Constitutional Law 2 Assignment for November 29, 2012

1. Read any textbook on Due Process and Equal protection of the Laws

2. Constitution, Article III, Section 2 (Memorize) ; Read any textbook discussing Article 2, Sec 3

3. Procedural Due Process

i.

Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, [No. 11390], (March 26, 1918) ALL GROUPS How is due process of law applied to judicial proceedings? What are its requisites?

ii.

Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659 [L-74457] (March 20, 1987) Group 1 : What does due process involve? Group 2 : When is there a reasonable connetion between the means employed and the purpose to be achieved? Group 3 : Why was there a violation of due process in the confiscation of carabaos?

iii.

Tanada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, [L-63915], (Dec. 29, 1986) ALL GROUPS Civil Code, Article 2; Executive Order 200; Publication of law as one requirement for compliance with procedural due process

iv.

Meris vs. Ofilada, 293 SCRA 606, [A.M. No. RTJ-97-1390] (Aug. 5, 1998) GROUP 1 What is the requirement of procedural due process in a criminal case?

v.

Fabella vs. Court of Appeals, 282 SCRA 256, [G.R. No. 110370] (Nov. 28, 1997) GROUP 2 What is the requirement of procedural due process in an administrative case/

4. Substantive Due Process

i.

Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 103, [No. 15972] (Oct. 11, 1920) GROUP 3 Who was Kwong Sing? What is meant by means employed are reasonably necessary for the purpose as a requirement of substantive due process?

ii.

GSIS vs. Montesclaros, 434 SCRA 441, [G.R. 146494] (July 14, 2004) Group 1 : What was the vested right described in the case? When does a police power measure becomes a violation of due process? Group 2 : What are the requirements of a valid classification? In this case, did the questioned policy satisfy the requirements?

iii.

United States vs. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 GROUP 3 What is lawful subject as a test of the constitutionality of a police power measure? What is lawful means as another test for the validity of a police power measure?

5. Equal Protection of the Laws

i.

People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, [No. 45987] (May 5, 1939) ALL GROUPS What is substantial distinction or classification in equal protection? Who was Cayat? What was the law he allegedly violated?

IN THE NEXT CASES, WHAT CONCEPT OR RULE RELATING TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS WAS DISCUSSED OR APPLIED?

ii. iii. iv. v. vi. vii.

JMM Promotions and Management Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 319 [G.R. No. 1200095] (August 5, 19960 Group 1 Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. San Diego, 180 SCRA 533 [G.R. No. 89572] (December 21, 1989) Group 2 Taxicab Operators vs. Board of Transportation, 117 SCRA 597 [L-59234] Group 3 Bautista vs. Junio, 127 SCRA 329 [L-50908] (Jan. 11, 1984) Group 1 De La Cruz vs. Paras, 123 SCRA 569, [No. 42571] (July 25, 1983) Group 2 Velasco vs. Villegas, 120 SCRA 568 [No. L-24153] (Feb. 14, 1983) Group 3

o----oOo----o

Judicial Due Process Requisites El Banco Espaol-Filipino vs Vicente Palanca FACTS: Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt. His debt amounted to P218, 294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owes. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracios property. Engracio however left for China and he never returned till he died. Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court further ordered the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that itd be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to execute Engracios property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process -as Engracio never receive the summons. ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed. HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had been met. The requisites are (1) There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it; (2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings;(3) The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard; and (4) Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

Presidential Proclamations- Publication is a requirement of due process Tanada vs Tuvera (136 SCRA 27) FACTS: Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concerns as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable they must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Taada et al seek a writ of mandamus to compel Tuvera to publish and/or to cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various Presidential Decrees (PDs), Letters of Instructions(LOIs), Proclamations(PPs), Executive Orders(EOs), and Administrative Orders(AOs). The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the case should be dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality. Without showing that the non-publication of these laws would bring injury to the petitioners, they have no cause of action, as provided for under the Rules of Court. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing 2. Whether or not the various PDs et al must be published before they shall take effect HELD: The petitioners have legal standing. The Supreme Court has already decided in various cases that a party has a cause of action when the question posed is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty. Under such, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. The Supreme Court held that the fact that a PD or LOI states its date of affectivity does not preclude their publication in the Official Gazette as they constitute important legislative acts, particularly in the present case where the president may on his own issue laws. The clear objective of this provision is to give the public general adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis non excusat It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. It is needless to say that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. Therefore Publication is indispensable.

Equal Protection Requisites of a Valid Classification Bar from Drinking Gin PEOPLE VS CAYAT FACTS: In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera and a member of the non-Christian tribes was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this attempt to treat them with discrimination or mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians. ISSUES: What is substantial distinction or classification in equal protection? Who was Cayat? What was the law he allegedly violated? HELD: The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as an inferior or less capable race. On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the non- Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. This law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act applies equally to all members of the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non- Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.

Group 2

Corina Chua Merryl Joyce Ferma Jerome Dizon

Kristal Jane Mendoza Colleen Fretzie Navarro Raymon Patdu

The method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court FACTS: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos. To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from inter-provinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred the law as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to out rightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos. ISSUE: When is there a reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose to be achieved? HELD: To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement-that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, EO No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that no carabaos regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing We find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive

A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law GSIS VS MONTESCLAROS FACTS: Nicolas filed and was approved an application for retirement benefits under PD No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977.Milagros, as wife and designated beneficiary, filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension. GSIS denied the claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of retirement on 17 February 1984. ISSUE: What are the requirements of a valid classification? In this case, did the questioned policy satisfy the requirements? HELD: The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another. NO, the proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the pensioners death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition.

Requirements of procedural due process in an administrative case FABELLA VS COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari against illegal dismissal of teachers due to violation of civil service laws and regulations for they had participated in talk-outs and strikes. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month differentials, clothing allowances and passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress, among other things. Petitioners claim that their dismissal was effected without any formal investigation While there was a semblance of investigation conducted by the respondents their intention to dismiss petitioners was already manifest when it adopted a procedure provided for by law, by shifting the burden of proof to the petitioners, fully knowing that the teachers would boycott the proceedings thereby giving them cause to render judgment ex-parte.

ISSUE: What is the requirement of procedural due process in an administrative case HELD: In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private respondents did not include a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers organization as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard