ADMINISTRATIVE LAW MALAGA VS. PENACHOS Chartered Institution and GOCC, defined.

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of prequalification requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD 1818? HELD: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows: Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

The same Code describes a chartered institution thus: Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or name of BE Construction and Best Built Construction, operating under a special charter, and vested by law with respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at functions relating to specific constitutional policies or two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner objectives. This term includes the state universities and Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as Introductory Provisions). their documents were considered late. It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818. the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their nonThere are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the government instrumentality. First, it was created in pursuance resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a acceptance of their documents. They also asked that if the priority program of the government to effect the sociobidding had already been conducted, the defendants be economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the directed not to award the project pending resolution of their Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer complaint. of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and award the National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining upon request of the president of the state college, such order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of such employees as can be spared without serious detriment to P.D. 1818. They also contended that the preliminary injunction public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it had become moot and academic as it was served after the was also decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance bidding had been awarded and closed. of the state college would henceforth be included in the On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order General Appropriations Law. and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree as there are infrastructure project of the government falling within the irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified coverage of the subject law. the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito). 1

DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA FACTS: In 1981, BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129). HELD: The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in theexercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal

of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD FACTS: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal Revenue Code provided that: "SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processedvideo-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax." "Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission. The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a 2

tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues. Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year. The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power. (2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional. HELD: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the GG issued EO 53 which was published on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On 08 August 1919, he was charged in violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

HELD: Fist of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. The said Act, as to the judgment of the SC, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as take the place of all others without the determination of the unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing brought about by the availability of unclassified and must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are any prescribed fact or event. virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business." YNOT VS. IAC WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs. UNITED STATES VS. ANG TANG HO FACTS: On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An FACTS: Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order No 626-A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. 3

Thegovernment argued that Executive Order No. 626-A was issued in theexercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for farm work or breeding.

from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenanton Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right ISSUE: Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as Substantive Due Process. separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the HELD: The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police borders of each state". On the other hand, power, because it is not reasonably necessary for the purpose the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see how freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to prohibiting the transfer of carabaos from one province to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be another can prevent their indiscriminate killing. Retaining the restricted by laws protecting the national security, public carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. Prohibiting the transfer of carabeef, after the slaughter of the However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the carabaos, will not prevent the slaughter either. limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. FACTS: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue totravel, but it is a well considered view that the right to a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. law of the land. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in thePhilippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor national interest and welfare. President Aquino has the President impair their right to travel because no law has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the authorized her to do so. Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime. They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and Universal Declaration of Human Rights and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which petition is hereby DISMISSED. has been ratified by the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. CARIO VS. CHR

FACTS: On 17 Sept 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided to stage rallies in order for their grievances to be heard. As a result thereof, HELD: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved eight teachers were suspended from work for 90 days. The is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries issue was then investigated, and on 17 December or within the Philippines. These are what the right 1990, Secretary Carino ordered the dismissal from the service to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case involved in this case at bar is the rightto return to one's was appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the country, a distinct right under international law, independent meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing 4

the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Carino.

surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. Coverage for Laguna de Bay Region included several provinces, cities and towns around the Laguna Lake. ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide Under Sec. 3, the collection of fees for the use of the lake and determine certain specific cases such as the alleged human water and its tributaries were enforced by the Authority. Then, rights violation involving civil and political rights. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991 was enforced. Municipalities around the Laguna Lake Region HELD: The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only investigate all forms of human rights interpreted this law as delegating the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters. Municipal violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and governments started issuing fishing privileges and fishing should not try and decide on the merits and matters involved permits to big fishpen operators. These unregulated issuances therein. The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with of Mayors permits to construct fishpens were clear violations the trial. of the policies implemented by the Authority. To solve the problem, the Authority issues a notice to the general public LLDA VS. CA declaring as illegal all fishpens, fishcages and other aquaFACTS: Republic Act No. 4850 created the Laguna Lake culture structures in the Bay Region that were not registered Development Authority (Authority) a Government Agency with the Authority. The notice includes a threat of penalty of that works toward environmental protection and ecology, demolition and imprisonment and/or fine. After a month, the navigational safety, and sustainable development. This agency Authority sent notices to the concerned owners stating that is responsible for the development of the Laguna Lake area demolition shall be effected within 10 days. Affected fishpen and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns in view of the owners filed seven injunction cases against the Authority in national and regional plans. President Ferdinand E. Marcos various trial courts. Authority filed a motion to dismiss the then passed Presidential Decree No. 813 amending certain cases on jurisdictional grounds which was denied by the lower sections of R.A. No. 4850 as response to the deteriorating court. Temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary environmental condition of the Metropolitan Manila area and injunction was issued enjoining the Authority from demolishing the surrounding areas of the Laguna de Bay. Problems include the structures in question. Authority appealed the case to the the environmental impact of development of water quality, Court of Appeals but the Court dismissed the consolidated inflow of polluted water, increasing urbanization and floods in petitions of the Authority. CA established that LLDA is not a Metropolitan Manila. Sec. 1 of P.D. 813 established a policy of quasi-judicial agency of the government and it cannot exercise development with environmental management and control, quasi-judicial functions as far as fishpens are concerned. CA the among others for the Laguna Lake Development Authority. Local Government Code of 1991 repealed the provisions of the Special powers, pertinent to this case, were also granted under LLDA Charter thereby devolving the power to grant permits to Sec. 3. which include the exclusive jurisdiction of the Authority the local government units concerned. Authority appealed to to issue new permit for the use of the lake waters for any the Supreme Court with petitions for prohibition, certiorari and projects or activities in or affecting the said lake including injunction against the navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. The Authority also has the ISSUE: Whether or not the Laguna Lake Development Authority should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake insofar as the power to collect fees for these activities and projects which may be shared with other governmental agencies and political issuance of permits for fisheries privileges is concerned. sub-divisions. The Authority was further empowered by HELD: Yes. The LLDA should exercise jurisdiction over the Executive Order No. 927 which enlarged its functions and Laguna Lake insofar as the issuance of permits for fisheries is powers. Said Order also named and enumerated towns, cities concerned. Petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction and provinces encompassed by the term Laguna de Bay are hereby granted, insofar as they related to the authority of Region. The Chief Executive based this Order on an the LLDA to grant fishing privileges within the Laguna Lake assessment that the land and waters of the Laguna Lake Region. Restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued Region are limited natural resources requiring judicious against the LLDA are declared null and void and ordered set management. Under Sec. 2 of E.O. 927, the Authority shall aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are hereby 5

prohibited from issuing permits to construct and operate (4) Although the LLDA is not co-equal to the RTCs, LLDA is fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures within the still a quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases Laguna Lake Region. Previous issuances are null and void. The that can issue cease and desist order (Laguna Lake fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures put by Development Authority v. CA). operators by virtue of permits issued by Municipal Mayors Padilla, J. (Concurring Opinion): within the Laguna Lake Region are hereby declared illegal structures subject to demolition by the LLDA. I fully concur. But I just want to say guys that the LGUs can still impose on those who apply for permit with an additional local Ratio: permit or license for revenue purposes. This would harmonize (1) Provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA RA No. 4850 with RA No. 7160 (LGC 1991). No. 7160) do not repeal the laws creating the LLDA. Therefore, LLDA maintains its exclusive authority over RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE CORP. vs. NLRC issuances of permits. FACTS: In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. - The charter of the LLDA is a SPECIAL LAW while the Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Local Government Code of 1991 is a GENERAL LAW. A Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On basic rule of statutory construction is that the January 1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having been enactment of a later legislation which is a general law appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information, Office Behavior - When there is conflict between a general law and a and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year, without special law, the special law will prevail since it evinces change in his position-designation, he was transferred to the the legislative intent more clearly than the general Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450.00 a statute. month. In 1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting - A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance, until he was transferred to the by a subsequent law by mere implications. Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made an - In Manila Railroad Company v. Rafferty, this basic rule is inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 upheld with an exception when the subsequent general plus allowances and other benefits. law has a manifest intent to repeal or alter the special law. In this case, such intent is not proven in this case. On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness (2) Legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint mission of environmental protection, navigational with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a safety, and sustainable development for the Laguna Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Lake Region. Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor - The power of the local government units, exercised through fragmented management policies, is interested Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated in fishing privileges for REVENUE PURPOSES. In contrast, November 15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, the power of the Authority is aimed at effectively the instant petition. regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay Region for QUALITY CONTROL and MANAGEMENT. Thus, the Authority is in a better position to manage the ISSUE: Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing issuance of permits. petitioners appeal on a technicality. (3) Charter of the Authority prevails because it is a valid exercise of POLICE POWER of the State. HELD: Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides: 6

SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice thereof. SECTION 6. No extension of period. No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained. The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time. The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room for interpretation. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985]). Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal. Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot after all be demanded. WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. CRUZ vs. YOUNGBERG Contingent regulation

FACTS: This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.

The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid. The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the petitioner to file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent as cause of action HELD: Yes. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power. The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted. ARANETA VS. GATMAITAN FACTS: The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, between the provinces of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn the operation of trawls in the said area and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the same League of Mayors prayed that the President ban the operation of trawls 7

in the San Miguel Bay area. In response to the pleas, the President issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was amended by EO 66 apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing during the typhoon season only. Subsequently, EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22.

PEOPLE VS. MACEREN FACTS: On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz using a device or equipment to catch fish thru electric current which thereby destroy any aquatic animals within its current reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace. The municipal court quashed the complaint and the CFI affirmed such dismissal. Hence this petition.

Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction praying that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Fisheries be enjoined from enforcing said executive order and to declare the same null and void. The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation and held that the EOs 22 and 66 ISSUE: Whether or not the 1967 regulation, penalizing electro are invalid. fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not the President has authority to issue of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of EOs 22, 66 and 80. 2.) Whether or not the said EOs were valid Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the as it was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly Fisheries Commission is valid. delegated to the President HELD: No. The court held that the that the Secretary of HELD: 1.)YES. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law, Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries waters come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders and Natural Resources. However, as the Secretary of are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its functions Act No. 3512. subject to the general supervision and control of the President The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit of the Philippines, the President can exercise the same power electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, and authority through executive orders, regulations, decrees the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. Hence, EOs 22,66 and 80 restricting and banning of Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. authority of law. 2.) YES. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes, Congress intended with the Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a promulgation of the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied fish net or fishing devise like trawl nets that could endanger in the old Fisheries Law. Administrative regulations adopted and deplete our supply of seafood, and to that end authorized under legislative authority by a particular department must be the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for by regulations and such restrictions as he deemed necessary in the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When the By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be President, in response to the clamor of the people and extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to authorities of Camarines Sur issued EO 80 absolutely embrace matters not covered by the statute. prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious BAUTISTA VS. JUNIO regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal FACTS: The constitutionality of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. province and dispose of issues of general concern which were 869, a response to protracted oil crisis, banning the use of in consonance and strict conformity with the law. private motor vehicles with H (heavy) and EH (extra heavy) 8

plates on week-ends and holidays, was assailed for being allegedly violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by herein respondents imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license of owners of the above specified vehicles found violating such LOI, is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of undue delegation of legislative power. Respondents denied the above allegations.

whether or not: 1) to make it permanent;2) to reduce or increase it further; or 3) to deny the application. The Board has jurisdiction to decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing. Pending that, however, it may order, under Section 8 of EO 172, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of a hearing, subject to the final outcome of the proceeding.

PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION vs. DECS ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights. HELD: No, the disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a problem that presses urgently for solution, wherein its reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus due process is not ignored, much less infringed. The exercise of police power may cut into the rights to liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. Those adversely affected may invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show a factual foundation for its invalidity. Petitioner: Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. is a nonstock, non-profit corporate entity duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines Respondent: Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports is a ranking cabinet member who heads the Department of Education, Culture and Sports of the Office of the President of the Philippines.

FACTS: On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by DECS submitted a report entitled "Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees." The report favorably recommended to the DECS the Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted following courses of action with respect to the Government's pursuant to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code which contains a specific provision as to penalties, the imposition of a policy on increases in school fees for the SY 1987 to 1988. DECS took note of the report and issued an Order authorizing the fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid with the exception of the impounding 15% to 20% increase in school fees as recommended by the Task Force. Petitioner sought for reconsideration on the of a vehicle. ground that increases were too high. Thereafter, the Order was modified reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to MACEDA VS. ENERG REGULATORY BOARD 15%. Petitioner still opposed the increases. FACTS: The petitioners pray for injunctive relief to stop the ERB from implementing its Order mandating a provisional increase Petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, went to in the prices of petroleum and petroleum products. The Order, this Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking which was in pursuance to EO 172, was a response to the that judgment be rendered declaring the questioned separate applications of Caltex, Pilipinas Shell and Petron Department Order unconstitutional. The thrust of the Petition Corporation for the Board to increase the wholesale posted is that the said Department Order was issued without any legal prices of petroleum products. Petitioners submit that the basis. The petitioner also maintains that the questioned Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount Department Order was issued in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution in asmuch as the petitioner was not to lack of jurisdiction and without proper notice and hearing. given due notice and hearing before the said Department ISSUE: Whether or not the ERB committed grave abuse of Order was issued. discretion. In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that HELD: NO. While under EO 172, a hearing is indispensable, it while the DECS is authorized by law to regulate school fees in does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex parte, a educational institutions, the power to regulate does not always provisional increase, as it did, subject to its final disposition of include the power to increase school fees. 9

Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parents are interested parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees are increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses that the questioned Order constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due process of law. ISSUE: Whether or not DECS has the power to prescribe school fees

YMCA protested theassessment. ISSUE: Whether or not the income of private respondent YMCA from rentals of small shops and parking fees is exempt from taxation

HELD: YMCA argues that Art. VI, Sec. 28(3) of the Constitution exempts charitable institutions from the payment not only of property taxes but also of income tax from any source. The Court is not persuaded. The debates, interpellations and HELD: Yes. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this expressions of opinion of the framers of the Constitution power includes the power to prescribe school fees. No other reveal their intent. Justice Hilario Davide Jr., a former government agency has been vested with the authority to fix constitutional commissioner, stressed during the Concom school fees and as such, the power should be considered debate that what is exempted is not the institution itself; those lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively exempted from real estate taxes are lands, buildings and discharge its functions and duties under the law. improvements actually, directly and exclusively used The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency for religious, charitable or educational purposes. Fr. Joaquin may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it Bernas, an eminent authority on the Constitution and also a were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and member of the Concom, adhered to the same view that the hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due exemption created by said provision pertained only to property process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative taxes. In his treatise on taxation, Justice Jose Vitug concurs, agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice stating that the tax exemption coversproperty taxes only. and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When Indeed, the income tax exemption claimed by YMCA finds no the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency basis in Art. VI, Sec. 28(3) of the Constitution. are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative YMCA also invokes Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3) of the Constitution character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply claiming that YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit educational exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, institution whose revenues and assets are used actually, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. directly and exclusively for educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes on its properties and income. The Court Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise reiterates that YMCA is exempt from the payment ofproperty of its legislative function? We believe so. The assailed tax, but not income tax on the rentals from its property. The Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that bare allegation alone that it is a non-stock, non-profit may be charged by all private schools in the country for educational institution is insufficient to justify its exemption schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and from the payment ofincome tax. Laws allowing tax hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance. exemption are construed strictissimi juris. Hence, for the YMCA to be granted the exemption it claims under the aforecited CIR VS. CA provision, it must prove with substantial evidence that: 1. it FACTS: Private respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution, which conducts various programs and activities that institution; and 2. the income it seeks to be exempted from are beneficial to the public, especially the young people, taxation is used actually, directly and exclusively for pursuant to itsreligious, educational and charitable objectives. educational purposes. However, the Court notes that not a YMCA earned an income from leasing out a portion of its scintilla of evidence was submitted by YMCA to prove that it premises to small shop owners and from parking fees collected met the said requisites. from non-members. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue YMCA is not an educational institution within the purview of (CIR) issued an assessment for deficiency income tax, Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3) of the Constitution. The term educational deficiency expanded withholding taxes on rentals institution, when used in laws granting tax exemptions, refers and professionalfees and deficiency withholding tax on wages. to a school, seminary, college or educational establishment. 10

Therefore, YMCA cannot be deemed one of the educational institutions covered by the said constitutional provision. Moreover, the Court notes that YMCA did not submit proof of the proportionate amount of the subject income that was actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.

and ordered said carabaous to be taken from the corral in which they were quarantined and drove them from one place to another. The accused contends that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760 ISSUE: Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture?

HELD: NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. FACTS: Petitioner is a domestic corporation composed of Section 8 of Act No. 1760 provides that any person violating taxicab operators. They filed the petition seeking to declare the any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, be nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 of the Bureau of punished. However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit Land Transportation. The assailed memorandum order acts and pronounce them as unlawful are Sections 3, 4 and 5. provides for the phasing out and discontinuance in the This case does not fall within any of them. A violation of the operation of dilapidated taxis or taxis of Model 1971 and orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by earlier. Pursuant to the said memorandum, the Bureau of Land paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The Transportation issued Implementing Circular No. 52 instructing orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly Regional Directors, the MV Registrars and other personnel of be said to have the force of law, are statutes and particularly the BLT, all within the National Capital Region, to implement not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a conveyances. violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed memorandum orders were therein. However, the accused did violate Art. 581, 2 of the invalid exercise of police power Penal Code which punishes any person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemic disease HELD: NO. Section 2 of Presidential Decree 101 grants the among animals. Board of Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION vs. DEFENSOR or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. As enunciated in the FACTS: Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of BOT circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and presidential issuances authorized the creation and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and development of what is now known as the National dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, Government Center (NGC). On March 5, 1972, former can prescribe regulations to promote the health,safety and President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, general welfare of the people. reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila vs. Board of Transportation U.S vs. PANLILIO FACTS: The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. It is alleged that the accused illegally and without being authorized to do so, and while quarantine against the said carabaos exposed to rinderpest was still in effect, permitted covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC. On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein. In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on 11

September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the governments socialized housing program. On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure the land tenure of the urban poor. Toward this end, lands located in the NGC, Quezon City shall be utilized for housing, socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other purposes. Sec. 3. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site to Bona Fide Residents. Proclamation No. 1826, Series of 1979, is hereby amended by excluding from the coverage thereof, 184 hectares on the west side and 238 hectares on the east side of Commonwealth Avenue, and declaring the same open for disposition to bona fide residents therein: Provided, That the determination of the bona fide residents on the west side shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and the determination of the bona fide residents on the east side shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and occupancy verification survey conducted in 2000: Provided, further, That all existing legal agreements, programs and plans signed, drawn up or implemented and actions taken, consistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby adopted. Sec.4. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site for Local Government or Community Facilities, Socioeconomic, Charitable, Educational and Religious Purposes. Certain portions of land within the aforesaid area for local government or community facilities, socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious institutions are hereby reserved for disposition for such purposes: Provided, That only those institutions already operating and with existing facilities or structures, or those occupying the land may avail of the disposition program established under the provisions this Act; Provided, further, That in ascertaining the specific areas that may be disposed of in favor of these institutions, the existing site allocation shall be used as basis therefore: Provided, finally. That in determining the reasonable lot allocation of such institutions without specific lot allocations, the land area that may be allocated to them shall be based on the area actually used by said institutions at the time of effectivity of this Act. ISSUE: Whether an IRR issued by an administrative office may be reviewed by Courts HELD: Yes. Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative

adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, so warrant. A direct invocation of the Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, 12

the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation that respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.

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