Carl P.

Watts (2011)
Carl P. Watts Is the United States a declining power? Politics Review Online Vol. 20, No. 4 (Apr. 2011) Introduction Students become familiar with the concept of power when they are first introduced to the discipline of government and politics. The International Relations scholar Joseph Frankel observed that All politics, by definition, revolve around the exercise and pursuit of power, but in international politics power is considerably more in evidence and less circumscribed than in domestic politics; hence this field is often described as power politics. (Frankel, 1988, pp.110-11) The centrality of power to the study of international relations is revealed in the number of books and articles in which scholars discuss the status of middle powers, great powers, superpowers, the balance of power, rising powers and declining powers. The first purpose of this article, then, is to bring some clarity to the concept by discussing the measurement of power in international relations. Secondly, the article will consider the position of the United States within the international states system. The academic and political debate about whether or not the United States is a declining power is not new, but in recent years it has been brought into sharp relief by the rapid rise of China in particular. In 2004 the National Intelligence Council predicted gloomily that as a result of the rising power of China, India, Brazil and Indonesia, by 2020 the "relative power position" of the United States will have been eroded. (NIC, 2004, p.11) The delicate approach that President Obamas administration takes in managing relations with China seems to give credence to the NICs predictions. However, it should be appreciated that the United States possesses enormous military and economic resources, and it is also capable of exercising considerable soft power around the globe. Further, the rising powers have considerable problems of their own that they will have to surmount if they are going to achieve the level of economic and military power evident in the United States, which suggests that the scale of US decline should not be exaggerated. Power in international relations The historian David Reynolds has commented that For the student of international relations few concepts are more important than that of power. Yet its meaning is difficult to pin down. (Reynolds, 1991, p.5) Power in international relations, as indeed in the domestic context, ultimately depends upon the ability to achieve ones objectives and, if necessary, enforce ones will. There are, of course, several modes of power. At the moderate end of the scale it may take the form of positive inducement, and it extends progressively through manipulation, coercion or, at the most extreme level, war. The sources of a countrys power are also diverse, as suggested by the following table. (Morgenthau, 1948; 1985, Waltz, 1979) Some variables of state power Tangible Intangible Numbers and skills of population National unity, morale and attitudes Extent, resources and strategic location of Coherence of governmental system territory Wealth and productive capacity (including Quality of leadership control of the sources of wealth) Existing and potential military capacity Reputation for military prowess Number and quality of allies Diplomatic skill and determination to achieve objectives Reynolds has observed that these various tangible and intangible factors are interrelated:

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All these elements come into play in a particular power relationship between two states. A strong economy may not be decisive if the countrys armed forces are illprepared for war. A large army may be irrelevant if the country has no will to fight, or if its leaders are distracted by other concerns at home or abroad. A state with limited economic resources may be able to secure unexpected advantage by diplomatic dexterity. And the reputation for being powerful may ensure influence long after economic and military strength has waned, particularly if war can be avoided. (Reynolds, 1991, pp.5-6) Most analysts now acknowledge that any assessment of state power must be qualified by the psychological factors involved in its relationship with other states, which negates the realist assumption that power is an asset that can be accumulated. (Kim, 2003, pp. 38-41) In other words, power must be conceived in relative terms. This can be illustrated by the fact that during the Second World War, the United States played a decisive role in defeating the advanced industrial societies of Germany, Italy, and Japan, yet in the 1960s and 1970s it was unable to defeat the peasant state of North Vietnam. (Reynolds, 1991, p.6) Similarly, the United States and its allies have been fighting in Afghanistan for nearly ten years, but despite their technical military superiority they have failed to eliminate the threat from Al Qaeda and the Taliban. In recent years academics and politicians have been paying more attention to the notion of soft power, which focuses on indirect ways to achieve foreign policy objectives. According to this perspective, a state may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other states that admire its values, want to emulate its example, and aspire to its level of prosperity and openness, are willing to follow it. Joseph Nye Jr., a leading proponent of this concept, has noted that the soft power of a country rests primarily on three factors: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority). (Nye, 2004, p.11) Soft power theorists like Nye suggest that less emphasis should be placed on attempts to force other states to change their behaviour by threatening military force or economic sanctions. Rather, it is important to set the agenda and attract other states to ones own position, so that they want the same outcomes. In other words, the exercise of soft power seeks to co-opt other states rather than coerce them. Debates about US power The Kennedy thesis Perceptions of waning US power can be dated back to the ignominious exit from Vietnam in the 1970s, but the debate about US decline was really energised in 1987 with the publication of The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers by Paul Kennedy. Kennedy argued that the position of the United States at the end of the twentieth century was analogous to the decline of Spain in the seventeenth century, France in the eighteenth century and Britain by the middle of the twentieth century. Kennedy suggested that each of these states had faced an insuperable struggle to reconcile the division of resources between domestic consumption, investment, and military spending. In particular, excessive military spending had compromised the economic vitality of these imperial powers, thereby generating the problem of overstretch, which could only be resolved by strategic retrenchment. Although Kennedy did not explicitly say so, he implied that if the problem was not addressed, then the United States would also experience this cycle of rise and relative decline. (Kennedy, 1987) The dramatic disintegration of the Soviet empire between 1989 and 1991 appeared to confirm Kennedys thesis; many political commentators agreed that high levels of military spending had indeed been responsible for the Soviet collapse. (Kegley, 1994, p.14)

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Yet the anxieties that had been unleashed by the Kennedy thesis receded very quickly into the background during the 1990s, which can be explained by three main factors. First, the Gulf War of 1991 was a showcase for the United States military prowess and diplomatic leadership. Second, potential challenges to American power simply disappeared: the demise of Soviet power removed the alternative to the capitalist system; Japan, which had enjoyed phenomenal growth in the 1980s, descended into economic crisis; and the power and prestige of the European Union was eviscerated by its weak response the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the onset of genocide in the Balkans. Third, the US economy enjoyed a sustained boom during the Clinton years, which seemed to refute the notion that American economic power was on the wane. (Cox, 2007, p.648) Now politicians and the academic community spoke not of potential US decline, but of a unipolar international system in which the United States was an undisputed hegemon. As William Wohlforth put it in 1999, The United States enjoys a much larger margin of superiority over the next most powerful state or, indeed, all other great powers combined than any leading state in the last two centuries. (Wohlforth, 1999, p.5) The American response to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 appeared to confirm the awesome reach of US power, as it invaded first Afghanistan, then Iraq, and adopted a belligerent approach in its relations with Iran and North Korea. The war on terror now served as a doctrine for the projection of US power around the globe. (Cox, 2007, p.649) Pessimistic assessments of US power In the last few years, however, the experience of fighting protracted campaigns against insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq has lead some to question American hubris. In 2009, Robert Pape returned to the argument that America is in unprecedented decline. Papes claim was based on the self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq War, and the ailing US economy, which is beset by the increasing indebtedness of the US government, and unfavourable trade balances. Pape suggested that If present trends continue, we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell for American hegemony. (Pape, 2009, p.21) Pursuing a similar line of argument to Kennedy in the 1980s, Pape suggests that US power is fundamentally a product of its economic strength. American wealth, technology, and population size are essential for building and modernising its military forces. Although the United States may choose to vary the degree to which its productive capacities are used to create military assets, it is economic performance that constrains the choice. The size of the American economy relative to its potential rivals ultimately determines the limits of US power in international politics. Although recent American growth compares favourably with advanced economies, it is being outstripped by Chinas developing economy, which is enjoying consistent double-digit growth. (Pape, 2009, p.24) Annual GDP Growth Rates (constant prices) 1993-2000 3.7 10.6 1.1 1.7 3.2 2.2 -2.1

USA China Japan Germany UK France Russia

2001-2008 2.2 10.1 1.5 1.3 2.4 1.7 6.7

US growth rates have declined by almost 50 percent from the Clinton years and this trajectory is likely to be revised further downward as a result of the financial crisis of 2008. As US growth declines, so does its share of world production, which has decreased from 31 per cent in 2000 to 23 per cent in 2008. In the corresponding period Chinas share of world production grew from 2 to 7 per cent. Projections suggest that by 2013 the United States will

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have a 21 per cent share of world production compared to Chinas 9 per cent. Analysts like Pape are alarmed by the scale of America's relative economic decline during the last decade because it represents a far greater loss of relative power in a shorter time than any other example between 1815 and 1945. Only the Soviet Union has declined at a faster rate, and that resulted in its total collapse. Pape contends that although the United States remains stronger than any other state individually, its power to stand up to the collective opposition of other major powers is rapidly eroding. It may be the case that China, and perhaps Russia, are now pursuing a policy of economic prebalancing in which they will avoid the risks of engaging in a premature arms buildup by concentrating first on closing the economic and technological gap between themselves and the United States. Successful economic prebalancing would lay the foundation for hard balancing in the future. (Pape, 2009, pp.3031) Pape therefore concludes that Unipolarity is becoming obsolete, other states are rising to counter American power and the United States is losing much of its strategic freedom. Washington must adopt more realistic foreign commitments. (Pape, 2009, p.34) Optimistic assessments of US power The foregoing discussion indicates that there are sound reasons why the United States may be considered a declining power, but there is also plenty of counterveiling evidence to suggest that the notion of American decline is overblown. The economic output of the United States is currently larger than the combined gross domestic products of the next three largest economies: Japan, China, and Germany. The United States enjoys a huge technological lead over other countries, accounting for about 40 per cent of world spending on research and development. US power is also underpinned by its growing population, which is expected to rise from 305 million to 439 million by 2050, and by the highly educated and skilled nature of the US population, particularly in areas such as science and technology. The United States retains enormous structural power, reflected in the considerable influence it exerts over institutions such as the World Trade Organisation, International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, and in the role of the dollar as the worlds leading currency. (Heywood, 2011, p.227) Optimists argue that it is not clear that rapid Chinese growth represents a profound threat to American interests. If the US economy continues to grow at 2.5 per cent per year, China would have to grow at 8.2 per cent just to maintain the gap between the two economies, which suggests that it will take generations for the Chinese to catch up. China is afflicted by deep poverty: out of a total population of 1.3 billion, 600 million have an income under $1,000 per year; another 440 million have incomes of between $1,000 and $2,000 per year; and only 60 million Chinese have incomes of $20,000 a year or more. The Chinese government faces a range of further problems, as Samuel Kim has pointed out, In the coming years, the way Beijing manages its economic reforms, especially the state-owned enterprises, rising unemployment and social unrest, rampant corruption, widening inequality, and ethnonational pressures from below and within may be decisive factors that will shape Chinas future as a complete great power. (Kim, 2003, p.72) Above all else, those who emphasize the unipolarity of the international states system point to the fact that the United States enjoys a huge margin of military superiority over its allies and adversaries alike. According to the Royal United Services Institute, The US is more than a superpower, it is more correctly termed a hyperpower. (RUSI, 2008, p.3) The US military budget is equal to the combined military spending of the next 14 most powerful states (most of them are US allies), and the combined military budgets of actual or potential state adversaries to the United States (Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Sudan, Syria and Libya) amounts to less than one-third of the US total. Before the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United States maintained 752 bases in 130 countries around the globe, and operated nine supercarrier battle groups at sea, whereas the rest of the world has none. (Ferguson, 2005, p.16; Johnson, 2004, 151ff.) The Royal United Services Institute points

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out that American weapons systems are at least a generation of technology ahead of our allies and around two generations ahead of any likely state adversaries. (RUSI, 2008, p.4) This is all highly impressive, but it is of course necessary to bear in mind the point made earlier in this article that power is a relationship, not a possession. Conclusion Power is a vital concept for understanding international relations, and debates about rising and declining powers will always exercise the attention of governments and academics alike. Although the United States has enjoyed a preponderance of power since the end of the Cold War, it cannot expect to determine indefinitely the way in which the international system operates. According to the Royal United Services Institute, It is reasonable to foresee the United States maintaining its dominant position for at least the first quarter of the twenty-first century. (RUSI, 2008, p.3) Many Americans would doubtless wish to see US hegemony continue beyond that. Yet, as Michael Cox has suggested, the real question is not whether or when the United States is going to experience decline, but rather how successfully it will adjust to the process, for it has clearly grown used to being the indispensable nation and is therefore unlikely to feel anything but deep existential angst about having to play a lesser role in the world. (Cox, 2007, p.653) References and Further Reading Berridge, G. W. and John W. Young (1988) What is a Great Power? Political Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2 (June), pp. 224-34. Bijian, Zheng. (2005) Chinas Peaceful Rise to Great Power Status, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5 (Sept.-Oct.), pp. 18-24. Cox, Michael. (2007) Is the United States in Decline Again? An Essay, International Affairs Vol. 83, No. 4, pp. 643653. Deng, Yong and Thomas G. Moore (2004), China Views Globalization: Toward a New Great-Power Politics, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Summer), pp. 117-136. Ferguson, Niall. (2005) Colossus: The Price of America's Empire. New York: The Penguin Press Frankel, Joseph. (1988) International Relations in a Changing World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4th ed. Heywood, Andrew. (2011) Global Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Johnson, Chalmers (2004) The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic. New York: Metropolitan Books. Kegley Jr., Charles W. (1994) How Did the Cold War Die? Principles for an Autopsy, Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Apr.), pp. 11-41 McCormick, Mark (2011) China v the US: how do the two the countries compare?, The Guardian (19 Jan.) at http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/jan/19/china-socialmedia Morgenthau, Hans J. (1948, 1985) Politics Among Nations: The struggle for power and peace. New York: Knopf, 6th ed.

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National Intelligence Council (2004) Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Councils 2020 Project. Washington DC: Government Printing Office. Nye Jr. Joseph S. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs) Pape, Robert F. (2009) Empire Falls, The National Interest, Vol. 99 (Jan.-Feb.), pp. 21-34. Royal United Services Institute (2008) The Future Security Environment. London: RUSI. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. London: Longman. Wohlforth, William C. (1999) The Stability of a Unipolar World International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1, (Summer), pp.5-41.