Oligarchy and Power Structure in Urban Colombia: The Case of Cali Author(s): David W.

Dent Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (May, 1974), pp. 113-133 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/156651 . Accessed: 23/05/2011 17:27
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1. Lat. Amer. Stud. 6, I, 113-I33

Printed in Great Britain

II3

Oligarchy and Power Structure in Urban Colombia: the Case of Cali*

by DAVID W. DENT

i. Introduction Colombia has long been described as dominated by an oligarchy or elite that tightly controls the principal means of political influence and the avenues of social mobility. For example, in his recent study of Colombian political development, Robert Dix observes that '... the posts of leadership, the key decisions, and the principal social, economic, cultural and political resources of the society remain in elite hands'.' Harry Kantor argues even more intensely that while Colombia has greatly changed since World War II, the ' traditional oligarchy clings to its power, illiteracy remains a major problem, transportationis still poor, and the eastern two-thirds of the nation's territory remains undeveloped '.2 At the same time, the resolution of these development problems, an unavoidable responsibility of contemporaryColombian governments, has illuminated rather than obscured observation of elite dominance over Colombian society. As Dix and others have discovered, the Colombian elite has consciously sought to preserveits prerogativesby stimulating national economic growth while avoiding the payment of most of the social and
* The data for this article stems from a project supported by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Division de Economia y Ciencias Sociales, Universidad del Valle, Call, Colombia, but was not gathered firsthand by this author. The author is deeply indebted to L. Vincent Padgett who originally gathered the data while he was Special Staff Assistant with the Rockefeller Foundation in Cali in I965-6 and has, through his generosity, allowed great freedom in its utilization and interpretation. In addition, a great deal of credit must go to Dean Reinaldo Scarpetta, Dr Guy Hayes and Dr James M. Daniel for developing the proper researchclimate. Finally, I would like to thank Gary W. Wynia, Stuart Wagner and Steven Thomas Seitz for criticalcomments on earlierdrafts. 1 Robert A. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven, Yale Universiry Press, x967), p. 7. 2 Harry Kantor, Patterns of Politics and Political Systems in Latin America (Chicago, Rand McNally & Company, I969), pp. 423-4 (emphasis added). See also Vernon L. Fluharty, Dance of the Millions (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957) for some familiar statementsabout Colombia's oligarchy.
L.A.S.-8

II4

David

W. Dent

political costs that have been incurred in other countries during the course of development.3 The concept of oligarchy is confusing because it refers both to individuals with certain personality characteristics and to a structuralarrangementwhereby decisions are made and power exercised. In Colombia, for example, rosca (ruling clique) is a derogatory term used to designate the oligarchy both regionally and nationally. The term also frequently refers to demagogic behavior of public sector elites whose power base rests on economic resources and the ability to mobilize support either through paternalisticor charismatic appeals, or both. Latin Americanists, on the other hand, while attempting to avoid this pejorative connotation, have frequently used the term oligarchy to describe the Colombian leadership structure and 'explain' its behaviour with little supporting evidence. As a result, the crucial problem with the concept is that it has gained uncritical acceptance by many as the dominant type of power arrangement without an empirical examination of the actual distribution of power in Colombian society, either at the regional or national level.4 James Payne has drawn attention to this shortcoming and has correctly warned that' it will not be appropriateto say " there is " or " there is not " an oligarchy until the investigatorhas establishedsome, ratherarbitrary,dividing line on this or that index of measurement'.5 The chief concern of this paper is with this measurement problem at the regional level in Colombia. One way of applying Payne's suggestion is to focus the examination of the oligarchy concept on the regional or local level. The accessibilityand manageability of such an arena offers an opportunity for examining leadership patterns empirically at an important level of Colombian political and social organization. In addition, generalizations developed at this level may provide hypotheses that can be tested comparativelythrough the examination of other regions or at the nation-statelevel. This paper examines the concept of 'oligarchy' and its applicability to the power structure of Cali, Colombia. The concept of oligarchy will be defined as a small group with essentially three attributes6: (i) considerable power within particularsocial sectorsor domains 7; (2) a high degree of inter-sectoral contact (public-private)and the potential for dominance over outside groups
3 Dix, op. cit., p. 7. ' See Delbert C. Miller, International Community Power Structures (Bloomingron, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1970), p. I79, for a caustic warning in this regard for investigations of power structuresin Latin America. 5 James L. Payne, 'The Oligarchy Muddle ', World Politics, xx (April I968), pp. 441-2. 6 The components utilized here are drawn mainly from Payne, loc. cit., with some slight additions. 7 Domain refers to ' the personswhose policies are affected ', i.e. in the arenas that individuals or organizations are being affected. See Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power

Oligarchy and Power Structure in Urban Colombia 115

on most issues; and (3) the exclusion of lower echelon elites from the top political, economic and social positions that it occupies. By testing these attributes against the actual power structurein Call we can thus begin to assess the degree of' oligarchic' control in that community.
2.

The Setting : Cali, Colombia

Cali is located in the southwestern portion of Colombia in the southern portion of the Cauca Valley. Its geographical relationship to the other major urban centers, Bogota (the national capital) and Medellin, the capital of the prosperousdepartment of Antioquia, closely resemblesan equilateral triangle. Each city is separated from the other by a distance of approximately 250 air miles. Colombia's pronounced geographical regionalism has long remained a deterrent to communication and sustained economic growth. It has only been within the last thirty years that regional barriersseparating these three regions have been overcome through modern methods of transportation and communication. Despite the increase in regional interdependence,local autonomy 'continues to have important implications for the country's political development, particularly in the geographic dispersion of the centers of economic,
social, and political power .8

As the capital of the department of Valle del Cauca (or simply Valle), Cali
has grown from a small provincial village with a population of 30,000 in I912 to one of approximately 920,000 in I97I.9 Its urban growth rate is one of the

highest in Latin America, averaging almost 8.5 per cent per year during the I96os.10 The severe strains from urbanization have put pressures on both public and private sector leaders in Cali to provide more and more services for the growing population in the Cauca Valley region. One recent study found that although some differentiationof economic and political roles has occurred as a result of rapid urbanization, the overall leadership structure still appears highly cohesive."
3. Methods

There are several methods of defining community influentials and power structures that are relevant to an empirical examination of the oligarchy conand Society : A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven, Yale University Press, I950), pp. 78-80 and 252-4, for a discussionof the concept ' arena '. Dix, op. cit., p. 23.

10 Asociaci6n Nacional de Industriales (ANDI), Cali and the Cauca Valley (Cali, Colombia, Biblioteca ANDI, n.d.), p. 8. 11 John Walton, 'Development Decision-Making: A Comparative Study of Latin America', Americanlournal of Sociology, 75 (March1970), p. 849.

9 Colombia Today, vol. vII, no. 5 (New York, I972), n.p.

ii6 David W. Dent cept. This study approachesthe measurement problem in two ways. The first is based on the definition of influence in terms of directorshippositions held by individuals in public and private sector organizations in the community. The second is based upon reputation in accord with nominations by the 65 positional leaders who were interviewed in Cali in I966.12This group of 65 positional leaders were chosen so as to include a manageable and representative cross-sectionof public and private sector elites in Cali. Furthermore, the research design hoped to capture individuals normally considered influential both economically and politically in the Cauca Valley region. The total elite group was stratified in order to ascertain whether or not differences in mobility patterns and attitudes differ and how these characteristics might help us to make more meaningful statements concerning the validity of the oligarchy concept in the Cauca Valley.13Moreover, because of the high degree of overlap between certain power domains, it appears to be analytically useful to speak of elites as stratified vertically across domains rather than within single domains. In order to stratify the total elite group (N =65), it was necessaryto divide those mentioned as political, economic and general 'influentials ' into non-overlapping categories since many were perceived as being influential in more than one power domain. A preliminary analysis of the data revealed a certain group who continually repeated among the three top influentials (political, economic and general) while others continually remained on the lower echelons. Naturally there were some who never reached the top although they never 'fell' to the lowest strata. The following steps were utilized to subdivide the 65 elites analytically. First, each of the three influential categories of power domains was rankordered according to the number of votes individuals received from the 65 positional elites who were interviewed. Second, those who received i or more votes in either of the three influential domains were designated as 'Primary Elites'. This resulted in a total of 15 Primary Elite respondents out of a total of 3I mentioned. Third, those who received between three and io votes in any of the three influential domains were designated as 'Middle Elites '. This resulted in a total of 19 Middle Elite respondents who were interviewed out of a total of 46 mentioned. Fourth, those who received only two votes or less in the above three categories were designated as 'Sub-Elites'. This resulted in a total of 3I Sub-Elites who were interviewed out of a total of 183 mentioned, and completed the three-part breakdown for the different elite strata.
12

The data was collected under the directorship of L. Vincent Padgert in collaboration with Harold Rizo Otero and JorgeErnesto Holguin. 13 See Morris Janowitz, ' Social Stratificationand the Comparative Analysis of Elites ', Social Forces, xxxv (Jan. I956), for other important reasons for stratifying elite groups.

Oligarchyand Power Structurein Urban Colombia 117 The elite stratificationarrangement was as follows: Primary Total votes by respondents Interviewees 31 15 Middle 46
I9

Sub 183 31

Total 260 65

In order to measure change within the elite stratificationarrangement and to infer more general aspects of social mobility, the interviewees were asked to rate their own opportunities (more, equal, less) for achieving success in Colombian society in comparison with their fathers. A follow-up question required the respondents to specify the factors responsible for differences in opportunities. 4. Power Domains and the OccupationalStructure of Leadership Political Influentials: Because of the culturally conditioned perceptions of Colombians as to what constitutes different sectors of the society and activities pertaining to those sectors, it is important to elucidate why individuals with different occupational backgrounds may be connected with several or divergent power domains. A political influential, for example, may be considered economically influential because of his involvement in such diverse projects as the formation of a charter for a publicly owned enterprise, a merger of large industrial plants, the procurement of licenses to import equipment and other possibilitiesin the economic domain. Part of this relationshipbetween political and economic influence is explained by the high number of lawyers in Colombia who are politicians and apply their legal skill to formal and informal types of activities which Colombians define as economic. In order to ascertain the most influential in the political domain, the interviewees were asked the following question: 'In your opinion, who are the persons who have the greatest capacity to move the political force of the department?' Those who received three or more votes were designated as political influentials. Table i shows the relative position of the top political influentials and their primary and secondary occupation.14The politically
14

The rationale for designating primary and secondary occupations of the elites studied stems from the fact that many of the elites who were interviewed often did not utilize the professional training which they mentioned under the category 'occupation or profession' in the questionnaire. In order to remedy the situation and to clarify the actual role of the respondent occupationally, the occupations were coded with the use of career patterns, profession and major activities in which the interviewees said they participated. The nine general categories of primary occupations consisted of businessman (divided into five sub-types), politician, professional, labor leader and priest. The five sub-types of ' businessman' were categorized into industrialist, manager of a major enterprise, financier/ banker and those businessmen involved in communications and commerce. The only basic difference between a manager of a major enterprise and an industrialist is the size of the

ii8 David W. Dent influential in Cali represent a variety of primary and secondary occupations despite the dominance of politicos (politicians). The degree of political influence in Cali is not necessarily tied to formal political roles and activity commonly recognized as political. For example, in Table I the top political influential is the head of one of the largest business enterprises in Colombia as well as the owner of the largest sugar processing plant in the Cauca Valley. His interest in land-owning pursuits also necessitates a concern with regional planning as it affects land use. His political influence is also derived from the publication of newspapers in the Cauca Valley. Moreover, any plans for expansion of infrastructure- roads, power plants and the like - clearly concern him. However, wealth per se is no guarantee of a high political office in Colombia, since some of the most politically important with an extensive economic base could not aspire to high elective office though they could obtain national cabinet posts. This is pointed up by the many Antioquefios who have migrated to Cali for business purposes and become quite rich, but have limited influence in Cali's power structure. Economic Influentials: In Colombia's private sector an industrialist may often be regarded as prominent in the political domain because his wealth, local birth, family name, education and other resources such as personality characteristicsgive him access to individuals who occupy high governmental positions, and because he is known to utilize this access as a major resource to affect governmental policy. Normally, however, industrialists tend to avoid local and departmental political offices, although they may accept a national level cabinet post for prestige reasons and because of pressure from specific interest groups. Although only seven (19 per cent) big businessmen were among the top
business operation and the distinction is mainly Colombian. The ' professional' category was used to designate lawyers, doctors, economists, educators and engineers. A 'labor leader' (dirigente sindical) refers either to an elected officer or a member of the board of directors (junta directiva) of a trade union whether national or local. A ' politician ' refers to anyone who has recently been or is an elected or appointed official of the national, departmentalor local government. It is interesting to note that no respondentreferred to himself directly as a politician. The seven general categories for secondary occupation did not mirror the primary occupations since some of the primary occupations would not have ' fit' into the secondary occupational categories. The agriculturalist/cattleman (agricultor/ganadero) refers to an occupation concerned with the ownership of large portions of land. The ' public administrator' is often a political appointee at the local level who lhas little, if any, influence or prestige. The ' consultant/director' refers to a secondary occupation in whiich an individual sits on as many boards of directorsas possible for the express purpose of enhancing his ability to relay information to others concerning investments, the letting of contracts, legislation and the opportunities for ' deals '. Colombians refer to these individuals as pregoneros (divulgers).

Oligarchyand Power Structurein Urban Colombia 119

TABLE I

of Primaryand SecondaryOccupations the Top Thirty-Two 'Political' Influentials Primary Secondary No. Votes t Occupation Occupation I Industrialist Politician 44 2 *Politician Professional 41 *Politician 32 3 Agriculturalist/Cattleman Politician 4 30 *Politician 28 Professional 5 6 20 Politician Financier/Banker Politician 16 7 8 Politician 5 *Politician 9 14 10 *Industrialist II Consultant/Director II Politician 10 Professional I2 *Politician 8 Professional Politician I3 7 6 14 *Enterprise Mgr. Consultant/Director Professional Politician 6 15 i6 Politician 5 Politician 17 *Enterprise Mgr. 5 I8 *Financier/Banker Consultant/Director 4 Politician 19 4
20 21 22 23 Politician *Professional Politician Politician Politician 4 4 4 4

24
25 26 27 28
29

Politician
Politician *Labor Leader *Politician *Archbishop of Cal Politician

Professional

3
3 3 3 3

Professional

30 31
32

*Industrialist Professional
Politician

Consultant/Director Consultant/Director

3 3 3
3

t In naming the most influential individuals, a few respondents gave only a particular status position (for example, ' the Governor' or ' the Archbishop of Cali ') without referring directly to the individual in office. However, in the coding operation these formal positions wcre filled with the particularindividual who held the position at that time. Interviewces

32 political influentials as presented in Table I, the data indicate that big businessmen may be important politically even though they do not possess a formal political position in the governmental arrangement. In order to measure the relative position of those in the economic domain of influence,

I20

David W. Dent

the respondents were asked the following question: 'In your opinion, who are the most important persons in the economic sector of the department? ' Those who received four or more votes were designated as economic influentials. Table 2 shows the relative position of the top economic influentials and their primary and secondaryoccupations. The top economic influentials show a much greater homogeneity of occupations than the top political influentials. Those classified as industrialist and manager of a major enterprise occupy 25 (80 per cent) of the top 31 influential positions followed by 5 (I6 per cent) in
TABLE 2

of Primaryand SecondaryOccupations the Top Thirty-One'Economic'

Influentials No.
1
2

3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I0

II
12

'3 '4 15
I6

I7 18 I9
20 21 22

23 24
25

26

27 28
29

30 31
* Interviewees

Primary Occupations *Industrialist Industrialist *Industrialist *Enterprise Mgr. Financier/Banker *Enterprise Mgr. Industrialist *Industrialist *Professional Enterprise Mgr. Enterprise Mgr. Financier/Banker Enterprise Mgr. Industrialist Enterprise Mgr. Enterprise Mgr. Enterprise Mgr. Enterprise Mgr. *Financier/Banker Professional Enterprise Mgr. *Industrialist Enterprise Mgr. Financier/Banker *Professional Professional Professional Politician *Financier/Banker *Enterprise Mgr. *Financier/Banker

Secondary
Occupation Votes

Consultant/Director Politician Consultant/Director Consultant/Director Consultant/Director Consultant/Director Consultant/Director

Consultant/Director

53
50 30
26 25
22 21

i6
12 12 12 II

Consultant/Director
Consultant/Director Consultant/Director

Politician Agriculturalist/Cattleman Consultant/Director Professional Consultant/Director Agriculturalist/Cattleman Agriculturalist/Cattleman Consultant/Director Consultant/Director Consultant/Director
Consultant/Director

9 9
8 8 7

6 6 5
5 5 5 5 5 4 4
4

Consultant/Director Consultant/Director Politician Businessman (Medium) Public Administrator Consultant/Director Consultant/Director Consultant/Director

4
4

Oligarchy and Power Structure in Urban Colombia I2I

the professional category and i politician. Furthermore, the relative positions of the top economic influentials give a clear perspective on the relative status position of the various business occupations in Valle del Cauca. By and large, the industrialists are the most influential, followed by enterprise managers and financiers/bankers. The small businessman who deals only in wholesale and retail sales apparently exercises little influence alone, although he may be important as a member of an associational interest group such as ACOPI (Association of Small Manufacturers). When the secondary occupations of the top 31 economic influentials are examined, it is clear that there is a predominance of consultants/directors (70 per cent) among the top group. The frequency with which the economic influentials fall within the consultant/director category would appear to suggest a great amount of interaction among the higher strata of economic influence. The consultant/director warrants special consideration because of the important role he plays in intra-elite communication. Although the consultant/director is not unique to Colombia or the Cauca Valley, he takes on a special role in a society such as Colombia's where the means of interest articulation and aggregation are rudimentaryand informal. One principal aspect of his role is to communicate demands among various entrepreneurswho sit on several boards of directors, and thus exercise considerable influence in the formation of consensus among private sector elite groups. In Cali, the top economic influentials and the top political influentials appear to consist of two almost wholly discrete sets of individuals. Only eight of the same elites appeared on both lists of influentials. A similar finding was reported by Robert O. Schulze in a study of a rapidly growing suburb in the United States. Schulze generalized for the United States that 'as the community becomes increasingly involved and interrelated in the large societal complex, however, its power structurebifurcates, resulting in two crucial and relatively discrete power sets, the economic dominants and the public leaders.' " This generalization has some validity for Cali although the emergence of Cali's bifurcated power structure may be more related to general public-privatesector relations than to structural differentiation. One of the Sub-Elites felt that 'it is difficult to find people who really exercise a general influence principally because of the scant communications between the economic and political sectors'. This statement seems to be supported by the difference in composition of economic and political elite groups which has just been noted. Such a bifurcation in the power structurehelps to explain the feeling of 'immobilism ' between public and private sectorswhich many elites
15 Robert 0. Schulze, ' The Bifurcationof Power in a Satellite City ', in Morris Janowitz (ed.), Community Political Systems (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, I96I), p. 22.

122

David W. Dent

conveyed in informal asides during the interviews or in conversationsafter the interviews were formally concluded. This feeling of ' immobilism ' expressed by many elites in Call refers to the notion that certain groups or even individuals will oppose or veto major decisions or programs that often require cooperation between the public and private sectors; if they are simply individualistic types of short-range decisions, however, immobilism is not such a problem. The immobilistic nature of Cali's power structure has also been noted by John Walton who points out that 'in Call power was more equally distributed among public and private organizations; each could and did withhold support from each other and, thus, guaranteed inaction '.16 It could also be argued that the bifurcation in power-influence along economic-political lines simply indicates that the private sector elites are bypassing the public sector in guaranteeing to themselves the perquisites of economic growth while using their independent power position to block public sector development efforts. Since the private sector elites have their own power bases from which to secure those things which they desire, such as favorable tax breaks, contracts and the like, the public sector at the local level is only burdensome to them or at best unnecessaryto their business activities. In any event, this is one area of local public-private sector relations which deserves further investigation. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the reputational technique could adequately capture this type of schism where the economic elite by-pass the political system in securing their needs vis-a-vis economic progress. General Influentials: A general category was included in the research design in order to measure influence without referring to any particularpower domain. The concern was to identify individuals of such stature that their influence was not bounded by any specific category of activity. In order to probe this variable, respondents were asked the following question: 'In your opinion, who are the persons who have the greatest influence in the department (Valle) ? Those who received four or more votes were designated ' top general influentials ' which resulted in a total of 29 top general influentials. Table 3 shows the relative positions of these 29 general influentials and their primary and secondaryoccupations. In contrastto the political and economic domains of influence, the' general ' dimension reveals more heterogeneity of primary occupations in the structure of general influence. The top 29 general influentials consisted of 13 (45 per cent) large businessmen, eight (27 per cent) politicians, four (15 per cent) professionals, three (io per cent) labor leaders, and the Archbishop of Cali. The
16 Walton. op cit., p. 848.

Oligarchy and Power Structure in Urban Colombia 123

TABLE

Primary and Secondary Occupations of the Top Twenty-Nine ' General' Influentials
No.
I 2

3 4 5 6

7
8 9
I0

11 II
12

I3 14
15 I6 17

I8 19
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

28
29

Primary Occupation *Industrialist *Archbishop of Cali Industrialist *Enterprise Mgr. *Politician *Politician *Politician Professional Financier/Banker *Labor Leader *Politician *Industrialist *Politician Politician Financier/Banker *Enterprise Mgr. Newspaper Editor *Professional *Financier/Banker *Professional *Politician *Industrialist *Labor Leader *Enterprise Mgr. *Professional Industrialist Labor Leader *Politician *Financier/Banker

Secondary Occupation Consultant/Director Politician Consultant/Director Agriculturalist/Cattleman Professional Professional Consultant/Director Politician Businessman (Small) Consultant/Director Professional Consultant/Director Politician Politician Politician Consultant/Director Consultant/Director Consultant/Director Consultant/Director Professional Politician Consultant/Director Public Administrator Consultant/Director

Votes

45
38 36

33
32 25
23 23 22

'7

I4

'4 '3
I3
II II

8 8 7 7 6 6 6 5 5 5 4 4

* Interviewees

presence of the three labor leaders who fill numbers Io, 23 and 27 points up the emergence of new functional interests in the structureof overall influence. This and other elements of heterogeneity in the general domain of influence suggests not only that the overall influence structure may be fragmented in both interests and outlook, but also is indicative of certain dimensions of social change that has been occurring in the Cauca Valley region. The traditional aspects of the society are pointed up by the high position of the Archbishop of Cali in the elite stratificationarrangement.His number two position closely resembles the findings of a community power structure study

124 David W. Dent

in San Crist6bal, Venezuela.l7 In that study the reputational approach positioned the Archbishop in the number three spot behind two politicians. The high position of the Archbishop of Cali reflects the importance of the Catholic Church as an institution which enjoys a relatively autonomous base of influence throughout Colombia in that the church represents a force in its own right equivalent to (even greater in some areas than) that of the state. The Archbishop of Call enjoys the traditional perquisites that are connected with his office, as well as the influence which stems from being extremely active in community affairs and social welfare programs. In referring to Cali, Cole Blasier has pointed out that the Church is influentialnot so much becauseof overt political activities . . but becauseit is one organizationwhich reachesdeeply into all sectorsof society in the Valle. Politicians and businessmen,to take two examples, hesitate to take positions,not, perhaps,becauseof specificsanctionsimposed openly anti-clerical by the clergy itself, but becauseof a varietyof social and other penaltiesimposed for failureto conform.18 The secondary occupations of the top 29 general influentials also showed a great deal of heterogeneity. None of the secondary professions or occupations really dominated the list of 29, although the consultant/director role was slightly predominant with 11 (39 per cent) followed by seven (24 per cent) politicians, four (15 per cent) professionals,three (Io per cent) labor leaders, an agriculturalist/cattleman,a public administratorand a small businessman. There is an obvious overlap in domains since all but two of the top 29 among those considered as having cross-sectoralor general influence also appeared among the top (approximately 30) names on the lists for the political and economic sectors. However, if one looks at the top io slots as determined by rank order, there are only three influentials who are situated in all three domains. The political-economic overlap seems slight by comparison since only eight influentials appeared in both Tables I and 2. In order to compare the overlap among the approximately30 top influentials in the three domains, a Spearman rank order correlation was computed. A rather low correlation ( + 28) appeared between the 'general' and political domains while a much higher correlation (+ .65) appeared between the general and economic domains. The high correlationbetween the economic and general influentials seems to indicate that regional power in Cali is more economic than political. This differs, however, from what Gary Hoskin found in his study in San Crist6bal, Venezuela: ' Politicos, whose power base rests primarily with their
17 18

Gary W. Hoskin, ' CommunityPower and Political Modernization: A Study of a Venezuelan City' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, Urbana, i967), p. 385. Cole Blasier, ' Power and Social Change in Colombia: The Cauca Valley ', Journal of InterAmericanStudies, viii (July 1966), p. 406.

Oligarchyand Power Structurein Urban Colombia I25 political party activities, appearto command more political power than leaders associatedwith other sectorsof community leadership, as reflectedby a higher proportionof politicians at the top level of power.' 19One of the Primary Elites remarked during the interview that' there is no clear political leadershipin the Cauca Valley, especially in the Liberal camp'. In sum, it appears that in the Cauca Valley the most influence and prestige are located in those occupations which are oriented toward the accumulation of capital and profit and do not center in and around government and political parties; elites whose major activities are considered ' political' are just not as influential as those whose primary activities rest within other domains or who may combine business and political interests. At this point it may be reasonableto explain the fragmentation of the overall power structurein terms of the greater power in the private sector and not on the basis of an equality of power between public and private sector elites as Walton found in his study of Cali. In other words, if there is little power in formal political positions at the local level, it really does not matter whether there is an overlap between the economic and political elites. In this sense, Cali's 'oligarchy ' can be understood best by the fact that the vast calculus of power rests with an economic or private sector elite to the exclusion of those in formally defined political roles. 5. Elite Stratificationand Mobility OccupationalMobility: Inter-generationalchanges in occupations can often indicate the type of modernization taking place within a particular region as well as explain the degree of fluidity within the society in terms of the accessibility of various elite occupations. With the rapid rate of economic growth in the Cauca Valley, it would seem logical to expect a corresponding change in occupational orientation among community elites. More important is the degree to which traditionally esteemed occupations are open to lower echelon elites. Inter-generational changes in occupations among the 65 respondents are indicated in Table 4. Although there appears to be a high amount of change in the occupational structure among one generation of elites, various types of elite recruitment indicate a ratherclosed elite when it comes to the Sub-Elite obtaining the more influential occupations. The occupations that the respondents mentioned for their fathers had to be taken at face value since there was no way of telling whether a father who was a lawyer, for example, really practiced law or perhaps participated in other activities. In any case, there appears to be
19 Hoskin, op cit., p. 424.

i26 David W. Dent

TABLE 4

Inter-Generational Mobility in Occupations among Cali's Elites

Father'sOccupation
{)

Son'sPrimary Occupation Professional Landowner Politician Industrialist Mgr. Major Enterprise Businessman (Other) LaborLeader Educator Totals NumberChanged Per cent Changed

'-4

~S .;v

0 X <=; l_<U~ V3~~~~~~~~~~~-m

U

I
2

I
I I

7 5
i

6
I 2 I
-

2
I I 2 2
-

-4

'7
I3

I9
I9

I -

IS

I
50

5
100

I
50

76 ioo

IO0 I00

little upward mobility in terms of occupations among the 65 elites.20 This finding corroborates Dix's argument concerning the closed nature of the Colombian elite.21More impressive, however, is the high degree of horizontal mobility among Cali's elites. This is particularlyevident in the change from agricultural pursuits to industrial and political activities. Although the role of ' politician' appears to be relatively open to those who aspire toward it, it is often closed to those who lack a law degree or who were not born locally. Sub-Elites are often able to acquire municipal or departmental legislative positions, but because of the unitary governmental arrangement, the formal political position at this level carrieslittle overall influence in the Cauca Valley.
20 For a contrary view, 21

see Miguel Urrutia, The Development

of the Colombian Labor Move-

ment (New Haven, Yale University Press, I969), p. 31. Dix's argument has been challenged recently in a study of political elites in various regions of Colombia by James L. Payne who has stated that ' recruitment to political office is relatively open in Colombia ' and that ' the son of a blue-collar worker, small farmer, or school teacher does have a meaningful (but not equal opportunity to reach top public offices '. See James L. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (New Haven, Yale University Press, I968), pp. 40-I. The major flaw in Payne's conclusion is that his data is based on departmental and municipal party directorate members who are not considered by most Colombians as an ' upper leadership group '. Clearly, the data presented in Table 4 questions Payne's conclusions while more closely supporting Dix's position with regard to the ' openness ' of the elite stratification arrangementin Colombia.

Oligarchy and Power Structure in Urban Colombia 127

In most cases, national appointive or elective posts are closed to those in the Sub-Elite category. In order to explore the notion of social mobility further, the interviewees were asked to rate their own chances of moving up the social ladder. They were also queried on the reasons attached to their particularanswer. The relative perception of opportunitiesto achieve success in Colombian society on the part of the three elite strata in Cali is presented in Table 5.
TABLE 5

The Relative Perception of Opportunities to achieve Success in Colombian ' Society among Three Elite Strata in Cali

(N= 4)
Primary Elite

(N = 8)
Middle Elite

(N = 30)
Sub-Elite

Opportunitiesare:
Better
Equal

N
Io
3

%
71
21

N
I7
-

%
95
-

N
23
4

%
77
I3

Less

5
more,
-

Io
less, or -

* The specific question was: 'Do you consider that you have -

equal opportunitiesas your father had to achieve successin society? '

The Middle Elites perceived their chances as being greater in more than nine out of ten cases while the Primary and Sub-Elites rated their chances as being greater in only seven out of ten cases. Perhaps some downward mobility is indicated by the Primary Elites who felt that their chances were only 'equal' to those of their fathers. The question which now must be raised is to which factors do Cali's elites contribute such differences in opportunities? Cali's elites attach different values to their chances for rising in the elite stratificationarrangement. The findings are presented in Table 6. Again, the Middle Elites seem more attached to factors connected with economic development and education than the other elite groups. However, more than two-thirds of all three strata felt that the most salient factors were the rapid development of the Colombian society and the availability of greater educational opportunities. Nevertheless, it is difficult to transfer these greater opportunities to the country as a whole because the Colombian educational system is still relatively closed to non-elites, particularlyat the university level. The rewards or benefits from Colombia's development have been spread among some of the population but not enough to prevent a high degree of popular supportfor the anti-establishmentcandidate, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, in the 1970 presidential campaign. Running a strong anti-' oligarchy' populiststyle campaign, Rojas Pinilla gained a majority of votes in Cali but lost the

I28 David W. Dent

TABLE

Diferences in Opportunities of Comparison the Perceptionof Inter-Generational for SocialMobilityamong ThreeElite Stratain Cali * (N= 3) (N=i9) (N = I5)
Social Mobility Attibutes Positive Attributes Primary Elite N % Middle Elite Sub-Elite

%
47 47 5
II II

Developmentof ColombianSocielty GreaterEducational Opportunities Family Success Family Name or PersonalMotivation

Negative Attributes (abolengo) Position (abolengo)

5 5
1

33t 33

9 9

I3

42
26

1
2 2

8 5
I

i6 3
I3

4
-

20 -

Lack of Family Name EconomicDifficulties Lack of Education

6
-

. . .

2 I ----i3

6 3

'To which factors do you attribute such difference of ' opportunities? t Becauseof multiple responses,percentagesdo not add up to o00.

* The specific question was:

presidential race by 53,000 votes to the Conservative Party candidate, Misael Pastrana.22 Overlapin Public and Private Sector Contact and/or Participation: To test the extent of participationand overlap among elites in the public and private sectors, respondents were asked to indicate whether they had contact or participation in several economic and political arenas. The results are presented in Table 7. The Primary Elites were clearly more active in both the public and private sectors. That is, the Primary Elites appearto have a broaderscope of influence than the other elite groups, especially in the public sector. In only five sectorsagriculture/cattle ranching, departmental and municipal government, hospitals and clinics, and entertainment - did the Middle Elites indicate lesser sector participation than the Sub-Elites. Thus, Table 7 seems to suggest the hypothesis that the greater the amount of influence, the broader the scope of activities. The most impressive difference between the various strata of elites
22

See Judith Talbot Campos and John F. McCamant, Cleavage Shift in Colombia: Analysis of the 1970 Elections (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1972), for a comprehensiveevaluation of the I970 presidentialelections.

Oligarchy and Power Structure in Urban Colombia I29 TABLE 7

Relationshipbetween Public and Private Sector Contact and/or Participation and ThreeElite Strata* (N= I5) r Type of Sector PrivateSector Agriculture/Cattle I2 Ranching and Manufacturing Commerce I3 and Transportation I:I Communications Bankingand Finance I:4 Education(Private) lI2 Professions (law, etc.) iro Hospitals and Clinics 7 Entertainment 8 (Bullfights) PublicSector [I NationalGovernment 3 Departmental I Government II Government l[I Municipal Decentralized Governmental I:5 Enterprises
'rimaryElite 4J 0/o

(N= i9)
Middle Elite O/ N

(N= 3)

Sub-Elite N %

80+

12

63

20

65

87
73

I2 I2

63 63

I8 I5 I3 5 II
9

58 48

93
8o 67 47

I5
IO o 6

798
53 53
32
20

58
42 48 35
29

53
73

4
7

37

Io

32

73
73

7
7

37
37 68

I8
19

58
6i

I00

13

21

69

had contact or participation ' ? t Percentagesare based upon each sector.

* The zed was: 'Of the following sectors, with which ones have you specific question utili;

is the lack of contact in the public sectorby the Middle Elites. Slightly less than two-thirds of the Middle Elites indicated no contact or participationwith the public sector at the municipal, departmental and national levels. This is perhaps best explained in terms of the occupational structure of the Middle Elites. Almost 60 per cent of the Middle Elites were classifiedas having a primary occupation in a category related to business and industry. What is also important in explaining the sector contact/participation of the Middle Elites is the fact that in their secondaryoccupations 53 per cent were classified as ' consultant/directors', whereas there were only 38 and 22 per cent respectively for the Primary and Sub-Elites. This would seem to indicate a high degree of personal intra-sectoralcommunication between the Middle Elites in the private sector. These fewer' linkages ' with the public sector on the part of the Sub-Elites and Middle Elites seems to suggest a separationor lack of conL.A.S.-9

I30 David W. Dent

fidence in the whole governmental arrangement at all three levels. This is rather important in Colombia because the ostensible goal of the Frente Nacional (National Front) was to lessen the bitter hatreds between Liberals and Conservativesby forcing them to share power and offices until I974. It did not, however, attempt to solve the lack of co-operationbetween the public and private sectors which is often more important than Liberal-Conservative cohesion for political stability. 6. Intra-Elite Communications The type of communication among local elites can be a crucial factor in the degree of cohesion and value consensus, and thus a measure of the extent to which the concept of oligarchy may be aplicable to local power structures. Often different elites tend to develop different strategies with regard to economic development and thus become divided over goals and priorities. This does not appear to be the case among elites in the Cauca Valley even though we have noticed some separation from the public sector among the predominately private sector Middle Elites. As structural differentiation increases among elite roles, communication becomes increasingly necessaryin order to facilitate change as well as for the elites to preserve themselves as effective influentials within their specific domains. Karl Deutsch argues that elites are often forced to reduce their scope of influence in order to remain effective. Communicationand attention overload tend to increasefurther this usual proon pensity to self-preoccupation the part of political leaders,interestgroups, and of particularly national states and governments,and they thus tend reduce their power to attain their goals or to preservethemselvesas effectivepoliticalactors.23 The patterns of interaction among elites may thus help to explain the role and power of various groups in the process of social change and development. Table 8 gives the primary and secondary occupations of those top elites (25) who were consulted with most frequently by the sixty-five elites interviewed. As Table 8 points out, I6 (6I per cent) of the top 25 elites possesseda primary occupation in some type of a business category, where as only six (23 per cent) politicians were among the top 25. Furthermore, the importance of the consultant/director role is pointed up by the fact that of the 25 secondary occupations 14 (54 per cent) were consultant/directors. Overall, Table 8 shows a break between the public and private sectors which would appear to imply that there is little communication across these two sectors in Cali. On the basis
23 Karl W. Deutsch, 'Toward a Theory of Power and Political Structures', in Hollis W.

Peter (ed.), ComparativeTheories of Social Change (Ann Arbor, Michigan, Foundation for Researchon Human Behavior, I965), pp. 65-6.

Oligarchy and Power Structure in Urban Colombia I3I

TABLE 8

Intra-Elite Communications Rank Order and Primary and Secondary Occupations among Elites in Cali * No.t
I
2

Primary Occupation

3
4 5

6 7 8 9

IO

II
12

13 14 15 16 17 18

I9
20 21 22 23

24

25

Businessman-Industrialist Mgr. Businessman-Enterprise Politician Politician Businessman-Communications Businessman-Financier/Banker Politician Professional Businessman-Industrialist Businessman-Industrialist Professional Politician Businessman-Industrialist Mgr. Businessman-Enterprise Businessman-Financier/Banker Mgr. Businessman-Enterprise Businessman-Financier/Banker Businessman-Enterprise Mgr. Politician Professional Businessman-Financier/Banker Businessman-Financier/Banker Politician Businessman-Enterprise Mgr. Businessman-Enterprise Mgr.

Occupation Secondary Consultant/Director Consultant/Director Professional Professional Politician Consultant/Director Consultant/Director Consultant/Director Politician Consultant/Director Politician Agriculturalist/Cattleman Consultant/Director Politician Consultant/Director Consultant/Director Consultant/Director Consultant/Director Professional Politician Consultant/Director Consultant/Director Consultant/Director Professional

Votes
24

I5
12 12 12 12 IO

9 9 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 5 5
5

5 5 5

* The specific question was: 'With whom do you consult in regard to activities which are

related to the various sectorsin which you participate?'

+ Only the top 25 elites were included in the rank order of those who were consulted with

most often.

of this fragmentation it is easy to see where conflicting goals and priorities would exist between the two sectors. In order to examine the scope of influence and the degree and kind of communication activity among Cali's elites, another table was constructed showing the particular strata which the top ten (as selected by the 65 interviewees) chose and the particular power domain in which those consulted were reputed to have influence. Table 9 attempts to summarize these relationships. Of particularimportance is the fact that each of the top ten was reputed to have influence in the general or overall domain while seven out of the ten

132

David

W. Dent TABLE 9

Choiceof Elite Strataand Domainsof Influenceamong thoseElites (io) Consultedwith the Most in Cali *
Votes Rank
24

Primary Occupation
Businessman-Industrialist Businessman-Enterprise Mgr. Politician Politician Businessman-Financier/Banker Politician

Domains of Influence of the Elite Strata Choice Top io Consulted Political Economic General Primary Middle Sub
X X X X X X X X X X X X
2

I
2

4
I

15
i2

12 12
10

3 3 3 4

4 I I 2 I

I I 2 I

I
-

I
-

9 8 8 8
II8

5 6 6 6

Professional Businessman-Industrialist Professional Politician

(Totals)

X X X
7

X X

X X X X
IO

4 3 6
2 -

7 3 3
23

2 2

26

The specific question was: 'With whom do you consult in regard to activities which are related to the various sectors (public and private) in which you participate?'

were reputed to have political influence, even though only three possessed a political role. The close-knit nature of the leadership structurein Cali is suggested by the fact that Middle Elites were consulted almost as many times as the Primary Elites. This finding indicates little in the way of a reduction in the scope of influence among Cali's elite in order to retain effective decision-making capabilities. Moreover, this finding simply conforms to the general expectations of a pyramidal model of communications in which those located at the apex tend to communicate the most with each other to the exclusion of outside groups. Despite the rather high degree of group interaction among the Primary and Middle Elites, the Sub-Elites remain by and large unconsulted as well as without reputed influence. 7. Conclusion The purpose of this study has been to uncover some empirical evidence of the validity of the oligarchy concept in one region of Colombia through an examination of the local power arrangement. Although the findings indicate that vertical mobility is severely limited to those in lesser elite positions, this does not mean that the elite as a whole is cohesive and united on issues and therefore capable of prevailing against demands from Sub-Elites. What is significant is that the power structure is basically immobilistic and fractionalized between sectors (public and private) despite the concentration of influence and the high degree of mostly personal intra-elite communication between the Primary and Middle Elites. The slight overlap that was found

Oligarchy and Power Structure in Urban Colombia 133

between the lists of influentials in the political and economic domains in the Cauca Valley and the high correlation between the economic and 'general' influentials suggests that there is little real power in the political sphere and, consequently, economic elites tend to dominate the policy-making process. The key idea is that leadership is weak in the political power domain in Cali. This is pointed up by the low correlation between the political and general influentials and the fact that centralgovernmental dominance (centralismo) stifles local initiative and, as a result, both executive and legislative powers are minimal. The politico per se has a weak position and is often nothing more than a petty bureaucratunless he has strong roots in the private sector. As a result, leadershipand control of the development processis usually outside formal governmental structureswhich possess the necessary sanctions to prevent immobilism. This not only builds apathy and indifference into the workings of the political system, but also seriously delegitimizes the whole governmental arrangement in the eyes of the populace. ' Although Cali's power' structure is dominated by the Primary and Middle Elites, it is not oligarchical in the sense of a united and fused elite which embodies public and private sector influentials. This lack of unity and cooperation between the public and private sectors places severe obstacles on development decision-making which frequently requires a collaborativeeffort to succeed. What does stand out in this study is something of an oligarchy of local industrialists and landowners who operate with the approval or consensus of national decision-makersin Bogota and, at times, with the blessings of the Catholic Church. Although Middle Elites were found to have relatively little contact with the public sector, the Primary Elites possessed a substantial amount of contact in both the public and private sectors. In summary, this paper has attempted to show the extent to which an oligarchy exists within the power structure of one large urban center in Colombia. The bifurcation of the leadership structure along public-private lines has resulted in frequent inaction and fractionalization among Cali's power contenders. Thus, we must qualify our concept of oligarchy to refer to the upper echelons of the private sector rather than a collusion along publicprivate lines in the case of Cali. If observersof the Colombian political situation are referring to Bogota and national politics and not Cali or other regional centers when they utilize the concept of oligarchy, then they should explicitly say so and offer evidence to support their assertions.From the evidence presented here, although certainly by no means conclusive, it is hoped that scholars in the Latin American area will examine their terms and evidence carefully before speaking of the ' existence' of an oligarchy for either national or regional power 'structures ' in Latin America.