Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
EN BANC
Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila And
Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Clerk of Court Atty. Henry P. Favorito of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Clerk of Court Atty. Miguel Morales of Branch 17, Clerk of Court Amie Grace Arreolaof Branch 4, Administrative Officer III William Calda of the Office of the Clerk of Court and Stenographer Isabel Siwa of Branch 16, all of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila. x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x
RESOLUTION
Parenthetically, Atty. Favorito, together with more than a hundred employees of the MeTC Manila, wrote an undated letter to Chief Justice Davide assailing the spot investigation conducted by DCA Dela Cruz.[9] Said letter was indorsed by Chief Justice Davide to DCA Dela Cruz on March 28, 2005 for his comment.[10] No comment can be found in the records of herein administrative cases.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: In a 1st Indorsement dated April 14, 2005, then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) directed Atty. Morales to comment on the undated anonymous letter-complaint.[11]
Before the Court are two anonymous complaints: docketed as A.M. No. P-08-2519 charging Atty. Miguel Morales (Atty. Morales),
Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 17, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila of misconduct; and A.M. No. P-08-2520 charging Atty. Morales, together with Isabel Siwa (Siwa), Court Stenographer, Branch 16; William Calda (Calda), Administrative Officer III, Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC); Amie Grace Arreola (Arreola), Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 4, and Atty. Henry P. Favorito (Atty. Favorito), Clerk of Court VI, OCC, all of the MeTC, Manila of misconduct, graft and corruption
and moonlighting.
In his Manifestation which the OCA received on April 27, 2005, Atty. Morales alleged that: the anonymous letter-complaint should not have been given due course as there is no truth to the allegations therein; the OCA took almost a year to act on the anonymous lettercomplaint which did not have the proper indorsement from the Office of the Chief Justice; even though he brought to the OCC his personal computer, such act is not prohibited; he did not use his computer to write pleadings during office hours and neither did he use paper of the OCC; the raid conducted by DCA Dela Cruz without search and seizure orders violated his right to privacy and the articles seized therewith should be considered inadmissible.[12]
In an unsigned and undated letter which the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received on February 24, 2005, the writers, who claim to be employees of the OCC-MeTC of Manila, allege that Atty. Morales, then detailed at the OCC, was consuming his working hours filing and attending to personal cases, such as administrative cases against employees in his old sala, using office supplies, equipment and utilities. The writers aver that Atty. Moraless conduct has demoralized them and they resorted to filing an anonymous complaint in fear of retaliation from Atty. Morales.[1]
In a letter dated April 12, 2005, Atty. Morales applied for optional retirement[13] which the Court approved in its Resolution dated October 12, 2005 subject to the withholding of his benefits pending resolution of cases against him, the instant case included.[14]
A.M. No. P-08-2520 Assistant Court Administrator (ACA) now Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Reuben P. dela Cruz, conducted a discreet
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Arreola asserts that: her record of arrival and departure was always signed by her superiors without question because it reflected the correct entries; she is always in the office even when there is typhoon; and she has proven herself useful in the OCC by answering queries of litigants and verifications from other offices and attending to complaints.[25]
In the same spot investigation conducted by DCA De La Cruz on March 16, 2005, a partly hidden plastic box was discovered containing the amount of P65,390.00 and six commercial checks, which Siwa voluntarily opened to the team. These were also confiscated and turned over to the custody of the OCA.[16]
In a letter to then Chief Justice Davide dated April 12, 2005, Siwa requested that said money and personal belongings that were confiscated be returned to her immediately and that a formal investigation be conducted regarding DCA Dela Cruz's conduct during the spot investigation.[17] The seized items were later returned to Siwa[18]while her letter-complaint was indorsed by the Chief Justice to the Court Administrator on April 18, 2005 for appropriate action.[19] As with the complaint filed by Atty. Morales, however, the status of Siwa's complaint could not be ascertained despite diligent efforts at inquiring about the matter from the OCA Legal Office.
In compliance, Atty. Favorito adopted the comments of Atty. Morales, Calda and Arreola and denied that he committed the acts alluded to in the anonymous letter-complaint.[26] Atty. Favorito also incorporated in his comment a letter of the employees of the OCC-MTC Manila disowning the alleged anonymous complaint.[27]
In a Resolution dated July 27, 2005, the Court, upon recommendation of the OCA, consolidated the two complaints and referred the same to the Executive Judge of theMeTC, Manila for investigation, report and recommendation.[28]
Report of the Investigating Judge In a 1st Indorsement dated April 14, 2005, the OCA directed Atty. Morales, Atty. Favorito, Calda, Arreola and Siwa to comment on the letter-complaint.[20]
In her Report dated September 1, 2006, MeTC Executive Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez-Estoesta states that discreet observation of the daily working activities of Atty. Morales and Siwa could no longer be done as the two had already availed themselves of their optional retirement; thus, random interviews with employees who had proximate working activities with them were resorted to, as well as perusal of court records.[29]
Siwa in her Comment avers that: the anonymous lettercomplaint should not have been given due course as it contravened Sec. 46(c) of Executive Order No. 292 and the implementing rules; it was not subscribed and sworn to by the complainant and there is no obvious truth to the allegations therein; while she admits that she is involved in the business of rediscounting checks, such is a legitimate endeavor, in fact, there are other employees of the court engaged in the same business; she is also not aware of any rule prohibiting her from engaging in said endeavor; she does not use the OCC to conduct her business and she is mindful of her duties as a government employee; thus, she has a staff to do the encashment of the checks; there were rare occasions when her staff members were stationed at the corridors to lend cash to employees but while said occasions may have occurred during office hours, her staff cannot be blamed for the same since the employees go to them; she has never neglected her duty as a court stenographer -- in fact, her last performance rating was very satisfactory; it is a known fact that because of the meager pay given to government employees, most augment their income by engaging in business; she should not be singled out for being enterprising and industrious; and it is unfair to accuse her of wrongdoing at a time when she has voluntarily retired from government service due to health reasons.[21]
The following employees were interviewed: Rueben Duque, Clerk of Court, Branch 16, MeTC; Beneluz Dumlao, Records Officer I; Marilou Magbag, Clerk III; EstrellaRafael, Records Officer I; Lydia dela Cruz, Records Officer III; Raymundo Bilbao, Clerk III; Marie Joy Valle, Clerk IV, and Ma. Lizabeth Marcelino, Administrative Officer II, all of the OCC; Rosie Jose, freelance bondswoman, and Norberto D. Soriano, authorized representative of the Commonwealth Insurance Company.[30]
A month after the incident, Siwa filed for optional retirement[22] which the Court approved in its Resolution[23] dated October 12, 2005, with the proviso that the amount ofP30,000.00 shall be retained from the money value of her earned leave credits pending resolution of the present case.
Insofar as Atty. Morales, Atty. Favorito, Calda and Arreola are concerned, the investigation immediately stumbled into a dead end. No one from the OCC personnel who were interviewed would give a categorical and positive statement affirming the charges against the said personnel. While almost all confirmed that Atty. Morales maintained his own computer and printer at the OCC, nobody could state for certain that what he worked on were pleadings for private cases. Rafael, who was seated right next to Atty. Morales at the OCC merely said that what preoccupied Atty. Morales were his own administrative cases. She did not notice Atty. Morales engage in private work in his computer although she saw Atty. Icaonapo drop by the office every now and then to personally see Atty. Morales. Rafael explained however that this could be because Atty. Icaonapo was the counsel of Atty. Morales in his administrative cases. While documents referring to private cases were found in the hard drive of the computer of Atty. Morales, and while the writing style is similar to that of the Manifestation he filed in this case, still no definite conclusion could be drawn that he has composed the said pleadings at the OCC during
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
There was also no evidence to support charges of extortion against Atty. Favorito and Calda. Two bondsmen who were randomly interviewed denied that Atty. Favoritoand Calda exacted illegal sums from them. The amounts they charged could actually refer to legal fees.[32]
As to Arreola, the charge against her also has no basis. The interviewees were unanimous in saying that Arreola was always around the office, and that while she fetched her son from a nearby school, she did so during lunch or after office hours. Random checks on Arreola also revealed that she was always at the OCC and at Branch 30 where she was reassigned.[33]
On Atty. Morales: The allegation that Atty. Morales had been using his personal computer to draft pleadings for private counsels was established in the spot inspection onMarch 16, 2005. The hard drive of Atty. Moraless computer yielded a pre-trial brief and a petition for relief from judgment with the name of Atty. Icaonapo. The said pretrial brief was the same pleading that was submitted to RTC Branch 1, Manila by Atty. Icaonapo on February 10, 2003. Atty. Morales in his Manifestation dated April 25, 2005 failed to refute the evidence that emanated from his computer and instead chided the OCA for confiscating the same.
As to Siwa, she candidly admitted that she was engaged in lending and discounting activities at her station, through her own staff which she had maintained for said purpose. Because of her business, a number of employees, even those from other government agencies, usually huddled at her station to hold transactions. Branch Clerk of Court RubenDuque relates that a number of people would often go to their office looking for Siwa for lending and rediscounting. Assuming that Siwa is not prohibited from engaging in said business, still it has distracted her from her duties as a stenographer. A random check on the court records of Branch 16 showed that Siwa had not yet submitted a complete transcription of 7 stenographic notes in 5 cases, 3 of which already had decisions rendered. In one case, the testimonies of two prosecution witnesses had to be re-taken to fill in the gap which not only wasted precious time of the court but also distressed the efforts of the prosecution in the presentation of its case.[34]
On Siwa: While she insisted that the anonymous letter should not have been given due course, she admitted in her April 28, 2005 Manifestation to being involved in the business of rediscounting checks, claiming that she was not the only employee engaged in the same, and that she maintained her own personnel to do the rediscounting which stretched to the premises of the MeTC-OCC where Atty. Favorito is the Clerk of Court.[37]
The OCA concluded that: Atty. Morales and Siwa should be found guilty of gross misconduct. Atty. Morales, for preparing pleadings for private counsels and litigants; andSiwa, for engaging in the business of rediscounting checks during office hours; gross misconduct carries the penalty of dismissal from the service even for the first offense, and while Atty. Morales and Siwa have already left the judiciary, the Court can still direct the forfeiture of their benefits; Atty. Favorito should also be held liable for neglect of duty because as Clerk of Court of the MeTC-OCC, he was negligent in allowing the nefarious activities of Atty. Morales and Siwa to happen right inside the confines of the MeTC-OCC.[38]
On Arreola and Calda: The OCA agrees with Judge Estoesta that the charges against them should be dismissed for lack of concrete evidence.[39]
1. In OCA IPI No. 05-2155-P [now A.M. No. P-08-2519], with no substantial evidence taken to prove the charges in the anonymous letter-complaint filed against Atty. Miguel C. Morales, it is RECOMMENDED that the same be ordered dismissed;
2. In OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P [now A.M. No. P-2520], likewise, with no substantial evidence taken to prove the charges in the anonymous letter-complaint filed against Atty. Miguel C. Morales, Atty. Henry P. Favorito, William Calda and Amie Grace Arreola, it is RECOMMENDED that the same be ordered dismissed insofar as said court employees are concerned; and
(a) That (resigned) Clerk of Court Miguel C. Morales, Branch 17, and (retired) Court Stenographer Isabel A. Siwa, Branch 16, both of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila be found GUILTY of Gross Misconduct with forfeiture of the benefits due them excluding accrued leave credits;
3. In OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P [now A.M. No. P-08-2520] insofar as it concerns Ms. Isabel Siwa, it is RECOMMENDED that she be directed to explain why she still has stenographic notes pending for transcription despite having already availed of an optional retirement pay.[35]
(b) That Clerk of Court Henry P. Favorito of the MeTC-OCC, Manila be found GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty and suspended without pay for a period of one (1) month and one (1) day, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely; and
The report was referred to the OCA for its evaluation, report and recommendation.[36]
(c) That the charges made in the April 1, 2004 anonymous letter against Clerk of Court Amie Grace A. Arreola, Branch 4 and Administrative Officer III William Calda, OCC, both of the MeTC, Manila be DISMISSED for lack of merit.[40]
OCA Report and Recommendation The Court's Ruling. The OCA, through ACA Antonio H. Dujua, in its November 7, 2007 Memorandum, states that it does not entirely concur with the findings and recommendation of JudgeEstoesta.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
An anonymous complaint is always received with great caution, originating as it does from an unknown author. Such a complaint, however does not justify outright dismissal for being baseless or unfounded for the allegations therein may be easily verified and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated and established by other competent evidence. Indeed, complainants identity would hardly be material where the matter involved is of public interest.[41]
The two anonymous letters charge Atty. Morales with the following offenses: attending to personal cases while using official time, office supplies, equipment and utilities, leaving the office after logging-in in the morning only to return in the afternoon, and playing computer games whenever he was at the office.
Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred and must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.[49] It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.[50] The burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given lies with the State.[51] Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed and courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.[52] To constitute a valid consent or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it must be shown that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.[53]
It is undisputed that pleadings for private cases were found in Atty. Morales's personal computer in the MeTC-OCC and Atty. Morales could not provide any satisfactory explanation therefor. Such fact, by itself, could already make Atty. Morales liable for simple misconduct for it hints of impropriety on his part. The Court has always stressed that all members of the judiciary should be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in the judicial branch but also to their behavior outside the court as private individuals, in order that the integrity and good name of the courts of justice shall be preserved.[42]
In this case, what is missing is a showing that Atty. Morales had an actual intention to relinquish his right. While he may have agreed to the opening of his personal computer and the printing of files therefrom, in the presence of DCA Dela Cruz, his staff and some NBI agents during the March 16, 2005 spot investigation, it is also of record that Atty. Morales immediately filed an administrative case against said persons questioning the validity of the investigation, specifically invoking his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
While Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting standards required of every court employee, unfortunately, the Court cannot use the evidence obtained from his personal computer against him for it violated his constitutional right.
Atty. Morales, in defense, argues that since the pleadings were acquired from his personal computer which DCA Dela Cruz confiscated without any valid search and seizure order, such evidence should be considered as the fruits of a poisonous tree as it violated his right to privacy.
Both the Investigating Justice and the OCA failed to discuss this matter. The Court however finds it proper to squarely address such issue, without prejudice to the outcome of the administrative case filed by Atty. Morales against DCA Dela Cruz regarding the same incident. The finding of guilt or exoneration of Atty. Morales hinges on this very crucial question: Are the pleadings found in Atty. Morales's personal computer admissible in the present administrative case against him?
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on governmental power.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure in turn is at the top of the hierarchy of rights, next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty and property, which is protected by the due process clause. This is as it should be for, as stressed by a couple of noted freedom advocates, the right to personal security which, along with the right to privacy, is the foundation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is provided for under Section 2, Article III thereof.[43] The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution also bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right.[44] The fact that the present case is administrative in nature does not render the above principle inoperative. As expounded in Zulueta v. Court of Appeals,[45] any violation of the aforestated constitutional right renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
xxxx
this
rule
one
of
which
is
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.[54]
DCA Dela Cruz in his report claims that that they were able to obtain the subject pleadings with the consent of Atty. Morales.[47] The
And as there is no other evidence, apart from the pleadings, retrieved from the unduly confiscated personal computer of Atty. Morales, to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
The Court agrees with the OCA that Siwa should be administratively disciplined for engaging in the business of lending and rediscounting checks.
Siwa admits engaging in the business of lending and rediscounting checks, claiming that it was a legitimate endeavor needed to augment her meager income as a court employee; that she is not aware of any rule prohibiting her from engaging in the business of rediscounting checks; that there are other employees engaged in the same business; and that she employs her own staff to do the encashment of the checks as she always attends to and never neglects her duties as a stenographer.[55]
Siwa conducted her business within the court's premises, which placed the image of the judiciary, of which she is part, in a bad light. Time and again, the Court has held that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat; thus the conduct of a person serving the judiciary must, at all times, be characterized by propriety and decorum, and be above suspicion so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary.[66]
Officials and employees of the judiciary are prohibited from engaging directly in any private business, vocation, or profession even outside office hours to ensure that full-time officers of the court render full-time service so that there may be no undue delay in the administration of justice and in the disposition of cases.[56] The nature of work of court employees requires them to serve with the highest degree of efficiency and responsibility and the entire time of judiciary officials and employees must be devoted to government service to ensure efficient and speedy administration of justice.[57] Indeed, the Court has always stressed that court employees must strictly observe official time and devote every second moment of such time to public service.[58] And while the compensation may be meager, that is the sacrifice judicial employees must be willing to take.
Siwa's infraction constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service which, under Sec. 52 A (20) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, carries the penalty of suspension of 6 months and 1 day to 1 year for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense. Since this is her first offense and considering the October 12, 2005 Resolution of the Court in A.M. No. 12096-Ret. which approved Siwa's application for optional retirement, retaining only the amount ofP30,000.00 from the money value of her earned leave credits pending resolution of the instant case, the Court finds she should be imposed the penalty of fine in the amount ofP30,000.00.
There is no evidence to show that Atty. Favorito knows or should have known that Atty. Morales had copies of pleadings for private cases in his personal computer for which Atty. Favorito could be held liable for neglect of duty as supervisor. As to Siwa's lending and rediscounting activities, however, the Court finds that Atty. Favorito was remiss in addressing said matter which activity took place in the court's premises which was under his responsibility.
Government service demands great sacrifice. One who cannot live with the modest salary of a public office has no business staying in the service. He is free to seek greener pastures elsewhere. The public trust character of the office proscribes him from employing the facilities or using official time for private business or purposes.[59]
The OCA in its Memorandum dated November 7, 2007 stated Siwa's offense is compounded by the fact that she was previously verbally instructed by her superior, MeTC Branch 16 Presiding Judge Crispin B. Bravo, to stop using court premises for her business. But she ignored the same, prompting the latter to issue a written Memorandum dated January 18, 2005 asking her to explain why she was still using the office in transacting/attending to her lending and rediscounting business when she was already verbally instructed to desist therefrom in December 2004.[60] that:
x x x in her April 28, 2005 Manifestation, Siwa admitted to being involved in the business of rediscounting checks, claiming that 'she is not the only employee engaged in the same business.' Respondent [Siwa] even had the audacity to admit that she 'maintained my own personnel' to do the rediscounting which stretched to the premises of the MeTC-OCC, where respondent Favorito is the Clerk of Court.[67] (Emphasis supplied)
Siwa apologized and promised not to let it happen again, in her letter dated January 21, 2005.[61] Siwa also admitted that she was using her house-helper in the rediscounting of checks and allowed the latter to use the court premises in the conduct of the same.[62]
Her allegation that she never neglected her duty as a stenographer is also belied by the findings of the Investigating Judge, who in her random check of records, discovered that Siwa had not yet submitted a complete transcription of 7 stenographic notes in 5 cases (3 criminal and 2 civil cases), in three of which decisions were already rendered.[63] In one case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses had to be re-taken.[64] Thus, contrary to Siwa's assertion, she was not able to satisfactorily perform her duties as a court stenographer while engaging in private business.
A review of the records, however, would show that what Siwa submitted is not a Manifestation but a Comment dated April 28, 2005 and there, instead of stating that her rediscounting activities stretched to the premises of the MeTC-OCC, she actually denied that she used the OCC to conduct said business. Pertinent portions of said Comment reads:
4.1. Respondent admits that she is involved in the business of rediscounting checks x x x.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
4.2. Respondent, however, denies that she uses the Office of the Clerk of Court to conduct this business x x x.
Liability of Arreola on absence during office hours. 4.3. There are other occasions when the said staff will be stationed at the corridors to lend emergency cash to employees in need. The said occasions may have occurred during office hours, for which, the respondent's staff may not be blamed since it was the employees themselves who go to them. However, these instances were rare. It should also be emphasized that these transactions occurred outside of the offices and within the common or public areas.[68] (Emphasis supplied)
As with the extortion charges against Atty. Favorito and Calda, the Court finds no sufficient evidence to hold Arreola administratively liable.
As reported by Judge Estoesta: Thus, Siwa never admitted that her business stretched to the premises of the OCC-MeTC but only claimed that her staff used corridors which were common or public areas for their transactions. x x x the charge against Ms. Amie Grace Arreola regarding her habit of leaving the office after logging-in found no concrete corroboration.
Still, Atty. Favorito failed to address such matter and to prevent such activities from taking place, even if they were conducted in the corridors, since such areas are still part of the court's premises. As Clerk of Court of the OCC, it is Atty. Favorito's duty to plan, direct, supervise and coordinate the activities of all divisions/sections/units in the OCC.[69] He should therefore be reprimanded for his failure to duly supervise and prevent such activities from happening within his area of responsibility.
The interviewees were actually unanimous in saying that Ms. Arreola was not prone to such habit as she is always around the office. Ms. Arreola may have been known to fetch her son at a nearby school but she has always done so during lunch hours and after office hours.
On the claim that Atty. Favorito and Caldo extorted money from sureties without issuing receipts therefor, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the Investigating Judge and the OCA.
As a matter of fact, at a time when the MeTC was stricken by a debilitating brown-out schedule in the afternoon sometime [in] July 2006, Ms. Arreola was still around, having been one of the skeletal force who volunteered to stay on. The undersigned has personally seen her around 5:30 p.m. of the same day.
As a matter of fact, several random checks on Ms. Arreola by the undersigned herself revealed that she has always been around at the OCC and at Branch 30 where she was re-assigned as Branch Clerk of Court. At times, personal visits were made, interspersed by telephone calls between 8:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. where Ms. Arreola proved herself to be always at the office.
x x x the charges of extortion levelled against Atty. Henry P. Favorito and Mr. William Calda x x x suffered from loose ends.
Needless to say, therefore, the charge against Ms. Arreola is certainly without basis.[72]
Random interviews with two (2) bondsmen denied that Atty. Favorito and Mr. Calda exacted such amounts.
The OCA agreed with the said finding and likewise recommended the dismissal of the charges against Arreola.[73]
The P50.00 and P500.00 specified to as processing fee could actually refer to the Legal Fees mandated under Section 8 (o) and Section 21 (c) of Rule 141, as follows x x x
Here, it is obvious that the anonymous letter-complainant has no understanding whatsoever of the legal fees charged by Office of the Clerk of Court.
It is well-settled that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. That is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, what will prevail is that respondent has regularly performed his or her duties.[74] Reliance on mere allegations, conjectures and suppositions will leave an administrative complaint with no leg to stand on, and charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence.[75]
This actually hints of the fact that said anonymous lettercomplainant may not be a personnel of the Office of the Clerk of Court after all.
Since there is no proof, apart from the allegations of the lettercomplaint, to hold Atty. Favorito, Calda and Arreola liable for the aforestated charges against them, the Court deems it proper to dismiss said charges for lack of merit.
The extortion charge slapped against Atty. Favorito and Mr. Calda, therefore, rings empty.[70]
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
In view of the initial findings of Investigating Judge Estoesta that Siwa was remiss in her duty of transcribing stenographic notes assigned to her, the OCA is hereby directed to conduct an audit investigation on Siwa's transcription of stenographic notes to determine the full extent of the notes she failed to transcribe on time. If warranted, such matter shall be treated as a separate case to be given a new docket number and assigned to another ponente for evaluation.
The OCA should also report on the status of the complaint filed by Atty. Morales which the Court received on March 31, 2005, the complaint of Isabel Siwa dated April 12, 2005, and the letter-complaint of Atty. Favorito together with other MeTC employees which the Court received on March 28, 2005, against DCA Dela Cruz, regarding the spot investigation conducted on March 16, 2005 regarding this case.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Isabel Siwa, Court Stenographer of Branch 16, Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and is FINED in the amount of P30,000.00 to be deducted from the money value of her leave credits which was set aside per Resolution dated October 12, 2005 in A.M No. 12096-Ret. entitled Application for Retirement Benefits under Section 13-
A of R.A. No. 8291 of Ms. Isabel A. Siwa, Court Stenographer II, MeTC, Manila, Branch 16.
The charges against Atty. Miguel Morales, former Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 17, are DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. Deputy Court Administrator Reuben de la Cruz is advised to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties.
The charges against William Calda, Administrative Officer of the Office of the Clerk of Court, and Amie Grace Arreola, formerly Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 4 now Clerk of Court of Branch 30, both of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to conduct an audit investigation on Isabel Siwa's transcription of stenographic notes in view of the finding of Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. GomezEstoesta in her Investigation Report dated September 1, 2006 in A.M. No. P-08-2519 and A.M. P-08-2520 (formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2155P and A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P) that Siwa has not submitted a complete transcription of stenographic notes in several cases assigned to her. Said matter shall be treated as a separate case, to be given a new docket number and assigned to a new ponente for final resolution.
SO ORDERED.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 180595 March 5, 2010
ARTHUR DEL ROSARIO and ALEXANDER DEL ROSARIO, Petitioners, vs. HELLENOR D. DONATO, JR. and RAFAEL V. GONZAGA, Respondents. DECISION ABAD, J.: This case is about the need for plaintiff to state the facts constituting his cause of action and the correct forum for actions for damages arising from alleged wrongful procurement and enforcement of a search warrant issued in connection with an alleged criminal violation of the intellectual property law. The Facts and the Case On January 23, 2002 Philip Morris Products, Inc. (Philip Morris) wrote the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), requesting assistance in curtailing the proliferation of fake Marlboro cigarettes in Angeles City, Pampanga. After doing surveillance work in that city, respondent Hellenor Donato, Jr., the NBI agent assigned to the case, succeeded in confirming the storage and sale of such fake cigarettes at the house at 51 New York Street, Villasol Subdivision, Angeles City, that belonged to petitioner Alexander del Rosario. On March 5, 2002 respondent Donato applied for a search warrant with Branch 57 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City to search the subject premises. But it took a week later or on March 12, 2002 for the RTC to hear the application and issue the search warrant. Although Donato felt that the delayed hearing compromised the operation, the NBI agents led by respondent Rafael V. Gonzaga proceeded to implement the warrant. Their search yielded no fake Marlboro cigarettes. Subsequently, petitioners Alexander and Arthur del Rosario (the Del Rosarios) filed a complaint for P50 million in damages against respondents NBI agents Donato and Gonzaga and two others before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 62, in Civil Case 10584. On August 6, 2003 respondents NBI agents answered the complaint with a motion to dismiss on the grounds of: a) the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action; b) forum shopping; and c) the NBI agents immunity from suit, they being sued as such agents. The RTC denied the motion on March 25, 2003. The NBI agents filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same on June 27, 2003. Dissatisfied, respondents NBI agents filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 79496. On June 29, 2007 the latter court granted the petition and annulled the RTCs orders, first, in alleging merely that the NBI agents unlawfully procured the search warrant without stating the facts that made the procurement unlawful, the complaint failed to state a cause of action; and second, the Del Rosarios were guilty of forum shopping in that they should have filed their claim for damages against the NBI agents through a motion for compensation with the court that issued the search warrant. The Del Rosarios sought reconsideration of the decision but the CA denied it on November 19, 2007, prompting them to file this petition for review. The Issues Presented
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 176066 August 11, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ESTELA TUAN y BALUDDA, Accused-Appellant. DECISION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: For review is the Decision1 dated September 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00381, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated April 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Baguio City, finding accused-appellant Estela Tuan y Baludda guilty in Criminal Case No. 17619-R, of illegal possession of marijuana under Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," as amended; and in Criminal Case No. 17620-R, of violating Presidential Decree No. 1866, otherwise known as the "Illegal Possession of Firearms," as amended. On April 5, 2000, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC against accused-appellant for illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of firearm. The Informations read: Criminal Case No. 17619-R The undersigned Public Prosecutor accuses ESTELA TUAN Y BALUDDA of the crime of VIOLATION OF SEC. 8, ART. II OF REPUBLIC ACT 6425, AS AMENDED (Illegal Possession of Marijuana), committed as follows:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 171980 October 6, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. OLIVE RUBIO MAMARIL, Accused-Appellant. DECISION PEREZ, J.: For review through this appeal1 is the Decision2 dated 31 August 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 28482 which affirmed the conviction of herein accused-appellant OLIVE RUBIO MAMARIL of possession of dangerous drugs in violation of Section 11, Article II3 of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The challenged judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED.4 The affirmed disposition reads:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 174570 December 15, 2010
ROMER SY TAN, Petitioner, vs. SY TIONG GUE, FELICIDAD CHAN SY, SY CHIM, SY TIONG SAN, SY YU BUN, SY YU SHIONG, SY YU SAN, and BRYAN SY LIM, Respondents. RESOLUTION PERALTA, J.: On February 17, 2010, this Court rendered a Decision1 in G.R. No. 174570 entitled Romer Sy Tan v. Sy Tiong Gue, et al., the decretal portion of which reads, as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated December 29, 2005 and August 18, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81389 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the RTC dated September 1, 2003 and October 28, 2003 are REINSTATED. The validity of Search Warrant Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 is SUSTAINED. On March 22, 2010, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration2 wherein respondents informed this Court, albeit belatedly, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted their motion for the withdrawal of the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 06241375. As such, respondents prayed that the decision be reconsidered and set aside and that the quashal of the subject search warrants be rendered moot and academic on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case. In his Comment3 dated July 7, 2010, petitioner maintains that the motion is a mere reiteration of what respondents have previously alleged in their Comment and which have been passed upon by this Court in the subject decision. Petitioner alleges that he also filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila a Complaint for Qualified Theft against the respondents based on the same incidents and that should the Information for Qualified Theft be filed with the proper
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
ARNEL U. TY, MARIE ANTONETTE TY, JASON ONG, WILLY DY, and ALVIN TY, Petitioners, vs. NBI SUPERVISING AGENT MARVIN E. DE JEMIL, PETRON GASUL DEALERS ASSOCIATION, and TOTALGAZ DEALERS ASSOCIATION, Respondents. DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: The Case In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, petitioners seek the reversal of the Decision1 dated September 28, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98054, which reversed and set aside the Resolutions dated October 9, 20062 and December 14, 20063 of the Secretary of Justice, and reinstated the November 7, 2005 Joint Resolution4 of the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor. Petitioners assail also the CA Resolution5 dated March 14, 2008, denying their motion for reconsideration. The Facts Petitioners are stockholders of Omni Gas Corporation (Omni) as per Omnis General Information Sheet6 (GIS) dated March 6, 2004 submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Omni is in the business of trading and refilling of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) cylinders and holds Pasig City Mayors Permit No. RET-04001256 dated February 3, 2004. The case all started when Joaquin Guevara Adarlo & Caoile Law Offices (JGAC Law Offices) sent a letter dated March 22, 2004 7 to the NBI requesting, on behalf of their clients Shellane Dealers Association, Inc., Petron Gasul Dealers Association, Inc., and Totalgaz Dealers Association, Inc., for the surveillance, investigation, and apprehension of persons or establishments in Pasig City that are engaged in alleged illegal trading of petroleum products and underfilling of branded LPG cylinders in violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 33,8 as amended by Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1865.9 Earlier, the JGAC Law Offices was furnished by several petroleum producers/brand owners their respective certifications on the dealers/plants authorized to refill their respective branded LPG cylinders, to wit: (1) On October 3, 2003, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) issued a certification10 of the list of entities duly authorized to refill Shellane LPG cylinders; (2) on December 4, 2003, Petron Corporation (Petron) issued a certification11 of their dealers in Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao authorized to refill Petron Gasul LPG cylinders; and (3) on January 5, 2004, Total (Philippines) Corporation (Total) issued two certifications12 of the refilling stations and plants authorized to refill their Totalgaz and Superkalan Gaz LPG cylinders. Agents De Jemil and Kawada attested to conducting surveillance of Omni in the months of March and April 2004 and doing a test-buy on April 15, 2004. They brought eight branded LPG cylinders of Shellane, Petron Gasul,Totalgaz, and Superkalan Gaz to Omni for refilling. The branded LPG cylinders were refilled, for which the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agents paid PhP 1,582 as evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 9004013 issued by Omni on April 15, 2004. The refilled LPG cylinders were without LPG valve seals and one of the cylinders was actually underfilled, as found by LPG Inspector Noel N. Navio of the Liquefied Petroleum Gas Industry Association (LPGIA) who inspected the eight branded LPG cylinders on April 23, 2004 which were properly marked by the NBI after the test-buy. The NBIs test-buy yielded positive results for violations of BP 33, Section 2(a) in relation to Secs. 3(c) and 4, i.e., refilling branded LPG cylinders without authority; and Sec. 2(c) in relation to Sec. 4, i.e., underdelivery or underfilling of LPG cylinders. Thus, on April 28, 2004, Agent De Jemil filed an Application for Search Warrant (With Request for Temporary Custody of the Seized Items)14 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City, attaching, among others, his affidavit15 and the affidavit of Edgardo C. Kawada,16 an NBI confidential agent.
Section 2(a), in relation to Sections 3(c) and 4, of B.P. Blg. 33, as amended by P.D. 1865;21 and (2) Violation of Section 2(c), in relation to Section 4, of B.P. Blg. 33, as amended by P.D. 1865,22docketed as
I.S. Nos. 2004-616 and 2004-618, respectively. During the preliminary investigation, petitioners submitted their Joint Counter-Affidavit,23 which was replied24 to by Agent De Jemil with a corresponding rejoinder25 from petitioners. The Ruling of the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor in I.S. No. 2004-616 and I.S. No. 2004-618
On November 7, 2005, the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor Leandro C. Catalo of Manila issued a Joint Resolution,26later approved by the Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo upon the recommendation of the Head of the Task Force on Anti-Intellectual Property Piracy (TFAIPP), Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Leah C. Tanodra-Armamento, finding probable cause to charge petitioners with violations of pertinent sections of BP 33, as amended, resolving as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that two (2) Informations for violations of Section 2 [a] (illegal trading in petroleum and/or petroleum products) and Section 2 [c] (underfilling of LPG cylinders), both of Batas Pambansa Bilang 33, as amended, be filed against respondents [herein petitioners] ARNEL TY, MARIE ANTONETTE TY, JASON ONG, WILLY DY and ALVIN TY.27 Assistant City Prosecutor Catalo found the existence of probable cause based on the evidence submitted by Agent De Jemil establishing the fact that Omni is not an authorized refiller of Shellane, Petron Gasul, Totalgaz andSuperkalan Gaz LPG cylinders. Debunking petitioners contention that the branded LPG cylinders are already owned by consumers who are free to do with them as they please, the law is clear that the stamped markings on the LPG cylinders show who are the real owners thereof and they cannot be refilled sans authority from Pilipinas Shell, Petron or Total, as the case may be. On the underfilling of one LPG cylinder, the findings of LPG Inspector Navio of the LPGIA were uncontroverted by petitioners. Petitioners motion for reconsideration,28 was denied through a Resolution29 by the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor issued on May 3, 2006. In time, petitioners appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Justice.30 The Ruling of the DOJ in I.S. No. 2004-616 and I.S. No. 2004-618 Secretary
On October 9, 2006, the Office of the Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution31 reversing and setting aside the November 7, 2005 Joint Resolution of the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Chief State Prosecutor is directed to cause the withdrawal of the informations for violations of Sections 2(a) and 2(c) of B.P. Blg. 33, as amended by P.D. 1865, against respondents Arnel Ty, Mari Antonette Ty, Jason Ong, Willy Dy and Alvin Ty and report the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. SO ORDERED.32 The Office of the Secretary of Justice viewed, first, that the underfilling of one of the eight LPG cylinders was an isolated incident and cannot give rise to a conclusion of underfilling, as the phenomenon may have been caused by human error, oversight or technical error. Being an isolated case, it ruled that there was no showing of a clear pattern of deliberate underfilling. Second, on the alleged violation of refilling branded LPG cylinders sans written authority, it found no sufficient basis to hold petitioners responsible for violation of Sec. 2 (c) of BP 33, as amended, since there was no proof that the branded LPG cylinders seized from Omni belong to another company or firm, holding that the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
determination of the Secretary of Justice. Therein, the Court, after expounding on the policy of non-interference in the determination of the existence of probable cause absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice, however, concluded, citing Alcaraz v. Gonzalez51 and Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,52 that an aggrieved party from the resolution of the Secretary of Justice may directly resort to judicial review on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, thus: x x x [T]he findings of the Justice Secretary may be reviewed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on the allegation that he acted with grave abuse of discretion. This remedy is available to the aggrieved party.53 (Emphasis supplied.) It is thus clear that Agent De Jemil, the aggrieved party in the assailed resolutions of the Office of the Secretary of Justice, availed of and pursued the proper legal remedy of a judicial review through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in assailing the latters finding of lack of probable cause on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. First Core Issue: Existence of Probable Cause Petitioners contend that there is no probable cause that Omni violated Sec. 2 (a), in relation to Secs. 3 (c) and 4 of BP 33, as amended,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
LPG cylinders Marked as Omnigas with Totalgaz emboss, 11.0 kg [empty] LPG cylinders Shellane, 11.0 kg [empty] LPG cylinders as Omnigas with Gasul emboss, [empty] Marked 11.0 kg
23 3
21
The foregoing list is embodied in the NBIs Receipt/Inventory of Property/Item Seized55 signed by NBI Agent Edwin J. Roble who served and implemented the search warrants. And a copy thereof was duly received by Atty. Allan U. Ty, representative of Omni, who signed the same "under protest" and made the annotation at the bottom part thereon: "The above items/cylinders were taken at customers trucks and the empty cylinders taken at the warehouse (swapping section) of the company."56 Even considering that the filled LPG cylinders were indeed already loaded on customers trucks when confiscated, yet the fact that these refilled LPG cylinders consisting of nine branded LPG cylinders, specifically Totalgaz,Petron Gasul and Shellane, tends to show that Omni indeed refilled these branded LPG cylinders without authorization from Total, Petron and Pilipinas Shell. Such a fact is bolstered by the test-buy conducted by Agent De Jemil and NBI confidential agent Kawada: Omnis unauthorized refilling of branded LPG cylinders, contrary to Sec. 2 (a) in relation to Sec. 3 (c) of BP 33, as amended. Said provisos provide: Sec. 2. Prohibited Acts.The following acts are prohibited and penalized: (a) Illegal trading in petroleum and/or petroleum products; xxxx Sec. 3. Definition of terms.For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be construed to mean: Illegal trading in petroleum and/or petroleum products xxxx (c) Refilling of liquefied petroleum gas cylinders without authority from said Bureau, or refilling of another companys or firms cylinders without such companys or firms written authorization; (Emphasis supplied.) As petitioners strongly argue, even if the branded LPG cylinders were indeed owned by customers, such fact does not authorize Omni to refill these branded LPG cylinders without written authorization from the brand owners Pilipinas Shell, Petron and Total. In Yao, Sr. v. People,57 a case involving criminal infringement of property rights under Sec. 155 of RA 8293,58 in affirming the courts a quos determination of the presence of probable cause, this Court held that from Sec. 155.159 of RA 8293 can be gleaned that "mere unauthorized use of a container bearing a registered trademark in connection with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods or services which islikely to cause confusion, mistake or deception among the buyers/consumers can be considered as trademark infringement."60 The Court affirmed the presence of infringement involving the unauthorized sale of Gasul andShellane LPG cylinders and the unauthorized refilling of the same by Masagana Gas Corporation as duly attested to and witnessed by NBI agents who conducted the surveillance and test-buys. Similarly, in the instant case, the fact that Omni refilled various branded LPG cylinders even if owned by its customers but without authority from brand owners Petron, Pilipinas Shell and Total shows palpable violation of BP 33, as amended. As aptly noted by the Court in Yao, Sr. v. People, only the duly authorized dealers and refillers
Gaz,
2.7
kg
17
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
persons subject to such legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed."70
The Court made it clear that a violation, like underfilling, on a per cylinder basis falls within the phrase of any actas mandated under Sec. 4 of BP 33, as amended. Ineluctably, the underfilling of one LPG cylinder constitutes a clear violation of BP 33, as amended. The finding of underfilling by LPG Inspector Navio of the LPGIA, as aptly noted by Manila Assistant City Prosecutor Catalo who conducted the preliminary investigation, was indeed not controverted by petitioners. On the issue of manifest bias and partiality, suffice it to say that aside from the allegation by petitioners, they have not shown that LPG Inspector Navio is neither an expert nor qualified to determine underfilling. Besides, it must be noted that the inspection by LPG Inspector Navio was conducted in the presence of NBI agents on April 23, 2004 who attested to that fact through their affidavits. Moreover, no rules require and petitioners have not cited any that the inspection be conducted in the presence of DOE representatives. Second Core Issue: Petitioners Liability for Violations Sec. 4 of BP 33, as amended, provides for the penalties and persons who are criminally liable, thus: Sec. 4. Penalties. Any person who commits any act herein prohibited shall, upon conviction, be punished with a fine of not less than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000) but not more than fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), or imprisonment of at least two (2) years but not more than five (5) years, or both, in the discretion of the court. In cases of second and subsequent conviction under this Act, the penalty shall be both fine and imprisonment as provided herein.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 181881 October 18, 2011
BRICCIO "Ricky" A. POLLO, Petitioner, vs. CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, DIRECTOR IV RACQUEL DE GUZMAN BUENSALIDA, DIRECTOR IV LYDIA A. CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITE AND THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondents. DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was charged administratively and eventually dismissed from the service. The employees personal files stored in the computer were used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct. Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1dated October 11, 2007 and Resolution2 dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 98224) filed by petitioner Briccio "Ricky" A. Pollo to nullify the proceedings conducted by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which found him guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 and penalized him with dismissal. The factual antecedents:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
2. VALID INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES A.) SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SPECIAL TASK FORCE, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, JR., J.: PETITIONER assails in this petition (for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition) the following resolutions of the Commission on Elections: Resolution No. 2327 dated 26 December 1991 for being unconstitutional, and Resolution No. 92-0829 dated 6 April 1992 and Resolution No. 92-0999 dated 23 April 1992, for want of legal and factual bases. The factual backdrop: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections scheduled on 11 May 1992, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued on 11 December 1991 Resolution No. 2323 otherwise referred to as the "Gun Ban," promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearms or other deadly weapons, on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. 1Subsequently, on 26 December 1991 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. 2 On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Representatives, wrote petitioner who was then Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting the return of the two (2) firearms 3 issued to him by the House of Representatives. Upon being advised of the request on 13 January 1992 by his staff, petitioner immediately instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner's house at Valle Verde and return them to Congress. Meanwhile, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the Philippine National Police (PNP) headed by Senior Superintendent Danilo Cordero set up a checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some twenty (20) meters away from its entrance. About thirty minutes later, the policemen manning the outpost flagged down the car driven by Arellano as it approached the checkpoint. They searched the car and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano was then apprehended and detained. He explained that he was ordered by petitioner to get the firearms from the house and return them to Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad of the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the police referred Arellano's case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for inquest. The referral did not include petitioner as among those charged with an election offense. On 15 January 1992, the City Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after finding the latter's sworn explanation meritorious. 4 On 28 January 1992, the City Prosecutor invited petitioner to shed light on the circumstances mentioned in Arellano's sworn explanation. Petitioner not only appeared at the preliminary investigation to confirm Arellano's statement but also wrote the City Prosecutor urging him to exonerate Arellano. He explained that Arellano did not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was complying with it when apprehended by returning the firearms to Congress; and, that he was petitioner's driver, not a security officer nor a bodyguard. 5 On 6 March 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution which, among other matters, recommended that the case against Arellano be dismissed and that the "unofficial" charge against petitioner be also dismissed. 6
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. 18
Petitioner contends that the guns were not tucked in Arellano's waist nor placed within his reach, and that they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Significantly, COMELEC did not rebut this claim. The records do not show that the manner by which the package was bundled led the PNP to suspect that it contained firearms. There was no mention either of any report regarding any nervous, suspicious or unnatural reaction from Arellano when the car was stopped and searched. Given these circumstances and relying on its visual observation, the PNP could not thoroughly search the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction. An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. 19 The existence of probable cause justifying the warrantless search is determined by the facts of each case. 20 Thus, we upheld the validity of the warrantless search in situations where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. 21 We also recognize the stop-and-search without warrant conducted by police officers on the basis of prior confidential information which were reasonably corroborated by other attendant matters, e.g., where a confidential report that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was conducted and appellants were caught in flagrante delicto transporting drugs at the time of their arrest; 22 where apart from the intelligence information, there were reports by an undercover "deep penetration" agent that appellants were bringing prohibited drugs into the country; 23 where the information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada bringing prohibited drugs was strengthened by the conspicuous bulge in accused's waistline, and his suspicious failure to produce his passport and other identification papers; 24 where the physical appearance of the accused fitted the description given in the confidential information about a woman transporting marijuana; 25 where the accused carrying a bulging black leather bag were suspiciously quiet and nervous when queried about its contents; 26 or where the identity of the drug courier was already established by police authorities who received confidential information about the probable arrival of accused on board one of the vessels arriving in Dumaguete City. 27 In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint was set up twenty (20) meters from the entrance to the Batasan Complex to enforce Resolution No. 2327. There was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so because of a confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was there any indication from the package or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
MABINI EPIE, JR. and RODRIGO PALASI, Petitioners, vs. THE HON. NELSONIDA T. ULAT-MARREDO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated September 15, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 55684. The facts of the case as gleaned from the records are: In an Information dated September 22, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet Province charged Mabini Epie, Jr. and Rodrigo Palasi, petitioners, with violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705,2 as amended. The Informtion reads: That on or about the 6th day of September 1998, along the Halsema National Highway at Acop, Municipality of Tublay, Province of Benguet, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually aiding each other and without any authority of law or without any license or permit granted by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess and transport 870 bd. ft. of Benguet Pine lumber having a total market value of TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (P24,360.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, to the damage and prejudice of the GOVERNMENT in the actual sum aforesaid. CONTRARY TO LAW. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet (presided by respondent Judge Nelsonida T. UlatMarredo), docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-CR-3138. When arraigned, both petitioners, with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BERNARDO TUAZON Y NICOLAS, accused-appellant. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: For Review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 31 July 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01799 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Bernardo Tuazon y Nicolas," affirming the Decision2 dated 14 October 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Antipolo City, Branch 71, in Criminal Case No. 99-16114, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,3 as amended. The Information filed against appellant alleged: The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses BERNARDO TUAZON y NICOLAS of the crime of Violation of Section 16, Article III, R.A. 6425, as amended, committed as follows: That, on or about the 7th day of March, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. BELEN MARIACOS, Appellant. DECISION NACHURA, J.: Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718, which affirmed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, San Fernando City, La Union, in Criminal Case No. 7144, finding appellant Belen Mariacos guilty of violating Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows: Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information, dated November 7, 2005 of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165, allegedly committed as follows: "That on or about the 27th day of October, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport, deliver 7,030.3, (sic) grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops without the necessary permit or authority from the proper government agency or office. CONTRARY TO LAW." When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, the following were stipulated upon: "1. Accused admits that she is the same person identified in the information as Belen Mariacos; 2. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy, San Gabriel, La Union; 3. That at the time of the arrest of the accused, accused had just alighted from a passenger jeepney; 4. That the marijuana allegedly taken from the possession of the accused contained in two (2) bags were submitted for examination to the Crime Lab; 5. That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005, the alleged drug submitted for examination gave positive result for the presence of marijuana;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA
shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further provides: SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, - versus NARCISO AGULAY y LOPEZ, Accused-Appellant.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 177150 November 22, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILLIAM CHING, accused-appellant. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
c. To pay the private complainant AAA the amount of P50,000.00 for exemplary damages; d. To pay the private complainant AAA the amount of P50,000.00 for moral damages; e. To pay the costs of the suit; 2. In Crim. Case No. Q-99-87053: a. To suffer the penalty of DEATH; b. To indemnify of P75,000.00; the private complainant AAA the amount
c. To pay the private complainant AAA the amount of P75,000.00 for exemplary damages; d. To pay the private complainant AAA the amount of P75,000.00 for moral damages; f. To pay the costs of the suit; and 3. In Crim. Case No. Q-99-87054: a. To suffer the penalty of DEATH; b. To indemnify of P75,000.00; the private complainant AAA the amount
c. To pay the private complainant AAA the amount of P75,000.00 for exemplary damages; d. To pay the private complainant AAA the amount of P75,000.00 for moral damages; and e. To pay the costs of the suit. In the event, however, that the accused shall be pardoned by the President, he is, however, forever barred from showing himself to the private complainant. He must not approach the private complainant; he shall never contact the private complainant directly or indirectly either by letters, telephone, cellphone or send text messages or with the use of any electrical devices.22 In view of the penalty imposed upon appellant, the RTC elevated the records of the case directly to the Court of Appeals for review pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.23 On 3 August 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision, affirming with modifications the Decision of the RTC, thus:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. JACK RACHO y RAQUERO, Appellant. DECISION NACHURA, J.: On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 affirming the Regional Trial Court2 (RTC) Joint Decision3 dated July 8, 2004 finding appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. The case stemmed from the following facts: On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team composed of member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the local police force to apprehend the appellant.4 The agent gave the police appellants name, together with his physical description. He also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the following day. On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROLANDO ARANETA y ABELLA @ BOTONG and MARILOU SANTOS y TANTAY @ MALOU, Accused-Appellants. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This is an appeal from the August 29, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02308, which affirmed the March 12, 2004 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 151, Pasig City (RTC),finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 5 and Section 11 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002." Criminal informations were filed in the RTC against Rolando Araneta y Abella a.k.a. "Botong" for Violation of Section 8 and Section 16 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended, in addition to the Information filed against him and co-accused Marilou Santos y Tantay a.k.a. "Malou" for Violation of Section 15, Article III in relation to Section 21, Article IV of R.A. 6425, as amended. In view of the enactment of R.A. No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002), the original informations were amended accordingly. The said Informations read: Criminal Case No. 11491-D People vs. Araneta & Santos (For Violation of Sec. 5 in relation to Sec. 26, Art. II, R.A. 9165) On or about July 5, 2002 in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized to sell, dispense, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO2 Danilo S. Damasco, a police poseur buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance weighing of (sic) eight (8) centigrams (0.08 gram), which was found positive to the test for metamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of said law. Contrary to Law. Criminal Case No. People vs. (For Violation of Sec. 11, Art. II, R.A. 9165) 11492-D Araneta
On or about July 5, 2002, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized to use or possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 1.22 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, which was found positive to the test for marijuana, a dangerous drug, and eight (8) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance with the following recorded net weight, to wit: 1) Exh. B1 RAA/070502 0.07 gram; 2) Exh. B2 RAA/070502 0.10 gram; 3) Exh. B3 RAA/070502 0.08 gram; 4) Exh. B4 RAA/070502 0.07 gram;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
SO ORDERED.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,1 Respondent. DECISION SERENO, J.: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 20112 and Resolution dated 8 July 2011. Statement of the Facts and of the Case The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the version of the prosecution, are as follows: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.3 Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued. During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion. In its 19 February 2009 Decision,4 the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs5committed on 10 March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also found his defense of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspects freedom of action is curtailed to a "degree associated with formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him "in custody" for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.) The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered "under arrest" at the time that his traffic citation was being made. It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense. This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation. Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with. This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them.14 It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation: The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the individuals will
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II