the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the editors of The Journal of Interdisciplinary History

Levi-Strauss and History Claude Levi-Strauss: The Anthropologist as Hero by E. Nelson Hayes; Tanya Hayes Review by: T. O. Beidelman The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring, 1971), pp. 511-525 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/202625 . Accessed: 06/08/2012 23:08
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T. O. Beidelman

Levi-Strauss and History

264 pp. $I0.00 ($2.95 paper).

Mass.,The M.I.T. Press,1970) Hayesand TanyaHayes(Cambridge, source datafor students of seekTheworkunder reviewis a fascinating in this case, the to understand sociologyof an intellectual vogue, ing Yet brandof structuralism. like the proverbial ClaudeLevi-Strauss' eachauthor blindmen gropingover variousportionsof an elephant, so his of far presents own version Levi-Strauss thatwe learn moreabout and outlookthan aboutLevi-Strauss the commentator his particular rehimself.Most of the contributions minorpieces-professional are from such viewsorbriefcommentaries non-scholarly Some, magazines. asthoseby DavidMaybury-Lewis, RobertMurphy, E. R. Leach, and that has areperceptive assume the reader considerable but background in cultural Steinercombinesexcellence Only George anthropology. The essays Sanche Gramont, with a less specialized de by approach. in andSusan areembarrassing theignorance H. Stuart Hughes, Sontag of theirauthors' and pronouncements concerning anthropology; the lesssaidaboutthe remaining the The essays, better. valueof thiscollecin tion is questionable termsof the aimsstated the editors by (neither, is a professional for a incidentally, anthropologist), it is hardly coherent "introduction Levi-Strauss to for and.dependable primarily a nonaudience, professional especially college students" (viii). At present, slim still the alas,Leach's paperback remains bestguide.I Before one can discussany facet of Levi-Strauss' writing, one shouldhave some graspof his personal view of the world and his of The profession. key to thislies in threeaspects his field experience. By thisI do not referto his fieldwork se which,judgingfrom his per was somewhat insubstantial. Rather,I mean published ethnography, thathisveryself-conscious attitudes aboutanthropology preliterate and
Thomas 0. Beidelman is Associate Professor of Anthropology at New York University. He is the author of Matrilineal Peoples of Eastern Tanzania (London, I967) and The Kaguru (New York, 1971) and has published numerous articles on East African ethnography. I E. R. Leach, Le'vi-Strauss (London, 1970); I review Leach's study in "Public Relations Officer of the Mind," Anthropos(in press).

as ClaudeLevi-Strauss:The Anthropologist Hero. Edited by E. Nelson

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societies are reflectionsof his experience in Brazil2 and his resultant judgments on the relative merits of civilized and primitive societies. All of these are centralto his concept of history. There are three relevantaspectsof his field experience: I) Levi-Strauss' profoundly negative view of modern civilization, though perhapsjustified, owes much to his particularand dejecting experiences with a group of dying cultures lived out by a native Amerindianpopulationwhich itself seemsdoomed. Most of the aboriginal societiesof America have undergonerapidand violent destruction in the face of Europeancolonization.The Indiansof Brazilwere at first hunted down by a backwardpeasantry,then neglected and later maladministeredby an inept government, and finally proselytized by Americanfundamentalist missionaries. Their inevitabledestructionand disorientation theme for Levi-Strauss' book, conjureup an appropriate Tristes not only for the participants for the anthropological but tropiques, observeras well. But would Levi-Strauss have written so negatively of culturalcontact and change had he worked in Asia or Africa where, despite disastersand colonial exploitation, the indigenous peoples not only survive and increasebut are now often aggressivelyclamoringfor their own forms of modern society? 2) Anotherfeatureof his field experienceis its relativesuperficiality. The interrelated tendenciestoward superficiality oversimplification and are important since they allow Levi-Straussto interpret with great freedom what he considersthe basicforcesbehind thesecultures.It does not appearthat Levi-Strauss residedwith any one society for more than a few months, and sometimeshis reportsrest upon observationsmade in a few weeks or days. In contrast,many anthropologistsfeel that a stay of eighteen months to two yearsin one locale is barelysufficientto grasp the outlines of a culture. Certainly, it seems unlikely that he masteredanyindigenouslanguage.Granted, is aperceptiveandhighly he but some of his colleaguesneverthelessentertain imaginativeobserver, misgivings regardinghow many of his findings are based on objective and reliabledataand how many on his own highly colored interpretations and projections.Certainly,one must residea considerable time in
In Tristes tropiques(Paris, 1955), translated by John Russell and published as A World on the Wane (London, I96I), Levi-Strauss touches upon nearly all of the themes which he later elaborates in his more controversial works. It is certainly this book more than any other of his writings that is generally appreciated and which may well survive as a kind of classic, though not as a scientific or scholarly achievement. For those interested in gaining insight into the personal values behind his work, 373-38I of the English translation are essential reading.
2

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are differences individualities discernible and any areabeforeprofound within a society.Yet Levi-Strauss' homoseem strikingly primitives both as personswithin a societyand even as cultural geneous types betweendifferent societies: . . my threemonths' ". compared intimacy with the nativeshad taughtme to know theirneeds,and thoseneeds were much the same-amazinglyso, in fact-from one end of the SouthAmerican continent theother."3 to Briefexposure a particular groupwouldmatter if the alien less to of investigation were material cultureor physicaltypes,but subject Levi-Strauss' of lies reputation in his interpretation how primitive level of a formal peoplethink.Forhim, thisis notjust on the difficult in andtaxonomic of categories set embedded a language, cosmological but involves even deeperlevels of significance. Thus we find him writing,oftenwith little demonstrable proof,not only of what these that peoplesaytheythinkandwantbut of thingshe implies theyyearn to but theirmyths,arts, half-consciously attain canonlyrealize through andlifestyles. dare so, onemusteither To do knowa society profoundly well-or so littlethatone is unimpeded apparently facts. discrepant by Whateverelse one may write about Levi-Strauss, can hardly one describe him as "systematic" (thoughHughesdoes so in his essay). Nowherein his writingsdoeshe examineall of the evidencefor any and cases to societyhe considers, he avoidsmanynegative contrary any This he haspresented. failure respect consider of the to and all theory data of bent,4but reported may be a reflection his own neo-Frazerian it alsoseemsconsistent his failure engagein trulyintensive with to and sustained fieldwork with any one particular Both in fieldwork society. andin analytical to writing,we havea smorgasbord approach culture andsociety,a positionwhichis consistent with Levi-Strauss' tendency to minimize detailed in fundamental differences orderto assert cultural similarities way of his structuralist idiom. by his describes journeysto remoteareasand exotic 3) Levi-Strauss in He aspartof a personal of peoples quest search self-realization. writes of alienation and with a mixtureof pain, enthusiasm, irony which a and With each suggests dramatic far from self-effacing personality. Levi-Strauss more and readingone findsthat every savageresembles
3 A World on the Wane, 23 5. Leach has elsewhere commented on Levi-Strauss' tendency to over-homogenize and anthropomorphize societies. See E. R. Leach, "Levi-Strauss: Anthropologist and Philosopher," New Left Review, XXXIV (1965), I2-37. 4 This has been observed elsewhere; cf. E. R. Leach, "'Kachin' and 'Haka Chin': A Rejoinder to Levi-Strauss," Man, IV (1969), 277-285; Beidelman, "Public Relations Officer."

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and is a to unturned more,thateverycustom trait merely further pebble reveal himself bothto himselfandto the world whichhe disdains yet I seemsto yearnto attract. can thinkof no otherwritingsin anthroThis with self-consciousness. neednot be alwaysa pology so suffused This fault,butit cansometimes in theway of objectivity. combinaget far toward explaininghis tion of escapismand self-assertion goes to of attraction a youngergeneration anthropologists concerned about in the questfor identityandmeaning a worldof violatedandindetermoral minate values. I haveprefaced discussion Levi-Strauss' of notionsof history my his at because viewson historymay be criticized with thesecomments which two levels:Oneis thatthemoralandthephilosophical positions seem To he assumes idiosyncratic. sometheymayseemuntenable. They but arenot necessarily wrongin the sensethatthey canbe disproved, in or areunworkable sincetheyleadto paralysis useful they judgments A is thatthefactson whichthesenotionsarebased actions. second point as areso distorted poorlyconsidered to maketheentire and presentation thanconvincing demonstraof assertion rather a merematter confident as but tion. This finalchargeis serious, to demonstrate much would of for careful examination allof theevidence eachof hisproposirequire tions,a taskfarbeyondthe scopeof thispaper.I canonly present my reader. statement the non-anthropological to as criticisms a cautionary all What haveto examine of thefacts. wouldhimself Forproofareader of is that is important is thatthereader madeaware a goodnumber here one of Levi-Strauss' interpretanearlyevery question anthropologists on detailfrom the tionswherethesearegrounded any kindof factual andarchaeological record.5 ethnographic in workswhich touch Thereare passages many of Levi-Strauss' it of but theproblems history, unquestionablywastheconcluding upon notion of in of Mind,6 which he attacksSartre's chapter The Savage had to that drew attention his views. However,Levi-Strauss history, in Raceand forwardsimilarnotionsearlierin Tristes tropiques,7 put
5 For example, cf. Leach, "'Kachin"'; F. Rackerby, "Levi-Strauss, Poverty Point, and the Misuse of Analogy," AmericanAntiquity, XXXIII (1968), 388-390. 6 La Pensee sauvage (Paris, 1962); English translation, The Savage Mind (Chicago, 1966). 7 A Wlorldon the Wane contains an incredibly simplistic and subjective account of preColumbian American history which advances wild diffusionist hypotheses on the most meager bits of myth and art motifs (239-248). Levi-Strauss seems to be satirizing himself when he states of such speculation: "Nothing is possible: everything, therefore, is possible" (248). It is here, too, that he first presents his pessimistic "entropy" theory about the history of human endeavor (397).

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History,8 in his inaugural lecture for the chair of social anthropology at the College de France,9 and in a published series of radio interviews.0I His thought is convoluted and at times vague and contradictory so that it is not always easy to resolve a position taken at one point in his writing with another taken later. For this reason the best method of expounding his interpretation of history seems to be chronological. I begin with Race and History (1952). Despite its title, the basic theme of this brief study is the advocacy of social diversity. "A culture's chance of uniting the complex body of inventions of all sorts which we describe as a civilization depends on the number and diversity of the other cultures with which it is working out, generally involuntarily, a common strategy. Number and diversity: a comparison of the Old World with the New on the eve of the latter's discovery provides a good illustration of the need for these two factors" (39). The author goes on to maintain that it was the diversity of cultures in the Old World which led to their vitality and that the New World cultures, being less diverse and complex, more easily succumbed to alien conquest."I No proof is offered for this audacious assertion other than a few over-general remarks, and no attempt is made to account for any technological differences nor for similar annihilations or conquests of societies in the Old World. In any case, the theory seems contradictory: on the one hand, "The one real calamity, the one fatal flaw which can afflict a group of men and prevent them from fulfilment is to be alone" (40); yet, on the other, "it is difficult to see how one civilization can hope to benefit from the way of life of another, unless it is prepared to renounce its own individuality" (41). How the relations between China and Japan, China and India, and Greece and Rome fit into all of this is difficult to tell. During this exposition Levi-Strauss uses the term "history" in two rather different ways. At some points he equates history with
8 Race et histoire(Paris, 1952); simultaneously published in English as Race and History (Paris, 1952). 9 LeFoninauguralefaite le mardi5janvier 1960 (Paris, 1960); translated by S. O. Paul and R. A. Paul and published as The Scope of Anthropology(London, 1967). o0 G. Charbonnier (ed.), Entretiensavec Claude Levi-Strauss (Paris, I96I); translated by John and Doreen Weightman and published as Conversationswith Claude Levi-Strauss (London, I969). II This seems an expansion of the Durkheimian notion of the desirability of social differentiation, as exhibited in his theories on the division of labor, a point which LeviStrauss takes up along the same lines in his provocative essay, "The Family," in Harry Shapiro (ed.), Man, Culture, and Society (New York, I960), 261-285; contrast this with :mile Durkheim, The Division of Labour (Glencoe, I947), 56-61.

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myth, history simply being a way of looking at the past in order to rationalize the present. At other times, he speaks of events over time as they "really" took place, that is, as though he is being objective and outside and beyond cultural values. The former notion of history relates to the ideas he later advances in his dispute with Sartre. I) "What would be the observer's attitude toward a civilization which had concentrated on developing values of its own, none of which was likely to affect his civilization: Would he not be inclined to describe that civilization as 'stationary'? In other words, does the distinction between the two types of history depend on the intrinsic nature of the cultures to which the terms are applied, or does it not rather result from the ethnocentric points of view which we always adopted in assessing the value of a different culture? We should thus regard as 'cumulative' any culture developing in a direction similar to our own, that is to say, whose development would appear to us to be significant. Other cultures, on the contrary, would seem to us to be 'stationary,' not necessarily because they are so in fact, but because the line of their development has no meaning for us, and cannot be measured in terms of the
criteria we employ" (23).

The problem is that facts can never be anything but what we can perceive as facts and this in turn remains imbedded in the totality of our own language and culture. If there is a factual truth outside of this formulation, it can be of little significance to us. If we claim to transcend our own culture, and if we communicate with other, disparate segments of our own society, then we have broadened the perspective of our social world; if we have failed in such communication, we are very likely to be labeled eccentrics or madmen. Having put forward the far from original notion that time is related to perceived differences, Levi-Strauss goes on to describe our concept of history, on its broadest scale (social evolution), as another myth-myth being for him the means by which men resolve the logical scandals presented when they confront reality with their particular cosmology. He says: Facedwith the two temptationsof condemning things which are offensive to him emotionally or of denying differenceswhich are beyond his intellectual grasp, modern man has launched out on countless lines of philosophicaland sociological speculationin a vain attempt to achieve a compromise between these two contradictorypoles, and to account for the diversity of cultures while seeking, at the same time, to eradicate what still shocks and offends him in that diversity.

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But however much these lines of speculationmay differ, and however strangesome of them may be, they all, in point of fact, come back to a single formula, which might probably best be described by the In expressionfalse evolutionism. what does this consist? It is really an to wipe out the diversity of cultureswhile pretendingto accord attempt it full recognition. If the variousconditionsin which human societiesare found, both in the past and in far distantlands, are treated as phasesor stagesin a single line of development, startingfrom the same point and leading toward the same end, it seems clear that the diversity is merely apparent.Humanity is claimed to be one and the same everywhere ....
[I4]

Of course, this is a gross oversimplification of contemporary theories of social evolution and smacks of many ideas popular in the Victorian era. Furthermore, I see little reason why similar objections cannot be raised against Levi-Strauss himself His theories about the fundamental structure of the human mind simply locate the "mythical" solvent elsewhere, attempting not only to minimize diversity even while lauding it, but to deny to time most of the significances which conventional historians have given it. We shall see that for Levi-Strauss time does exert a profound influence upon mankind, but only in terms so broad as to be irrelevant to conduct or judgment. For him, the ultimate significance of time is that it gives sufficient dimensions to human activities for these to lead to the eventual dissolution of all societies and the annihilation of all men everywhere. Possibly so, but this seems more useful as eschatology than as social science. 2) At other points, he writes of history in a sense which suggests something more objective: [Thereare]two types of history:a progressive,acquisitivetype, in which discoveries and inventions are accumulatedto build up great civilizations; and another type, possibly equally active and calling for the utilization of as much talent, but lacking the gift of synthesiswhich is the hall-mark of the first. All innovations, instead of being added to previous innovations tending in the same direction, would be absorbed in a sort of undulating tide which, once in motion, could never be canalizedin a permanentdirection. [I9] For Levi-Strauss, primitive societies fit this second category. It is difficult to resolve this view with that advanced under heading (I), for there, differences were simply the product of perception determined by one's society; whereas here, there are, objectively speaking, two different types of social processes going on in time. This seems confusing and

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inconsistent, but it does allow Levi-Strauss to preserve his dichotomization between civilized (hot, fluid) societies and primitive (cool, static) ones, whereas the assertions in heading (2) enable him to disallow any conventional evaluation of these which would judge civilization superior to primitive life. In his inaugural address, Levi-Strauss speaks of the possibilities of reconstructing the past by applying new scientific advances to archaeological methods. He goes on to remark: "This historian's profession of faith may come as a surprise, since I have at times been criticized for being uninterested in history and for paying scant attention to it in my work" (25). Indeed, history seems to hold few positive interests for Levi-Strauss. He goes on to say: In truth,it is the natureof the factswe study which leadsus to distinguish within them that which belongs to the order of structureand that which belongs to the order of event. Important as the historical perspective which-as may be, we can only attainit at the end: afterlong researches radiocarbondating and palynology demonstrate-are not even always within our competence. By contrast, the diversity of human societies and their number-several thousand still at the end of the nineteenth century-make it seem to us as if they were displayed in the present. There is no cause for surprise,then, if we take a cue from our object of study and adopt a transformational ratherthan afluxionalmodel. [30] Knowing Levi-Strauss, there is no cause for surprise, but data on social change are incredibly rich and offer other alternatives for analysis besides archaeology. In describing his transformational model, LeviStrauss engages in a quasi-scientific idiom which has sometimes led to his being incorrectly described as objective or as having a method. He explains how he abstracts logical systems from the facts observed in the field and then suggests that these can be expanded in terms of their own internal logic in order to understand their scope and possibilities. He writes of playing with these models "in the laboratory," but it is merely the laboratory of his own mind. He concludes with the Gallic summation: "In the absence of an inaccessible factual truth, we would have arrived at a truth of reason" (34). He ends his address by referring to an ideal civilization in which machines would do the burdensome tasks of men while men would be freed from exploitation. This relates to Levi-Strauss' belief that highly complex, internally differentiated, literate societies (civilizations) ordinarily exist only at the terrible price of exploitation and human

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and For of a are suffering. himthearts merely by-product literacy, man's function literacy to enable to exploitandenslave another.12 one of is men In contrast, existfreeof the sinof hecticproduction, societies primitive whichis possible of and only by the enslavement alienation the masses, while civilization's franticproductivity profoundwrong compounds betweenall civilizauponwrong.Forhim, thereis moreresemblance thanthere between two categories. ends,"Then, is culture He the having entirelytaken over the burdenof manufacturing progress,society would be free from the millennial cursewhich has compelledit to enslave menin orderthattherebe progress. Henceforth, historywould makeitselfby itself.Society, wouldbe and outside abovehistory, placed able to exhibit once again that regularand, as it were, crystalline teachus is not structure whichthe best-preserved primitive of societies
antagonisticto the human condition" (49). tions, on the one hand, and between all primitivesocieties,on the other, mastery over his environment is apparentlyonly incidental; the real

It is difficult makeout precisely to what is meantby thesecomand ments, whatis meant a society being"outside above by by especially and history, of history."A little Weber, the synthesizer sociology at wouldleadtowardclearer of the possible; leastfor Weber appraisal the motivations self-aggrandizement power remainrelatively and of
constant from society to society and provide bases for comparative

it that objective study.WithLevi-Straussappears somekindof absolute in inheres structures themselves-if,indeed,anythingcan be morality madeout of the preceding passages. lecturehe speaksof socialgoals and Althoughin his inaugural with in makessome moraljudgmentson societies, his Conversations with his otherwork wherehe has Charbonnier is more consistent he and affairs in how hisstudies shownlittleinterest contemporary in may beenmodifiedby has aid society:"Butmy political attitude not really and it the factthatI became anthropologist; remains an outside, almost andso I mustadmitthatit is to, thinking, impervious my professional an essentially Thisis all the more truein thatit is emotional attitude.
very difficult to bridge the gap between the objective attitude one

other communities from the strivesto maintainwhen considering in outsideandthe situation whichone findsoneself,willy-nilly,inside heim,andFreud.
I2

one's own society" (13). Yet he claims inspirationfrom Marx, DurkIn Conversations(29-3 I), he provides the most extended exposition of this view.

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Elsewhere, he retreats before any opportunities to disclose some immediate relevance of his findings for his own society: "You are asking me to make a comparison, but I would not be an anthropologist if I did not abstain from commenting on the position of one particular society, which happens to be our own, in the light of observations deriving from other societies" (48). When asked to make a comparative judgment between our culture and certain primitive ones, he states: "But if the anthropologist allowed himself to be obsessed by problems of this kind, he would become a philosopher and cease to practice anthropology. His function is a more modest one. It consists in marking out a particular sector, which is the total category of cultural phenomena, and within this prescribed field the anthropologist undertakes a task which is comparable to that performed by the botanist, the zoologist or the entomologist, a task of description and classification...." (I53). At the least, this seems inconsistent since Levi-Strauss' notions about the contrast between civilization and primitive societies, or about the biases of historical writers, indicate pervasive and important value judgments. The preceding three quotations suggest a wrong-headed conception of both the biological and social sciences. Levi-Strauss seems most irresponsible when he at first seems liberal and relativistic. The problem is not to avoid judgments, for these are the essence and purpose of social science, and since we are immersed in one or more societies, these judgments cannot be dissociated from our own moral notions. Rather, the problem is to make it constantly clear when and why we make such judgments and not to enshrine them in a realm beyond revision and criticism. In these same Conversations, Levi-Strauss expands upon the analogy between social processes and entropy, first put forward in Tristes tropiques: I would say that, in comparisonwith our own great society, with all the great modern societies,the societiesstudied by the anthropologistare in a sense "cold" societies rather than "hot" societies, or like clocks in relation to steam-engines.They are societieswhich createthe minimum of that disorderwhich the physicists call "entropy," and they tend to remain indefinitely in their initial state, and this explains why they appearto us as static societies with no history. [33] Yet, if one recalls his previous statements in Race and History, there has been constant change and flux in all societies, and any measure of a society's scope and importance is simply a function of the observer's

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own cultural eyeglasses. This includes the anthropologist. Certainly the more we learn from oral history and archaeology, the more varied the past of such societies appears. It may be that they were not static in form as well as in activity but that we lack information about the upheavals which took place. How else can we account for the many revolutionary innovations since prehistoric times? [These cool societies] ... function at a temperatureof absolute zeronot zero as understood by the physicist, but in the historical sense; this is what we mean when we say that these societieshave no history-and to consequentlythey arecharacterized a very high degree by phenomena of a mechanical nature, which in their case are more important than statisticalphenomena.... [Thus] Societies like our own, which have a history, operate, I would say, at a higher temperatureor, to be more of between the internaltemperatures exact, there are greaterdifferentials the system, differentialswhich are caused by social differences. We should not, then, draw a distinction between "societies with no history" and "societieswhich have histories."In fact, every human society has a history, and they all go equally far back, since all history datesfrom the birth of mankind. But whereas so-called primitive societies are surroundedby the substanceof history and try to remain impervious to it, modern societies interiorize history as it were, and turn it into the motive power of their development. [38-39] History has now become not simply a myth to resolve logical scandals in our perception of experience, but rather a kind of symbolic jujitsu (to borrow a phrase from Victor Turner) by which we take the energy of time and change and channel it into the maw of our own furnace of frantic social activity. (Any reading ofLevi-Strauss encourages an urge to coin preposterous metaphors.) As to how to retrieve a workable definition of a society from the preceding, every reader is on his own. It seems that Levi-Strauss finds it difficult to believe in change, except as it contributes to our own illusory struggles toward misdirec-

ted ends. He seems to hold out little hope that we shall return to an
arcady of primitive communities and he sees the gargantuan turmoil of civilization leading us to annihilation. From one perspective, social progress and evolution are misconceived ideas; from another, social change and activity end in nothingness. History is hardly very useful in these terms. Levi-Strauss' reluctance to involve himself in contemporary societies, either European or those of the Third World, seems to stem from an expression of moral revulsion toward his own civilization and

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from a disinclination engagein collectiveefforts.On the personal to a aboutminglingwith level, thereseemsto be an aloofness, diffidence dishis own, anda preference a towardattaining moremanipulatable tancefor dealing with the alien.One muststaylong in an aliensociety derived incursions to experience fearful, the thoughat timesrewarding, fromcommonvalues,goals,andshared passions.
Consideringthe preceding works, little new is put forth in The historicalpolemic is Sartre, SavageMind,but the targetof Levi-Strauss' and this has attracteda wider audiencethan his earliercomments. He means. For him, what Levi-Strauss and here it is difficultto understand while history is only selectively totemic thought is totally classificatory in so: "Historyis surreptitiously introducedinto the structure a modest, almostnegative way: it does not accountfor the present,but it makesa selectionbetween its elements,accordingonly some of them the privilege of having a past. The poverty of totemic myths is thereforedue to the fact that the function of each is only to establisha differenceas a difference:they are the constitutiveunits of a system" (23 ). And thus he arguesthat the civilizationsof Europeand Asia have a totemic void
because: ". .. the latter have elected to explain themselves by history raises the topic of history by contrasting it with totemism
(231-232),

with that of classifyingthings is and that this undertaking incomparable and beings (naturaland social) by means of finite groups" (232). It is dubious whether societiescan be so neatly dichotomized. In any case, Levi-Straussseems to be considering history as a kind of myth, for historian'schoice of categories.Even if mythical history is false, it at form (the more so, one might least manifestsin a pure and accentuated traits of an historicalevent" because it is false) the characteristic say, (242). Elsewherehe usesthe word "history"to referto somethingmore real, meaning the actualtotal past. Yet all systemsof thought are selecwhich he describes. tive and all partakeof those aspectsof classification all At a high level of abstraction historyis a kind of myth sinceit tells us only that which we see as significantand that significancederivesfrom our own perplexitieswith the present, from our own social milieu. But such an interpretationseems ratherdejavu; a study such as Pieter For (London, 1964, rev. ed.) is only one of Geyl's Napoleon: andAgainst historiansentirely aware of this problem. many by Levi-Strauss goes on to accuseSartreof naivety in his interpretation of history along non-relativisticlines, noting that Sartrehas confused
"... all historical events are to a large extent the products of the

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his own individualcumsocialperspectivewith real, unknowabletruth:

He who begins by steeping himself in the allegedly self-evident truths of introspectionnever emerges from them. Knowledge of men sometimes seems easierto those who allow themselvesto be caught up in the snareof personalidentity. But they thus shut the door on knowledge of man: written or unavowed "confessions"form the basisof all ethnographic research. Sartre in fact becomes the prisoner of his Cogito: Descartes made it possible to attain universality, but conditionally on remaining psychological and individual; by socializing the Cogito, Sartremerely exchanges one prison for another. Each subject'sgroup and period now take the place of timeless consciousness ... [249]

is essentialto an understandingof the mythology of "our own time"

(249). Levi-Strauss is correct as far as he goes, but there seems no reason why anthropology and sociology also are not part of our contemporary mythology. These, too, reflect and translate alien experience into another, more meaningful set of terms. A great deal of what we call anthropological explanation consists of translation. Furthermore, LeviStrauss' own mental laboratory, which he describes as enabling one to secure analytical truths through reason, seems a form of highly personal

To the anthropologist, the contrary, philosophy this on (like all the a the studyof which affords first-class document, others) ethnographic

cogitation. Elsewhere Levi-Strauss characteristically backtracks by admitting that no one can elude these difficulties. But if so, why then such an intense polemic beforehand? "I am not however suggesting that man can or should sever himself from this internality. It is not in his power to do so and wisdom consists for him in seeing himself live it, while at the same time knowing (but in a different register) that what he lives so completely and intensely is a myth-which will appear as such to men of a future century, and perhaps to himself a few years hence, and will no longer appear at all to men of a future millenium. All meaning is answerable to a lesser meaning, which gives it its highest meaning, and if this regression finally ends in recognizing 'a contingent law of which one can say only: it is thus, and not otherwise' [he quotes Sartre], this prospect is not alarming to those whose thought is not tormented by transcendence even in a latent form. For man will have gained all he can reasonably hope for if, on the sole condition of bowing to this contingent law, he succeeds in determining his form of conduct and in placing all else in the realm of the intelligible" (255-256).

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Are we then to assume that all knowledge, being relative, is of equal validity, depending only on social context? It is not clear. LeviStraussgoes on to announce: The anthropologist history,but he doesnot accordit a special respects value. He conceivesit as a studycomplementary his own: one of to in them unfurlsthe rangeof humansocieties time, the otherin space. And the difference even less great than it might seem, since the is as societies they historian strivesto reconstruct pictureof vanished the to wereatthepointwhichfor themcorresponded the present, whilethe the does his best to reconstruct historical stageswhich ethnographer historical theirexistingform.... Consequently, temporarily preceded or factsareno moregiventhanany other.It is the historian, the agent of history, and who constitutes themby abstraction asthoughunderthe of threatof an infiniteregress.. . What is true of the constitution historical factsis no less so of theirselection.... A trulytotal history would cancelitself out-its productwould be nought. What makes historypossibleis that a sub-setof eventsif found,for a given period, of to haveapproximately samesignificance a contingent indivifor the dualswho have not necessarily the experienced eventsand may even considerthem at an intervalof severalcenturies. Historyis therefore
never history, but history-for. [256, 257]

Yet, the same is true for anthropology,which is always anthropologyare models presentedby Levi-Strauss highly for. Certainlythe structural selective and have been the product of his own perspective. Levi-Straussassertsdichotomies which cannot be demonstrated but which imply valuejudgments.Thereis only a differenceof tone, not meaning, in these two assertions:I) of primitive societies-". .. it is in this intransigentrefusalon the part of the savage mind to allow anything human (or even living) to remainaliento it, that the realprinciple of dialecticalreason is to be found" (245); 2) while of civilization". .. the ultimate goal of the human sciences to be not to constitute, but

to dissolveman" (247). But all societiestry to constructtotal cosmolomay be, symbols gies, and, however complex a systemof categorization are both more and less than the entities and actions they somehow standfor. Levi-Straussexhibits no sustainedconsiderationof history as the study is generallyacceptedto be, and historicaldata play little part in his research.What limited interest he does show is contingent upon aim of denying other issuesimportantto him relatingto his paradoxical in fundamentaldifferences human cultureswhile at the same time any

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implying that the values of primitive societiesare equal or superiorto civilization. By minimizing technology and maximizing modes of thought thisis passedon to the reader,along with an over-homogenization of alien societies.I3Levi-Strausswrites more of the exploitative and less of the useful aspectsof such achievements.If Levi-Strauss has anything to say on the philosophy of history, it is at a general level exhibiting little novelty or use to either historiansor anthropologists. The relativity of knowledge to a social milieu is hardly a new realization, while the contrastsbetween civilization and primitive societies, staticand fluid cultures,are too broadand ungroundedin factualdetails to be of much analyticaluse. Levi-Strauss' position seems to make little sense in terms of much of contemporarysocial science or philosophy.
13 In a perceptive review of the application of current sociological fads to Greek and Roman historical studies, an anonymous reviewer writes: "This is all vastly stimulating, and there is a great deal of truth in it; but it does show up the main disadvantage of structural analysis as a tool for historical research. If you are concentrating on categories, you tend to ignore chronology; in any structural pattern the time-factor is at a discount." "What was the Parthenon for?" Times Literary Sutpplement,3574 (28 August 1970), 937-938. Indeed, where the universal nature of the human mind is the key causal factor for an explanatory system, events through time become secondary, at best.