WarriorsRage:TheGreatTankBattleof73Easting NavalInstitutePress,2009

TheBattleof73Easting:AStudyin Leadership,CompetenceandMobile ArmoredFirepowerinAction.

PresentationtotheFirstInfantry DivisionMuseumatCantigny, 5September2012 DouglasMacgregor,PhD Colonel(ret)U.S.Army +17039756954

TheMission:FindandDestroythe RepublicanGuard!
Pin(theIraqiRepublicanGuard)withtheir backsagainstthesea,then,goinandwipe themoutOncetheyregonebeprepared tocontinuetheattacktoBaghdad.
GeneralNormanSchwarzkopf, November1990.

AttackIraqipoliticalmilitaryleadership andcommandandcontrol;gainand maintainairsuperiority;severIraqisupply lines,destroychemical,biologicaland nuclearcapability;destroyRepublican GuardforcesintheKuwaitiTheater; liberateKuwait.

U.S.CentralCommandOperations Order91001,17January1991

Expectationsin19901991: ConventionalWisdom
ThirdU.S.ArmyPersonnelCommandestimates VIICorpswilltake20,000casualtiesinthefirstfive daysoffightingtheIraqiArmy.
RichardSwain,LuckyWar.ThirdArmyin DesertStorm,page205

TheWhiteHousehadbeenaccustomedoverthe yearstothemilitarycominginwithverylargeforce requirementsforcontingencyplans.Thiswas clearlypartlyoutofcaution,buttherewasalsothe perceptionattimesitwastodissuadethe Presidentfromaction.

RobertM.Gates,DeputyNationalSecurity Advisor,1990,TheGeneralsWar,page 154.

IfSaddamwithdrawswithmostofhisforces intact,wehaventreallywon.
BrentScowcroft,NationalSecurityAdvisor, 1991fromAWorldTransformed,page 473.

GettingReadyfortheFight: LessonsinLeadership
Gettherightpeopleintotherightleadership positionsandtherestwilltakecareofitself.(Natural bornleaders!) Cavalryunitsorarmoredreconnaissanceoutfitsare likedeepseasharksthathavetoswimtoeatand live.Aslongasanarmoredcavalryunitisinmotion,it findsanddevoursitsenemy.Oncelaunchedinto action,itmustnotstop! Inthefastpacedactionofmobile,armoredcombat, disciplinemustbeaformofhabit(BattleDrill). Armoredwarfareishairtriggerfast,lethal,and unforgiving.Themarginbetweenvictorand vanquishedcanbeafractionofasecond.Waitingfor ordersisdeadly. Relentlesspreparationforoffensiveoperations suppressesthesoldiersnaturalinclinationstofear andhomesickness.

TheAdvanceintoIraq23 24February1991:
OBJ GATES OBJ MERREL
RedfoxForward Reconnaissance Element

Republican GuardCorps
OBJ MAY

OBJ FEUCHT PLDIXIE

LimitofAdvanceon24Feb. 1991at1700hours

CougarBattlegroup(Main Body)

LimitofAdvanceon24Feb.1991 at1000hours

PLBECKS

LimitofAdvanceon23Feb.1991 at1500hours
PLHARPS

Note:Distancefrom SaudiBordertoedge ofRepublicanGuard SecurityZonewas roughlyequaltothe distancefrom Washington,DCto Philadelphia, Pennsylvaniaor123 miles.

TheBattle:26February1991:
XX TenKilometer Zoneofattack. BoxFormation wasten kilometers deep.

FoxTroop

GhostTroop Versus

Directionof Movementtoward73 Easting

HawkCompany

EagleTroop

II Fragmentaryorder(FRAGO)0522hourstotheregiment:2ndACR[ArmoredCavalryRegiment] attacksEasttofixTawalkana MechanizedDivision;onorder,1ID[1st InfantryDivision]passes through2ndACRtocontinuetheattackEastacknowledge,over!

CougarBattleGroupCombatPower Soldiers 1,100 M1A1AbramsTanks 42 ArmoredFightingVehicles(Bradley) 41 155mmSelfPropelledHowitzers 8 4.2MortarsmountedinM113s 6 M113A2 12 RepublicanGuardBrigadeCombatPower Soldiers 2,100to2,300(estimated)

Versus

T72Tanks 70(tanksfromretreatingunitsmixed induringfighting) ArmoredFightingVehicles(alltypes) 80+ ArtillerySystems(alltypes) 20+ Trucks 4050

3rd AD

XX

59

10

68

2nd Cavalry

Ghost Troop 1600hrs

Situationbetween 1600and1700hours Ghost Troop 1610hrs

3AD XX 2ACR Ghost3rd Platoon

ScoutsMove forward1615hrs. 2nd PlatoonTanks attackat1630.

73EASTING

3T72 13BMP

1618hrsCougar 05 05 attacksEasttoward 70Easting

MINES

3T72s

Cougar3 Eagle Troop 1645hrs Eagle Troop 1630hrs

E2 MINES 1T72 1BMP

Cougar3 Eagle Troop 1607hrs

EagleTroop Punchestothe73 Easting 1618hrs.

17T72 18BMP

00

2/2 II 3/2

29T72 2T55 11BMP 3MTLB 1SA13

EagleTroop consolidatesalong 73Easting 1643hrs.

3rdArmoredDivisionZone ofAttack

2ndCavalrys LimitofAdvance 1700hrs 26Febto 0600hrs 27Feb alongthe70 Easting

73Easting

ActualCougar Deploymentalong the73Eastingfrom 1643to0600hrs

FoxTroop

GhostTroop

Note:CaissonBatterysGun Platoonswerepositioned immediatelybehindGhost andEagleTroops. HawkCompany EagleTroop

HeavyBlackLine MarksCougar Squadrons PositionsAlongthe 73Eastingafter 1700hours26 February

2ndSquadron

ll
3rdSquadron

IronTroop

N E

FortyminutesafterEagleTroop attacks,IronTroopattacksto73 Easting, thenfallsbackbehind70 Easting,LimitofAdvance.

TheOutcome:
28February1991 Thegate'sclosedWhatisn'tescapingisheavytanks,whatisn't escapingisartillerypiecesI'mtalkingaboutthegatethatclosedonthe warmachinethatisoutthere.
GeneralNormanSchwarzkopf,CDR,U.S.Central Command,28February1991

27March1991 Inaddition,thegeneral(Schwarzkopf)saidintheinterview,major RepublicanGuardunitshad"buggedout"beforethemainattackby Americanforces andcrossedtheEuphratesRiver Whentheshooting stopped,thegeneralsaid,hewas"suckered"byIraqimilitary commanderswhoaskedforandreceivedpermissiontoflyhelicopters overIraq.

PatrickE.Tyler,AftertheWar;SchwarzkopfSays TruceEnabled IraqistoEscape,TheNewYorkTimes,27March1991.

7October1994 80,000IraqitroopsincludingtwoveteranRepublicanGuarddivisions moveSouthtowardKuwaitiBorder.MadeleineK.AlbrighttellstheUN SecurityCouncilIraqmightsoonhavesome60,000troopsand1,000 tankspoisedtoattackKuwait.U.S.respondsputting36,000troopson planesandsettinganother160,000inmotion.

Lessonsfromthe73Easting Observed,butnotlearned:
Thedistantrearofanarmyengagedinbattleisnotthebestplacefromwhich tojudgecorrectlywhatisgoingoninfront.
GeneralU.S.Grant,1863

Thereisonlyonetacticalprinciplewhichisnotsubjecttochange.Itistouse themeansathandtoinflictthemaximumamountofwound,death,and destructionontheenemyintheminimumamountoftime."

GeneralGeorgeS.PattonJr.,1942

"ThecasualtiesarethelowestinanyArmyvehicles,despitehowoftentheAbrams (Tank)istargeted about70%ofthemorethan1,100tanksusedinIraqhavebeen struckbyenemyfire,mostlywithminordamage.

SteveKomarow,USAToday,30March2005,page3.

TheAmericanpeopledontfullyrealizewhatsgoingon,saidthe27yearoldStaff SergeantfromBuffalo,NewYork.Theyjustknowbackhomewhatthehigherups heretellthem.Butthehigherupsdontgoanywhere,andactuallytheyonlygoto thesafeplaces,placeswithalittlebitofgunfire.

JoshuaPartlow,IDontThinkThisPlaceisWorthAnotherSoldiersLife, TheWashingtonPost, 27October2007,pageA10.