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LRT VS NAVIDAD FACTS: October 14, 1993, 7:30 p.m.

. : Drunk Nicanor Navidad (Nicanor) entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token. o While Nicanor was standing at the platform near the LRT tracks, the guard Junelito Escartin approached him. o Due to misunderstanding, they had a fist fight Nicanor fell on the tracks and killed instantaneously upon being hit by a moving train operated by Rodolfo Roman December 8, 1994: The widow of Nicanor, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, Roman, LRTA, Metro Transit Org. Inc. and Prudent (agency of security guards) for the death of her husband. o LRTA and Roman filed a counter-claim against Nicanor and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent: denied liability averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and surpervision of its security guards LRTA and Roman: presented evidence Prudent and Escartin: demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task RTC: In favour of widow and against Prudent and Escartin, complaint against LRT and Roman were dismissed for lack of merit CA: reversed by exonerating Prudent and held LRTA and Roman liable o

extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755 Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the formers employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers

This liability of the common carriers does NOT cease upon proof that they Exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees

ISSUE: W/N LRTA and Roman should be liable according to the contract of carriage HELD: NO. Affirmed with Modification: (a) nominal damages is DELETED (CANNOT co-exist w/ compensatory damages) (b) Roman is absolved. Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty off exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers Civil Code: o Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances o Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed

Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carriers employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. Carriers presumed to be at fault or been negligent and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieaved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure Where it hires its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task, the common carrier is NOT relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage GR: Prudent can be liable only for tort under Art. 2176 and related provisions in conjunction with Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. (Tort may arise even under a contract, where tort [quasi-delict liability] is that which breaches the contract) o EX: if employers liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee, employer can be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. o EX to the EX: Upon showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee Factual finding of the CA: NO link bet. Prudent and the death of Nicanor for the reason that the negligence of Escartin was NOT proven NO showing that Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability o Contractual tie bet. LRT and Nicanor is NOT itself a juridical relation bet. Nicanor and Roman Roman can be liable only for his own fault or negligence

Mindex Resources Development v. Morillo G.R. No. 138123 March 12, 2002 [Panganiban, J.]

Facts: Petitioner agrees verbally to rent the truck owned by respondent which was burned by unidentified persons after it broke own due to a mechanical defect. Issue: w/n it is a fortuitous event HELD: No. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss-when the effect is found to be partly the result of a persons participation, whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is humanized and removes from the rules applicable to acts of God. Petitioner is also negligent. Negligence, as commonly understood, is that conduct that naturally or reasonably creates undue risks or harm to others.

earn default interest, and the respondent-banks have four alternative remedies without prejudice to the application of the provisions on collaterals and any other steps or action which may be adopted by the majority lender. The four remedies are alternative, with the right of choice given to the lenders, in this case the respondents. Under Article 1201 of the Civil Code, the choice shall produce no effect except from the time it has been communicated. In the present case, we find that written notices were sent to the petitioner by the respondents. The notices clearly indicate respondents choice of remedy: to accelerate all payments payable under the loan agreement It should be noted that the agreement also provides that the choice of remedy is without prejudice to the action on the collaterals. Thus, respondents could properly file an action for foreclosure of the leasehold rights to obtain payment for the amount demanded. REPUBLIC VS. LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION 21 SCRA 279 FACTS: In the early afternoon of August 17, 1960, barge L1892, owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation was being towed down the Pasig River by two tugboats when the barge rammed against one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan bailey bridge, smashing the posts and causing the bridge to list. The river, at the time, was swollen and the current swift, on account of the heavy downpour in Manila and the surrounding provinces on August 15 and 16, 1960. The Republic of the Philippines sued Luzon Stevedoring for actual and consequential damage caused by its employees, amounting to P200,000. Defendant Corporation disclaimed liability on the grounds that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees that the damages to the bridge were caused by force majeure, that plaintiff has no capacity to sue, and that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction to navigation. After due trial, the court rendered judgment on June 11, 1963, holding the defendant liable for the damage caused by its employees and ordering it to pay plaintiff the actual cost of the repair of the Nagtahan bailey bridge which amounted to P192,561.72, with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint. ISSUE: Was the collision of appellant's barge with the supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge caused by fortuitous event or force majeure? RULING:

MONDRAGON LEISURE AND RESORTS CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ASIAN BANK CORPORATION, FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, and UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK G.R. No. 154188 June 15, 2005 Facts: Mondragon International Philippines, Inc., Mondragon Securities Corporation and herein petitioner entered into a lease agreement with the Clark Development Corporation for the development of what is now known as the Mimosa Leisure Estate.To help finance the project, petitioner, entered into an Omnibus Loan and Security Agreement with respondent banks for a syndicated term loan in the aggregate principal amount of US$20M. Under the agreement, the proceeds of the loan were to be released through advances evidenced by promissory notes to be executed by petitioner in favor of each lender-bank, and to be paid within a six-year period from the date of initial advance inclusive of a one year and two quarters grace period. Petitioner, which had regularly paid the monthly interests due on the promissory notes until October 1998, thereafter failed to make payments. Consequently, written notices of default, acceleration of payment and demand letters were sent by the lenders to the petitioner. Then, respondents filed a complaint for the foreclosure of leasehold rights against petitioner. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint but was denied. Issue: Whether or not respondents have a cause of action against the petitioner? Held: Under the foregoing provisions of the Agreement, petitioner may be validly declared in default for failure to pay the interest. As a consequence of default, the unpaid amount shall

Yes. Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and stationary object and uncontrovertedly provided with adequate openings for the passage of water craft, including barges like of appellant's, it was undeniable that the unusual event that the barge, exclusively controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption of negligence on the part of appellant or its employees manning the barge or the tugs that towed it. For in the ordinary course of events, such a thing will not happen if proper care is used. In Anglo American Jurisprudence, the inference arises by what is known as the "res ipsa loquitur" rule The appellant strongly stressed the precautions taken by it on the day in question: that it assigned two of its most powerful tugboats to tow down river its barge L1892; that it assigned to the task the more competent and experienced among its patrons, had the towlines, engines and equipment double-checked and inspected' that it instructed its patrons to take extra precautions; and concludes that it had done all it was called to do, and that the accident, therefore, should be held due to force majeure or fortuitous event. These very precautions, however, completely destroyed the appellant's defense. For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical in so far as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, "events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines). It was, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as was commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening was not impossibility to foresee the same. The very measures adopted by appellant prove that the possibility of danger was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen, and was not caso fortuito. AUSTRIA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 39 SCRA 527 FACTS: Maria G. Abad received from Guillermo Austria a pendant with diamonds to be sold on a commission basis or to be returned on demand. While walking home, the purse containing the jewelry and cash was snatched by two men. A complaint of the incident was filed in the Court of First Instance against certain persons. Abad failed to return the jewelry or pay for its value despite demands made by Austria. Austria brought an action against the Abad spouses for the recovery of the pendant or of its value and damages. Abad spouses set up the defense that the alleged robbery had extinguished their

obligation. ISSUE: Should the Abad spouse be held liable for the loss of the pendant? RULING: No. The Court ruled that the exempting provision of Article 1174 of the Civil Code is applicable in the case. It is a recognized jurisdiction that to constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a person from responsibility, it is necessary that the event must be independent of the human will or of the obligors will; the occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and that the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. To avail of the exemption granted, it is not necessary that the persons responsible for the event should be found or punished. It is sufficient that to unforeseeable event which is the robbery took place without concurrent fault or negligence on the part of the obligor which can be proven by preponderant evidence. It was held that the act of Maria Abad in walking home alone carrying the jewelry was not negligent for at that time the incidence of crimes was not high. OSMEA VS. RAMA JOHNSON, September 9, 1909NATURE APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. FACTS -15 Nov 1890: Doa Rama executed anddelivered to Victoriano Osmea a contract(EXHIBIT A) which stated that she receivedP200 in cash from Don Osmea which shewould pay in sugar in January/Februarythe next year at the price on the day of delivering the sugar into the Donswarehouses + Interest w/ rate of half acuartillo per month on each peso from Nov15 to the day of the settlement; if ever theDoa could not pay in full, a balance shallbe struck, showing the amountoutstanding at the end of each June,including interest, and outstandingbalance of the respondent would beconsidered as capital which therespondent would pay in sugar. Therespondent also promised that she wouldsell to Don Osmea all her sugar thatwould be harvested, and as security, shepledged all her present and futureproperty, and as a special security, shewould give her house in Pagina. Thecontract was signed by 2 witnesses.-27 Oct. 1891: Defendant asked a furtherloan from the Don of P70, P50 of whichwould be loaned to Don Peares, and theP70 would be paid in sugar.-Some time after the execution anddelivery of the above contracts, DonOsmea died. In the settlement anddivision of the property of his estate theabove contracts became the property of one of his hieirs, Agustina Rafols. Later(nodate given) the said Agustina Rafols cededto the present plaintiff all of her right andinterest in said contracts.-( my copy is missing some paragraphs,cant find a copy in the internet so justlook at your copies for the periodsbetween the death of Don Osmea andMarch 15)-15 March 1902: Doa Rama recognizedher obligations in the said contract withDon Osmea, stating in the contract sheexecuted (EXHIBIT C) that if her house inPagina would be sold she would use themoney to pay for her debts.-26 June 1906: Doa Tomasa did not paythe amount due so the plaintiff commenced this action in CFI Cebu.

CFI deci judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of P200 with interest at the rate of 18 3/4 percent per annum, from the 15th day of November, 1890, and for the sum of P20,with interest at the rate of 181 per centper annum, from the 27th day of October,1891, until the said sums were paid. Plaintiffs Claim the execution anddelivery of the above contracts, thedemand for payment, and the failure topay on the part of the defendant, and theprayer for a judgment for the amount dueon the said contracts. (own testimony Idont know if Agustina is a guy my copysaid the plaintiff himself) Defendants defense general denial andsetting up the special defense of prescription. (no evidence presented) ISSUEWON the proof presented during thetrial in CFI is sufficient for the lowercourt to recognize the debt of DoaRama, provided that she imposed thecondition that she would pay herdebts upon selling her house?HELD YES, the proof presented is sufficient. Ratio A condition imposed upon acontract by the promisor, the performanceof which depends upon his exclusive will,is void, in accordance with the provisionsof article 1115 of the Civil Code. Reasoning It was suggested during thediscussion of the case in this court that, inthe acknowledgment of the indebtednessmade by the defendant, she imposed thecondition that she would pay theobligation if she sold her house. If thatstatement found in her acknowledgmentof the indebtedness should be regarded asa condition, it was a condition whichdepended upon her exclusive will, and is,therefore, void. (Art. 1115, Civil Code.) The acknowledgment, therefore, was anabsolute acknowledgment of theobligation and was sufficient to preventthe statute of limitation from barring theaction upon the original contract. Dispositive We are satisfied, from all of the evidence adduced during the trial, thatthe judgment of the lower court should beaffirmed. So ordered.

UP v Walfrido Delos Angeles F: T h e l a n d i n q u e s t i o n i s a g r a n t o f endowment to UP. UP an ALUMCO entere into a loggingagreement extenible by 5 yrs to cuta n c o l l e c t t i m b e r f r o m t h e l a n d i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f p a y m e n t t o U P o f royalties, forest fees ALUMCO incurred an unpaid accountof php 219,362.94, several demandswere made by UP After receiving a notice to rescind thel o g g i n g a g r e e m e n t , A L U M C O e x e c uted an Acknowledgement of D e b t a n d P r o p o s e d m a n n e r o f payments which was approved by theP r e s i d e n t o f U P, it h a d a s t i p u l at i on t h a t s h o u l d A L U M C O f a i l i n i t s obligation, UP has the right to rescindthe agreement without the necessityof any judicial suit A L U M C O c o n t i n u e d w i t h t h e o perations but failed to pay again

U P i n f o r m e d A L U M C O t h a t i t h a d considere d the agreement ineffectivean file a case against ALUMCO in CFI(QC) for collection or payment Before the issuance of the preliminaryi n j u n c t i o n , U P t o o k o n a n o t h e r concessionaire for the logging ops bya d v e r t i s i n g a n i n v i t a t i o n t o b i d which was eventually awarded to StaClara A L U M C O f i l e d m o t i on s t o d i s c h a r g e t h e w r i t s o f a t t a c h m e n t a n d p r e l i m injunction but were denied by CT A L U M C O f i l e d a n o t h e r p e t i t i o n t o enjoin UP from conducting biding andawarding rights to another company U P r e c e i v e d t h e o r d e r a f t e r i t co ncluded its contract with STa Clara On motion of ALUMCO and Jose Rico,the CT declared UP in contempt andi n t h e s a m e o r d e r p r o h i b i t e d S t a C l a r a f r o m e x e r c i s i n g i t s l o g g i n g rights UPs MR DENIED ALUMCO gave several excuses as tow h y i t f a i l e d o n i t s o b l i g a t i o n I t s former general manager, Cesar Guyd id n o t t u rn o v e r m a n a g e me n t ; th e logs turned out to be rotten; It also contended the UPs unilateral rescission of the contract without a ctorder was invalidISSUE: WON UP can treat its contract withALUMCO rescinded and may disregard thesameSC: Ruled IFO of UP I t w a s A L U M C O t h a t e x p r e s s l y stipulat ed in the Acknowledgement of Debt that UP has the right to rescindthe contract without the necessity of judicial suit S u c h s t i p u l at i o n i n c on n e c t i o n w i t h A r t 1 1 9 1 o f t h e c i v i l c o d e i s v a l i d : THERE IS NOTHING IN THE LAW THATP R O H I B I T T H E P A R T I E S F R O M E N TERING INTO AGREEMENT THATV I O L A T I O N O F T H E T E R M S O F C O N T R A C T W O U L D C A U S E CANCELLATION TH EREOF EVENWITHOUT COURT INTERVENT I O N (Froilan V Pan Oriental Shipping) T h e p a r t y w h o d e e m s t h e c o n t r a c t violated may c o n s i d e r i t r e s c i n d ed and act accordingly, without previousc o u r t a c t i o n , b u t i t p r o c e e d s a t i t s o w n r i s k . F O R I T I S ON L Y T HE F I N A L JUDGMENT OF THE CORRESPONDNGC O U R T T H A T W I L L C O N C L U S I V E L Y SETTLE WHETHER THE ACTION TAKENWAS OR WAS NOT CORRECT IN LAW. The contracting party who finds itself i n j u r e d m u s t f i l e a s u i t ; i n c a s e o f a b u s e a nd error by rescinder, theo t h e r p a r t y i s n o t b a r r e d f r o m questioning the act in court B e s i d e s , A L U M C O s e x c u s e s f o r n ot being able to pay is not sufficient.H E L D : W r i t o f C e r t i o r a r i g r a n t e d . L O W E R COURTS ORDER SET ASIDE

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