Self Deception about emotion Summary report by Lanny Hackney

Self Deception about Emotion Lisa Damm

This journal issue discusses the concept of self deception related to emotion. The author Lisa Damm argues that there are two variants of self deception about emotion. In the discussion she outlines distinctions between the cognitively motivated self deception and phenomenon motivated self deception. Where the role of perception is placed in high importance in regards to emotion in self deception. It provides an explanation of what it means to be self deceived in regard to experiencing emotion. This discussion is broken down into categorical sections within the journal entry. Contemporary Philosophical approaches to self deception. Damm illustrates that the intentionalists argue that self deception is analogous to interpersonal deception whereby the deceiver intentionally tries to deceive the listener. Although in self deception she says that there must be some psychological appeal that partitions part of the brain that carries out the deception process. This temporal partitioning occurs over time, where the person does not believe the narrative being told but, self deceives themselves that the narrative is true losing their belief that it isnt true in the process. Motivationists, do not accept the claims by the intentionalist that there is an intent formed to deceive, but rather argue that a desire or emotion plays a role in the formation of the false belief. The motivationalists hypothesis is that a persons tendency to want something to be true exerts a biased influence on what they believe. The example given is that of a mother not wanting to believe the fact that her child is using a hard drug, and convinces herself that the child is drug free through a strong desire for it to not be true. Contemporary approaches to emotion. In this section Damm discusses that cognitivists view of emotion as propositional attitudes. Naming proponents such as, Robert Solomon (2006), Martha Nussbaum (2001), and Jerome Neu (2000). Modern psychologists and philosophers attack the cognitivist view on the basis of the bodily components of emotion. Solomon (2006) relaxes his stance as a result of some of the attacks. Damm (2011).

Alternatively, the more modern non-cognitivistic views are more recent. The noncognitvists do not deny that there is a cognitive component to emotion, but assert that other important aspects of emotion are to be acknowledged as well. Emotional components such as those of behavioral, motivational, bodily, and phenomenal nature. The amount of non-cognitivists are vast and include Ronald Sousas perceptual account (1987), Jesse Prinzs account, and works by Paul Eckman, Friesen, Ellsworth et al (1972). Damm continues to say that the argument between these 2 views isnt settled by emotion self deception alone, but to take hold of these 2 views we look at, (1)how emotions are typically made up of several components including a cognitive and bodily component, and (2) the phenomenal content of emotional experiences are derived from our perceptions of the content of these cognitive and bodily components. Non-cognitivist views have two significant differences than the cognitivist about self deception. Firstly, non cognitivist claim that emotions are not identified solely by the cognitive component and cannot be reduced to just the cognitive component. That the emotions involve multiple components where only one is cognitive. Therefore, the identification of an emotion will involve multiple components. Next, they say that there is a phenomenon logical aspect to emotions in which we become aware of emotion by top-up processes. But, we are able to influence the formation of the emotional experience by top-down processes. Consequentially, not all non-cognitivist agree with the phenomenological aspect of emotion. Self Deception and Emotion. Damm clarifies what it means to be self deceived by differentiating that a persons unique own experience of feeling the emotion or the phenomena of it they cannot be wrong about. Albeit, more broadly they can be self deceived with regard to belief that the emotional experience best represents his evaluative response to an event. Where evaluative response is a self referencing evaluation of the situation that results in a belief, a belief that responds to cognitive and affective components of the reaction. Damms distinction is that the evaluative response cannot be pinned down to a specific moment in time, but captures the whole event over time. Whereas, the phenomon of ones emotional experience correlates to a particular moment in time and can and will change from moment to moment. Two forms of self deception where the persons belief that their emotion being experienced best captures their evaluative response to the event. The person can be self deceived in believing that his emotion experience best captures his response to the event when it does not, or vice versa. Acknowledging that, not all cases of mismatch are considered self deception, the person might be mistaken but not cognitively motivated to engage in self deception. This clash the person is deceived by her evaluative accuracy of the belief. Because of the mistake regarding belief Damm refers to this as cognitively motivated self deception about emotion. The example of a person who experiences anger and does not want to be angry is given , so therefore convinces themselves they are not angry. When in actuality, they are still angry, just self deceiving them self of their own cognitive motivations by Damms approach.

Cognitively motivated self deception about emotion. Damm elaborates that, Gendler constructs an account of self deception as pretense that provides a more appealing explanation of cognitively motivated deception. Pretense considered interchangeable with imagination, fantasize, or make believe the capacity to engage in offline processing of situations, situations that dont correspond to actual state of affairs. Gendlers account states that a person is motivated by wish fulfillment to engage in self deception. An individual feels an emotion but then is self deceived into believing this emotion is not an accurate evaluative response. The example given, of a man not being mad at his boss for not promoting him, when in fact did contractually offer him opportunity to obtain a promotion. The man hates interpersonal conflict and is therefore motivated to self deceive himself of not being mad at the boss. Although, Gendler acknowledges multiple times throughout his account that if one is pushed, will express the emotion being deceived. So, if a co worker were to start conversation about how bad the boss is the man would exert his actual felt emotion. The emotion actually believed to be the accurate evaluative response will ultimately emerge if pressured out of the individual, thereby also acknowledging the self deception. This notion of pretense is employed to explain how a person can seemingly, simultaneously hold 2 contradicting beliefs. Damm points out that Gendlers account does not allow for the phenomenological motivated variant of self deception unlike it does for the cognitively motivated. Phenomenological motivated deception about emotion. Damm discusses the plausibility of desires being sufficiently strong motivators to feel E an emotion that this motivates an act of self deception to be carried out so well that the person actually feels E this emotion and is able to avoid feeling the belief that they dont feel it. Dana Nelkin (2002) presents an account of necessary conditions of self deception be that a person have a desire to believe that P (some proposition) is true and to treat the evidence available in a biased way. Nelkin presents this in four conditions. 1. P is false. 2. S has the desire to believe that P is true, and the desire causes S to treat evidence in a biased way. 3. Ss biased way results in the persons belief that P is true. 4. Data possessed by S at time provides greater warrant for not believing P than for P. If it does not, then it explains selective data gathering by S. Conclusions

Damm concludes that self deception is a psychological phenomenon than manifests in many ways, and each way requires different explanation. Distinguished between two different senses in which a person can be self deceived about their beliefs as related to emotional experiences. Cognitively motivated self deception about emotion people are self deceived about their beliefs as related to emotional experiences that they engage in pretense or make believe. In phenomenological motivated self deception about emotion, people are self deceived about whether or not their experiences are best capturing their evaluative responses to the events. Phenomenon motivated treat evidence in such a way to foster an emotion experience consistent with their desires. The role of perception in emotion self deception. One primary reason for being able to self deceive is the role perception plays Damm continues. She elaborates on framing effects occurring when different descriptions of possible solutions to a problem result in different solution choices by subjects. Framing effects are of interest she says because they seem to violate the principle of description invariance a purported normative standard of rationality. In the example of Asian disease epidemic outbreak in the US which was to kill a number of people. Two plans were devised both making sacrifices both with different probabilities of death and saves. The same information was presented to 2 groups each time same information but different explanations. Program A will save 200 people and program B there is a 1/3 probability that 600 will be saved and 2/3 probability no people be saved to the next group Program C 400 people will die and program d 1/3 probability that nobody will die and 2/3 probability that 600 will die. Subjects were prone to choose the risk aversion options in first example although in the C an D options they took the risk taking options. How they were described effected the chosen solution to the problem.