A Study of Soviet Artillery in The Direct Fire Role

A STUDY OF SOVIET USE OF FIELD ARTILLERY WEAPONS IN A DIRECT FIRE ROLE
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S.Army

Command and General Staff College In partial
fulfillment of the requlrements for the
degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
by LARRY W. COKER, JR., MAJ, USA B.A., Trinity Unlverslty, 1974
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas I986
Approved for public release; distrlbutlon is unllrnlted.
86-3503
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE
Name of Candidate: MAJ Larry W. Coker, Jr. Tltle of Thesls: A Study of Sovlet Use of Field Artlllery Weapons in a Direct Fire Role
Approved By:
-.
Q-Je
MAJ (P) Robert L. Stockwell, MA
J L
, Thesis Commlttee Chalman
A
/ l
, Member, Graduate Faculty
LTCbohn T. Banks, MA
COL Phlllp W. Dyer, P h . d
&&fl<dA/
&+J(&M&.&
, Member, Consulting Faculty
Accepted this 6th day of June 1986 by:
, Dlrector. Graduate Degree

Programs
Phlllp J. Brookes. Ph.D.
The opinions and concluslons expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarlly represent the vlews of the US. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. ( R e f e r a m to thls s the f .I
ii
ABSTRACT
A STUDY OF SOVIET USE OF FIELD ARTILLERY WEAPONS IN A DIRECT FIRE ROLE, by Major Larry W. Coker, Jr., USA, 102 pages. This study i s a detailed look at the information available in current Soviet military publications on how the Soviets use their field artillery weapons in a direct f i r e role. It Includes a discussion of the historical background for use of direct f i r e as it was developed during the Great Patriotic War. The primary emphasis i s on how the Soviets currently employ direct fire during offensive and defensive operations, and the training techniques used to develop direct f i r e skills at individual and collective levels. The conclusions drawn from this study are that the Soviets w i l l aggressively use their field artillery in a direct f i r e role i n both offensive and defensive situations, but most routinely in the meeting engagement; the major advantages for the use of direct fire are timeliness, accuracy, and ammunition savings; routine training is conducted by Soviet artillery units t o develop their direct fire skills; and the Soviets' significant numerical advantage In artillery assets allows them the flexibility t o employ It for direct fire.
iii
TABLEOFCONTENTS Chapter 1. Introduction Problem Statement Limitations and Delimitations Significance of the Study Survey of Literature Methods and Procedures Endnotes Chapter 2 Historical Background . Direct Fire i n the Great Patriotic War The Use of Artillery in Direct Fire Advantages of Direct Fire Vulnerability of Direct Fire Weapons The Artillery offensive Increased Centralization and Concentration of Artillery Self-Propelled Artillery Soviet Artillery from the 1950s to 1973 Endnotes Chapter 3. Current Soviet Tactics and Procedures Direct Fire in the Offense Meeting Engagement Artillery Preparation of the Attack Other Offensive Situations Direct Fire i n the Defense Special Situations
1
2 2 3 4 7
11
11
12
13
15
1
7 20
22
26
30
33
34
34
37
40
43
46
46
47
River Crossings Combat in Mountainous Terrain

Combat i n Built-up Areas Destruction of Fort ifications Direct Fire in the Overall Field Artillery Mission Advantages of Direct Fire versus Survivability Considerations The Advantages of Direct Fire Survivabi1ity Considerations Endnotes iv
49
50
52
53
53
55
60
Chapter 4. Direct Fire Artillery Training and Equipment Training Techniques Realistic Training individual and Crew Training Direct Fire in Combined Arms Trainlng Direct Fire Gunnery Technical Preparation of the Piece Artillery Equipment and Ammunition for Direct Fire Endnotes Chapter 5. Conclusions and Recommendations Appendix A. Direct Fire Gunnery Calculations Appendix B. Artillery Equipment and Ammunition for Direct Fire Bibliography initial Distribution List
63
63
64
65
69
74
75
76
78
79
83
88
95
102
CHAPTER I
IMRODUCTION In my 'upbrlnglng' as a Held artlllery offlcer, I have been taught that

Held artlllery weapons are extremely vulnerable when used In a dlrect flre role. Thls 1s especlally true when a crew employs a field artlllery piece against a tank. The fleld artlllery plece 1s at a dlstlnct disadvantage
s because Its accuracy uslng dlrect flre 1 very Ilmlted beyond 1,000 meters, s whlle a modern tank 1 capable of engaglng targets with a hlgh probablllty
of a hit at several tlmes that range. The dlfterence In effectlve ranges between the fleld artillery weapon and the tank certalnly glves the tank a slgnlflcant advantage In an engagement between them. Current Unlted States Army doctrine conslders the use of dlrect flre
by fleld artlllery weapons as strlctly defenslve In nature. It 1s a method t o
provlde a last resort defense of the battery posltlon prlor to maklng a hasty dlspiacement to an alternate posltlon. Dlrect flre 1s also used t o provide protectlon durlng road marches. For the most part, It 1s expected to be used out of necesslty rather than by cholce.
In stark contrast, the Soviets are much more aggressive In employlng

fleld artlllery weapons for direct flre. They tradltlonally have used such
flre In offensive as well as defenslve sltuatlons. The aggressive use of

fleld artlllery In dlrect fire has a hlstorlcal bask in the Sovlet method for employment of artlllery agalnst the Germans durlng World War II. These
1
methods remain basically unchanged today despite the increased lethality of newer weapons on the battlefield.
The purpose of this study is to determine why the Soviets readily use indirect field artillery weapons for direct fire purposes. In studying this question and determining the reasons, there are several other supporting questions that have to be answered.
1. What is the historical basis for Soviet use of field artillery in the
direct f ire role?
2.
What are the tactics and procedures used by the Soviets in
employing field artillery in the direct fire role, and how do they provide for survivability?
3. How does the direct fire role for Soviet field artillery relate to
the overall mission in providing direct support to the manewer force?
4. What impact do the characteristics of Soviet weapons systems
and ammunition have on the employment and effectiveness of their field artillery in direct fire?
5. What can we learn from the methods and procedures used by the
Soviets in training for use of direct fire by the field artillery?
The effectiveness of this study is limited by the availability of translations of primary source material in Soviet documents. i have been
2
dependent on these translatlons due to my lnablllty to read Russlan. I do no think thls has been a significant problem since there amount of translated materlal available for study. Thls study I concerned wlth the Soviet field artlllery systems most s often found organic or attached at the Soviet regimental level. These are
the D30 122mm towed howitzer, the 2SI 122mm self propelled howltzer
Is a tremendous
and the 253 152mm self propelled howltzer. These weapons are prlmarlly deslgned and used as lndirect flre weapons. Although the Sovlets are one
of few modem armed forces s t l l l using speclallzed anti-tank artillery,
these weapons wlll not be addressed speciflcally in this study. The tlme perlod covered by thls study goes back to the Soviet partlclpatlon In World War II (the Great Patrlotlc War) only for the purpose of explorlng the hlstorical context of the problem. The primary focus is to establish the current methods and reasons for employment of fleld artillery in the dlrect flre role.
This study w i l l serve to bring together facts about direct flre from a
multitude of sources. For that reason It may be a reasonable 'prlmer' for military personnel on how the Sovlets may employ field artillery for dlrect fire. By studylng the Sovlet use of fleld artlllery for direct flre, It may also be possible to assess signlf icant vulnerabilities that can potentlally be exploited on the future battlefield.
Wlth the vast superiorlty the
Sovlets enloy In the number of field artlllery tubes avallable to them, any means to assist In the reductlon of that advantage w i l l be helpful.
3
There is considerably more information available on the Soviet use

of field artillery for direct fire than I had initially expected to be able to find. It can be divided between the historical information, primarily tied
to how the Soviets used their artillery for direct fire in World War II, and
information on current intentions for employment. Several sources have provided information for both the historical basis of Soviet use of field artillery in direct fire, and the current doctrine. The first is The Sovi u
to
es i
which is a good bibliographical source for both types of information. The second i s a translation of Jhe Artillerv Battalion in
Combat2 by Marshal of Artillery G. Ye. Peredel'skiy and published in March,

1984. This i s an excellent source for information on how direct fire i s
used now, as well as for specific historical examples from the Great Patriotic War. This use of historical examples i s a significant indication that the employment methods for artillery in direct fire have changed very littie. The third is 'Soviet Combined Arms: Theory and Practice' by J. Erickson. This is an unpublished defense study done a t the University of Edinburgh that traces the development of Soviet comblned arms from the Great Patriotic War to present. Both The 0f f ensw by AA. Sidorenko and
Ant itank Warfare by G. Biryukov and G. Melnikov are books written in the
1970s by Soviet military officers who are 'candidates of Military Science.'
Both also provide historical examples for direct fire use by artillery and the indication that direct fire employment remained a valid technique into the 1970s.
4
Strictly historical sources include a Department of the Army translation of F.A Samsonov's W x o e r i m e of Arttllerv in the This Is an excellent source for information on how and why the Soviets utilized direct fire artillery in the Great Patriotlc War. Another good source is the series of articles that appeared throughout the Field Artillerv
a6the years 1942-1944 during
These were wrltten
by Soviet artillery officers telling the American artillery communlty what
was working well against the Germans. There are also several articles
from 1946 and 1947, also from the W Artillery Journal7&where Erltish d and Amertcan officers analyze the Soviet artillery experiences of World
War 11.
Translations are avatlable of the Sovtet UUj.tary His-
a8 slnce 1978 and they have provtded several articles that for Issues
discussed the Soviet employment of artlllery in the Great Patriotic War. There are many other sources that provlde some historical
n perspective o Soviet w e of fleld artlllery for direct flre including B.H

Liddell Hart's Red Army9 and Raymond Garthoff's B v i e t Military
.0I-
The latter also glves good Information on the development of
self propelled artillery related to a direct flre role for it. The role of self-propelled artillery I also discussed in an article, 'The Postwar s Development of Tank Forces' by P A Rotmtstrw In Selected Sovlet Mllltary compiled m1 by the U.S. Air Force. Another article in this same book is by I.N. Vorobyev entitled 'Fire, Assault, Manewer' and provides a good historical example of offensive use of direct flre artillery. Other sources that provide analysis of Soviet artlllery development are War M
W 1917- I9*
& I
l2 edited by S.L. Mayer and 'An Analysis of
Soviet Artlllery D e ~ e l o p m e n t by ~ ' ~ Kurt Hoffman In

5
Revfew.
There are numerous sources which provide information for my study on current Soviet use of field artillery for direct fire. The best sources are the numerous articles found in the Soviet tlilitary HerplQl4. Translations are available for this monthly publication and each edition generally has several articles on artillery. Frequently the articles make some reference to the direct f i r e use of field artillery weapons. The majority of current information is to be found in periodicals. 'The Wind of Change in Soviet Artillery,' by F i r e
lnternatlonal
Defense Reviekl5 by CON.
Donnelly provides some good background information as does 'Destruction Soviet Artillery In the 1980s and Beyond,' Field A r t m i for
!,h?umll6 Christopher Bellamy. The article by Bellamy is excellent by
providing information on the contribution of direct fire in accomplishing the 'fire destruction' mission of Soviet artillery. The Field Artillerv and -I8 magazine provide numerous articles on current Review Soviet artillery equipment and tactics. The Soviet Armed For=
l9 edited by David R. Jones
provides some background material on artillery developments. Volume 8

(1983-4) discusses the apparent Soviet move to eight guns per battery in
the artillery battalions organic t o maneuver regiments which w i l l have implications on the quantity of artillery assets potentially available for direct fire. Two recent books by Richard Simpkin20, Antitank and J&.d
&m also provide information on the antitank role of Soviet artillery. r &
There are several references available to provide limited technical information on Soviet artillery equipment and its capabilities. These S include Weaoons of the FZQQern oviet Ground Force321 edited by Ray Bonds
6
and 3poes Arr[lpyCpDdArtill= 22. The translatlon of the Fleld A r t l l l a QfficersHandbook23 by Valentin Lebedev provldes Information on artlllery ammunition and direct f Ire procedures.
The prlmary method for conducting this study Is by making an extensive search of available literature concerning the subject. Although several books are avallable to answer questions on the historical aspect of Sovlet use of direct flre artillery, access to the vast malority of the Information on how Soviets currently vlew the direct flre role Is through periodlcals. The Sovlet Army Studles Offlce (SASO) provlded nwnemus leads onto resources avallable. Through SASO I have been able to get several unpublished resources and also some access to the research data base at the Sovlet Studies Research Center at Sandhurst, England. Another resource used was a discussion wlth MAJ Brian McQulstlon, a fellow student In CGSC whose previous asslgnment was at Defense e Intelligence Agency when, he followed Sovlet artlllery developments. H read the study in Its flnal draft and provided several helpful observatlons and comments. The data collected from these sources was organlzed Into chapters generally along the lines of the supporting research questions addressed earlier In this chapter. Chapter 2 is an assessment of the historical background that gave rlse to the Sovlets use of field artillery In a routlne dlrect fire mode. The thlrd chapter discusses the current (SlnCe 1975)
7
tactics and procedures used by the Sovlets In the employment of their f leld artillery. Chapter 4 discusses current Sovlet trainlng for direct flre and comments on current Sovlet artlllery and ammunltion for direct flre. Finally, chapter 5 contalns the conclusions that can be drawn from thls study and the recommendations for future study.
Endnotes for Chapter 1
1 MyronJ Smith, Jhe Soviet Army. 1939 1980: A Guide to Sour. ( 1982).
2 G.Ye. Peredel'skiy, lhflArtillerv -(Combat(1985). 3 A A Sidorenko, JheOffenstre(l970).

4 G Biryukov and G. Melnlkov, Antitank W a r f m ( 1972). .
5 F. A Sarnsonov, ( 1952).
of Artillerv in the Great Patriotic
6 The following articles are from the Field A r t i l l e r v J o*~A Karelsky, 'Sovlet Artillery Flre,' 32 (July 1942): 51 1; Walter Kerr, 'Death or Insanity,' 33 (October 1943): 814-6; Parapov, 'Ambushing with Artlllery,' 34 (November 1944): 786; P. Slesanw, 'Self-Propelled Artillery v m Tanks,' 34 (November 1944): 787-8; L. Vysokrntrovsky, 'k'tillt?fy V~C.SWTiger and Ferdinand; 33 (October 1943): 810- 1; ,'Dlrect Artillery Fire,' 33 (September 1942): 694 7 WR Young, 'Artillery Offensive. An Exarnlnatlon of Russian Practlce,' . Fleld Artillerv J o m 36 (January 1946): 26-9; HG.deWateviIle, 'Russlan Artillery 1941-1945,'Field Artillery-37 (May-June 1947).
8 V. Kiselev, 'The Development of the Antltank Defense in the Postwar Years,' Militarv Historical(June 1978): 46-53; A Tsynkalov, 'The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," &Uitan, Hlstorlcal J m (Jul 1979): 18-23; G. Peredel'skly, 'Combat Employment of Artillery in Army Defenslve Operatlons; (November 1979): 16-21. 9 B.H. Liddell Hart, The Red Array ( 1956).
10 RaymondL. Garthoff,SPviet MilitprvDoctrina(l953).
1 I I.N. Vorobyev, "Fire, Assault, Manewer,' and P.A Rostmistrov, 'The Postwar Development of Tank Forces,' from US Air Force edited Selected .. as 1970 1975. ASoviet Vlew(1976). -
12 S . L M a y e r J e d i t o r , J & & & & n W a r ~ 1 9 1 7
- 1 9 6 ( 1977).
13 Kurt Hofmann, 'An Analysis of Soviet Artillery Development,' R ~ i w ( 1982): 135-9. I5

14 The articles from the Soviet Heraldare too numerous to list here. They can be referenced in the bibliography.
mite
15 C.N. Donnelly, 'The Wlnd of Change In Soviet Artillery,' Q&QS&&W 6 (1 982): 737-44.
international
16 Christopher Bellarny, 'Destruction by Fire: Soviet Artillery in the 1980s and Beyond," Field A r t i l l e p Journal 53 (September-October 1985): 40-5.
17 George R. Patrick, 'Soviet SP Doctrine.' Field Artillery Jpytapl (July-August 1978): 27-29, W i l l i a m P. Baxter, 'Soviet 122-mm Self-Propelled Howitzer,' U8LQArtillerv Journal (January-February 1980): 35-7; Keith W. Dayton, 'Field Artillery Survivability The Soviet Perspective,' Field At ri l m Jownal (Septemberdctober 1981): 4-50.
18 Larry W. Williams, 'Soviet Self-Propelled Artillery,' & ~ Q C (September-October 1978): 18-20; John Erickson, 'Soviet Combined Arms Operations.' A~QQC (May-June 1980): 16-2 1,
19 David R Jones, Soviet J983 1984 (1985).
Review m a l . Volymk&
( 1984).
20 Richard E. Simpkin, AU,W& ( 1982) and

21 Ray Bonds, editor, e -t l
( 198I).
G m dForn
22 -,Jane's
A r m u and Artlllerv 1985 1986 ( 1985).

( 1984)
23 Valentin Y. Lebedev, Field Artillery Officer's Hao&Q!?k

10
CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
It is appropriate to look at the historical background in order to
make an assessment of why the Soviets embrace the use of direct flre by their field artillery. Presented in this chapter are the developments that led to the routine use of direct fire in the Great Patriotic War and the continuation of these techniques after the war and Into the early 1970s. Fire in -c War
According to Raymond Garthoff, the use of fleld artillery by the Soviets In the Great Patriotlc War underwent five malor changes. One of those was the tendency f o r wide use of artillery pieces in direct fire. The others were the introduction of the 'Artillery Offensive,' the increase in
centralization of artillery command and control, the increase in

concentration of artillery weapons and the increase in use of self-propelled weapons.' Patriotic War.
This study w i l l examine these changes and the
effect they had on use of artillery in a direct fire role during the Great
P
The Soviets were not prepared for the attack by Nazi Germany on 22
June 1941. With the combination of the surprise of the attack and the
power of the German armor formations, the Soviets fought the first months
of the war at a great disadvantage. In this situation the Soviet troops had
to delay and defend against the tanks by any means possible.2 One of the primary means was to engage the tanks with direct artillery fire. The Supreme High Command required all artillery units to be prepared for the
use of direct fire with attention t o the likely tank approaches. This was
not a new tactic, but a renewed emphasis on the tactics discussed in the existing Soviet field
regulation^.^
The renewed emphasis on direct fire techniques is confirmed in an account by Walter Kerr who was the Moscow correspondent for the W York Herald Tribune a t the beginning of the war. He was taken on a tour of artillery units north of Moscow in early 1942 by Soviet Lieutenant General Viktor Tikhonov. There he was told by the general that since the outbreak
of the war the Red Army had issued instructions that a l l artillery gun
crews would train for antitank fire. Enemy tanks had broken through the
lines too many times in the early weeks of the war and caught Russian
artillery unprepared. While they were visiting the artillery regiment the gunners were practicing direct fire procedures a t 600 yards4 Marshal of Artillery P. Kuleshov wrote an article about the Soviet artillery in the Great Patriotic War on the occasion of the 600th anniversary of the Russian Artillery in 1982. In the article he said The high combat qualities of Soviet artillery . . . . .were revealed clearly a t the very beginning of the war under the extremely unfavorable 12
conditions for our Army. Artillery's chief and most important mission in the initial period of the war consisted of combating enemy tanks and aircraft.. . .It was necessary to let the tanks come to within close range and f i r e on them pointblank, and that i s just what our artillerymen did."5
The large losses of Soviet tanks and aircraft at the beginning of the
war made the need for artillery to f i l l the direct fire role even greater.
Thus, as a necessity in 1941, the Soviet artillery was routinely employed from direct fire positions on the main defensive line at ranges from
200-900 yards in order to defeat the advancing German armor.
of Direct Fire. Many advantages of using direct f i r e were discovered as a result of the need to use it defensively. These advantages have to do with command and control, effectiveness.
In the early part of the war, the Soviets had an insufficient amount
ammunition savings and
of communications equipment available to allow artillery units to communicate with forward observers for the adjustment of indirect fire.6
In order to communicate, the maneuver commanders moved the guns
forward into their formations.
The artillery could have the targets
identified to them and then engage them with direct fire. It appears that this effective method for command and control of the close support artillery was used in appropriate situations even after the communications equipment situation improved. Another major advantage to the Soviets in utilizing direct fire was the savings in ammunition expenditures. One or two rounds from a direct
13
fire gun could do the work of twenty rounds fired from indirect f i r e
position^.^
These ammunition savings were particularly significant at the Artillery ammunition was lost in large
beginning of the Great Patriotic War when the Soviets were hard pressed t o put up an effective defense. round count. Finally, there was a marked advantage in the effectiveness of the artillery fire from direct fire positions. Soviet indirect fire procedures were not well developed and were significantly less effective than the American capabilities in the Second World War in both accuracy and timeliness. This was particularly applicable to engagement of targets of opportunity where the target was called in to the artillery for immediate engagement. It did not apply to the delivery of fire onto preplanned targets where timeliness was not such a critical factor. A good historical example that demonstrates the effectiveness of the direct fire techniques of the Soviet artillery i s an account of the action
of a towed a r t i l l e r y battery in March of 1943 in the 16th Army Sector,
quantities with the German advance and it was necessary to make each
possibly as part of the action in the Demyansk pocket. The Soviet battery position was attacked three times by German tanks and infantry. Over the course of the battle the battery was almost totally destroyed, but successfully held i t s position. Through direct fire the battery destroyed thirty-one tanks and killed over four hundred enemy soldiers.8 Six German tanks were destroyed for every Soviet artillery piece lost (one artillery piece survived the engagement). It is no wonder that the Soviets found it advantageous to use artillery, even towed artillery, in direct fire engagements against tanks. This i s almost certainly an exceptional case
14
regarding the number of losses inflicted on the Germans by a single battery. However, it does show how effective the Soviet artillery could be against German tanks and infantry. The effectiveness of using direct fire artillery was also applicable to offensive situations as described in this quote from Major General F.A. Samsonov: 'Practice has shown that artillery preparation i s most effective when a section of the guns (of all calibers up to 203mm) are brought forward t o fire over open sights a t the embrasures of the enemy's forts and Other strongly fortified positions. This method reduces the time necessary for destroying the defense works and enables the infantry to approach the object of attack without loss. It has also been found far more effective and economical than spreading the fire over whole areas.9
When providing this type of offensive support to the infantry, it was by no means unusual f o r the a r t i l l e r y t o move out in front of the combat formations of the infantry.I0
The direct fire artillery would
usually try to flank these fortifications, then destroy them t o allow the infantry to pass through and continue the attack. This flanking movement was obviously important to the survivability of the artillery weapon and Indications are that even when flanking a position was not possible, the artillery moved up and did i t s job, accepting whatever losses were required. Vulnerabi 1itv of Direct F ire Weaom. The major disadvantage of using artillery in a direct fire role was i t s vulnerability t o enemy fire,
particularly when considering towed artillery weapons and their crews as
in the example above. The opinion has often been voiced that the Soviets
"never shrank from hazarding losses in men and material which an Anglo-American commander would have hesitated to incur."
Soviet
commanders were more interested in results and the benefits of using direct fire justified the costs. Direct fire was simpler for command and control and the dramatic increase in effectiveness justified the losses. Even a ratio of one tank k i l l to each artillery piece lost may have been considered a fair trade, especially at the beginning of the war. It is
interesting to note here that both the f i r s t artillery soldier and the first
artillery officer decorated as a Hero of the Soviet Union in the Great

Patriotic War received their award for valor by engaging German tanks at
close range by direct fire.

The Soviets were perhaps somewhat more concerned with the vulnerabilities of artillery pieces used in direct fire than we give them credit for. An article from the Field Artillerv Journal in September I942 contained a detailed explanation by the Soviets of their development of the tactics to use artillery in a direct fire role.14 Emphasis was provided on several survivability techniques. These included the need for engineer preparation of firing positions prior to occupation of them and establishment of defilade positions to the rear of firing positions for artillery t o 'sit and wait' until time for execution of the fire missions. Just prior t o dusk the guns would be quickly rolled by hand from defilade t o
the firing positions and engagement o f targets would commence.
Withdrawal of the artillery upon completion of the missions was by echelon and was accomplished under the cover o f darkness. Strict camouflage 16
discipline was also mentioned as critical to the success of operating with guns so close to the enemy lines. Another source indicated that immediately upon successful destruction of assigned targets the individual artillery pieces would march order and move to the rear.15 This amount of preparation indicates distinct efforts by the Soviets to l i m i t the vulnerabilities of the artillery when required to use direct fire. The efforts to camouflage the artillery weapons used in direct fire i s also confirmed in an account of preparations for the Soviet counterattack from Leningrad in January, 1943. distribution of the direct laying weapons.'16 meters from the German front lines. The Soviets initially used their artillery in a direct f i r e role because of the need to use all available resources to stop the German invasion. Certain advantages became apparent with the use of the a r t i l l e r y
for direct fire, particularly the increased accuracy and timeliness and the
'Great accuracy and
concealment was required in carrying out the measures directed to The account goes on to discuss that these weapons were emplaced for direct fire at 400 to 800
significant decrease in ammunition requirements. Although the Soviets were very aggressive in the employment of their artillery for direct fire, they were concerned with developing tactics that increased the chances for survivability. The Artillerv Ofe
The f i r s t months of fighting against the Germans, to include the first offensive operations of the Soviet forces in December, 1941, showed some serious shortcomings in artillery operations. 17 One remedy t o these
problems was a directive on 10 January 1942 from the Supreme High Command to institute the artillery 0ffensive.l' The three principles of the artillery offensive were t o concentrate artillery in the area of the main effort, to conduct 'unintermittent' fire through the depth of the defenses and to enforce close interaction between the infantry, tanks and artillery. The second of these principles, providing 'unintermittent' fires, had two reqirements. The f i r s t was to have the battalion and regimental artillery closely accompany the manewer force with fire until success was achieved. The principal method to achieve this was by 'direct laying from exposed positions.'18 Secondly, the heavier batteries were to concentrate their fire on massed enemy troops and artillery. This was of course accomplished with indirect fire. The effectiveness of the 'artillery offensive' increased throughout the war.
In the later stages, with the tremendous amount of artillery
available, the preparation would usually close with one tremendous salvo delivered by all guns and mortars directed against every enemy capability to resist the attack. The results were that 50%to 70%of the enemy troops were put out of action even before the Soviet maneuver assault began.I9 This capability for massive destruction earned the Soviet artillery the t i t l e of 'The God of War.' One factor that demonstrates the effectiveness of the direct fire technique i s that when fire plans were drawn up to execute an artillery preparation, the highest priority targets were the f i r s t t o be singled out for destruction by direct fire. It was only in cases where direct fire was infeasible for a specific target that heavy concentrations of indirect fire were used instead.20
18
There was s t i l l considerable defensive fighting to do even after the new doctrine of the artillery offensive was implemented. The artillery continued to play an important role in the destruction of enemy tanks by direct fire from the front lines of defensive resistance,*l up German armor advances. Indirect fire of artillery engaged an attacking tank formation at the maximum range possible. demobilize a tank. Damage to tanks by indirect fire was not extensive because a direct or near hit was required to destroy or However, it did serve to separate the supporting infantry and generate confusion in the attacking forces. As the tanks approached the main line of resistance, the antitank and close support artillery engaged the tanks at close range. This i s where the majority of tank kills occurred. Those tanks that successfully broke through were then met by the direct fires of the artillery that had been providing the indirect fire support. This effectively insured that the tanks were subjected to artillery f i r e over the entire avenue o f their attack on Soviet positions.22 Even the artillery in indirect f i r e positions had a secondary antitank role in defense in the event of an enemy penetration. Batteries were required to select direct fire positions near their firing positions. The field artillery was usually massed along the second most likely armor avenue of approach, with the bulk of the antitank artillery covering the most likely route.23 The Soviets gained proficiency in combining direct and indirect artillery fire to break
19
1 -
y
Artillery assets were initially distributed
The control of the Soviet artillery underwent some changes during the Great Patriotic War. relatively evenly across the front and employed as individual units. The Soviets found it necessary to centralize some artillery in organizations a t higher levels so that they could be rapidly moved en masse to whatever area was being threatened and concentrate the required numbers t o create a successful defense. This technique was enforced by the principle of the artillery offensive that required concentration of artillery in the area of the main effort.
As the number of artillery weapons increased during 1942, regiments
were formed to create the beginnings of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command (RGVK). As the size of the RGVK grew, these regiments were further organized into artillery divisions and even a r t i l l e r y corps. Eventually, almost 50% of all artillery assets were in the RGVK. The specific purpose of the RGVK was to centralize the artillery assets and provide the capability to mass great quantities of artillery on the main axes of troop operations.*" The maneuver units s t i l l retained their own artillery units t o create a dual level a r t i l l e r y organization; the centralized artillery described above and a decentralized artillery. The decentralized artillery provided support at the lowest maneuver levels and was called the close support
artillery or the accompanying artillery. This close support artillery i s

defined in the Soviet m t a r y Encvclooedic Dictionary as: 'subunits (guns) of battations or regiments, as well as special self-propelled artillery, deployed in the Great Patriotic War in infantry 20
and tank dispositions, to deliver fire on enemy forces impeding their advance. For the most part delivered direct fire. -25 The close support artillery was able t o resort to direct fire because the centralized artillery assets were available to provide indirect fire support. The centralization of artillery assets and the increasing numbers of artillery weapons produced by the Soviets allowed for massive concentration of artillery. The 1941-42 norm for the density of artillery pieces and mortars in the area of the main effort was 70-80 guns per kilometer. That had increased to 130-200 per kilometer by 1943, 150-250 per kilometer by 1944 and 250-300 per kilometer by 194S26 The extreme was during the final offensive against Berlin where the Sovlets massed
670 guns per kilometer (22,000 artillery pieces) against the Germans. An
unusually large proportion of these guns, by Western standards, were employed in a direct fire role on the front line.=27
In the sectors of
greatest
importance for
the Leningrad
counterattack in January 1943 there were at least 40 direct fire guns per kilometer of front. In the main attack by 2nd Army, thirty seven per cent
of the small caliber artillery pieces (mostly 76mm) were in direct fire
positions,
and about ten percent of the larger caliber artillery pieces
(mostly 122mrn. but some 152mm) were in direct f i r e positions. The supporting attack by 8th Army showed about fifteen per cent less use of direct fire artillery.28 The weighting of the main attack with direct fire weapons reflects the importance attributed t o the effectiveness of direct
f ire.
21
oelled Artillerv When the Soviets conducted offensive operations they discovered
quickly that the towed artillery in the front lines was unable to keep up
with the tanks during battle, particularly those providing direct fire
support. The Soviets solved this major problem of providing continuous fire support to mechanized formations by increasing the use of self-propelled artillery. This use of self-propelled artillery is considered another one of the major changes in artillery development by the Soviets. The major role of self-propelled artillery was t o use direct fire to assist armor forces in defeating German tanks.
The Soviets had some experience with self-propelled gun designs in
the 1930s, however, the industrial capacity priority was t o production of tanks until the later part of 1942. Light tank production then shifted t,o providing self-propelled
artillery.
The s 1 ~ - 7 6 * ~ as the f i r s t w
self-propelled gun produced, but it was not sufficiently armored or effective enough against newer German tanks. It was eventually employed primarily as an infantry support assault gun. effective in the antitank role. The SU-122 entered production shortly after the SU-76, and, due to i t s larger caliber, was more The SU-152, the largest callber of self-propelled artillery, appeared in early 1943 and was a very effective antitank weapon. Its major shortcoming was a carrying capacity for only twenty rounds of ammunition, requiring continual replenishment during battle.30
The f i r s t self-propelled gun regiments were formed in December
1942 with a mixture of SU-76s and SU- 122s. By the beginning of I944 the
22
r i f l e divisions included their own self-propelled artillery and the combined arms team of infantry, tanks and self-propelled artillery was employed.31 Soviet Marshal P. A Rotmistrov, Chief Marshal of Armored Forces, wrote in 1945 on the Great Patriotic War experience: The rapid pace of offensive operations presented new requirements regarding maneuverability of artillery, and practice showed that if the attacking troops did not: have artillery support a t the right moment, it lost i t s significance at once. There i s where self-propelled artillery comes in. By i t s firepower and mobility it supplements field artillery, assists tanks in battle, and aids in the development of the battle.-32
Rotmistrov especially stressed the antitank role of such weapons and emphatically stated field artillery [indirect fire1 Is almost useless against modem tanks. 33 In writings in the early 1970s, Rotmistrov provided the rationale for development of self-propelled artillery during the Great Patriotic War. He related that the decision t o produce
self-propelled artillery with guns of a caliber and lethality exceeding those of Nazi tanks was a direct result of the introduction of powerful new weapons fielded by the Germans beginning at the Battle of Kursk (the 60
ton Tiger tank and 70 ton Ferdinand self-propelled gun).
Soviet
self-propelled artillery was specifically expected t o deal with these enemy armored vehicles.34 The use of self-propelled artillery almost exclusively in a direct fire role raised some controversy as t o who owned the new artlllery weapons, the armor commanders or the field artillery commanders. Initially, the new self-propelled artillery was in fact subordinated t o the tank forces. It was determined that under the conditions of manewer warfare,
23
self-propelled artillery directly accompanying the tanks provided the best form of artillery s u p p 0 r t 3 ~ This close maneuver unit support further enhanced the concept of two artilleries: a centralized one capable of massing i t s assets to provide indirect fire support and another in direct accompaniment of the maneuver forces. The concept of employment of tanks and self-propelled artillery together was an important one. The self-propelled artillery relieved the tanks o f tasks relating to the direct engagement of enemy tanks allowing
the tanks to perform maneuver while the artillery provided f i r e p ~ w e r . ~ ~
This concept is confirmed by another quote from Rotmistrov: can draw this strike on themselves and open fire against attackers on the spot, giving friendly tanks an opportunity to maneuver and attack the enemy in the flank and rear.-37
... . in case of a counterattack by enemy tanks, self-propelled guns
Frequently self-propelled guns found themselves compelled t o repel tank attacks on their own.
An historical example of this shows how
effective they were against German tanks. This i s an account of action by a Soviet self-propelled artillery unit in the Orel-Kunk sector in July of
1943. Intelligence reported the movement of a German unit of twenty Tiger
tanks and four Ferdinand self-propelled guns.
A Soviet unit of twelve
self-propelled howitzers was sent to defend against the attack. They took up concealed positions in depth. When the German unit arrived, the Soviet artillery opened up from defilade positions a t a maximum range of 500 meters. Engagements were at 250-300 meters at the height of the battle.
24
The Soviet unit destroyed eight of the Tigers and a l l four of the Ferdinands, effectively repulsing the attack.38 Experiences like these showed that self-propelled artillery of a large caliber was an extremely effective weapon against even the heaviest German armored vehicles. It is stressed though, that the guns had to be properly employed from concealed positions and at close ranges. When the nature of the terraln allowed it, the self-propelled artillery utilizing direct fire were unrivalled in effectiveness for tank ambushes. Another example of this capability i s an instance later in the
war where the Soviets sent two artillery regiments to ambush an expected
German armored counterattack. The terrain was analyzed and the most likely route for the Germans was covered by the artillery positioned in concealed positions in depth on the route. The German counterattack came
in the expected direction with a total of sixty medium and Tiger tanks and
Ferdinand heavy self-propelled guns. When the engagement was over the Soviet artillery had destroyed forty-five of the German armored vehicles and successfully turned back the German c~unterattack.~' Self-propelled artillery played an ever increasing part in Soviet offensive operations. As later models were produced they tended to have stronger armor and increased mobility. This made them more flexible and more effective in operations against tanks.
To conclude the lessons learned from the Great Patriotic War, Soviet
employment of direct fire became prominent out of the sheer need t o defend against German armor with any means available.
It had the
additional advantages of ammunition savings and overcoming the obstacles 25
of a relatively poor indirect fire capability when engaging targets of opportunity. It was a significant contributor to the effectiveness of the 'artillery offensive' so important to the Soviet successes against the Germans. The major disadvantage of vulnerability was an acceptable tradeoff for the results achieved and was greatly overcome by the development of self-propelled artillery that could hold i t s own against German armor when properly employed. The Soviets came out of the Great Patriotic War with a tradition of direct fire artillery tactics that worked extremely well for them. Soviet Art illerv from the 1950s to 1973 Immediately after the war and into the mid 1950s. the tactlcal employment of artillery as a major factor in antitank defense operations remained essentially unchanged. Direct fire artillery and particularly self-propelled artillery was expected to engage enemy armor at the forward edge of the battlefield and Into the depth of the enemy positions.4 The major factor to subsequently affect artillery development in the mid 1950s was tied to the arrival of the Nuclear Age. The cannon artillery's pre-eminence as the prime means of mass destruction was replaced by the missile and atomic weapons. The strategic rocket forces became the important service in the military at the expense of the others.
The cannon artillery faded into the background during this period and
received l i t t l e emphasis. The ultimate means f o r carrying out direct fire artillery tactics, the self-propelled weapon, received only minor
26
developmental attention and no further production. The prevailing opinion
was that conventional warfare was unlikely because it was impossible to

maintain front lines and achieve major thrusts in an era of nuclear weapons.41 The artillery weapons that were developed were improvements of towed artillery to further enhance i t s range and generally update it from the Great Patriotic War vintage equipment on hand. In 1955, a 203mm towed gun-howitzer was produced that was capable of firing a nuclear projectile. All the weapons that were produced continued to have a direct fire capability in deference to the lessons learned early in the Great Patriotic War. By the mid 1960% the Soviets had resolved that future war would not automatically involve the immediate massive use of nuclear weapons, and at least the initial stages of war could be fought conventionally. US. studies of the Soviet use of direct fire artillery determined their employment would be based on experience from the Great Patriotic War. It was understood that the Soviets would continue to use direct fire artillery
in both defensive and offensive operations. The use of direct fire was
based on a conviction of i t s tactical usefulness from the Great Patriotic War and the advantages derived from 'defeating targets in less time with less ammunition using direct fire"42 A r t i l l e r y weapon emplacement for direct fire was expected to be from 1,000 to 1,500 meters which i s a reflection of the increased capability of the newer towed weapons that the Soviets had developed. Studies of that time concluded that all Soviet field artillery weapons were capable of direct fire up to and including the nuclear capable 203mm g u n / h o w i t ~ e r 4The tactics of moving towed guns ~ 27
up into camouflaged positions near the front line under cover of darkness to ire accomplish direct I missions was also retained.# Soviet sources in the early 1970s indicate that the use of direct fire by artillery was indeed still a viable concept. Soviet Chief Marshal of Armored Forces P. k Rotmistrov wrote during this period that the use of hollow-charge shells had insured that even low initial shell velocity weapons could successfully perform antitank missions. He stated specifically: Thus, in modern offensive battle too, self-propelled artillery . . . w i l l carry a large share of the fight against enemy tanks.45 Major General of A r t i l l e r y G. Biryukov in his book, Antitank W rfare, a published in 1972 stated The usual ground artillery (excluding the antitank artillery) i s s t i l l an important antitank weapon in modem combat. At the same time the role of artillery fire in combatting tanks with usual ammunition from covered positions [indirect fire1 has considerably decreased. . .-46
He goes on to say that the problem with indirect fire is the large ammunition expenditure and large number of guns required, and even with
this the effects on a tank formation are minimal. It i s the a r t i l l e r y placed
in covered positions which engage tanks with direct fire that are effective.
This i s particularly important in the defense of a breakthrough by enemy armor when artillery moves from i t s indirect fire positions to positions allowing direct f i r e engagement. With special armor piercing and shaped charge ammunition the artillery can destroy any modern tank. The use of artillery in direct fire, supplementing a powerful artillery barrage i s an effective means to repel massive enemy armored attacks.47
28
Colonel k A. Sidorenko in his book, The Offensive published in 1970, stated 'Very important significance i s had during the period of the fire preparatlon by dlrect fire as the most effective method of destroying observed enemy weapons as well as destroying defensive works on the forward edge of the battle area and in the Immediate depth. In the last war, guns of various calibers were used for direct fire. . . . Under contemporary conditions artillery guns. . . . may be widely used for the conduct of direct I ire.-40
We see that even into the early 1970s. the Great Patriotic War
experience with direct f i r e was carried over and considered an effective means of employing a slgnit'icant percentage of artillery weapons.
29

1 Raymond L. Garthoff, Sov iet Militan/ Doctrine (1953): 303.
2 V. Pogonin, "Organizing the Plan of Fire and Engineer Obstacles,' ma l HeralQ (March 1983): 101. t r,
3 U.S.S.R. Commissariat of Defense, Field Service Re Armv. 193 6 ( 1937):125.
Soviet
4 Walter Kerr, "Death or Insanity,'Field A r t illerv Jouma 1,33 (October 1943): 815.
5 P. Kuleskov, 'In the Great Patriotic War," Militarv Herald (January 1982): 112.
6 S.L. Mayer, editor, The Russian War Machine 19 17- 1945 ( 1 7 ) 190. 97:
7 B.H. Liddell Hart, editor. The Red Army ( 1956): 357.
8 F.A. Samsonov, editor, Combat Exaerience of Artillerv in the Patriotic War (November 1952): 85-6.
9 W.R. Young, "Artillery Offensive. An Examination of Russian Practice," nal 36 (January 1946): 27.
I0 Samsonov, m
1 1 Samsonov, !&&at
t Fxoerience: 60.
Fxaer ience 33. .
12 H.G. dewateville, "Russian Artillery 1941-1945,'Field Artillery Journal. 37 (May-June 1947): 196.
13 Kuleskov, "In the Great Patriotic War": 112-3.
14 , 'Direct Artillery Fire," Field Artillerv Journal. 32 (September 1942): 694.
30
15 Hart, Red Armr 358-9.
16 Samsonov, m a t F x o e r i m: 47.
17 L. Sapkov, "Evolution of Artillery Tactics and Combat Employment,'
Military Herald (April 1982): 120. 18 k Karelsky, 'Soviet Artillery Fire,' Field Artillery Journa32 (July 1942): 5 I 1. 19 J. Erickson, 'Soviet Combined Arms: Theory and Practice' (September 1979): 43. 20 Liddell Hart, 2 I Samsonov, -er 355. iencq: 84-5.
22 Samsonov, Gombat ExDerienca: 96-7. 23 Liddell Hart, Red 36 1-2.
24 Kuleskov, 'In the Great Patriotic War': 1 15. 25 N.V. Ogarkov, editor, M Dd - ei UC 175. 26 Sapkov, 'Evolution of Artillery': 121. 27 Garthoff, Soviet Doctrinc 123. 28 Samsonov, Combat EXDWience: 47. 29 The numbers in designation of models of self-propelled artillery referred t o the caliber of the gun (i.e. SU-76 is a 76mm gun). 30 Mayer, yar Machine: 190. 3 I Erickson, 'Soviet Combined Arms": 28. 32 Garthoff, Soviet Doctring 305-6. 31 Dictionary ( 1983):VOl I,
33 Garthoff, Soviet Doctrine: 306.

34 Young, 'Artillery Offensive.: 27. 35 P.A Rostmistrov, "The Postwar Development of Tank Forces,' Selected Soviet M l l i t a p Writtnqs (1976): 282. 36 dewateville, 'Russian Artillery': 197. 37 Rostmistrov, 'Tank Forces': 283. 38 L. Vysokoostrovsky, 'Artillery versus Tiger and Ferdinand," Artillery Journal33 (October 1943): 81 1. 39 MAJ Parapov, "Ambushing With Artillery," Field Artillerv Journa 34 (November 1944): 786.
40 V. Kiselev, "The Development of the Antitank Defense in the

Postwar Years,' Militarv Historical Journa1 (June 1978): 25.
41 Kurt Hofmann, "An Analysis of Soviet Artillery Development" In t e m n aI i D 15 ( 1982) Special Issue: 136-7.
~ 42 U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, Emp 1 Artillerv in the Direct Fire Rola ( 1962): 5..
25.
43 Thomas P. Rarnetta, "Direct Fire,' Artillerv Trends 23 (July 1962):
44 USAAMS, "Employment of Artillery': 24.

45 Rostmlstrov, "Tank Forces": 284. 46 G. Biryukov and G. Melnikov, Antitank Warfare ( 1972): 72. 47 Biryukov, Antitank Warfare: 73.
48 AA. Sidorenko, The Offensive (1970): 123.
32
CHAPTER 3 CURRENT SOVIET TACTICS AND PROCEDURES The number of articles available from Soviet sources1 that discuss the direct f i r e use of artillery make it clear that the use of direct fire i s s t i l l seen as a viable means of employing artillery in the offense, the defense and in special situations. The purpose of this chapter i s to explain the current Soviet tactics and employment procedures for dlrect fire. The organization of Soviet artillery is an important factor in how it
is tactically employed. The Soviets can be considered to have two artillery

forces2 The first force i s decentralized and is the one we are concerned w i t h in this study. It is a field artillery battalion organic to the Motorized Rifle Regiment and Tank Regiment. It provides the close support artillery assets to the manewer force and is often used in a direct flre role. This force i s also known as organic or accompanying artillery. The quantity and features of the organlc artillery are discussed in Chapter 4. The second artillery force i s the centralized artillery that i s controlled at divislon and higher levels. Some of thls artillery is passed down to the regiments in organizing the force for combat. The artillery that ends up at regimental level may also find itself performing an occasional direct fire mission, but the usual method of employment is
33
indirect f i r e 3 The centralized artillery retained at division and higher levels would only rarely be employed for direct fire. They are, however, all capable of using direct fire in self defense.
There are two primaty occasions in offensive operations where the Soviets w i l l use their field artillery in a direct fire role. The first is by the artillery unit assigned to the advanced guard during a march in anticipation of a meeting engagement. Second, is by portions of the organic regimental artillery as part of a fire plan during the artillery preparation of the attack. Although these are certainly not the only occasions where direct fire w i l l be used, they are the most prevalent in current Soviet
mi1itary Iiterature.
v
The advanced guard of a Soviet regiment conducting a march is a battalion size maneuver force.
It usually has an artillery battalion
attached to it. Ahead of the advanced guard is a forward security element made up of a maneuver company with an artillery battery attached to it. The artillery moves in the forward elements of these formations.
A
platoon size reconnaisance patrol operates far enough in front of the forward security element (5 to 10 kilometers) to provide enough reaction time and space for the security element to move into combat formations
prior to contact wtth an enemy force.
34
Upon a warning of enemy forces ahead, the most likely deployment for the artillery battery from the security element is to take positions that provlde for dlrect flre engagement of the en'my force. The battery locatlon i s quickly selected based on the security element commander's plan for maneuver. Specific gun positions are dlrected upon arrlval at the posltton. The battery is deployed by platoon wlth several hundred meters between them and as much as a hundred meters between guns of a platoon. The artlllery battallon commander traveling wlth the advanced guard is Informed of the sttuation and approves the c o m e of action. The battalion commander w i l l then direct the other two batteries of the battalion to deploy Into Indirect fire positions t o provide support for the inltial engagement as it develops. When the enemy c o m a into the killing zone of the direct fire battery it opens fire and the maneuver elements of the security element attack. The battery commander controls the flre of one platoon and the senior battery officer controls the other platoon. By the completion of this engagement the maneuver forces of the advanced guard have also arrived and they continue to develop the s1tuatim4 The requlrements t o insure success in these situations are to train for deployment from the march, achieve proficiency in preparing the guns for firing, understand and properly react t o Control signals, and skillfully use the terrain In deploying the firing platoons for their p r o t e c t i ~ n .This ~ last point is stressed in every dlscusslon 1 have read of movlng into direct
fire positions from the march. One of the few hlStOrlCal examples from the
Great Patriotic War that tells about a Soviet defeat is one that relates a situation where the terraln was used incorrectly. The battery tried to
35
move in to a direct f i r e position in sight of the enemy and lost five of their
six guns t o tank fire.6 The best use of the terrain is to cover the approach
of the guns to their firing positions and to use it to select positions with maximum observation and fields of fire. it is preferable to position the
guns t o form a 'fire pocket' for the enemy vehicles to move into. This
allows most of the
guns to fire at the more vulnerable sides of enemy
vehicles. Another advantageous use of terrain is to emplace on the reverse slopes of hills and open close range fire at tanks as they appear on the crest. This effectively takes away the tank's range advantage.
It seems to be a frequent requirement for both towed and
self-propelled artillery units to train in repelling a tank attack during a meeting engagement. It is standard practice for the battery operating in the security element to deploy into direct fire positions at the report of enemy units by the reconnaisance patrol. The battery commander of a self-propelled artillery unit was berated in the conducting a meeting engagement.' Herald for reacting improperly during a training excercise as part of the security element The situation was the same as mentioned above, and his tactical blunder was that he put his battery in an indirect fire position. The evaluator mentioned several reasons f o r why the choice should have been direct fire positions instead. The first point was that direct fire would have provided for more effective accomplishment of the mission with less ammunition expenditure. Secondly, there were two more batteries following with the advanced guard that were available to provide indirect fire support. The third point was that the side that fires
first in a meeting engagement i s the one that wins it, and he had lost that
36
opportunity.
Finally,
he failed to use the tactical features of his These were llsted as 'high maneuverability,
self-propelled howitzers.
control targets.
controllability and survivability." The bottom line in the evaluation of this self-propelled artillery in direct f i r e are acting incorrectly.'
unit was that 'those officers who exclude an opportunity t o use today's
The second occasion where direct fire is likely to be used in
offensive operations is as part of the fire plan developed for the artillery preparation of the attack. It is routine to use some designated artillery weapons to fire from direct fire positions to complement the traditional heavy volume of tndlrect fires of the preparation. it has been suggested that this may have even more significance today than it did during the Great Patriottc War because of the current need to reduce the time of the preparation due t o improved enemy counterfire capabilities9 The artillery preparation of the attack is intended as a powerful surprise fire assault by all artillery units against preplanned targets of personnel and weapons on the forward edge of the battlefield and through the depths of the enemy defense to include artillery units and command and The weapons assigned direct fire missions destroy pinpoint targets such as tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, antitank guided missile launchers and emplacements on the forward edge.1 With the high level of mechanization of Soviet forces, the primary focus Is on destruction of the enemy antiarmor capability to enhance the odds of the success of Soviet mechanized formations in the attack.
37
Extensive and detailed reconnaisance is performed of the enemy positions to determine the targeting requirements for the preparation. Reconnaissance detachments, combined arms commanders and commanders of organic and attached artillery perform this reconnaisance and pass information on targets to higher levels. The fire plan i s prepared at the highest level involved in the operation and then passed down for execution. This can include direction for which specific targets w i l l be engaged with direct fire. The most important targets on the forward edge of the battlefield are the ones that w i l l be engaged by direct fire weapons. The regimental artillery chief coordinates the artillery preparation for the attack for the manewer regiment commander. He analyzes the mission and the assets available to him, and then designates which weapons w i l l be involved in the direct f i r e missions. This includes the tanks and antitank guided misslles of supported manewer units as well as artillery pieces. The regimental artillery chief provides very detailed information to the artillery units on their direct fire missions1I
1. Specific fire missions with primary and alternate targets for each
weapon. In many cases more than one weapon w i l l be assigned for the destruction of a single target.
2. The sequence for execution. 3. The general locations for firing positions.
4. The time for position occupation and time to be ready to open fire.
5. The signals for commencing and ceasing fire.

6. The allowed ammunition consumption for each target.
38
The regimental artillery chief prepares a fire chart of the weapons used in direct fire to include tanks, antitank guided missiles, and artillery guns. This i s considered to be the most important document of the fire plan.I2 It shows the posltion of the weapons and the designation of their targets. The battery commander whose guns are to be employed in the direct fire role selects the specific firing position locations for each gun based on the information from the fire plan. The positlons are chosen based on the ability to observe the target, at a range within the limits of direct fire and with approach routes that facilitate movement into the positions. The artillery commander must know the maneuver plan to Insure the direct fire Positions do not hlnder forward movement of friendly attacking forces and the positlon is chosen no closer than 400 meters from enemy positions to keep it out of small arms range.I3 The battery commander also designates the rendezvous location where the guns w l l l reassemble following completion of the direct fire missions. The weapon commanders study the approach to their designated firing position in detail. They w i l l most likely physically occupy the position during the night preceding the preparation. flring and camouflage the weapon from observation.
of the wide dispersal between guns.14
They check the They are also
technical condition of the sighting devices, prepare the ammunition for responsible for establishing wire communications to adjacent guns because
39
Firing from direct fire positions is usually conducted at the beginning of the artillery preparation. This i s t o insure that the targets are clearly observable prior t o the enemy's forward edge of the battlefield becoming covered w i t h dust and smoke from the shell bursts of the artillery preparation. The need to destroy the targets with a f i r s t round hit
is greatly emphasizedsince later observation and correction of fire may be

extremely difficult or impossible. The time available for completion of direct fire missions is estimated to be 5-8 minutes.'
It is tremendously important for the artillery to defeat the enemy's
antitank capability during the preparation.
This point i s greatly
emphasized in current Soviet articles on the artillery preparation. It is considered that an artillery preparation by only indirect fires would leave enough weapons undamaged on the forward edge to slow the attacking units and possibly prevent the success of the attack. The employment of direct f i r e weapons and the detailed planning process for direct fire is done t o insure the defeat of this antitank capability and to facilitate the success of the Soviet maneuver forces in the attack.
Although this study has discussed the two situations most often
mentioned by the Sovlets on employment of their field artillery assets in a direct fire role, they are not the only situations. There are many other tactical situations where direct fire employment of the supporting artillery is feasible. Thls is particularly the case in pursuit operations
40
where the tactical situation can become very similar to the meeting engagement already discussed. The phase of artillery support following the preparation i s the support of the attack.I6 This phase begins immediately upon the completion of the preparation fires and continues until the Soviet forces have overrun the front line battalions of the enemy. The transition from the preparatlon to support of the attack Is supposed to be lmperceptlble. The artillery units in place from the preparation are capable of supporting this phase without movement from positions because of the range capabilities of their weapons. Accompanying artillery moves forward to follow the advance of the manewer units and i s capable of providing direct fire support The majority of the artillery remains in indirect fire positions and continues to follow the fire plan for support of the attack. The f i r e plan usually calls for successive concentrations of artillery fire on enemy positions. The concentration i s fired on the enemy position until the friendly maneuver forces reach it The concentration i s then shifted to the next enemy position. There are additional on call targets available i f requested by manewer commanders. The extensive Indirect fires are supplemented by the artillery moving w i t h the manewer formations which i s available for conduct of direct fire i f needed. Direct fire use of artillery
is probably minimal during thls phase since it i s rarely discussed.

Despite the extensive fire planning there are indications that fire support coordinatlon during thls period does not always meet expectatlons.
It i s a common theme in current literature that the manewer and artillery
commanders must know each others needs better In Order to effectively

41
fight the combined arms battle. The emphasis for Soviet artillerymen is to understand maneuver, think like a maneuver commander, anticipate their needs and provide the required fire support in a timely manner.
In a recent article in the Soviet plilitary HeralQ, it was recommended

that the artillery designated to accompany the maneuver forces in support
of the attack be completely held back from participation in the preparation
so that they could be prepared to immediately move forward. The primary

function of the artillery was t o hit all "surviving and suddenly appearing targets' dangerous t o the tanks. This indicates at least some requirement for artillery in a direct fire role. The final statement of the article is an assessment that artillery Officers 'must be imbued wlth a tank spirit' to deploy rapidly and support tanks in a dynamic batt1e.l' Another source refers to the accompanying artillery specifically as a fire support asset that fills a void between the tank gun of the maneuver force and the indirect artillery available from the division and army artillery groups. The presence of this additional link in the fire support chain would be very beneficial for providing a guarantee of artillery support
in an intensive electronic warfare environment where
communicationwith indirect f i r e sources was limited or eliminated. The final phase of ftre support is fire accompaniment in the depth of the enemy defenses. Artillery units that have provided indirect fire support displace forward by echelon in order to provide continued support. The situation becomes more fluid and the advancing maneuver units may find themselves attacking enemy defenses from the march, fighting meeting engagements and conducting pursuit operations. As the situation
42
continues to develop the likelihood of utilizing artillery in a direct fire
role increases. The conduct of the leading artillery battery in a meeting

engagement w i l l be the same here as discussed earlier in the chapter. The accompanying artillery i s also likely to deploy to direct fire positions in reaction to enemy counterattacks. The Soviet use of field artillery for direct fire in the offense i s most prevalent in the meeting engagement and in the artillery preparation for a deliberate attack. The accompanying artillery w i l l also have opportunity to employ direct f i r e as it follows immediately behind the maneuver forces in the attack.
As the attack succeeds against the enemy forces and the
battlefield becomes more fluid, the incidence of direct fire use of field artillery assets w i l l increase.
some of the foundations for the use of direct fire emanated from the
desperate need for the Soviets to stop the German tanks in the early part of
the Great Patriotic war. The soviets are extremely fond of ustng historical
situations as examples of how contemporary requtrements must also be
met and a large portion of the historical examples that are used for direct fire relate t o its value in defending against tanks. There is no question
that an artillery untt i s expected t o stand and flght and win in a defensive
engagement with tanks.
There are very few references to fleld artillery pleces being

integrated into the front line defenses of Soviet maneuver units. I have
43
seen no examples of this type of deployment in current literature and it i s likely that it occurs only rarely. The artillery prepares defensive fire plans in the same detail as in offensive situations. Again, tanks, antitank guided missiles and antitank artillery are part of the overall fire plan, not just field artillery units. The most likely enemy course of action is targeted in the fire plan with on call targets and shifts prepared for other situations. Artillery f i r e i s conducted by Indirect fire means and starts at its maximum range to break up enemy formations approaching friendly positions. As the enemy approaches the forward edge of the defense, maneuver unit weapons assigned to specific sectors engage the
enemy at their maximum effective range. Indirect
artillery fire continues to move in closer as the enemy approaches to maximize destruction and confusion. Maximum firepower is brought to bear at the forward edge of the battlefield.i9 The defense is organized in depth and as the enemy forces penetrate or bypass friendly positions the direct fire capability of the artillery is brought into action. The direct fire capabilities of field artillery weapons are considered
by the Soviets when they organtze their defense in depth. Artillery flring
positions in a defensive situation are deliberately selected on primary tank avenues of approach. defensive depth2O The specific firing positions of the field artillery units are also selected with the antitank role in mind. The battery is positioned for its primary Indirect fire role w i t h consideration for survlvabiltty from enemy
44
This i s to allow the artillery batteries the
opportunity to destroy enemy tanks in the event they break Into the
artillery flre. Speclfic posltlons are also selected for each weapon to be employed for dlrect flre In the case of an enemy armor attack. The terraln should favor safe movement t o the dlrect flre posltlon and It must allow for good observation out to the maxlmum effectlve dlrect fire range of the weapon. The posltlon needs to provlde for the concealment of the artlllery plece t o allow the tank to move within range wlthout detectlon of the artlllery weapon. At the posltlon reference polnts are deslgnated, ranges are predetermined to facllltate accurate engagement of tanks and speclflc zones of flre are allocated. The zones of flre Interlock and overlap to allow more than one artillery plece to engage a target at the same time.*' Fleld artillery unlts, particularly self-propelled howitzers, may be deslgnated as part of the manewer unlt's antltank reserve. This reserve would be called to relnforce manewer unlts at threatened sectors. When actlng as part of an antltank reserve in a planned defenslve movement, it I likely that the effectiveness of the direct fire w i l l be s enhanced by combat englneer work. The most common englneer obstacle is the mlnefleld. The advantage of havlng advancing tanks distracted by a mlnefleld at the same t h e that an artlllery unlt is engaging It In dlrect fire
Is significant22 It makes the tanks more vulnerable by restrlctlng

Although antitank capabllltles of artlllery In dlrect fire positions is
moblllty and enhances the survlvablllty of the dlrect flre artillery. by far the maJor subJect dlscussed, the Sovlets traln to employ dlrect flre agalnst personnel targets as well. The Sovlet artillery has several For ammunltlon rounds deslgned speclflcally for antltank missions.
45
antipersonnel mlsslons though, they simply use a hlgh explosive round with
a time fuze on a short setting. The major problem in effectiveness i s an
accurate determination of the range t o the target and setting the proper
fuze time relative t o the range. In an article from the mtary Heral4 the
ranges used t o work out optimum fuze settings were between 300 and 500
meters for a 122mm howitzer ~ n i t . 2 ~ The Soviets can be expected t o use their artillery for direct fire missions when defending in the depth of their positions. Artillery w i l l aggressively move out t o meet tank attacks from prepared positions on primary tank avenues of approach. Although, the primary concern i s an antitank capability, the Soviets have developed methods t o insure an effective antipersonnel capability in defense of battery positions as well.
There are several special combat situations discussed by the Soviets that lend themselves t o the use of their field artillery in a direct f i r e role. The situations I w i l l discuss here are river crossings, mountainous terrain, fortifications. combat in combat in built-up areas and the destruction of
J = = u Q w
The artillery support provided for a river crossing is likely to involve use of field artillery in a direct fire role. Organic artillery weaponsare frequently moved up t o a position where they can engage
46
targets on the opposite bank at the crossing sites and support the establishment of the brldgehead.
In the case of a deliberate river crossing an artlllery preparatlon I s

planned the same as in any other deliberate attack. The direct fire targets
are destroyed early In the preparation Wen the preparation flres are then
shifted to the depths of the enemy defense with the crosslng of the attacking troops, the direct fire artillery weapons stay in place and
continue t o provide a cover of close-In fire as the bridgehead is

established. The priority targets are tanks and antltank weapons which can cause the most damage to crossing vehlcles. When the artillery battertes cross the river to support continuation of the attack, they occupy positions on the primary avenue of approach for annor In order to repulse any counterattack effort by direct fire to protect the bridgehead.24
An assault river crossing w i l l be characterized in a similar nature to

a meeting engagement. The artillery battery of the forward detachment
as the situation crossing site for the main body. Combat actions
47
w i l l often be employed to provide direct fire support at the crossing site
I developed for the advanced guard to secure the bridge or s
in mountainous terrain have their special
s characteristics. Most action is along valleys but the tactical edge I to the
force with the advantage of the commandlng helghts. Units routinely have exposed flanks and a considerable distance to the next adjacent unit.
Artillery units likewise have distinct characteristics for mountain warfare. Each battery w i l l most often be performing i t s mission independently. The likelihood for using guns in direct fire i s significantly increased. The advantage of the effectiveness of direct fire is even more obvious w i t h the increased d i l l iculty of conducting accurate indirect f i r e due to the tremendous differences in elevation between weapon and target. The reduced ammunition expediture that results from direct fire i s also significant because ammunition resupply is more difficult to accomplish in mountainous terrain.25 Another problem in the conduct of indirect artillery l i r e in the mountains is the large dead spaces that cannot be fired into because of trajectory limitations. A recent article from the Milltarv Herald discusses the advantages of using direct fire to long ranges in the mountains because of the difficulty of indirect fire.26 Direct fire to long ranges i s conducted by semidirect laying. W i t h semidirect laying the direction of the tube (in the horizontal plane) is determined by direct aiming on the target itself. The elevation of the tube (in the vertical plane)
is determined by a calculation of trajectory based on the range to the

target and leveling of the indirect fire sight. Although f i r s t round accuracy
is diminished at the longer ranges, it can evidently be adjusted t o the

target more quickly than with indirect fire methods under the same conditions. Although there i s not a specific effective range l i m i t discussed for using semidirect laying in the mountains, the insinuation i s that i f you can see the target, use it. The comment i s made that visibility at up t o 10 kilometers is not unusual in the mountains.
48
it is interesting t o note the increased frequency of dlscussions on

the nature of combat in the mountains since the Soviets have gotten involved in Afghanistan. Some of the discussions of training excercises in the mountains make the reader wonder i f the action described is really just
an excercise.
Combat in built-up areas is another speclal situation that has routine application for direct fire use of artlllery. Although It i s desirable to avoid and bypass built-up areas wherever possible, there are sltwtions when it cannot be done. The tactical employment of organic artillery in large built-up area is characterized by decentralizatlon. Batteries w i l l llkeiy operate as part of an assault group with platoons and indivldual artillery pieces given separate and distinct dlrect fire missions in varlous parts of the area of action. indlrect fire capabilities are at a disadvantage because of the limited fields of view and difficulties of observing and adjusting artillery rounds In a city. Because of the sturdiness of large buildings, requirements are increased for heavler caliber artlllery (from 152mm and up) to perform direct fire as well. The range for direct fire i s likely to be very short because of the limited space available between bulldings for the artlllery to set up. Moving in so close to a target requires increased consideration of how to provide for survivability of the artillery plece. One technique i s to place the target under heavy fire from small arms, machine guns and tanks, i f possible, while the artillery piece moves into position and opens fire. In
49
many cases it does not take a great number of hits from a large caliber weapon for the defenders to realize their fate. Engineer preparation can be used in some situations and some cover can be gained from existing rubble or buildings. It is not uncommon to move into the direct fire position under cover of darkness2 The antitank mission for artillery i s also common in the city with
city building.
guns placed in covered and concealed direct fire positions to protect flanks and approaches to friendly positions from tank attacks or counterattacks.
A situation that is similar to the destruction of buildings in a city is
the requirement for destruction of fortifications. This situation i s easier from the standpoint of emplacement options for the guns performing the mission However, the strength of the fortification w i l l be greater than a The existence of articles in current Soviet military literature discussing the techniques for destruction of fortifications indicates that this is a valid requirement for use of direct fire The use of heavy caliber weapons (152mm and 203mm) i s directed for effective destruction of fortifications. Concrete piercing shells with delayed action fuzes are used as the ammunition. The 203mm artillery is considered most effective in the destruction of concrete structures with a wall thlckness of one meter and more or earth and timber structures with a wall thickness of one and one-half meters. The 152mm artillery is considered capable of destruction of earth and timber construction with walls up to one meter thick. The forward wall of the structure is the
50
target and the Impact of the round must be at an angle between 60' and 90' from the wall. The contrast between the effectiveness of indirect and direct fire In performlng destwctlon mlsslons is greatly stressed. The lesson I 'that s one must always strive to destroy a [fortlficatlonl wlth dlrect flre: Detalled calculatlons were performed In determlnlng the number of rounds requlred to destroy a gun emplacement wlth a 152mm ertlllery plece. The wall thlckness was one meter and the calculatlons flgured it would require
60 rounds (for two hlts) by lndlrect fire. The same weapon flrlng at a
range of 1500 meters would only need two rounds (for a single hlt) wlth direct flre. Just as Important, It would take twenty to thirty mlnutes to accomplish the mlsslon by indlrect flre compared to flve to ten mlnutes by
s direct flre. With these dlfferences It I easy to see why the dlrect flre
method I preferred29 s The tactlcs employed In conducting destwctlon mlsslons of fortifications are simllar to those of the artillery partlclpatlng in an artlllery preparatlon The destructlon of fortlflcatlons w l l l often be conducted In conjunction wlth the preparatlon. Detailed reconnalssance
wlll be conducted of the target and the flrlng posltlon. The flrlng posltlon
I selected as close to the target as posslble because the greater the s

veloclty of the shell at Impact, the greater damage w i l l be Inflicted on the fortlflcatlon. The flrlng posltlon w l l l have engineer Improvements made to
It and camouflage to provlde for survlvablllty of the artlllery piece durlng
the engagement. protection as well.
Coverlng forces w l l l often be asslgned to provlde 51
The special situations described in this section have shown that there are many situations where the Soviets intend t o use field artillery weapons in a direct f i r e role t o accomplish specific purposes. The most prevalent factor that seems to drive the decision t o use direct f i r e in these situations is that indirect f i r e cannot accomplish the mission as well.
There were no sources that provided specific reference or guidance
on how often direct fire w i l l be used or what percentage of artillery
assets w i l l normally be used in a direct f i r e role. It is clear that the

organic artillery at the manewer regiment level is routinely prepared to utilize direct fire. Most of the articles found in current Soviet military publications discuss aspects of indirect fire or direct fire, but not both. Therefore, the interrelationship of the two is hard to determine. One indication that the use of direct fire in supporting the manewer force is routine i s the number of articles that address the use of direct fire. For instance, the m i t a y HeralQ for 1984 had articles discussing the use of direct fire in five of the twelve publications for the year. The likelihood i s that the degree of use of direct fire by regimental level artillery is purely dependent on the given tactical situation.
If
conditions are considered favorable for a direct fire mission it w i l l be used without hesitation. The artillery assets at the division artillery group level and above w i l l rarely be used in a direct fire role. The most likely
52
employment of artillery for direct fire at higher levels i s in the defensive role.
of Direct Fire versus Survlvabilitv Canslderatfons

Two topics regularly addressed in any discussion of the direct fire use of artillery are the advantages of using it and the need for measures to
were:
4. It stopped German tanks.
insure the survivability of the artillery weapons. These two points are the
primary tradeoffs in using direct fife. The survivability aspect Is what provided the original interest to conduct this study.
The major advantages of direct fire from the Great Patriotic War
1. It solved the problem of maneuver calling for artillery fire when
then, was a critical shortage of communications equipment.
2 It resulted in significant ammunition savings. .

3. It was more responsive and accurate at a time when the indirect f ire
procedures were not very sophisticated.
Some of these same advantages are mentioned over and over again as the reasons for contemporary use of artillery for direct fire. The two advantages that are always mentioned are completion of the mission in the shortest amount of time and with the expenditure of a minimum amount of 53
ammunition. These points both rise from the superior accuracy of direct fire compared to indirect fire. They cannot be argued against and are well supported with the example used earlier in discussing the destruction of a
fortif led position.

The savings of time in performing fire missions has become more important as modem counterfire capabilities have improved. The Soviets' desire to shorten the period of artillery preparations would be well served by an increase in the use of direct fire artillery to destroy targets on the forward edge of the battlefield. The other reasons for direct fire use in the Great Patriotic War can be related indirectly to contemporary conditions. equipment shortage no longer exists. The communications However, the active electronic
warfare environment that can be expected on the modem battlefield can complicate and even negate communications capabilities. It would be a distinct advantage to have a direct fire support capability that i s immediately available and capable of working by signals and unaffected by an intensive electronic warfare environment. The poor quality or indirect artillery support in the early part of the Great Patriotic War was greatly improved even by the end of that war. Today the Soviets are as fully capable as any Western nation in putting 'steel on the target'. The exception to that may be in the rigidity of the fire planning system and a lack of flexibility in engaging targets of opportunity while scheduled fires are taking place. There i s a considerable advantage
for the manewer commander to have direct fire artillery assets
acompanying him on the advance to engage priority targets of opportunity.

54
the direct fire mission? very apparent.
The availability of the extra artlllery prevents intemption of the scheduled fires or a reduction of its effects.
The tradeoff for the many advantages of direct fire is the
vulnerability of the artillery weapons to tanks, antltank guided mlssiles and other weapons while engaged on the front lines or from defensive posltions. The battlefleld has become more lethal stnce the Great Patrlotlc War with tremendous increases in the effective ranges and lethality of modem weapons. Can the artillery still be expected to survive to perform The Soviets had extensive discussions about the survivability of field artillery in a series of artlcles in the Militarv H e m in the m i d - 1 9 7 0 ~ ~The discussion was generated because of the 1973 ~ Arab-Israeli War, where the increased lethallty of the battlefield became The majority of the Soviet discussion centered on protection from the dangers of counterfire and did not seem to include a Concern for artillery moving in the front lines other than a mention of the threat of antltank gulded mlssiles as a new weapon system. The points that could be drawn from the articles that would pertain to direct fire mlsslons lor artillery were as follows:
1. For defensive purposes, the advantage was discussed of echeloning
and dispersing the formation of guns in indirect fire positions for defense against tank attacks. This would facilitate the engagement of tanks by direct fire i f the echelonlng i s done in the direction of likely approach. The
55
point was made that antitank artillery units already used the tactic for
that very reason and that 'any battery must present an insurmountable
obstacle for tanks."31
2. The need for coordination with engineers for laying minefields on the
approaches to the battery position was mentioned. The distraction and confusion of tanks in the minefield allows the artillery to engage the tanks with greater success and therefore enhances the survivability of the artillery unit.
3. Digging in positions for the howitzers can be done much quicker with
modem engineer equipment and directional charges. This would also apply
to artillery pieces moving up to the forward edge for direct fire missions
as part of the preparation fires.
4. Reliable suppresslon of enemy weapon systems prevents them from
being used against the attacker.

5.
This would particularly apply to an
artillery piece operating from the forward edge of the battlefield. Use of dummy gun emplacements and mock-ups can improve survivability. If a dummy gun i s more observable by the enemy than an actual one, It may draw enemy fire allowing for accomplishment of the mission. Concerns f o r the survivability of artillery continue into the present day as well. The means for enhancing survivability addressed above are s t i l l prevelant in the literature ten years later. The fourth point about planning suppressive fires is probably stressed the most now. One of the duties of the regimental artillery chief in planning preparation fires i s to 56
make arrangements to provide cover for dlrect flre guns wlth the indirect flres of other fire support assets.32
A good lndicatlon that survivability continues t o be a concern i s the

following passage from a recent article on dlrect flre written by Lieutenant General of Artillery Ye. Komarov: Preserving vlability durlng dlrect lald fire has speclal signlflcance for artlllery Iunltsl, slnce the probable enemy has new, effective klnds of weapons and ammunition. . . . . How does one artfully select and camouflage an open flre posltion since as soon as he opens flre from It, It completely identlfles itself7 Consequently, If the gun does not hlt the target wlth the first rounds and does not qulckly leave the posltion, it w i l l be destroyed by the enemy.4 3
Unfortunately, the general never really gets around to tellfng the reader what the solution is to the problem he has raised. He later equates the direct fire mission to a duel, with success dependent on beating the enemy to the punch in accuracy and speed of fire. The crew must be well coordinated and the personnel should have flawless bravery, valor, and endurance and a wllllngness t o flre untll the destructlon of the target Is accompllshed without fearlng counterflre from the enemy. The trainlng
of the gun crew must also Insure lnter-replaceabillty of personnel and a

capablllty to perform the mlssion with any number of personnel. Although this may be standard Soviet rhetoric t o promote the importance of each soldler performlng hts duties at any cost, It also demonstrates an awareness of the dangers of engaging in dlrect fire.
57
A seeming contradiction t o the survivability question appears in the

opening paragraph of an article on self-propelled howitzers by a Soviet colonel who states that "mobility and dependable armor plating renders these pieces invulnerable in battle'34 This is certainly not found to be a predominant opinion. The same author, later in his article, discusses the difficulties of moving into direct fire positions on the forward edge of the battlefield due to the size of the self-propelled guns and the engine noise. He suggests quickly moving into the position in conjunction with the initial barrage fired by the indirect weapons or moving in at night with artificially created noise cover and suppression of enemy radar and infrared capability. These techniques would certainly not be required for an 'invulnerable' weapon. Some of the most recent options discussed for improving the survivability of artillery firing from direct fire positions show that considerable thought is s t i l l being put into the problem. One author
If an
contends that engineer preparation of a position is not enough.
artillery piece does not hit the target with the first round it should maneuver to a prepared alternate position and try again from t h ~ e . 3 ~ Another suggestion is to develop techniques that would allow for adjustment of rounds under conditions of limited visibility36 This seemed to be a reference t o use of a smoke screen for protection of the firing piece. Similar t o this option was an account of a direct fire excercise conducted at night where an antitank guided missile target was located w i t h the assistance of illumination and then fired on and destroyed after
58
the illumination round had gone out. This would certainly make return fire
on the direct fire artillery piece difficult.37

The tradeoff between the many advantages of direct fire and the single disadvantage of vulnerability has been one faced by the Soviets since their employment of direct fire techniques in the Great Patriotic War. The effectiveness of current techniques are hard to determine in a training environment without an enemy returning fire. The Soviets are creatively trying to solve the question of survkabllity, but the bottom line may remain Sworov's principle: You yourself may perish, but help out a comrade. =38
59
I The sources referred to are primarily from the Soviet tllllfarv H e r u as seen in the bibliography.
2 Christopher Bellamy, 'Destruction by Fire: Soviet Artillery In the. 1980sand Beyond,' 53 (September-October 1985):
4.
0
3 It is likely that the organic artillery of the regiment is more routinely employed in direct fire missions than artillery passed down from higher levels t o form the regimental artillery group (RAG). This Is assumed because of the greater opportunity for organic artillery units to routinely train with the maneuver units.
4 V. Vishnevskiy, 'The Battery on the March and in the Meeting Battle,' fllltfprv HeralQ (August 1984): 108-9.
5 Vishnevskiy, 'Battery on the March.': 109.

6 I. Tsvetkov, 'A Battery Repels a Tank Attack,' plilitarv Herald (August 1974): 165-6.
7 V. Morgun, 'Self-Propelled Artillery Battery in an Advance Party," Plilitaw Herald (January 1985): I 16.
8 Morgun, 'Self-Propelled Artillery Battery': 1 17. 9 G. Vasilishin, 'Direct Firing During Artillery Preparation of the Attack,' twltprv Herald (September 1983): 130.
10 G. Ye. Peredel'skiy, The Artillery
(1984): 44.
I I Vasilishin, "Direct Firing During Preparation': 133.

60
1 V. Selyavin, "Dlrect Flre,'Soviet Military R e v l w (November 1975): 2 1.

9
1 1. Yeplfanov, 'Employment of Artlllery,'cwltarv Herald (AprlI 3 18) 2. 92: 7
I4 Vaslllshin, 'Dlrect Flring During Preparation': 134.

15 Yepifanov, 'Employment of Artillery': 29.
1 There are four phases of artillery support for an attack: flre 6 support for a force's movement forward; artlllefy preparation of the
attack (as already dlscussed); artlllery support of the attack; and artlllery accompaniment In the depth of the enemy defenses.
I N. Strelkov, 'Support of a Tank Attack,' 7 1 8 ) 117-8. 94: 1 Rlchard E. Slmpkln. Bed A r m o ( 1 8 ) 74. 8 ~ 94:
(March
1 V. Il'in and V. Sofronov, 'Artillery Fire Plan In Support of a Motorized 9

Rlfle Battal1on;Militarv
Herald (AprlI 1981): 35,38.

*
20 Peredel'skly,
19 2.
21 A Sazevich and A Noskov, 'From the Experience of Direct Flre,' 90: Herald (March 1 8 ) 138.
22 V. Pogonln, 'Organking the Plan of Flre and Engineer Obstacles,' !l.U,&p Herald (March 1983): 103,I08. 23 Sazevich and Noskov, 'Experlence of Direct Flre': 139-40. 24 V. Avdeyev, 'Support of a Rlver Crosslng,' flU&ary Herald (September 1 8 ) 136-7. 93:
25 Peredel'skly, M t i l l e r v
.Ill.
6
1
26 1. Anashkin and V. Kolesov, 'From a Direct Fire Position t o Long Ranges,'MilitaCy Herald (November 1982): 1 I I . 27 A Novichkov and L. Sebyakin, 'Artillery Actions,' (October 1982): 62-3.
t j j l J p / Herald
28 Yu. Koloskov, "Artillery in the Breakthrough of Fortified Areas," W i t a r v HerplQ (April 1976): 13 1-7; and V. Pogonin, 'The Destruction of Especially Strong Structures,'Wltarv Herald (July 1978): 109-13. 29 Koloskov, 'Breakthrough of Fortified Areas': 134-7.
30 V. lvanov and V. Nestrov, "A Question on the Survivability of Artillery Podrazdeleniye,' m i t a w HecPlQ (October 1975): 143-9; 1. Yeplfanov, 'On the Matter of Survivability of Artillery Podrazdeleniye,' plilitarv Herald (April 1976): 138-41; 1. Anashkin, "Jointly Solving a Problem,' Herald (October 1976): I 15-9.
3 I lvanov and Nestrov, 'A Question on Survivability': 145.
32 Vasilishin, 'Direct Firlng During a Preparation': 133.

33 Ye. Komarov, 'About Direct Laid Fire,' M 1984): 98.
J (August
34 V. Barsukov, 'Self-Propelled Howitzers on the Defensive,' Military (June 1978): 1 14. 35 Anashkin and Kolesov, 'From a Direct Fire Position': I 16. 36 Komarov. 'About Direct Laid Fire': 100. 37 V. Karov, 'ATGM Launcher Destruction by Direct Fire,' m M i l i t a r y t Review (June 1979): 24. 38 V. Pogonin, 'Coordination in Engagement by Fire,' (October 1984): 96. 62
HeraId
CHAPTER 4 DIRECT FIRE ARTILLERY TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT The Soviets routinely train to use their artillery in the dlrect fire role. The numerous articles that discuss trainlng for direct fire missions are a good indication that they frequently expect to employ their artillery
in a direct fire role. The two aspects of training that w i l l be discussed in

this chapter are training techniques and direct fire gunnery. The chapter then concludes with a discussion of Soviet equipment and ammunltion as it relates to direct fire.
Training i s conducted in the Soviet army with an emphasis on the need to learn indlvidual skills first, followed by integration of the individual skills into collective tasks a t gun crew level, platoon level and on up. The trainers are required t o provide immediate feedback to the personnel being trained by use of critiques. in these the trainer points out the errors that were made and how t o correct them in subsequent training. Evaluations appear to be frequent with a high degree of competition between crews and units encouraged. The majority of articles found in the
63
Soviet
HeralQ about training are discussions of the results of
evaluated training exercises. The Soviets do not appear to be particularly sensitive about airing many of the mistakes made during training as an example t o other units.
B!Wstic
~~Plnlns
The Soviets are urged to 'train as things are done in actual combat."' There are many indications that resource constraints prevent them from accomplishing that objective. There are frequent references to the use of 'dry-firing exercises' and indications of extensive use of subcaliber devices and explosion simulators. In the description of one artillery unit exercise, the unit commander was discussing the use of subcaliber devices for the conduct of their direct fire training. He scoffed a t the idea of using combat rounds for training because it would just be too expensive2 Other articles have indicated that an element of realism is added by making use of artillery explosion simulators down range to indicate the impact of shells
in a dry-fire exercise.
The element of realism that the Soviets seem to excel in i s the
extensive and routine use of the combined arms exercise. This may be an advantage of the artillery being part of the maneuver regiment organization.
It seems that the organic artillery units are frequently
involved in excercising their immediate tactical requirements in support of the tanks and infantry of their unit. The artillery commander appears t o be routinely challenged with the task of planning and excercising the fire support requirements for the regiment in varying tactical situations. A
64
description of one of these exercises involving employment of direct I Ire assets of a regiment i s provided in detail later in this chapter.
'
Soviet trainers are often admonished to insure the tactical
situations they devise for training are original and not stereotyped. An example was an artillery unit that had Just qualified all of their gun crews for direct fire with high marks. They went out several days later to participate in a tactical exercise wlth a motorlzed r i f l e unit and the direct firing results were low. An investigation of this discrepancy revealed that the battery officers had adjusted the sights on the targets during the record fire rather than the Individual gun chlefs. The exact ranges to the targets were also well known. The poor direct flre performance during the exercise with the gun chiefs firing at unknown target ranges and on
m 4
unfamiliar terrain was a much better indication of the true capabillties of
the unit in combat. The point that the unit needed to properly train the gun
chiefs in direct fire procedures was well made.J
The Individual and crew level skills necessary l o r learning artillery The initial discussion concerns the skills necessary at an
direct l i r e techniques are discussed in a recent article from the tlWxy individual level. The Individual subjects emphasized in this unit were:
1. The selection of t,he correct projectile. charge and detonator
according t o the nature of the target.
2. HOW t o adjust direct fire of the weapon.
3. Changes in settings or the stght and the aiming point l o r the stght.
65
4. How to fire at targets located dangerously close to their own troops.
5. The concepts of the range of direct fire.

It i s interesting to note that the training in direct fire started out
with a short lesson on the role of Soviet artillerymen in developing the theory and practice of direct fire during the Great Patriotic War. Historical examples were provided with the purpose of developing in the personnel "a desire to learn to strike targets with the f i r s t shot during the direct laying fire."5 Once the individual skills are mastered, the training progresses to crew level. The five lessons were taught at the range and included Lesson 1. Consolidation of the firing position and preparation of fire. Characteristics of preparing the weapon. Determining the range to the target. Emphasis was also placed here on immediate security of the position. Lesson 2. Adjustment of fire and fire for effect a t stationary observed targets. Lesson 3. Hitting moving land targets during frontal, flanking and oblique movement. (This lesson i s twice as long as any of the
others. 1
Lesson 4.
Fire at ranges exceeding the range of direct fire. Conditions for (This i s
Characteristics of fire at moving infantry. accomplishing fire missions.
Lesson 5. Mastering the skills of fire by direct laying. are made more difficult.)
apparently additional practice or maybe a lesson where conditions
66
The significance of these lessons i s that a comprehenslve tralning

program Is prepared to insure Sovlet artillery crews are well versed in direct fire procedures. The emphasis is on skllls required to effectively engage moving tanks, but anti-infantry training Is conducted as well. Along the llnes of my previous comments on the reallsm of trainlng,
it should be noted that this unit used dry-fire with explosive charges
simulating the exploslons of the rounds 'fired: They also conducted almost half of their training at nlght or under conditions of limited vlsibility with the target or their gun position screened by smoke. Another point was that a 'heavy emphasis was placed upon developing bravery, selflessness, endurance, self-control and readiness to contlnue fire until the total elimination of the enemy.'' This kind of comment certalnly shows an awareness of the danger in employing fleld artlllery in the direct fire role. The training methodology described in this article indicates an effort to integrate lndlvidual and collectlve tasks in order to achieve proficiency in a tactical skill. field artlllery. Another excellent example of crew level trainlng Is provided in the continuation of the article mentloned earlier about the unit that had the officers man the gun sights in order for the unit to score well on i t s direct fire qualification. An intensified training program was designed t o correct the previously noted deficiencies.8 This account reflects how the training should have been conducted in the f lrst place. Practice sessions were conducted on unfamiliar terrain to develop skills in estimatlng ranges to targets and bursts by eye. Thls was a major
67
The slgnlficance of the article is the
indication it glves that direct fire tralning is an Important mission of the
shortcoming in the unit's earlier failure. Training was conducted for the gun chiefs to achieve a high level of proficiency on working with the direct fire sights. Accuracy was the f i r s t goal, and then speed. The 'competitive' method of training was used. Classes on the performance of direct tire mtssiens were first held at the smallbore range, then at a moving target range using a subcaliber device and finally on the terrain using burst simulation. The final training exercise was held in as realistic a fashion as possible considering resource constraints. The battalion chief of staff was
the trainer and met the artillery platoon at the motor park. They moved to
a tactical area and were given the situation and a platoon mission to support manewer operations with direct fire. He gave them battle assignments and they tactically moved to the vicinity of the firing position using the terrain to advantage and camouflage. The trainer then pointed out to them appropriate reference points, the ranges to them, the forward edge
of the enemy defenses, probable locations of enemy antitank weapons,
probable avenues of tank approach and the site for each of the platoon guns to occupy. Additional information included the conditions for firing, the route to use to the positions and the signal to occupy the positions. Once all questions were answered, the trainer gave the signal to occupy the gun positions.
When the position occupations were completed, the crews were all
gathered a t the first gun in order to review and emphasize proper direct fire procedures prior to engagement of the f i r s t target. A crew was put on the gun and the f i r s t target was revealed. All of the gun chiefs were required to determine the range and firing settings to engage the target. 68
They were all checked, evaluated and the correct ones glven to the artillery plece and the flrst round was 'fired. A slmulator indicated the locatlon of the burst and the gun chiefs had to calculate the correctlon required to adjust the next round. This continued until the target was destroyed. The second target was handled ln a similar manner with each crew mannlng I t s own gun. Alter completion of the second mission, a brief critique of each crew was held. Targets were then exposed at an increased rate and each crew 'flred against about ten targets. Proflclency of the crews increased significantly by the last target engagement. A flnal revlew was conducted, common mlstakes discussed and each gun chief was given a grade. The moral of the story 1s that the battery was capable of properly employing direct fire procedures when required in the next combined arms exerclse. This account of the training process reveals the lmportance of direct fire skllls to the Soviet artillery unit. It verifies the employment procedures discussed in the previous chapter and indicates the desire of Soviet trainers to make training as realistic an exercise as possible, even when conducting the trainlng 'by the numbers'. Direct Fire In Unblned Arms Tcalnlna The most complex level of collectlve training is the comblned arms exercise. Not only is the indivldual unit requlred to perform varied misslons to certain standards, but the unit must also coordinate i t s actlons with many other units to meet a common objective. This next example of how the Soviets conduct thelr direct flre artillery training Is significant when viewed with conslderation of the effort put into thls exercise. It is 69
an exercise designed to practice the control of weapons assigned to

conduct direct fire during an artillery p r e p a r a t i ~ n .Although the account ~ provided of thls exercise is long and quite detailed, I think it is important for the insight it offers on the extensive training that goes into assuring proficiency of direct fire assets.
It also provides an account of the
command and control procedures used for direct fire employment of artillery during a preparation that supplements the information provided in chapter 3. A practice exercise preceding the 'full blown' exercise i s described
in the article. It i s held at a r i f l e range and is designed to work out
command and control requirements. There i s extensive use of simulations for the practice and it i s unclear i f the actual exercise is to be conducted with live ammunition.I0 aura of a test. practiced included Although this i s referred to as a practice exercise, it was evaluated by a large control group of officers and had the The regimental artillery chief was in charge of the The command and control functions that were participating units.
I . Organization of communications.
2. Fire planning. 3. Procedures for issuance of orders to participating commanders.
4. Methods for target identification.
5. Reaction to signals.
The equipment involved in the exercise included the antitank assets of two motorized r i f l e battalions, an antitank guided missile battery from the antitank reserve and two 122mm self-propelled howitzer batteries
70
from the organlc artillery battallon of the regiment. Thls provldes a good lndlcatlon of the direct fire role the artillery Is expected to perform In conjunct ion with an art iI lery preparat Ion. The regimental artlllery chlef was brlefed on the tactlcal situation several days before the exercise. This indicates a scenario of a deliberate attack on prepared enemy positions. supporting unit commanders:
1. Orientation points.
He immediately started his
reconnalssance and determined the following information for the
2. Firing positions for each howltzer and antltank gulded missile unlt.
3. Locatlon for planned and unplanned targets.
4. How the targets w l l l be simulated for the exerclse.
5. Locatlons of battery commanders observation posts.
6. Routes of movement lnto the firing positions.

7. Planned shlfts of fire.
The regimental artillery chief then developed the plan of fire for the means allocated to direct fire. He informed the subordinate commanders of the tactlcal sltuatlon two days prior to the exercise. The regimental artillery chlef took the subordinate commanders to the area for the exercise the night before the attack and provided them the information listed above and showed them their positions on the terrain. He also provided them the names for the prevlously selected orientation points, the location for his own observation post and an excerpt of the f i r e plan that pertained to their weapons.
71
The exercise formally began an hour before sunrise when the unit commanders briefed the tasks to the gun chiefs and crews. During the darkness the weapons were moved into position and camouflaged. The technical preparation of the gun was completed and wire communications were laid to the regimental chief's observation post. With sunrise, the guns identified all targets and orientation points and laid the guns on their initial targets. The preparation was scheduled to begin at 0740 hours. The evaluation team chief provided an intelligence update thirty minutes prior
t o the start of the preparation. The update indicated two targets had
departed their positions and five targets had proven to be dummy positions. He added three newly detected targets. The reaction was to change target data and send the headquarters platoon commander and his assistant to the artillery and antitank guided missile battery commanders with the target updates. The preparation began exactly on time and simulators were used to show the impact of the initial rounds fired. The f i r s t targets fired were individual targets away from the enemy strongpoints with indirect f i r e scheduled t o hit the strongpoints immediately at the beginning of the preparation.
As the indirect fires shifted to the depth of the enemy
positions, the direct fire assets engaged targets in the strong points that survived the indirect fire. The flexibility of control of the direct fire weapons was then demonstrated with the following techniques:
1. Enemy strongpoints that put up s t i f f resistance were identified by
naming the orientation point for the position and marking it by orange smoke grenades or by machine gun tracer bullets. The artillery batteries 72
were dlrected to shift thelr fire to the new targets and contlnue firlng
until directed to cease fire.

2. An enemy counterattack was formed. The target area was designated
ln a slmllar manner to the method above. The artillery was directed to
engage the attacking infantry and the antitank guided mlsslle battery was directed to engage the tanks. The counterattack was defeated.
3. The control of the unlts was by wlre communications up to this time.

The situation required a move to another posltion to support employment of the second echelon forces. The batteries were directed to activate their radlo communicatlons net and dlrected to move to new posltlons for contlnued support of the attack. The gun crews were tested at the new positions wlth a record fire and the exerclse ended. The complexity of this training exercise is an excellent indication of the importance direct fire assets play for Soviet units conducting an attack.
It also demonstrates the hlgh degree of centralization used in
planning the employment of dlrect fire assets and controlling them after completion of the Initial target tasklngs of the preparation. The Soviets train at all levels to attaln proflciency in the conduct of direct fire mlsslons by thelr fleld artillery units. frequently emphasized. The Importance of individual knowledge and expertise in performing direct f Ire tasks i s Considerable imagination and innovation i s requlred in promotlng realism in the conduct of tralning within apparent
s resource constraints. The necessary collective training I conducted and

evaluated to Insure the capability of artillery systems to support the tactlcal plan wlth direct fire technlques.
73
Considerable time and effort go into determining the best methods for insuring the first round hits the target when conducting direct fire. Several reasons for this need have been mentioned previously. The most obvious one i s the increased survivability of the artillery piece because the target doesn't have a chance to shoot back. Another frequently mentioned reason i s the potential difficulty of seeing the target for subsequent adjustment of rounds. This i s particularly the case for direct fire weapons participating in a preparation. The reduction in ammunition expenditure is also helpful by allowing for the engagement of more targets with the same amount of ammunition. Some basic techniques in gunnery and technical preparation of the piece are used by Soviet artillery to increase the accuracy of the initial round. Soviet artillerymen do not just sight on the target and fire when conducting direct fire. They apply corrections based on the meteorological and ballistic conditions. The correct,ions become more important as the range t o the target increases. it is necessary to apply these gunnery calculations to facilitate f irst round accuracy, particularly when engaging targets a t the maximum ranges of direct fire. More details on the determination of these corrections can be found in Appendix A
The accurate determination of the range to the target i s the most
important factor affecting the direct fire gunnery corrections used by Soviet artillerymen. An error in determination of the range can totally negate the validity of the corrections that were calculated and applied at the gun.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Soviets spend 74
considerable time in training artillerymen to correctly estlmate the range to the target. The application of gunnery corrections when engaging direct fire targets at other than minlmum distance demonstrate the Soviets' dedication to achlevlng first round accuracy. purpose. The emphasls that corrections cannot be Ignored, no matter how small, supports that same
The primary consideration for the technlcal preparation of the piece
is collimatlon of the sights (boresightlngl. This can be explained as the

alignment of the axis of the sight to insure i t i s parallel t o the axis of the gun tube. The purpose Is t o insure that the tube Is shooting where the sight i s aimed. This is a point which i s frequently emphasized and may indicate that it is a problem area. The need to check the sights upon arrival in the firing position i s stressed to insure that weapon movement has not placed them out of proper adjustment. This is the most Important technical aspect of the gun that can degrade the accuracy of direct fire.
It
I also Important to Insure the weapon i s placed in the firing s
position with a minimum amount of cant o f 'sideways slope.' The accuracy

of the artillery piece i s seriously degraded i f the cant i s too great. In this
case the tube moves In the vertical plane as well when adjustments in the horizontal plane are intended. These are the two most frequently mentioned points to check to Insure the gun is technically prepared for direct fire. The responsibility is 75
the gun chief's, but he can expect to be checked routinely by the battery
of f icers.
The items discussed above on training and gunnery provide a picture
of how the Soviets train to accomplish the direct fire artillery mission.
The amount of information available and the frequency of'articles on direct fire training and gunnery methods provide an indication of the importance
of direct fire as a method of artillery employment.
Artillerv Eauioment and Ammunition for Direct Fire The capabilities of the weapon systems and ammunition available must be considered when determining the suitability of using artillery in a direct fire role. The capabilities of the howitzers found at the regimental level and the types of ammunition available to them make the Soviet use of artillery in direct fire viable. A discussion of the characteristics of these weapons as they relate to their use in a direct fire role and the ammunition
. available can be found a t Appendix 8

The artillery weapon systems usually found at the regimental level
are the D30 122mm towed howitzer and the 2S1 122mm self-propelled
howitzer. The 2 5 152mm self-propelled howitzer may also be found at '3 the regimental level when it i s passed down from the divisional artillery group assets. The available information indicates that these weapons are extremely capable of performing the direct fire mission assigned to them. Although they were designed primarily for the indirect fire role, some features complement direct fire employment as well. These include 360' 76
traverse capability, low profile and rapid emplacement time. Probably the most Significant feature that supports the use of these weapons In direct fire is a high rate of fire that allows them to fire a second round relatively quickly i f the first one does not hit the target. The most important factor in the area of ammunition Is that all of these weapons have an antitank projectile available. These antitank rounds are extremely important in increasing the effectiveness of the artllefy in a direct fire role. The major. advantage that this ammunition provides is the ability to effectively engage targets at signifkantly increased ranges. While a 2S1 howitzer can defeat
an American Abrams tank at 2,050 meters
with a high explosive antitank (HEAT) round, It must engage the same tank
within 880 meters to destroy it with a fragmentation high explosive round.11 The ability to engage targets at the extended range is very significant to the survivability of the artillery piece. The Soviet artillery pieces found at regimental level have several characteristics that provide for their effective use In a direct fire role. The greatest enhancement to the direct fire capability of these weapons i s the availability of effective antitank ammunition.
77
Endnotes for Chapter 4 1 G. Peredel'skiy, "Basic Directions in the Training of Artillery and W (February 1974): 103. Missilemen,'~i~itary
2 S.Kravchenko, "Artillerymen in the Arctic Region," m t a r v Herald (December 1983): 52.
3 A Shulakov, "Training in Firing by Direct Laying,' mitap Herald (August 1977): 72-3.
4 V. Voronetskiy and V. Dianov, 'Teaching Firing by Direct Laying," M i l i t a v Herald (November 1984): 105-7.
5 Voronetskiy and Dianov, 'Teaching Firing': 106.

6 Voronetskiy and Dianov, 'Teaching Firing': 105. 7 Voronetskiy and Dianov, 'Teaching Firing': 106.
8 Shulakov, 'Training in Firing': 73-6.
9 V. Tumanov, 'Exercise in Controlling the Fire from Means Allocated for Direct Laying Fire,' Militarv Herala (October 1978): 126-38. 10 The first thought that comes to mind here i s that the final product w i l l be a 'staged version' of an exercise. Although my impression is that such an exercise may be the case, the actual exercise is to be conducted on different terrain which can yield different results with troops added. Rehearsals prior to actual tactical missions are part of doctrine for many armies including the US. The discriminator in this case may be whether the 'full blown' exercise is also rehearsed first.
I 1 Voronetskiy and Dianov, "Teaching Firing": 107.
78
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOmENDATlONS
Several different areas have been explored in an attempt to answer the question of why the Soviets readily use their indirect field artillery weapons in a direct fire role. These include the historical basis for direct fire, the features of current employment to include training methods and the equipment capabilities that the Soviets currently possess. There i s no doubt that the Soviets are willing and able t o commit artillery assets In the direct fire role in any future conflict. They developed a strong tradition of the use of direct fire during the Great Patriotic War. They had no other choice in the beginning of the war because
of the need to stop German tanks at any cost. The Soviets continued to use
artillery in direct fire as they discovered the advantages of timeliness,

accuracy and the resultant ammunition swings. The concept of self-propelled weapons reduced the vulnerabilities of the artillery and promoted i t s use in the close support of the combined arms operations of tanks and infantry. The direct fire use of artillery today can be traced back to the Great Patriotic War experience and i s often supported by examples from that era. The need for the use of direct fire has changed though. The numerical advantage of tank and mechanized forces rest with the Soviets. The use of 79
direct fire is more directed towards enemy antitank assets in order to preserve that advantage. The interest in timeliness is more related to a desire to avoid increased enemy counterf i r e capabilities. The self-propelled weapon emphasizes the desire to provide a responsive support weapon to the combined arms operation and less an attempt at invulnerability. Finally, the vast quantity of artillery available to the Soviets allows them t o employ portions for direct fire without a degradation of their indirect fire support capabilities.
In current tactics, the Soviets employ artillery for direct fire most
often during the meeting engagement t o gain the initiative and provide maneuver forces the opportunity to develop the situation to their advantage. Portions of regimental artillery may be employed for direct fire missions during artillery preparations to destroy significant targets at the forward edge of the battlefield. Direct fire w i l l also be used in special situations, most notably in mountain operations and in the destruction of fortifications and buildings. All artillery can be expected to employ direct fire in the defense. Maneuver units should understand that as they penetrate and move into the depth of Soviet defenses, artillery w i l l move into positions to engage them with direct fire. The Soviets provide for the survivability of their artillery employed for direct fire. The most recent emphasis has been on use of covering fires form other indirect fire means and use of limited visibility situations for protection. Current artillery weapon systems are very capable of accurate engagement using direct fire and enjoy the distinct advantage of antitank projectiles to enhance their effectiveness. information available on how the Soviet artillery trains demonstrates that direct fire is not merely a 80
crew drill, but rather is integrated into the collective level of combined arms training for the regiment. All artillery units are expected to have developed a level of expertise in direct fire allowing for i t s employment in any situation.
in the final analysis, the advantage in artillery assets enjoyed by the

Soviets offers them the flexibility to employ artillery units in direct fire roles as they see situations that require it. Although use of direct fire i s not a major role for Soviet artillery, it i s a distinct capability which must be expected to be used aggressively in both offensive and defensive situations.
Recommendations.
As a result of this study, there are at least two possible areas of
study that could be pursued using this as a start point. The f i r s t is t o perform a detailed assessment of the vulnerabilities presented by the Soviet use of artillery for direct fire on the modem battlefield and determine what assets we have to fully exploit those vulnerabilities. The second i s to look at the direct fire capabilities and tactics of the United States Army and make a determination i f we are perhaps too limited in our view of the use of artillery in a direct fire role.
APPENDIX A DIRECT FIRE GUNNERY CALCULATIONS This appendix provides information on procedures Soviet
artillerymen use to determine gun sight corrections used in direct fire. The corrections are determined and applied based on meteorologlcal and ball istic conditions. The meteorological corrections are based on the temperature and wind conditions. The air and the powder/projectlle temperature are The consideration of temperature in considered to be the same.
determining corrections i s particularly important at low temperature ranges where the range deviation of a round exceeds 100 meters when fired at a range of 1,000 meters at a temperature of -15'C.I That i s a full 10% correction to the range of the round and is very significant. Wind conditions arc! also an important correction factor in the conduct of direct fire. There are opposing opinions on the need t o consider range wind. One opinion i s that due to the short distance the round travels
in direct fire, the affect of a range wind i s insignificant. Another source

states that a range wind o f 5 meters per second should be considered because it w i l l affect the distance the round travels by 5 meters on the ground when engaging a target at 1,400 meters. That i s only a 0.35%
03
correction of the range of the round and would probably be insignificant for most targets. It does point out the degree to which the Soviets are willing to go to insure the first round hits the target.
Cross wind calculations are universally considered to be an
important factor in the accuracy of direct fire. Using the same wind speed of 5 meters per second as a crosswind and a range to the target o f 1,400 meters, the round would be laterally off target by 1.5 meters. firing at a small target or the front end profile of a tank. Ballistic corrections are also applied to insure the most accurate initial round possible. The most commonly discussed ballistic factor i s the variation in muzzle velocity for each individual artillery piece. The muzzle velocity i s different for each individual weapon and can have a sizeable effect on the range of the rounds it fires. The articles I've read concerning gunnery techniques have all recommended compilation of a direct f i r e table
for each weapon that i s based on the muzzle velocity variation of that
This
deviation could be the difference between a hit and a miss, especially when
piece2
The table also includes the variations in range based on An
temperatures. The result i s a single table to enter for a specific artillery piece to get range corrections necessary for accurate direct fire. example of one of these tables is shown on the next page.3
84
RANGE
A I R and POWDER TEMPERATURE ('C)
(meters) -35
600 1000 1500
-25
50
90
130
-15
40
70
110
-5
30
50
+5 +15 +25 +35

20
40
50
'
60
100
160
10
20
30
0 1-10
( I
-20
-20
80
2000
2500
220 180 140
110 70
40
0 0
-40
-50
280 270 180
140 90
40
One point that cannot be lost i s that the accuracy o f all these corrections is dependent on the accuracy of determining the range to the target. Without the correct range, the error in measuring the range totally negates the value of the corrections applied at the gun. The preferred method for the Soviets i to make use of a rangefinder for accurate s information. In the absence of such equipment, extensive training must be conducted on estimating the range to
target^.^
85
Endnotes for Appendix A
1 Voronetskiy and Dianov, "Teaching Firing': 106.
2 Yu. Aristarkhov, 'In Order to Destroy a Target With the First Round," t l i l i t a r y Herald (October 1976): 129-35; and Voronetskly and Dlanov, "Teaching Firing': 105-7. 3 Aristarkhov, 'In Order to Destroy a Target": I3 I .
4 There are four rangefinders in the equipment of an artillery battalion. Each battery has one and it i s part of the equipment for the commander's observation vehicle. it is not known i f gun crews get much chance to use
them.
86
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX B
ARTILLERY EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION FOR DIRECT FIRE
The primary role of these field artillery weapons i s engagement of targets by indirect fire. Although these weapons are designed and built with this function in mind, the focus during this examination of hardware i s to determine what aspects of these weapons lend themselves (or do not lend themselves) to the performance of the direct fire mission. Each Soviet maneuver regiment has an organic artillery battalion that i s equipped with 18 122mm howitzers. The BTR equipped motorized r i f l e regiment has 030 towed howitzers while the BMP equipped motorized r i f l e regiment has 2S1 self-propelled howitzers. Most tank regiments are equipped with the 2SI self-propelled howitzers, although there may s t i l l be some with the D30. With either weapon, these are the artillery assets
that are most likely t o be employed in a direct fire role in support of the
regiment. This discussion also includes the 2S3 152mm self-propelled
s howitzer, which I found in the artillery regiment at division level. This

weapon w i l l not usually be employed in a direct fire role. However, i f a destruction mission i s called for that requires a heavier caliber weapon, this i s the most likely weapon t o be used.
It can also be passed down to
the manewer regiment as part of a regimental artillery group, and since all 88
Soviet artillery i s designed for a direct fire capability to combat tanks in a defensive role,
it
may
be
seen
performing
that
mission.
Each battalion has three firing batteries with 6 howitzers. The battery is divided into two firing platoons of 3 howitzers each for command and control. The howitzers are most likely to be employed as platoons or individual gun sections when deployed for direct fire.I Towed H o w i m . The 030 has been the 'workhorse' of the Soviet's close support artillery for a long time. It was first introduced
in 1963. it has many features that promote i t s use in a direct fire role.
First, it I emplaced on a three trail firing platform that allows for a full s 360' traverse capability. It has an emplacement time of 90 seconds which
is rapid for a towed weapon. The D30 has a semi-automatic vertical

sliding wedge breechblock that allows for a rate of fire of 7 to 8 rounds per minute. That provides for a high rate of fire against targets on the forward edge of the battlefield or against attacking tanks or infantry. It also has a low profile of about 1.5 meter when laid for direct fire. A major plus for this weapon in performing i t s direct fire mission i s a very effective antitank ammunition round. The major disadvantage when considering direct fire i s the total lack of protection for the crew. Since the three trails are staked down during the emplacement of the weapon, the displacement process of pulling up the stakes can also make it quite vulnerable when preparing to leave the position.2
89
9 weapon has i . This

replaced the 030 in BMP equipped motorized r i f l e regiments and most tank regiments. Its armament i s the same tube as the D30 and it therefore has the advantage of firing the same antitank round. It has a 360' traverse capability and a very low profile for a self-propelled artillery piece (2.4 meters). The 2Sl's mobility allows it to occupy and depart direct fire positions very quickly and armor plating provides crew protection. It has the same type breechblock as the 030 and a power rarnmer and extractor allowing a rate of fire of 5-8 rounds per minute. It has an on board carrying capacity of 40 rounds of ammunition. The disadvantage the 251 has in operating on the front lines in a direct fire role i s the lightness of i t s armor. It i s only 15rnm thick a t the hull and 20mm thick on the t ~ r r e t The front hull is sharply angled though, .~ making a straight on shot considerably more difficult.
2S1 122mm SP Howtzer
90
9i s This weapon.
similar in appearance to the US. MI09 self-propelled howitzer. Several of the features to be considered for direct fire are the same as the 2S1. I t s self-propelled mobility, 360' traverse and crew protection features are the same. The 2S3 has a slower rate of f i r e of 4 rounds per minute. It also fires an antitank round, but not as an effective one as the 2S1. The on board ammunition carrying capacity i s 46 rounds. Although this i s a bigger weapon than the other self-propelled howitzer, it i s evident that it is not as well suited to the performance of the direct fire role. Even though this weapon appears heavier, it has the same thickness
of armor as the 2S1 resulting in a weapon that is too lightly armored for
operations on the front line.
2S3 152rnrn SP HowiQer
Ammunition. There are three types of ammunition that can be used for
direct fire purposes. The first i s a high explosive fragmentation (Frag-HE) round. This i s the least effective against armored targets and the most
91
effective against personnel targets. A l l three weapons discussed above fire this as standard ammunition. The success of Soviet artillery in performing an antitank mission employing direct f i r e techniques lies with the antitank ammunition they have available. There are two types. The most effective i s the high explosive antitank round (HEAT). For the 122mm howitzers it i s a non-rotating, fin stabilized projectile that is capable of a 460rnm armor penetration at any range. The 152mm version of the same round w i l l penetrate 400mm of armor. The other antitank round is the armor piercing tracer round (AP-TI and is available t o the two self-propelled weapon systems. It penetrates 185mm of armor in the 122mm version and 120mm of armor in the 152rnm version. These antitank rounds are extremely important in increasing the effectiveness of the artillery in a direct fire role. The major advantage that this ammunition provides fs the ability to effectively engage targets at significantly increased ranges. While a 2S1 howitzer can defeat an American Abrams tank at 2,050 meters with a HEAT round, it must engage the same tank within 880 meters to destroy it with a Frag-HE round4 The ability t o engage targets at the extended range is very significant t o the survivability of the artillery piece.
92
Endnotes for Appendix B
1 The Soviets have evidently experimented with and may possibly increase the number of artlllery pieces in a battalion to 24. A photograph was published In two years ago of an eight gun battery of a motorized r i f l e division in the Leningrad Military District. Speculation was that this could be a test of the concept of a quantitative increase in tubes wlthout a required increase in command and control. Thls would provide a significant increase in the number of artillery tubes available for direct fire missions. 2 Christopher Bellamy, "Soviet Artillery and Rocket Design," Delence Review. 4 ( I 983): '78 I. 3 Thls can be compared t o the armor platlng of a T62 tank wlth 102rnrn of armor at the hull and 242rnm at the turret. 4 V. Voronetskiy and V. Dianov, 'Teaching Fire by Dlrect Laying,'
Herald ( 1984): 107.
93
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Biryukov, G. and Melnikov, G. lmtitank War fare. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972. Bonds, Ray, editor. m o n s of the Modem Soviet Ground Forces. London: 9 Salamander Books, I 8I . Garthoff, Raymond L. a v i e t 1953. D o c t r k Glencoe, IL: The Free Press,
Hemsley, John. Soviet TrOOD Control Oxford Brassey's Publishers . Limited, 1982.
Jones, David R. t . Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1985. Lebedev, Valentin Y. Field Artillerv Officer's Handbook. MOSCOW: 984. 1 (Translated in USSR Report, JPRS-UMA-85-0 1 I -L, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1985). Liddell Hart, B.H., editor. Jhe Red Armv. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1956. Mayer, S.L., editor. The Russipn War M a m e 19 17- I 9 a . London: Chartwell Books, Inc., 1977. Ogarkov, N.V., editor. Wilitarv W e d i c Dictionary. Moscow: 1983. (Translated in USSR Report, JPRS-UMA-8s-002-L, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1985).
95
Peredel'skiy, G.Ye. Jhe Artillerv Battal ion in Combat. Moscow: 1984. (Translated in USSR Report, JPRS-UMA-85-0 12-L, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1985).
Poirer, Robert G. and Conner, Albert C. Red Armv O rder of Bat*

C Presidio Press, 1985. k
. Novato,
Samsonov, F.A, editor. Qmbat FXDerience of Artil lerv in the Patriotic War. Moscow: 1952. (Translated by Department of the Army, 1952). Sidorenko, AA Jhe Offensive. Moscow: 1970. (Translated by U.S. Air Force in Soviet Military Thought Series). Simpkin, Richard E.
&)ljJa&
Oxford Brassey's Publishers, Limited, 1982.
Simpkin, Richard E. Red Amour. Oxford Brassey's Publishers, Limited, t 984. Smith, Myron J Jhe Soviet Armv. 1939- 1980 A Guide to Sources in . DSanta Barbara: ABC-Clio, Inc., 1982. . Ziemke, E a r l F. Stalinarad t o BerIin: The German Defeat in the East. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Off ice, 1968.
P
ane's Armourand A r t i l l e y 1985- 1986. London: Jane's Publishing CO., Ltd., 1985
2. Government Documents and Studies.

Defense Intelligence Agency. Soviet Front Fire Sumort. Washington, D.C., 1982. Defense Intelligence Agency. Jhe Soviet Tank Division. Washington, D.C., 1982.
US. A i r Force. Selected Sov i e t Militarv WriUnas 1970- 1975. A Soviet ! & Washington, D.C., 1976. &.
96
U.S. Army. FM 6 50. The Field Artillerv Cannon 1983 (Change 1, 1985).
. Washington, D.C.,
US. Army Artillery and Misstle School. Emepyment of Field A r t illerv 1

fbe Direct Fire Role. Fort Sill, OK, 1962.
U.S. Army War College. Translation of Field Service Re-Soviet Armv. 1936. Washington, D.C., 1957.
3. Periodic&.
in
Aleshenko, V. "Use of Artillery Against Antitank Weapons,' Soviet Military Review, 1 (January 1982): 16-18. Anashkin, I and Kolesov, V. 'From a Direct Fire Position to Long Ranges,' PlilitarvHerald. I I (November 1982): 1 1 1 - 1 17. Anashkin, 1. "Jointly Solving a Problem," Militarv Herald 10 (October 1976): 115-1 19. Aristarkhov, Yu. "In Order to Destroy a Target With the First Round,' Militarv HeralQ, 10 (October 1976): 129- 135. Avdeyev, V. "Support of a River Crossing," plilitprr Hera 1983): 136- 139.
la
9 (September
Barsukov, V. "Self-Propelled Howitzers on the Defenstve," Military Herald 6 (June 1978): I 14-1 18. Bartlett, Charles M. "Soviet Self-Propelled Cannon Artillery," Military Revie% LVI II (June 1978): 54-66. Bellamy, Christopher. 'Destruction by Fire: Soviet Artillery in the 1980s and Beyond,' field Artillerv J o u r W 53 (September-October 1985):
4-45.
Bellamy, Christopher. "Sovtet Artillery and Tactical Rocket Design,' Oefence Review, 4 8 ( 1983): 775-787. 97
&Q&
Biryukov, G. "Artillery in Combatting Tanks,'
3 (March
1 7 ) 147-151. 96:
dewateville, H.G. "Russian Artillery 1 4 -1945,' Field Art illerv Joumal, 91 37 (May-June 1 4 ) 175, 195-199. 97:
Donnelly, C.N. 'The Wind of Change in Soviet Artillery," Delense Review, 6 ( 1982): 737-744.
lntemational
Hofmann, Kurt. "An Analysis of Soviet Artillery Development,' 15 ( 1982)Special Issue: 135-9.
ll'in, V. and Sofronov, V. 'Artillery Fire Plan in Support of Motorized Rifle Battalion,' Militarv Herald 4 (April I981 ): 34-40.
Ivanonov, V. and Nestrov, V. 'AQuestion on the Survivability of A r t i l l e r y Podrazdeleniye,' Militarv H e r a u 10 (October 1 7 ) 143-149. 95: Karelsky, A. "Soviet Artillery Fire," field Artillery JourrlpL 32 (July 1 4 ) 5 1 1. 92: Karov, V. "ATGM Launcher Destruction by Direct Fire,' a v i e t Militarv 99: Review, 6 (June 1 7 ) 24-5. Kerr, Walter. 'Death o r Insanity,' Field A r t i l l e r v Joumal, 33 (October 1 4 ) 8 14-6. 93: Kiselev, V. 'The Development of the Antitank Defense in The Postwar Years,' U r v Historical 6 (June 1978):46-53. Koloskov, Yu. 'Artillery in the Breakthrough of Fortified Areas,' Military HeralQ, 4 (April 1 9 6 : 13 I 137. 7)
Koloskov, Yu. 'Artillery Support for a Crossing," Militarv Herald, 5 9May 1981 ): 45-52. Komarov, Ye. "About Direct Laid Fire,' flilitarv Herald, 8 (August 1 8 ) 94:
96-100. 98
Kravchenko, S. "Artillerymen In the Arctic Region,' (December 1983): 28-3 I. Kuleskov, P. 'In the Great Patriotic War," W t a y 1982): 112-1 19.
12
I (January
Morgun, V. 'Self-Propelled Artillery Battery in an Advance Party,' Military 1 (January 1983): 115-1 17. Novichkov, A and Sebyakin, L. 'Artillery Actions,' Mltitarv HeralQ, 10 (October 1982): 59-64. Parapov, M. 'Ambushing With Aftlllery,'
(November 1944): 786.
34
Peredel'skiy, G.Ye. '8aslc Dlrectlons In the Tralning of Artillery and Mlssllemen,' Militarv Herald, 2 (February 1974): 103-108. Peredel'skiy, G.Ye. 'Combat Employment of A r t i l l e r y in Army Defensive Operations," Ui1 Itarv m mI 1 (November 1979): 16-2 1 . Pogonln, V. 'Coordlnatlon in Engagement by Fire,' M i l i t a y Herald, 10 (October 1984): 93- 100. Pogonin, V. "Organlzing the Plan of Fire and Engineer Obstacles,' f l i l i t a q 3(March 1983): 101-108. Pogonln, V. 'The Destruction of Especially Strong Structures," flllitary 7 (July 1978): 109-1 13. Rametta, Thomas P. "Direct Fire," Artillerv Tre&
23 (July 1962): 25-32.
Sapkov, L. 'Evolution of Artillery Tactics and Combat Employment,' MilltarvHerplP, 4(April 1982): 118-124. Sazevich, A and Noskov, A 'From the Experience of Direct Fire,' Militarv t&&.j, 3 (March 1980): 137-140.
99
Selyavin, V. "Direct Fire," Soviet Militarv Review, 1 I (November 1975): 18-19. Shulakov. A "Training in Firing by Direct Laying," Militarv Herald 8 (August 1977): 72-76. Slesarev, P. 'Self-Propelled Artillery Versus Tanks,' Field Arti l l e r y Journal 34 (November 1944): 787-788. Strelkov, N. 'Support of a Tank Attack,' Vilitarv Heraid 3 (March 1984): 116-121. Stroganov. Ye. 'Primary Artillery Weapons Podrazdeleniye,' M 8 (August 1979): 98- 105. W
Tsvetkov, 1. 'A Battery Repels a Tank Attack,' M i l i t a p Heral& 8 (August 1974): 165- 169. Tsynkalov, A "Combating Enemy Antitank Weapons in the Third Period of the War,' Mllitarv Hlstorical Journal. 7 (July 1979): 18-23. Tumanov, V. 'Excercise in Controlling the Fire from Means Allocated for Direct Laying Fire," Militarv HeralQ 10 (October 1978): 126- 138. Vasilishin, G. "Direct Fire During A r t i l l e r y Preparation of the Attack,' Militarv HeralQ 9 (September 1983): 130-135. Vishnevskiy, V. 'The Battery on the March and in the Meeting Battle," . . Heral& 8 (August 1984): 105- 109. Voronetskiy, V. and Dianov, V. 'Teaching Fire by Direct Laying," M i l i t a r y Herald. I I (November 1984): 105-107. Vysokoostrovsky, L. "Artillery Venus Tiger and Ferdinand,' JournaL 33 (October 1943): 8 10-8 I 1. Yepifanov, 1. 'Employment of Artillery,' Militarv HeralQ 4 (April 1982): 25-3 I .
1 00
Yepifanov, 1. "Mountain Excercise,' Militarv Hera1 10 (October 1983): 4 93- 102. Yepifanov, I. 'On the Matter of Survivability of Artillery Podrazdeleniye,' Wllitarv HeralQ, 4(April 1976): 138-141. Yepifanov, V. "A Day at the Range,' u t a r v HeralQ, 1 I (November 1980): 128- 130. Young, W.R. 'Artillery Offensive. An Examination of Russian Practice,' Field Artillery JournpL 36 (January 1946): 26-29. Zaloga, Steven J. 'Soviet Assault Guns,' &$s ( 1983): 849-852. Defence Review, 49
'Direct Artillery Fire,' Field Artillerv J o u w 32 (September 1942): 694. 'More on the 1S2mm 253 Self-Propelled Gun/Howitzer,' Jane's Defence Weeklv, 1:9 (10 March 1984): 358.
4. Unoublished P
Erickson, J. 'Soviet Combined Arms: Theory and Practice,' Defence Studies, University of Edinburgh, September 1979.
101
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
I . Combined Arms Research Library U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
2. Defense Technlcal information Center Cameron Statlon Alexandria, Vlrginia 22314
3. Morrls Swett Library U.S. Army Field Artillery School

Fort Sill, Oklahoma 73503
4. Commandant U.S. Army Russian Institute

APO New York 09053
5. MAI(P) Robert L. Stockwell Soviet Army Studies Office USACGSC Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
6. LTC John T. Banks Center for Army Tactics USACGSC Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 7. COL Phllip W. Dyer 3410 High Street Lincoln, Nebraska 68506
102

A Study of Soviet Artillery in The Direct Fire Role

Încărcat de

Informații document

Titlu original

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

A Study of Soviet Artillery in The Direct Fire Role

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

A STUDY OF SOVIET USE OF FIELD ARTILLERY WEAPONS IN A DIRECT FIRE ROLE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S.Army

by LARRY W. COKER, JR., MAJ, USA B.A., Trinity Unlverslty, 1974

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas I986

Approved for public release; distrlbutlon is unllrnlted.

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

MAJ (P) Robert L. Stockwell, MA

, Thesis Commlttee Chalman

, Member, Graduate Faculty

COL Phlllp W. Dyer, P h . d

, Member, Consulting Faculty

Accepted this 6th day of June 1986 by:

, Dlrector. Graduate Degree

Phlllp J. Brookes. Ph.D.

River Crossings Combat in Mountainous Terrain

IMRODUCTION In my 'upbrlnglng' as a Held artlllery offlcer, I have been taught that

In stark contrast, the Soviets are much more aggressive In employlng

flre In offensive as well as defenslve sltuatlons. The aggressive use of

direct f ire role?

What are the tactics and procedures used by the Soviets in

There is considerably more information available on the Soviet use

Combat2 by Marshal of Artillery G. Ye. Peredel'skiy and published in March,

a6the years 1942-1944 during

These were wrltten

by Soviet artillery officers telling the American artillery communlty what

Translations are avatlable of the Sovtet UUj.tary His-

n perspective o Soviet w e of fleld artlllery for direct flre including B.H

The latter also glves good Information on the development of

l2 edited by S.L. Mayer and 'An Analysis of

Soviet Artlllery D e ~ e l o p m e n t by ~ ' ~ Kurt Hoffman In

Defense Reviekl5 by CON.

!,h?umll6 Christopher Bellamy. The article by Bellamy is excellent by

l9 edited by David R. Jones

provides some background material on artillery developments. Volume 8

Endnotes for Chapter 1

2 G.Ye. Peredel'skiy, lhflArtillerv -(Combat(1985). 3 A A Sidorenko, JheOffenstre(l970).

of Artillerv in the Great Patriotic

12 S . L M a y e r J e d i t o r , J & & & & n W a r ~ 1 9 1 7

13 Kurt Hofmann, 'An Analysis of Soviet Artillery Development,' R ~ i w ( 1982): 135-9. I5

20 Richard E. Simpkin, AU,W& ( 1982) and

A r m u and Artlllerv 1985 1986 ( 1985).

23 Valentin Y. Lebedev, Field Artillery Officer's Hao&Q!?k

centralization of artillery command and control, the increase in

ammunition savings and

forward into their formations.

The artillery could have the targets

particularly when considering towed artillery weapons and their crews as

artillery officer decorated as a Hero of the Soviet Union in the Great

close range by direct fire.

'Great accuracy and

artillery or the accompanying artillery. This close support artillery i s

and about ten percent of the larger caliber artillery pieces

... . in case of a counterattack by enemy tanks, self-propelled guns

tanks and four Ferdinand self-propelled guns.

A Soviet unit of twelve

additional advantages of ammunition savings and overcoming the obstacles 25

developmental attention and no further production. The prevailing opinion

was that conventional warfare was unlikely because it was impossible to

Endnotes for Chapter 2

3 U.S.S.R. Commissariat of Defense, Field Service Re Armv. 193 6 ( 1937):125.

7 B.H. Liddell Hart, editor. The Red Army ( 1956): 357.

14 , 'Direct Artillery Fire," Field Artillerv Journal. 32 (September 1942): 694.

15 Hart, Red Armr 358-9.