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Conflict and Conflict Resolution, Social
Psychology of
The term ‘conflict’ has two broad meanings: o
ert
conflict, which refers to clashing actions by two or
more parties, as in a fist fight or war, and subjecti
e
conflict, which refers to perceived divergence of interest
or annoyance attributed to another party. Subjective
conflict is often a source of overt conflict, as when
annoyance about a neighbor’s loud music leads to a
shouting match. But subjective conflict can produce
other outcomes as well, including use of the following
four basic strategies: contending, problem solving,
yielding, and inaction. Only one of these, contending,
leads to overt conflict.
Conflict occurs at all levels of society, from the
interpersonal to the international, and hence is of
interest to most branches of the social and behavioral
sciences. Conflict has attracted the attention of re-
searchers because of its large costs and benefits. Costs
are incurred when conflict escalates to the point of
harming relationships, destroying property, or injur-
ing people. Benefits accrue because conflict presides
over most significant social change; contributes to
solidarity within conflicting groups; and in its milder
forms, often leads to the reconciliation of legitimate
interests, thus strengthening relationships and safe-
guarding the peace.
1. Sources of Conflict
The modern social psychology of conflict began with a
demonstration field experiment by Sherif (1966).
Sherif ran several summer camps in which he produced
overt conflict between two cabins of preadolescent
boys and then resolved this conflict. Conflict was
produced by means of the two sources of subjective
conflict mentioned above: divergence of interest (for
example, competitive games) and annoyance attri-
buted to the other group (for example, the counselors
vandalized one cabins’ campgrounds and blamed it on
the other cabin).
What conditions produce divergence of interest and
annoyance from others? One answer is scarce re-
sources. A second is role differentiation that produces
disparate values, as between buyer and seller, parent
and child, sales and production. A third is any
condition that causes aspirations to rise rapidly (such
as a sudden improvement in outcomes) or to become
inconsistent with those of another party (such as
ambiguity about which party is more powerful). A
fourth is any source of distrust, because distrust tends
to block cooperation and produce defensive behavior,
which often annoys or frightens the other party.
When groups rather than individuals are involved,
additional mechanisms encourage conflict. Groups
are less trusted than individuals. Also, a perception
that one’s group is deprived relative to a reasonable
standard (fraternalistic depri
ation) has been shown
to be a major source of political conflict. Arguing that
Sherif’s ‘realistic conflict theory’ is too narrow, Tajfel
(1978) proposes that intergroup conflict often arises
because group members compete with other groups in
an effort to feel good about their social identity and
hence about themselves. Another unique aspect of
groups is the role of leadership. Leaders and would-be
leaders often dramatize frustration at the hands of
other groups, exacerbating conflicts while strength-
ening their position with their constituents.
2. Strategic Choice in Conflict
Rubin et al. (1994) have put forward a dual concern
model of the psychological states that affect choice
2531
Conflict and Conflict Resolution, Social Psychology of
Concern about other’s outcomes
Yielding
Inaction
Concern about own outcomes
Figure 1
The dual concern model (after Pruitt and Carnevale
1993, p. 105)
among the four basic strategies mentioned earlier.
Shown in Fig. 1, this model postulates two kinds of
concern: concern about own outcomes (‘self-concern’)
and concern about the other party’s outcomes (‘other-
concern’), each ranging from weak to strong. People
with strong self-concern have high, inflexible aspir-
ations and are resistant to concession making. People
with strong other-concern place importance on the
other party’s interests. Self-concern and other-concern
are independent dimensions rather than opposite ends
of a continuum. Beginning in the upper left-hand
quadrant of Fig. 1, low self-concern coupled with high
other-concern is assumed to produce a strong altruistic
orientation, which encourages yielding. High self-
concern combined with high other-concern is assumed
to produce a strong cooperative orientation, which
encourages problem solving. High self-concern com-
bined with low other-concern is assumed to produce a
strong individualistic orientation, which leads to the
use of contentious tactics. Low self-concern coupled
with low other-concern is assumed to produce inac-
tion, an absence of efforts to achieve anything.
The dual concern model, though not a compre-
hensive theory of strategic choice, fits a lot of data
from psychometric and experimental research. The
psychometric tradition, which employs factor analysis
and multidimensional scaling, views strategic prefer-
ences as individual differences in ‘conflict style.’ The
experimental tradition, which involves studies of
negotiation behavior, examines conditions that affect
the likelihood of choosing each strategy. These studies
have identified several sources of self-concern, in-
cluding having high aspirations or fallback positions,
being an accountable representative, and negatively
framing the issues so that concessions are interpreted
as loss rather than failure to gain. Sources of other-
concern include having a close relationship with or
dependence on the other party, and being in a positive
2532
mood. Other research suggests that contentious tactics
are more likely to be adopted the greater the an-
Problem noyance or perceived divergence of interest, the more
solving
dehumanized the target, and the more deindividuated
the actor or target.
When increasingly harsh contentious tactics are
used in a conflict, escalation is said to occur. Escalation
usually results from a conflict spiral in which each
Contending party is reacting to the other party’s most recent
actions. However, some escalation consists of one
party’s reactions to persistent annoyance from another
party (Pruitt 1998). Escalation is often accompanied
by other changes: issues proliferate, negative attitudes
and partisan perceptions develop, distrust sets in,
goals change from doing well for oneself to hurting the
other party, and broader communities polarize into
hostile camps (Rubin et al. 1994). If groups are
involved, ingroup solidarity usually increases and
militant leaders often become more prominent. These
changes tend to outlive the conflict in which they are
generated, hurting the broader relationship between
the parties and making the next conflict episode more
likely to escalate (Coleman 1957).
3. Conditions that Encourage Conflict Resolution
Conflict resolution refers to any reduction in the
severity of conflict or mitigation of its underlying
causes. It may entail de-escalation of an overt struggle
or reconciliation (in whole or in part) of divergent
interests.
Social psychologists have long been interested in
the role of social contact and communication in the
resolution of conflict. Research has shown that these
procedures help to alleviate mild conflict but may be
worse than useless in severe conflict, allowing argu-
ments and fights to develop (Deutsch 1973). Sherif
(1966) found that a better way to reverse escalation in
his camps was to get the boys to cooperate on
superordinate (i.e., shared) goals. The value of this
technique has been confirmed in other settings.
Zartman (1997), an international relations scholar
who takes a psychological approach, has argued that
severe conflict is most likely to be resolved when both
sides become motivated to escape the conflict, a
condition he calls ripeness. He finds that superordinate
goals (‘mutually enticing opportunities’) seldom
underlie ripeness in international conflict and civil
war. Rather, ripeness is usually produced by a mutually
hurting stalemate, in which the parties find that they
are enduring unacceptable costs in a struggle they
cannot win, sometimes augmented by the perception
of an impending catastrophe if the conflict continues.
It can be argued that severe conflicts of the kind
discussed by Zartman will only move toward res-
olution if ripeness is supplemented by optimism about
the success of conciliatory actions. Optimism derives
from two sources: working trust, a belief that the other

side is also motivated to resolve the conflict, and
percei
ed common ground, a perception that a mutually
acceptable agreement is actually possible.
Optimism can develop in a number of ways.
Sometimes one of the parties takes unilateral con-
ciliatory initiati
es that encourage the other party to
become more trusting. Such initiatives are especially
effective when they are noticeable and unexpected, are
fully explained, and cannot be construed as a trick or
sign of weakness (Rubin et al. 1994). In severe
conflicts, optimism more commonly arises out of
intervention by intermediaries. Sometimes the psycho-
logical and social distance between adversaries is so
great that a chain of two or more intermediaries is
necessary to bridge the gap.
4. Negotiation
Conflict resolution can begin in a number of ways, but
to be successful, it usually must culminate in nego-
tiation. In other words, the parties must eventually try
to work out their differences.
Research on negotiation has been the centerpiece of
the social psychological approach to conflict for many
years. Most of it is done in the laboratory with
experimental games, but case studies and question-
naires are also sometimes used. At one time, research
on negotiation was mostly performed in departments
of psychology, but today, the main locus of this
research is in management schools, where investiga-
tors who are basically social psychologists conduct
dozens of studies each year. Early experimental re-
search dealt with negotiation about a single issue (e.g.,
a price or a wage rate), where one party’s gain is the
other’s loss. But current research usually looks at
more complex settings that have integrati
e potential,
in the sense that all parties can do well if they engage
in problem solving. An important generalization,
which applies to both kinds of settings, is that higher
demands and slower concessions make it harder to
reach agreement but, if agreement is reached, produce
more favorable outcomes. Summaries of the psycho-
logical research on negotiation can be found in
Bazerman et al. (2000) and Pruitt and Carnevale
(1993).
5. Third Party Inter
ention
When conflict threatens to escalate and negotiation is
ineffective, third parties often intervene. Five inter-
vention procedures will be reviewed here: mediation,
arbitration, relationship therapy, peacekeeping, and
the design of conflict management systems.
In mediation, a third party assists the disputants
with their negotiation. (Mediation includes the ac-
tivities of intermediaries, a topic discussed earlier.)
Conflict and Conflict Resolution, Social Psychology of
Among the most important mediator tactics are
building rapport with the disputants, facilitating com-
munication, questioning unrealistic aspirations, re-
framing the issues, encouraging disputant creativity,
and thinking up new solutions if the disputants fail to
do so. Several studies support a broad generalization,
that vigorous mediator intervention tends to be
effective when the parties are hostile toward each other
or lack the motivation to escape their conflict but is
counterproductive when the opposite is true (Rubin et
al. 1994). Mediators are especially likely to succeed
when the parties are highly motivated to resolve the
conflict, resource shortages are not severe, and the
issues do not involve general principles. Mediator
neutrality usually contributes to the success of me-
diation but is not as essential, as formerly believed.
Indeed, success is sometimes achieved because the
mediator is closer to the side that must make the larger
concessions (Kressel et al. 1989).
In arbitration, the third party renders a judgment
about the proper solution to the conflict. Several
studies have examined the impact of med-arb, a
procedure in which binding arbitration occurs if
agreement is not reached in mediation. This procedure
usually motivates the disputants to try harder to solve
their dispute during the mediation phase, because they
fear loss of control over their outcomes if arbitration
occurs (Kressel et al. 1989).
When disputants have a distressed relationship,
third parties sometimes engage in relationship therapy
(Pruitt 1998). Relationship therapy, which has been
pioneered by marital therapists, usually involves prob-
lem solving training, in which the parties are taught
skills of listening, clear communication, avoiding
blame, analyzing needs, and brainstorming for solu-
tions. The therapist may also help the disputants
identify repetitive patterns of interaction that are
contributing to the conflict. Kelman (1992) has de-
veloped problem sol
ing workshops, a form of re-
lationship therapy for intergroup and international
conflict. In these workshops, selected members of both
groups meet for several days to analyze the conflict.
When conflicts become violent or threaten to do so,
third party intervention may take the form of peace-
keeping. Examples include separating fighting chil-
dren, arresting abusive spouses, and United Nations
operations within ethnically divided countries. Fisher
and Keashly (Fisher 1990) have proposed a normative
model which recommends that third parties: (a) use
peace keeping in violent conflicts, (b) provide incen-
tives to encourage ripeness in heavily escalated but
nonviolent conflicts, (c) offer relationship therapy
(they call it ‘consultation’) in moderately escalated
conflicts, and (d) mediate mildly escalated conflicts.
This model assumes that each of these strategies
produces the conditions necessary for the success of
the next strategy in the list.
A final third-party role is the design of conflict
management systems for large social entities such as
2533
Conflict and Conflict Resolution, Social Psychology of
schools, factories, and communities. Guidelines put
forward by Ury et al. (1988) include identifying
potentially antagonistic groups, appointing and train-
ing prospective negotiators on each side who will meet
if conflict develops, appointing and training prospec-
tive mediators to help these negotiators, and agreeing
to observe an immediate cooling-off period whenever
conflict develops. Such systems work better if they
involve early warning systems that allow negotiators
and mediators to mobilize in advance of hostilities.
6. Disputant Preferences among Conflict
Resolution Procedures
A number of studies have examined disputant prefer-
ences among the procedures available for conflict
resolution. A persistent finding is that arbitration is
preferred to autocratic decision making. According to
Lind and Tyler (1988), this shows that having a voice
in the proceedings contributes to a sense of procedural
justice. Preferences among negotiation, mediation,
and arbitration depend on the circumstances. For
example, high time pressure enhances attraction to
arbitration, presumably because it can be finished up
quickly. On the other hand, people in close relation-
ships tend to reject arbitration, presumably because of
its coercive features. Sequences of preferences are
often found, a common one being to start with
negotiation and move to third-party intervention if
negotiation is unsuccessful (Pruitt and Carnevale
1993).
Some recent research has concerned cultural differ-
ences in preferences among conflict resolution proce-
dures. For example, when dealing with ingroup
members, people from collectivist societies prefer
nonconfrontational procedures, hence, they are less
attracted to direct competition and problem solving
than people from individualist societies (Bazerman et
al. 2000). But when dealing with outgroup members,
collectivists tend to be more competitive than indivi-
dualists (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993).
7. Conclusions
Conflict and conflict resolution are vigorous research
fields. The interdisciplinary nature of these fields can
be seen in the annual conferences of the International
Association for Conflict Management and the pages
of the Journal of Conflict Resolution, the International
Journal of Conflict Management, and the Negotiation
Journal. Social psychologists in psychology depart-
ments were more prominent in these fields at an earlier
time than they are today. But the contribution of
social psychology is readily apparent in the work of
investigators from most other disciplines.
Three criticisms of these fields seem appropriate.
The first is that they lack an overarching theory and
2534
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences
mainly depend on ideas from other disciplines, a
problem shared with many other branches of the
social sciences. The other two criticisms concern the
study of negotiation. One is that there is too much
emphasis on the phase of actual negotiation, in which
joint decisions are made, as opposed to the pre- and
postnegotiation phases. Indeed, the latter two phases
are often longer and more complex than the phase of
actual negotiation and have more bearing on whether
conflict is resolved (Druckman 1986). The other
criticism is that there is too much research on
negotiation altogether. Negotiation is, after all, only
one star in a much larger universe.
See also: Conflict and Socioemotional Development;
Conflict: Anthropological Aspects; Conflict\Con-
sensus; Conflict Sociology; Dispute Resolution in
Economics; Mediation, Arbitration, and Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR); Negotiation and Bar-
gaining: Role of Lawyers
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D. G. Pruitt
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