Bayan vs Zamora I.

THE FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate. The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. II. THE ISSUE Was the VFA unconstitutional? III. THE RULING [The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.] NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in 25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it. xxx xxx xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

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The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

Commissioner of Customs vs Eastern Sea Trading FACTS: EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a Trade and Financial Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan then). EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the said EO was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed. ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate. HELD: No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated agreements or protocols. The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.

USAFFE VETERANS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. THE TREASURER OF THEPHILIPPINES, ET AL.FACTS: In October 1954, the USAFFE Veterans Associations Inc. (Usaffe), prayed in itscomplaint before the Manila court of first instance that the Romulo-Snyder Agreement(1950) whereby the Philippine Government undertook to return to the United StatesGovernment in ten annual installments, a total of about 35-million dollars advanced by theUnited States to, but unexpanded by, the National Defense Forces of the Philippines beannulled, that payments thereunder be declared illegal and that defendants as officers of the Philippine Republic be restrained from disbursing any funds in the National Treasury inpursuance of said Agreement. Said Usaffe Veterans further asked that the moneysavailable, instead of being remitted to the United States, should be turned over to theFinance Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for the payment of all pendingclaims of the veterans represented by plaintiff.The complaint rested on plaintiff's three propositions: first, that the funds

to be "returned"under the Agreement were funds appropriated by the American Congress for the Philippinearmy, actually delivered to the Philippine Government and actually owned by saidGovernment; second, that U.S. Secretary Snyder of the Treasury, had no authority toretake such funds from the P.I. Government; and third, that Philippine foreign SecretaryCarlos P. Romulo had no authority to return or promise to return the aforesaid sums of money through the so-called Romulo-Snyder Agreement.The defendants moved to dismiss, alleging Governmental immunity from suit. But the courtrequired an answer, and then heard the case merits. Thereafter, it dismissed the complaint,upheld the validity of the Agreement and dissolved the preliminary injunction i hadpreviously issued. The plaintiff appealed. ISSUE: Whether the Romulo-Snyder Agreement is void. HELD: There is no doubt that President Quirino approved the negotiations. And he hadpower to contract budgetary loans under Republic Act No. 213, amending the Republic ActNo. 16. The most important argument, however, rests on the lack of ratification of theAgreement by the Senate of the Philippines to make it binding on this Government. On thismatter, the defendants explain as follows:That the agreement is not a "treaty" as that term is used in the Constitution, is conceded.The agreement was never submitted to the Senate for concurrence (Art. VII, Sec. 10 (7).However, it must be noted that treaty is not the only form that an international agreementmay assume. For the grant of the treaty-making power to the Executive and the Senatedoes not exhaust the power of the government over international relations. Consequently,executive agreements may be entered with other states and are effective even without theconcurrence of the Senate. It is observed in this connection that from the point of view of the international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements intheir binding effect upon states concerned as long as the negotiating functionaries haveremained within their powers. "The distinction between so-called executive agreements"and "treaties" is purely a constitutional one and has no international legal significance".There are now various forms of such pacts or agreements entered into by and betweensovereign states which do not necessarily come under the strict sense of a treaty andwhich do not require ratification or consent of the legislative body of the State, butnevertheless, are considered valid international agreements.In the leading case of Altman vs, U. S., 224, U. S. 583, it was held that "an internationalcompact negotiated between the representatives of two sovereign nations and made in thename and or behalf of the contracting parties and dealing with important commercialrelations between the two countries, is a treaty both internationally although as anexecutive agreement it is not technically a treaty requiring the advice and consent of theSenate.Nature of Executive Agreements. Executive Agreements fall into two classes: (1) agreements made purely as executive actsaffecting external relations and independent of or without legislative authorization, whichmay be termed as presidential agreements and (2) agreements entered into in pursuants of acts of Congress, which have been designated as Congressional-Executive Agreements.The Romulo-Snyder Agreement may fall under any of these two classes, for precisely onSeptember 18, 1946, Congress of the Philippines specifically authorized the President of the Philippines to obtain such loans or incur such indebtedness with the Government of theUnited States, its agencies or instrumentalities.Even granting, arguendo, that there was no legislative authorization, it is hereby maintainedthat the Romulo-Snyder Agreement was legally and validly entered into to conform to thesecond category, namely, "agreements entered into purely as executive acts withoutlegislative authorization." This second category usually includes money agreementsrelating to the settlement of pecuniary claims of citizens. It may be said that this method of settling such claims has come to be the usual way of dealing with matters of this kind.Such considerations seems persuasive; indeed, the Agreement was not submitted to theU.S. Senate either; but we do not stop to check the authorities above listed nor test theconclusions derived therefrom in order to render a definite pronouncement, for the reasonthat our Senate Resolution No. 15 3 practically admits the validity and binding force of suchAgreement. Furthermore, the acts of Congress Appropriating funds for the yearlyinstallments necessary to comply with such Agreements constitute a ratification thereof,which places the question the validity out of the Court's reach, no constitutional principlehaving been invoked to restrict Congress' plenary power to appropriate funds-loan or noloan.Petition denied.

Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the President may nullify attachments and order the transfer of frozen Iranian assets pursuant to Section 1702(a)(1) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Based on the Courts inferences from legislation passed by Congress (IEEPA and the Hostage Act) regarding the Presidents authority to deal

with international crises and from the history of congressional acquiescence in executive claims settlement, the President may also suspend claims pursuant to the Executive Order. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Where Congress has a history of acquiescence, as with claims settlement, it thereby implicitly approves of the Presidents actions regarding that specific subject matter about which Congress was silent. Facts. In response to the seizure of American personnel as hostages at the American Embassy in Iran, the President issued various Executive Orders and regulations by which the President nullified attachments and liens on Iranian assets in the United States, directed that these assets be transferred to Iran, and suspended claims against Iran that may be presented to an International Claims Tribunal. On December 19, 1979, Petitioner, Dames & Moore, filed suit in the United Sates District Court against Defendants, the government of Iran, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and many Iranian banks, alleging that its subsidiary was a party to a contract with the Atomic Energy Organization and that the subsidiarys interest had been assigned to Petitioner. Petitioner alleged it was owed over 3 million dollars. The District Court issued orders of attachment directed against the Defendants property and the property of certain Iranian banks. In a January 20, 1981 Executive Agreement, the President agreed to nullify attachments and ordered the transfer of frozen Iranian assets. On February 24, 1981, the President ratified an earlier Order wherein he suspended all claims which may be presented to the Tribunal and provided that such claims shall have no legal effect in any action now pending in U.S. courts. Issue. Whether the Presidents acts of nullifying the attachments and ordering the transfer of all frozen assets are specifically authorized by Congress. Whether the President has authority to suspend claims pending in American courts. Held. Yes. Because the Presidents actions in nullifying the attachments and ordering the transfer of assets were taken pursuant to congressional authorization (Section 1702 (a)(1) of IEEPA), it is supported by the strongest of presumptions and widest latitude of judicial interpretation and the burden of persuasion rests heavily on any who might attack it. Yes. Based on the legislation (IEEPA and the Hostage Act) which Congress has enacted in the area of the Presidents authority to deal with international crises, and from the history of congressional acquiescence in executive claims settlement, the President was authorized to suspend claims pursuant to the Executive Order Discussion. The majority resorts to drawing inferences from Congress legislation to conclude that the President has authority to suspend claims in American Courts. United States v. Belmont

Procedural History:

Appeal from denial of claim for payment of money deposited by Russian corporation. The United States (P) claimed that it was due funds deposited in a U.S. bank by a Russian corporation that had been nationalized by the Soviet government. Overview: A Russian corporation had deposited money in Belmont (D), a private bank in New York City, prior to the 1918 nationalization and liquidation by the Soviet government of the corporation. In 1933, the Soviet Union and the United States (P) agreed to a final settlement of claims and counterclaims. The Soviet Union agreed to take no steps to enforce claims against American nationals and assigned and released all such claims to the United States (P). When the U.S. (P) sought to recover the money, the court held that the situs of the bank deposit was within the state of New York and was not an intangible property right within Soviet territory and that it would be contrary to the public policy of the State of New York to recognize or enforce the nationalization decree. The United States (P) appealed and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. Issue: Does the national government have complete power in the conduct of international affairs? Rule: the national govt has complete power in the conduct of intl. affairs and states cannot curtail or interfere in that power Analysis: The Court noted that recognition of the Soviet Union and the release of all claims were interdependent Thus it was purely in the realm of foreign policy to make this agreement States cannot interfere in the conduct of foreign relations. Outcome: (Sutherland, J.) Yes. The national government has complete power in the conduct of international affairs and states cannot curtail or interfere in that power. The United States (P) recognized the Soviet government coincidentally with the assignment of all claims. The President has the power to conduct foreign relations, without the consent of the Senate. In respect of foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. Reversed and remanded.

United States v. Pink (S.Ct. 1942)

Facts: The Soviet Union assigned to the U.S. its claims to the assets of a Russian insurance companys New York branch. The U.S. sued to recover those assets, asserting the priority of the governments claims over those of creditors earmarked for payment by New York State. Issue: Are federal treaties and agreements, as instruments of national foreign policy, supreme

over contravening state policies? Rule: (Douglas, J.) All international compacts and agreements have the same dignity and legislative supremacy as treaties and therefore must be honored by the states.