1a. Baliwag Transit v CA, 1989-01-31 F: Student George Calipan suffered multiple SPIs while aboard a Baliwag bus.

He executed a Release of Claims in favor of Baliwag and Fortune Insurance in consideration of P8,020.50. His parents opposed the compromise agreement, on the ground that they did not sign the Release and that they were the ones who shouldered Georges hospitalization expenses. I: Is the Release of Claims valid? H: Yes. Since the suit is one for breach of contract of carriage, the Release of Claims executed by George, as the injured party, discharging Fortune Insurance and Baliwag from any and all liability is valid. The contract of carriage was between George, as the paying passenger, and Baliwag, as the common carrier. As such carrier, Baliwag was bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight could provide (NCC Art 1755), and is liable for injuries to them through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees (Art 1759). 1b. British Airways v CA & FITGS, 1993-02-09 F: FITGS principal ROLACO sent a pre-paid ticket advice to BA, which failed to transport the contract workers to Jeddah. FITGS flew the workers in other airlines and sued BA for damages. BA contends that FITGS has no cause of action there being no perfected contract of carriage existing between them as no ticket was ever issued and, therefore, the obligation of BA did not arise. I: Was there a perfected contract? H: Yes. In dealing with the contract of common carriage of passengers, there are 2 aspects of the same: (a) the contract "to carry (at some future time)," which is consensual and is necessarily perfected by mere consent (NCC Art 1356), and (b) the contract "of carriage" or "of common carriage" itself which should be considered as a real contract for not until the carrier is actually used can the carrier be said to have already assumed the obligation of a carrier. In this case, the contract "to carry" is the one involved. Note: ROLACO reimbursed FITGS for its expenses, so the SC deleted actual damages in the award. 1c. LRTA & Roman v Navidad & Prudent, 2003-02-06 F: After a fist fight with Prudent guard Escartin, Navidad fell from the LRT station platform into the tracks and was fatally hit by an incoming train operated by Roman. I: Is LRTA liable? H: Yes. A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered its premises, entitling him to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation. A common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. The CA found that there is nothing to link Prudent to the death of Navidad for the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven. There is also no showing that Roman is guilty of any culpable act or omission, and is thus absolved. Note: RTC held Prudent & Escartin liable. CA exonerated Prudent & Escartin and held LRTA & Roman liable. 1d. De Guzman v CA & Cendana F: Junk dealer Cendana brings scrap material to Manila for resale and delivers cargo on the way back to Pangasinan. De Guzman contracted with Cendana for delivery of 600 cartons of milk to Pangasinan. The truck and its cargo were hijacked. I: 1. Is Cendana a common carrier? 2. Is Cendana liable for the loss? H: 1. Yes. NCC Art 1732 defines common carrier and makes no distinction between one whose principal business is the carrying of persons or goods, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity ("sideline"). It also carefully avoids making any distinction between offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does it distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the general public, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability under the NCC provisions governing common carriers. 2. No. Hijacking is not one of the exempting causes to the general rule in Art 1734 that common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods which they carry. The limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force (see Art 1745(6)). The loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. Even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence. Note: CFI found Cendana to be a common carrier and Liable. CA reversed.

1e. Spouses Cruz v Sun Holidays, 2010-06-29 F: Cruz and his wife perished on board the boat M/B Coco Beach III that capsized in stormy weather en route to Batangas from Puerto Galera, where the couple had stayed at a resort owned and operated by Sun Holidays. The tour package-contract included transportation to and from the resort and the point of departure in Batangas. I: Is Sun Holidays liable as a common carrier? H: Yes. Its ferry services are so intertwined with its main business as to be properly considered ancillary thereto. The constancy of its ferry services in its resort operations is underscored by its having its own Coco Beach boats. And the tour packages it offers, which include the ferry services, may be availed of by anyone who can afford to pay the same. These services are thus available to the public. That Sun Holidays does not charge a separate fee or fare for its ferry services is of no moment. It would be imprudent to suppose that it provides said services at a loss. The Court is aware of the practice of beach resort operators offering tour packages to factor the transportation fee in arriving at the tour package price. 1f. Asia Lighterage & Shipping Inc v CA, Prudential Guaranty & Assurance F: ALSs barge carrying a cargo of wheat in stormy weather developed a hole and later sank. PGA indeminified the consignee and as subrogee sought to recover from ALS. I: 1. Is ALS a common carrier? 2. Did it exercise extraordinary diligence in its care and custody of the consignee's cargo? H: 1. Yes. ALS is a common carrier whether its carrying of goods is done on an irregular rather than scheduled manner, and with an only limited clientele. A common carrier need not have fixed and publicly known routes. Neither does it have to maintain terminals or issue tickets. 2. No. ALS cannot invoke the occurrence of the typhoon as force majeure to escape liability for the loss sustained by PGA. Surely, meeting a typhoon head-on falls short of due diligence required from a common carrier. More importantly, the officers/employees themselves of ALS admitted that when the towing bits of the vessel broke that caused its sinking and the total loss of the cargo upon reaching the Pasig River, it was no longer affected by the typhoon. The typhoon then is not the proximate cause of the loss of the cargo; a human factor, i.e., negligence had intervened. 1g. First Phil Industrial Corp v CA F: FPIC is in the business of transporting petroleum products from the Batangas refineries, via pipeline, to Sucat and JTF Pandacan Terminals. It sought business tax exemption as a common carrier. I: Is FPIC a common carrier? H: Yes. It is engaged in the business of transporting or carrying goods, i.e. petroleum products, for hire as a public employment. It undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently, that is, to all persons who choose to employ its services, and transports the goods by land and for compensation. The fact that it has a limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a common carrier. 1h. Planters Product Inc v CA, SSA & KKKK, 1993-09-19 F: Shipper Mitsubishi entered into a time charter-party with shipowner KKK for delivery of 9,330 metric tons of urea fertilizer from New York to consignee PPI in Manila. Upon unloading, a survey report revealed a shortage of 107 M/T and 18 M/T contaminated with dirt. PPI sought to recover from KKKK. I: Does a charter-party between a shipowner and a charterer transform a common carrier into a private one as to negate the civil law presumption of negligence in case of loss or damage to its cargo? H: No in a time charter-party. When petitioner chartered the vessel M/V "Sun Plum", the ship captain, its officers and compliment were under the employ of the shipowner and therefore continued to be under its direct supervision and control. Note: CFI held KKKK a common carrier and liable. CA reversed. SC held KKKK a common carrier, but w/o liability because there was no proof it was negligent and because of the nature of urea. 1i. Fabre & Cabil v CA, WWCF & Antonio, 1996-07-26 F: Spouses Fabre operate a school bus service in Manila. WWCF hired Fabres minibus and his new driver Cabil to transport its 33 members to and from La Union. The bus turned over after a sharp curve on a rainy night. Passenger Antonio was paralyzed. I: Is Fabre liable as a common carrier? H: Yes. This case involves a contract of carriage. The Fabres did not have to be engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions of the NCC on common carriers to apply to them. As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise "extraordinary diligence" for the safe transportation of the passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not excused by proof that they exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employee (Art 1759). Note: SC held Fabres liable whether on the basis of culpa contractual or quasi-delict.

1j. Bascos v CA & Cipriano, 1993-04-07 FACTS: In 1988 Jibfair contracted with Cipriano to haul 2,000 metric tons of soya bean meal from Del Pan to Purefoods warehouse in Calamba. Cipriano subcontracted the transport and delivery of 400 sacks worth P156K at P50 per M/T to Bascos, whose truck was hijacked in Paco at night. Per contract that held Ciptrade liable for loss due to hijacking, Cipriano indemnified Jibfair and sought reimbursement from Bascos. CAUSE OF ACTION: Breach of contract of carriage. DEFENSE: (1) No contract of carriage since Ciptrade leased Bascos truck, (2) Ciptrade liable for P11K for loading the cargo, (3) Hijacking immediately reported to Ciptrade; Bascos & police exerted all efforts to locate hijacked property, (4) Robbery and carnapping filed against Opriano and (5) Hijacking a force majeure which exculpates Bascos from any liability. TRIAL COURT: Bascos ordered to pay P156K to Cipriano. CA: Affirmed trial court. ISSUES: (1) Is Bascos a common carrier? (2) Was the hijacking a force majeure? DEFENSE: (1) Affidavits referred to contract as lease, not of carriage, (2) Bascos offers truck for lease to those with cargo to move, not general public; few customers; small business NOTE: Trial Court & CA held affidavits re contract of lease self-serving, SC added not sufficient. HELD: (1) Yes. De Guzman v CA held that Art 1732 defining common carrier does not distinguish (1) whether the carrying of goods or persons is a principal or ancillary activity, (2) whether the service is regular/scheduled or occasional, and (3) whether the service is offered to the general public or a narrow segment thereof. (2a) No. De Guzman v CA held that hijacking, not being included in the provisions of Art 1734, must be dealt with under the provisions of Art 1735 and thus, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or negligent. To exculpate the carrier from liability arising from hijacking, he must prove that the robbers or the hijackers acted with grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force. Bascos own failure to adduce sufficient proof of extraordinary diligence made the presumption conclusive against her. (2b) Per Art 1745(6), a common carrier is held responsible and will not be allowed to divest or to diminish such responsibility even for acts of strangers like thieves or robbers except where such thieves or robbers in fact acted with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force. Bascos affidavit based on what helper Morden told her, not a first-hand account. Mordens salaysay not considered best evidence if affiant available as witness. SC bound by CA conclusion. RULING: Petition dismissed, CA affirmed. 1k. FGU Ins Corp v GP Sarmiento Trucking Corp & Eroles (Exclusive carrier not a common carrier.) FACTS: In 1994 GPS undertook to deliver 30 refrigerators for Concepcion Industries from Alabang to Dagupan City. In Tarlac, GPS truck driven by Eroles collided with another truck and fell into a deep canal, damaging its cargo. FGU indemnified Concepcion for P204K and sought reimbursement from GPS. CAUSE OF ACTION: Damages & breach of contract of carriage as subrogee. ARGUMENTS: GPS an exclusive hauler and not a common carrier; cause of damage purely accidental. GPS filed demurrer to evidence with leave of court. RTC: Dismissed complaint. FGU did not present evidence GPS is a common carrier, hence presumption of negligence in Art 1735 not availing. Laws on Oblicon (negligence or fault not presumed) and quasi-delict (Art 2185 presumption of negligence if driver of MV violating traffic regulation) apply. CA: Affirmed RTC. FGU insists GPS a common carrier despite limited clientele and thus has burden of proving by preponderance of evidence, but which it failed to do. ISSUES: (1) Is GPS a common carrier? (2) Is there a presumption of negligence? HELD: (1) No. Common carriers are engaged in the business of transporting passengers or good, for hire or compensation, offering their services to the public, whether to the public in general or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive basis. The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, providing space for those who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee. GPS, being an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries since 1970, rendering or offering its services to no other, cannot be considered a common carrier. (2) Yes. In culpa contractual, upon which the action of FGU rests as being the subrogee of Concepcion, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. GPS failed to prove its exercise of due diligence to overcome the presumption. RULING: Dismissal re Eroles affirmed, but reversed re GPS (ordered to pay P204K to FGU). NOTES: (1) The driver, not being a party to the contract of carriage between Concepcion and GPS, may not be held liable under the agreement. FGUs civil action against the driver can only be based on culpa aquiliana, which would require the claimant for damages to prove negligence or fault on the part of the defendant. (2) Res ipsa loquitur holds a defendant liable where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the his management and the accident is such that, in the ordinary course of things, cannot be expected to happen if those who have its management or control use proper care. Requirement that other responsible causes be first eliminated applies only to pure tort. (3) If a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, the movant shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

1l. Crisostomo v CA & Caravan Travel, 2003-08-25 (Travel agencies are not common carriers.) FACTS: In 1991 Lawyer Crisostomo booked a Jewels of Europe tour with Caravan for P74K. Caravans ticketing manager Menor (Crisostomos niece) delivered the travel documents to Crisostomo, but told her the flight was on the Sat. Without checking the docs, Crisostomo went to the airport on the Sat, only to find out her flight was actually on Fri. When she complained, Menor prevailed upon her to take the British Pageant tour, for which she paid P8K down payment for the P21K tour. Upon her return she demanded P61K reimbursement. Caravan refused and Crisostomo filed a complaint with the RTC for breach of contract of carriage and damages. ARGUMENTS: Crisostomo: (1) Departure date not clearly indicated in plane ticket, (2) Caravan, through Menor, was negligent in informing her of the wrong flight schedule, (3) "British Pageant" was merely a substitute for the "Jewels of Europe" tour, such that the cost of the former should be properly set-off against the sum paid for the latter. Caravan: (1) Crisostomo was informed of the correct departure date, which was clearly and legibly printed on the plane ticket; (2) Travel documents were given to Crisostomo 2 days ahead of the scheduled trip. She had only herself to blame for missing the flight, as she did not bother to read or confirm her flight schedule as printed on the ticket; (3) It is accepted industry practice to disallow refund for individuals who failed to take a booked tour; (4) "British Pageant" was not a substitute for the package tour that Crisostomo missed. This tour was independently procured by her after realizing that she made a mistake in missing her flight for "Jewels of Europe". RTC (1995): Caravan liable (plus damages & atty fees), but P61K reduced by 10% because of Crisostomos contributory negligence. CA: Reversed. Crisostomo more negligent, as a lawyer she should know better. She forfeited her rights to Jewels of Europe and liable to Caravan for P13K balance for British Pageant. ARGUMENTS: Crisostomo: In the contract of carriage the common carrier is obliged to observe utmost care and extraordinary diligence which is higher in degree than the ordinary diligence required of the passenger. ISSUE: Is Caravan a common carrier? HELD: No. Its covenant with its customers is simply to make travel arrangements in their behalf. It is not in the business of transporting either passengers or goods and is therefore, neither a private nor a common carrier. (At most, it acted merely as an agent of the airline.) It is thus not bound under the law to observe extraordinary diligence in the performance of its obligation. RULING: Petition denied, CA affirmed. NOTE: Menor abroad, did not testify. 1m. Erezo v Jepte, 1957-09-30 (The registered owner rule doctrinal case) FACTS: Jeftes 6x6 truck, driven by Espino, collided with a taxi at a street intersection in Manila, and hit Erezos son Ernesto who died from injuries. Espino pleaded guilty to homicide through reckless negligence and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay Ernestos heir P3K. As the amount of the judgment could not be enforced against him, Erezo sued Jefte. Jepte claims the truck belongs to Port Brokerage. Trucks of PB were registered in Jeftes name as a convenient arrangement so as to enable PB to pay the registration fee with his backpay as a pre-war government employee. CFI HELD: Jefte represented himself to be the owner of the truck and the Motor Vehicle Office, relying on his representation, registered the vehicles in his name, the Government and all persons affected by the representation had the right to rely on his declaration of ownership and registration. Therefore, he is liable because he cannot be permitted to repudiate his own declaration. ARGUMENTS: Jefte: At the time of the accident the relation of employer and employee between the driver and Jefte was not established, it having been proved at the trial that the owner of the truck was the PB, of which Jefte was merely a broker. ISSUE: Should Jefte be allowed to prove that he had sold the truck to another and thus shift the responsibility for the injury to the real and actual owner? SC HELD: No. The law does not relieve him directly of the responsibility that the law fixes and places upon him as an incident or consequence of registration. Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done. A registered owner who has already sold or transferred a vehicle has the recourse to a third-party complaint, in the same action brought against him to recover for the damage or injury done, against the vendee or transferee of the vehicle. 1n. Santos v Sibug, 1981-05-26 (Regd Owner Rule) FACTS: In 1963 Sibug was bumped by a passenger jeepney driven by Gragas, owned by Santos, but registered in Vidads name and operated under Vidads CPC. Sibug sued Vidad and Gragas. CFI XVII HELD: Vidas and Gragas J&S liable: P506 actual, P3K moral, Atty fees & costs. FACTS: Sheriff levied on Santos jeep and scheduled public auction sale. Santos presented third-party claim (and submitted bond) with Sheriff and then an action for Damages and injunction against Vidad, Sibug, Sheriff and bonding company. ARGUMENTS: Santos: He is actual owner. Fictitious Deed of Sale for purpose of operating jeepney under Vidads franchise.

He did not receive any consideration from Vidad. For Santos protection Vidad executed a re-transfer Deed of Sale back to former. Santos not a party to the civil case. CFI X HELD: Enjoined Sheriff from conducting sale and ordered jeepneys return to Santos. Sibug and bonding company J&S liable to pay P15 per day until jeepney returned, plus attorneys fees and costs. SC OPINION: Although Santos, as the kabit was the true owner as against Vidad, the latter, as the registered owner/operator and grantee of the franchise, is directly and primarily responsible and liable for the damages caused to Sibug, the injured party, as a consequence of the negligent or careless operation of the vehicle. This is based on the principle that the operator of record is considered the operator of the vehicle in contemplation of law as regards the public and third persons even if the vehicle involved in the accident had been sold to another where such sale had not been approved by the then Public Service Commission. FACTS: Sibug appealed to CA. CA HELD: Nullified CFI X judgment. Santos may not be permitted to prove his ownership over a particular vehicle being levied upon but registered in another's name in a separated action. As the vehicle was registered in the name of Vidad, the government or any person affected by the representation that said vehicle is registered under the name of a particular person had the right to rely on his declaration of ownership and registration: and the registered owner or any other person for that matter cannot be permitted to repudiate said declaration with the objective of proving that said registered vehicle is owned by another person and not by the registered owner. Were we to allow a third person to prove that he is the real owner of a particular vehicle and not the registered owner it would in effect be tantamount to sanctioning the attempt of the registered owner of the particular vehicle in evading responsibility for it cannot be dispelled that the door would be opened to collusion between a person and a registered owner for the latter to escape said responsibility to the public or to any person. FACTS: Santos appealed. SC HELD: As a matter of substance and on the merits, the ultimate conclusion of the CA nullifying the Decision of Branch X permanently enjoining the auction sale, should be upheld. Legally speaking, it was not a "stranger's property" that was levied upon by the Sheriff pursuant to the judgment rendered by Branch XVII. The vehicle was, in fact, registered in the name of Vidad, one of the judgment debtors. And what is more, the aspect of public service, with its effects on the riding public, is involved. Whatever legal technicalities may be invoked, we find the judgment of respondent CA to be in consonance with justice. 1o. Lita Enterprises Inc v CA, Sps Ocampo & Garcia, 1984-04-27 (Regd Owner & pari delicto rules) FACTS: In 1966, Sps Ocampo and Garcia purchased 5 cars to be used as taxicabs. Since they had no franchise to operate taxicabs, they contracted with LEI for the use of the latter's CPC in consideration of an initial payment of P1K and a monthly rental of P200 per taxicab unit. Said cars were registered in the name of LEI, but possession remained with Sps Ocampo who operated and maintained the same under LEIs trade name Acme Taxi. In 1967, one of said taxicabs driven by their employee Martin, collided with a motorcycle whose driver Galvez, died from head injuries sustained therefrom. A criminal case was filed against driver Martin, while a civil case for damages was instituted by Galvez heir against LEI as registered owner of the taxicab. LEI was adjudged liable for P25K damages and P7K attorney's fees. 2 of the vehicles of Sps Ocampo were levied upon and sold at public auction for P12K and P8K. In 1973, Ocampo decided to register his taxicabs in his name. He requested LEI to turn over the registration papers to him, but the latter allegedly refused. Hence, he and his wife filed a complaint against LEI, Galvezs heir, Visayan Surety & Ins Co and the Sheriff of Manila for reconveyance of motor vehicles with damages. CFI dismissed the complaint against the last 3 but LEI was ordered to transfer the registration certificate of the 3 remaining cars to Ocampo, who in turn was ordered to pay rentals in arrears to LEI. On appeal to SC, LEI sought to recover from Sps Ocampo what LEI has paid or was declared liable to Galvezs heir. Issue: May registered owner LEI recover from true owners Sps Ocampo? H: No. Although not outrightly penalized as a criminal offense, the "kabit system" is invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy and, therefore, void and inexistent under NCC Art 1409. The court will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract, but will leave them both where it finds them per Art 1412(1). All proceedings and decisions in the 2 civil cases annulled and set aside. 1p. PCI Leasing & Finance Inc v UCPB General Ins Co Inc, 2008-07-04 (RO-lessor still liable if lease not registered) FACTS: Sometime in 1990 at 22:30 in Lipa City, an 18-wheeler, owned by PCI, leased to SUGECO and driven by its employee Gonzaga, hit-and-run a UCPB-owned car insured by UCPB GICI. There was heavy damage to the car and physical injuries to its driver and passenger. UCPB GICI paid P244.5K indemnity to UCPB and demanded the same amount from PCI which did not pay, prompting UCPB GICI to sue. PCI DEFENSE: Driver Gonzaga not its employee, but that of lessee and operator SUGECO. RTC: PCI & Gonzaga J&S liable. CA: Affirmed RTC, invoking registered-owner rule in the Public Service Act, but deleted Attorneys Fees and lowered the interest rate from 12% to 6%. ISSUES: (1) May PCI as registered owner of a MV that figured in a quasi-delict be held J&S liable with the driver thereof, for the damages caused to third parties?

(2) Is PCI, as a financing company, absolved from liability by RA 8556 (Financing Company Act of 1998)? PCI DEFENSE: PSA applicable to common carriers only, not private carriers. HELD: (1) Yes. The RO of a vehicle driven by a negligent driver may still be held liable under applicable jurisprudence involving laws on compulsory MV registration (RA 4136) and the liabilities of employers for quasi-delicts under the NCC. Erezo v Jepte held that the RO is primarily responsible for the damage caused to the vehicle of the plaintiff, but he has a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that he may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused to the plaintiff. (2) No. A sale, lease, or financial lease that is not registered with the LTO, still does not bind third persons who are aggrieved in tortious incidents, for the latter need only to rely on the public registration of a MV as conclusive evidence of ownership. A lease is an encumbrance which needs to be registered in order for it to bind third parties. NOTE: (1) For damage or injuries arising out of negligence in the operation of a MV, the RO may be held civilly liable with the negligent driver either (a) subsidiarily, if the aggrieved party seeks relief based on delict under RPC Arts 100 & 103; or (b) solidarily, if the complainant seeks relief based on a quasi-delict under NCC Arts 2176 & 2180. (2) In case a separate civil action is filed, the RO of a MV is primarily and directly responsible for the consequences of its operation, including the negligence of the driver, with respect to the public and all third persons. In contemplation of law, the RO of a MV is the employer of its driver, with the actual operator and employer, such as a lessee, being considered as merely the owner's agent. Even if a sale has been executed before a tortious incident, the sale, if unregistered, has no effect as to the right of the public and third persons to recover from the RO. The public has the right to conclusively presume that the RO is the real owner, and may sue accordingly. 5a. Roldan v Lim Ponzo & Co 1917 FACTS: Roldan contracted Lim to transport 2,244 packages of sugar in his lorcha but 1,222 packages were lost in a wreck and the remaining 1,022 packages were damaged. ISSUE: Is notice to the carrier within 24 hours required? HELD: No for the 1,222 packages lost. Art 366 of the Commercial Code is limited to cases of claims for damaged goods actually turned over by the carrier and received by the consignee. It has no application in such cases wherein the goods entrusted to the carrier are not delivered by the carrier to the consignee. In such cases there can be no question of a claim for damages suffered by the goods while in transport, since the claim for damages arises exclusively out of the failure to make delivery. 5b. Philamgen & Tagum Plastics (TPI) v Sweet Lines (SLI), Davao Veterans Arrastre & CA 1992 FACTS: Low density polyethylene from the US was transported by SLI from Manila to Davao, but with shortages, damages and losses. Par 5 of the bill of lading states Claims must be filed within 30 days from accrual. Suits shall be instituted within 60 days from date of accrual of right of action. Failure to file claims or institute judicial proceedings as provided constitutes waiver of claim or right of action. ISSUE: Is par 5 valid? HELD: Yes, the validity of a contractual limitation of time for filing the suit itself against a carrier shorter than the statutory period therefor has generally been upheld as such stipulation merely affects the shipper's remedy and does not affect the liability of the carrier. As the requirements in Art 366 of the Code of Commerce, restated with a slight modification in the assailed par 5 of the bills of lading, are reasonable conditions precedent, they are not limitations of action. Being conditions precedent, their performance must precede a suit for enforcement and the vesting of the right to file suit does not take place until the happening of these conditions. 5c. Dole Philippines v Maritime 1987 FACTS: Maritime discharged damaged machine parts to Dole in Dec 1971. Dole filed a claim in May 1972 and a complaint with the CFI in June 1973. ISSUE: Does NCC Art 1155 providing that the prescription of actions is interrupted by the making of an extrajudicial written demand by the creditor apply to actions brought under COGSA? HELD: No. It cannot be made to apply, as such application would have the effect of extending the one-year period of prescription fixed in the law. It is desirable that matters affecting transportation of goods by sea be decided in as short a time as possible; the application of the provisions of NCC Art 1155 would unnecessarily extend the period and permit delays in the settlement of questions affecting transportation, contrary to the clear intent and purpose of the law. 5d. Zulueta v PanAm 1972 FACTS: Honolulu-Manila flight, stopover in Wake Island. Zulueta late in reboarding, verbally abused, humiliated and refused boarding. Trial court awarded P1M in moral damages, P400K in exemplary damages and P100K in attorneys fees. ISSUE: Is Zulueta entitled to moral and exemplary damages? HELD: Yes. Per NCC Art 2217, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Per Art 2229, exemplary damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good. Per Art 2232, in contracts, the court may award exemplary

damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. The records amply establish plaintiffs' right to recover both moral and exemplary damages. To some extent, however, plaintiff had contributed to the gravity of the situation because of the extreme belligerence with which he had reacted on the occasion. Exemplary and moral damages halved, and attorneys fees reduced to P75K. 5e. Air France v Carrascoso, GR L-21438, 1966-09-28 FACTS: Carrascoso was already in his first class seat when he was asked by an Air France manager, on pain of being thrown out of the plane if he refused, to vacate his seat for a white man who allegedly had a better right. CFI and CA awarded moral and exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees. ISSUE: Were the awards proper? HELD: Yes. Air Frances contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Moral damages are proper per NCC Art 2219(10) and Art 21 (willfully causesinjurycontrary topublic policy) because the evidence points to bad faith, resulting in inconvenience and humiliation. Exemplary damages are proper because Carrascosos ejectment fits into the legal precept of acting in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner" per NCC Art 2232. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys' fees. 5f. TWA v CA & Vinluan, GR 78656, 1988-08-30 FACTS: Atty. Vinluan had a twice-confirmed first class plane ticket from JFK to SFO, but was rudely denied a first class seat by a TWA employee who alleged unavailability. Some Caucasians who checked in later than Vinluan were given preference to first class seats that became available. CFI and CA awarded moral and exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees. ISSUE: Were the awards proper? HELD: Yes. The discrimination is obvious and the humiliation is undeniable. Considering the circumstances and the social standing of Vinluan in the community, he is entitled to the award of moral and exemplary damages. But moral damages should be reduced from P500K to P300K, and exemplary damages should be reduced from P300K to P200K. This award should be reasonably sufficient to indemnify Vinluan for the humiliation and embarrassment that he suffered and to serve as an example to discourage the repetition of similar oppressive and discriminatory acts. NOTE: TWA alleged mechanical problems that led to use of a smaller plane with fewer first class seats, but Vinluan showed that the switch was for reasons of economy, because there were fewer than expected coach class passengers. 5g. Armovit v CA & Northwest, GR 88561, 1990-04-20 FACTS: Dr. Armovit and his family were rudely bumped off the MNL-NRT leg of their flight back to the US because of the wrong time of departure on their re-confirmed tickets. RTC awarded actual, moral, exemplary and nominal damages plus attorneys fees. CA eliminated moral damages because Armovit did not testify, reduced the exemplary damages for being exorbitant and excessive compared to the actual loss, and eliminated nominal damages because it cannot co-exist with actual or compensatory damages. ISSUE: Are the Armovits entitled to moral and exemplary damages? HELD: Yes. The contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect, malfeasance, or any rude or discourteous conduct on the part the carrier's employees could give ground for an action for damages against the carrier. The gross negligence committed by Northwest in the issuance of the tickets with errors as to the time of the flight, the failure to correct such erroneous entries and the manner by which the Armovits were rudely informed that they were bumped off are clear indicia of malice and bad faith and establish that Northwest committed a breach of contract which entitles the Armovits to moral damages. The award of exemplary damages is proper to provide an example for the public good. NOTE: Dr. Armovit was not able to testify because of the uncertain times shortly after Ninoy Aquinos assassination, but his brother testified. 5h. PAL v CA, Bagadiong & Santo Tomas, GR 5504-5, 1990-08-13 FACTS: Respondents had confirmed tickets for a Naga-Manila flight and had already checked their luggage but were bumped off to give way to the Governors party. Trial court awarded moral and exemplary damages, and increased both on the motion for reconsideration. CA reduced the combined moral and exemplary damages. ISSUE: Are respondents entitled to moral and exemplary damages, and may the trial court increase the same? HELD: Yes. The findings that PAL had breached its contract of carriage in bad faith and in wanton disregard of passengers rights lay the basis and justification for such awards. The imposition of exemplary damages is necessary to deter airlines from committing similar breaches of contract in the future. The award of moral and exemplary damages in an aggregate amount may not be the usual way of awarding said damages. However, there can be no question that the entitlement to moral damages having been established, exemplary damages may be awarded; and exemplary damages may be awarded even though not so expressly pleaded in the complaint nor proved. NOTE: SC held untenable PALs contention that unlawful acts of third persons constitute caso fortuito.