lower
Being, but the energy is not without beginning or essential to each essence. The worry here by
Eunomius was that if the energies were essential to the essences they would necessarily be
productive and be co-eternal, thus not only necessarily producing the Beings of Son and Spirit
but also necessarily producing the created world.
17
This is because each activity produces works

12
This goes a step further than Arius who maintained that the essences of the Father and the Son are unlike each
other, yet never went to extent as defining the essence as ingenerate.
13
Farrell, op. cit., p. 108
14
Plotinus, Enneads III:2:16:54, Loeb Classical Library, p. 98-99
15
This is similar to Plotinus system of One-Nous-World Soul where the Nous is distinguished from the One by one
distinction of cause: an Uncaused Cause, and the World Soul is distinguished by two classes of causes: an
Uncaused-Cause and a Caused-Cause.
16
Apology 23:5-8,15-16; Extant Works p. 62-65
17
Gregory quoting Eunomius CE I, NPNF II, 5, p. 68-69: But perhaps some of the opponents of this will say, The
Creation also has an acknowledged beginning; and yet the things in it are not connected in thought with the
everlastingness of the Father, and it does not check, by having a beginning of its own, the infinitude of the divine
life, which is the monstrous conclusion this discussion has pointed out in the case of the Father and the Son. One
4
insofar as it exists,
18
which means that there is a corresponding existent with each activity. Each
one of these existents is absolutely identical with its own essence. Thus, the Eunomian system
takes on this 2
nd
dialectical structure shown:
(1) Father-Essence (Ingenerate)
(a) Energy of Father in producing:
(2) Son-Essence (Generate)
(b) Energy of Son in producing:
(3) Spirit-Essence (Generate)
Notice in the five-tiered structure of Eunomius that the Energy of Father in producing the Son
has the same logical status vis--vis the Son-Essence and like wise so do (b) and (3). The
dialectic of opposition here, however, is between the essence and energy, the latter being
incommensurate with the Being that does the producing of the other Being and is, therefore,
non-essential. Gregory makes a sweeping indictment of this view and its interposition:
He [Eunomius] declares that a certain energy which follows upon the first Being
produced, in the fashion of such a tool, a corresponding work, namely our LordBut
what is this energy which follows the Almighty and is to be conceived of prior to the
Only-Begotten, and which circumscribes His being?...And why do we go on talking of the
Almighty as the Father, if things which follow Him externally that produced the Son: and
how can the Son be a son any longerThe Holy Spirit also according to this sequence will
be found not in the third, but in the fifth place, that energy which follows the Only-
Begotten, and by which the Holy spirit came into existence necessarily intervening
between them.
19

The importance of this passage is to illustrate how the Eunomian system appears to multiply
constituents, from what is first thought of as three is actually now five. The dialectic at this point
appears to be breaking down and logically leading to absurd implications. In the Eunomian
system, we have what could be considered an arbitrary stopping pointperhaps even a
paradoxical pointof producing divine beings with the Holy Spirit. The question could be
asked why there couldnt be another supposed divine being produced by the Spirit and so on
down the hierarchy ad infinitum, since the starting points dont seem to be construed by
revealed truth but by philosophy in general. It is at this juncture that we could conclude that the

therefore of two things must follow. Either the Creation is everlasting; or, it must be boldly admitted, the Son is later
in time (than the Father). The conception of an interval in time will lead to monstrous conclusions, even when
measured from the Creation up to the Creator.
18
Barnes, op. cit., p. 193-194
19
NPNF II, 5, p. 58
5
Eunomian doctrine resembles Plotinus and not the Trinity as understood in the Christian
tradition.
20
There is a structural problem in Eunomius that must be further scrutinized.
III. Apophasis and the Divine Names
One of Gregorys insights in evaluating the Eunomian system is his recognition of the
change of names for the divine hypostases (from Father-Son-Holy Spirit) to the Gnostic
technique of taking old terms and assigning new meanings to themdictated by the
metaphysical assumptionsitself [rather than] Scripture:
21

[I]n professing to expound the mystery of the Faith, he corrects as it were the
expressions in the Gospel, and will not make use of the words by which our Lord in
perfecting our faith conveyed that mystery to us: he suppresses the names of Father,
Son, and Holy Ghost, and speaks of a Supreme and Absolute Being instead of the
Father, of another existing through it, but after it instead of the Son, and of a third
ranking with neither of these two instead of the Holy Ghost.
22

These terms are to be rejected by Gregory since they destroy the relationships between the Three
Persons and reduce the Hypostases of the Son and Spirit to impersonal entities proceeding from
an ultimately Impersonal Supreme Being.
23
The rule of faith as it were takes precedent over
any philosophical first principle. In fact, it is not a stretch at all to say that Gregorys religious
first principles are not one or synthesized with Hellenistic first principles, but this does lead
to the question of how we can know God and what the divine names (ovoo) signify for Gregory
in which we will now touch upon. Unlike Eunomious where names either signify different
essences, or in the case of Eunomius Supreme Being in which the names are all convertible to
ingenerate, Gregory has a very non-dialectical approach, and it is to this approach that we must
now trace out.
Gregory is insistent in exposing the dialectical system of Eunomius. In CE II he makes
an interesting argument that goes right to the heart of the issue of the divine names and its
identity relation between simple and ingenerate:
They say that God is declared to be without generation, that the Godhead is by nature
simple, and that which is simple admits of no composition. If, then, God Who is declared
to be without generation is by His nature without composition, His title of Ungenerate
must belong to His very nature, and that name is identical with ungeneracy. To whom we
reply that the terms incomposite and ungenerate are not the same thing, for the former

20
Paulos Mar Gregoros, Cosmic Man: The Divine Presence, p. 111
21
Farrell, op. cit., p. 170-171
22
CE I, NPNF II, 5, p. 50
23
Farrell, op. cit., p. 171; c.f. NPNF II, 5, p. 50-51: If those had been the appropriate terms, they would not have
mentioned, as they did, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, granting indeed it were pious or safe to remodel at all, with a
view to this innovation, the terms of faith; or else they were all ignorant men and uninstructed in the mysteries, and
unacquainted with what he calls the appropriate namesthose men who had really neither the knowledge nor the
desire to give the preference to their own conceptions over what had been handed down to us by the voice of God.
6
represents the simplicity of the subject, the other its being without origin, and these
expressions are not convertible in meaning though both are predicated of the one
subject.
24

There is a distinction to be had here between incomposite and ungenerate yet both being
predicable of the one subject
25
without confusing these two distinct realities. Moreover, Gregory
does not see this distinction as compromising the simplicity of God.
26
If these two properties are
not considered distinct, but metaphysically identical of the same reality, then Gregory would not
be able to predicate the property of incomposite of the Hypostases of Son and Spirit. To phrase
it another way, since the Son and the Spirit do not have the property of ingenerate and
(according to Eunomius) is considered to be identical with the term incomposite, then it would
be impossible to say that the Son and Spirit have the same nature as the Father. It is for this
reason that Gregory of Nyssa can justify the distinction. But what is the presupposition
underlining the Eunomian system of thought? Gregory moves from attacking the identity of
these attributes, to now what he sees as the basis of Eunomius rational confidence of knowing
the nature of God:
In order, then, to render their attack upon the Savior efficacious, this is the blasphemous
method that they have adopted. There is no need, they urge, of looking at the collective
attributes by which the Sons equality in honour and dignity with the Father is signified,
but from the opposition between generate and ungenerate we must argue a distinctive
difference of nature; for the Divine nature is that which is denoted by the term
ungenerateand declaring this to be sovereign and supreme they make this word
comprehend the whole greatness of Godhead, so as to necessitate the inference that if
ungeneracy is the main point of the essence, and the other attributes are bound up with
it, viz. Godhead, power, imperishableness and so onif (I say) ungeneracy mean these,
then, if this ungeneracy cannot be predicated of something, neither can the rest.
27

In other words, the dialectic of opposition among terms becomes the primary and sole means of
obtaining knowledge of the divine and this becomes not only the demonstration of knowing God
but also the very means of obtaining union with him. This is very similar to the Neo-Platonic
method described by Plotinus in the Enneads.
28
Though Gregory is not adverse to any use of

24
CE II, NPNF II, 5, p. 252, emphasis mine; c.f. CE III, NPNF II, 5, p. 195: [I]t is in his assault on the doctrine of
orthodoxy that he opposes the Godhead to the generateand this is the point he tries to establish by his words,
that that which is not ungenerate is not God.
25
In the case of Ungenerate the predicable Subject would be the Father alone.
26
Gregory continues, But from the appellation of Ungenerate we have been taught that He who is so named is
without origin, and from the appellation of simple that He is free from all admixture (or composition), and these
terms cannot be substituted for each other. There is therefore no necessity that, because the Godhead is by its nature
simple, that nature should be termed ungeneracy; but in that He is indivisible and without composition, He is spoken
of as simple, while in that He was not generated, He is spoken of as ungenerate. Ibid.
27
CE II, NPNF II, 5, p. 256
28
Enneads I:3:4:2-9, op. cit., p. 158-159: [Dialectic] is the science which can speak about everything in a reasoned
and orderly way, and say what it is and how it differs from other things and what it has in common with them; in
what class each thing is and where it stands in that class, and if it really is what it is, and how many really existing
7
dialectic in obtaining knowledge of things, his use of this method in distinguishing the different
order of Being between the sensible and intelligible and the uncreated and created would could
be considered dialectical,
29
he is nonetheless adverse to itor perhaps to its sufficiencyin
obtaining knowledge and understanding the distinctions in God. We must now look at the
distinctions that Gregory has in mind in relation to the divine names and his apophatic, non-
dialectical approach.
Gregorys response to Eunomius on the knowability of God is quite negative. Though
hardly monolithic at times, he strongly affirms that no human facultyeven of the angels
themselvescan have a knowledge of the ouoio of God. God in essence is incomprehensible and
unknowable:
There is no faculty in human nature adequate to the full comprehension of the divine
essence. It may be that it is easy to show this in the case of human capacity alone, and to
say that the incorporeal creation is incapable of taking in and comprehending that nature
which is infinite will not be far short of the truthYet if we weigh even their [angels]
comprehension with the majesty of Him Who really is, it may be that if any one should
venture to say that even their power of understanding is not far superior to our own
weaknessfor wide and insurmountable is the interval that divides and fences off
uncreated from created nature. The latter is limited, the former notThe former is
bounded only by infinity. The latter stretches itself out within certain degrees of
extension, limited by time and space; the former transcends all notion of degree, baffling
curiosity from every point of view.
30

This is not to say that incognoscibility of the divine nature should be taken in an absolute sense,
but it is a knowledge that is obtained by unknowing through faith. In other words, this is a
knowledge that is not obtained through rational discourse but rather through liturgical worship
of God and experiencing His works, which we will clarify here as Gregorys non-dialectical
approach.
31
This is so for Gregory because man can never broach the adiastemic boundary of
the essence of God. No human faculty and reason whatsoever that man possesses can transcend
his diastemic conception. The divine nature has only one name: the single name of being

things there are, and again how many non-existing things, different from real beings. It discusses good and not good,
and the things that are classed under good and its opposite, and what is eternal and not eternal, with certain
knowledge about everything and not mere opinion.
29
Here I follow Fr. David Balss lead in his synopsis of Gregorys Hiearchy of Being in ME1OY2IA OEOY, p.
34-52. But this student would argue that Gregory admits of a both/and dialectic of predication about a subject and
not an either/or dialectic of opposition. The Hypostasis of Christ is a case in point where you have two different
natures and opposite properties that exist in His One Person.
30
CE II, NPNF II, 5, p. 257
31
Archbishop Basil Krivocheine, Simplicity of the Divine Nature and the Distinctions in God, According to St.
Gregory of Nyssa, p. 78-79
8
Above every name.
32
All that can transgress the adiastemic boundary are the divine tvtpytioi
that flow from the divine essence:
33

God is not an expression, neither hath He His essence in voice or utterance. But God is of
Himself what also He is believed to be, but He is named, by those who call upon Him,
not what He is essentially (for the nature of Him Who alone is is unspeakable), but He
receives His appellations from what are believed to be His operations [tvtpytiv] in
regard to our life. To take an instance ready to our hand; when we speak of Him as God,
we so call Him from regarding Him as overlooking and surveying all things, and seeing
through the things that are hidden.
34

And,
We are clearly taught by Holy Scripture, by the mouth of great David, when, as by certain
peculiar and appropriate names, derived from his contemplation of the works of God, he
thus speaks of the Divine nature: The Lord is full of compassion and mercy, long-
suffering, and of great goodness. Now what do these words tell us? Do they indicate His
operations [tvtpytioi], or His nature? No one will say that they indicate aught but His
operations [tvtpytioi].
35

Gregory is clear from these passages that the names of God are the actual names of the divine
energeiai.
36
The name Divine Life, which man partakes of, is also conceived as energeia by
Gregory:
[T]he True Life is an actuality, actualizing itself.
37

Even the names to, and toq, are not names of the divine essence but of Gods energeia,
38

which gives Gregory a powerful argument in asserting the co-equality of the Hypostases. For if
the same operations are predicable of the Three Persons of the Trinity then this would point to
the undistinguishable character of their substance.
39
However, if the divine essence has no

32
CE I, NPNF II, 5, p. 99
33
Scot Douglass, Theology of the Gap: Cappadocian Language Theory and the Trinitarian Controversy, p. 87
34
CE II, NPNF II, 5, p. 265
35
Ibid.
36
David Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom, p. 163. Fr. David Bals
notes the same in ME1OY2IA OEOY p.114: The appellations Being ( He who is ) or real Being ,
therefore, are not to be taken, according to Gregory, as definitions of the Divine Substance. He later seems unclear
to what this distinction amounts to when he says, If they refer in a special way to the Divine Substance as opposed
to the attributes which we can predicate of It, they do this exactly by showing that this Substance has no name. This
does not mean their content is purely negative. Though they cannot penetrate into the content of the Divine Reality,
they indicate the Fact of this Reality, and also Its self-sufficiency and infinity. It is the purpose of this paper to shed
some meaning on what that distinction is (or perhaps not). It is this writers opinion that opposing these names to the
attributes of God would blur the very distinction at which Gregory means to maintain against Eunomius. I shall
make a further comment on this later when I discuss the divine simplicity and dialectic.
37
NPNF II, 5, p. 287
38
On the Holy Trinity, NPNF II, 5, p. 329; On Not Three Gods, NPNF II, 5, p. 333; c.f. Bradshaw, op. cit., p. 163
39
On the Holy Trinity, Ibid.
9
name to Gregory,
40
yet being known through its energeiai, it is the point in this essay to now
investigate the kind of distinction Gregory has between ousia and energeia.
IV. Non-Dialectical Simplicity
Before we proceed on with an analysis of the text of St. Gregory of Nyssa on the divine
simplicity, it will be helpful to recall the system of Eunomius. We must remember and take into
account that Eunomius emphasized to such an extent the absolute unity of the Father that any
attribute that could be predicated of the Supreme Being, were identical with ingeneracy, both
individually and severally to the point that any predicate is synonymous and indistinguishable
with this name.
41
The One divine attribute of ingenerate stood over against any other name: One
Name Many Names. All the other names are reconciled with ingeneracy by collapsing them
into this One by means of identity. This is the synthesis of their mutual opposition, and hence,
the essence of the dialectical method. With this in mind, we will now investigate Gregorys
view of simplicity.
As we have stated, so far, the strong apophasis that Gregory maintains in the knowledge
of God as well as situating the divine names at the category of the divine energeia, yet he is still
insistent that this does not contradict that God is simple. It would be wrong to think that he
maintains this out of polemical necessity against Eunomius. Simplicity is a doctrine held by
all:
42

He [Eunomius] declares each of these Beings, whom he has shadowed forth in his
exposition, to be single and absolutely one. We believe that the most boorish and simple-
minded would not deny that the Divine Nature, blessed and transcendent as it is, was
single. That which is viewless, formless, and sizeless, cannot be conceived of as
multiform and compositeSimplicity in the case of the Holy Trinity admits of no
degreesWe comprehend a potency without parts.
43


40
CE III, NPNF II, 5, p. 198: We are taught the fact of Its [the divine nature], while we assert that an appellation of
such force as to include the unspeakable and infinite Nature, either does not exist at all, or at any rate is unknown to
us.
41
Michel Ren Barnes is the most insistent on this point that Ive seen on the non-identity of the divine attributes for
Gregory and their exact identity for Eunomius. Quoting Gregory stating, In our teaching, the indicators in God of
connatural rank are deity itself, wisdom and power, and being good, [being] judge, just, mighty, patient, true,
creator, sovereign, invisible and unending, Barnes goes on to state, The contrast between Eunomius
understanding of indicators and Gregorys may be summarized in this way: Eunomius understands the indicator to
be identical to the divine essence, while Gregory understands precisely not to be identical with the divine essence,
op. cit. p. 289-290, emphasis mine.
42
Krivocheine, op. cit., p. 80
43
CE I, NPNF II, 5, p. 57
10
Gregory goes on in the same passage to make a reductio ad absurdum argument out of
Eunomius own conception of simplicity.
44
For if simplicity of the divine essence is the starting
point of theology and it is defined by the attribute ingenerate, how can he [Eunomius] than
admit of an absolute simplicity with respect to the Son and Spirit since they are really distinct
from the attribute of ingenerate? The implication would be that Eunomius could not admit of
Beings that are categorized by their difference[s] less and more without him unconsciously
establishing a composite and heterogeneous Deity.
45
But in Gregorys terms theyre starting
point is unfounded:
It starts from data that are not granted, and then it constructs by mere logic a blasphemy
upon them.
46

Gregory suspects the problem here to be in the ordo theologiae that Eunomius is starting with,
and that is the Neo-Platonic structure and its definitional character of the divine ousia as
ingenerate that we have stated. For Gregory, simplicity is precisely not the starting point, but the
reality of revelation in the Persons of the Trinity.
47
He then considers the Hypostases in their
connatural acts or operations (e.g. the power to create), to deduce that they are united in nature
and power.
48
Gregory hints at this proper ordo theologiae that first considers the reality of
Person and the Churches dogma of the Trinity in his Ref Conf of Eunomius:
For while there are many other names by which Deity is indicated in the Historical
Books, in the Prophets and in the Law, our Master Christ passes by all these and
commits to us these titles as better able to bring us to the faith about the Self-Existent,
declaring that it suffices us to cling to the title, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in order to
attain apprehension of Him Who is absolutely Existent, Who is one and yet not one.
49

Moving along in the same passage Gregory describes this relationship of one and yet not one as
also being indicative of the attributes common to the Three Persons: He is divided without
separation, and united without confusion.
50
We note that in these last two passages that
Gregory does not see the divine simplicity in opposition or in contradiction to the concept of

44
Ibid.: If he [Eunomius] had been thinking of a Being really single and absolutely one, identical with goodness
rather than possessing it, he would not be able to count a greater and a less [Father and Son] in it at all.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid., p. 56
47
That is, there is a problem of the relationship between Faith and Reason for Eunomius. For Gregory if logic is
contradicting the teachings of the Church, then there is a problem in the logical order that the questions are being
asked. C.f. Gregoros, op.cit., p. 119: For Eunomius the conclusions of strict logic are finally authoritative[for the
Cappadocians] the teachings of the Church becomes a criterion for evaluating the validity of the logic used.
48
Barnes makes an interesting insight here, op. cit., p. 237: Gregory uses the title divine powertio uvoi,as
his preferred title for God because uvoi, is as far back in the descriptive sequence tpyotvtpytiouvoi,
ouoio as he can meaningfully speak.
49
Ref Conf, NPNF II, 5, p. 102
50
Ibid. We should stop and recognize the Chalcedonian language here being applied.
11
real distinction.
51
Though the names of each of these energies are designations through a process
of intellection [tivoio],
52
it would be wrong to think of these attributes as solely epistemic
distinctions in the human subject, but rather, each of them signifying a distinct reality in God as
well:
If asked to define incorruptibility, say that it has the same meaning as mercy or
judgment. Thus let all Gods attributes be convertible terms, there being no special
signification to distinguish one from another. But if Eunomius thus prescribes, why do
the Scriptures vainly assign various names to the divine nature, calling God a Judge,
righteous, powerful, long-suffering, true, merciful, and so on? For if none of these titles
is to be understood in any special or peculiar sense, but, owing to this confusion in their
meaning, they are all mixed up together, it would be useless to employ so many words for
the same thing, there being no difference of meaning to distinguish them from one
another.
53

Or perhaps to make these realities identical to the divine essence, Eunomius tries to
[Throw] everything into confusion [attributing to Basil of]identifying the essence of the
Only-begotten with his operation [tvtpytio].
54

We must recall here something we stated earlier in the essay. It is a part of the Neo-Platonic
dialectic to reconcile all the distinctiveness that could be attributed to the Highest Being. As
Gregory points out in the previous passage, thus quoted in CE II, where he shows a certain
amount of frustration and astonishment that a theologian would attempt to convert attributes
like justice, righteousness, incorruptible with terms like simplicity and ingeneracy, it is his point
and insistence that we must reject this method on the basis of the truths in Scripture. Scripture
is the criterion for assess the validity of the logic that is used.
55

Gregorys doctrine of simplicity takes an even more interesting turn when we investigate
his meaning between the divine nature and what is around the divine nature (o tpi qv tiov
uoiv). Though Gregorys use of this phrase is far and wide in his writings
56
and too voluminous

51
Krivocheine, op. cit., p. 82
52
CE II, NPNF II, 5, p. 281: If, then, these words are given us, but not as indicative of essence, and every word
given in Scripture is just and appropriate, how else can these appellations be fitly applied to the Only-begotten Son
of God, except in connection with the faculty of conception? For it is clear that the Divine Being is spoken of under
various names, according to the variety of His operations [tvtpytioi], so that we may think of Him in the aspect so
named.
53
CE II, NPNF II, 5, p. 297-298
54
Ibid., p. 286-287
55
Gregoros, op.cit., p. 119
56
c.f. CE II, NPNF II, 5, p. 259: And so, too, all the other things which in the course of his reasoning he [Abraham]
was led to apprehend as he advanced, whether the power of God, or His goodness, or His being without beginning,
or His infinity, or whatever else is conceivable in respect to [around] the divine nature; Ibid., p. 264: [W]e allow
ourselves in the use of many diverse appellations in regard to [around] HimFor whereas no suitable word has been
found to express the Divine nature, we address God by many names fresh to our notions respecting [around] Him.
On Not Three Gods NPNF II, 5, p. 332: Hence it is clear that by any of the terms we use the Divine nature itself is
not signified, but some on of its surroundings is made known.
12
to treat comprehensively here, I wish to draw on one passage to make a point. There is a
distinction and non-identity between the subject and what is around Him:
For instance (for it is better to present an argument by way of illustration), when David
says, God, a righteous judge, strong and patient, if is were not understood with each
of the epithets included in the phrase, the enumerations of the appellations will seem
purposeless and unreal, not having any subject to rest upon; but when is is understood
with each of the names, what is said will clearly be of force, being contemplated in
reference to that which is. As, then, when we say He is a judge, we conceive concerning
[tpi, i.e. around] Him some operation [tvtpytio] of judgment, and by the is carry
our minds to the subject, and are hereby clearly taught not to suppose that the account
of His being is the same with the action [tvtpytio].
57

Each of these energies is predicated of the subject, i.e. the Persons of the Trinity. They have no
mode of existence, as it were, outside the reality and consideration of the Hypostases. They
exist only in a person, yet the energies are not identical with the subject and its being. Gregory
does not believe that this distinctionbetween the divine nature and what is around it
compromises the divine simplicity in any way. It is only if we take a dialectical or definitional
view of simplicity that this distinction would compromise the Trinitys absence of multiform and
composition. For if we do take a dialectical account it would amount to a difference in essences
which is precisely the point of contention between Gregory and Eunomius. Gregory could not be
anymore affirmative that Gods simplicity is non-dialectical:
For these terms are not set against each other in the way of opposites, as if, the one
existing there, the other could not co-exit in the same subjectbut the force of each of
the terms used in connection with the Divine Being is such that, even though it has a
peculiar significance of its own, it implies no opposition to the term associated with it.
58

One of the ways that Gregory uses to clarify this non-dialectical simplicity is the beautiful
analogy he applies with the simple human soul.
59
Just as the human soul is simple, immaterial,
and incomposite, it still possesses many different distinctionswith respect to its faculties and
activitywhich could be predicated of it:
Will it follow, because there are these various names of sciences viewed in connection
with one single, that that single soul is to be considered composite soul?...If, then, the
human mind, with all such terms applied to it, is not injured as regards its simplicity,
how can any one imagine that the Deity, when He is called wise, and just, and good, and
eternal, and all the other Divine names, must, unless all these names are made to mean
one thing, become of many parts, or take a share [participation] of all these to make up
the perfection of His nature
60


57
CE III, 5, NPNF II, 5, p. 198
58
CE II, NPNF II, 5, p. 298
59
On p. 127 of ME1OY2IA OEOY, Fr. David Bals sees this as an unfortunate answer. Though far from being
perfect due to the diastema of mans human nature, I see this analogy as a useful one to express this non-dialectical
simplicity.
60
CE II, NPNF II, 5, p. 300, emphasis mine.
13
We should not press this analogy to far though as this would confuse the adiastema-diastema
breach that we mentioned earlier, but it does tell us something about the kind of distinction that
Gregory has in mind. The unity of the divine nature is not in opposition to the many divine
energeiai. To state more precisely, divine simplicity is not in dialectical opposition to a real
multiplicity of distinction in God. Is it possible that we could reject and resist this
interpretation and possibly see this multiplicity on the created side of the ontological divide
between Uncreate-Created?
61
If so, we need to ask a question. How are we to escape the very
dialectic of opposition that Eunomius wishes to foist upon Gregory (i.e. that created being
differs and is in opposition to the Supreme Being because it is individuated by distinction)?
Would not this dialectic between simplicity and multiplicity of distinction not only compromise
the distinction between the divine ousia and the divine energeiai but also between the divine
ousia and the divine hypostases? Fortunately, Gregory denies this answer because there is
nothing which can be contemplated in God which has been created:
62

For seeing that it is clear to all that God Who is over all has in Himself nothing as a thing
created or imported, not power nor wisdom, nor light, nor word, nor life, nor truth, nor
any at all of those things which are contemplated in the fullness of the Divine bosom (all
which things the Only-begotten God is, Who is in the bosom of the Father), the name of
creation could not properly be applied to any of those things which are contemplated in
God, it would follow, has His Wisdom as a thing imported, receiving afterwards, as the
result of making, something which He had not at first.
63

We cannot brush aside this passage for it is striking. Gregorys argument here is simple.
Regarding the virtue of being uncreate, the many appellations that are contemplated in and
around God have the same logical status as the Person of the Logos. If the Logos is a creature,
than the many divine names are created realities. If the Logos is uncreate, so are the divine
energeiai that we perceive [tvvoio].
It is possible to summarize point-by-point possible interpretations of Gregorys doctrine
of divine simplicity that should be precluded:
64

(1) If any interpretation of the divine simplicity where unity precludes distinctions in
God is to be rejected.
(2) If any interpretation asserts that these distinctions imply a definition of distinction
is opposition to the divine nature is to be rejected.
65


61
Bals, op. cit., p. 128. In rejection of the Palamite real distinction in God, Bals wishes to place all the
multiplicity of the divine names that are around the divine nature in created effects.
62
Krivocheine, op. cit., p. 98, emphasis mine.
63
CE III, I, NPNF II, 5, p. 140
64
It is not my point here to try and circumscribe Gregory on divine simplicity, but to list points that I think should
be avoided, less we are to make Gregory the victim of Eunomius dialectical arguments.
14
(3) Interpretations that assert unity in opposition to multiplicity are also to be rejected
as this would undermine Gregorys defense of the unity and uniqueness of the divine
Hypostases.
(4) If the interpretation of divine simplicity obscures the reality of the divine names as
making them all identical both individually and severally with the divine ousia, it is
to be rejected.
(5) And finally, if the interpretation of simplicity emphasizes multiplicity to the extent
that the divine nature is seen as compositional or compounded in separation such
that the unity of the Persons of the Trinity would be destroyed is also to be equally
rejected.
V. Lio Yiou, the Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit, and Dialectic
So far we have traced out Gregorys break up of Eunomius use of dialectic. In this part
we will look at the meaning of io Yiou in the Contra Eunomium. It is precisely within this
context that is has a non-dialectical meaning. However, we shall first investigate a problem in
some other texts of Gregory that would oppose this thesis. In Gregorys De Oratione Dominica,
which for purposes here we will assume the passage in the work to be authentic,
66
he appears to
have a Trinitarian structure similar to Eunomius, specifically, in what perhaps could be
considered the Spirit originating from two classes of causes. Well quote the text here in full:
I say, that the nature of the Holy Trinity has been shown to be one, though not confused
as regards the properties which belong to each Person as His special characteristic, since
their special features are not changed into each other. Hence the characteristic of the
Fathers Person cannot be transferred to the Son or the Spirit, nor, on the other hand,
can that of the Son be accommodated to the one of the others, or the property of the
Spirit be attributed to the Father and the Son. But the incommunicable distinction of the
properties is considered in the common nature. It is the characteristic of the Father to
exist without cause. This does not apply to the Son and the Spirit; for the Son went out
from the Father, as says Scripture, and the Spirit proceedeth from God and from the
Father. But as the being without cause, which belongs only to the Father, cannot be
adapted to the Son and the Spirit, so again the being caused, which is the property of the
Son and of the Spirit, cannot by its very nature, be considered in the Father. On the other
hand, the being not ungenerated is common to the Son and to the Spirit; hence in order
to avoid confusion in the subject, one must again search for the pure difference in the
properties, so that what is common be safeguarded, yet what is proper be not mixed. For
He is called the Only-Begotten of the Father by the Holy Scripture; and this term
establishes His property for Him. But the Holy Spirit is also said to be from the Father,
and is testified to be the Sons. For it says: If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is
none of His. Hence the Spirit that is from God is also Christs Spirit; but the Son, Who is

65
Distinct realities can be predicated of a single subject according to Gregory and not be in opposition. What is
needed is a dialectic that can admit of a both/and, not either/or.
66
Quasten, op. cit., p. 268-269; ACW v. 18, Intro., p. 8-10.
15
from God, neither is nor is said to be from the Spirit; and this relative sequence is
permanent and inconvertible. Hence the sentence cannot properly be resolved and
reversed in its meaning so that as we say the Spirit to be Christs, we might also call
Christ the Spirits. Since therefore, this individual property distinguishes one from the
other with absolute clarity, but as, on the other hand, the identity of action bears witness
to the community of nature, the right doctrine about the Divinity is confirmed in both;
namely that the Trinity is numbered by the Persons, but that it is not divided into parts
of different nature.
67

There are a number of things that needed to be pointed out in this passage. Since the
characteristic of the Fathers Person cannot be transferred and as being without
causebelongs only to the Father, Gregory applies the rule that whatever is said to be in
common is said of all three Hypostases [i.e. natural things], and whatever is said of only one
Hypostasis is proper only to that Hypostasis.
68
Gregory goes on to search for the pure
differences between Son and Spirit since they are [properly] classed as being not
ungenerated. It is here that Gregory seems to make an argument based on the analogy from the
economy to reason back to the theological Trinity, since the Spirit is from God is also Christs
Spirit, but he denies that the converse is true that the Son, Who is from God, neither is nor is
said to be from the Spirit. Can this be reflective of the eternal hypostatic origin of these two
hypostases? Unfortunately Gregory is not clear from this passage. Though we would not deny
that there is an order to the Persons coming in the economy, it seems that his strict rule here in
seeing a precise order in the economic cause would not make since of the Creed when we state
that the Son was incarnate of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary. In other words, the sending
of the Son in the economy by the Father is not an act that is alien to the Spirit [or one that is
alien to the Son for that matter]. It does not seem clear to me that Gregory sees the Holy Spirits
relation to the Hypostases Father and Son in dialectical fashion nor as in a Neo-Platonic
structure originating from an Uncaused-Cause and from a Caused-Cause as with Eunomius. If
construed in this sense, this would conflict with his statement in the same passage that the
Personal Feature of the Father [i.e. as cause] cannot be communicated to the other Hypostases.
However, in a passage in On Not Three Gods, Gregory appears that he presents without any

67
On the Lords Prayer, ACW v.18, p. 54-55. There is no use of io Yiou in this passage but it is irrelevant and
seems implied nonetheless.
68
Farrell, op. cit., p. 169. We have made this point clear in the analysis of the appellations of God, but the hypostatic
properties of ingenerate, generate, and procession are what are unique to the each Hypostasis alone: Father, Son,
Holy Spirit respectively. C.f. St. Basil Letter XXXVIII to Gregory of Nyssa, NPNF II, 8, p. 137: My argument,
then, is this. That which is spoken of in a special and peculiar manner is indicated by the name of the hypostasis.
Suppose we say a man. The indefinite meaning of the word strikes a certain vague sense upon the ears. The nature
is indicated, but what subsists and is specially and peculiarly indicated by the name is not made plain. Suppose we
say Paul. We set forth, by what is indicated by the name, the nature subsisting. That is, in regard to hypostases of
the same nature, what is said about more than one hypostasis is said about all of them or the nature of them, but what
is not said of all of them is what is peculiar and specific.
16
ambiguity the view that the Son fits this position as a mediatory cause. The Son is now an
interposition between the Father and Spirit:
[W]hile we confess the invariable character of the nature, we do not deny the difference
in respect of cause, and that which is caused, by which alone we apprehend that one
Person is distinguished from another;by our belief, that is, that one is the Cause, and
another is of the Cause; and again in that which is of the Cause we recognize another
distinction. For one is directly from the first Cause, and another by [io ] that which is
directly from the first Cause; so that the attribute of being Only-begotten abides without
doubt in the Son, and the interposition of the Son, while it guards His attribute of being
Only-begotten, does not shut out the Spirits natural relation to the Father.
69

It would appear that Gregory affirms that the Son is a mediate Cause to the Spirits existence. He
does not use any analogy of the economy and from the surrounding context it appears he is
writing of the theological Trinity. The idea that Gregory wishes to preserve the unique
Hypostatic feature of the Son: He being the Only-Begotten. For if the Son and the Spirit are both
Caused, how do we distinguish there unique properties? It appears that in this passage Gregory
has fallen prey to the use of the dialectic of opposition with a second step of interposition of
the Son in attempting to distinguish between generation and procession.
70
This supposition can
and should be resisted since Gregory does state at the end of the passage that the Spirit has a
natural relation to the Father, though it is difficult to see how the Spirits own relation of
origin from the Father could be considered natural if it is the Son that constitutes an
interposition between the Spirit and the Father.
71

Turning to Gregorys Contra Eunomium corpus we find a different approach. As we have
remarked earlier, there is not just a problem of the Spirit and the Son being subordinated to the
level of creatures, there is also a structural problem to Eunomius system. The former is a
product of the latter and this all by the dialectical method of distinguishing the hypostases by
opposition.
72
When Gregory turns his aim toward the subordinated structure of the Eunomian
system, I find it fascinating that he avoids the implicit interposition that we saw in his works On
Not Three Gods and On the Lords Prayer. Gregory states in CE I his intention:

69
On Not Three Gods, NPNF II, 5, p. 336
70
St. Gregory the Theologian warns of this use of philosophy in synthesizing theology in the 5
th
Theological
Oration, NPNF II, 7, p.319-320: For, tell me, what position will you assign to that which Proceeds, which has
started up between the two terms of your division, and is introduced by a better Theologian than you, our Savior
Himself? Or perhaps you have taken that word out of your Gospels for the sake of your Third Testament, The Holy
Ghost, which proceedeth from That Source, is no Creature; and inasmuch as He is not Begotten is no Son; and
inasmuch as he is between the Unbegotten and the Begotten is God. And thus escaping the toils of your syllogisms,
He has manifested himself as God, stronger than your divisions. What then is Procession? Do you tell me what is the
Unbegottenness of the Father, and I will explain to you the physiology of the Generation of the Son and the
procession of the Spirit, and we shall both of us be frenzy-stricken for prying into the mystery of God.
71
Bradshaw, op. cit., p. 215
72
See point 3 on p. 3 of this paper.
17
[O]n the subject of the Holy Spirit the blasphemy is plain and unconcealed: he says that
He is not to be ranked with the Father or the Son, but is subject to both. I will therefore
examine as closely as possible this statement.
73

That Gregory is dealing with the issue of uncreate or created existence among the Hypostasis of
the Spirit and Son is evident, but it is precisely the dialectical structure that is producing the
problem, and he says that it is the starting-point [of Eunomiuis] from which this irresistible
perception of a hidden truth takes its rise in all these logical excursions.
74
Instead of starting
from scriptural revelation, Gregory states Eunomius speaks first of beings instead of persons.
75

The dialectic can never distinguish between more than two at a time and thus one Being
existing through the First
76
and then one [that] is produced from another.
77
It is no wonder at
this point that Gregory resists not only the inequality he sees among the Beings but the very
structure itself:
He opposes the arrangement of Scripture. He separates off that equality with the Father
and the Son of His proper and natural rank and connexion which our Lord Himself
pronounces, and numbers Him with subjects: he declares Him to be a work of both
Persons, of the Father, as supplying the cause of His constitution, of the Only-begotten,
as of the artificer of His subsistence: and defines this as the ground of His subjection,
without as yet unfolding the meaning of subjection.
78

Not only does Eunomius exchange out the meaning of Scripture of the names of the divine
Hypostases and their proper relations Gnostic style, but he can now exchange certain properties
that characterize each of the Beings since they are more or less simple!
79
Gregory has traced
out in this short passage the commonality Eunomius has with the Neo-Platonic framework.
Thus, the Spirit is distinguished by two classes of causes, an Uncaused-Cause and a Caused-
Cause: The Father supplying the cause of His constitution and the Son is the artificer of His
subsistence. Moreover, it is difficult to see, since Eunomius starts from data that are not
granted,
80
where the system would ever have a principled reason to not cause another more
or less simple Being as stated earlier.
81


73
CE I, NPNF II, 5, p. 53
74
Ibid. p. 56
75
Ibid. p. 56 There is a problem with the ordo theologiae in Eunomius as I stated earlier.
76
Ibid. p. 53
77
Ibid. p. 55
78
Ibid. p. 54
79
Ibid. p. 57
80
Ibid.
81
C.f. p. 4 of this paper. Athanasius seemed to pick up on this point as well in the Neo-Platonic structure of the
Arians in Four Discourses Against the Arians, NPNF II, 4, p. 318-319: If then God be as man, let Him become also
a parent as man, so that His Son should be father of another, and so in succession one from another, till the series
they imagine grows into a multitude of gods.
18
After discussing the division of intelligible being into uncreate and created,
82
Gregory
points out the dialectic of the opposite quality in that which fails of the good
83
that
characterizes the Holy Spirit and the Son in Eunomius thinking because Eunomius admits the
Hypostases of Son and Spirit possess the good by acquisition and participation. Gregory goes on
to state that the divine nature
has distinctions within itself in keeping with the majesty of its own nature[and] we
regard it as consummately perfect and incomprehensibily excellent, yet as containing
clear distinctions within itself which reside in the peculiarities of each of the Persons: as
possessing invariableness by virtue of its common attribute of uncreatedness, but
differentiated by the unique character of each Person.
84

In this short excerpt we witness the same rule applied as earlier. Each Hypostasis is
characterized by his own unique hypostatic property. Gregory goes on to show in the strongest
of terms, however, that properties that are said about more than one Hypostasis are said about
the nature, but properties said about one and only one Hypostasis are unique to each one alone.
First he considers the Hypostasis of the Father:
This peculiarity contemplated in each sharply and clearly divides one from the other: the
Father, for instance, is [both] uncreate and ungenerate as well: He was never generated
any more than He was created. While this uncreatedness is common to Him and the Son
and the Spirit, He is ungenerate as well as the Father. This is peculiar and
uncommunicable, being not seen in the other Persons.
85

Then, the Hypostasis of the Son:
The Son in His uncreatedness touches the Father and the Spirit, but as the Son and the
Only-Begotten He has a character which is not that of the Almighty or of the Holy
Spirit.
86

And finally the Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit:
The Holy Spirit by the uncreatedness of His nature has contact with the Son and
Father, but is distinguished from them by His own tokens. His most peculiar
characteristic is that He is neither of those things which we contemplate in the Father
and the Son respectively. He is simply, neither as ungenerate, nor as only-begotten: this
it is that constitutes His chief peculiarity.
87

It seems that in this last passage, thus quoted, that Gregorys strong apophaticism does not wish
to touch further on the relation of the Spirit. He is simply, and confesses the absolute
distinctions amongst the Hypostases. It seem as if there is nothing more to say about the
Hypostasis of the Spirit since he has adequately been distinguished from the Ingenerate and the
Only-Begotten, but Gregory moves on to clarify the relationship of the Spirit to the other two

82
CE I, NPNF II, 5, p.60-61.
83
Ibid. p. 61
84
Ibid.
85
Ibid.
86
Ibid.
87
Ibid.
19
Hypostases, and it is the same rule as before: what is common is of the nature, what is unique is
of one Hypostasis:
Joined to the Father by His uncreatedness, He is disjoined from Him again by not being
Father. United to the Son by the bond of uncreatedness, and of deriving His existence
from the Supreme
88

It is clear in this passage that Gregory distinguishes what is shared in common among the
Hypostases and what is not. With the Father, what is common is uncreate, what is unique is not
being Father. With the Sonlike the Fatherwhat is shared is uncreate, but what is unique is
precisely His deriving His existence from the Father. The implications would be if the Holy
Spirit derived is His existencethat is proceedsfrom both the Father and the Son, something
would be common to two Hypostases which is not common to the Spirit. Either the derivation of
the Spirit would be common to Himself along with the Father and the Son, i.e. a property of the
common nature, or He is something of a dissimilar nature, since the derivation would only be
common to two Hypostases. Both conclusions are clearly unacceptable. The former would
destroy the Hypostatic character of the Holy Spirit and hence confuse all of them with the divine
nature, while the latter would be the very essence of the Eunomian dialectic! This is not to say
that Gregory sees no relation whatsoever between the Son and Spirit, as it seems this would
imply, but that this relation is properly not one of derivation or relation of origin. As we quoted
earlier from Gregorys work On the Lords Prayer, He does see a certain order to the
Hypostases, a certain taxis [oi,] even.
89
Gregory points to this order continuing with the
passage quoted:
He [the Holy Spirit] is parted again from Him [Father] by the characteristic of not being
the Only-Begotten of the Father, and having been manifested by means of the Son
Himself.
90

This is a remarkable passage and will characterize the uniqueness of Byzantine Triadology since
the Cappadocian Fathers.
91
Again Gregory distinguishes between what is common and
particular. The Holy Spirit is not the Only-Begotten [or the Ingenerate Father], but there is a
commonality in the Trinity of manifesting the Spirit, that starts first with the Father and goes
forth through the Son. That this manifestation is not a unique Hypostatic characteristic only to
one can be seen when Gregory identifies the manifestation of the Spirit with the divine energeia
in CE III:

88
Ibid.
89
Farrell, op. cit., p. 1057
90
CE I, op. cit. p. 61
91
For an analysis of the Byzantine doctrine of the eternal manifestation of the Spirit, see Aristeides Papadakis
Crisis In Byzantium: The Filioque Controversy in the Patriarchate of Gregory II of Cyprus.
20
And yet who in the world does not know that life-giving power proceeds to actual
operation [tvtpytio] both in the Father and in the Son
92

And also common to the Holy Spirit:
For if there does reside in the Father and the Son a life-giving power, it is ascribed also
the Holy Spirit, according to the words of the Gospel.
93

This is so for Gregory since the identity of the energeiai that the Spirit possesses, is the same
energeiai as the Son and the Father, meaning it is something said aboutor more accurately
aroundtheir nature.
94
This manifesting of the Spirit by the Father through the Son cannot be
thought of as a Hypostatic origination, precisely because Gregory identifies this act with the act
of willing, that is in God there is no difference between will and energy.
95
As we have shown
previously, every operation and divine name is common to all the Hypostases. Gregory
expresses this manifestation in even more explicit terms as a circular movement among the
Persons in another work against Macedonius:
You see the revolving circle of the glory moving from Like to Like. The Son is glorified by
the Spirit; the Father is glorified by the Son; again the Son has His glory from the Father;
and the Only-begotten thus becomes the glory of the Spirit. For with what shall the
Father be glorified, but with the true glory of the Son: and with what again shall the Son
be glorified, but with the majesty of the Spirit? In like manner, again, Faith completes
the circle, and glorifies the Son by means of the Spirit, and the Father by means of the
Son.
96

It appears that in this passage that Gregory has in mind a manifestation of glory that is
irrespective of creation. A real relation that would characterize and constitute Gods internal
Being, in which the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit will to manifest the divine love as energeiai in

92
CE III, NPNF II, 5, p. 245, Gregory also describes this manifestation of the divine energeia having a logical order
yet common to the Persons of the Trinity in On Not Three Gods, NPNF II, 5, p.334: Yet although we set forth
Three Persons and three names, we do not consider that we have had bestowed upon us three lives, one from each
Person separately; but the same life is wrought in us by the Father and prepared by the Son, and depends on the will
of the Holy Spirit. Since then the Holy Trinity fulfils every operation in a manner similar to that of which I have
spoken, not by separate action according to the number of the Persons, but so that there is one motion and
disposition of the good will which is communicated from the Father through the Son to the Spirit (for as we do not
call those whose operation gives one life three Givers of life, neither do we call those who are contemplated in one
goodness three Good beings, nor speak of them in the plural by any of their other attributes); so neither can we call
those who exercise this Divine and superintending power and operation towards ourselves and all creation,
conjointly and inseparably, by their mutual action, three Gods.
93
Ref. Conf., Ibid., p. 131
94
Ibid., p. 132
95
CE II, Ibid., p. 273: He [Moses] shows that in the case of God there is no difference between will and
performance; but, on the contrary, that though the purposing initiates Gods activity, the accomplishment keeps pace
with the purpose, and that the two are to be considered together and at once, viz. the deliberate motion of the mind,
and the power that effects its purpose. C.f. On Not Three Gods, Ibid., p. 334 cited above in note 89.
96
On the Holy Spirit against the followers of Macedonius, Ibid., p. 324
21
many different ways to Them. It is at this level that we could say that the economic Trinity
reflects the theological Trinity.
97

VI. Conclusion
This analysis, I presume, exposes some of the philosophical presuppositions of the
Eunomian system. The method of dialectic and the starting pointsin the ordo theologiaeof
Supreme Being and divine simplicity led to a subordinated structure of Triadology. First we
looked at the definition of what constitutes the Supreme Being as ingenerate and simple. All
the many names that are adequately predicable of this Being converge and are synthesized with
the attribute of ingenerate. Real opposition of terms denotes nature: Ingenerate Generate.
This dialectic of opposition is the way of knowing these distinctions. There is an interposition of
an attribute of energy or will that sustain each lower Being, that is, each energy has a real
existent associated with it.
In summarizing this essay in regard to St. Gregory of Nyssa, we see not only a break with
the dialectic of opposition but even a certain hostility towards it as a method in Theology and
more specifically in knowing and discussing the doctrine of the Trinity. Unlike Eunomius, who
thought that we could speak about the essence of God by the adequate terminology applied to it,
Gregory speaks of the divine names as being something distinct from the ousia of God and are
divine energeiai around Him. Gregory recognizes that man cannot comprehend the divine
nature, and that the only name for the divine nature is that it is above all names. Man can never
breach the adiastemic boundary to know the essence of God. Even God as True Being is a
divine energeia signifying something around the divine nature. For God is always understood
as the cause of being, who is above all being.
98
The bulk of this essay proceeds to evaluate the
divine simplicity for Gregory. Hopefully, it has been demonstrated that it is a non-dialectical
one. One that doesnt preclude multiplicity of distinctions in God, and one that does preclude a
divine simplicity to be construed as a dialectic of opposition between One and Many. We also
noted that divine simplicity was an outcome and conclusion rather than a starting point in doing
Theology. The Hypostases of the Trinity are co-equal since each of the divine appellations can be
predicated to all of them for example: justice, truth, goodness, uncreate, etc. Moreover,
commonality in their acts denotes commonality in nature. In the analysis touching the
procession of the Spirit, particular texts were analyzed to denote again the non-dialectical

97
Boris Bobrinskoy, The Mystery of the Trinity: Trinitarian Experience and Vision in the Biblical and Patristic
Tradition, p. 275, 296
98
Ecclesiastes 7, 413 (1-4) Gregorii Nysseni Opera; cited in Deidre Carabine, The Unkown God Negative Theology
in the Platonic Tradition: Plato to Eriugena, p. 238
22
method. Weve also brought forth certain texts that seem difficult, and on the face of them,
would seem to take on a similar Neo-Platonic structure as seen in Eunomianism. Two particular
texts in Contra Eunomium I confirm the thesis of this paper. Gregory stringently maintains the
Basilian principle that what is said about more than one Hypostasis is common to their nature,
and what is said about only one Hypostasis is unique to that one alone. We also examined the
idea of the manifestation of the Spirit from the Father through the Son as this will become an
important theme of later Byzantine Theologians.
23
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