Property Easments

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 193023 June 22, 2011

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. YUNITA TUAZON, ROSAURO TUAZON and MARIA TERESA TUAZON, Respondents. DECISION BRION, J.: This is a petition for review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the decision1 (dated March 15, 2010) of the Court of Appeals (CA)2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 82480, which set aside the order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarangnan, Samar, Branch 40, and remanded the case back to the RTC for determination of just compensation. The RTC had dismissed the complaint of respondents Yunita Tuazon, Rosauro Tuazon and Maria Teresa Tuazon against the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) for payment of just compensation and damages. ANTECEDENTS The antecedent facts are not in dispute. The respondents are co-owners of a 136,736-square-meter coconut land4 in Barangay Sta. Cruz, Tarangnan, Samar. The land has been declared for tax purposes in the name of the respondents predecessor-in-interest, the late Mr. Pascual Tuazon. Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR5 installed transmission lines on a portion of the land for its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power TL Project. In the process, several improvements on the land were destroyed. Instead of initiating expropriation proceedings, however, NAPOCOR entered into a mere right-of-way agreement6with Mr. Tuazon for the total amount of TWENTY SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT and 21/100 PESOS (P26,978.21). The amount represents payments for "damaged improvements" (P23,970.00), "easement and tower occupancy fees" (P1,808.21), and "additional damaged improvements" (P1,200.00). In 2002, the respondents filed a complaint against NAPOCOR for just compensation and damages, claiming that no expropriation proceedings were made and that they only allowed NAPOCOR entry into the land after being told that the fair market value would be paid. They also stated that lots similarly located in Catbalogan, Samar, likewise utilized by NAPOCOR for the similar projects, were paid just compensation in sums ranging from P2,000.00 toP2,200.00 per square meter, pursuant to the determination made by different branches of the RTC in Samar.

Instead of filing an answer, NAPOCOR filed a motion to dismiss based on the full satisfaction of the respondents claims. The RTC granted the motion in this wise: ORDER Acting on the Motion to Dismiss and the Opposition thereto and after a very careful study of the arguments raised by the Parties, the court resolves in favor of the Defendant. Accordingly, the Court hereby orders the DISMISSAL of this case without costs. IT IS SO ORDERED. Tarangnan, Samar, Philippines, February 3, 2004. (Sgd.) ROBERTO A. NAVIDAD Acting Presiding Judge7 The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals The respondents filed an ordinary appeal with the CA. In its Appellees Brief, NAPOCOR denied that expropriation had occurred. Instead, it claimed to have lawfully established a right-of-way easement on the land per its agreement with Mr. Tuazon, which agreement is in accord with its charter, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6395. NAPOCOR maintained that Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 gave it the right to acquire a right-of-way easement upon payment of "just compensation" equivalent to not more than 10% of the market value of a private lot traversed by transmission lines.8 The CA disagreed with the RTC. Citing National Power Corporation v. Hon. Sylvia G. AguirrePaderanga, etc., et al.9 and National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation,10 the CA pointed out that the demolition of the improvements on the land, as well as the installation of transmission lines thereon, constituted "taking" under the power of eminent domain, considering that transmission lines are hazardous and restrictive of the lands use for an indefinite period of time. Hence, the CA held that the respondents were entitled, not just to an easement fee, but to just compensation based on the full market value of the respondents land. Citing Export Processing Zone Authority v. Hon. Ceferino E. Dulay, etc., et al.,11 the CA maintained that NAPOCOR "cannot hide behind the mantle of Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 as an excuse of dismissing the claim of appellants" since the determination of just compensation is a judicial function. "No statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings,"12 the CA added. The dispositive of the assailed decision reads: In sum, after establishing that NAPOCORs acquisition of the right-of-way easement over the portion of the appellants land was a definite taking under the power of eminent domain, NAPOCOR is liable to pay appellants [referring to the respondents herein] just compensation and not only easement fee. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Order dated February 3, 2004 of the RTC, Br. 40, Tarangnan, Samar is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is hereby REMANDED to the RTC, Br. 40 of Tarangnan, Samar for the proper determination of just compensation.13 The Petition The present petition reiterates that by installing transmission lines, NAPOCOR did not expropriate the respondents land, but merely established a right-of-way easement over it. The petition relies

heavily on the lack of transfer of the lands title or ownership. NAPOCOR maintains that since the respondents claim involved an easement, its charter a special law should govern in accordance with Article 635 of the Civil Code.14NAPOCOR insists that its agreement with the respondents predecessor-in-interest and the easement fee that was paid pursuant thereto were authorized by its charter and are, thus, valid and binding. Finally, the petitioner alleges that establishing right-of-way easements over lands traversed by its transmission lines was the "only mode" by which it could "acquire" the properties needed in its power generation and distribution function. It claims that R.A. 8974,15 specifically its implementing rules, supports this position. THE COURT RULING We find the petition devoid of merit and AFFIRM the remand of the case to the RTC for the determination of just compensation. The petitioner pleads nothing new. It essentially posits that its liability is limited to the payment of an easement fee for the land traversed by its transmission lines. It relies heavily on Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 to support this position. This position has been evaluated and found wanting by this Court in a plethora of cases, including Manubay16which was correctly cited by the CA in the assailed decision. In Manubay,17 NAPOCOR sought the reversal of a CA decision that affirmed the payment, as ordered by the RTC in Naga City, of the full value of a property traversed by NAPOCORs transmission lines for its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project. Through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, the Court echoing the 1991 case of National Power Corporation v. Misericordia Gutierrez, et al.18 formulated the doctrinal issue inManubay,19 as follows: How much just compensation should be paid for an easement of a right of way over a parcel of land that will be traversed by high-powered transmission lines? Should such compensation be a simple easement fee or the full value of the property? This is the question to be answered in this case.20 In holding that just compensation should be equivalent to the full value of the land traversed by the transmission lines, we said: Granting arguendo that what petitioner acquired over respondents property was purely an easement of a right of way, still, we cannot sustain its view that it should pay only an easement fee, and not the full value of the property. The acquisition of such an easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. This conclusion finds support in similar cases in which the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use. Republic v. PLDT held thus: "x x x. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way." True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines,

the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to which the owner of a condemned property is entitled is generally the market value. Market value is "that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefore."21 (Emphasis ours; citations omitted.) We find it significant that NAPOCOR does not assail the applicability of Manubay22 in the present case. Instead, NAPOCOR criticizes the application of Gutierrez23 which the CA had cited as authority for the doctrine that eminent domain may also "be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession."24 NAPOCOR assails Gutierrez25 as irrelevant on the ground that the expropriation proceedings were instituted in January 1965, when the NAPOCOR Charter had not been amended with the insertion of Section 3A(b) in 1976.26 To NAPOCOR, Section 3-A(b) provides for a "fixed formula in the computation of just compensation in cases of acquisition of easements of right-of-way." Heavily relying on Section 3A(b), therefore, NAPOCOR argues: Absent any pronouncement regarding the effect of Section 3-A (b) of R.A. 6395, as amended, on the computation of just compensation to be paid to landowners affected by the erection of transmission lines, NPC v. Gutierrez, supra, should not be deemed controlling in the case at bar.27 We do not find NAPOCORs position persuasive. The application of Gutierrez28 to the present case is well taken. The facts and issue of both cases are comparable.29 The right-of-way easement in the case similarly involved transmission lines traversing privately owned land. It likewise held that the transmission lines not only endangered life and limb, but restricted as well the owners use of the land traversed. Our pronouncement in Gutierrez30 that the exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily includes the imposition of right-of-way easements upon condemned property without loss of title or possession31 therefore remains doctrinal and should be applied.32 NAPOCORs protest against the relevancy of Gutierrez, heavily relying as it does on the supposed conclusiveness of Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 on just compensation due for properties traversed by transmission lines, has no merit. We have held in numerous cases that Section 3-A(b) is not conclusive upon the courts.33 In National Power Corporation v. Maria Bagui, et al.,34 we categorically held: Moreover, Section 3A-(b) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding on the Court. It has been repeatedly emphasized that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. (Citations omitted.)

The determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a function addressed to the discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government.35 This judicial function has constitutional raison dtre; Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. In National Power Corporation v. Santa Loro Vda. de Capin, et al.,36 we noted with approval the disquisition of the CA in this matter: The [herein petitioner] vehemently insists that its Charter [Section 3A (b) of R.A. 6395] obliges it to pay only a maximum of 10% of the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. To uphold such a contention would not only interfere with a judicial function but would also render as useless the protection guaranteed by our Constitution in Section 9, Article III of our Constitution that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. The same principle further resolves NAPOCORs contention that R.A. 8974, specifically its implementing rules, supports NAPOCORs claim that it is liable to the respondents for an easement fee, not for the full market value of their land. We amply addressed this same contention in Purefoods37 where we held that: While Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, and the implementing rule of R.A. No. 8974 indeed state that only 10% of the market value of the property is due to the owner of the property subject to an easement of right-of-way, said rule is not binding on the Court. Well-settled is the rule that the determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, the Court held that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "justness" of the decreed compensation. (Citations omitted.) That the respondents predecessor-in-interest did not oppose the installation of transmission lines on their land is irrelevant. In the present petition, NAPOCOR insinuates that Mr. Tuazons failure to oppose the instillation now estops the respondents from their present claim.38 This insinuation has no legal basis. Mr. Tuazons failure to oppose cannot have the effect of thwarting the respondents right to just compensation. In Rafael C. de Ynchausti v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., et al.,39 we ruled: "The owner of land, who stands by, without objection, and sees a public railroad constructed over it, can not, after the road is completed, or large expenditures have been made thereon upon the faith of his apparent acquiescence, reclaim the land, or enjoin its use by the railroad company. In such case there can only remain to the owner a right of compensation." (Goodin v. Cin. And Whitewater Canal Co., 18 Ohio St., 169.) "One who permits a railroad company to occupy and use his land and construct its road thereon without remonstrance or complaint, cannot afterwards reclaim it free from the servitude he has permitted to be imposed upon it. His acquiescence in the company's taking possession and constructing its works under circumstances which made imperative his resistance, if he ever intended to set up illegality, will be considered a waiver. But while this presumed waiver is a bar to

his action to dispossess the company, he is not deprived of his action for damages for the value of the land, or for injuries done him by the construction or operation of the road." (St. Julien v. Morgan etc., Railroad Co., 35 La. Ann., 924.) In sum, we categorically hold that private land taken for the installation of transmission lines is to be paid the full market value of the land as just compensation. We so ruled in National Power Corporation v. Benjamin Ong Co,40and we reiterate this ruling today: As earlier mentioned, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, substantially provides that properties which will be traversed by transmission lines will only be considered as easements and just compensation for such right of way easement shall not exceed 10 percent of the market value. However, this Court has repeatedly ruled that when petitioner takes private property to construct transmission lines, it is liable to pay the full market value upon proper determination by the courts. (Citations omitted.) WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the present petition for review and AFFIRM the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on March 15, 2010, in CA-G.R. CV No. 82480. SO ORDERED. ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO* Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

Property foreclosure
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 170292 June 22, 2011

HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND (HDMF), Petitioner, vs. Spouses FIDEL and FLORINDA R. SEE and Sheriff MANUEL L. ARIMADO, Respondents. DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: A party that loses its right to appeal by its own negligence cannot seek refuge in the remedy of a writ of certiorari. This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 31, 2005 Decision,2 as well as the October 26, 2005 Resolution,3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 70828. The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision reads thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and is accordingly DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Legazpi City dated February 21, 2002 and its Order dated March 15, 2002 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.4 Factual Antecedents Respondent-spouses Fidel and Florinda See (respondent-spouses) were the highest bidders in the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a property5 that was mortgaged to petitioner Home Development Mutual Fund or Pag-ibig Fund (Pag-ibig). They paid the bid price of P272,000.00 in cash to respondent Sheriff Manuel L. Arimado (Sheriff Arimado). In turn, respondent-spouses received a Certificate of Sale wherein Sheriff Arimado acknowledged receipt of the purchase price, and an Official Receipt No. 11496038 dated January 28, 2000 from Atty. Jaime S. Narvaez, the clerk of court with whom Sheriff Arimado deposited the respondent-spouses payment.6 Despite the expiration of the redemption period, Pag-ibig refused to surrender its certificate of title to the respondent-spouses because it had yet to receive the respondent-spouses payment from Sheriff Arimado7 who failed to remit the same despite repeated demands.8 It turned out that Sheriff Arimado withdrew from the clerk of court the P272,000.00 paid by respondent-spouses, on the pretense that

he was going to deliver the same to Pag-ibig. The money never reached Pag-ibig and was spent by Sheriff Arimado for his personal use.9 Considering Pag-ibigs refusal to recognize their payment, respondent-spouses filed a complaint for specific performance with damages against Pag-ibig and Sheriff Arimado before Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City. The complaint alleged that the law on foreclosure authorized Sheriff Arimado to receive, on behalf of Pag-ibig, the respondent-spouses payment. Accordingly, the payment made by respondent-spouses to Pag-ibigs authorized agent should be deemed as payment to Pag-ibig.10 It was prayed that Sheriff Arimado be ordered to remit the amount of P 272,000.00 to Pag-ibig and that the latter be ordered to release the title to the auctioned property to respondent-spouses.11 Pag-ibig admitted the factual allegations of the complaint (i.e., the bid of respondent-spouses,12 their full payment in cash to Sheriff Arimado,13 and the fact that Sheriff Arimado misappropriated the money14) but maintained that respondent-spouses had no cause of action against it. Pag-ibig insisted that it has no duty to deliver the certificate of title to respondent-spouses unless Pag-ibig actually receives the bid price. Pag-ibig denied that the absconding sheriff was its agent for purposes of the foreclosure proceedings.15 When the case was called for pre-trial conference, the parties submitted their Compromise Agreement for the courts approval. The Compromise Agreement reads: Undersigned parties, through their respective counsels[,] to this Honorable Court respectfully submit this Compromise Agreement for their mutual interest and benefit that this case be amicably settled, the terms and conditions of which are as follows: 1. [Respondent] Manuel L. Arimado, Sheriff IV RTC, Legazpi acknowledges his obligation to the Home Development Mutual Fund (PAG-IBIG), Regional Office V, Legazpi City and/or to [respondent-spouses] the amount of P300,000.00, representing payment for the bid price and other necessary expenses incurred by the [respondent-spouses], the latter being the sole bidder of the property subject matter of the Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale conducted by Sheriff Arimado on January 14, 2000, at the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Legazpi; xxxx 3. Respondent Manuel L. Arimado due to urgent financial need acknowledge[s] that he personally used the money paid to him by [respondent-spouses] which represents the bid price of the above[-]mentioned property subject of the foreclosure sale. The [money] should have been delivered/paid by Respondent Arimado to Home Development Mutual Fund (PAG-IBIG) as payment and in satisfaction of its mortgage claim. 4. Respondent Manuel L. Arimado obligates himself to pay in cash to [petitioner] Home Development Mutual Fund (PAG-IBIG) the amount of P272,000.00 representing full payment of its claim on or before October 31, 2001 [so] that the title to the property [could] be released by PAG-IBIG to [respondent-spouses]. An additional amount of P28,000.00 shall likewise be paid by [respondent] Arimado to the [respondent-spouses] as reimbursement for litigation expenses; 5. [Petitioner] Home Development Mutual Fund (PAG-IBIG) shall upon receipt of the P272,000.00 from [respondent] Manuel L. Arimado release immediately within a period of three (3) days the certificate of title of the property above-mentioned to [respondentspouses] being the rightful buyer or owner of the property;

6. In the event [respondent] Manuel L. Arimado fails to pay [petitioner] Home Development Mutual Fund (PAG-IBIG), or, [respondent-spouses] the amount of P272,000.00 on or before October 31, 2001, the [respondent-spouses] shall be entitled to an immediate writ of execution without further notice to respondent Manuel L. Arimado and the issue as to whether [petitioner] Home Development Mutual Fund (PAG-IBIG) shall be liable for the release of the title to [respondent spouses] under the circumstances or allegations narrated in the complaint shall continue to be litigated upon in order that the Honorable Court may resolve the legality of said issue; 7. In the event [respondent] Manuel L. Arimado complies with the payment as above-stated, the parties mutually agree to withdraw all claims and counterclaim[s] they may have against each other arising out of the above-entitled case.16 The trial court approved the compromise agreement and incorporated it in its Decision dated October 31, 2001. The trial court stressed the implication of paragraph 6 of the approved compromise agreement: Accordingly, the parties are enjoined to comply strictly with the terms and conditions of their Compromise Agreement. In the event that [respondent] Manuel L. Arimado fails to pay [petitioner] HDMF (Pag-ibig), or [respondent-spouses] the amount of P272,000.00 on October 31, 2001, the Court, upon motion of [respondent-spouses], may issue the necessary writ of execution. In this connection, with respect to the issue as to whether or not [petitioner] HDMF (Pag-ibig) shall be liable for the release of the title of the [respondent-spouses] under the circumstances narrated in the Complaint which necessitates further litigation in court, let the hearing of the same be set on December 14, 2001 at 9:00 oclock in the morning. SO ORDERED.17 None of the parties sought a reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision. When Sheriff Arimado failed to meet his undertaking to pay on or before October 31, 2001, the trial court proceeded to rule on the issue of whether Pag-ibig is liable to release the title to respondentspouses despite non-receipt of their payment.18 Ruling of the Regional Trial Court19 The trial court rendered its Decision dated February 21, 2002 in favor of respondent-spouses, reasoning as follows: Under Article 1240 of the Civil Code, payment is valid when it is made to a person authorized by law to receive the same. In foreclosure proceedings, the sheriff is authorized by Act No. 3135 and the Rules of Court to receive payment of the bid price from the winning bidder. When Pag-ibig invoked the provisions of these laws by applying for extrajudicial foreclosure, it likewise constituted the sheriff as its agent in conducting the foreclosure and receiving the proceeds of the auction. Thus, when the respondent-spouses paid the purchase price to Sheriff Arimado, a legally authorized representative of Pag-ibig, this payment effected a discharge of their obligation to Pag-ibig. The trial court thus ordered Pag-ibig to deliver the documents of ownership to the respondentspouses. The dispositive portion reads thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondentspouses] and against the [petitioner] HDMF, ordering said [petitioner] to execute a Release and/or Discharge of Mortgage, and to deliver the same to the [respondent-spouses] together with the documents of ownership and the owners copy of Certificate of Title No. T-78070 covering the property sold [to respondent-spouses] in the auction sale within ten (10) days from the finality of this decision. Should [petitioner] HDMF fail to execute the Release and/or Discharge of Mortgage and to deliver the same together with the documents of ownership and TCT No. T-78070 within ten (10) days from the finality of this decision, the court shall order the Clerk of Court to execute the said Release and/or Discharge of Mortgage and shall order the cancellation of TCT No. T-78070 and the issuance of a second owners copy thereof. SO ORDERED.20 Pag-ibig filed a motion for reconsideration on the sole ground that "[Pag-ibig] should not be compelled to release the title to x x x [respondent-spouses] See because Manuel Arimado [has] yet to deliver to [Pag-ibig] the sum ofP272,000.00."21 The trial court denied the motion on March 15, 2002. It explained that the parties compromise agreement duly authorized the court to rule on Pag-ibigs liability to respondent-spouses despite Sheriff Arimados non-remittance of the proceeds of the auction.22 Pag-ibig received the denial of its motion for reconsideration on March 22, 200223 but took no further action. Hence, on April 23, 2002, the trial court issued a writ of execution of its February 21, 2002 Decision.24 On May 24, 2002,25 Pag-ibig filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 in order to annul and set aside the February 21, 2002 Decision of the trial court. Pag-ibig argued that the February 21, 2002 Decision, which ordered Pag-ibig to deliver the title to respondent-spouses despite its non-receipt of the proceeds of the auction, is void because it modified the final and executory Decision dated October 31, 2001.26 It maintained that the October 31, 2001 Decision already held that Pag-ibig will deliver its title to respondent-spouses only upon receipt of the proceeds of the auction from Sheriff Arimado. Since Sheriff Arimado did not remit the said amount to Pag-ibig, the latter has no obligation to deliver the title to the auctioned property to respondentspouses.27 Further, Pag-ibig contended that the February 21, 2002 Decision was null and void because it was issued without affording petitioner the right to trial.28 Ruling of the Court of Appeals29 The CA denied the petition due course. The CA noted that petitioners remedy was to appeal the February 21, 2002 Decision of the trial court and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. At the time the petition was filed, the Decision of the trial court had already attained finality. The CA then held that the remedy of certiorari was not a substitute for a lost appeal.30 The CA also ruled that petitioners case fails even on the merits. It held that the February 21, 2002 Decision did not modify the October 31, 2001 Decision of the trial court. The latter Decision of the trial court expressly declared that in case Sheriff Arimado fails to pay the P272,000.00 to Pag-ibig,

the court will resolve the remaining issue regarding Pag-ibigs obligation to deliver the title to the respondent-spouses.31 As to the contention that petitioner was denied due process when no trial was conducted for the reception of evidence, the CA held that there was no need for the trial court to conduct a full-blown trial given that the facts of the case were already admitted by Pag-ibig and what was decided in the February 21, 2002 Decision was only a legal issue.32 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration33 which was denied for lack of merit in the Resolution dated October 26, 2005.34 Issues Petitioner then raises the following issues for the Courts consideration: 1. Whether certiorari was the proper remedy; 2. Whether the February 21, 2002 Decision of the trial court modified its October 31, 2001 Decision based on the compromise agreement; 3. Whether petitioner was entitled to a trial prior to the rendition of the February 21, 2002 Decision. Our Ruling Petitioner argues that the CA erred in denying due course to its petition for certiorari and maintains that the remedy of certiorari is proper for two reasons: first, the trial court rendered its February 21, 2002 Decision without the benefit of a trial; and second, the February 21, 2002 Decision modified the October 31, 2001 Decision, which has already attained finality. These are allegedly two recognized instances where certiorari lies to annul the trial courts Decision because of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.35 The argument does not impress. "[C]ertiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of last recourse."36 It is proper only when appeal is not available to the aggrieved party.37 In the case at bar, the February 21, 2002 Decision of the trial court was appealable under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court because it completely disposed of respondent-spouses case against Pag-ibig. Pag-ibig does not explain why it did not resort to an appeal and allowed the trial courts decision to attain finality. In fact, the February 21, 2002 Decision was already at the stage of execution when Pag-ibig belatedly resorted to a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari. Clearly, Pag-ibig lost its right to appeal and tried to remedy the situation by resorting to certiorari. It is settled, however, that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal, "especially if the [partys] own negligence or error in [the] choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse."38 Moreover, even assuming arguendo that a Rule 65 certiorari could still be resorted to, Pag-ibigs petition would still have to be dismissed for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of 60 days from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration.39 Pag-ibig admitted receiving the trial courts Order denying its Motion for Reconsideration on March 22, 2002;40 it thus had until May 21, 2002 to file its petition for certiorari. However, Pag-ibig filed its petition only on May 24, 2002, 41 which

was the 63rd day from its receipt of the trial courts order and obviously beyond the reglementary 60day period. Pag-ibig stated that its petition for certiorari was filed "within sixty (60) days from receipt of the copy of the writ of execution by petitioner [Pag-ibig] on 07 May 2002," which writ sought to enforce the Decision assailed in the petition.42 This submission is beside the point. Rule 65, Section 4 is very clear that the reglementary 60-day period is counted "from notice of the judgment, order or resolution" being assailed, or "from notice of the denial of the motion [for reconsideration]," and not from receipt of the writ of execution which seeks to enforce the assailed judgment, order or resolution. The date of Pag-ibigs receipt of the copy of the writ of execution is therefore immaterial for purposes of computing the timeliness of the filing of the petition for certiorari.
1avvphi1

Since Pag-ibigs petition for certiorari before the CA was an improper remedy and was filed late, it is not even necessary to look into the other issues raised by Pag-ibig in assailing the February 21, 2002 Decision of the trial court and the CAs rulings sustaining the same. At any rate, Pag-ibigs arguments on these other issues are devoid of merit. As to Pag-ibigs argument that the February 21, 2002 Decision of the RTC is null and void for having been issued without a trial, it is a mere afterthought which deserves scant consideration. The Court notes that Pag-ibig did not object to the absence of a trial when it sought a reconsideration of the February 21, 2002 Decision. Instead, Pag-ibig raised the following lone argument in their motion: 3. Consequently, [Pag-ibig] should not be compelled to release the title to other [respondentspouses] See because Manuel Arimado [has] yet to deliver to [Pag-ibig] the sum of P 272,000.00.43 Under the Omnibus Motion Rule embodied in Section 8 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, all available objections that are not included in a partys motion shall be deemed waived. Pag-ibig next argues that the February 21, 2002 Decision of the trial court, in ordering Pag-ibig to release the title despite Sheriff Arimados failure to remit the P272,000.00 to Pag-ibig, "modified" the October 31, 2001 Decision. According to Pag-ibig, the October 31, 2001 Decision allegedly decreed that Pag-ibig would deliver the title to respondent-spouses only after Sheriff Arimado has paid the P272,000.00.44 In other words, under its theory, Pag-ibig cannot be ordered to release the title if Sheriff Arimado fails to pay the said amount. The Court finds no merit in this argument. The October 31, 2001 Decision (as well as the Compromise Agreement on which it is based) does not provide that Pag-ibig cannot be ordered to release the title if Sheriff Arimado fails to pay. On the contrary, what the Order provides is that if Sheriff Arimado fails to pay, the trial court shall litigate (and, necessarily, resolve) the issue of whether Pag-ibig is obliged to release the title. This is based on paragraph 6 of the Compromise Agreement which states that in the event Sheriff Arimado fails to pay, "the [respondent-spouses] shall be entitled to an immediate writ of execution without further notice to [Sheriff] Arimado and the issue as to whether [Pag-ibig] shall be liable for the release of the title to [respondent spouses] under the circumstances or allegations narrated in the complaint shall continue to be litigated upon in order that the Honorable Court may resolve the legality of said issue." In fact, the trial court, in its October 31, 2001 Decision, already set the hearing of the same "on December 14, 2001 at 9:00 oclock in the morning."45 It is thus clear from both the October 31, 2001 Decision and the Compromise Agreement that the trial court was authorized to litigate and resolve the issue of whether Pag-ibig should release the title upon Sheriff Arimados failure to pay the P272,000.00. As it turned out, the trial court eventually resolved the issue against Pag-ibig, i.e., it ruled that Pag-ibig is obliged to release the title. In so

doing, the trial court simply exercised the authority provided in the October 31, 2001 Decision (and stipulated in the Compromise Agreement). The trial court did not thereby "modify" the October 31, 2001 Decision. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 31, 2005 Decision, as well as the October 26, 2005 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70828 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice Chairperson TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA* Associate Justice CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

Property ejectment
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 170658 June 22, 2011

ANICETO CALUBAQUIB, WILMA CALUBAQUIB, EDWIN CALUBAQUIB, ALBERTO CALUBAQUIB, and ELEUTERIO FAUSTINO CALUBAQUIB, Petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: Due process rights are violated by a motu proprio rendition of a summary judgment. Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the September 21, 2005 Decision,2 as well as the November 30, 2005 Resolution,3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 83073. The two issuances of the appellate court ruled against petitioners and ordered them to reconvey the subject properties to respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic). The CA upheld the April 26, 2004 Decision4 of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, the dispositive portion of which decreed as follows: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court declares that the Republic of the Philippines is the owner of that certain property denominated as Lot No. 2470 of the Cadastral Survey of Tuguegarao with an area of three hundred ninety two thousand nine hundred ninety six (392,996) square meters which is registered in its name as evidenced by Original Certificate No. 13562, and as such, is entitled to the possession of the same, and that the defendants illegally occupied a five (5) hectare portion thereof since 1992. Defendants are then ordered to vacate the portion so occupied by them, and pay to the national government the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) per year of occupancy, from 1992 up to the time the property is vacated by them. Defendants counterclaim is dismissed. No pronouncement as to cost. IT IS SO ORDERED.5 Factual Antecedents On August 17, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclamation No. 80,6 which declared a 39.3996-hectare landholding located at Barangay Caggay, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a military reservation site. The proclamation expressly stated that it was being issued "subject to private rights, if any there be." Accordingly, the respondent obtained an Original Certificate of Title No. 13562 7 over the property, which is more particularly described as follows: A parcel of land (Lot No. 2470 of the Cadastral Survey of Tuguegarao), situated in the barrio of Caggay, Municipality of Tuguegarao. Bounded on the E. by Lot No. 2594: on the SE, by the Provincial Road: on the SW by Lot Nos. 2539, 2538, and 2535: and on NW, by Lot Nos. 2534, 2533, 2532, 2478 and 2594. On January 16, 1995, respondent8 filed before the RTC of Tuguegarao, Cagayan a complaint for recovery of possession9 against petitioners alleging that sometime in 1992, petitioners unlawfully entered the military reservation through strategy and stealth and took possession of a five-hectare portion (subject property) thereof. Petitioners allegedly refused to vacate the subject property despite repeated demands to do so.10 Thus, respondent prayed that the petitioners be ordered to vacate the subject property and to pay rentals computed from the time that they unlawfully withheld the same from the respondent until the latter is restored to possession.11

Petitioners filed an answer denying the allegation that they entered the subject property through stealth and strategy sometime in 1992.12 They maintained that they and their predecessor-in-interest, Antonio Calubaquib (Antonio), have been in open and continuous possession of the subject property since the early 1900s.13 Their occupation of the subject property led the latter to be known in the area as the Calubaquib Ranch. When Antonio died in 1918, his six children acknowledged inheriting the subject property from him in a private document entitled Convenio. In 1926, Antonios children applied for a homestead patent but the same was not acted upon by the Bureau of Lands.14 Nevertheless, these children continued cultivating the subject property. Petitioners acknowledged the issuance of Proclamation No. 80 on August 17, 1936, but maintained that the subject property (the 5-hectare portion allegedly occupied by them since 1900s) was excluded from its operation. Petitioners cite as their basis a proviso in Proclamation No. 80, which exempts from the military reservation site "private rights, if any there be."15 Petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against them. The pre-trial conference conducted on August 21, 1995 yielded the following admissions of fact: 1. Lot No. 2470 of the Tuguegarao Cadastre is a parcel of land situated in Alimanao, Tuguegarao, Cagayan with an area of 392,996 square meters. On August 17, 1936, the President of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 80 reserving the lot for military purposes. On the strength of this Proclamation, OCT No. 13562 covering said lot was issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. 2. The defendants are in actual possession of a 5-hectare portion of said property. 3. The Administrator of the Camp Marcelo Adduru Military Reservation demanded the defendants to vacate but they refused. 4. The defendants sought presidential assistance regarding their status on the land covered by the title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The Office of the President has referred the matter to the proper administrative agencies and up to now there has been no definite action on said request for assistance.16 Given the trial courts opinion that the basic facts of the case were undisputed, it advised the parties to file a motion for summary judgment.17 Neither party filed the motion. In fact, respondent expressed on two occasions18its objection to a summary judgment. It explained that summary judgment is improper given the existence of a genuine and vital factual issue, which is the petitioners claim of ownership over the subject property. It argued that the said issue can only be resolved by trying the case on the merits. On January 31, 2001, the RTC issued an Order thus: The Court noticed that the defendants in this case failed to raise any issue. For this reason, a summary judgment is in order. Let this case be submitted for summary judgment. SO ORDERED.19 Ruling of the Regional Trial Court20

Subsequently, without any trial, the trial court rendered its April 26, 2004 Decision21 dismissing petitioners claim of possession of the subject property in the concept of owner. The trial court held that while Proclamation No. 80 recognized and respected the existence of private rights on the military reservation, petitioners position could "not be sustained, as there was no right of [petitioners] to speak of that was recognized by the government."22 Ruling of the Court of Appeals23 Petitioners appealed24 to the CA, which affirmed the RTC Decision, in this wise: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The appealed decision dated April 26, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 4846 is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
lawphi1

SO ORDERED.25 The CA explained that, in order to segregate the subject property from the mass of public land, it was imperative for petitioners to prove their and their predecessors-in-interests occupation and cultivation of the subject property for more than 30 years prior to the issuance of the proclamation.26 There must be clear, positive and absolute evidence that they had complied with all the requirements of the law for confirmation of an imperfect title before the property became a military reservation site.27 Based on these standards, petitioners failed to establish any vested right pertaining to them with respect to the subject property.28 The CA further held that petitioners did not say what evidence they had of an imperfect title under the Public Land Act.29 The CA denied reconsideration of its Decision, hence petitioners appeal to this Court. Petitioners Arguments Petitioners maintain that the subject property was alienable land when they, through their ancestors, began occupying the same in the early 1900s. By operation of law, they became owners of the subject parcel of land by extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Thus, when Proclamation No. 80 declared that "existing private rights, if there be any" are exempt from the military reservation site, the subject property remained private property of the petitioners. Petitioners then ask that the case be remanded to the trial court for the reception of evidence. They maintain that the case presents several factual issues, such as the determination of the nature of the property (whether alienable or inalienable) prior to 1936 and of the veracity of petitioners claim of prior and adverse occupation of the subject property. 30 Respondents Arguments Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argues that petitioners were not able to prove that they had a vested right to the subject property prior to the issuance of Proclamation No. 80. As petitioners themselves admit, their application for homestead patent filed in 1926 was not acted upon, hence they did not acquire any vested right to the subject property. Likewise, petitioners did not prove their occupation and cultivation of the subject property for more than 30 years prior to August 17, 1936, the date when Proclamation No. 80 took effect.31 Issue32

The crux of the case is the propriety of rendering a summary judgment. Our Ruling The petition has merit. Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the defendant, the court finds that the answer filed by the defendant does not tender a genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.33 A deeper understanding of summary judgments is found in Viajar v. Estenzo:34 Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits. But if there be a doubt as to such facts and there be an issue or issues of fact joined by the parties, neither one of them can pray for a summary judgment. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. An examination of the Rules will readily show that a summary judgment is by no means a hasty one. It assumes a scrutiny of facts in a summary hearing after the filing of a motion for summary judgment by one party supported by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may file an opposition to the motion supported also by affidavits, depositions, or other documents x x x. In spite of its expediting character, relief by summary judgment can only be allowed after compliance with the minimum requirement of vigilance by the court in a summary hearing considering that this remedy is in derogation of a party's right to a plenary trial of his case. At any rate, a party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant.35 "A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [the] moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."36 The test of the propriety of rendering summary judgments is the existence of a genuine issue of fact,37 "as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim."38 "[A] factual issue raised by a party is considered as sham when by its nature it is evident that it cannot be proven or it is such that the party tendering the same has neither any sincere intention nor adequate evidence to prove it. This usually happens in denials made by defendants merely for the sake of having an issue and thereby gaining delay, taking advantage of the fact that their answers are not under oath anyway." 39 In determining the genuineness of the issues, and hence the propriety of rendering a summary judgment, the court is obliged to carefully study and appraise, not the tenor or contents of the pleadings, but the facts alleged under oath by the parties and/or their witnesses in the affidavits that they submitted with the motion and the corresponding opposition. Thus, it is held that, even if the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, a summary judgment is proper so long as "the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine."40 The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing on the motion are therefore important because these enable the court to determine if the parties pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of, or against, the motion are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and adequately justify the finding that, as a matter of law, the claim is clearly meritorious or there is no defense to the action.41 The non-observance of the procedural requirements of filing a motion and conducting a hearing on the said motion warrants the setting aside of the summary judgment.42

In the case at bar, the trial court proceeded to render summary judgment with neither of the parties filing a motion therefor. In fact, the respondent itself filed an opposition when the trial court directed it to file the motion for summary judgment. Respondent insisted that the case involved a genuine issue of fact. Under these circumstances, it was improper for the trial court to have persisted in rendering summary judgment. Considering that the remedy of summary judgment is in derogation of a party's right to a plenary trial of his case, the trial court cannot railroad the parties rights over their objections. More importantly, by proceeding to rule against petitioners without any trial, the trial and appellate courts made a conclusion which was based merely on an assumption that petitioners defense of acquisitive prescription was a sham, and that the ultimate facts pleaded in their Answer (e.g., open and continuous possession of the property since the early 1900s) cannot be proven at all. This assumption is as baseless as it is premature and unfair. No reason was given why the said defense and ultimate facts cannot be proven during trial. The lower courts merely assumed that petitioners would not be able to prove their defense and factual allegations, without first giving them an opportunity to do so. It is clear that the guidelines and safeguards for the rendition of a summary judgment were all ignored by the trial court. The sad result was a judgment based on nothing else but an unwarranted assumption and a violation of petitioners due process right to a trial where they can present their evidence and prove their defense. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The April 26, 2004 summary judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 1, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 1, for trial. The Presiding Judge is directed to proceed with dispatch. SO ORDERED. MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice Chairperson TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

Property reconstitution of title

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 182980 June 22, 2011

BIENVENIDO CASTILLO, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case Petitioner Bienvenido Castillo (Bienvenido) filed the present petition for review on certiorari1 of the Decision2dated 23 October 2007 as well as the Resolution3 dated 7 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81916. The appellate court reversed the Decision4 dated 3 October 2003 of Branch 22, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan (trial court) in P-111-2002. The trial court ordered the reconstitution of the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-16755 as well as the issuance of another owners duplicate copy, in the name of the registered owner and in the same terms and conditions as the original, in lieu of the lost original copy. The Facts Bienvenido filed on 7 March 2002 a Petition for Reconstitution and Issuance of Second Owners Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16755. The petition reads as follows: 1. That petitioner is of legal age, Filipino, widower and with residence and postal address at Poblacion, Pulilan, Bulacan; 2. That petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Paltao, Pulilan, Bulacan covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16755, a zerox [sic] copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A"; 3. That the zerox [sic] copy of technical description and subdivision plan of the parcel of land with an area of 50,199 [square meters] (Lot 6-A) are hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C";

4. That the original copy of the said certificate of title on file with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan was lost and/or destroyed during the fire on March 7, 1987 in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, certification from the said office is hereto attached as Annex "D"; 5. That, the owners copy of the said certificate of title was likewise lost and all efforts to locate the same proved futile and in vain, copy of the the [sic] "Affidavit of Loss" is hereto attached as Annex "E"; 6. That no co-owners copy of duplicate of the same certificate has been issued; 7. The names and addresses of the boundary owners of said lot are the following: a. West - Jorge Peralta b. North - Lorenzo Calderon c. South - Lorenzo Calderon d. East - Melvin & Marlon Reyes with postal address at Poblacion, Pulilan, Bulacan; 8. That said property has been declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 97-19001-00019, zerox [sic] copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "F"; 9. That the real estate tax for the current year has been paid per official receipt no. 0287074, zerox [sic] copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "G"; 10. That said property is free from all liens and encumbrances; 11. That there exist no deeds or instruments affecting the said property which has been presented for and pending registration with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan; WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after due notice and hearing judgment be rendered: 1. Declaring the Original Owners Duplicate Certificate of Title No. T-16755 that was lost as null and void; 2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to issue second owners duplicate copy of the said certificate of title upon payment of proper fees.5 The trial court furnished the Land Registration Authority (LRA) with a duplicate copy of Bienvenidos petition and its Annexes, with a note stating that "No Tracing Cloth of Plan [sic] and Blue print of plan attached."6 As requested by the LRA in its letter dated 17 April 2002,7 the trial court ordered Bienvenido to submit within 15 days from receipt of the order (a) the original of the technical description of the parcel of land covered by the lost/destroyed certificate of title, certified by the authorized officer of the Land Management Bureau/Land Registration Authority and two duplicate copies thereof, and (b) the sepia film plan of the subject parcel of land prepared by a duly licensed Geodetic Engineer, who shall certify thereon that its preparation was made on the basis of a certified technical description, and two blue print copies thereof.8 Bienvenido complied with the order.9

The trial court, in an order dated 7 August 2002, ordered Bienvenido to supply the names and addresses of the occupants of the subject property.10 Bienvenido manifested that there is no actual occupant in the subject property.11 On 4 October 2002, the trial court issued an order which found Bienvenidos petition sufficient in form and substance and set the same for hearing.12 Copies of the 4 October 2002 order were posted on three bulletin boards: at the Bulacan Provincial Capitol Building, at the Pulilan Municipal Building, and at the Bulacan Regional Trial Court.13 The 4 October 2002 order was also published twice in the Official Gazette: on 13 January 2003 (Volume 99, Number 2, Pages 237 to 238), and on 20 January 2003 (Volume 99, Number 3, Pages 414 to 415).14 After two cancellations,15 a hearing was conducted on 12 March 2003. During the hearing, the following were marked in evidence for jurisdictional requirements: Exhibit "A" - Order of the Court dated 4 October 2002 Exhibit "A-1" - Second page of the Order of the Court dated 4 October 2002 Exhibit "A-2" - Third page of the Order of the Court dated 4 October 2002 Exhibit "A-3" - Registry return receipt of notice to the Office of the Solicitor General Exhibit "A-4" - Registry return receipt of notice to the Land Registration Authority Exhibit "A-5" - Registry return receipt of notice to the Register of Deeds Exhibit "A-6" - Registry return receipt of notice to the Public Prosecutor Exhibit "A-7" - Registry return receipt of notice to boundary owner Jorge Peralta Exhibit "A-8" - Registry return receipt of notice to boundary owner Lorenzo Calderon Exhibit "A-9" - Registry return receipt of notice to boundary owners Melvin and Marlon Reyes Exhibit "B" - Certificate of Posting Exhibit "C" - Certificate of Publication from the Director of the National Printing Office Exhibit "D" - Official Gazette, Volume 99, Number 2, 13 January 2003 Exhibit "D-1" - Page 237, Publication of the trial courts Order dated 4 October 2002 Exhibit "D-2" - Page 238, Publication of the trial courts Order dated 4 October 2002 Exhibit "E" - Official Gazette, Volume 99, Number 3, 20 January 2003 Exhibit "E-1" - Page 414, Publication of the trial courts Order dated 4 October 2002 Exhibit "E-2" - Page 415, Publication of the trial courts Order dated 4 October 200216

Fernando Castillo (Fernando), Bienvenidos son and attorney-in-fact, testified on his fathers behalf. During the course of his testimony, Fernando identified the following: Exhibit "F" - Photocopy of TCT No. T-16755 Exhibit "G" - Blueprint of the subject property Exhibit "H" - Technical description of the property Exhibit "I" - Affidavit of Loss executed by Bienvenido Castillo Exhibit "I-1" - Entry of the Affidavit of Loss in the book of the Register of Deeds Exhibit "J" - Certification issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds, Malolos, Bulacan that TCT No. T-16755 was burned in a fire on 7 March 1987 Exhibit "K" - Tax declaration Exhibit "L" - 2002 Real Estate Tax Receipt Upon presentation of the photocopy of TCT No. T-16755, Fernando stated that the title was issued in the names of his parents, Bienvenido Castillo and Felisa Cruz (Felisa), and that his mother died in 1982. Fernando did not mention any sibling. Fernando further testified that on 6 February 2002, Bienvenido executed an Affidavit of Loss which stated that he misplaced the owners copy of the certificate of title sometime in April 1993 and that all efforts to locate the same proved futile. The title is free from all liens and encumbrances, and there are no other persons claiming interest over the land.17 The LRA submitted a Report dated 25 July 2003, portions of which the trial court quoted in its Decision. The LRA stated that: (2) The plan and technical description of Lot 6-A of the subdivision plan Psd-37482 were verified correct by this Authority to represent the aforesaid lot and the same have been approved under (LRA) PR-03-00321-R pursuant to the provisions of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26. WHEREFORE, the foregoing information anent the lot in question is respectfully submitted for consideration in the resolution of the instant petition, and if the Honorable Court, after notice and hearing, finds justification pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 26 to grant the same, the plan and technical description having been approved, may be used as basis for the inscription of the technical description on the reconstituted certificate. Provided, however, that in case the petition is granted, the reconstituted title should be made subject to such encumbrances as may be subsisting; and provided further, that no certificate of title covering the same parcel of land exists in the office of the Register of Deeds concerned.18 The Trial Courts Ruling On 3 October 2003, the trial court promulgated its Decision in favor of Bienvenido. The trial court found valid justifications to grant Bienvenidos petition as the same is in order and meritorious. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds for the province of Bulacan is hereby ordered, upon payment of the prescribed fees, to reconstitute the original copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 16755 and to issue another owners duplicate copy thereof, in the name of the registered owner and in the same terms and conditions as the original thereof, pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 26, as amended by P.D. No. 1529, in lieu of the lost original copy. The new original copy shall in all respects be accorded the same validity and legal effect as the lost original copy for all intents and purposes. Provided, that no certificate of title covering the same parcel of land exists in the office of the Register of Deeds concerned. SO ORDERED.19 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Notice of Appeal on 18 November 2003. The OSG stated that it was grave error for the trial court to order reconstitution despite absence of any prayer seeking such relief in the petition and on the basis of a mere photocopy of TCT No. T-16755. Counsel for Bienvenido filed a motion for early resolution on 25 January 2006. The Appellate Courts Ruling On 23 October 2007, the appellate court rendered its Decision which reversed the 3 October 2003 Decision of the trial court. Bienvenidos counsel withdrew from the case on 11 October 2007 and was substituted by Mondragon and Montoya Law Offices. The appellate court ruled that even if Bienvenido failed to specifically include a prayer for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-16755, the petition is captioned as "In re: Petition for Reconstitution and Issuance of Second Owners Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16755, Bienvenido Castillo, Petitioner." The prayer for "such other reliefs and remedies just and proper under the premises" is broad and comprehensive enough to justify the extension of a remedy different from that prayed for. However, the appellate court still ruled that the trial court erred in ordering the reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. T-16755 and the issuance of another owners duplicate copy thereof in the name of the registered owner. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 26 specified the order of sources from which transfer certificates of title may be reconstituted, and Bienvenido failed to comply with the order. Moreover, the documentary evidences presented before the trial court were insufficient to support reconstitution. The loss of the original copy on file with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan may be credible, but Bienvenido failed to adequately explain the circumstances which led to the loss of the owners copy. The tax declaration presented is not a conclusive evidence of ownership, but merely indicates possession. The plan and technical description of the property are merely additional documents that must accompany the petition for the LRAs verification and approval. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated October 3, 2003 of Branch 22, RTC of Malolos, Bulacan in P-111-2002 is hereby SET ASIDE and a new judgment is entered dismissing the Petition therein. SO ORDERED.20 On 3 December 2007, Bienvenidos counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or for New Trial.21 The motion asserted that Bienvenido presented sufficient documents to warrant reconstitution of TCT No. T-16755. Aside from the photocopy of TCT No. T-16755, Fernando presented the plan and technical description approved by the LRA. Moreover, to support the Motion for New Trial,

Fernando went through Bienvenidos papers and found the Deed of Absolute Sale22 from the original owner, Elpidio Valencia, to spouses Bienvenido and Felisa. Fernando also found the cancellation of mortgage23 of the property covered by TCT No. T-16755 issued by the Development Bank of the Philippines. Fernando also submitted a copy of the Extra-Judicial Partition24 by and among the heirs of his mother. The property covered by TCT No. T-16755 was partitioned among Bienvenido, Fernando, and Fernandos siblings Emma Castillo Bajet (Emma) and Elpidio Castillo (Elpidio). In Fernandos affidavit attached to the Motion for Reconsideration and/or for New Trial, Fernando stated, but without presenting any proof, that Bienvenido passed away at the age of 91 on 14 February 2006. The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the Motion for Reconsideration and/or for New Trial. Bienvenidos petition failed to satisfy Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 26. The Affidavit of Loss is hearsay because Bienvenido failed to affirm it in court. Therefore, the loss of the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-16755 is not established. The plan and technical description approved by the LRA are not independent sources of reconstitution and are mere supporting documents. The documents submitted in support of the Motion for New Trial are not newly discovered, but could have been discovered earlier by exercise of due diligence. In its Resolution25 dated 7 May 2008, the appellate court denied the Motion for Reconsideration and/or for New Trial. Issues The following were assigned as errors of the appellate court: I. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the documentary evidence presented by petitioner in the lower court are insufficient to support the reconstitution prayed for. II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that petitioner failed to establish the circumstances which led to the loss of his duplicate owners copy of TCT No. T-16755. III. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that there is no merit in the motion for new trial filed by petitioner.26 The Courts Ruling The petition must fail. There can be no reconstitution as the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the present case. Process of Reconstitution of Transfer Certificates of Title under R.A. No. 26 Section 3 of R.A. No. 26 enumerates the sources from which transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted. Section 3 reads: Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order: (a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title; (c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof; (d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds, containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued; (e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased, or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and (f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title. Bienvenido already admitted that he cannot comply with Section 3(a) to 3(e), and that 3(f) is his last recourse. Bienvenido, through Fernandos testimony, presented a photocopy of TCT No. T-16755 before the trial court. The owners original duplicate copy was lost, while the original title on file with the Register of Deeds of Malolos, Bulacan was burned in a fire on 7 March 1987. The property was neither mortgaged nor leased at the time of Bienvenidos loss of the owners original duplicate copy. Section 12 of R.A. No. 26 describes the requirements for a petition for reconstitution. Section 12 reads: Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owners duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the building or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or if there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support to the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in Section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration office (now Commission of Land Registration) or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property. We compared the requirements of Section 12 to the allegations in Bienvenidos petition. Bienvenidos petition complied with items (a), (b), (f) and (g): in paragraph 5 of the petition, he alleged the loss of his copy of TCT No. T-16755; paragraph 6 declared that no co-owners copy of the duplicate title has been issued; paragraph 10 stated that the property covered by the lost TCT is free from liens and encumbrances; and paragraph 11 stated that there are no deeds or instruments

presented for or pending registration with the Register of Deeds. There was substantial compliance as to item (c): the location of the property is mentioned in paragraph 2; while the boundaries of the property, although not specified in the petition, refer to an annex attached to the petition. The petition did not mention anything pertaining to item (d). There was a failure to fully comply with item (e). By Fernandos admission, there exist two other co-owners of the property covered by TCT No. T-16755. Fernandos siblings Emma and Elpidio were not mentioned anywhere in the petition. Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 prescribes the requirements for a notice of hearing of the petition: Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of the hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court. The trial courts 4 October 2002 Order was indeed posted in the places mentioned in Section 13, and published twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette: Volume 99, Number 2 dated 13 January 2003 and Volume 99, Number 3 dated 20 January 2003. The last issue was released by the National Printing Office on 21 January 2003.27 The notice, however, did not state Felisa as a registered co-owner. Neither did the notice identify Fernandos siblings Emma and Elpidio as interested parties.
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The non-compliance with the requirements prescribed in Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. No. 26 is fatal. Hence, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution. We cannot stress enough that our jurisprudence is replete with rulings regarding the mandatory character of the requirements of R.A. No. 26. As early as 1982, we ruled: Republic Act No. 26 entitled "An act providing a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title lost or destroyed" approved on September 25, 1946 confers jurisdiction or authority to the Court of First Instance to hear and decide petitions for judicial reconstitution. The Act specifically provides the special requirements and mode of procedure that must be followed before the court can properly act, assume and acquire jurisdiction or authority over the petition and grant the reconstitution prayed for. These requirements and procedure are mandatory. The Petition for Reconstitution must allege certain specific jurisdictional facts; the notice of hearing must be published in the Official Gazette and posted in particular places and the same sent or notified to specified persons. Sections 12 and 13 of the Act provide specifically the mandatory requirements and procedure to be followed.28 We cannot simply dismiss these defects as "technical." Liberal construction of the Rules of Court does not apply to land registration cases.29 Indeed, to further underscore the mandatory character of these jurisdictional requirements, the Rules of Court do not apply to land registration cases.30 In all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute, and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is prescribed by a statute, the mode of proceeding is mandatory, and must be strictly complied with, or the proceeding will be utterly void.31 When the trial court lacks jurisdiction to

take cognizance of a case, it lacks authority over the whole case and all its aspects.32 All the proceedings before the trial court, including its order granting the petition for reconstitution, are void for lack of jurisdiction.33 WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 23 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 7 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81916. SO ORDERED. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO* Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice JOSE C. MENDOZA Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO** Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

Succession settlement of estate intestate succession

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 182645 June 22, 2011

In the Matter of the Heirship (Intestate Estates) of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez, Antonio Rodriguez, Macario J. Rodriguez, Delfin Rodriguez, and Consuelo M. Rodriguez and Settlement of their Estates, RENE B. PASCUAL, Petitioner, vs. JAIME M. ROBLES, Respondent. DECISION PERALTA, J.: On December 15, 2010, this Court promulgated a Resolution1 which set aside its Decision2 earlier issued on December 4, 2009 on the ground that herein petitioner, Rene B. Pascual failed to implead herein respondent Jaime M. Robles, who is an indispensable party to the present case. After receiving respondent's Comment and Opposition,3 as well as petitioner's Reply4 thereto, the Court will now proceed to determine the merits of the instant petition for certiorari. Again, the Court finds it apropros to restate the pertinent antecedent facts and proceedings as set forth in the December 4, 2009 Decision as well as in the December 15, 2010 Resolution, to wit: On 14 September 1989, a petition for Declaration of Heirship and Appointment of Administrator and Settlement of the Estates of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez (Hermogenes) and Antonio Rodriguez (Antonio) was filed before the [Regional Trial Court] RTC [of Iriga City]. The petition, docketed as Special Proceeding No. IR-1110, was filed by Henry F. Rodriguez (Henry), Certeza F. Rodriguez (Certeza), and Rosalina R. Pellosis (Rosalina). Henry, Certeza and Rosalina sought that they be declared the sole and surviving heirs of the late Antonio Rodriguez and Hermogenes Rodriguez. They alleged they are the great grandchildren of Antonio based on the following genealogy: that Henry and Certeza are the surviving children of Delfin M. Rodriguez (Delfin) who died on 8 February 1981, while Rosalina is the surviving heir of Consuelo M. Rodriguez (Consuelo); that Delfin and Consuelo were the heirs of Macario J. Rodriguez (Macario) who died in 1976; that Macario and Flora Rodriguez were the heirs of Antonio; that Flora died without an issue in 1960 leaving Macario as her sole heir. Henry, Certeza and Rosalina's claim to the intestate estate of the late Hermogenes Rodriguez, a former gobernadorcillo, is based on the following lineage: that Antonio and Hermogenes were brothers and the latter died in 1910 without issue, leaving Antonio as his sole heir. At the initial hearing of the petition on 14 November 1989, nobody opposed the petition. Having no oppositors to the petition, the RTC entered a general default against the whole world, except the Republic of the Philippines. After presentation of proof of compliance with jurisdictional requirements, the RTC allowed Henry, Certeza and Rosalina to submit evidence before a commissioner in support of the petition. After evaluating the evidence presented, the commissioner found that Henry, Certeza and Rosalina are the grandchildren in the direct line of Antonio and required them to present additional evidence to establish the alleged fraternal relationship between Antonio and Hermogenes.

Taking its cue from the report of the commissioner, the RTC rendered a Partial Judgment dated 31 May 1990 declaring Henry, Certeza and Rosalina as heirs in the direct descending line of the late Antonio, Macario and Delfin and appointing Henry as regular administrator of the estate of the decedents Delfin, Macario and Antonio, and as special administrator to the estate of Hermogenes. Henry filed the bond and took his oath of office as administrator of the subject estates. Subsequently, six groups of oppositors entered their appearances either as a group or individually, namely: (1) The group of Judith Rodriguez; (2) The group of Carola Favila-Santos; (3) Jaime Robles; (4) Florencia Rodriguez; (5) Victoria Rodriguez; and (6) Bienvenido Rodriguez Only the group of Judith Rodriguez had an opposing claim to the estate of Antonio, while the rest filed opposing claims to the estate of Hermogenes. In his opposition, Jaime Robles likewise prayed that he be appointed regular administrator to the estates of Antonio and Hermogenes and be allowed to sell a certain portion of land included in the estate of Hermogenes covered by OCT No. 12022 located at Barrio Manggahan, Pasig, Rizal. After hearing on Jamie Robles' application for appointment as regular administrator, the RTC issued an Order dated 15 December 1994 declaring him to be an heir and next of kin of decedent Hermogenes and thus qualified to be the administrator. Accordingly, the said order appointed Jaime Robles as regular administrator of the entire estate of Hermogenes and allowed him to sell the property covered by OCT No. 12022 located at Barrio Manggahan, Pasig Rizal. On 27 April 1999, the RTC rendered a decision declaring Carola Favila-Santos and her co-heirs as heirs in the direct descending line of Hermogenes and reiterated its ruling in the partial judgment declaring Henry, Certeza and Rosalina as heirs of Antonio. The decision dismissed the oppositions of Jamie Robles, Victoria Rodriguez, Bienvenido Rodriguez, and Florencia Rodriguez, for their failure to substantiate their respective claims of heirship to the late Hermogenes. On 13 August 1999, the RTC issued an Amended Decision reversing its earlier finding as to Carola Favila-Santos. This time, the RTC found Carola Favila-Santos and company not related to the decedent Hermogenes. The RTC further decreed that Henry, Certeza and Rosalina are the heirs of Hermogenes. The RTC also re-affirmed its earlier verdict dismissing the oppositions of Jaime Robles, Victoria Rodriguez, Bienvenido Rodriguez, and Florencia Rodriguez.5 Robles then appealed the August 13, 1999 Decision of the RTC by filing a notice of appeal, but the same was denied by the trial court in its Order dated November 22, 1999 for Robles' failure to file a record on appeal.

Robles questioned the denial of his appeal by filing a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. In a Resolution dated February 14, 2000, this Court referred the petition to the [Court of Appeals (CA)] for consideration and adjudication on the merits on the ground that the said court has jurisdiction concurrent with this Court and that no special and important reason was cited for this Court to take cognizance of the said case in the first instance. On April 16, 2002, the CA rendered judgment annulling the August 13, 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC. Henry Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and his group moved for the reconsideration of the CA decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated January 21, 2004. Rodriguez and his co-respondents did not appeal the Decision and Resolution of the CA. On the other hand, Robles filed an appeal with this Court assailing a portion of the CA Decision. On August 1, 2005, this Court issued a Resolution denying the petition of Robles and, on November 10, 2005, the said Resolution became final and executory. On May 13, 2008, the instant petition was filed.6 Petitioner posits the following reasons relied upon for the allowance of his petition: I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED APRIL 16, 2002 WAS ISSUED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, HENCE, A PATENT NULLITY. II THE ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 21, 2007 ISSUED BY THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 34, IRIGA CITY, BASED ON THE COURT OF APPEALS' APRIL 16, 2002 DECISION WAS ISSUED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, HENCE, A PATENT NULLITY. III THE AFOREMENTIONED COURT OF APPEALS' APRIL 16, 2002 DECISION AND FEBRUARY 21, 2007 ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 34, IRIGA CITY, WERE NULL AND VOIDAB INITIO AS THEY CONTRAVENED, INCONSISTENT WITH AND CONTRADICTORY TO THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISIONS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, WHICH IS IN GROSS VIOLATION OF THE RULE THAT ALL COURTS SHOULD TAKE THEIR BEARINGS FROM THE SUPREME COURT.7 The Court finds that there are compelling reasons to dismiss the present petition, as discussed below. First, petitioner has no personality to file the instant petition. The requirement of personality is sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which essentially provides that a person aggrieved by any act of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions

rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may file a petition for certiorari.8 This Court has held that: An aggrieved party under Section 1, Rule 65 [of the Rules of Court] is one who was a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the original action for certiorari under Rule 65. x x x. Although Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that the special civil action of certiorari may be availed of by a "person aggrieved" by the orders or decisions of a tribunal, the term "person aggrieved" is not to be construed to mean that any person who feels injured by the lower courts order or decision can question the said courts disposition via certiorari. To sanction a contrary interpretation would open the floodgates to numerous and endless litigations which would undeniably lead to the clogging of court dockets and, more importantly, the harassment of the party who prevailed in the lower court. In a situation wherein the order or decision being questioned underwent adversarial proceedings before a trial court, the "person aggrieved" referred to under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains to one who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court. The correctness of this interpretation can be gleaned from the fact that a special civil action for certiorari may be dismissed motu proprio if the party elevating the case failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order or decision before the lower court. Obviously, only one who was a party in the case before the lower court can file a motion for reconsideration since a stranger to the litigation would not have the legal standing to interfere in the orders or decisions of the said court. In relation to this, if a non-party in the proceedings before the lower court has no standing to file a motion for reconsideration, logic would lead us to the conclusion that he would likewise have no standing to question the said order or decision before the appellate court via certiorari.9 Thus, a person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court or in the CA cannot maintain an action for certiorariin the Supreme Court to have the judgment reviewed.10 Stated differently, if a petition for certiorari or prohibition is filed by one who was not a party in the lower court, he has no standing to question the assailed order.11 In the present case, petitioner was never a party to the proceedings in the RTC and the CA. In fact, he admits that he is a third party insofar as the instant case is concerned. There is no dispute that it was only in January 2005 that he acquired interest in a portion of the properties subject of the estate proceedings when he bought a real property located in San Fernando, Pampanga, which belonged to the Rodriguez estate. Petitioner claims that he filed the instant petition for certiorari only after learning of the assailed Decision of the CA and the Order of the RTC on March 13, 2008, implying that he could not have intervened earlier. This, however, is not an excuse or justification to allow petitioner to file the instant petition. To do so would put into the hands of the litigants in a case the power to resurrect or to introduce anew, with the assistance of intervenors, issues to a litigation which have already been long settled on appeal. Indeed, petitioner may not be allowed to intervene at this late a stage. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.
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In The Learning Child, Inc. v. Ayala Alabang Village Association,12 this Court's disquisition on the significance of the abovementioned Section is instructive, to wit:

This section is derived from the former Section 2, Rule 12, which then provided that the motion to intervene may be filed "before or during a trial." Said former phraseology gave rise to ambiguous doctrines on the interpretation of the word "trial," with one decision holding that said Motion may be filed up to the day the case is submitted for decision, while another stating that it may be filed at any time before the rendition of the final judgment. This ambiguity was eliminated by the present Section 2, Rule 19 by clearly stating that the same may be filed "at any time before rendition of the judgment by the trial court," in line with the second doctrine above-stated. The clear import of the amended provision is that intervention cannot be allowed when the trial court has already rendered its Decision, and much less, as in the case at bar, when even the Court of Appeals had rendered its own Decision on appeal.13 In his book on remedial law, former Supreme Court Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado explained the rationale behind the amendments introduced in Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court as follows: The justification advanced for this is that before judgment is rendered, the court for good cause shown, may still allow the introduction of additional evidence and that is still within a liberal interpretation of the period for trial. Also, since no judgment has yet been rendered, the matter subject of the intervention may still be readily resolved and integrated in the judgment disposing of all claims in the case, and would not require an overall reassessment of said claims as would be the case if the judgment had already been rendered.14 It is also worthy to note that the disputed Decision was promulgated way back on April 16, 2002. The respondents in the said case, namely, Henry Rodriguez, Certeza Rodriguez and Rosalina Pellosis, did not appeal. Herein respondent, on the other hand, who was the petitioner in the case, filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court assailing a portion of the CA Decision. However, the petition was denied via a Resolution issued by the Court dated August 1, 2005, and that the same had become final and executory on November 10, 2005. Hence, by the time herein petitioner filed the instant petition on the sole basis that he acquired an interest in a portion of the disputed estate, the assailed CA Decision had long become final and executory. In Mocorro, Jr. v. Ramirez,15 this Court reiterated the long-standing rule governing finality of judgments, to wit: A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law. The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. x x x The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments. x x x16 Unlike the August 13, 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC, Iriga City, Branch 34, which was found by the CA to be a complete nullity, there is no showing that the instant case falls under any of the exceptions enumerated above. Considering the foregoing, the Court no longer finds it necessary to address the issues raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

Property / prejudicial question\

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 166838 June 15, 2011

STA. LUCIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, Inc., Petitioner, vs. CITY OF PASIG, Respondent, MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, Intervenor. DECISION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: For review is the June 30, 2004 Decision1 and the January 27, 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69603, which affirmed with modification the August 10, 1998 Decision3 and October 9, 1998 Order4of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 157, in Civil Case No. 65420. Petitioner Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. (Sta. Lucia) is the registered owner of several parcels of land with Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 39112, 39110 and 38457, all of which indicated that the lots were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Pasig5 (Pasig). The parcel of land covered by TCT No. 39112 was consolidated with that covered by TCT No. 518403, which was situated in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal (Cainta). The two combined lots were subsequently partitioned into three, for which TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, and 599131, now all bearing the Cainta address, were issued. TCT No. 39110 was also divided into two lots, becoming TCT Nos. 92869 and 92870. The lot covered by TCT No. 38457 was not segregated, but a commercial building owned by Sta. Lucia East Commercial Center, Inc., a separate corporation, was built on it.6

Upon Pasigs petition to correct the location stated in TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, and 599131, the Land Registration Court, on June 9, 1995, ordered the amendment of the TCTs to read that the lots with respect to TCT No. 39112 were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Pasig City.7 On January 31, 1994, Cainta filed a petition8 for the settlement of its land boundary dispute with Pasig before the RTC, Branch 74 of Antipolo City (Antipolo RTC). This case, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3006, is still pending up to this date. On November 28, 1995, Pasig filed a Complaint,9 docketed as Civil Case No. 65420, against Sta. Lucia for the collection of real estate taxes, including penalties and interests, on the lots covered by TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, 599131, 92869, 92870 and 38457, including the improvements thereon (the subject properties). Sta. Lucia, in its Answer, alleged that it had been religiously paying its real estate taxes to Cainta, just like what its predecessors-in-interest did, by virtue of the demands and assessments made and the Tax Declarations issued by Cainta on the claim that the subject properties were within its territorial jurisdiction. Sta. Lucia further argued that since 1913, the real estate taxes for the lots covered by the above TCTs had been paid to Cainta.10 Cainta was allowed to file its own Answer-in-Intervention when it moved to intervene on the ground that its interest would be greatly affected by the outcome of the case. It averred that it had been collecting the real property taxes on the subject properties even before Sta. Lucia acquired them. Cainta further asseverated that the establishment of the boundary monuments would show that the subject properties are within its metes and bounds.11 Sta. Lucia and Cainta thereafter moved for the suspension of the proceedings, and claimed that the pending petition in the Antipolo RTC, for the settlement of boundary dispute between Cainta and Pasig, presented a "prejudicial question" to the resolution of the case.12 The RTC denied this in an Order dated December 4, 1996 for lack of merit. Holding that the TCTs were conclusive evidence as to its ownership and location,13 the RTC, on August 10, 1998, rendered a Decision in favor of Pasig: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Pasig], ordering Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. to pay [Pasig]: 1) P273,349.14 representing unpaid real estate taxes and penalties as of 1996, plus interest of 2% per month until fully paid; 2) P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees; and 3) The costs of suit. Judgment is likewise rendered against the intervenor Municipality of Cainta, Rizal, ordering it to refund to Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. the realty tax payments improperly collected and received by the former from the latter in the aggregate amount of P358, 403.68.14 After Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed their Notices of Appeal, Pasig, on September 11, 1998, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTCs August 10, 1998 Decision.

The RTC, on October 9, 1998, granted Pasigs motion in an Order15 and modified its earlier decision to include the realty taxes due on the improvements on the subject lots: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration is hereby granted. Accordingly, the Decision, dated August 10, 1998 is hereby modified in that the defendant is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff the amount of P5,627,757.07 representing the unpaid taxes and penalties on the improvements on the subject parcels of land whereon real estate taxes are adjudged as due for the year 1996.16 Accordingly, Sta. Lucia filed an Amended Notice of Appeal to include the RTCs October 9, 1998 Order in its protest. On October 16, 1998, Pasig filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, to which both Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed several oppositions, on the assertion that there were no good reasons to warrant the execution pending appeal.17 On April 15, 1999, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution against Sta. Lucia. On May 21, 1999, Sta. Lucia filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals to assail the RTCs order granting the execution. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52874, the petition was raffled to the First Division of the Court of Appeals, which on September 22, 2000, ruled in favor of Sta. Lucia, to wit: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED by this Court. The assailed Order dated April 15, 1999 in Civil Case No. 65420 granting the motion for execution pending appeal and ordering the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal is hereby SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID.18 The Court of Appeals added that the boundary dispute case presented a "prejudicial question which must be decided before x x x Pasig can collect the realty taxes due over the subject properties."19 Pasig sought to have this decision reversed in a Petition for Certiorari filed before this Court on November 29, 2000, but this was denied on June 25, 2001 for being filed out of time. 20 Meanwhile, the appeal filed by Sta. Lucia and Cainta was raffled to the (former) Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 69603. On June 30, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision, wherein it agreed with the RTCs judgment: WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of P50,000.00 attorneys fees is DELETED.21 In affirming the RTC, the Court of Appeals declared that there was no proper legal basis to suspend the proceedings.22 Elucidating on the legal meaning of a "prejudicial question," it held that "there can be no prejudicial question when the cases involved are both civil."23 The Court of Appeals further held that the elements of litis pendentia and forum shopping, as alleged by Cainta to be present, were not met. Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed separate Motions for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated January 27, 2005.

Undaunted, Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed separate Petitions for Certiorari with this Court. Caintas petition, docketed as G.R. No. 166856 was denied on April 13, 2005 for Caintas failure to show any reversible error. Sta. Lucias own petition is the one subject of this decision.24 In praying for the reversal of the June 30, 2004 judgment of the Court of Appeals, Sta. Lucia assigned the following errors: ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING [WITH MODIFICATION] THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN PASIG CITY II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT SUSPENDING THE CASE IN VIEW OF THE PENDENCY OF THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE WHICH WILL FINALLY DETERMINE THE SITUS OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PAYMENT OF REALTY TAXES THROUGH THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA WAS VALID PAYMENT OF REALTY TAXES IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT IN THE MEANTIME THAT THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE CASE IN ANTIPOLO CITY REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS BEING FINALLY RESOLVED, THE PETITIONER STA. LUCIA SHOULD BE PAYING THE REALTY TAXES ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES THROUGH THE INTERVENOR CAINTA TO PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO.25 Pasig, countering each error, claims that the lower courts correctly decided the case considering that the TCTs are clear on their faces that the subject properties are situated in its territorial jurisdiction. Pasig contends that the principles of litis pendentia, forum shopping, and res judicata are all inapplicable, due to the absence of their requisite elements. Pasig maintains that the boundary dispute case before the Antipolo RTC is independent of the complaint for collection of realty taxes which was filed before the Pasig RTC. It avers that the doctrine of "prejudicial question," which has a definite meaning in law, cannot be invoked where the two cases involved are both civil. Thus, Pasig argues, since there is no legal ground to preclude the simultaneous hearing of both cases, the suspension of the proceedings in the Pasig RTC is baseless. Cainta also filed its own comment reiterating its legal authority over the subject properties, which fall within its territorial jurisdiction. Cainta claims that while it has been collecting the realty taxes over the subject properties since way back 1913, Pasig only covered the same for real property tax purposes in 1990, 1992, and 1993. Cainta also insists that there is a discrepancy between the locational entries and the technical descriptions in the TCTs, which further supports the need to await the settlement of the boundary dispute case it initiated.

The errors presented before this Court can be narrowed down into two basic issues: 1) Whether the RTC and the CA were correct in deciding Pasigs Complaint without waiting for the resolution of the boundary dispute case between Pasig and Cainta; and 2) Whether Sta. Lucia should continue paying its real property taxes to Cainta, as it alleged to have always done, or to Pasig, as the location stated in Sta. Lucias TCTs. We agree with the First Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52874 that the resolution of the boundary dispute between Pasig and Cainta would determine which local government unit is entitled to collect realty taxes from Sta. Lucia.26 The Local Government Unit entitled To Collect Real Property Taxes The Former Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals held that the resolution of the complaint lodged before the Pasig RTC did not necessitate the assessment of the parties evidence on the metes and bounds of their respective territories. It cited our ruling in Odsigue v. Court of Appeals27 wherein we said that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence of both its ownership and location.28 The Court of Appeals even referred to specific provisions of the 1991 Local Government Code and Act. No. 496 to support its ruling that Pasig had the right to collect the realty taxes on the subject properties as the titles of the subject properties show on their faces that they are situated in Pasig.29 Under Presidential Decree No. 464 or the "Real Property Tax Code," the authority to collect real property taxes is vested in the locality where the property is situated: Sec. 5. Appraisal of Real Property. All real property, whether taxable or exempt, shall be appraised at the current and fair market value prevailing in the locality where the property is situated. xxxx Sec. 57. Collection of tax to be the responsibility of treasurers. The collection of the real property tax and all penalties accruing thereto, and the enforcement of the remedies provided for in this Code or any applicable laws, shall be the responsibility of the treasurer of the province, city or municipality where the property is situated. (Emphases ours.) This requisite was reiterated in Republic Act No. 7160, also known as the 1991 the Local Government Code, to wit: Section 201. Appraisal of Real Property. All real property, whether taxable or exempt, shall be appraised at the current and fair market value prevailing in the locality where the property is situated. The Department of Finance shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the classification, appraisal, and assessment of real property pursuant to the provisions of this Code. Section 233. Rates of Levy. A province or city or a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area shall fix a uniform rate of basic real property tax applicable to their respective localities as follows: x x x. (Emphases ours.)

The only import of these provisions is that, while a local government unit is authorized under several laws to collect real estate tax on properties falling under its territorial jurisdiction, it is imperative to first show that these properties are unquestionably within its geographical boundaries. Accentuating on the importance of delineating territorial boundaries, this Court, in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections30 said: The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.31 (Emphasis ours.) The significance of accurately defining a local government units boundaries was stressed in City of Pasig v. Commission on Elections,32 which involved the consolidated petitions filed by the parties herein, Pasig and Cainta, against two decisions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) with respect to the plebiscites scheduled by Pasig for the ratification of its creation of two new Barangays. Ruling on the contradictory reliefs sought by Pasig and Cainta, this Court affirmed the COMELEC decision to hold in abeyance the plebiscite to ratify the creation of Barangay Karangalan; but set aside the COMELECs other decision, and nullified the plebiscite that ratified the creation of Barangay Napico in Pasig, until the boundary dispute before the Antipolo RTC had been resolved. The aforementioned case held as follows: 1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; while 2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is GRANTED. The COMELEC Order in UND No. 97-002, dated March 21, 1997, is SET ASIDE and the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico in the City of Pasig is declared null and void. Plebiscite on the same is ordered held in abeyance until after the courts settle with finality the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta, in Civil Case No. 94-3006.33 Clearly therefore, the local government unit entitled to collect real property taxes from Sta. Lucia must undoubtedly show that the subject properties are situated within its territorial jurisdiction; otherwise, it would be acting beyond the powers vested to it by law. Certificates of Title as Conclusive Evidence of Location While we fully agree that a certificate of title is conclusive as to its ownership and location, this does not preclude the filing of an action for the very purpose of attacking the statements therein. In De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation,34 we proclaimed that: We agree with the petitioners that, generally, a certificate of title shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein and conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein. However, it bears stressing that while certificates of title are indefeasible, unassailable and binding against the whole world, including the government itself, they do not create or vest title. They merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. They cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true

owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither do they permit one to enrich himself at the expense of other.35 In Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation v. Heirs of Vicente Coronado,36 we set aside the lower courts ruling that the property subject of the case was not situated in the location stated and described in the TCT, for lack of adequate basis. Our decision was in line with the doctrine that the TCT is conclusive evidence of ownership and location. However, we refused to simply uphold the veracity of the disputed TCT, and instead, we remanded the case back to the trial court for the determination of the exact location of the property seeing that it was the issue in the complaint filed before it.37 In City Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero,38 this Court reprimanded the City of Tagaytay for levying taxes on a property that was outside its territorial jurisdiction, viz: In this case, it is basic that before the City of Tagaytay may levy a certain property for sale due to tax delinquency, the subject property should be under its territorial jurisdiction. The city officials are expected to know such basic principle of law. The failure of the city officials of Tagaytay to verify if the property is within its jurisdiction before levying taxes on the same constitutes gross negligence.39 (Emphasis ours.) Although it is true that "Pasig" is the locality stated in the TCTs of the subject properties, both Sta. Lucia and Cainta aver that the metes and bounds of the subject properties, as they are described in the TCTs, reveal that they are within Caintas boundaries.40 This only means that there may be a conflict between the location as stated and the location as technically described in the TCTs. Mere reliance therefore on the face of the TCTs will not suffice as they can only be conclusive evidence of the subject properties locations if both the stated and described locations point to the same area. The Antipolo RTC, wherein the boundary dispute case between Pasig and Cainta is pending, would be able to best determine once and for all the precise metes and bounds of both Pasigs and Caintas respective territorial jurisdictions. The resolution of this dispute would necessarily ascertain the extent and reach of each local governments authority, a prerequisite in the proper exercise of their powers, one of which is the power of taxation. This was the conclusion reached by this Court in City of Pasig v. Commission on Elections,41 and by the First Division of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 52874. We do not see any reason why we cannot adhere to the same logic and reasoning in this case. The "Prejudicial Question" Debate It would be unfair to hold Sta. Lucia liable again for real property taxes it already paid simply because Pasig cannot wait for its boundary dispute with Cainta to be decided. Pasig has consistently argued that the boundary dispute case is not a prejudicial question that would entail the suspension of its collection case against Sta. Lucia. This was also its argument in City of Pasig v. Commission on Elections,42 when it sought to nullify the COMELECs ruling to hold in abeyance (until the settlement of the boundary dispute case), the plebiscite that will ratify its creation of Barangay Karangalan. We agreed with the COMELEC therein that the boundary dispute case presented a prejudicial question and explained our statement in this wise: To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.

The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case. While this may be the general rule, this Court has held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, that, in the interest of good order, we can very well suspend action on one case pending the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the first. In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area are included in the boundary dispute case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra viresacts of such barangays. x x x.43 (Emphases ours.) It is obvious from the foregoing, that the term "prejudicial question," as appearing in the cases involving the parties herein, had been used loosely. Its usage had been more in reference to its ordinary meaning, than to its strict legal meaning under the Rules of Court.44 Nevertheless, even without the impact of the connotation derived from the term, our own Rules of Court state that a trial court may control its own proceedings according to its sound discretion: POWERS AND DUTIES OF COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS Rule 135 SEC. 5. Inherent powers of courts. Every court shall have power: xxxx (g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them comformable to law and justice. Furthermore, we have acknowledged and affirmed this inherent power in our own decisions, to wit: The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes (sic) on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled the second action should be stayed. The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering its time and effort, that of counsel and the litigants. But if proceedings must be stayed, it must be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts. It bears stressing that whether or not the RTC would suspend the proceedings in the SECOND CASE is submitted to its sound discretion.45
1avvphil

In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Pasig RTC should have held in abeyance the proceedings in Civil Case No. 65420, in view of the fact that the outcome of the boundary dispute case before the Antipolo RTC will undeniably affect both Pasigs and Caintas rights. In fact, the only reason Pasig had to file a tax collection case against Sta. Lucia was not that Sta. Lucia refused to pay, but that Sta. Lucia had already paid, albeit to another local government unit. Evidently, had the territorial boundaries of the contending local government units herein been delineated with accuracy, then there would be no controversy at all. In the meantime, to avoid further animosity, Sta. Lucia is directed to deposit the succeeding real property taxes due on the subject properties, in an escrow account with the Land Bank of the Philippines. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2004 Decision and the January 27, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69603 are SET ASIDE. The City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta are both directed to await the judgment in their boundary dispute case (Civil Case No. 94-3006), pending before Branch 74 of the Regional Trial Court in Antipolo City, to determine which local government unit is entitled to exercise its powers, including the collection of real property taxes, on the properties subject of the dispute. In the meantime, Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. is directed to deposit the succeeding real property taxes due on the lots and improvements covered by TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, 599131, 92869, 92870 and 38457 in an escrow account with the Land Bank of the Philippines. SO ORDERED. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

Property reconveyance
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 169985 June 15, 2011

MODESTO LEOVERAS, Petitioner, vs. CASIMERO VALDEZ, Respondent. DECISION BRION, J.: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the March 31, 2005 decision2 and the October 6, 2005 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68549. The CA decision reversed the June 23, 2000 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, Urdaneta City,

Pangasinan, dismissing respondent Casimero Valdezs complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance and damages against petitioner Modesto Leoveras. FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS Maria Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were the registered owners - three-fourths () and onefourth () pro-indiviso, respectively - of a parcel of land located in Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 24695, with an area of 28,171 square meters. 5 In September 1932, Sta. Maria sold her three-fourths () share to Benigna Llamas.6 The sale was duly annotated at the back of OCT No. 24695. When Benigna died in 1944,7 she willed her threefourths () share equally to her sisters Alejandra Llamas and Josefa Llamas.8 Thus, Alejandra and Josefa each owned one-half () of Benignas three-fourths () share. On June 14, 1969, Alejandras heirs sold their predecessors one-half () share (roughly equivalent to 10,564 square meters) to the respondent, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.9 Also on June 14, 1969, Josefa sold her own one-half () share (subject property) to the respondent and the petitioner, as evidenced by another Deed of Absolute Sale.10 On even date, the respondent and the petitioner executed an Agreement,11 allotting their portions of the subject property. WITNESSETH That we [petitioner and respondent] are the absolute owners of [the subject property] which is particularly described as follows: xxx That our ownership over the said portion mentioned above is evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale xxx That in said deed of sale mentioned in the immediate preceding paragraph, our respective share consist of 5, 282.13 [one-half of 10,564 square meters] square meter each. That we hereby agreed and covenanted that our respective share shall be as follows: Modesto Leoveras 3,020 square meters residential portion on the northern part near the Municipal road of Poblacion Pugaro, Manaoag, Pangasinan; Casimero Valdez 7,544.2712 square meters of the parcel of land described above.13 On June 8, 1977, the petitioner and the respondent executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over the subject property.14 The parties took possession of their respective portions of the subject property and declared it in their name for taxation purposes.15 In 1996, the respondent asked the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan on the requirements for the transfer of title over the portion allotted to him on the subject property. To his surprise, the respondent learned that the petitioner had already obtained in his name two transfer certificates of title (TCTs): one, TCT No. 195812 - covering an area of 3,020 square meters; and two, TCT No. 195813 - covering an area of 1,004 square meters (or a total of 4,024 square meters).

The Register of Deeds informed the respondent that they could not find the record of OCT No. 24695; instead, the Register of Deeds furnished the respondent with the following 16 (collectively, petitioners documents): 1. Two (2) deeds of absolute sale dated June 14, 1969, both executed by Sta. Maria, purportedly conveying an unspecified portion of OCT No. 24695 as follows: a. 11, 568 square meters to the respondent and petitioner17 b. 8, 689 square meters to one Virgilia Li Meneses18 2. Deed of Absolute Sale (Benigna Deed) also dated June 14, 1969 executed by Benigna19 which reads: I, Benigna Llamas, Fernandez xxx do sell xxx by way of ABSOLUTE SALE unto the said Casimero Valdez, Modesto Leoveras and Virgilia Meneses their heirs and assigns, 7,544 sq.m.; 4,024 sq. m. and 8,689 sq. m. more or less respectively of a parcel of land which is particularly described as follows: "A parcel of land xxx covered by [OCT No.] 24695." (Emphases added) 3. Subdivision Plan of PSU 21864 of OCT No. 2469520 4. Affidavit of Confirmation of Subdivision21 dated May 3, 1994 (Affidavit), which reads: That we, Virgilia Li Meneses, xxx Dominga Manangan; Modesto Leoveras; and Casimero Valdez xxx xxx are co-owners of a certain parcel of land with an area of 28, 171 sq. m. more or less in subdivision plan Psu 21864 xxx covered by [OCT No.] 24695 situated at Poblacion (now Pugaro), Manaoag, Pangasinan; xxx we agree xxx to subdivide and hereby confirmed the subdivision in the following manner xxx: Lot 2 with an area of 3, 020 sq. m. xxx to Modesto Leoveras xxx; Lot 3 with an area of 1,004 sq. m. xxx to Modesto Leoveras xxx; Lot 4 with an area of 7,544 sq. m. xxx to Casimero Valdez xxx; Lot 5 with an area of 8, 689 sq. m. xxx to Virgilia Meneses; Lot 6 with an area of 7,043 sq. m. xxx to Dominga Manangan (Emphasis supplied.) On June 21, 1996, the respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against the petitioner, seeking the reconveyance of the 1,004-square meter portion (disputed property) covered by TCT No. 195813, on the ground that the petitioner is entitled only to the 3,020 square meters identified in the parties Agreement. The respondent sought the nullification of the petitioners titles by contesting the authenticity of the petitioners documents. Particularly, the respondent assailed the Benigna Deed by presenting

Benignas death certificate. The respondent argued that Benigna could not have executed a deed, which purports to convey 4,024 square meters to the petitioner, in 1969 because Benigna already died in 1944. The respondent added that neither could Sta. Maria have sold to the parties her threefourths () share in 1969 because she had already sold her share to Benigna in 1932. 22 The respondent denied his purported signature appearing in the Affidavit,23 and prayed for: a) xxx the cancellation of the [petitioners documents]; b) the cancellation of TCT No. 195813 in the name of Modesto Leoveras and that it be reconveyed to the [respondent]; c) the cancellation and nullification of [TCT No. 195812] covering an area of 3,020 square meters xxx; d) [the issuance of] title xxx in the name of [respondent] over an area of 17, 104 square meters of OCT 24695; 24 (Underscoring supplied) In his defense, the petitioner claimed that the parties already had (i) delineated their respective portions of the subject property even before they acquired it in 1969 and (ii) agreed that upon acquisition, each would own the portion as delineated; that the area he actually possessed and subsequently acquired has a total area of 4,024 square meters, which he subdivided into two portions and caused to be covered by the two TCTs in question. The petitioner claimed that in signing the Agreement, he was led to believe, based on the parties rough estimation, that the area he actually possessed is only 3,020 square meters contrary to the parties real intention - i.e., the extent of their ownership would be based on their actual possession.25 The petitioner further claimed that the respondent voluntarily participated in executing the Affidavit, which corrected the mistake in the previously executed Agreement26 and confirmed the petitioners ownership over the disputed property. The petitioner asked for the dismissal of the complaint and for a declaration that he is the lawful owner of the parcels of land covered by his titles. RTC RULING The RTC dismissed the complaint. The court ruled that the respondent failed to preponderantly prove that the Benigna Deed and the Affidavit are fabricated and, consequently, no ground exists to nullify the petitioners titles. The court observed that the respondent did not even compare his genuine signature with the signatures appearing in these documents. CA RULING On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC by ruling against the authenticity of the Benigna Deed and the Affidavit. The CA gave weight to Benignas death certificate which shows the impossibility of Benignas execution of the deed in 1969. The CA also noted the discrepancy between the respondents signatures as appearing in the Affidavit, on one hand, and the documents on record, on the other.27 The CA added that the respondents failure to compare his genuine signature from his purported signatures appearing in the petitioners documents is not fatal, since Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court allows the court to make its own comparison. In light of its observations, the CA ruled:

As the totality of the evidence presented sufficiently sustains [the respondents] claim that the titles issued to [the petitioner] were based on forged and spurious documents, it behooves this Court to annul these certificates of title. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated June 23, 2000 is SET ASIDE. Declaring TCT No. 195812 and TCT No. 195813 as NULL and VOID, [the petitioner] is hereby directed to reconvey the subject parcels of land to [the respondent].28 (Emphasis added.) Unwilling to accept the CAs reversal of the RTC ruling, the petitioner filed the present appeal by certiorari, claiming that the CA committed "gross misappreciation of the facts"29 by going beyond what the respondent sought in his complaint. THE PETITION The petitioner claims that the CA should not have ordered the reconveyance of both parcels of land covered by the TCTs in question since the respondent only seeks the reconveyance of the disputed property i.e., the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 195813. The petitioner asserts that after the subject sale, the parties physically partitioned the subject property and possessed their respective portions, thereby setting the limits of their ownership. The petitioner admits that the Benigna Deed is "fabricated" but hastens to add that it was only designed (i) to affirm the "true intent and agreement" of the parties on the extent of their ownership, as shown by their actual physical possession, and (ii) as a "convenient tool" to facilitate the transfer of title to his name. THE RESPONDENTS COMMENT The respondent claims that since the petitioner himself admitted using a spurious document in obtaining his titles (as alleged in the complaint and as found by the CA), then the CA correctly cancelled the latters titles.30 The petitioner forged the respondents signature in the Affidavit to make it appear that he agreed to the division indicated in the document. The respondent defended the CAs reconveyance of both parcels of land, covered by the petitioners titles, to the respondent by arguing that if the distribution in the Affidavit is followed, the "original intendment" of the parties on their shares of the subject property would be "grievously impaired"31 THE ISSUES The two basic issues32 for our resolution are: 1. Whether the CA erred in nullifying the petitioners titles. 2. Whether the CA erred in ordering the reconveyance of the parcel of land covered by the petitioners titles. THE RULING We partially grant the petition.

An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful landowner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another, to compel the registered owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him.33 The plaintiff in this action must allege and prove his ownership of the land in dispute and the defendants erroneous, fraudulent or wrongful registration of the property. We rule that the respondent adequately proved his ownership of the disputed property by virtue of the (i) Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Josefa in favor of the parties; (ii) the parties Affidavit of Adverse Claim; and (iii) the parties Agreement, which cover the subject property. The petitioner does not dispute the due execution and the authenticity of these documents,34 particularly the Agreement. However, he claims that since the Agreement does not reflect the true intention of the parties, the Affidavit was subsequently executed in order to reflect the parties true intention.
1avvphi1

The petitioners argument calls to fore the application of the parol evidence rule,35 i.e., when the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the written agreement is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of these terms can be admitted other than what is contained in the written agreement.36 Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned.37 To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party to present evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, as in this case, the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intention of the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, which nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties.38 At the trial, the petitioner attempted to prove, by parol evidence, the alleged true intention of the parties by presenting the Affidavit, which allegedly corrected the mistake in the previously executed Agreement and confirmed his ownership of the parcels of land covered by his titles. It was the petitioners staunch assertion that the respondent co-executed this Affidavit supposedly to reflect the parties true intention. In the present petition, however, the petitioner made a damaging admission that the Benigna Deed is fabricated, thereby completely bolstering the respondents cause of action for reconveyance of the disputed property on the ground of fraudulent registration of title. Since the Affidavit merely reflects what is embodied in the Benigna Deed, the petitioners admission, coupled with the respondents denial of his purported signature in the Affidavit, placed in serious doubt the reliability of this document, supposedly the bedrock of the petitioners defense. Curiously, if the parties truly intended to include in the petitioners share the disputed property, the petitioner obviously need not go at length of fabricating a deed of sale to support his application for the transfer of title of his rightful portion of the subject property. Notably, there is nothing in the Affidavit (that supposedly corrected the mistake in the earlier Agreement) that supports the petitioners claim that the partition of the subject property is based on the parties actual possession. Note that the RTC dismissed the complaint based on the respondents alleged failure to prove the spuriousness of the documents submitted by the petitioner to the Register of Deeds. However, by admitting the presentation of a false deed in securing his title, the petitioner rendered moot the issue of authenticity of the Benigna Deed and relieved the respondent of the burden of proving its falsity as a ground to nullify the petitioners titles.

By fraudulently causing the transfer of the registration of title over the disputed property in his name, the petitioner holds the title to this disputed property in trust for the benefit of the respondent as the true owner;39 registration does not vest title but merely confirms or records title already existing and vested. The Torrens system of registration cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or to permit one to enrich oneself at the expense of others.40 Hence, the CA correctly ordered the reconveyance of the disputed property, covered by TCT No. 195813, to the respondent. The parties Agreement effectively partitioned the subject property The petitioner also relies on his alleged actual possession of the disputed property to support his claim of ownership. Notably, both parties make conflicting assertions of possession of the disputed property.41 The petitioner testified on his possession as follows: Q: How many square meters did you get from the land and how many square meters was the share of [respondent]? A: 4[0]20 square meters and my brother-in-law 6,000 plus square meters. xxx Q: Was there a boundary between the 4,020 square meters and the rest of the property which (sic) designated by your brother-in-law? A: There is sir, and the boundary is the fence. Q: When did you put up that fence which is the boundary? A: After the deed of sale was made. Q: And that boundary fence which you put according to you since the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in 1969 up to the present does it still exist? A: Yes, sir. Q: Since the time you purchased the property according to you you already divided the property, is that correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: And that as of today who is in possession of that 4,020 square meters? A: I, sir.42 The petitioner and the respondent were originally co-owners of the subject property when they jointly bought it from the same vendor in 1969. However, the parties immediately terminated this state of indivision by executing an Agreement, which is in the nature of a partition agreement. The Civil Code of the Philippines defines partition as the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong.43 Partition is the division between two or

more persons of real or personal property, owned in common, by setting apart their respective interests so that they may enjoy and possess these in severalty,44 resulting in the partial or total extinguishment of co-ownership.45 In the present case, the parties agreed to divide the subject property by giving the petitioner the 3,020 square meters "residential portion on the northern part near the Municipal road."46 There is no dispute that this 3,020- square meter portion is the same parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2 (which is not the subject of the respondents action for reconveyance) in the Affidavit and the Subdivision Plan presented by the petitioner before the Register of Deeds. The fact that the Agreement lacks technical description of the parties respective portions or that the subject property was then still embraced by a single certificate of title could not legally prevent a partition, where the different portions allotted to each were determined and became separately identifiable, as in this case.47 What is strikingly significant is that even the petitioners own testimony merely attempted to confirm his actual possession of the disputed property, without, however, supporting his claim contrary to the written Agreement that the parties ownership of the subject property would be co-extensive with their possession. This is the core of the petitioners defense. At any rate, just as non-possession does not negate ownership, neither does possession automatically prove ownership, 48 especially in the face of an unambiguous document executed by the parties themselves.
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Contrary to the petitioners claim that his actual possession determines the extent of his ownership, it is the parties Agreement that defines the extent of their ownership in the subject property. One of the legal effects of partition, whether by agreement among the co-owners or by judicial proceeding, is to terminate the co-ownership and, consequently, to make the previous co-owners the absolute and exclusive owner of the share allotted to him.49 Parenthetically, the respondent declared for taxation purposes the portion he claims in December 1987.50 The total area (7,544 square meters) of the properties declared is equivalent to the area allotted to the respondent under the Agreement. On the other hand, the petitioner declared the 1,004-square meter portion only in September 1994, under Tax Declaration No. 9393,51 despite his claim of exclusive and adverse possession since 1969. Nullification of the petitioners title over the 3,020 square meter portion While the petitioner admitted using a spurious document in securing his titles, nonetheless, he questions the CAs nullification of TCT No. 195812 on the ground that, per the respondents own admission and the parties Agreement, he is the rightful owner of the land covered by this title. We disagree. The petitioners argument confuses registration of title with ownership.52 While the petitioners ownership over the land covered by TCT No. 195812 is undisputed, his ownership only gave him the right to apply for the proper transfer of title to the property in his name. Obviously, the petitioner, even as a rightful owner, must comply with the statutory provisions on the transfer of registered title to lands.53 Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that the subsequent registration of title procured by the presentation of a forged deed or other instrument is null and void. Thus, the subsequent issuance of TCT No. 195812 gave the petitioner no better right than the tainted registration which was the basis for the issuance of the same title. The Court simply cannot allow the petitioners attempt to get around the proper procedure for registering the transfer of title in his name by using spurious documents. Reconveyance is the remedy of the rightful owner only

While the CA correctly nullified the petitioners certificates of title, the CA erred in ordering the reconveyance of the entire subject property in the respondents favor. The respondent himself admitted that the 3,020- square meter portion covered by TCT No. 195812 is the petitioners just share in the subject property.54 Thus, although the petitioner obtained TCT No. 195812 using the same spurious documents, the land covered by this title should not be reconveyed in favor of the respondent since he is not the rightful owner of the property covered by this title.55 WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED. Accordingly, the petitioner is directed to RECONVEY to the respondent the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 195813. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

Property quieting of title

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 150462 June 15, 2011

TOP MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. LUIS FAJARDO AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PIAS CITY, Respondents. DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the Decision1 dated May 30, 2001 and Resolution2 dated October 23, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60712 which affirmed the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 275 in Civil Case No. 94-564 dismissing petitioners complaint for quieting of title and damages against private respondent. The factual antecedents: On December 31, 1964, Emilio Gregorio (Gregorio) filed an application for registration of title over Lots 1 to 4 of Plan Psu-204785 situated at Mag-asawang Mangga, Las Pias, Rizal, before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch II (LRC Case No. N-5053, LRC Rec. No. N-27523). On January 4, 1966, said court issued an order declaring as abandoned the reserved oppositions of Jose T. Velasquez and Pablo Velasquez. Thereafter, the case proceeded to trial.

Meanwhile, on July 29, 1965, Jose T. Velasquez (Velasquez) filed an application for registration of title over six lots denominated as Lots 7 and 9 of Psu-80886, Ap-5538, and Lots 1, 7, 9 and 11 of Psu-56007 Amd., Ap-11135, situated at Almanza, Las Pias, Rizal, in LRC Case No. N-5416, LRC Rec. No. N-28735, before the same court. On January 31, 1966, the CFI rendered a decision4 in LRC Case No. N-5053 declaring Gregorio to be the absolute owner of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 described in Plan Psu-204785. On March 9, 1966, an order was issued by said court for the issuance of the decree of registration, stating that the January 31, 1966 had become final. On March 30, 1966, the same court promulgated a decision in LRC Case No. N-5416 adjudicating Lots 1, 7, 9 and 11 of Psu-56007-Amd, plan Ap-11135, and Lots 7 and 9 of Psu-80886 (Ap-5538) to Jose T. Velasquez. On May 3, 1966, said court ordered the issuance of a decree of registration in view of the finality of the March 30, 1966 decision. In the meantime, on July 25, 1966, the LRA called the attention of the Director of Lands regarding the overlapping of Lots 1, 7 and 11 of Psu-56007-Amd awarded to Velasquez, with Lots 1 to 4 of Psu-204785 adjudicated to Gregorio, and requested that portions of these lots that are not in conflict be segregated. On September 16, 1966, the LRA informed the CFI that Lots 1 and 7 of Psu-56007Amd (Ap-11135) had been amended by the Bureau of Lands to exclude therefrom portions covered by Lot 2, Psu-64894, Psu-96904, and Lots 1 to 4, Psu-204785 of Gregorio.5 On the basis of the LRA report, Velasquez petitioned the CFI to set aside the award earlier made in favor of Gregorio in LRC Case No. N-5035 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and to give due course to his application over the said lots in LRC Case No. N-5416. On November 23, 1966, the CFI issued an Order in LRC Case Nos. N-5053 and N-5416 declaring that the application of Velasquez be given due course insofar as Lots 1 and 7 of Ap-11135 which are identical to Lots 1 to 4, Plan Psu-204785, and the January 31, 1966 decision in LRC Case No. N-5053 in favor of Gregorio respecting the same lots as null and void.6 On December 6, 1966, Decree Nos. N-111862 to N-111865 and the corresponding certificates OCT Nos. 5677, 5678, 5679 and 5680 were issued in favor of Velasquez. On January 7, 1967, Gregorio appealed the November 23, 1966 decision of the CFI to the CA (CAG.R. No. 40739-40-R). On July 30, 1971, the CA rendered its Decision7 reversing the CFI, as follows: WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and, in lieu thereof, another is hereby rendered declaring null and void the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, dated March 30, 1966, in Land Registration Case No. N-5416, LRC Rec. No. N-28735, insofar as it adjudicates in favor of appellee Jose T. Velasquez Lots Nos. 1 and 7 of Plan Ap-11315; and directing that the Order of March 9, 1966 for the issuance of the decree in Land Registration Case No. N-5053, LRC Rec. No. N-27523, over Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Plan Psu-204785, in the name of appellant Emilio Gregorio, be given due course. No costs. IT IS SO ORDERED.8 Per entry of judgment issued by the CA, the above decision became final and executory on February 1, 1972.9 It appears, however, that a petition for review had been filed by Velasquez with this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. L-34239-40 ("Jose T. Velasquez v. Emilio Gregorio"), which was given due course per Resolution dated March 7, 1972 of the Second Division. Eventually, this Court denied the petition under Resolution10 dated February 8, 1984 stating that:

We have carefully scrutinized the arguments of the parties stated in their respective briefs as well as the reasons adduced by the Court of Appeals to support its decision sought to be reviewed and We have Resolved to RECONSIDER the resolution of March 7, 1972, and enter instead another resolution DENYING the petition for lack of merit with COSTS against the petitioners.11 The above resolution became final and executory on March 2, 1984 as per entry of judgment12 issued by this Court. Prior to this however, on October 31, 1972, Decree No. N-141990 over Lots 1, 3 and 4 of Plan Psu-204785 were issued by the LRA and the corresponding OCT No. 9587 in the name of Gregorio, was subsequently issued on November 21, 1972. 13 Lots 1, 3 and 4, Plan Psu-204785 covered by OCT No. 9587 also became the subject of Civil Case No. 16977 of the CFI of Rizal. Gregorio sought the annulment of the deed of sale over the said lots in favor of Luciana Parami. The CFI dismissed the complaint of Gregorio in a decision rendered on May 8, 1974. Gregorio appealed to the CA (CA-G.R. No. 56015-R, entitled "Emilio Gregorio v. Spouses Luciana and Corpus Parami and the Register of Deeds of Rizal") which reversed the CFI. In its decision dated February 7, 1978, the CA declared the aforesaid deed of sale null and void, and ordered the cancellation of certificate of title (No. 38433) in the name of the Paramis and issuance of an OCT in favor of Gregorio covering Lots 1, 3 and 4, Plan Pasu-204785. On November 20, 1979, the court in the same case issued an order declaring the children (Ana, Paz, Carmen, Remedios and Rolando, all surnamed Gregorio) of the deceased Emilio Gregorio "as his compulsory heirs to substitute the said plaintiff."14 Pursuant to the said decision, OCT No. 9587 in the name of Emilio Gregorio was cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No. S-91911 in favor of his heirs was issued.15 In a Report dated September 12, 1984, the LRA informed the CFI in LRC Case No. N-5416 that compliance with the July 30, 1971 CA decision in CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R adjudicating Lots 1, 3 and 4 of Plan Psu-204785 in favor of Gregorio will result in duplication of titles over the said properties. The report further stated: 21. That based on the records of this Commission, Lots 1, 3 and 4 of plan Psu-204785 were already covered by TCT No. S-91911 in the name of the Heirs of Emilio Gregorio with several annotations of encumbrances x x x; 22. That among those encumbrances are the deeds of sale executed by them in favor of Herminia Galman covering an undivided portion of aforesaid Lot 1, and of Everlita Talusan of the whole Lots 3 and 4 denominated as Entry No. 21079/S-97421, and that the latter vendee E. Talusan had already acquire[d] TCT No. S-97421 over said two lots in her name also with several annotation of encumbrances x x x; 23. That as per our verification from the Registry of Deeds of Makati, corresponding titles were issued in the name of J.T. Velasquez denominated as OCT Nos. 5678, 5677, 5679 and 5680 x x x; 24. And that these certificates of title were all cancelled and assigned in favor of J.V. Development Corporation as per Entry Nos. 99377/T-195606, 195605, 195605 and 19505 all inscribed on July 27, 1967. WHEREFORE, these facts are respectfully brought to the attention of this Honorable Court with the recommendation:

That Decree Nos. N-111862 to N-111865 issued on December 6, 1966 over Lots 1 to 4, Psu204785, in favor of Jose T. Velasquez, as well as existing subsequent titles emanating from the same shall be declared null and void and ordered cancelled.16 On April 9, 1984, the heirs of Emilio Gregorio filed an ex-parte motion for execution before the RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 152 in LRC Case Nos. N-5053 and N-5416. On March 21, 1986, the RTC of Pasig issued the following Order17: Considering that the Resolution issued on February 8, 1984 by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L34239-40, entitled "Jose T. Velasquez vs. Emilio Gregorio", denying the petition for review on certiorari of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R, had on March 2, 1984 become final and executory in favor of Emilio Gregorio, and considering further the recommendation contained in the Report dated September 12, 1984 of the Acting Commissioner of Land Registration thru Silverio G. Perez, Chief, Division of Original Registration, relative to LRC Case No. N-5053, LRC Record No. N-27523, wherein Emilio Gregorio is the applicant and in LRC Case No. N-5416, LRC Record No. N-28735, wherein Jose T. Velasquez is the applicant, which report is hereby approved, the Court declares as null and void Decree Nos. N-111862 to N-111865, inclusive, issued on December 6, 1966, covering Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4, Psu-204785 in favor of Jose T. Velasquez in LRC Case No. No. 5416 as well as all existing subsequent titles emanating therefrom, and any and all encumbrances constituted against said Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4, Psu-204785 and other acts of disposition affecting the same. WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds of Pasay City is hereby directed to cancel Original Certificates of Title Nos. 5677, 5678, 5679 and 5680 issued in the name of Jose T. Velasquez and all titles and transactions emanating therefrom and which are annotated at the back of the said Certificates of Title, and to issue, in lieu thereof, new Certificates of Title in the name of the Heirs of Emilio Gregorio, after paying the prescribed fees therefor, pursuant to the Order for issuance of a decree dated March 9, 1966 in the LRC Case No. N-5053, Record No. N-27523. SO ORDERED.18 On April 29, 1986, TCT Nos. 107727, 107728 and 107729 (covering Lot 1)19 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Pasay City in the name of the Heirs of Emilio Gregorio. Subsequently, by virtue of a Partition Agreement with Herminia Galman, the property was subdivided into two lots between the heirs of Gregorio (Lot 1-A consisting of 20,000 sq. ms.) and Galman (Lot 1-B consisting of 27,536 sq. ms.). Consequently, TCT No. 107729 was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. 4635 in the name of the heirs of Gregorio and TCT No. 4636 in the name of Herminia Galman, were issued by the Register of Deeds of Las Pias.20 Undeniably, the duplication of titles over Lot 1, Psu-204785 with the issuance of TCT No. S91911 (transfer from OCT No. 9587) and TCT No. 107729 and its derivative title, TCT No. 4635, both in the name of the same owners, gave rise to the present controversy. The Claim of Luis Fajardo (TCT No. 27380, now TCT No. T-34923) As earlier mentioned, Gregorio appealed the November 23, 1966 CFI decision in LRC Case Nos. N5053 and N-5416 awarding Lots 1 to 4 of Psu-204785 in favor of Velasquez, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R. Sometime after this, he entered into an agreement with Tomas Trinidad (Trinidad) and Luis Fajardo (Fajardo) entitled "Kasunduan na may Pambihirang Kapangyarihan." By virtue of this agreement, Fajardo would finance the cost of the litigation and in return he would be entitled to

one-half of the subject property after deducting twenty per cent (20%) of the total land area as attorneys fees for Trinidad if the appeal is successful. After the CA rendered a favorable ruling on Gregorios appeal, Fajardo and Trinidad filed Civil Case No. 35305 before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 164 to enforce their agreement with Gregorio. On May 8, 1986, said court rendered judgment in their favor, as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering herein defendants: (1) to convey to Atty. Tomas Trinidad as honorarium for his services an area of 14,684 sq.m. which is twenty percent (20%) of 72,424 sq.m. the total area of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4; (2) to convey to Luis Fajardo an area of 29,369 sq.m. representing fifty percent (50%) of the remainder of the property after deducting the honorarium of Atty. Trinidad. (3) to pay the cost of suit and litigation expenses. SO ORDERED.21 The heirs of Gregorio appealed the above decision but their appeal was declared abandoned and dismissed by the CA. By virtue of an Entry of Judgment issued by the CA dated December 8, 1988, Trinidad and Fajardo filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. However, the writ issued remained unsatisfied as per the Return filed by the Sheriff on April 10, 1989. On August 14, 1989, the court appointed Deputy Sheriff Marcial Estrellado to execute the deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs. Deputy Sheriff Estrellado executed the Officers Deed of Conveyance22 dated August 15, 1989 in favor of Trinidad and Fajardo. While the plaintiffs moved for the approval of the subdivision plan needed for the transfer and issuance of separate titles as per decision, the Register of Deeds of Las Pias wrote a letter-reply23 to the Deputy Sheriff indicating that the deed of conveyance and Order of the Court dated August 14, 1989 entered as Entry No. 6503 and 6504 in their docket book could not be pursued because the subject property was already sold to other parties. In compliance with the order of the CFI, then Register of Deeds of Las Pias Alejandro R. Villanueva submitted an official report24 stating that TCT No. S-91911, still existing in their records, should have been cancelled when TCT Nos. 107727, 107728 and 107729 were issued in compliance with the Order dated March 21, 1986 of the RTC of Pasig, and that such caused an anomalous situation of having two separate and distinct certificates of title covering the same parcels of land although in the name of the same registered owners. Villanueva opined that the issuance of TCT Nos. 107727, 107728 and 107729 covering Lots 1, 3 and 4 of Psu-204785, "placed TCT No. S-91911, as deemed cancelled, inasmuch as the latter certificate of title covers one and the same parcels of land" and hence TCT No. S-91911 should not anymore be subject of any transactions. The CFI initially withdrew its Order dated August 14, 1989 but eventually reinstated the same and ordered the Register of Deeds to annotate the Deed of Conveyance at the back of TCT No. S-91911 within 24 hours upon receipt of the order. Said directive was reiterated by the CFI on June 7, 1991. On June 26, 1991, the court authorized the subdivision of Lot 1, Psu-204785 and directed the Register of Deeds to issue separate titles in favor of plaintiffs Trinidad and Fajardo. Consequently, TCT No. T-2738025 covering 29,369 sq. ms. portion of Lot 1, Psu-204785 in the name of Luis Fajardo was issued on December 12, 1991. On April 26, 1993, said TCT No. T-27380 was cancelled per

Order26 of the court dated March 13, 1992 and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-3492327 was issued, still in the name of Luis Fajardo and without any of the encumbrances carried over from TCT No. S-91911. The Claim of Top Management Programs Corporation (TCT No. T-8129) On September 24, 1991, herein petitioner Top Management Programs Corporation sought the annulment of the CFI orders in Civil Case No. 35305 reinstating the August 14, 1989 order and directing the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of Trinidad and Fajardo, on the ground of extrinsic fraud. Petitioner claimed that by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale28 dated November 29, 1988 which was notarized on January 9, 1989, the heirs of Gregorio sold to it a parcel of land with an area of 20,000 sq. ms., located at Las Pias and identified as Lot 1-A Psd-293076, being a portion of Lot 1, Psu-204785 covered by TCT No. T-4635, and that on February 20, 1989, TCT No. T-812929 covering the said property was issued in its name. On November 28, 1991, the CA rendered its decision dismissing the petition for annulment (CA-G.R. SP No. 26100). It held that there existed no extrinsic fraud which would justify the annulment of the questioned orders. Petitioner sought the reversal of the CA ruling before this Court via a petition for certiorari. By Decision30 dated May 28, 1993, this Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the CA judgment. On the issue raised by petitioner as to whether the CA erred in holding that petitioners claim of title to Lot 1-A should be served as third-party claim on the Deputy Sheriff who executed the Deed of Conveyance and caused its registration, or to vindicate the claim to the property through a separate independent action, the Court refrained from discussing the same since its resolution is inconsequential and would not alter in any way the outcome of the petition.31 Civil Case No. 94-564 Thus, on February 10, 1994, petitioner filed before the RTC of Makati Civil Case No. 94-564 for Quieting of Title With Damages. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of TCT No. T-27380 in the name of Fajardo -- who obtained the same from the court in a case without the knowledge of petitioner who was not a party therein -- despite the existence of TCT No. T-8129 in its name constitutes a cloud upon the title of petitioner. Petitioner claimed that it acquired the same property in good faith and for value from the original owners thereof. In his Answer, private respondent Fajardo asserted that it is the title of petitioner which originated from a void title. OCT No. 5678 from which TCT No. 4635 was derived, was in effect declared null and void under this Courts Resolution dated February 8, 1984 in G.R. No. L-34239-40 which dismissed petitioners appeal from the July 30, 1971 CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R. The CA had nullified the CFI decision dated March 30, 1966 in LRC Case No. N-5416 insofar as it adjudicates the subject lots to Velasquez. After petitioners formal offer of evidence, private respondent filed a demurrer to evidence, which the trial court granted in its Order32 dated June 8, 1998, as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the case is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. The Register of Deeds of Las Pias City is hereby ordered to cancel TCT No. T-8129 in the name of plaintiff Top Management Programs Corporation. SO ORDERED.33

Petitioner appealed to the CA and on May 30, 2001 said court rendered the assailed Decision34 affirming the trial courts dismissal of petitioners complaint. The CA held that petitioner cannot invoke the rule that the title which bears the earlier date should prevail in view of the infirmity in TCT No. 107729 which on its face shows that its origin was a title already voided by the appellate court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA. Hence, this petition alleging that the CA erred in (a) declaring TCT No. T-8129 as defective based on a mere clerical error despite acknowledgment of its issuance resulting from a final determination by this Court of the validity of Emilio Gregorios claim over the subject property, and (b) affirming the validity of private respondents TCT No. T-27380 despite the clear nullity of its mother title (OCT No. 9587) which was issued pending the appeal filed by Velasquez from the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R to this Court. Petitioner reiterates that an error was made on the entries in TCT No. 107729. Instead of providing that said title, as well as TCT Nos. 107727 and 107728 issued in the name of the Heirs of Emilio Gregorio, emanated from the application for registration of Emilio Gregorio in LRC Case No. N-5053, LRC Rec. No. N-27523 pursuant to the Order of the RTC in LRC Case Nos. N-5416 and N-5053, the Register of Deeds of Pasay City annotated on the face of said titles that these were derived from Jose T. Velasquezs OCT No. 5678 under Decree No. N-111862. Petitioner laments that deplorable situation of the legitimate successor of the winning litigant holding a title wrongly annotated to have been derived from the voided title of the loser in the case. The winning party was then given a title registered as derived from the title he fought so hard to set aside. Moreover, there is no logic in the appellate courts conclusion that petitioners title traces its origin to a mother title already voided, when in fact it is undisputed that TCT No. 107729 was issued pursuant to the March 21, 1986 order of the RTC of Pasig in LRC Case Nos. N-5416 and N-5053 implementing the final and executory February 8, 1984 decision of this Court in G.R. Nos. L-34239-40 denying Velasquezs appeal. Petitioner further claims that it is a buyer in good faith who had no knowledge of any defect in the title of his predecessor-in-interest. It paid the purchase price and acquired its title long before it discovered the right to compensation of private respondent through the Officers Deed of Conveyance. Finally, petitioner argues that the issuance of OCT No. 9587 during the pendency of Velasquezs appeal to this Court renders said title null and void ab initio, citing the ruling in Director of Lands v. Reyes35. Since OCT No. 9587 is a nullity, it follows that its derivative title, private respondents TCT No. T-27380, is likewise a nullity. Private respondent counters that petitioners assertion of the existence of clerical errors in the annotations of the entries in TCT No. 8129 is, at the very least, an admission that said title is indeed defective. Obviously, petitioner may not file a petition to quiet its title and at the same time seek, in the same proceeding, the corrections of the entries therein. As to the issue of premature issuance of OCT No. 9587, private respondent points out that the decision in LRC Case No. N-5053 dated January 31, 1966 as a consequence of which Decree of Registration No. 141990 was issued, has already attained finality even before Velasquez sought the annulment of the award in favor of Emilio Gregorio utilizing the Report of the Commissioner of Land Registration dated September 16, 1966, to the effect, among others, that a portion of the land awarded in his favor overlapped with that adjudicated to Gregorio. Hence, the prohibition mentioned in the case of Director of Lands v. Reyes (supra) has no application to the case at bar, and therefore could not serve as basis to nullify OCT No. 9587, the mother title of TCT No. T-27380 in the name of private respondent.

We deny the petition. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property. In an action for quieting of title, the plaintiffs must show not only that there is a cloud or contrary interest over the subject real property, but that they have a valid title to it.36 The court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not only to place things in their proper places, and to make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce the improvements he may desire, as well as use, and even abuse the property as he deems fit.37 Petitioner anchors its claim over the disputed lot on TCT No. T-8129 issued on February 20, 1989 which is a transfer from TCT No. 107729 in the name of the Heirs of Emilio Gregorio, from whom it bought the property in January 1989. On the other hand, private respondent acquired the same land by virtue of the Officers Deed of Conveyance dated August 15, 1989 executed in their favor pursuant to the final judgment in Civil Case No. 35305 of the RTC of Pasig, Branch 164 and was issued TCT No. T-27380 in his name on December12, 1991. In Degollacion v. Register of Deeds of Cavite38 we held that if two certificates of title purport to include the same land, whether wholly or partly, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates of title were derived. Citing our earlier ruling in Mathay v. Court of Appeals39 we declared: x x x where two transfer certificates of title have been issued on different dates, to two different persons, for the same parcel of land even if both are presumed to be title holders in good faith, it does not necessarily follow that he who holds the earlier title should prevail. On the assumption that there was regularity in the registration leading to the eventual issuance of subject transfer certificates of title, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates of title in dispute were derived. Should there be only one common original certificate of title, x x x, the transfer certificate issued on an earlier date along the line must prevail, absent any anomaly or irregularity tainting the process of registration.40 From the recitals in the transfer certificates of title respectively held by petitioner and private respondent, as well as the records of the LRA, there appears not just one but two different original certificates. TCT No. T-8129 on its face shows that the land covered was originally registered as OCT No. 5678 under Decree No. N-111862 (Velasquez), while TCT No. T-27380 indicates the original registration as OCT No. 9587 under Decree No. N-141990 (Gregorio). Both the LRC and CA found TCT No. 107729 and its derivative titles TCT Nos. 4635 and T-8129 as void and inexistent since OCT No. 5678 in the name of Velasquez had been nullified under the order for execution of the final judgment in LRC Case Nos. N-5053 and N-5416 in which Gregorio prevailed. Consequently, the lower courts upheld the title of private respondent which alone can be traced to the original certificate in the name of Emilio Gregorio (OCT No. 9578). Petitioner, however, asserts that the entries in his TCT contain errors and insists that TCT Nos. 107729, 4635 and T-8129 actually emanated from the application for registration of Emilio Gregorio in LRC Case No. N-5053, LRC Record No. N-27523 pursuant to the Order of the Regional Trial Court in LRC Case Nos. N-5053 and N-5416, as in fact TCT No. 107729 were issued along with TCT Nos. 107727 and 107728 covering two other lots also in the name of the Heirs of Emilio Gregorio by way of implementing the final judgment of said court in the case between Gregorio and Velasquez, as affirmed by the CA and this Court.

We disagree. TCT No. 107729 in the name of the heirs of Emilio Gregorio issued on April 29, 1986, on its face showed badges of irregularity in its issuance. First, the technical description stated that it covers a portion of Lot 1, plan Psu-204785, LRC Case No. N-5416 instead of N-5053. Second, the decree number and date of issuance, as well as OCT number clearly indicate that the original decree pertained to Velasquez and not Gregorio. Third, the name of the registered owner in the original certificate is not Velasquez or Gregorio but "Delta Motor Corp." And fourth, the certificate from which TCT No. 107729 was supposedly a transfer should have been the OCT (of Gregorio) and not those unfamiliar TCT numbers indicated therein. The annotations regarding the supposed original registration of TCT No. 107729 read as follows: IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 12th day of December in the year nineteen hundred and sixty-six in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal Volume A-69 page 78 as Original Certificate of Title No. 5678 pursuant to Decree No. N-111862 issued in L.R.C. _____________ Record No. N-28735 Case No. N-5416 in the name of Delta Motor Corp. . This certificate is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27737/A/T-145-A S-8722/T41 which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is concerned.41 (Emphasis supplied.) The foregoing errors are not mere typographical as petitioner claims, but serious discrepancies in the registration process. In fact, it is not far-fetched that the erroneous entries could have been intended to create the impression that TCT No. 107729 was a separate and distinct title from the previously issued TCT No. S-91911 even if they pertain to one and the same lot adjudicated to Emilio Gregorio. Such conclusion is reinforced by the unexplained inaction or failure of the heirs of Gregorio to rectify the alleged errors in their title before selling the property to petitioner. The heirs of Gregorio knew that their TCT No. S-91911 bore encumbrances in favor of third parties, notably the notice of pending litigation (Lis Pendens) involving the property covered by said title before the CFI of Pasig, Metro Manila in Civil Case No. 35305, which Trinidad caused to be annotated thereon. The issuance of a new certificate with exactly identical entries as that of TCT No. S-91911 (as to its original registration) would mean that the aforesaid annotations had to be carried over to such new certificate. Strangely, it is TCT No. 107729 which RD Alejandro R.Villanueva upheld in his February 5, 1989 Report notwithstanding its later issuance and the glaring errors in the entries of its original registration. It must be stressed that OCT No. 5677, 5678, 5679 and 5680 and its derivative titles were ordered cancelled precisely because they were issued pursuant to Decree Nos. N-111862 to N-111865 issued in LRC Case No. N-5416 in the name of Velasquez, who lost in the final judgment rendered in CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R, and whose claim to the lots covered thereby were declared null and void. Logically, therefore, any new certificate of title to be issued to the heirs of Gregorio by virtue of the aforesaid final judgment adjudicating the land to Emilio Gregorio, could not possibly be a transfer or replacement of the aforesaid void OCTs in the name of Velasquez. But even granting that the subject entries in TCT No. 107729 were mere clerical errors and assuming arguendo that said certificate was issued to implement the final judgment in CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R, such execution is tainted with infirmity. The March 21, 1986 order issued by the RTC of Pasig did not only cancel OCT No. 5678 (and other titles in the name of Velasquez covering the same lots adjudicated to Gregorio), it also ordered the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of the heirs of Emilio Gregorio despite having been informed by the LRA and the Register of Deeds that there was already issued OCT No. 9587 over the same lot in the name of Emilio Gregorio, which was replaced with TCT No. S-91911 in the name of the heirs of Emilio Gregorio

following the decision rendered by the appellate court (CA-G.R. No. 56015-R) in another case filed by Gregorio against spouses Parami (Civil Case No. 16977). At this point, it serves well to emphasize that upon finality of judgment in land registration cases, the winning party does not file a motion for execution as in ordinary civil actions. Instead, he files a petition with the land registration court for the issuance of an order directing the Land Registration Authority to issue a decree of registration, a copy of which is then sent to the Register of Deeds for inscription in the registration book, and issuance of the original certificate of title.42 The LRC upon the finality of the judgment adjudicating the land to an applicant shall, following the prescribed procedure, merely issues an order for the issuance of a decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title in the name of such applicant.43 In this case, the RTC of Pasig, cognizant of a previous decree of registration instead ordered the Register of Deeds to issue new certificates in favor of the heirs of Gregorio, erroneously declaring that such certificates are in lieu of OCT Nos. 5677, 5678, 5679 and 5680. Said court exceeded its authority when it ordered the issuance of transfer certificates in the name of the heirs of Gregorio despite the existence of TCT No. S-91911 already issued to them covering the sae parcel of land. This caused the duplication of titles held by the heirs of Gregorio over Lot 1. Thus, while there was only one decree and original certificate issued to the common predecessor-in-interest of petitioner and private respondent, Emilio Gregorio, the latters heirs were able to secure two transfer certificates covering the same land. Indeed it could not order the issuance of another OCT as it would result to duplication of titles or "double titling."44 A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case.45 Issuance of another decree covering the same land is therefore null and void.46 In the light of the LRA Report dated September 12, 1984 stating that compliance with the July 30, 1971 final judgment rendered by the CA which reversed the LRC decision and adjudicated Lots 1, 3 and 4 in favor of Emilio Gregorio, would result in duplication of titles, it was grave error for the RTC of Pasig to grant the motion for execution filed by the heirs of Emilio Gregorio who sought, -- in the guise of implementing the July 30, 1971 CA decision -- the issuance of new titles in their name notwithstanding the existence of OCT No. 9587 and TCT No. S-91911. Given such vital information, there exists a compelling need for the land registration court to ascertain the facts and "address the likelihood of duplication of titles x x x, an eventuality that will undermine the Torrens system of land registration."47 Petitioner nonetheless assails OCT No. 9587 as null and void, having been issued when the adverse decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R was elevated by it to this Court. Following the doctrine in Director of Lands v. Reyes (supra), it is asserted that OCT No. 9587 should not have been issued because the decision in CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R was not yet final at the time, pending resolution by this Court of the appeal by Velasquez (G.R. No. L-34239-40). In Director of Lands v. Reyes (supra), this Court laid down the rule that execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration proceeding and the certificate of title thereby issued is null and void. In that case, the assignee of the original applicant applied for a motion for issuance of a decree of registration before the lower court pending the approval of the Record on Appeal. The motion was opposed by the Government which appealed the lower courts decision adjudicating the land to the said assignee. We thus ruled: Under the circumstances of this case, the failure of the appellants to serve a copy of their Notice of Appeal to the counsel for the adjudicatee Roman C. Tamayo is not fatal to the appeal because, admittedly, he was served with a copy of the original, as well as the Amended Record on Appeal in

both of which the Notice of Appeal is embodied. Hence, such failure cannot impair the right of appeal. What is more, the appeal taken by the Government was from the entire decision, which is not severable. Thus, the appeal affects the whole decision. In any event, We rule that execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration proceeding. It is fraught with dangerous consequences. Innocent purchasers may be misled into purchasing real properties upon reliance on a judgment which may be reversed on appeal. A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the Land Registration Act which requires that a decree shall be issued only after the decision adjudicating the title becomes final and executory, and it is on the basis of said decree that the Register of Deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title. Consequently, the lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a decree of registration despite the appeal timely taken from the entire decision a quo.48

1auuphi1

OCT No. 9587 on its face showed that its basis was Decree No. N-141990 issued on October 31, 1972 pursuant to the January 31, 1966 decision of the CFI in Land Reg. Case No. N-5053 and CA decision dated July 30, 1971. Per records of this Court, however, Velasquez had filed a petition for review of the CA decision. Be that as it may, the premature issuance of the decree in favor of Emilio Gregorio and the corresponding original certificate of title in his name did not affect his acquisition of title over the subject land considering that Velasquezs petition was eventually dismissed. Neither can petitioner, by reason alone of defective issuance of OCT No. 9587, claim a right over the subject land superior to that acquired by the private respondent. A reading of the annotations of encumbrances at the back of TCT No. T-27380 which were carried over from TCT No. S-91911 in the name of the Heirs of Gregorio, would show that during the pendency of Civil Case No. 35305 filed before the CFI of Rizal by private respondent and Trinidad, the latter caused the annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens involving the same properties of the defendants therein, the heirs of Emilio Gregorio. The notice of lis pendens was registered as Entry No. 2139849 on TCT No. S-91911. Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.50 The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. 51 Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any subsequent transaction affecting the land involved would have to be subject to the outcome of the litigation.52 Petitioner being a mere transferee at the time the decision of the RTC of Pasig in Civil Case No. 35305 had become final and executory on December 6, 1988, it is bound by the said judgment

which ordered the heirs of Emilio Gregorio to convey Lots 1, 2, 3 & 4, Psu-204875 in favor of private respondent and Trinidad. As such buyer of one of the lots to be conveyed to private respondent pursuant to the courts decree with notice that said properties are in litigation, petitioner merely stepped into the shoes of its vendors who lost in the case. Such vested right acquired by the private respondent under the final judgment in his favor may not be defeated by the subsequent issuance of another certificate of title to the heirs of Gregorio respecting the same parcel of land. For it is wellsettled that being an involuntary transaction, entry of the notice of lis pendens in the primary entry book of the Register of Deeds is sufficient to constitute registration and such entry is notice to all persons of such claim.53 "It is to be noted that the notation of the lis pendens on the back of the owners duplicate is not mentioned for the purpose of constituting a constructive notice because usually such owners duplicate certificate is presented for the purpose of the annotation later, and sometimes not at all until [it is] ordered by the court."54 Strictly speaking, the lis pendens annotation is not to be referred to "as a part of the doctrine of notice; the purchaser pendente lite is affected, not by notice, but because the law does not allow litigating parties to give to others, pending the litigation, rights to the property in dispute so as to prejudice the opposite party. The doctrine rests upon public policy, not notice."55 Thus we have held that one who buys land where there is a pending notice of lis pendens cannot invoke the right of a purchaser in good faith; neither can he have acquired better rights than those of his predecessor in interest.56 In view of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not err in affirming the trial courts order dismissing petitioners complaint for quieting of title and ordering the cancellation of its TCT No. T-8129. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 30, 2001 and Resolution dated October 23, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60712 are AFFIRMED. With costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

Property beneficiaries
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 177995 June 15, 2011

HEIRS OF AGAPITO T. OLARTE AND ANGELA A. OLARTE, NAMELY NORMA OLARTEDINEROS, ARMANDO A. OLARTE, YOLANDA OLARTE-MONTECER and RENATO A. OLARTE, Petitioners, vs.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (NHA), MARIANO M. PINEDA, AS GENERAL MANAGER, THE MANAGER, DISTRICT I, NCR, EDUARDO TIMBANG and DEMETRIO OCAMPO, Respondents. DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the February 23, 2007 Decision1 and May 22, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 79163 which dismissed petitioners petition for certiorari. Subject of the instant case is a parcel of land denominated as Lot 12, Block 2 of the TramoSingalong Zonal Improvement Project (ZIP) located at 2131 F. Muoz St., San Andres, Malate, Manila. The property used to be owned by the Philippine National Railways (PNR), but was later turned over to the National Housing Authority (NHA). Petitioners, siblings Armando Olarte, Norma Olarte-Dineros, Yolanda Olarte-Montecer and Renato A. Olarte, claim that their parents, the late Agapito and Angela Olarte, started occupying the subject property in 1943 by virtue of a lease contract with the PNR and constructed thereon a two-storey residential house. Petitioners further allege that they were born and raised during their parents occupancy of the subject property. On November 3, 1965, the Board of Liquidators under the Office of the President (OP) awarded a Certificate of Priority to Agapito Olarte, to wit: Certificate of Priority TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: This is to certify that Agapito Olarte, Filipino, of legal age, single/married to Angela A. Olarte, has since 1945 continuously occupied a portion of Lot No. Parcel -7 situated in the City/Municipality of Singg., Malate, Province of Manila, and is therefore entitled to priority in the acquisition of said portion, subject to such rules and regulations as may hereafter be promulgated. The right acquired hereunder is non-transferable and any transfer thereof shall be null and void. Given under my hand at Manila, on this 3rd day of November, in the year of our Lord, one thousand nine hundred sixty(-)five. DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES BY AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT: (Sgd.) RODOLFO P. HIZON CHAIRMAN-GENERAL MANAGER3

Agapito and Angela thereafter passed away in 1981 and 1984, respectively. Petitioner Norma Olarte-Dineros was then designated as administratrix of the residential house and the subject parcel of land. In 1985, the two-storey residential house was declared in the name of Agapito for taxation purposes.4 In the same year, petitioners leased out a portion of the residential house to respondents Eduardo Timbang and Demetrio Ocampo. Thereafter, Yolanda left for Saudi Arabia to work while Norma lived with her husband in Pangarap Village, Caloocan City.5 In 1987, the NHA conducted a Census Tagging Operation in the area where the subject property is located. In 1988, Ocampo was judicially ejected from the premises by petitioners for nonpayment of rentals. On October 15, 1990, this Court in G.R. No. 95206 denied Ocampos petition for review of the CA decision which sustained the trial courts judgment ejecting Ocampo from the leased premises. On December 14, 1990, this Courts decision became final and executory. 6 What transpired thereafter is not extant from the records, but it appears that on April 30, 1997, the NHA issued a Resolution resolving a conflict of claims between petitioners and respondents Timbang and Ocampo over the subject property. The full text of the April 30, 1997 NHA Resolution reads: Sirs/Mesdames: This has reference to your conflict of claims over Lot 12, Block 2, Tramo-Singalong Zip Project, Manila. Records show that: 1. Structure with Tag No. 497 was censused as owned by Norma Olarte[-]Dineros, an absentee structure owner. Said structure was rented out to the following: a. A certain Mr. Ilagan who has left the premises with no forwarding address. b. Eduardo Timbang who is still residing in the said structure. c. Demetrio Ocampo who was judicially ejected and left the rented unit in 1993. 2. The present occupants of the structure are: a. Norma Olarte who is the censused absentee structure owner. b. Eduardo Timbang who is a censused renter. c. Armando Olarte brother of Norma Olarte who occupied the portion vacated by Mr. Ilagan in 1988 one year after the official closure of the census tagging operation [of] the project.

d. Yolanda Olarte Montecer, sister of Norma Olarte who occupied in 1994 [a] portion vacated by Demetrio Ocampo. 3. In 1988, Norma Olarte[-]Dineros filed an ejectment case against Demetrio Ocampo who finally left the premises in 1993 by virtue of a court order. 4. The District Office recommended that the subject lot be awarded in favor of Armando Olarte and Eduardo Timbang per area of actual occupancy and that Demetrio Ocampo be qualified to apply for a generated lot or buy a structure within the project site. After judicious review and evaluation of the records of the case, we found that: 1. Eduardo Timbang and Demetrio Ocampo are the only qualified beneficiaries of the subject lot for having been censused as renters therein. Norma Olarte[-]Dineros, Armando Olarte, and Yolanda Olarte Montecer, are all disqualified for not being census residents within the project site. 2. The decision of the court with regards to the ejectment case filed against Demetrio Ocampo treated only the possessory rights over the structure but not the determination of who is the rightful awardee/beneficiary of the lot. 3. The Court of Appeals as affirmed by the Supreme Court declared: "until they (Olartes) are refunded the necessary and useful expenses for the residential house, they have a right to retain possession of it." In other words, the Olartes can only be entitled to reimbursement of their lawful expenses for the construction of the existing structure built on the controverted lot. 4. The departure of Demetrio Ocampo from the contested structure was not voluntary. He has no intention of leaving the premises were it not to the adverse decision of the court in which case he has no other recourse but to reside even outside the project area. In short, he cannot be punished for his involuntary act of looking shelter outside the project area. In view of the foregoing, you are advised that: 1. Eduardo Timbang and Demetrio Ocampo are to negotiate with Norma Olarte-Dineros for the voluntary sale of the structure of Ms. Dineros or voluntarily dismantle the same, in case of failure of negotiations within sixty (60) days upon receipt hereof; otherwise, this Authority shall cause the dismantling of the said structure. 2. Mr. Armando Olarte is not qualified for lot award as he was not included in the census or is not a bonafide resident as defined in the code of policies as he occupied the structure one year after the official closure of tagging operation in the project site. 3. Lot 12, Block 2, Tramo-Singalong ZIP Project is hereby awarded to Eduardo Timbang and Demetrio Ocampo in equal share. 4. This resolution is FINAL. Should the aggrieved parties opt to appeal, they have thirty (30) days from receipt hereof within which to file an appeal with the Office of the President, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987.

Very Truly yours, (Sgd) MARCIANO M. PINEDA General Manager7 (Emphasis supplied.) The April 30, 1997 Resolution was received by petitioners on June 25, 1997. Twenty-six (26) days later, or on July 21, 1997, petitioners filed an Appeal and Memorandum on Appeal with the OP anchored on the following grounds: I. THE GENERAL MANAGER OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (NHA) COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY IN RESOLVING THAT EDUARDO TIMBANG AND DEMETRIO OCAMPO ARE THE ONLY QUALIFIED BENEFICIARIES OF THE SUBJECT LOT FOR HAVING BEEN CENSUSED AS RENTERS OF THE LOT; AND IN AWARDING TO THEM LOT 12, BLOCK 2, TRAMO-SINGALONG ZIP PROJECT IN EQUAL SHARE. II. THE GENERAL MANAGER OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (NHA), THE HONORABLE MARCIANO M. PINEDA, COMMITTED A SERIOUS [AND] REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RESOLVING FURTHER THAT NORMA OLARTE[-]DINEROS, ARMANDO OLARTE AND YOLANDA OLARTE MONTECER ARE ALL DISQUALIFIED FOR NOT BEING CENSUS RESIDENTS WITHIN THE PROJECT SITE AND THAT THE OLARTES CAN ONLY BE ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF THEIR LAWFUL EXPENSES FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE EXISTING STRUCTURE BUILT ON THE LOT. III. THAT THERE WAS A SERIOUS IRREGULARITY AND CORRUPTION IN THE CENSUS TAGGING OPERATIONS DELIBERATELY DESIGNED TO FAVOR THE RENTERS EDUARDO TIMBANG AND DEMETRIO OCAMPO AND TO DISQUALIFY THE PETITIONERS DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY AND THEIR PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN CONTINUOUS, OPEN AND UNINTERRUPTED POSSESSION AND OCCUPANCY OF THE SAID LOT 12, BLOCK 2, TRAMOSINGALONG ZIP PROJECT SINCE 1943 AND WERE EARLIER GIVEN PRIORITY RIGHTS TO ACQUIRE THE SAID PROPERTY. IV. THAT THE PETITIONERS WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND THEY ARE ABOUT TO LOSE THE RESIDENTIAL HOUSE WHICH IS THE ONLY PIECE OF PROPERTY AND THE RIGHTS TO LOT 12, BLOCK 2, TRAMO-SINGALONG ZIP PROJECT WHERE ALL OF THEM WERE BORN AND HAVE GROWN UP, WHICH THE PETITIONERS INHERITED FROM THEIR PARENTS, HENCE, SAID RESOLUTION IS NULL AND VOID.8

On November 29, 2002, the OP, thru Deputy Executive Secretary Arthur P. Autea, issued a Resolution9 dismissing petitioners appeal for being filed out of time and for lack of merit. The OP cited Section 210 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 134411 which provides that an appeal from the decision of the NHA should be made within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision and that if an appeal was made and said decision is not reversed and/or amended within a period of thirty (30) days, the decision is deemed affirmed. The OP held that since more than thirty (30) days had lapsed since the appeal became ripe for decision and there was no reversal or amendment of the appealed ruling, the questioned award of the NHA is deemed affirmed. The OP further ruled that the appeal was filed out of time, noting that it took petitioners twenty-six (26) days to file it. The OP further ruled that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with, in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion or unless the findings are not supported by substantial evidence. It held that petitioners failed to prove grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NHA and that the records show that the assailed ruling is supported by substantial evidence. Petitioners moved to reconsider the November 29, 2002 Resolution of the OP arguing that petitioners rightly relied on the statement of the NHA regarding the period for filing the appeal because the NHA was the entity specifically charged with deciding the parties rights and obligations to the subject land. They contend that there was no bad faith or any intention on their part to delay the disposition of the case; hence, the OP should have relaxed the rules on the matter of perfection of appeals. They likewise claim that the delay is not unreasonable since it was precipitated by a mistake of the NHA itself. Petitioners add that there was grave abuse of discretion on the NHAs part for completely disregarding the facts as laid down by petitioners, and for relying on its census tagging to favor respondents Timbang and Ocampo. By Resolution12 dated June 27, 2003, however, the OP denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Thus, on September 15, 2003, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the OPs rulings. In a Resolution13 dated September 19, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari outright on the grounds that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only two of the four petitioners and that they erroneously availed of the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 instead of an appeal under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Petitioners moved to reconsider the dismissal of their petition, but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution14 dated August 3, 2004. The case was thereafter elevated to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 165821. On June 21, 2005, this Court rendered a Decision15 reversing and setting aside the September 19, 2003 and August 19, 2004 CA Resolutions and remanding the case to the CA for further proceedings. The Court ruled that the ends of justice would be better served if substantial issues are squarely addressed, especially since either side stands to lose a family home. However, since the issues involved are factual in nature, this Court ruled that such issues are best addressed to the CA, which has the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Upon remand, however, the CA again dismissed the petition sustaining the OPs ruling.

Thus, petitioners again brought this case before this Court, raising the following arguments: I. THE SUPREME COURT HAS ALREADY SETTLED THE ISSUE OF WHO IS THE LAWFUL POSSESSOR OF THE DISPUTED LAND. THE CERTIFICATE OF PRIORITY IS [A] RECOGNITION BY THE STATE OF PETITIONER[S] POSSESSION OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE MERE LESSEES OF PETITIONERS. II. PETITIONERS WERE DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW. III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT WHICH EARLIER DISMISSED THE APPEAL OF THE PETITIONERS FOR HAVING BEEN FILED OUT OF TIME. THE HONORABLE COURT HAS ALREADY RULED THAT A LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES MUST BE ACCORDED THE PETITIONERS SINCE IT IS THEIR FAMILY HOME THAT IS AT STAKE.16 Petitioners argue that the issue of prior possession has already been passed upon and settled by this Court in its Decision dated October 15, 1990 in G.R. No. 95206. Thus, it is erroneous for the NHA to award the subject land to respondents on the ground that petitioners are not censused owners since petitioners by and through their predecessors in interest have been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, open, public and adverse possession since 1943. They further contend that the Certificate of Priority awarded to their parents Agapito and Angela operated to grant them the right to purchase the said property as soon as it became open for acquisition by private individuals. Thus, the blind reliance of the OP on the NHA resolution on the tagging census operation effectively deprived petitioners of their lawful rights to the property without due process of law and invalidated altogether the Certificate of Priority earlier issued to their parents. Petitioners likewise argue that they were deprived due process of law as the tagging operations were conducted without prior notice to the owners or lawful occupants of the area. At the time of the tagging operations, petitioners Armando and Renato were in possession thereof. This, however, was conveniently ignored by the NHA when it concluded that Armando is not qualified for a lot award and is not a bona fide resident. Worse, petitioners contend that they were never informed nor given the opportunity to present or adduce evidence of their continued occupancy of the subject property by themselves and through their predecessors in interest. The NHA simply relied on the tagging operations. Petitioners also submit that the CA, in affirming the OPs decision, effectively denied them the opportunity to present completely their meritorious case on appeal. They point out that it is the NHA resolution itself which provided for a thirty (30)-day appeal period and petitioners, in their honest belief that they were granted said amount of time within which to file their appeal, cannot be faulted for having filed the appeal beyond the reglementary period mandated in P.D. No. 1344. They argue that while the government is usually not estopped by the mistake or error of its officials or agents, the rule does not afford a blanket or absolute immunity. Petitioners further contend that this Court has already ruled that a liberal interpretation of the rules must be accorded them since it is their family home that is at stake.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the NHA, on the other hand argues that though petitioners blame the NHA for their belated filing of the appeal when its resolution granted them a period of thirty (30) days within which to appeal to the OP, such does not change the fact that their appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period. The OSG submits that the OP aptly held that the error of the NHA, which did not take into account Section 2 of P.D. No. 1344 providing for the fifteen (15)-day period to appeal, cannot be invoked as a ground for estoppel. Also, petitioners have no one to blame but themselves for the belated filing of their appeal as ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. The OSG likewise argues that a perusal of the records of the case would show that petitioners need not present evidence to establish their possession because although they allege to be owners, they are nonetheless disqualified from being beneficiaries of the land. As to Armando, even though he actually occupied the property, he did so one year after the official closure of the census tagging operation. As to Norma and Yolanda, they are disqualified for not being census residents. The OSG also contends that the Certificate of Priority cannot be considered title to the property. In fact, petitioners could be deemed to have abandoned whatever right they may have over the property by virtue of the Certificate of Priority when they stopped residing on the property as they were found by NHA as not census residents within the project area. Clearly therefore, there was basis for the NHA for holding Timbang and Ocampo as eligible beneficiaries. Essentially, the issues to be resolved in the instant case are: (1) Should petitioners be blamed for filing their appeal late because they relied on the erroneous pronouncement in the NHA resolution that they have thirty (30) days to file it instead of fifteen (15) days as mandated by law? and (2) Are petitioners disqualified to be awardees for Lot 12, Block 2, Tramo-Singalong ZIP, Manila? As to the first issue, we answer in the negative. Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules, failing in which the right to appeal is lost.17 In the instant case, the proximate cause of petitioners failure to comply with the rules, specifically that pertaining to the period within which to appeal, is the pronouncement in the appealed resolution itself that they have thirty (30) days contrary to what is prescribed in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1344, the applicable law in the case. We agree with petitioners that they cannot be blamed for honestly believing that they indeed had thirty (30) days considering it was the NHA itself which said so. Being the agency tasked to implement P.D. No. 1344, it is but plausible for petitioners to assume that what the NHA pronounced is the correct period within which they can file their appeal. However, as to the second issue, we rule in the affirmative. The Zonal Improvement Project or ZIP was adopted to strengthen further the efforts of the government to uplift the living conditions in the slums and blighted areas18 in line with the spirit of the constitutional provision guaranteeing housing and a decent quality of life for every Filipino. 19 The ownership of land by the landless is the primary objective of the ZIP.20 The Code of Policies embodied in NHA Circular No. 13 governed the implementation of the ZIP as to the classification and treatment of existing structures, the selection and qualification of intended beneficiaries, the disposition and award of fully developed lots in all ZIP zones within Metro Manila, and other related activities.21 In the Declaration of Policy, it provides that the tagging of structures

and the census of occupants shall be the primary basis for determining beneficiaries within ZIP Project sites.22 Paragraph V, on the other hand, lays down the rules on beneficiary selection and lot allocation: V. BENEFICIARY SELECTION AND LOT ALLOCATION 1. The official ZIP census and tagging shall be the primary basis for determining potential program beneficiaries and structures or dwelling units in the project area. 2. Issuance of ZIP tag number in no way constitutes a guarantee for ZIP lot allocation. 3. Absentee censused households and all uncensused households are automatically disqualified from lot allocation. 4. Only those households included in the ZIP census and who, in addition, qualify under the provisions of the Code of Policies, are the beneficiaries of the Zonal Improvement Program. 5. A qualified censused-household is entitled to only one residential lot within the ZIP project areas of Metro Manila. 6. Documentation supporting lot allocation shall be made in the name of the qualified household head. 7. An Awards and Arbitration Committee (AAC) shall be set up in each ZIP project area to be composed of representative each from the Authority, the local government, the barangay and the community. The AAC shall determine lot allocation amongst qualified beneficiaries, arbitrate in matters of claims and disputes, and safeguard the rights of all residents in ZIP project areas by any legal means it may consider appropriate. All decisions of the AAC shall be subject to review and approval of the General Manager of the Authority, the local Mayors, and finally the Governor of the Metropolitan Manila Commission.23 The declaration of policy in the Code of Policies stated that an absentee or uncensused structure owner was disqualified from owning a lot within the ZIP zones.24 The Code of Policies shows the following persons to be automatically disqualified as beneficiaries of the project, namely: (1) Absentee censused household censused household that vacates a duly tagged structure or dwelling unit and leaves the project area for a continuous period for at least six months without written notice to the NHA and the local government unit; (2) Uncensused household household that is not registered in the official ZIP census; (3) Absentee structure owner any individual who owns a structure or dwelling unit in a ZIP project area and who has not occupied it prior to the official closure of the Census; and (4) Uncensused structure owner any person who owns a structure or dwelling unit not registered in the official ZIP census.25 (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, in the award of the ZIP lot allocation, the primary bases for determining the potential program beneficiaries and structures or dwelling units in the project area were the official ZIP census and tagging conducted. It was, therefore, the primordial requisite that the intended beneficiary must be the occupant of the tagged structure at the time of the official ZIP census or at the closure

thereof. Otherwise, the person was considered an absentee structure owner for being absent from his usual residence or domicile.26 Here, at the time of the official ZIP census, the NHA found that Norma was an absentee structure owner and it was not petitioners but respondents Timbang and Ocampo and a certain Mr. Ilagan who were occupying the subject property. Armando on the other hand occupied the portion vacated by Mr. Ilagan in 1988 one year after the official closure of the census tagging operation while Yolanda occupied a portion vacated by Demetrio Ocampo in 1994 after the latter was judicially evicted in 1993. Though there was no mention as to Renato, petitioners in their pleadings admit that he was working in Novaliches and would only go to the subject property during weekends. Petitioners however dispute the NHA and census findings and allege that Armando and Renato never left the subject property, but we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the NHA. It is settled that the Court is not a trier of facts and accords great weight to the factual findings of lower courts or agencies whose function is to resolve factual matters. It is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over again. Moreover, findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but finality when affirmed by the CA,27 as in the case at bar. Evidently, all petitioners cannot qualify as beneficiaries because they were not the occupants of the subject property at the time of the census. They were living elsewhere at that crucial time. Undeniably, they were primarily using the subject property as a source of income by renting it out to third persons and not as their abode. Petitioners thus are not homeless persons which the ZIP intended to benefit. That petitioners were the descendants of the persons who built the residential house does not mean that the lot on which it stood would automatically be awarded to them. Petitioners cannot anchor their rights on the Certificate of Priority awarded to their parents. As correctly argued by the OSG, petitioners are deemed to have abandoned whatever right they may have over the property by virtue of the Certificate of Priority, when they chose not to reside on the subject property and found by NHA as not census residents within the project area. Neither can petitioners rely on this Courts final judgment sustaining Ocampos ejectment from the subject property. The only issue for resolution in an ejectment case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. An ejectment case is designed to restore, through summary proceedings, the physical possession of any land or building to one who has been illegally deprived of such possession, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. Any ruling on the question of ownership is only provisional and made for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto.28 Certainly, a judgment in an ejectment case could only resolve the question as to who has a better right to possess the subject property but definitely, it could not conclusively determine whether petitioners are entitled to the award under the ZIP or ascertain if respondents are disqualified beneficiaries.29
1avvphi1

We likewise disagree with petitioners argument that they were deprived due process since they were not notified of the census tagging operations in their area. It cannot be said that the census was conducted for one day only that petitioners could have just missed their opportunity to be considered as censused occupants. If in fact they actually live on the subject property and are really occupants thereof, there is no way that they will not be aware of the census tagging operations since all residents in the area were subjected to it. The fact that they allegedly knew nothing of the census tagging operations all the more bolsters the NHAs finding that petitioners are mere absentee structure owners and not occupants of the subject property.

Similarly without merit is petitioners contention that they were deprived of due process of law. If petitioners were not able to present evidence to substantiate their claim, they only have themselves to blame and not the NHA or the Office of the President whom they believed to have ignored their claims and contentions. Nothing in the records show that petitioners invoked the jurisdiction of the Awards and Arbitration Committee (AAC) that was set up in their area to determine lot allocation amongst qualified beneficiaries, arbitrate in matters of claims and disputes, and safeguard the rights of all residents in the ZIP project area.30 If at the first instance, they already went to the AAC, they could have easily proven their claims since it includes members from the barangay and the community who know them and could attest that they are indeed actual residents of the subject property. Petitioners, however, failed to avail of this remedy. In sum, while this Court finds that petitioners appeal to the OP should be considered timely filed, we find the same to be without merit. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. With costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

PFR declaration of nullity

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 189207 June 15, 2011

ERIC U. YU, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE AGNES REYES-CARPIO, in her official capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig-Branch 261; and CAROLINE T. YU, Respondents. DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: The Case

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to annul and set aside the March 31, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106878. The CA Decision affirmed the Orders dated August 4, 20082 and October 24, 20083 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 261 in Pasig City. The Facts The instant petition stemmed from a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner Eric U. Yu against private respondent Caroline T. Yu with the RTC in Pasig City. The case was initially raffled to Branch 163. On May 30, 2006, Judge Leili Cruz Suarez of the RTC-Branch 163 issued an Order, stating that petitioners Partial Offer of Evidence dated April 18, 2006 would already be submitted for resolution after certain exhibits of petitioner have been remarked. But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of marriage of the parties.4 On September 12, 2006, private respondent moved to submit the incident on the declaration of nullity of marriage for resolution of the court, considering that the incidents on custody, support, and property relations were mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage. 5 On September 28, 2006, petitioner opposed private respondents Motion, claiming that the incident on the declaration of nullity of marriage cannot be resolved without the presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, support, and property relations.6 Petitioner, therefore, averred that the incident on nullity of marriage, on the one hand, and the incidents on custody, support, and property relations, on the other, should both proceed and be simultaneously resolved. On March 21, 2007, RTC-Branch 163 issued an Order in favor of petitioners opposition. Particularly, it stated that: The Court agrees with the contention of the Petitioner that it would be more in accord with the rules if the Parties were first allowed to present their evidence relative to the issues of property relations, custody and support to enable the Court to issue a comprehensive decision thereon.7 Subsequently, private respondent was able to successfully cause the inhibition of Judge Cruz Suarez of the RTC-Branch 163. Consequently, the case was re-raffled to another branch of the Pasig RTC, particularly Branch 261, presided by Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio.8 Thereafter, while the case was being heard by the RTC-Branch 261, private respondent filed an Omnibus Motion on May 21, 2008. The Omnibus Motion sought (1) the strict observation by the RTC-Branch 261 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, in the subject proceedings; and (2) that the incident on the declaration of nullity of marriage be already submitted for resolution.9 Conversely, private respondent prayed that the incident on the declaration of nullity of marriage be resolved ahead of the incidents on custody, support, and property relations, and not simultaneously. Quite expectedly, petitioner opposed the Omnibus Motion, arguing that the issues that were the subject of the Omnibus Motion had already been resolved in the March 21, 2007 Order. Concurrently, petitioner prayed that the incidents on nullity, custody, support, and property relations of the spouses be resolved simultaneously.10

In its Order dated August 4, 2008, the RTC-Branch 261 granted the Omnibus Motion. Judge ReyesCarpio explained that: At the outset, the parties are reminded that the main cause of action in this case is the declaration of nullity of marriage of the parties and the issues relating to property relations, custody and support are merely ancillary incidents thereto. xxxx Consistent, therefore, with Section 19 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the Court finds it more prudent to rule first on the petitioners petition and respondents counter-petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of each others psychological incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations. If the Court eventually finds that the parties respective petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis of either or both of the parties psychological incapacity, then the parties shall proceed to comply with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a final decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued. Pending such ruling on the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage, the Court finds no legal ground, at this stage, to proceed with the reception of evidence in regard the issues on custody and property relations, since these are mere incidents of the nullity of the parties marriage.11 On August, 28, 2008, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the August 4, 2008 Order. On October 24, 2008, Judge Reyes-Carpio issued an Order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. In denying the motion, Judge Reyes-Carpio reasoned: x x x [I]t is very clear that what petitioner seeks to reconsider in the Courts Order dated August 4, 2008 is the procedure regarding the reception of evidence on the issues of property relations, custody and support. He opposes the fact that the main issue on declaration of nullity is submitted for decision when he has not yet presented evidence on the issues on property relations, custody and support. Considering that what he seeks to set aside is the procedural aspect of the instanct case, i.e. the reception of evidence which is a matter of procedure, there is no question that it is A.M. 02-11-[10]SC which should be followed and not the procedures provided in Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code. While it is true that the Family Code is a substantive law and rule of procedure cannot alter a substantive law, the provisions laid in Articles 50 and 51 relative to the liquidation and dissolution of properties are by nature procedural, thus there are no substantive rights which may be prejudiced or any vested rights that may be impaired. In fact, the Supreme Court in a number of cases has even held that there are some provisions of the Family Code which are procedural in nature, such as Article[s] 185 and 50 of the Family Code which may be given retroactive effect to pending suits. Adopting such rationale in the instant case, if the Court is to adopt the procedures laid down in A.M. No. 02-11-[10]-SC, no vested or substantive right will be impaired on the part of the petitioner or the respondent. Even Section 17 of A.M. No. 02-11[10]-SC allows the reception of evidence to a commissioner in matters involving property relations of the spouses. xxxx Lastly, it is the policy of the courts to give effect to both procedural and substantive laws, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Moreover, as previously stated, the Court finds it more prudent to rule first on the petitioners petition and respondents counter-petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of each others

psychological incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations. If the Court eventually finds that the parties respective petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis of either or both of the parties psychological incapacity, then the parties shall proceed to comply with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a final decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued.12 The Ruling of the Appellate Court On January 8, 2009, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, assailing both the RTC Orders dated August 4, 2008 and October 24, 2008. The petition impleaded Judge ReyesCarpio as respondent and alleged that the latter committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the assailed orders. On March 31, 2009, the CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the petition. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads: All told, absent any arbitrary or despotic exercise of judicial power as to amount to abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge in issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition for certiorari cannot prosper. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.13 The Issues This appeal is, hence, before Us, with petitioner maintaining that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the assailed orders issued by the trial court and dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. Particularly, petitioner brings forth the following issues: A. Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding that a petition for certiorari is not a proper remedy of the Petitioner B. Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack [or excess] of jurisdiction in upholding the Respondent Judge in submitting the main issue of nullity of marriage for resolution ahead of the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations C. Whether or not the reception of evidence on custody, support and property relations is necessary for a complete and comprehensive adjudication of the parties respective claims and [defenses].14 The Courts Ruling We find the petition without merit. A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy in assailing that a judge has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court clearly sets forth when a petition for certiorari can be used as a proper remedy:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis Ours.) The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction."15 The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility."16Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void."17 From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross.18 But this is not the case here. Nowhere in the petition was it shown that the acts being alleged to have been exercised with grave abuse of discretion(1) the Orders of the RTC deferring the presentation of evidence on custody, support, and property relations; and (2) the appellate courts Decision of upholding the Orders were patent and gross that would warrant striking down through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. At the very least, petitioner should prove and demonstrate that the RTC Orders and the CA Decision were done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment.19 This, however, has not been shown in the petition. It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are alleged to have been exercised with grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order is one which "does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court."20 To be clear, certiorari under Rule 65 is appropriate to strike down an interlocutory order only when the following requisites concur: (1) when the tribunal issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (2) when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief.21 In this case, as We have discussed earlier, petitioner failed to prove that the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and that those were patently erroneous. Considering that the requisites that would justify certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order have not been complied with, the proper recourse for petitioner should have been an appeal in due course of the judgment of the trial court on the merits, incorporating the grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders.22 The appellate court, thus, correctly cited Triplex Enterprises, Inc. v. PNBRepublic Bank and Solid Builders, Inc., penned by Chief Justice Renato Corona, which held:

Certiorari as a special civil action is proper when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. The writ may be issued only where it is convincingly proved that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, or an act too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or that the trial court exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. While certiorari may be maintained as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order in cases where the tribunal has issued an order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, it does not lie to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling. In this connection, we quote with approval the pronouncement of the appellate court: In this jurisdiction, there is an "erroneous impression that interlocutory [orders] of trial courts on debatable legal points may be assailed by certiorari. To correct that impression and to avoid clogging the appellate court with future certiorari petitions it should be underscored that the office of the writ of certiorari has been reduced to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for any other purpose." The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void. Moreover, it is designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors in judgment. The rationale of this rule is that, when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. Otherwise, every mistake made by a court will deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment will be a void judgment. When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the defendant, any mistake in the application of the law and the appreciation of evidence committed by a court may be corrected only by appeal. The determination made by the trial court regarding the admissibility of evidence is but an exercise of its jurisdiction and whatever fault it may have perpetrated in making such a determination is an error in judgment, not of jurisdiction. Hence, settled is the rule that rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of a trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a separate appeal or review on certiorari. They must be assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case. Here, petitioner assails the order of the trial court disallowing the admission in evidence of the testimony of Roque on the opinion of the OGCC. By that fact alone, no grave abuse of discretion could be imputed to the trial court. Furthermore, the said order was not an error of jurisdiction. Even assuming that it was erroneous, the mistake was an error in judgment not correctable by the writ of certiorari.23 Be that as it may, even dwelling on the merits of the case just as the CA has already done and clearly explicated, We still find no reason to grant the petition. It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the presentation of evidence on the incidents on custody, support, and property relations. It is clear in the assailed orders that the trial court judge merely deferred the reception of evidence relating to custody, support, and property relations, to wit: August 4, 2008 Order

Consistent, therefore, with Section 19 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the Court finds it more prudent to rule first on the petitioners petition and respondents counter-petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of each others psychological incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations. If the Court eventually finds that the parties respective petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis of either or both of the parties psychological incapacity, then the parties shall proceed to comply with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a final decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued. Pending such ruling on the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage, the Court finds no legal ground, at this stage, to proceed with the reception of evidence in regard the issues on custody and property relations, since these are mere incidents of the nullity of the parties marriage.24 October 24, 2008 Order Lastly, it is the policy of the courts to give effect to both procedural and substantive laws, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Moreover, as previously stated, the Court finds it more prudent to rule first on the petitioners petition and respondents counter-petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of each others psychological incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations. If the Court eventually finds that the parties respective petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis of either or both of the parties psychological incapacity, then the parties shall proceed to comply with Article (sic) 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a final decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued.25 And the trial judges decision was not without basis. Judge Reyes-Carpio finds support in the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Particularly, Secs. 19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations after the trial court renders a decision granting the petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the petition: Section 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties. xxxx Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes. - Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by this Court, to a time when a decision granting the petition is already at hand and before a final decree is issued. Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the family court, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children, and delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the petition. And following the pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles

50 and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to what petitioner asserts. Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code state: Article 50. x x x The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous judicial proceedings. xxxx Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters. (Emphasis Ours.) Finally, petitioner asserts that the deferment of the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations would amount to an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment on the main issue.26 This argument does not hold water. The Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive evidence on the subject incidents after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in issuing the assailed orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, petitioners assertion that ruling the main issue without receiving evidence on the subject incidents would result in an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and, hence, contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.27
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Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a capricious and whimsical manner, much less in a way that is patently gross and erroneous, when she issued the assailed orders deferring the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations. To reiterate, this decision is left to the trial courts wisdom and legal soundness. Consequently, therefore, the CA cannot likewise be said to have committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio and in ultimately finding an absence of grave abuse of discretion on her part. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 106878 finding that Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.* Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

Property registration of title

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 179673 June 8, 2011

NATIVIDAD STA. ANA VICTORIA, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION ABAD, J.: This case is about the need for an applicant for registration of title to land to prove that the same has been officially declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The Facts and the Case On November 2, 2004 petitioner Natividad Sta. Ana Victoria applied for registration under the law1 of a 1,729-square meter lot in Bambang, City of Taguig, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of that city. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the respondent Republic of the Philippines, opposed the application in the usual form. Victoria testified and offered documentary evidence to show that the subject lot, known as Lot 5176D, Mcadm-590-D of the Taguig Cadastral Mapping is a portion of a parcel of land with an area of 17,507 sq m originally owned by Victorias father Genaro Sta. Ana and previously declared in his name for tax purposes. Upon Genaros death, Victoria and her siblings inherited the land and divided it among themselves via a deed of partition. The Conversion/Subdivision Plan Victoria presented in evidence showed that the land is inside the alienable and disposable area under Project 27-B as per L.C. Map 2623, as certified by the Bureau of Forest Development on January 3, 1968. Victoria testified that she and her predecessors-ininterest have been in possession of the property continuously, uninterruptedly, openly, publicly, adversely and in the concept of owners since the early 1940s or for more than 30 years and have been declared as owners for taxation purposes for the last 30 years. The Republic did not present any evidence in support of its opposition. On January 25, 2006 the MeTC rendered a decision,2 granting the application for registration and finding that Victoria sufficiently established her claim and right under the land registration law to have the subject property registered in her name. The Republic appealed the MeTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), pointing out in its brief that Victoria failed to present evidence that the subject property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain and that she failed to establish the kind of possession required for registration. In her brief, Victoria replied that the Conversion/Subdivision Plan she submitted carried a notation that the subject property is within alienable and disposable area. Further, she attached to her brief a Certification3 dated November 6, 2006 issued by the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources (DENR), verifying the subject property as within the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. On June 19, 2007 the CA rendered judgment, reversing and setting aside the MeTC decision because Victoria failed to prove that the subject lot is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. She could not, said the CA, rely on the notation in the Conversion/Subdivision Plan she submitted before the MeTC, although it carried a notation that the land is alienable and disposable as certified by the Chief of Survey of the Land Management Services of the DENR on January 3, 1968, because such notation was made only in connection with the approval of the plan. On the other hand, the CA could not take cognizance of the DENR Certification of November 6, 2006 that she submitted together with her appellees brief even if it were to the same effect since she did not offer it in evidence during the hearing before the trial court. The CA found it unnecessary to pass upon the evidence of Victorias possession and occupation of the subject property. It denied Victorias motion for reconsideration on September 11, 2007. Issues Presented The issues in this case are: 1. Whether or not Victoria amply proved that the subject lot is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and 2. Whether or not she has amply proved her claim of ownership of the property. Courts Ruling Section 14(1)4 of the Property Registration Decree has three requisites for registration of title: (a) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (b) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.5 A similar right is granted under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.6 There are no material differences between Sec. 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.7 Sec. 14(1) operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain.8 Here, the only reason the CA gave in reversing the decision of the MeTC is that Victoria failed to submit the November 6, 2006 Certification issued by the DENR, verifying the subject property as within the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, during the hearing before the MeTC. She belatedly submitted it on appeal. To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or statute.9 The applicant may secure a certification from the government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but the certification must show that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the pubic domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO.10 The applicant must also

present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.11 The DENR Certification submitted by Victoria reads: This is to certify that the tract of land as shown and described at the reverse side of this Conversion/Subdivision Plan of Lot 5176 MCadm 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping, Csd-00000648, containing an area of 17,507 square meters, situated at Bambang, Taguig City, Metro Manila, as surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Justa M. de las Alas for Marissa S. Estopalla, et al., was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable Land, under Project No. 27-B, Taguig City, Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on January 3, 1968.12 On July 28, 2010 the Court issued a resolution requiring the OSG to verify from the DENR whether the Senior Forest Management Specialist of its National Capital Region, Office of the Regional Technical Director for Forest Management Services, who issued the Certification in this case, is authorized to issue certifications on the status of public lands as alienable and disposable, and to submit a copy of the administrative order or proclamation that declares as alienable and disposable the area where the property involved in this case is located, if any there be.13 In compliance, the OSG submitted a certification from the DENR stating that Senior Forest Management Specialist Corazon D. Calamno, who signed Victorias DENR Certification, is authorized to issue certifications regarding status of public land as alienable and disposable land.14 The OSG also submitted a certified true copy of Forestry Administrative Order 4-1141 dated January 3, 1968,15 signed by then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Arturo R. Tanco, Jr., which declared portions of the public domain covered by Bureau of Forestry Map LC-2623, approved on January 3, 1968, as alienable and disposable. Since the OSG does not contest the authenticity of the DENR Certification, it seems too hasty for the CA to altogether disregard the same simply because it was not formally offered in evidence before the court below. More so when even the OSG failed to present any evidence in support of its opposition to the application for registration during trial at the MeTC. The attack on Victorias proof to establish the nature of the subject property was made explicit only when the case was at the appeal stage in the Republics appellants brief. Only then did Victoria find it necessary to present the DENR Certification, since she had believed that the notation in the Conversion/Subdivision Plan of the property was sufficient.
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In Llanes v. Republic,16 this Court allowed consideration of a CENRO Certification though it was only presented during appeal to the CA to avoid a patent unfairness. The rules of procedure being mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, the Court is empowered to suspend their application to a particular case when its rigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice.17 Denying the application for registration now on the ground of failure to present proof of the status of the land before the trial court and allowing Victoria to re-file her application would merely unnecessarily duplicate the entire process, cause additional expense and add to the number of cases that courts must resolve. It would be more prudent to recognize the DENR Certification and resolve the matter now. Besides, the record shows that the subject property was covered by a cadastral survey of Taguig conducted by the government at its expense. Such surveys are carried out precisely to encourage landowners and help them get titles to the lands covered by such survey. It does not make sense to raise an objection after such a survey that the lands covered by it are inalienable land of the public domain, like a public forest. This is the City of Taguig in the middle of the metropolis.

The CA also erred in not affirming the decision of the MeTC especially since Victoria has, contrary to the Solicitor Generals allegation, proved that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject lot continuously, uninterruptedly, openly, publicly, adversely and in the concept of owners since the early 1940s. In fact, she has submitted tax declarations covering the land way back in 1948 that appeared in her fathers name. We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of the trial court that Victoria amply established her right to have the subject property registered in her name, given that she has met all the requisites for registration of title under the Property Registration Decree. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the June 19, 2007 decision and the September 11, 2007 resolution of the Court of Appeals, and REINSTATES the January 25, 2006 decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 74 of the City of Taguig. SO ORDERED. ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

Property ejectment
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 170575 June 8, 2011

Spouses MANUEL and FLORENTINA DEL ROSARIO, Petitioners, vs. GERRY ROXAS FOUNDATION, Inc., Respondent. DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: The allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for are the determinants of the nature of the action1 and of which court has jurisdiction over the action.2 This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the April 26, 2005 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87784 which dismissed the Petition for Review before it. Also assailed is the CA Resolution4 dated November 15, 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereto. Factual Antecedents The controversy between petitioners Manuel and Florentina Del Rosario

and respondent Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc. emanated from a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed by the former against the latter, the surrounding circumstances relative thereto as summarized by the CA in its assailed Decision are as follows: The petitioner Manuel del Rosario appears to be the registered owner of Lot 3-A of Psd-301974 located in Roxas City which is described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18397 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Roxas. Sometime in 1991, the respondent, as a legitimate foundation, took possession and occupancy of said land by virtue of a memorandum of agreement entered into by and between it and the City of Roxas. Its possession and occupancy of said land is in the character of being lessee thereof. In February and March 2003, the petitioners served notices upon the respondent to vacate the premises of said land. The respondent did not heed such notices because it still has the legal right to continue its possession and occupancy of said land.5 On July 7, 2003, petitioners filed a Complaint6 for Unlawful Detainer against the respondent before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Roxas City, docketed as Civil Case No. V-2391. Said complaint contains, among others, the following significant allegations: 3. Plaintiffs are the true, absolute and registered owner[s] of a parcel of land, situated at Dayao, Roxas City and covered by and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18397 issued to the plaintiffs by the Register of Deeds for Roxas City as evidenced by a xerox copy thereof which is hereto attached as Annex "A". 4. Sometime in 1991, without the consent and authority of the plaintiffs, defendant took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same and use[d] it for commercial purposes. xxxx 7. Plaintiffs have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of the land without any contractual or legal basis. Hence, defendants possession of the subject property is only by tolerance. 8. But [plaintiffs] patience has come to its limits. Hence, sometime in the last quarter of 2002, plaintiffs made several demands upon said defendant to settle and/or pay rentals for the use of the property. xxxx 10. Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letters, defendant failed and refused, as it continues to fail and refuse to pay reasonable monthly rentals for the use and occupancy of the land, and to vacate the subject premises despite the lapse of the fifteen-day period specified in the said demand letters. Consequently, defendant is unlawfully withholding possession of the subject property from the plaintiffs, who are the owners thereof.7 Upon service of summons, respondent filed its Answer8 dated July 31, 2003 where it averred that:

3. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 4 of the Complaint to the effect that the defendant "took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same" and has been using the premises in accordance with its agreements with the City of Roxas and the purposes of the defendant corporation without any objection or opposition of any kind on the part of the plaintiffs for over twenty-two long years; the defendant specifically DENIES the allegations contained in the last part of this paragraph 4 of the Complaint that the defendant has used the property leased for commercial purposes, the truth of the matter being that the defendant has used and [is] still using the property only for civic non-profit endeavors hewing closely to purposes of the defendant Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc., inter alia, devoted to general welfare, protection, and upliftment of the people of Roxas City, Capiz, and in Panay Island, and elsewhere in the Philippines; that the Foundation has spent out of its own funds for the compliance of its avowed aims and purposes, up to the present, more than P25M, and that all the improvements, including a beautiful auditorium built in the leased premises of the Foundation "shall accrue to the CITY (of Roxas), free from any compensation whatsoever, upon the expiration of this Lease" (Memorandum of Agreement, Annex "2" hereof), eighteen (18) years hence; xxxx 5. The defendant specifically DENIES the allegations set forth in paragraph 7 of the Complaint, the truth being that the defendant took possession of the subject property by virtue of Memorandums of Agreement, photo-copies of which are hereto attached as Annexes "1" and "2" and made integral parts hereof, entered into by defendant and the City of Roxas, which is the true and lawful owner thereof; thus, the possession of the subject property by the defendant foundation is lawful, being a lessee thereof; xxxx 8. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 10 of the Complaint that defendant refused to pay monthly rental to the plaintiffs and to vacate the premises, but specifically DENIES the rest of the allegations thereof, the truth being that defendant has no obligation whatsoever, to the plaintiffs, as they are neither the owners or lessors of the land occupied by defendant; xxxx As and by way of AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE The defendant repleads the foregoing allegations, and avers further that: 12. The plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendant. The leased property does not belong to the plaintiffs. The property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18397, [is] occupied by the [defendant] as [lessee] of the City of Roxas since 1991, the latter having acquired it by purchase from the plaintiffs way back on February 19, 1981, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale which is hereto attached as Annex "3" and made an integral part hereof. While, admittedly, the said certificate of title is still in the name of the plaintiffs, nevertheless, the ownership of the property covered therein has already transferred to the City of Roxas upon its delivery to it. Article 1496 of the Civil Code provides that, ownership of the thing sold

is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee. It is also provided under Article 1498 of the Civil Code that, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. Upon execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex "3"), the plaintiffs have relinquished ownership of the property subject thereof in favor of the vendee, City of Roxas. Necessarily, the possession of the property subject of the said Deed of Absolute Sale now pertains to the City of Roxas and the plaintiffs have no more right, whatsoever, to the possession of the same. It is defendant foundation by virtue of the Memorandums of Agreement (Annexes "1" and "2" hereof), which has the legal right to have possession of the subject property; 9 After the MTCC issued an Order setting the case for preliminary conference, respondent filed on October 20, 2003 a Motion to Resolve its Defenses on Forum Shopping and Lack of Cause of Action. Records show that before the instant case was filed, the City of Roxas had already filed a case against petitioners for "Surrender of Withheld Duplicate Certificate Under Section 107, [Presidential Decree No.] 1529" docketed as Special Case No. SPL-020-03 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City. Subsequently, on October 27, 2003, petitioners filed their Opposition to the said Motion. Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities On November 24, 2003, the MTCC issued an Order10 resolving the respondents Motion. In the said Order, the MTCC held that: The plaintiffs [have] no cause of action against herein defendant. The defendant is the lessee of the City of Roxas of the parcel of land in question. There has been no previous contractual relationship between the plaintiffs Del Rosarios and the defendant Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc. affecting the title of the land leased by the [Gerry] Roxas Foundation. The Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc. has not unlawfully withheld the possession of the land it is leasing from its lessor. Its right to the physical possession of the land leased by it from the City of Roxas subsists and continues to subsist until the termination of the contract of lease according to its terms and pursuant to law. The defendant had presented as its main defense that the property was already sold by the plaintiffs to the present lessor of the property, the City of Roxas thru a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 19, 1981 executed by herein [plaintiff] spouses as vendors. Plaintiffs had not directly and specifically shown that the purported Deed of Absolute Sale does not exist; rather, they contend that said document is merely defective. They had not even denied the signatories to the said Contract of Sale; specifically the authenticity of the spouses-plaintiffs signatures; all that plaintiffs did merely referred to it as null and void and highly questionable without any specifications. When the parties pleadings fail to tender any issue of fact, either because all the factual allegations have been admitted expressly or impliedly; as when a denial is a general denial; there is no need of conducting a trial, since there is no need of presenting evidence anymore. The case is then ripe for judicial determination, either through a judgment on the pleadings (Rules of Court, Rule 34) or by summary judgment under Rule 35, Rules of Court. In the instant case, plaintiffs alleged that sometime in 1991, without the consent and authority of the plaintiffs, defendant took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same and use[d] it for commercial purposes. x x x for so many years, plaintiffs patiently waited for

someone to make representation to them regarding the use of the subject property, but the same never happened. Plaintiff[s] have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of the land without any contractual or legal basis. Hence, defendants possession of the subject property is only by tolerance. xxxx Defendant admits the allegations of the plaintiffs that the defendant "took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same" and has been using the premises in accordance with its agreements with the City of Roxas and the purposes of the defendant corporation without any objection or opposition of any kind on the part of the plaintiffs for over twenty-two long years. That the defendants possession of the subject property is by virtue of a contract of lease entered into by the defendant foundation with the City of Roxas which is the true and lawful owner, the latter having acquired said property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale as early as February 19, 1981, long before the defendant foundations occupation of the property. In Alcos v. IAC 162 SCRA 823 (1988), Buyers immediate possession and occupation of the property was deemed corroborative of the truthfulness and authenticity of the deed of sale. WHEREFORE, although this Court finds the defense on forum shopping interposed by the defendant to be untenable and unmeritorious, and hence, denied; this Court still finds the pleadings filed by the plaintiffs-spouses to be without a cause of action and hence, dismisses this instant complaint. With cost against the plaintiffs. SO ORDERED.11 Ruling of the Regional Trial Court On appeal, the RTC of Roxas City, Branch 17 rendered a Decision12 dated July 9, 2004 affirming the MTCC Order. Ruling of the Court of Appeals Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Review. However, the CA, in a Decision13 dated April 26, 2005, dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed Decision of the RTC. Petitioners timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration14 which was, however, denied in a Resolution15 dated November 15, 2005. Issues Still undaunted, petitioners now come to this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues: I. Whether x x x in determining if there is a case for unlawful detainer, a court should limit itself in interpreting a single phrase/allegation in the complaint; and, II. Whether x x x there exists an unlawful detainer in this case.16 Our Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit. The allegations in petitioners Complaint constitute judicial admissions. Petitioners alleged in their Complaint before the MTCC, among others, that: (1) sometime in 1991, without their consent and authority, respondent took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same and used it for commercial purposes; and (2) they allowed the respondent for several years, to make use of the land without any contractual or legal basis. Petitioners thus conclude that respondents possession of subject property is only by tolerance. Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that: Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. x x x "A judicial admission is one so made in pleadings filed or in the progress of a trial as to dispense with the introduction of evidence otherwise necessary to dispense with some rules of practice necessary to be observed and complied with."17 Correspondingly, "facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admissions of the plaintiff and binding upon him."18 "The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader."19 In this case, petitioners judicially admitted that respondents took control and possession of subject property without their consent and authority and that respondents use of the land was without any contractual or legal basis. Nature of the action is determined by the judicial admissions in the Complaint. In Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo,20 citing Caiza v. Court of Appeals,21 this Court held that "what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought." This Court, in Sumulong v. Court of Appeals,22 differentiated the distinct causes of action in forcible entry vis--vis unlawful detainer, to wit: Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the only issue is who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess and the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession.23 "The words by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth shall include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession, therefrom."24 "The foundation of the action is really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right."25

"The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary."26 The employment of force, in this case, can be deduced from petitioners allegation that respondent took full control and possession of the subject property without their consent and authority.
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"Stealth, on the other hand, is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without permission," 27 while strategy connotes the employment of machinations or artifices to gain possession of the subject property.28 The CA found that based on the petitioners allegations in their complaint, "respondents entry on the land of the petitioners was by stealth x x x."29However, stealth as defined requires a clandestine character which is not availing in the instant case as the entry of the respondent into the property appears to be with the knowledge of the petitioners as shown by petitioners allegation in their complaint that "[c]onsidering the personalities behind the defendant foundation and considering further that it is plaintiffs nephew, then the vice-mayor, and now the Mayor of the City of Roxas Antonio A. del Rosario, although without any legal or contractual right, who transacted with the foundation, plaintiffs did not interfere with the activities of the foundation using their property."30 To this Courts mind, this allegation if true, also illustrates strategy. Taken in its entirety, the allegations in the Complaint establish a cause of action for forcible entry, and not for unlawful detainer. "In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth."31 "[W]here the defendants possession of the property is illegal ab initio," the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) is the remedy to recover possession.32 In their Complaint, petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession and control of the subject property without any contractual or legal basis.33 Assuming that these allegations are true, it hence follows that respondents possession was illegal from the very beginning. Therefore, the foundation of petitioners complaint is one for forcible entry that is "the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right."34 Thus, and as correctly found by the CA, there can be no tolerance as petitioners alleged that respondents possession was illegal at the inception.35 Corollarily, since the deprivation of physical possession, as alleged in petitioners Complaint and as earlier discussed, was attended by strategy and force, this Court finds that the proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for Forcible Entry and not the instant suit for unlawful detainer. Petitioners should have filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry within the reglementary one-year period from the time of dispossession. Petitioners likewise alleged in their Complaint that respondent took possession and occupancy of subject property in 1991. Considering that the action for forcible entry must be filed within one year from the time of dispossession,36 the action for forcible entry has already prescribed when petitioners filed their Complaint in 2003. As a consequence, the Complaint failed to state a valid cause of action against the respondent. In fine, the MTCC properly dismissed the Complaint, and the RTC and the CA correctly affirmed said order of dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 26, 2005 and the Resolution dated November 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87784 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

Succession settlement of estate

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 177099 June 8, 2011

EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, Petitioner, vs. SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 177192 SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP, Petitioner, vs. EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO, Respondents. DECISION NACHURA, J.: Before us are the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari of petitioners Sebastian G. Agtarap (Sebastian)1and Eduardo G. Agtarap (Eduardo),2 assailing the Decision dated November 21, 20063 and the Resolution dated March 27, 20074 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73916. The antecedent facts and proceedings On September 15, 1994, Eduardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 114, Pasay City, a verified petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his deceased father Joaquin Agtarap (Joaquin). It was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 94-4055.

The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without any known debts or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with Lucia Garcia (Lucia),5 and second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April 24, 1924. Joaquin and Lucia had three childrenJesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose (survived by three children, namely, Gloria,6 Joseph, and Teresa7). Joaquin married Caridad on February 9, 1926. They also had three childrenEduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by her daughter Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and 874-(38255). Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the said realties and had been appropriating for himselfP26,000.00 per month since April 1994. Eduardo further alleged that there was an imperative need to appoint him as special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate assets and their civil fruits, pending the appointment of a regular administrator. In addition, he prayed that an order be issued (a) confirming and declaring the named compulsory heirs of Joaquin who would be entitled to participate in the estate; (b) apportioning and allocating unto the named heirs their aliquot shares in the estate in accordance with law; and (c) entitling the distributees the right to receive and enter into possession those parts of the estate individually awarded to them. On September 26, 1994, the RTC issued an order setting the petition for initial hearing and directing Eduardo to cause its publication. On December 28, 1994, Sebastian filed his comment, generally admitting the allegations in the petition, and conceding to the appointment of Eduardo as special administrator. Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucias death in April 1924, they became the pro indiviso owners of the subject properties. They said that their residence was built with the exclusive money of their late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the house were shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manongs Restaurant) was built with the exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner. They opposed the appointment of Eduardo as administrator on the following grounds: (1) he is not physically and mentally fit to do so; (2) his interest in the lots is minimal; and (3) he does not possess the desire to earn. They claimed that the best interests of the estate dictate that Joseph be appointed as special or regular administrator. On February 16, 1995, the RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as regular administrator of Joaquins estate. Consequently, it issued him letters of administration. On September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed an answer in intervention, alleging that Mercedes is survived not only by her daughter Cecile, but also by him as her husband. He also averred that there is a need to appoint a special administrator to the estate, but claimed that Eduardo is not the person best qualified for the task. After the parties were given the opportunity to be heard and to submit their respective proposed projects of partition, the RTC, on October 23, 2000, issued an Order of Partition, 8 with the following disposition In the light of the filing by the heirs of their respective proposed projects of partition and the payment of inheritance taxes due the estate as early as 1965, and there being no claim in Court against the estate of the deceased, the estate of JOAQUIN AGTARAP is now consequently ripe for

distribution among the heirs minus the surviving spouse Caridad Garcia who died on August 25, 1999. Considering that the bulk of the estate property were acquired during the existence of the second marriage as shown by TCT No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) which showed on its face that decedent was married to Caridad Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict by evidence other than their negative allegations, the greater part of the estate is perforce accounted by the second marriage and the compulsory heirs thereunder. The Administrator, Eduardo Agtarap rendered a true and just accounting of his administration from his date of assumption up to the year ending December 31, 1996 per Financial and Accounting Report dated June 2, 1997 which was approved by the Court. The accounting report included the income earned and received for the period and the expenses incurred in the administration, sustenance and allowance of the widow. In accordance with said Financial and Accounting Report which was duly approved by this Court in its Resolution dated July 28, 1998 the deceased JOAQUIN AGTARAP left real properties consisting of the following: I LAND: Two lots and two buildings with one garage quarter located at #3030 Agtarap St., Pasay City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 38254 and 38255 and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, Metro Manila, described as follows: TCT NO. LOT NO. 38254 38255 745-B-1 745-B-2 AREA/SQ.M. 1,335 sq. m. 1,331 sq. m. ZONAL VALUE P5,000.00 P5,000.00 AMOUNT P6,675,000.00 P6,655,000.00 P13,330,000.00

TOTAL------------------------------------------------------------II BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS: BUILDING I (Lot # 745-B-1) -----------------------------BUILDING II (Lot # 745-B-2) ----------------------------Building Improvements -------------------------------------Restaurant -----------------------------------------------------TOTAL ---------------------------------------------------------

P350,000.00 320,000.00 97,500.00 80,000.00 P847,500.00

TOTAL NET WORTH ----------------------------------------- P14,177,500.00 WHEREFORE, the net assets of the estate of the late JOAQUIN AGTARAP with a total value of P14,177,500.00, together with whatever interest from bank deposits and all other incomes or increments thereof accruing after the Accounting Report of December 31, 1996, after deducting therefrom the compensation of the administrator and other expenses allowed by the Court, are hereby ordered distributed as follows: TOTAL ESTATE P14,177,500.00

CARIDAD AGTARAP of the estate as her conjugal share P7,088,750.00, the other half of P7,088,750.00 to be divided among the compulsory heirs as follows: 1) JOSE (deceased) 2) MILAGROS (deceased) 3) MERCEDES (deceased) 4) SEBASTIAN 5) EDUARDO 6) CARIDAD P1,181,548.30 P1,181,548.30 P1,181,548.30 P1,181,548.30 P1,181,548.30 P1,181,548.30

The share of Milagros Agtarap as compulsory heir in the amount of P1,181,548.30 and who died in 1996 will go to Teresa Agtarap and Joseph Agtarap, Walter de Santos and half brothers Eduardo and Sebastian Agtarap in equal proportions. TERESA AGTARAP JOSEPH AGTARAP WALTER DE SANTOS SEBASTIAN AGTARAP EDUARDO AGTARAP P236,291.66 P236,291.66 P236,291.66 P236,291.66 P236,291.66

Jose Agtarap died in 1967. His compulsory heirs are as follows: COMPULSORY HEIRS: 1) GLORIA (deceased) represented by Walter de Santos 2) JOSEPH AGTARAP 3) TERESA AGTARAP 4) PRISCILLA AGTARAP Hence, Priscilla Agtarap will inherit P295,364.57. Adding their share from Milagros Agtarap, the following heirs of the first marriage stand to receive the total amount of: HEIRS OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE:
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P295,364.57 P295,364.57 P295,364.57 P295,364.57

1) JOSEPH AGTARAP -

P236,291.66 share from Milagros Agtarap P295,364.57 as compulsory heir of

P531,656.23 Jose Agtarap 2) TERESA AGTARAP P236,291.66 share from Milagros Agtarap P295,364.57 as compulsory heir of P531,656.23 Jose Agtarap 3) WALTER DE SANTOS - P236,291.66 share from Milagros Agtarap P295,364.57 as compulsory heir of P531,656.23 Jose Agtarap HEIRS OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE: a) CARIDAD AGTARAP - died on August 25, 1999 P7,088,750.00 P1,181,458.30 Total of P8,270,208.30 as compulsory heir share from Milagros as compulsory heir share from Milagros - as conjugal share - as compulsory heir

b) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - P1,181,458.38 P 236,291.66 c) EDUARDO AGTARAP P1,181,458.38 P 236,291.66 d) MERCEDES -

as represented by Abelardo Dagoro as the surviving spouse of a compulsory heir P1,181,458.38

REMAINING HEIRS OF CARIDAD AGTARAP: 1) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP 2) EDUARDO AGTARAP MERCEDES AGTARAP (Predeceased Caridad Agtarap) In sum, Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap stand to inherit: SEBASTIAN P4,135,104.10 share from Caridad Garcia P1,181,458.30 - as compulsory heir P 236,291.66 - share from Milagros P5,522,854.06 EDUARDO P4,135,104.10 share from Caridad Garcia P1,181,458.30 as compulsory heir

P 236,291.66 share from Milagros P5,522,854.06 SO ORDERED.9 Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph and Teresa filed their respective motions for reconsideration. On August 27, 2001, the RTC issued a resolution10 denying the motions for reconsideration of Eduardo and Sebastian, and granting that of Joseph and Teresa. It also declared that the real estate properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the modification of the October 23, 2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the heirs. However, before the RTC could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to the CA. On November 21, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated August 27, 2001 is AFFIRMED and pursuant thereto, the subject properties (Lot No. 745-B-1 [TCT No. 38254] and Lot No. 745-B-2 [TCT No. 38255]) and the estate of the late Joaquin Agtarap are hereby partitioned as follows: The two (2) properties, together with their improvements, embraced by TCT No. 38254 and TCT No. 38255, respectively, are first to be distributed among the following: Lucia Mendietta - of the property. But since she is deceased, her share shall be inherited by Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros and Jose in equal shares. Joaquin Agtarap - of the property and of the other half of the property which pertains to Lucia Mendiettas share. Jesus Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. But since he is already deceased (and died without issue), his inheritance shall, in turn, be acquired by Joaquin Agtarap. Milagros Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. But since she died in 1996 without issue, 5/8 of her inheritance shall be inherited by Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap, (in representation of Milagros brother Jose Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall be inherited by Mercedes (represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecile), Sebastian Eduardo, all surnamed Agtarap. Jose Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. But since he died in 1967, his inheritance shall be acquired by his wife Priscilla, and children Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa in equal shares. Then, Joaquin Agtaraps estate, comprising three-fourths (3/4) of the subject properties and its improvements, shall be distributed as follows: Caridad Garcia - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1999, her share shall be inherited by her children namely Mercedes Agtarap (represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter

Cecilia), Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares. Milagros Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1996 without issue, 5/8 of her inheritance shall be inherited by Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap, (in representation of Milagros brother Jose Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall be inherited by Mercedes (represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecile), Sebastian and Eduardo, all surnamed Agtarap. Jose Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since he died in 1967, his inheritance shall be acquired by his wife Priscilla, and children Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap in equal shares. Mercedes Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1984, her inheritance shall be acquired by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecile in equal shares. Sebastian Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. Eduardo Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. SO ORDERED.11 Aggrieved, Sebastian and Eduardo filed their respective motions for reconsideration. In its Resolution dated March 27, 2007, the CA denied both motions. Hence, these petitions ascribing to the appellate court the following errors: G.R. No. 177192 1. The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the aforementioned important facts12 which alter its Decision; 2. The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the necessity of hearing the issue of legitimacy of respondents as heirs; 3. The Court of Appeals erred in allowing violation of the law and in not applying the doctrines of collateral attack, estoppel, and res judicata.13 G.R. No. 177099 THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATE OF MILAGROS G. AGTARAP AND ERRED IN DISTRIBUTING HER INHERITANCE FROM THE ESTATE OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF HER LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENCE OF TESTATE PROCEEDINGS OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS. II. THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) ERRED IN DISMISSING THE DECISION APPEALED FROM FOR LACK OF MERIT AND IN AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 27, 2001 OF THE LOWER COURT HOLDING THAT THE

PARCELS OF LAND COVERED BY TCT NO. 38254 AND TCT (NO.) 38255 OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF PASAY BELONG TO THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP MARRIED TO LUCIA GARCIA MENDIETTA NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR REGISTRATION UNDER THEIR EXISTING CERTIFICATES OF TITLE AS REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP, CASADO CON CARIDAD GARCIA. UNDER EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE, THE PROBATE COURT HAS NO POWER TO DETERMINE THE OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THESE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE WHICH SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN AN APPROPRIATE SEPARATE ACTION FOR A TORRENS TITLE UNDER THE LAW IS ENDOWED WITH INCONTESTABILITY UNTIL IT HAS BEEN SET ASIDE IN THE MANNER INDICATED IN THE LAW ITSELF.14 As regards his first and second assignments of error, Sebastian contends that Joseph and Teresa failed to establish by competent evidence that they are the legitimate heirs of their father Jose, and thus of their grandfather Joaquin. He draws attention to the certificate of title (TCT No. 8026) they submitted, stating that the wife of their father Jose is Presentacion Garcia, while they claim that their mother is Priscilla. He avers that the marriage contracts proffered by Joseph and Teresa do not qualify as the best evidence of Joses marriage with Priscilla, inasmuch as they were not authenticated and formally offered in evidence. Sebastian also asseverates that he actually questioned the legitimacy of Joseph and Teresa as heirs of Joaquin in his motion to exclude them as heirs, and in his reply to their opposition to the said motion. He further claims that the failure of Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos to oppose his motion to exclude them as heirs had the effect of admitting the allegations therein. He points out that his motion was denied by the RTC without a hearing. With respect to his third assigned error, Sebastian maintains that the certificates of title of real estate properties subject of the controversy are in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, and as such are conclusive proof of their ownership thereof, and thus, they are not subject to collateral attack, but should be threshed out in a separate proceeding for that purpose. He likewise argues that estoppel applies against the children of the first marriage, since none of them registered any objection to the issuance of the TCTs in the name of Caridad and Joaquin only. He avers that the estate must have already been settled in light of the payment of the estate and inheritance tax by Milagros, Joseph, and Teresa, resulting to the issuance of TCT No. 8925 in Milagros name and of TCT No. 8026 in the names of Milagros and Jose. He also alleges that res judicata is applicable as the court order directing the deletion of the name of Lucia, and replacing it with the name of Caridad, in the TCTs had long become final and executory. In his own petition, with respect to his first assignment of error, Eduardo alleges that the CA erroneously settled, together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros, in contravention of the principle of settling only one estate in one proceeding. He particularly questions the distribution of the estate of Milagros in the intestate proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding was conducted in another court for the probate of the will of Milagros, bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share that she would receive from Joaquins estate. He states that this violated the rule on precedence of testate over intestate proceedings. Anent his second assignment of error, Eduardo contends that the CA gravely erred when it affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of this case belong to the first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of title were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con ("married to") Caridad Garcia. According to him, the RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction, was not vested with the power and authority to determine questions of ownership, which properly belongs to another court with general jurisdiction.

The Courts Ruling As to Sebastians and Eduardos common issue on the ownership of the subject real properties, we hold that the RTC, as an intestate court, had jurisdiction to resolve the same. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction.16 As held in several cases,17 a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title. However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience. First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a separate action.18 Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership.19Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.20 We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate courts jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.
1auuphi1

It should be remembered that when Eduardo filed his verified petition for judicial settlement of Joaquins estate, he alleged that the subject properties were owned by Joaquin and Caridad since the TCTs state that the lots were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia. He also admitted in his petition that Joaquin, prior to contracting marriage with Caridad, contracted a first marriage with Lucia. Oppositors to the petition, Joseph and Teresa, however, were able to present proof before the RTC that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 were derived from a mother title, TCT No. 5239, dated March 17, 1920, in the name of FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES Y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, el primero casado con Emilia Muscat, y el Segundo con Lucia Garcia Mendietta (FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, the first married to Emilia Muscat, and the second married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta).21 When TCT No. 5239 was divided between Francisco Barnes and Joaquin Agtarap, TCT No. 10864, in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta, was issued for a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 745 of the Cadastral Survey of Pasay, Cadastral Case No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 1368, consisting of 8,872 square meters. This same lot was covered by TCT No. 5577 (32184)22 issued on April 23, 1937, also in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta.

The findings of the RTC and the CA show that Lucia died on April 24, 1924, and subsequently, on February 9, 1926, Joaquin married Caridad. It is worthy to note that TCT No. 5577 (32184) contained an annotation, which reads Ap-4966 NOTA: Se ha enmendado el presente certificado de titulo, tal como aparece, tanchando las palabras "con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a" y poniendo en su lugar, entre lineas y en tinta encarnada, las palabras "en segundas nupcias con Caridad Garcia", en complimiento de un orden de fecha 28 de abril de 1937, dictada por el Hon. Sixto de la Costa, juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Rizal, en el expediente cadastal No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No. 1368; copia de cual orden has sido presentada con el No. 4966 del Libro Diario, Tomo 6.0 y, archivada en el Legajo TNo. 32184. Pasig, Rizal, a 29 abril de 1937.23 Thus, per the order dated April 28, 1937 of Hon. Sixto de la Costa, presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the phrase con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a was crossed out and replaced by en segundas nuptias con Caridad Garcia, referring to the second marriage of Joaquin to Caridad. It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that prior to the replacement of Caridads name in TCT No. 32184, Lucia, upon her demise, already left, as her estate, one-half (1/2) conjugal share in TCT No. 32184. Lucias share in the property covered by the said TCT was carried over to the properties covered by the certificates of title derivative of TCT No. 32184, now TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255. And as found by both the RTC and the CA, Lucia was survived by her compulsory heirs Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros, and Jose. Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid; in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, and if both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction to determine whether the properties are conjugal as it had to liquidate the conjugal partnership to determine the estate of the decedent. In fact, should Joseph and Teresa institute a settlement proceeding for the intestate estate of Lucia, the same should be consolidated with the settlement proceedings of Joaquin, being Lucias spouse.24Accordingly, the CA correctly distributed the estate of Lucia, with respect to the properties covered by TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 subject of this case, to her compulsory heirs. Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the claim of Sebastian and Eduardo that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 conclusively show that the owners of the properties covered therein were Joaquin and Caridad by virtue of the registration in the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia, deserves scant consideration. This cannot be said to be a collateral attack on the said TCTs. Indeed, simple possession of a certificate of title is not necessarily conclusive of a holders true ownership of property.25 A certificate of title under the Torrens system aims to protect dominion; it cannot be used as an instrument for the deprivation of ownership.26 Thus, the fact that the properties were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, is not sufficient proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses coverture.27 The phrase "married to Caridad Garcia" in the TCTs is merely descriptive of the civil status of Joaquin as the registered owner, and does not necessarily prove that the realties are their conjugal properties.28 Neither can Sebastians claim that Joaquins estate could have already been settled in 1965 after the payment of the inheritance tax be upheld. Payment of the inheritance tax, per se, does not settle the estate of a deceased person. As provided in Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court

SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. -- When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive share to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs. Thus, an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs only after the payment of the debts of the estate, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax. The records of these cases do not show that these were complied with in 1965. As regards the issue raised by Sebastian on the legitimacy of Joseph and Teresa, suffice it to say that both the RTC and the CA found them to be the legitimate children of Jose. The RTC found that Sebastian did not present clear and convincing evidence to support his averments in his motion to exclude them as heirs of Joaquin, aside from his negative allegations. The RTC also noted the fact of Joseph and Teresa being the children of Jose was never questioned by Sebastian and Eduardo, and the latter two even admitted this in their petitions, as well as in the stipulation of facts in the August 21, 1995 hearing.29 Furthermore, the CA affirmed this finding of fact in its November 21, 2006 Decision.30 Also, Sebastians insistence that Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos are not heirs to the estate of Joaquin cannot be sustained. Per its October 23, 2000 Order of Partition, the RTC found that Gloria Agtarap de Santos died on May 4, 1995, and was later substituted in the proceedings below by her husband Walter de Santos. Gloria begot a daughter with Walter de Santos, Georgina Samantha de Santos. The RTC likewise noted that, on September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed a motion for leave of court to intervene, alleging that he is the surviving spouse of Mercedes Agtarap and the father of Cecilia Agtarap Dagoro, and his answer in intervention. The RTC later granted the motion, thereby admitting his answer on October 18, 1995.31 The CA also noted that, during the hearing of the motion to intervene on October 18, 1995, Sebastian and Eduardo did not interpose any objection when the intervention was submitted to the RTC for resolution.32 Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and there appears no compelling reason to hold that both courts erred in ruling that Joseph, Teresa, Walter de Santos, and Abelardo Dagoro rightfully participated in the estate of Joaquin. It was incumbent upon Sebastian to present competent evidence to refute his and Eduardos admissions that Joseph and Teresa were heirs of Jose, and thus rightful heirs of Joaquin, and to timely object to the participation of Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro. Unfortunately, Sebastian failed to do so. Nevertheless, Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro had the right to participate in the estate in representation of the Joaquins compulsory heirs, Gloria and Mercedes, respectively.33 This Court also differs from Eduardos asseveration that the CA erred in settling, together with Joaquins estate, the respective estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria. A perusal of the November 21, 2006 CA Decision would readily show that the disposition of the properties related only to the settlement of the estate of Joaquin. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court,

as cited above, the RTC was specifically granted jurisdiction to determine who are the lawful heirs of Joaquin, as well as their respective shares after the payment of the obligations of the estate, as enumerated in the said provision. The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria in the distribution of the shares was merely a necessary consequence of the settlement of Joaquins estate, they being his legal heirs. However, we agree with Eduardos position that the CA erred in distributing Joaquins estate pertinent to the share allotted in favor of Milagros. Eduardo was able to show that a separate proceeding was instituted for the probate of the will allegedly executed by Milagros before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City.34 While there has been no showing that the alleged will of Milagros, bequeathing all of her share from Joaquins estate in favor of Eduardo, has already been probated and approved, prudence dictates that this Court refrain from distributing Milagros share in Joaquins estate. It is also worthy to mention that Sebastian died on January 15, 2010, per his Certificate of Death.35 He is survived by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap (Teresita) and his children Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap (Joaquin Julian) and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio (Ana Ma.). Henceforth, in light of the foregoing, the assailed November 21, 2006 Decision and the March 27, 2007 Resolution of the CA should be affirmed with modifications such that the share of Milagros shall not yet be distributed until after the final determination of the probate of her purported will, and that Sebastian shall be represented by his compulsory heirs. WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177192 is DENIED for lack of merit, while the petition in G.R. No. 177099 is PARTIALLY GRANTED, such that the Decision dated November 21, 2006 and the Resolution dated March 27, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: that the share awarded in favor of Milagros Agtarap shall not be distributed until the final determination of the probate of her will, and that petitioner Sebastian G. Agtarap, in view of his demise on January 15, 2010, shall be represented by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap and his children Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio. These cases are hereby remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 114, Pasay City, for further proceedings in the settlement of the estate of Joaquin Agtarap. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

Property registration
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 181812 June 8, 2011

FELICIANO GAITERO and NELIA GAITERO, Petitioners, vs. GENEROSO ALMERIA and TERESITA ALMERIA, Respondents. DECISION ABAD, J.: Will laches, a rule of equity, benefit one who himself slept on his supposed right? The Facts and the Case Following a cadastral survey in Barangay Ysulat, Tobias Fornier, Antique, a land registration court issued an original certificate of title1 to Rosario O. Tomagan (Tomagan) covering a 10,741 squaremeter land, designated as Lot 9960.2 Subsequently in 1993, Tomagan subdivided the lot awarded to her into four: Lot 9960-A3 covering 3,479 sq m; Lot 9960-B covering 1,305 sq m; Lot 9960C4 covering 3,073 sq m; and Lot 9960-D covering the remaining 2,884 sq m. Tomagan waived her rights over Lots 9960-A and 9960-C in favor of petitioner Feliciano Gaitero (Gaitero) and Lot 9960-B in favor of Barangay Ysulat, Tobias Fornier. She retained Lot 9960-D.5 Lot 9960-A that went to Gaitero adjoined Lot 9964 which belonged to respondent spouses Generoso and Teresita Almeria (the Almerias) and was covered by OCT P-14556. In June 2000, the Almerias commissioned a relocation survey of their lot and were astonished to find that Gaitero, who owned adjoining Lot 9960-A, intruded into their lot by as much as 737 sq m (the disputed area). On August 9, 2000, apparently to settle the dispute, the Almerias waived their rights over a 158 sq m portion of the disputed area in Gaiteros favor but maintained their claim over the remaining 579 sq m. Subsequently, however, Gaitero filed an affidavit of adverse claim on the Almerias title over the remaining 579 sq m.6 When barangay conciliation proceedings failed to settle the differences between the two neighbors, Gaitero filed an action for recovery of possession against the Almerias7 before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Tobias Fornier-Anini-Y-Hamtic. Gaitero prayed for the return of the possession of the remaining 579 sq m, moral damages of P100,000.00, exemplary damages of P25,000.00, attorneys fees of P15,000.00, and litigation expenses of P10,000.00. Gaitero claimed that he was the registered owner of Lot 9960-A, which was covered by TCT T-2544 and had an assessed value of P11,050.00; that he inherited the same from his mother, Maria Obay, who in turn inherited it from her father, Bonifacio Obay; that before the cadastral survey, Lot 9960-A was erroneously lumped with Lot 9960 in Tomagans name; that, acknowledging the mistake, Tomagan subdivided Lot 9960 into four lots and waived her rights over Lots 9960-A and 9960-C in Gaiteros favor; that the Almerias claimed a portion of Lot 9960-A by virtue of a relocation survey and fenced it close to Gaiteros house, obstructing the latters passageway; and that while the Almerias returned 158 sq m of the disputed portion, they refused to return to him the remaining 579 sq m. Answering the complaint and instituting a counterclaim, the Almerias alleged that they bought Lot 99648 in 1985 by virtue of an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and Sale; that it was Gaitero who unlawfully encroached on the 737 sq m portion of Lot 9964; and that, while they had waived a portion of the disputed area, Gaiteros incessant claim to the remaining 579 sq m prompted them to cancel their previous waiver of the 158 sq m.9 The Almerias prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and the award of damages in their favor.

In his reply, Gaitero claimed that the cadastral survey was erroneous in that it included a 737 sq m portion of Lot 9960-A into Lot 9964. After trial, on December 9, 2002 the MCTC rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint and ordering Gaitero to pay the Almerias P20,000.00 in moral damages and P20,000.00 in attorneys fees. The MCTC held that the Almerias were entitled to the possession of the disputed area considering that it is included in the technical description of their registered title. Further, the MCTC held that Gaitero acknowledged the true boundaries of 9960-A when Lot 9960 was subdivided in 1993. Indeed, the subdivision plan clearly shows that the disputed area is excluded from 9960-A. On appeal,10 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the decision of the MCTC.11 The RTC held that, while the Almerias were the rightful owners of the disputed area, laches prevented them from asserting their right over the same since it took them 15 years before they did so. The RTC also ordered the Almerias to pay Gaitero moral damages of P50,000.00, attorneys fees of P15,000.00 and litigation expenses of P30,000.00. On review,12 the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered judgment on May 21, 2007, reversing the decision of the RTC and reinstating that of the MCTC. The CA held that the Almerias owned the disputed area since, between a registered title and a verbal claim of ownership, the former must prevail. The CA did not consider the Almerias in laches since no one had lodge a claim of ownership against their title to the disputed property. On motion for reconsideration, the CA deleted the award of moral damages, litigation expenses, and attorneys fees in its resolution of February 11, 2008. The Issue Presented The sole issue presented to the Court is whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Almerias are entitled to the possession of the disputed area as against Gaitero. The Courts Ruling Possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Necessarily, whoever owns the property has the right to possess it.13 Here, between the Almerias registered title of ownership and Gaiteros verbal claim to the same, the formers title is far superior. As the MCTC, the RTC, and the CA found, the disputed area forms part of the Almerias registered title. Upon examination, this fact is also confirmed by the subdivision plan which partitioned Tomagans original Lot 9960. The evidence shows that the Almerias bought Lot 9964, which includes the disputed area, from the Asenjo heirs in whose names the land was originally registered. Since Gaitero was unable to prove that fraud attended the titling of the disputed area, the Almerias right over the same became indefeasible and incontrovertible a year from registration.14 The Court cannot consider Gaiteros claim of ownership of the disputed area, based on his alleged continuous possession of the same, without running afoul of the rule that bars collateral attacks of registered titles.15Gaiteros action before the MCTC is one for recovery of possession of the disputed area. An adjudication of his claim of ownership over the same would be out of place in such kind of action. A registered title cannot be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in a direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, reliance on registered titles would be lost.16 Gaiteros action is prohibited by law and should be dismissed.
1awphi1

Gaiteros theory of laches cannot vest on him the ownership of the disputed area. To begin with, laches is a consideration in equity17 and therefore, anyone who invokes it must come to court with

clean hands, for he who has done inequity shall not have equity.18 Here, Gaiteros claim of laches against the Almerias can be hurled against him. When the lot that the Almerias acquired (Lot 9964) was registered in 1979, Gaitero had constructive, if not actual, notice that the cadastral survey included the disputed area as part of the land that Leon Asenjo claimed. Yet, neither Gaitero nor his mother complained or objected to such inclusion. Worse, when Gaitero saw the subdivision plan covering Tomagans original Lot 9960 in 1993, it showed that the disputed area fell outside the boundaries of Lot 9960-A which he claimed. Still, Gaitero did nothing to correct the alleged mistake. He is by his inaction clearly estopped from claiming ownership of the disputed area. He cannot avail himself of the law of equity. WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 80285 dated May 21, 2007 and February 11, 2008, respectively. SO ORDERED. ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

Property quieting of title

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 167391 June 8, 2011

PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. MAXIMO BONIFACIO, CEFERINO R. BONIFACIO, APOLONIO B. TAN, BENITA B. CAINA, CRISPINA B. PASCUAL, ROSALIA B. DE GRACIA, TERESITA S. DORONIA, CHRISTINA GOCO AND ARSENIO C. BONIFACIO, in their capacity as the surviving heirs of the late ELEUTERIA RIVERA VDA. DE BONIFACIO,Respondents. VILLARAMA, JR., J.: This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the Decision2 dated January 31, 2005 and Resolution3dated March 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62211. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Complaint4 for Quieting of Title and Damages filed by Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation (Phil-Ville) and denied its Motion for Reconsideration.5 The factual antecedents, as culled from the records, are as follows.

Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation is the registered owner of three parcels of land designated as Lots 1-G-1, 1-G-2 and 1-G-3 of the subdivision plan Psd-1-13-006209, located in Caloocan City, having a total area of 8,694 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 270921,6 2709227 and 270923.8 Prior to their subdivision, the lots were collectively designated as Lot 1-G of the subdivision plan Psd-2731 registered in the name of Phil-Ville under TCT No. T-148220.9 Said parcels of land form part of Lot 23-A of the Maysilo Estate originally covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 99410 registered on May 3, 1917 in the name of Isabel Gil de Sola as the judicial administratrix of the estate of Gonzalo Tuason and thirty-one (31) others. Phil-Ville acquired the lots by purchase from N. Dela Merced and Sons, Inc. on July 24, 1984. Earlier, on September 27, 1961, a group composed of Eleuteria Rivera, Bartolome P. Rivera, Josefa R. Aquino, Gregorio R. Aquino, Pelagia R. Angeles, Modesta R. Angeles, Venancio R. Angeles, Felipe R. Angeles Fidela R. Angeles and Rosauro R. Aquino, claiming to be the heirs of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, a co-owner to the extent of 1-189/1000% of the properties covered by OCT Nos. 982, 983, 984, 985 and 994 of the Hacienda Maysilo, filed a petition with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal in Land Registration Case No. 4557. They prayed for the substitution of their names on OCT No. 994 in place of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal. Said petition was granted by the CFI in an Order11 dated May 25, 1962. Afterwards, the alleged heirs of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal filed a petition for the partition of the properties covered by OCT Nos. 982, 983, 984, 985 and 994. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. C-424 in the CFI of Rizal, Branch 12, Caloocan City. On December 29, 1965, the CFI granted the petition and appointed three commissioners to determine the most equitable division of the properties.12 Said commissioners, however, failed to submit a recommendation. Thirty-one (31) years later, on May 22, 1996, Eleuteria Rivera filed a Supplemental Motion13 in Civil Case No. C-424, for the partition and segregation of portions of the properties covered by OCT No. 994. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 120, of Caloocan City, through Judge Jaime D. Discaya, to whom the case was transferred, granted said motion. In an Order14 dated September 9, 1996, Judge Discaya directed the segregation of portions of Lots 23, 28-A-1 and 28-A-2 and ordered the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City to issue to Eleuteria Rivera new certificates of title over them. Three days later, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan, Yolanda O. Alfonso, issued to Eleuteria Rivera TCT No. C-31453715 covering a portion of Lot 23 with an area of 14,391.54 square meters. On December 12, 1996, the trial court issued another Order directing the acting Branch Clerk to issue a Certificate of Finality of the Order dated September 9, 1996. Thereafter, one Rosauro R. Aquino filed a petition for certiorari contesting said Order of December 12, 1996 and impugning the partial partition and adjudication to Eleuteria Rivera of Lots 23, 28-A-1 and 28-A-2 of the Maysilo Estate. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43034 at the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, a writ of possession16 was issued in Eleuteria Riveras favor on December 26, 1996 upon the Order17of Judge Discaya issued on the same date. Accordingly, Sheriff Cesar L. Cruz served a Notice to Vacate18 dated January 2, 1997 upon Phil-Ville, requiring it to vacate Lots 23-A and 28. Bonifacio Shopping Center, Inc., which occupied Lot 28-A-2, was also served a copy of the notice. Aggrieved, Bonifacio Shopping Center, Inc. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43009, before the Court of Appeals. In a Decision19 dated February 19, 1997, the appellate court set aside and declared as void the Order and Writ of Possession dated December 26, 1996 and the Notice to Vacate dated January 2, 1997. The appellate court explained that a party who has not been impleaded in a case cannot be bound by a writ of possession issued in connection therewith.

Subsequently, on February 22, 1997, Eleuteria Rivera Vda. de Bonifacio died at the age of 96.20 On April 23, 1997, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 137 creating a special committee to investigate the circumstances surrounding the issuance of OCT No. 994 and its derivative titles. On April 29, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision21 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43034 granting Rosauro R. Aquinos petition and setting aside the RTCs Order of September 9, 1996, which granted Eleuteria Riveras prayer for partition and adjudicated in her favor portions of Lots 23, 28-A1 and 28-A-2 of the Maysilo Estate. The appellate court likewise set aside the Order and the Writ of Possession dated December 26, 1996. Nonetheless, on June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages against the surviving heirs of Eleuteria Rivera Vda. de Bonifacio (namely Maximo R. Bonifacio, Ceferino R. Bonifacio, Apolonia B. Tan, Benita B. Caina, Crispina B. Pascual, Rosalia B. de Gracia, Teresita S. Doronia, Christina B. Goco, Arsenio C. Bonifacio, Carmen B. Bernardino and Danilo C. Bonifacio) and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. C-507 in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 122. On October 7, 1997, then Senator Marcelo B. Fernan filed P.S. Resolution No. 1032 directing the Senate Committees on Justice and Human Rights and on Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement to conduct a thorough investigation, in aid of legislation, of the irregularities surrounding the titling of the properties in the Maysilo Estate. In a Decision22 dated March 24, 2000, the Caloocan RTC ordered the quieting of Phil-Villes titles over Lots 1-G-1, 1-G-2 and 1-G-3, declaring as valid TCT Nos. 270921, 270922 and 270923 in PhilVilles name. The fallo of said Decision reads: WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. Ordering the quieting of title of the plaintiff over Lots 1-G-1, 1-G-2 and 1-G-3, all the subd. plan Psd-1-13-006209, being a portion of Lot 1-G, Psd-2731, LRC Rec. No. 4429, situated in Kalookan City, as owner thereof in fee simple and with full faith and credit; 2. Declaring Transfer Ce[r]tificates of Title Nos. 270921, 270922 and 270923 in the name of Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation over the foregoing parcels of land issued by the Registry of Deeds for Kalookan City, as valid and effective; 3. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. C-314537 over Lot 23, being a portion of Maysilo Estate situated in Maysilo, Kalookan City, in the name of Eleuteria Rivera, issued by the Registry of Deeds for Kalookan City, as null and void and with no force and effect; 4. Ordering the private defendants to surrender to the Registry of Deeds for Kalookan City, thru this Court, the Owners Duplicate Certificate of said Transfer Certificate of Title No. C314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera; 5. Directing the public defendant, Register of Deeds of Kalookan City to cancel both Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera on file with the Register of Deeds for Kalookan City, and the Owners Duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. C-314537 being required to be surrendered by the private defendants; and

6. Ordering the private defendants to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P10,000.00, as and by way of attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.23 In upholding Phil-Villes titles, the trial court adopted the conclusion in Senate Committee Report No. 103124 dated May 25, 1998 that there is only one OCT No. 994, registered on May 3, 1917, and that OCT No. 994, purportedly registered on April 19, 1917 (from which Eleuteria Riveras title originated) does not exist. The trial court also found that it was physically impossible for respondents to be the heirs of Eleuteria Riveras grandmother, Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, one of the registered owners of OCT No. 994, because Maria de la Concepcion was born sometime in 1903, later than Eleuteria Rivera who was born in 1901.25 Lastly, the RTC pointed out that contrary to the contentions of Riveras heirs, there is no overlapping of titles inasmuch as Lot 23 lies far from Lot 23-A, where PhilVilles lands are located. On April 13, 2000, Atty. K.V. Faylona, on behalf of respondents, addressed a letter26 to the Branch Clerk of Court of the Caloocan City RTC requesting the complete address of Phil-Ville and its counsel. Supposedly, respondents counsels of record, Attys. Nicomedes Tolentino and Jerry D. Baares, had abandoned the defense but still kept the records of the case. Thus, the Notice of Appeal27 on behalf of respondents was filed by Atty. Faylona while two of the heirs, Danilo Bonifacio and Carmen Bernardino, filed a separate Notice of Appeal28 through their own counsel. The appeals were consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66547. On April 17, 2000, respondents withdrew their appeal and instead filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari,29 which was docketed as G.R. No. 142640. In a Resolution30 dated September 25, 2000, the Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits since the case does not involve pure questions of law. Respondents moved for reconsideration of the Resolution, but the Court denied their motion. Thus, respondents petition was transferred to the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62211. Meanwhile, on October 17, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision31 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66547, dismissing the appeal as regards Danilo Bonifacio and Carmen Bernardino. Yet, along with Danilo and Carmen, respondents moved for reconsideration on the contention that they are not bound by the judgment since they had withdrawn their appeal therein. The Court of Appeals denied said motion in a Resolution dated June 7, 2004. Danilo, Carmen and respondents elevated the case to the Supreme Court through a Petition for Review on Certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 163397. Said petition, however, was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated September 8, 2004 for being filed out of time. Subsequently, on January 31, 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision in CAG.R. SP No. 62211, setting aside the RTC judgment and dismissing Phil-Villes complaint. The appellate court held that the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear Phil-Villes complaint as it effectively seeks to annul the Order dated May 25, 1962 of the CFI in LRC No. 4557, which directed the substitution of the late Eleuteria Rivera and her co-heirs in place of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal as registered owners on OCT No. 994. The appellate court likewise affirmed the validity of OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917 citing the Supreme Court Decisions in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems v. Court of Appeals32 and Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals33 as precedents. Phil-Ville sought reconsideration34 of the decision, but the Court of Appeals denied its motion in the assailed Resolution dated March 15, 2005. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner alleges that: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER NINTH DIVISION) ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION ON THE PETITION FOR REVIEW OF RESPONDENTS MAXIMO BONIFACIO, ET AL. IN CA-G.R SP NO. 62211 BECAUSE OF THE EARLIER DISMISSAL OF THEIR APPEAL IN CA-G.R NO. 66547. II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER NINTH DIVISION) ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION ON THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED BY RESPONDENTS MAXIMO BONIFACIO, ET AL. IN CA-G.R. NO. SP 62211 WHICH DOES NOT RAISE PURE QUESTION[S] OF LAW OR ISSUE[S] OF JURISDICTION AND THEREFORE THE PROPER REMEDY AVAILABLE TO THEM IS ORDINARY APPEAL WHICH, AS STATED, HAD ALREADY BEEN DISMISSED IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 66547. III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER NINTH DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION ON THE COMPLAINT FOR QUIETING OF TITLE FILED BY PETITIONER PHIL-VILLE IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-507, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IN FAILING TO DECLARE RESPONDENTS MAXIMO [BONIFACIO], ET AL. ALREADY IN ESTOPPEL TO RAISE THE SAID ISSUE OF JURISDICTION.35 Condensed, petitioner puts in issue the following: (1) whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of respondents petition; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring that the trial court had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. C-507. Pertinently, however, the genuine issue in this case is whether TCT No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera constitutes a cloud over petitioners titles over portions of Lot 23-A of the Maysilo Estate. Petitioner argues mainly that the Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction in resolving respondents petition for review since it had dismissed their appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 66547 for failure to file brief. Petitioner also points out that respondents petition is defective because Maximo Bonifacio alone signed its verification and certification of non-forum shopping without proof that he was authorized to sign for the other respondents. It contends that the ruling in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals will not invalidate its titles because it is not a party to any of said cases. As well, petitioner invokes the finding in the joint investigation by the Senate and the Department of Justice (DOJ) that there is only one OCT No. 994, that is, the one registered on May 3, 1917. It maintains that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear its action since it is one for quieting of title and not for annulment of the CFI Order dated May 25, 1962. Conversely, respondents rely on MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals that upheld the titles emanating from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917. Therefore, they insist that petitioner has no cause of action to seek the nullification of their title which is a

derivative of said OCT. Respondents reiterate that since they had withdrawn their appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 66547, the Court of Appeals decision therein applies only to Danilo Bonifacio and Carmen Bernardino. Lastly, they believe that petitioners action is one for annulment of judgment, which is foreign to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner argues in its first two assignments of errors that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining respondents petition. However, said contention deserves scant consideration since the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 62211, properly assumed jurisdiction over respondents case after the same was referred to it by this Court through our Resolution dated September 25, 2000. The issue raised by respondents, as petitioners in G.R. No. 142640, was purely a question of fact that is beyond the power of this Court to resolve. Essentially, respondents asked the Court to determine the ownership of the lots purportedly covered by petitioners titles. Neither do we find merit in petitioners contention that the dismissal of the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 66547 is binding on respondents. The appellate court itself recognized the withdrawal of appeal filed by respondents, thus: However, defendants Maximo R. Bonifacio, et al. withdrew their appeal so that the only appellants herein are defendants-appellants Danilo R. Bonifacio, et al.36 So did the trial court err in taking cognizance of petitioners action for quieting of title contrary to respondents assertion that it is actually one for annulment of the CFI Order dated May 25, 1962? To this query, we rule in the negative. The nature of an action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought by plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action was filed irrespective of whether he is entitled to all or only some of such relief.37 In its complaint, petitioner alleges: 27. That said TCT No. C-314537 of the late Eleuteria Rivera, although apparently valid and effective, are in truth and in fact invalid and ineffective[;] 27.1. An examination of Decree No. 36455 issued on April 19, 1917 in LRC Case No. 4429 and also of OCT No. 994 which was issued pursuant thereto will show that Lot 23 covered by the said TCT No. C-3145[3]7 of the late Eleuteria Rivera is not one of the 34 parcels of land covered by said Decree No. 36455 and OCT 994; 27.2. That, as hereinbefore stated, the same TCT No. C-314537 of the late Eleuteria Rivera is a direct transfer from OCT No. 994 which was registered on April 19, 1917. The fact, however, is that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was issued pursuant to Decree No. 36455 in LRC Case No. 4429 and said OCT 994 was registered with the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917. The Office of the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City or of Malabon or of Pasig City has no record of any OCT No. 994 that was allegedly registered on April 19, 1917; 27.3. That said TCT No. C-314537 of the late Eleuteria Rivera could not cover Lot 23-A or any portion/s thereof because, as hereinbefore recited, the whole of Lot 23-A had been totally disposed of as early as July 24, 1923 and she and/or any of her alleged predecessors-in-interest is not among those named in the memorandum of encumbrances of OCT No. 994 as vendees or vendors of said Lot 23-A;38

Ultimately, petitioner submits that a cloud exists over its titles because TCT No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera purports to cover the same parcels of land covered by petitioners TCT Nos. 270921, 270922 and 270923. It points out that what appears to be a valid and effective TCT No. C-314537 is, in truth, invalid because it covers Lot 23 which is not among those described in the OCT No. 994 on file with the Register of Deeds of Rizal and registered on May 3, 1917. Petitioner notes that the OCT No. 994 allegedly registered on April 19, 1917 and from which TCT No. C314537 was derived, is not found in the records of the Register of Deeds. In other words, the action seeks the removal of a cloud from Phil-Villes title and/or the confirmation of its ownership over the disputed properties as the successor-in-interest of N. Dela Merced and Sons, Inc. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest in real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. In such action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not only to place things in their proper places, and make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property.39 In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.40 As regards the first requisite, we find that petitioner was able to establish its title over the real properties subject of this action. Petitioner submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale41 by which it acquired the subject property from N. Dela Merced and Sons, Inc., as well as copies of OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 and all the derivative titles leading to the issuance of TCT Nos. 270921, 270922 and 270923 in petitioners name as follows:
1avvphi1

Title No. 8004 8059 8160 8164 8321 8734 12946 28315 39163 43559 18767

Registration Date July 24, 1923 September 3, 1923 October 24, 1923 November 6, 1923 February 26, 1924 September 11, 1924 November 21, 1927 July 16, 1935 November 18, 1939 July 26, 1941 June 16, 1950 Vedasto Galino -ditto-dittoJuan Cruz Sanchez -dittoEmilio Sanchez -ditto-

Holder

Eastern Syndicate Mining Co., Inc. Royal Lawrence Rutter Mapua Institute of Technology Sofia Nepomuceno

57541 81679

March 13, 1958 December 15, 1960

Leona N. de Jesus, Pacifico Nepomuceno, Sofia Nepomuceno, Soledad Nepomuceno de Jesus Pacifico Nepomuceno, Sofia N. Jugo, Soledad N. de Jesus Pacifico Nepomuceno & Co. Pacifico Nepomuceno & Co. Inc. N. de La Merced & Sons, Inc. Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corp.42

(81680) 17745 December 15, 1960 C-13794 C-14603 T-148220 April 21, 1978 May 16, 1978 April 22, 1987

Petitioner likewise presented the Proyecto de particion de la Hacienda de Maysilo43 to prove that Lot 23-A, of which petitioners Lots 1-G-1, 1-G-2 and 1-G-3 form part, is among the 34 lots covered by OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917. It produced tax receipts accompanied by a Certification44 dated September 15, 1997 issued by the City Treasurer of Caloocan stating that PhilVille has been religiously paying realty taxes on the lots. Its documentary evidence also includes a Plan45 prepared by the Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division showing that Lot 23-A of the Maysilo Estate is remotely situated from Lot 23 portion of the Maysilo Estate. Petitioner ties these pieces of evidence to the finding in the DOJ Committee Report46 dated August 28, 1997 and Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated May 25, 1998 that, indeed, there is only one OCT No. 994, that is, the one registered on May 3, 1917. On the other hand, respondents have not adduced competent evidence to establish their title to the contested property or to dispute petitioners claim over the same. It must be noted that the RTC Order dated September 9, 1996 in Civil Case No. C-424, which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera had long been set aside by the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 43034. Clearly, respondents claim anchored primarily on TCT No. C-314537 lacks legal basis. Rather, they rely simply on the Courts pronouncement in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals that OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917 and all titles emanating from it are void. The Supreme Court sustained said decisions in the case of Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation47 promulgated on November 29, 2005. In said case, the Court declared void the titles of the Manotoks and Aranetas which were derived from OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917 consistent with its ruling in MWSS and Gonzaga. The Court disregarded the DOJ and Senate reports on the alleged anomalies surrounding the titling of the Maysilo Estate. However, on motion for reconsideration, the Court issued a Resolution48 dated December 14, 2007 which created a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the consolidated cases on remand. The Special Division was tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to the Court a report on its findings as well as recommend conclusions within three months from the finality of said Resolution. However, to guide the proceedings before the Special Division, the Court laid the following definitive conclusions: First, there is only one OCT 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date which should be reckoned as the date of registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of registration on [19] April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date when the title took effect.

Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient to invalidate the Dimson and CLT claims over the subject property if singular reliance is placed by them on the dates appearing on their respective titles. Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSS [and] Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that at bar.49 (Emphasis supplied.) Eventually, on March 31, 2009, the Supreme Court issued a Resolution50 reversing its Decision of November 29, 2005 and declaring certain titles in the names of Araneta and Manotok valid. In the course of discussing the flaws of Jose Dimsons title based on his alleged 25% share in the hereditary rights of Bartolome Rivera, Eleuteria Riveras co-petitioner in LRC No. 4557, the Court noted: However, the records of these cases would somehow negate the rights of Rivera to claim from Vidal. The Verification Report of the Land Registration Commission dated 3 August 1981 showed that Rivera was 65 years old on 17 May 1963 (as gathered from the records of Civil Case Nos. 4429 and 4496). It can thus be deduced that, if Rivera was already 65 years old in 1963, then he must have been born around 1898. On the other hand, Vidal was only nine (9) years in 1912; hence, she could have been born only on [1903]. This alone creates an unexplained anomalous, if not ridiculous, situation wherein Vidal, Riveras alleged grandmother, was seven (7) years younger than her alleged grandson. Serious doubts existed as to whether Rivera was in fact an heir of Vidal, for him to claim a share in the disputed portions of the Maysilo Estate.51 The same is true in this case. The Death Certificate52 of Eleuteria Rivera reveals that she was 96 years old when she died on February 22, 1997. That means that she must have been born in 1901. That makes Rivera two years older than her alleged grandmother Maria de la Concepcion Vidal who was born in 1903. Hence, it was physically impossible for Eleuteria Rivera to be an heir of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal. Moreover, the Partition Plan of the Maysilo Estate shows that Lot 23-A was awarded, not to Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, but to Isabel Tuason, Esperanza Tuason, Trinidad Jurado, Juan O Farrell and Angel O Farrell.53 What Vidal received as her share were Lot 6 and portions of Lots 10 and 17, all subject to the usufructuary right of her mother Mercedes Delgado. This was not at all disputed by respondents. On the other hand, Vedasto Galino, who was the holder of TCT No. 8004 registered on July 24, 1923 and to whom petitioner traces its titles, was among the successful petitioners in Civil Case No. 391 entitled Rosario Negrao, et al. v. Concepcion Vidal, et al., who sought the issuance of bills of sale in favor of the actual occupants of certain portions of the Maysilo Estate. Be that as it may, the second requisite in an action for quieting of title requires that the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite itsprima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein. Thus, the cloud on title consists of: (1) any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable; and (4) may be prejudicial to the title sought to be quieted. The fourth element is not present in the case at bar. While it is true that TCT No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera is an instrument that appeared to be valid but was subsequently shown to be invalid, it does not cover the same parcels of land that are described in petitioners titles. Foremost, Riveras title embraces a land measuring 14,391.54 square meters while petitioners lands has an aggregate area of only 8,694 square meters. On the one hand, it may be argued that petitioners land could be subsumed within Riveras 14,391.54-square meter property. Yet, a comparison of the technical descriptions of the parties titles negates an overlapping of their boundaries. The technical description of respondents TCT No. C-314537 reads: A parcel of land (Lot 23, being a portion of Maysilo Estate) situated in Maysilo, Caloocan, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NW., along line 1-2 by Blk. 2; on the SW., along line 2-3 by Jacinto Street, along lines 3-4-5 by Blk. 4; along line 5-6 by Bustan St., and San Diego St., on the S., along lines 6-7-8 by Blk. 13, all of Caloocan Cadastre; on the NE., along line 8-9 by Caloocan Cadastre; and on the N., along line 9-1 by Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being S. 28 deg. 30E., 530.50 m. from MBM No. 1, Caloocan Cadastre; thence S. 07 deg. 20W., 34.00 m. to point 2; S. 17 deg. 10E., 12.00 m. to point 3; (0/illegible) S. 15 deg. 31E., 31.00 m. to point 4; S. 27 deg. 23E., 22.50 m. to point 5; S. 38 deg. 41E., 43.20 m. to point 6; S. 71 deg. 35E., 10.60 m. to point 7; N. 84 deg. 30E., 38.80 m. to point 8; N. 11 deg. 40W., 131.20 m. to point 9; N. 89 deg. 10W., 55.00 m. to the point of beginning; containing an area of FOURTEEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED NINETY ONE SQUARE METERS AND FIFTY FOUR SQUARE DECIMETERS (14,391.54). more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground by Old Ps. cyl. conc. mons. 15 x 60 cm.; bearings true;54 (Emphasis supplied). On the other hand, the technical description of petitioners lands before they were subdivided under TCT No. T-148220 is as follows: A parcel of land (Lot No. 1-G of the subdivision plan Psd-2731, being a portion of Lot 23-A, Maysilo Estate, GLRO Rec. No. 4429), situated in the Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal. Bounded on the North., by Calle A. Samson; on the East., by properties of Gregoria de Jesus, Arcadio de Jesus and Felix de Jesus; on the South., by properties of Lucas Bustamante and Patricio Galauran; and on the West., by property of Patricio Galauran; and Lot No. 1-E of the subdivision

plan. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being N.69 deg. 27E., 1600.19 m. from BLLM No. 1, Mp. of Caloocan, more or less, thence S. 21 deg. 25E., 44.78 m. to point 2; thence S. 14 deg. 57E., 37.24 m. to point 3; thence S. 81 deg. 11W., 20.28 m. to point 4; thence S. 86 deg. 06W., 15.45 m. to point 5; thence N. 67 deg. 20W., 15.91 m. to point 6; thence N. 35 deg. 19W., 37.56 m. to point 7; thence N. 27 deg. 11W., 12.17 m. to point 8; thence N. 19 deg. 26W., 23.32 m. to point 9; thence N. 13 deg. 08W., 28.25 m. to point 10; thence S. 78 deg. 45W., 13.00 m. to point 11; thence N. 0 deg. 56E., 48.92 m. to point 12; thence N. 89 deg. 13E., 53.13 m. to point 13; thence S. 21 deg. 24E., 67.00 m. to the point of beginning; containing an area of EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETY FOUR (8,694) SQUARE METERS, more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground points 1,2,3 and 13 by Old PLS conc. mons. point 4,6,7,8 and 9 by Old PLS stone mons.; points 5 to 10 and old stakes points 11 and 12 by PLS conc. mons. bearings true, declination 1 deg. 08E., date of the original survey, Sept. 8-27, Oct. 4-21 and Nov. 17-18, 1911 and that of the subdivision survey, Oct. 14 and 15, 1927.55 (Emphasis supplied). Such disparity in location is more vividly illustrated in the Plan prepared by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division, showing the relative positions of Lots 23 and 23-A. As it appears on the Plan, the land covered by respondents TCT No. C-314537 lies far west of petitioners lands under TCT Nos. 270921, 270922 and 270923. Strictly speaking, therefore, the existence of TCT No. C-314537 is not prejudicial to petitioners titles insofar as it pertains to a different land. Significantly, an action to quiet title is characterized as a proceeding quasi in rem.56 In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named a defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgment therein is binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.57 Yet, petitioner was well aware that the lots encompassed by its titles are not the same as that covered by respondents title. In its complaint, Phil-Ville alleges: 27.4. That Lot 23, being a portion of Maysilo Estate, as described in said TCT No. C-314537 of the late Eleuteria Rivera when plotted using its tie line to MBM No. 1, Caloocan Cadastre is outside Lot 23-A of the Maysilo Estate. This must be so because Lot 23 is not [a] portion of Lot 23-A, Maysilo Estate.58 This brings petitioners action within the purview of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court on Declaratory Relief. Section 1 of Rule 63 provides: SECTION 1. Who may file petition.-Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. (Emphasis supplied). An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to

secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs. In the present case, petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of title after it was served a notice to vacate but before it could be dispossessed of the subject properties. Notably, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 43034, had earlier set aside the Order which granted partial partition in favor of Eleuteria Rivera and the Writ of Possession issued pursuant thereto. And although petitioners complaint is captioned as Quieting of Title and Damages, all that petitioner prayed for, is for the court to uphold the validity of its titles as against that of respondents. This is consistent with the nature of the relief in an action for declaratory relief where the judgment in the case can be carried into effect without requiring the parties to pay damages or to perform any act.59 Thus, while petitioner was not able to demonstrate that respondents TCT No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera constitutes a cloud over its title, it has nevertheless successfully established its ownership over the subject properties and the validity of its titles which entitles it to declaratory relief. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 31, 2005 and Resolution dated March 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62211 are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated March 24, 2000 of the Caloocan RTC in Civil Case No. C-507 is hereby REINSTATED and UPHELD. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

Property reconveyance
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 142676 June 6, 2011

EMERITA MUOZ, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. VICTORIANO R. YABUT, JR. and SAMUEL GO CHAN, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 146718 EMERITA MUOZ, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES SAMUEL GO CHAN and AIDA C. CHAN, and THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,Respondents. DECISION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Before Us are the following consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In G.R. No. 142676, Emerita Muoz (Muoz) is seeking the reversal, annulment, and setting aside of the Decision1dated July 21, 1995 and Resolution2 dated March 9, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35322, which affirmed the Orders3 dated June 10, 1994 and August 5, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88 (RTC-Branch 88) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632. The RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 8286, the forcible entry case instituted by Muoz against Atty. Victoriano R. Yabut, Jr. (Atty. Yabut) and Samuel Go Chan before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 33 of Quezon City; and nullified the MeTC Order4 dated May 16, 1994, granting Muozs prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which restored possession of the subject property to Muoz. In G.R. No. 146718, Muoz is praying for the reversal, setting aside, and nullification of the Decision5 dated September 29, 2000 and Resolution6 dated January 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40019, which affirmed the Orders7 dated August 21, 1995 and October 3, 1995 of the Quezon City RTC, Branch 95 (RTC-Branch 95) in Civil Case No. Q-28580 denying Muozs Motion for an Alias Writ of Execution and Application for Surrender of the Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 532978 against respondents Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) and the spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan (spouses Chan). I FACTS The subject property is a house and lot at No. 48 Scout Madrian St., Diliman, Quezon City, formerly owned by Yee L. Ching. Yee L. Ching is married to Emilia M. Ching (spouses Ching), Muozs sister. Muoz lived at the subject property with the spouses Ching. As consideration for the valuable services rendered by Muoz to the spouses Chings family, Yee L. Ching agreed to have the subject property transferred to Muoz. By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, seemingly executed by Yee L. Ching in favor of Muoz,9 the latter acquired a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 186306 covering the subject property in her name on December 22, 1972.10However, in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 28, 1972, Muoz purportedly sold the subject property to her sister, Emilia M. Ching. As a result, TCT No. 186306 was cancelled and TCT No. 186366 was issued in Emilia M. Chings name. Emilia M. Ching, in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 16, 1979, sold the subject property to spouses Go Song and Tan Sio Kien (spouses Go), hence, TCT No. 186366 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 258977 in the spouses Gos names. On October 15, 1979, Muoz registered her adverse claim to the subject property on TCT No. 258977 of the spouses Go. The next day, on October 16, 1979, Muoz filed a complaint for the annulment of the deeds of absolute sale dated December 28, 1972 and July 16, 1979, the cancellation of TCT No. 258977 in the spouses Gos names, and the restoration and revival of TCT

No. 186306 in Muozs name. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-28580 and raffled to RTC-Branch 95. On October 17, 1979, Muoz caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 258977 of the spouses Go. In an Order dated December 17, 1979, the RTC-Branch 95 granted the spouses Gos motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordered the sheriff to put the spouses Go in possession of the subject property. The writ was implemented by the sheriff on March 26, 1980, driving Muoz and her housemates away from the subject property. Muoz filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, assailing the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 10148. The appellate court dismissed Muozs petition on January 4, 1980. Yee L. Ching and his son Frederick M. Ching filed an urgent motion for leave to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 10148 and for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). The Court of Appeals issued a TRO. However, in a Resolution dated March 18, 1980, the appellate court denied the motion to intervene of Yee L. Ching and Frederick M. Ching, and cancelled the TRO previously issued. Yee L. Ching and Frederick M. Ching challenged before this Court, in G.R. No. 53463, the Resolution dated March 18, 1980 of the Court of Appeals. Eventually, in a Resolution dated June 3, 1981, the Court dismissed the petition in G.R. No. 53463, for lack of merit and failure of Yee L. Ching and Frederick M. Ching to substantially show that the RTC-Branch 95 and the Court of Appeals gravely abused their discretion. In a subsequent Resolution dated June 21, 1982, the Court clarified that its Resolution of June 3, 1981 was without prejudice to the continuation of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-28580 still pending before the trial court, "in order that proper and final adjudication may be made of whether or not the deed of sale by Emerita L. Muoz in favor of Emilia M. Ching is a real, genuine and authentic transaction, thereby to settle once and for all the issue of ownership of the property herein in question."11 Trial in Civil Case No. Q-28580 proceeded before RTC-Branch 95. In the meantime, Muozs adverse claim and notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 258977 was cancelled on October 28, 1982 on the basis of an alleged final judgment in favor of the spouses Go.12 The spouses Go obtained a loan of P500,000.00 from BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Family) and to secure the same, they constituted a mortgage on the subject property on November 23, 1982.13 When the spouses Go defaulted on the payment of their loan, BPI Family foreclosed the mortgage. BPI Family was the highest bidder at the auction sale of the subject property. The spouses Go failed to exercise their right of redemption within the prescribed period, thus, BPI Family was finally able to register the subject property in its name on October 23, 1987 under TCT No. 370364.14 Apparently, the original copy of TCT No. 370364 was among those razed in the fire at the Quezon City Register of Deeds on June 11, 1988. As a result of the administrative reconstitution of the lost title, TCT No. RT-54376 (370364) was issued to BPI Family. On December 3, 1990, BPI Family executed in favor of the spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan (spouses Chan) a Deed of Absolute Sale15 covering the subject property for and in consideration ofP3,350,000.00. Consequently, TCT No. RT-54376 (370364) in the name of BPI Family was cancelled and TCT No. 53297 was issued in the spouses Chans names on January 28, 1991.16 The spouses Chan obtained a loan from BPI Family on October 2, 1992 for the construction of a building on the subject property, and to secure the same, constituted a mortgage on the subject property in favor of BPI Family.17 On July 19, 1991, RTC-Branch 95 rendered its Decision18 in Civil Case No. Q-28580, against Emilia M. Ching, Yee L. Ching, and the spouses Go (Emilia M. Ching, et al.). It found that Muozs signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 28, 1972 was forged; that Muoz never sold the subject property to her sister, Emilia M. Ching; and that the spouses Go were not innocent purchasers for value of the subject property. The fallo of the said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing for lack of merit [Emilia M. Ching, et al.s] respective counterclaims, cross-claims, and counter-cross-claim, declaring as null and void ab initio the following documents, to wit: (a) Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 28, 1972, copy of which is marked in evidence as Exh. M; (b) TCT No. 186366 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, copy of which is marked in evidence as Exh. N; (c) Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 16, 1979, copy of which is marked in evidence as Exh. 3; and, (d) TCT No. 258977 of the Registry of Deeds for Metro Manila District III, copy of which is marked in evidence as Exh. 4, and directing defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel from the records of the subject property the registrations of all the said documents and to restore and revive, free from all liens and encumbrances, TCT No. 186306 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, copy of which is marked in evidence as Exh. L, as well as ordering defendants Emilia M. Ching, Go Song and Tan Sio Kien jointly and severally to pay [Muoz] the sum ofP50,000.00 as and for attorneys fees and to pay the costs of suit. The court also hereby dismisses the rest of the claims in [Muozs] complaint, there being no satisfactory warrant therefor.19 Emilia M. Ching, et al.s, appeal of the foregoing judgment of the RTC-Branch 95 was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 33811 before the Court of Appeals. In its Decision20 dated March 4, 1993, the appellate court not only affirmed the appealed judgment, but also ordered the spouses Go and their successors-in-interest and assigns and those acting on their behalf to vacate the subject property, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against [Emilia M. Ching, et al.]. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued on December 17, 1979 is hereby set aside and declared dissolved. Defendants-appellants Go and Tan, their successors-ininterest and assigns and those acting on their behalf, are ordered to vacate the disputed premises and to deliver the same to [Muoz] immediately upon receipt of this decision.21 Emilia L. Ching, et al., filed before this Court a motion for extension of time to file their petition for review, which was assigned the docket number G.R. No. 109260. However, they failed to file their intended petition within the extended period which expired on April 23, 1993. In a Resolution22 dated July 12, 1993, the Court declared G.R. No. 109260 terminated. The Resolution dated July 12, 1993 of the Court in G.R. No. 109260 became final and executory on July 15, 1993 and was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments on even date.23 More than two months later, on September 20, 1993, the RTC-Branch 95 issued a writ of execution to implement the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580. The spouses Chan, who bought the subject property from BPI Family, then came forward and filed before the RTC-Branch 95 on October 22, 1993 an Urgent Motion to Stop Execution as Against Spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida Chan,24 opposing the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. Q-28580. The spouses Chan asserted ownership and possession of the subject property on the basis of a clean title registered in their names under TCT No. 53297. The spouses Chan further contended that the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 could not be executed against them since they were not parties to the said case; they were not successors-in-interest, assigns, or acting on behalf of the spouses Go; and they purchased the subject property from BPI Family without any notice of defect in the latters title. It was only at this point that Muoz, upon her own inquiry, discovered the cancellation on October 28, 1982 of her adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated on the spouses Gos TCT No. 258977, and the subsequent events that led to the transfer and registration of the title to the subject property from the spouses Go, to BPI Family, and finally, to the spouses Chan.

In its Order25 dated December 28, 1993, the RTC-Branch 95 denied the spouses Chans urgent motion to stop the execution. According to the RTC-Branch 95, the photocopy of TCT No. 370364 in the name of BPI Family, submitted by the spouses Chan with their motion, could hardly be regarded as satisfactory proof that Muozs adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated therein were also missing from the original copy of said certificate of title. Muozs adverse claim and notice of lis pendens were annotated on TCT No. 258977 in the spouses Gos names as P.E.-8078 and P.E.8178, respectively. So when TCT No. 258977 of the spouses Go was cancelled and TCT No. 370364 was issued to BPI Family, it could be presumed that the Register of Deeds regularly performed his official duty by carrying over Muozs adverse claim and notice of lis pendens to TCT No. 370364. In addition, the RTC-Branch 95 pointed out that in this jurisdiction, the entry of the notice of lis pendens in the day book of the Register of Deeds was already sufficient notice to the whole world of the dispute over the subject property, and there was no more need to annotate the same on the owners duplicate of the certificate of title. Finally, the RTC-Branch 95 held that TCT No. RT-54376 (370364) of BPI Family and TCT No. 53297 of the spouses Chan shall be subject to the reservation under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 2626 "[t]hat certificates of title reconstituted extrajudicially, in the manner stated in sections five and six hereof, shall be without prejudice to any party whose right or interest in the property was duly noted in the original, at the time it was lost or destroyed, but entry or notation of which has not been made on the reconstituted certificate of title." Thus, the spouses Chan were deemed to have taken the disputed property subject to the final outcome of Civil Case No. Q-28580. On January 3, 1994, the RTC-Branch 95 issued an Alias Writ of Execution.27 On January 10, 1994, the writ was enforced, and possession of the subject property was taken from the spouses Chan and returned to Muoz.28 In its Orders dated April 8, 1994 and June 17, 1994, the RTC-Branch 95 denied the spouses Chans motion for reconsideration and notice of appeal, respectively. 29 G.R. No. 142676 Pending resolution by the RTC-Branch 95 of the spouses Chans motion for reconsideration and notice of appeal in Civil Case No. Q-28580, Muoz instituted before the MeTC on February 4, 1994 a Complaint for Forcible Entry with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction30 against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, docketed as Civil Case No. 8286. Muoz alleged in her complaint that she had been in actual and physical possession of the subject property since January 10, 1994. She hired a caretaker and two security guards for the said property. On February 2, 1994, Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, along with 20 other men, some of whom were armed, ousted Muoz of possession of the subject property by stealth, threat, force, and intimidation. Muoz prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut and all persons claiming right under them to vacate the subject property. Muoz additionally prayed for judgment making the mandatory injunction permanent and directing Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut to pay Muoz: (1) compensation for the unlawful occupation of the subject property in the amount of P50,000.00 per month, beginning February 2, 1994 until the said property is fully and completely turned over to Muoz; (2) attorneys fees in the amount ofP50,000.00, plus P1,500.00 per court appearance of Muozs counsel; and (3) costs of suit. Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut denied Muozs allegations, insisting that Samuel Go Chan is the valid, lawful, and true legal owner and possessor of the subject property. Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut averred that the Turn-Over of Possession and Receipt of Possession dated January 10, 1994 attached to Muozs complaint as proof that the subject property had been placed in her possession is a falsified document. The Writ of Execution issued on September 20, 1993 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 had already expired and the Sheriffs Return on the Writ another document purporting to show that possession of the subject property was turned-over to Muoz on January 10, 1994 was then being challenged in a complaint before the Office of Deputy Court Administrator

Reynaldo L. Suarez of the Supreme Court. Samuel Go Chans possession of the subject property has never been interrupted. His sister, Cely Chan, resided at the subject property and was never removed therefrom. On February 2, 1994, Atty. Yabut was at the subject property only to protect the rights and interest of his client, Samuel Go Chan, and since the latters possession of the subject property had never been interrupted, Atty. Yabut entered the same peacefully, without intimidation, force, or stealth. The other people at the subject property on February 2, 1994 were there to attend the services at the Buddhist Temple which occupied the fourth floor of the building erected by the spouses Chan on the subject property. Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, thus, asked the MeTC to dismiss Muozs complaint for lack of merit and legal basis.31 The MeTC received evidence from the parties on whether a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued, as prayed for by Muoz. In its Order dated May 16, 1994, the MeTC adjudged that the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 was already executed against the spouses Chan and there was, indeed, a turn-over of possession of the subject property to Muoz. Accordingly, the MeTC granted Muozs prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, restoring possession of the subject property to Muoz. Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut questioned the foregoing MeTC order through a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction32 before the RTC-Branch 88, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-20632. They asserted that they were not bound by the execution of the final judgment of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 as they were not parties to the said case. Muoz, on the other hand, argued that the MeTC Order of May 16, 1994 was an interlocutory order, and under Section 19 of the Rules of Summary Procedure, a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order issued by the court is one of the prohibited pleadings and motions in summary proceedings. In its Order dated June 10, 1994, the RTC-Branch 88 issued a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994. On August 5, 1994, the RTC-Branch 88 issued another Order resolving Muozs motion to dismiss the petition for certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632, motion for reconsideration of the Order dated June 10, 1994 of RTC-Branch 88 granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and motion to resolve with additional grounds for dismissal. According to the RTC-Branch 88, the MeTC failed to distinguish the issue of finality of the judgment of the RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 from the assertions of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut that the spouses Chan are not covered by said final judgment because they are not successors-in-interest, assigns, or privies of the spouses Go and they are purchasers of the subject property in good faith. The issue of whether the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 extended to the spouses Chan was then still being litigated in the same case before RTC-Branch 95, where the spouses Chans motion for reconsideration of the denial of their notice of appeal was pending. The RTC-Branch 88 further found that the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing Muozs complaint for forcible entry on the ground of "lis pendens," as the issue as to who between Muoz and the spouses Chan had the better right to possession of the subject property was the subject of the pending proceeding in Civil Case No. Q-28580 before the RTC-Branch 95. In the end, the RTC-Branch 88 decreed: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment (a) Denying the motion to dismiss of respondent Muoz for lack of merit; (b) Denying the motion for reconsideration of respondent Muoz for the recall and/or setting aside of the writ of preliminary injunction granted to petitioners;

(c) Declaring the Order dated May 16, 1994 of Public respondent Hon. Elsa de Guzman in Civil Case No. 8286 illegal and therefore null and void; and (d) Dismissing the ejectment suit in Civil Case No. 8286 on ground of lis pendens. Without pronouncement as to costs.33 Muoz appealed the Orders dated June 10, 1994 and August 5, 1994 of RTC-Branch 88 before the Court of Appeals. Her appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35322. Aside from the nullification of the two orders, Muoz additionally prayed for the dismissal from the service of the RTC-Branch 88 presiding judge and the disbarment of Atty. Yabut. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated July 21, 1995, sustained the appealed orders of RTCBranch 88. The Court of Appeals held that the MeTC should have dismissed the forcible entry case on the ground of "lis pendens"; that the spouses Chan were not parties in Civil Case No. Q-28580, and impleading them only in the execution stage of said case vitiated their right to due process; that the order of the RTC-Branch 95 involving the spouses Chan in Civil Case No. Q-28580 was null and void, considering that they are strangers to the case, and they are innocent purchasers for value of the subject property; that the notice of lis pendens was already cancelled from the spouses Gos certificate of title at the time they mortgaged the subject property to BPI Family; and that the title to the subject property was already free of any and all liens and encumbrances when the spouses Chan purchased the said property from BPI Family. The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated March 9, 2000, denied Muozs motion for reconsideration. G.R. No. 146718 Meanwhile, Muoz filed before the RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 a Motion to Cite the Register of Deeds in Contempt of Court for the failure of the Register of Deeds to restore Muozs TCT No. 186306 despite having been served with a copy of the writ of execution on October 11, 1993. In its Judgment (on the Contempt Proceedings against the Register of Deeds of Quezon City Samuel C. Cleofe)34 dated March 18, 1994, the RTC-Branch 95 denied Muozs motion, convinced that the Register of Deeds had a valid excuse for his inability to implement the served writ. The Register of Deeds could not cancel the spouses Chans TCT No. 53297, the subsisting certificate of title over the subject property, absent any authority or directive for him to do so. The directive in the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 and the writ of execution for the same only pertained to the cancellation of the spouses Gos TCT No. 258977. Thereafter, Muoz filed a Motion for Contempt against the spouses Chan and a Second Motion for Contempt against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut. Muoz also filed a Motion for an Alias Writ of Execution and Application for Surrender of the Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 53297,35 in which she prayed for the issuance of an alias writ of execution directing the Register of Deeds not only to cancel TCT No. 258977 and all documents declared null and void ab initio in the dispositive portion of the Decision36 dated July 19, 1991 of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580, and to restore and revive, free from all liens and encumbrances Muozs TCT No. 186306, but likewise to cancel the present certificate of title covering the subject property, TCT No. 53297. In its Order dated August 21, 1995, the RTC-Branch 95 denied all of Muozs aforementioned motions. The RTC-Branch 95 was of the view that Samuel Go Chans title should be litigated in another forum, not in Civil Case No. Q-28580 where the judgment had already become final and executory. The RTC-Branch 95 also stressed that since the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 had long become final and executory, it could no longer be changed or amended except for clerical error or mistake. Accordingly, the RTC-Branch 95 resolved as follows:

1. Ordering, as it hereby orders, the denial of [Muozs] first and second motions for contempt and hereby absolves respondents Samuel Go Chan, Celia Chan, Atty. Victoriano R. Yabut, Jr., and several John Does of the Contempt Charges against them. 2. Ordering, as it hereby orders, the issuance of an alias writ of execution directing the Courts Deputy Sheriff: (a) Defendants Go Song and Tan Sio Kien, their successors-in-interest and assigns and those acting on their behalf to vacate the disputed premises and deliver the same to [Muoz]; (b) Defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel from the records of the subject property the registration of all the following documents, to wit: (1) "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated December 28, 1972; (2) Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 186366 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City; (3) "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated July 16, 1979; and (4) TCT No. 258977 of the Registry of Deeds for Metro Manila II, and to restore and revive, free from all liens and encumbrances TCT No. 186306 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City; and (c) Defendants Emilia M. Ching, Go Song and Tan Sio Kien jointly and severally to pay [Muoz] the sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorneys fees and to pay the cost of suit.37 Unrelenting, Muoz filed a Motion for Clarificatory Order, pointing out that the spouses Chan are the present occupants of the subject property. The Order dated August 21, 1995 of the RTC-Branch 95 directed the deputy sheriff to deliver the subject property to Muoz, and this could not be done unless the spouses Chan are evicted therefrom. Resultantly, Muoz prayed that "a clarificatory order be made categorically stating that the spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan, and all persons claiming right under them, are likewise evicted from the subject premises pursuant to the Order of 21 August 1995."38 Once more, the RTC-Branch 95 denied Muozs motion in its Order dated October 3, 1995. The RTC-Branch 95 reiterated the rule that after the judgment had become final, only clerical errors, as distinguished from substantial errors, can be amended by the court. Furthermore, when the decision or judgment sought to be amended is promulgated by an appellate court, it is beyond the power of the trial court to change, amplify, enlarge, alter, or modify. Ultimately, the RTC-Branch 95 pronounced that it was "restrained x x x to consider as mere clerical error the exclusion of spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan in the Decision of the Court dated July 19, 1991, a final judgment, which judgment cannot now be made to speak a different language."39 Attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC-Branch 95 in issuing its Orders dated August 21, 1995 and October 3, 1995, Muoz filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, which was remanded to the Court of Appeals in observance of the hierarchy of courts, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40019. The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on September 29, 2000 dismissing Muozs petition. The Court of Appeals agreed with the RTC-Branch 95 that the spouses Chan could not be covered by the alias writ of execution considering that they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-28580. The cancellation of TCT No. 53297 in the spouses Chans names could not be done apart from a separate action exclusively for that matter. The spouses Chan are deemed buyers in good faith and for value as the certificate of title delivered to them by BPI Family was free from any liens or encumbrances or any mark that would have raised the spouses Chans suspicions. Every person dealing with registered lands may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and he is not required to go beyond the

certificate and inquire into the circumstances culminating in the vendors acquisition of the property. The Court of Appeals denied Muozs motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated January 5, 2001. Muoz comes before this Court via the present consolidated petitions. Muoz posits that the final judgment and writ of execution of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q28580 bind not only Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go, but also their successors-in-interest, assigns, or persons acting on their behalf, namely, BPI Family and spouses Chan. The spouses Chan cannot be deemed innocent purchasers for value of the property since the cancellation of the adverse claim and notice of lis pendens on the spouses Gos TCT No. 258977 is completely null and void. Muoz further argues that the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994 in Civil Case No. 8286 correctly ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction restoring possession of the subject property to her, as she had already acquired prior possession of the said property upon the execution of the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580. Also, the spouses Chans petition for certiorari before the RTC-Branch 88, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-20632, challenging the Order dated May 16, 1994 of the MeTC in Civil Case No. 8286, is a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Summary Procedure; and the RTC-Branch 88 and the Court of Appeals should be faulted for giving due course to the said petition even in the absence of jurisdiction. On the other hand, in their comments to the two petitions at bar, the spouses Chan, Atty. Yabut, and BPI Family assert that given the peculiar factual circumstances of the case, RTC-Branch 88 was justified in taking cognizance of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabuts petition for certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632; that Muoz is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 88 after participating in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632; that the spouses Chans title to the subject property is not affected by the final judgment of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q28580, and the said judgment cannot be executed against the spouses Chan since they are neither parties to the case, nor are they the successors-in-interest, assigns, or persons acting on behalf of Emilia M. Ching or the spouses Go; that BPI Family and consequently, the spouses Chan, obtained title to the subject property as innocent purchasers for value, there being no notice of any infirmity in said title; and that Muoz is guilty of forum shopping for filing her petition in G.R. No. 146718 even while her petition in G.R. No. 142676 is still pending. II RULING For the sake of expediency, we will be discussing first the merits of the petition in G.R. No. 146718. G.R. No. 146718 Civil Case No. Q-28580 involved Muozs complaint for the annulment of the deeds of absolute sale dated December 28, 197240 and July 16, 1979,41 the cancellation of the spouses Gos TCT No. 258977, and the restoration and revival of Muozs TCT No. 186306. The final judgment of RTCBranch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 was in favor of Muoz and against Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go. The problem arose when during the pendency of the said case, title and possession of the subject property were transferred from the spouses Go, to BPI Family, and finally, to the spouses Chan. BPI Family and the spouses Chan were never impleaded as parties and were not referred to in the dispositive portion of the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580.

Muoz questions in G.R. No. 146718: (1) the Order dated August 21, 1995 denying her Motion for Contempt against the spouses Chan, Second Motion for Contempt against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, and Motion for an Alias Writ of Execution and Application for Surrender of the Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 53297; and (2) the Order dated October 3, 1995 denying her Motion for Clarificatory Order, both issued by the RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580, and upheld by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40019. In sum, Muoz was seeking in her aforementioned motions: (1) a categorical order from the RTC-Branch 95 that the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q28580 be executed against the spouses Chan; and (2) the surrender and cancellation of the spouses Chans TCT No. 53297 and restoration of Muozs TCT No. 186306. There is no merit in Muozs petition in G.R. No. 146718. Civil Case No. Q-28580 is an action for reconveyance of real property. In Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez,42 we described an action for reconveyance as follows: An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in anothers name. Although the decree is recognized as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the registered owner is not necessarily held free from liens. As a remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the land registration court. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third person for value. A notice of lis pendens may thus be annotated on the certificate of title immediately upon the institution of the action in court. The notice of lis pendens will avoid transfer to an innocent third person for value and preserve the claim of the real owner.43 (Emphases ours.) The rule is that: (1) a judgment in rem is binding upon the whole world, such as a judgment in a land registration case or probate of a will; and (2) a judgment in personam is binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest but not upon strangers. A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam; it is binding only against the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action. An action for declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.44 Since they were not impleaded as parties and given the opportunity to participate in Civil Case No. Q-28580, the final judgment in said case cannot bind BPI Family and the spouses Chan. The effect of the said judgment cannot be extended to BPI Family and the spouses Chan by simply issuing an alias writ of execution against them. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution issued pursuant thereto.45 A similar situation existed in Dino v. Court of Appeals,46 where we resolved that: As the registered owner of the subject property, petitioners are not bound by decision in Civil Case No. R-18073 for they were never summoned in said case and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. 73069 was already cancelled at the time petitioners purchased the subject property. While it is true that petitioners are indispensable parties in Civil Case No. R-18073, without whom no complete relief could be accorded to the private respondents, the fact still remains that petitioners were never actually joined as defendants in said case. Impleading petitioners as additional defendants only in the execution stage of said case violated petitioners right to due process as no

notice of lis pendens was annotated on the existing certificate of title of said property nor were petitioners given notice of the pending case, therefore petitioners remain strangers in said case and the Order of the trial court involving them is null and void, considering that petitioners are innocent purchasers of the subject property for value.47 We further stress that Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, clearly provides that "[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law." Herein, several Torrens titles were already issued after the cancellation of Muozs. Certificates of title had been successively issued to Emilia M. Ching, spouses Go, BPI Family, and spouses Chan. Civil Case No. Q-28580, in which a final judgment had already been rendered, specifically challenged the validity of the certificates of title of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go only. To have the present certificate of title of the spouses Chan cancelled, Muoz must institute another case directly attacking the validity of the same. The fact that the titles to the subject property of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go were already declared null and void ab initio by final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 is not enough, for it does not automatically make the subsequent titles of BPI Family and the spouses Chan correspondingly null and void ab initio. It has long been ingrained in our jurisprudence that a void title may become the root of a valid title if the derivative title was obtained in good faith and for value. Following the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title, every person dealing with registered lands may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and he is not required to go beyond the certificate and inquire into the circumstances culminating in the vendors acquisition of the property. The rights of innocent third persons who relied on the correctness of the certificate of title and acquired rights over the property covered thereby cannot be disregarded and the courts cannot order the cancellation of such certificate for that would impair or erode public confidence in the Torrens system of land registration.48 Hence, we pronounced in Republic v. Agunoy, Sr.49: Here, it bears stressing that, by petitioner's own judicial admission, the lots in dispute are no longer part of the public domain, and there are numerous third, fourth, fifth and more parties holding Torrens titles in their favor and enjoying the presumption of good faith. This brings to mind what we have reechoed in Pino v. Court of Appeals and the cases therein cited: [E]ven on the supposition that the sale was void, the general rule that the direct result of a previous illegal contract cannot be valid (on the theory that the spring cannot rise higher than its source) cannot apply here for We are confronted with the functionings of the Torrens System of Registration. The doctrine to follow is simple enough: a fraudulent or forged document of sale may become the ROOT of a valid title if the certificate of title has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name of the forger or the name indicated by the forger.50(Emphases ours.) Although the RTC-Branch 95 had declared with finality in Civil Case No. Q-28580 that the titles of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go were null and void, there is yet no similar determination on the titles of BPI Family and the spouses Chan. The question of whether or not the titles to the subject property of BPI Family and the spouses Chan are null and void, since they are merely the successors-in-interest, assigns, or privies of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go, ultimately depends on the issue of whether or not BPI Family and the spouses Chan obtained their titles to the subject property in bad faith, i.e., with notice of Muozs adverse claim and knowledge of the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-28580. The latter is a factual issue on which we cannot rule in the

present petition, not only because we are not a trier of facts, but more importantly, because it was not among the issues raised and tried in Civil Case No. Q-28580. In support of her prayer for an alias writ of execution against BPI Family and the spouses Go, Muoz cites our ruling in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City,51 in relation to De la Cruz v. De la Cruz.52 De la Cruz is an action for reconveyance of Lot 671 founded on breach of trust filed by Augustina de la Cruz, et al., against Lucia dela Cruz (Lucia) and Iglesia Ni Kristo (INK). We upheld the validity of the sale of Lot 671 by Lucia to INK, and thereby validated the title of INK to the said property. Calalang actually involved two petitions: (1) a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition originally filed by Virginia Calalang (Calalang) before this Court, and (2) a petition for injunction with damages originally filed by Augusto M. de Leon (De Leon), et al., before the RTC and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-45767. Calalang and De Leon, et al., assert titles that were adverse to that of INK. De Leon, et al., in particular, claim that their titles to Lot 671 were derived from Amando Clemente. Calalang and De Leon, et al., sought from the court orders enjoining INK from building a fence to enclose Lot 671; requiring the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) to conduct an investigation of the anomaly regarding Lucias reconstituted title to Lot 671; and dismissing the proceedings instituted by the Register of Deeds for the cancellation of their titles. We dismissed the petitions of Calalang and De Leon, et al., on the ground of res judicata, the legality or validity of the title of INK over Lot 671 had been settled with finality in De la Cruz. De la Cruz was applied to Calalang and De Leon, et al., since the facts on which such decision was predicated continued to be the facts on which the petitions of Calalang and De Leon, et al., were based. Muozs reliance on Calalang is misplaced. There are substantial differences in the facts and issues involved in Calalang and the present case. In Calalang, there is duplication or overlapping of certificates of title issued to different persons over the same property. We already upheld in De la Cruz the validity of the certificate of title of INK over Lot 671, which effectively prevents us from recognizing the validity of any other certificate of title over the same property. In addition, Lucia, the predecessor-in-interest of INK, had her certificate of title judicially reconstituted. The judicial reconstitution of title is a proceeding in rem, constituting constructive notice to the whole world. Hence, we rejected the petitions of Calalang and De Leon, et al., to enjoin INK from building a fence enclosing Lot 671, and the concerned public authorities from instituting appropriate proceedings to have all other certificates of title over Lot 671 annulled and cancelled. In the instant case, there has been no duplication or overlapping of certificates of title. The subject property has always been covered by only one certificate of title at a time, and at present, such certificate is in the spouses Chans names. As we have previously discussed herein, Muoz cannot have the spouses Chans TCT No. 53297 cancelled by a mere motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution in Civil Case No. Q-28580, when the spouses Chan were not parties to the case. Civil Case No. Q-28580 was a proceeding in personam, and the final judgment rendered therein declaring null and void the titles to the subject property of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go should bind only the parties thereto. Furthermore, despite the void titles of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go, the derivative titles of BPI Family and the spouses Chan may still be valid provided that they had acquired the same in good faith and for value. More in point with the instant petition is Pineda v. Santiago.53 Pineda still involved Lot 671. INK sought from the RTC a second alias writ of execution to implement the judgment in Calalang against

Conrado Pineda (Pineda), et. al. In opposing the issuance of such writ, Pineda, et al., asserted that they held titles to Lot 671 adverse to those of Lucia and INK and that they were not parties in De la Cruz or in Calalang. In its assailed order, the RTC granted the second alias writ of execution on the basis that the issue of ownership of Lot 671 was already determined with finality in favor of Lucia and INK. The writ ordered the deputy sheriff to eject Pineda, et al., from Lot 671. When the matter was brought before us, we annulled the assailed order as the writ of execution issued was against Pineda, et al., who were not parties to Civil Case No. Q-45767, the ejectment suit instituted by De Leon, et al. We elaborated in Pineda that: Being a suit for injunction, Civil Case No. Q-45767 partakes of an action in personam. In Domagas v. Jensen, we have explained the nature of an action in personam and enumerated some actions and proceedings which are in personam, viz: "The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam." The respondent judge's jurisdiction is, therefore, limited to the parties in the injunction suit. To stress, the petition for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-45767, was filed only by therein petitioners Augusto M. de Leon, Jose de Castro, Jose A. Panlilio, Felicidad Vergara Vda. De Pineda, Fernando L. Vitug I, Fernando M. Vitug II, Fernando M. Vitug III, and Faustino Tobia, and later amended to include Elena Ostrea and Feliza C. Cristobal-Generoso as additional petitioners therein, against Bishop Erao Manalo, in his capacity as titular and spiritual head of I.N.K. Herein petitioners Conrado Pineda, et al. never became parties thereto. Any and all orders and writs of execution, which the respondent judge may issue in that case can, therefore, be enforced only against those parties and not against the herein petitioners Conrado Pineda, et al. In issuing the assailed Order dated 22 April 1998, which directed the issuance of the 2nd Alias Writ of Execution to eject nonparties (herein petitioners), the respondent judge clearly went out of bounds and committed grave abuse of discretion. The nature of the injunction suit Civil Case No. Q-45767 as an action in personam in the RTC remains to be the same whether it is elevated to the CA or to this Court for review. An action in personam does not become an action in rem just because a pronouncement confirming I.N.K.'s title to Lot 671 was made by this Court in the Calalang decision. Final rulings may be made by this Court, as the Highest Court of the Land, in actions in personam but such rulings are binding only as against the parties therein and not against the whole world. Here lies another grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge when he relied on the Calalang decision in his assailed Order dated 07 May 1998 as if it were binding against the whole world, saying:

"After evaluating the arguments of both parties, decisive on the incident is the decision of the Supreme Court in favor of the respondent I.N.K., represented by its titular and spiritual head Bishop Erao G. Manalo, sustaining its ownership over the subject Lot 671. This Court could do no less but to follow and give substantial meaning to its ownership which shall include all dominical rights by way of a Writ of Execution. To delay the issuance of such writ is a denial of justice due the I.N.K." As a final word, this decision shall not be misinterpreted as disturbing or modifying our ruling in Calalang. The final ruling on I.N.K.'s ownership and title is not at all affected. Private respondent I.N.K., as the true and lawful owner of Lot 671 as ruled by the Court in Calalang, simply has to file the proper action against the herein petitioners to enforce its property rights within the bounds of the law and our rules. I.N.K.'s recourse of asking for the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the petitioners in Civil Case No. Q-45767 and the respondent judge's orders in said case, granting I.N.K.'s prayer and enforcing the alias writ of execution against the present petitioners, constitutes blatant disregard of very fundamental rules and must therefore be stricken down. 54 (Emphases ours.) Consistent with Pineda, and as appositely recommended by the RTC-Branch 95 and the Court of Appeals in the present case, Muozs legal remedy is to directly assail in a separate action the validity of the certificates of title of BPI Family and the spouses Chan. G.R. No. 142676 G.R. No. 142676 is Muozs appeal of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286, the forcible entry case she instituted against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut before the MeTC. There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In such cases, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In filing forcible entry cases, the law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the property, and second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, i.e., by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. It is also settled that in the resolution thereof, what is important is determining who is entitled to the physical possession of the property. Indeed, any of the parties who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself since such cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.55 Title is never in issue in a forcible entry case, the court should base its decision on who had prior physical possession. The main thing to be proven in an action for forcible entry is prior possession and that same was lost through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth, so that it behooves the court to restore possession regardless of title or ownership.56 We more extensively discussed in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals57 that: Ownership or the right to possess arising from ownership is not at issue in an action for recovery of possession. The parties cannot present evidence to prove ownership or right to legal possession except to prove the nature of the possession when necessary to resolve the issue of physical possession. The same is true when the defendant asserts the absence of title over the property. The absence of title over the contested lot is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case.

The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is - who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a partys title to the property is questionable, or when both parties intruded into public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved by the proper government agency. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to physical possession.58 (Emphases ours.) Based on the foregoing, we find that the RTC-Branch 88 erred in ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286 even before completion of the proceedings before the MeTC. At the time said case was ordered dismissed by RTC-Branch 88, the MeTC had only gone so far as holding a hearing on and eventually granting Muozs prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Muoz alleges in her complaint in Civil Case No. 8286 that she had been in prior possession of the subject property since it was turned-over to her by the sheriff on January 10, 1994, pursuant to the Alias Writ of Execution issued by the RTC-Branch 95 to implement the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580. The factual issue of who was in prior possession of the subject property should be litigated between the parties regardless of whether or not the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q28580 extended to the spouses Chan. Hence, the pendency of the latter issue in Civil Case No. Q28580 before the RTC-Branch 95 did not warrant the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286 before the MeTC on the ground of litis pendentia. The two cases could proceed independently of one another. Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut aver that the spouses Chan have never lost possession of the subject property since acquiring the same from BPI Family in 1990. This is a worthy defense to Muozs complaint for forcible entry, which Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut should substantiate with evidence in the continuation of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 8286 before the MeTC. In addition, Civil Case No. 8286, a forcible entry case, is governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, Section 19 whereof provides: SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule: xxxx (g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court. The purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules. Pursuant to this objective, the Rule prohibits petitions for certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary delays and to expedite the disposition of cases.59

Interlocutory orders are those that determine incidental matters that do not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings.60 An order granting a preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, is interlocutory and unappealable.61
1avvphil

The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the MeTC in its Order dated May 16, 1994, directing that Muoz be placed in possession of the subject property during the course of Civil Case No. 8286, is an interlocutory order. Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut assailed the said order before the RTC-Branch 88 via a petition for certiorari, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-20632. The RTCBranch 88 gave due course to said petition, and not only declared the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994 null and void, but went further by dismissing Civil Case No. 8286. The prohibition in Section 19(g) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is plain enough. Its further exposition is unnecessary verbiage.62 The petition for certiorari of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632 is clearly covered by the said prohibition, thus, it should have been dismissed outright by the RTC-Branch 88. While the circumstances involved in Muozs forcible entry case against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut are admittedly very peculiar, these are insufficient to except the petition for certiorari of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632 from the prohibition. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.63 Nonetheless, even though the peculiar circumstances extant herein do not justify the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286, they do require limiting pro hac vice the reliefs the MeTC may accord to Muoz in the event that she is able to successfully prove forcible entry by Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut into the subject property (i.e., that the sheriff actually turned-over to Muoz the possession of the subject property on January 10, 1994, and that she was deprived of such possession by Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut on February 2, 1994 by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth). Taking into account our ruling in G.R. No. 146718 that the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 does not extend to the spouses Chan, who were not impleaded as parties to the said case the MeTC is precluded from granting to Muoz relief, whether preliminary or final, that will give her possession of the subject property. Otherwise, we will be perpetuating the wrongful execution of the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580. Based on the same reason, Muoz can no longer insist on the reinstatement of the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994 granting a preliminary mandatory injunction that puts her in possession of the subject property during the course of the trial. Muoz though may recover damages if she is able to prove wrongful deprivation of possession of the subject property from February 2, 1994 until the finality of this decision in G.R. No. 146718. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we: (1) GRANT Emerita Muozs petition in G.R. No. 142676. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated July 21, 1995 and Resolution dated March 9, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35322, which affirmed the Orders dated June 10, 1994 and August 5, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88 of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q94-20632. We DIRECT the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 33 of Quezon City to reinstate Emerita Muozs complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 8286 and to resume the proceedings only to determine whether or not Emerita Muoz was forcibly deprived of possession of the subject property from February 2, 1994 until finality of this judgment, and if so, whether or not she is entitled to an award for damages for deprivation of possession during the aforementioned period of time; and

(2) DENY Emerita Munozs petition in G.R. No. 146718 for lack of merit, and AFFIRM the Decision dated September 29, 2000 and Resolution dated January 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40019, which in turn, affirmed the Orders dated August 21, 1995 and October 3, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95 of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-28580. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

PFR: Nullity of marriage 36

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 175367 June 6, 2011

DANILO A. AURELIO, Petitioner, vs. VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO, Respondent. DECISION PERALTA, J.: Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the October 6, 2005 Decision2 and October 26, 2006 Resolution,3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238. The facts of the case are as follows: Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988. They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel. On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.4 In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent

prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code which provides: Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. As succinctly summarized by the CA, contained in respondents petition are the following allegations, to wit: x x x The said petition alleged, inter alia, that both husband and wife are psychologically incapable of performing and complying with their essential marital obligations. Said psychological incapacity was existing prior and at the time of the marriage. Said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in the maintenance of the family. He refused to foot the household bills and provide for his familys needs. He exhibited arrogance. He was completely insensitive to the feelings of his wife. He liked to humiliate and embarrass his wife even in the presence of their children. Vida Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings change very quickly from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of their marriage. Private respondent manifested psychological aversion to cohabit with her husband or to take care of him. The psychological make-up of private respondent was evaluated by a psychologist, who found that the psychological incapacity of both husband and wife to perform their marital obligations is grave, incorrigible and incurable. Private respondent suffers from a Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features; whereas petitioner suffers from passive aggressive (negativistic) personality disorder that renders him immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a marriage.5 On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss6 the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code. On January 14, 2003, the RTC issued an Order7 denying petitioners motion. On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the RTC in an Order8 dated December 17, 2003. In denying petitioners motion, the RTC ruled that respondents petition for declaration of nullity of marriage complied with the requirements of the Molina doctrine, and whether or not the allegations are meritorious would depend upon the proofs presented by both parties during trial, to wit: A review of the petition shows that it observed the requirements in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (268 SCRA 198), otherwise known as the Molina Doctrine. There was allegation of the root cause of the psychological incapacity of both the petitioner and the respondent contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the petition. The manifestation of juridical antecedence was alleged in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition. The allegations constituting the gravity of psychological incapacity were alleged in paragraph 9 (a to l) of the petition. The incurability was alleged in paragraph 10 of the petition.

Moreover, the clinical finding of incurability was quoted in paragraph 15 of the petition. There is a cause of action presented in the petition for the nullification of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Whether or not the allegations are meritorious depends upon the proofs to be presented by both parties. This, in turn, will entail the presentation of evidence which can only be done in the hearing on the merits of the case. If the Court finds that there are (sic) preponderance of evidence to sustain a nullification, then the cause of the petition shall fail. Conversely, if it finds, through the evidence that will be presented during the hearing on the merits, that there are sufficient proofs to warrant nullification, the Court shall declare its nullity.9 On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA via petition for certiorari10 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On October 6, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, [the] instant petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.11 In a Resolution dated October 26, 2004, the CA dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that respondents complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage when scrutinized in juxtaposition with Article 36 of the Family Code and the Molina doctrine revealed the existence of a sufficient cause of action. Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising two issues for this Courts consideration, to wit: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF THE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE ARE SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO DECLARE THE NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN VIDA AND DANILO. II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS ACTION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO DISMISS BY THE TRIAL COURT IS PATENTLY AND UTTERLY TAINTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION; AND THAT APPEAL IN DUE COURSE IS NOT A PLAIN, ADEQUATE OR SPEEDY REMEDY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 12 Before anything else, it bears to point out that had respondents complaint been filed after March 15, 2003, this present petition would have been denied since Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-1013 prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss in actions for annulment of marriage. Be that as

it may, after a circumspect review of the arguments raised by petitioner herein, this Court finds that the petition is not meritorious. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 this Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity, to wit: (1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.15 This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the above pronouncements, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the Solicitor General required in the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.16 Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations contained in respondents petition are insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Specifically, petitioner contends that the petition failed to comply with three of the Molina guidelines, namely: that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in the complaint; that such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied marital obligation must be stated in the petition.17

First, contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes. Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.
lawph!1

Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondents allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that "the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal of the Molina guidelines would show that the same contemplate a situation wherein the parties have presented their evidence, witnesses have testified, and that a decision has been reached by the court after due hearing. Such process can be gleaned from guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to a decision rendered by the RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly be too burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at first instance whether the allegations contained in the petition are sufficient to substantiate a case for psychological incapacity. Let it be remembered that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.18 It would thus be more prudent for this Court to remand the case to the RTC, as it would be in the best position to scrutinize the evidence as well as hear and weigh the evidentiary value of the testimonies of the ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses presented by the parties. Given the allegations in respondents petition for nullity of marriage, this Court rules that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss. By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.19 Even assuming arguendo that this Court were to agree with petitioner that the allegations contained in respondents petition are insufficient and that the RTC erred in denying petitioners motion to dismiss, the same is merely an error of judgment correctible by appeal and not an abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.20 Finally, the CA properly dismissed petitioners petition. As a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss, which is an interlocutory order, is not reviewable by certiorari. Petitioners remedy is to reiterate the grounds in his motion to dismiss, as defenses in his answer to the petition for nullity of marriage, proceed trial and, in case of an adverse decision, appeal the decision in due time.21 The

existence of that adequate remedy removed the underpinnings of his petition for certiorari in the CA.22 WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is DENIED. The October 6, 2005 Decision and October 26, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

PFR : illegitimate filliation DNA

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 190710 June 6, 2011

JESSE U. LUCAS, Petitioner, vs. JESUS S. LUCAS, Respondent. DECISION NACHURA, J.: Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order? In this petition for review on certiorari, we address this question to guide the Bench and the Bar in dealing with a relatively new evidentiary tool. Assailed in this petition are the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17, 2009. The antecedents of the case are, as follows: On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing)2 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72, Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie), migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain "Ate Belen (Belen)" who worked in a prominent nightspot in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany Belen to work. On one occasion, Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belens workplace, and an intimate relationship developed between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant and, on March 11, 1969, she gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioners father was not stated in petitioners certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his father is respondent. On August 1, 1969, petitioner was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue, Pasay City. Respondent allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and petitioner for a period of about two years. When the relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie refused to accept respondents offer of support

and decided to raise petitioner on her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all attempts were in vain. Attached to the petition were the following: (a) petitioners certificate of live birth; (b) petitioners baptismal certificate; (c) petitioners college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy. Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial court on August 29, 2007 and obtained a copy of the petition. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, on September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued the Order3 setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to the petition to file his opposition. The court also directed that the Order be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in any newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, and that the Solicitor General be furnished with copies of the Order and the petition in order that he may appear and represent the State in the case. On September 4, 2007, unaware of the issuance of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a Special Appearance and Comment. He manifested inter alia that: (1) he did not receive the summons and a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him as respondent; (3) should the court agree that summons was required, he was waiving service of summons and making a voluntary appearance; and (4) notice by publication of the petition and the hearing was improper because of the confidentiality of the subject matter.4 On September 14, 2007, respondent also filed a Manifestation and Comment on Petitioners Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Respondent reiterated that the petition for recognition is adversarial in nature; hence, he should be served with summons. After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.5 Respondent averred that the petition was not in due form and substance because petitioner could not have personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioners father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence. On July 30, 2008, the RTC, acting on respondents motion for reconsideration, issued an Order6 dismissing the case. The court remarked that, based on the case of Herrera v. Alba,7 there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which the parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. The court opined that petitioner must first establish these four procedural aspects before he can present evidence of paternity and filiation, which may include incriminating acts or scientific evidence like blood group test and DNA test results. The court observed that the petition did not show that these procedural aspects were present. Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case considering that (a) his mother did not personally declare that she had sexual relations with respondent, and petitioners statement as to what his mother told him about his father was clearly hearsay; (b) the certificate of live birth was not signed by respondent; and (c) although petitioner used the surname of respondent, there was no allegation that he was treated as the child of respondent by the latter or his family. The court opined that, having failed to

establish a prima facie case, respondent had no obligation to present any affirmative defenses. The dispositive portion of the said Order therefore reads: WHEREFORE, for failure of the petitioner to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action in his petition, his motion for the submission of parties to DNA testing to establish paternity and filiation is hereby denied. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice. SO ORDERED.8 Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration to the Order dated July 30, 2008, which the RTC resolved in his favor. Thus, on October 20, 2008, it issued the Order9 setting aside the courts previous order, thus: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated July 30, 2008 is hereby reconsidered and set aside. Let the Petition (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) be set for hearing on January 22, 2009 at 8:30 in the morning. xxxx SO ORDERED.10 This time, the RTC held that the ruling on the grounds relied upon by petitioner for filing the petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. The court stressed that the petition was sufficient in form and substance. It was verified, it included a certification against forum shopping, and it contained a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which petitioner relies on for his claim, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. The court remarked that the allegation that the statements in the petition were not of petitioners personal knowledge is a matter of evidence. The court also dismissed respondents arguments that there is no basis for the taking of DNA test, and that jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence. It noted that the new Rule on DNA Evidence11 allows the conduct of DNA testing, whether at the courts instance or upon application of any person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated October 20, 2008 and for Dismissal of Petition,12reiterating that (a) the petition was not in due form and substance as no defendant was named in the title, and all the basic allegations were hearsay; and (b) there was no prima facie case, which made the petition susceptible to dismissal. The RTC denied the motion in the Order dated January 19, 2009, and rescheduled the hearing.13 Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning the Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009. On September 25, 2009, the CA decided the petition for certiorari in favor of respondent, thus: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED for being meritorious. The assailed Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 both issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172 of Valenzuela City in SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case docketed as SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 is DISMISSED.14

The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent, as no summons had been served on him. Respondents special appearance could not be considered as voluntary appearance because it was filed only for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the court over respondent. Although respondent likewise questioned the courts jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the same is not equivalent to a waiver of his right to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. The CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, specifically seeking a DNA testing order to abbreviate the proceedings. It noted that petitioner failed to show that the four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met. The CA further held that a DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case, thus: While the tenor [of Section 4, Rule on DNA Evidence] appears to be absolute, the rule could not really have been intended to trample on the substantive rights of the parties. It could have not meant to be an instrument to promote disorder, harassment, or extortion. It could have not been intended to legalize unwarranted expedition to fish for evidence. Such will be the situation in this particular case if a court may at any time order the taking of a DNA test. If the DNA test in compulsory recognition cases is immediately available to the petitioner/complainant without requiring first the presentation of corroborative proof, then a dire and absurd rule would result. Such will encourage and promote harassment and extortion. xxxx At the risk of being repetitious, the Court would like to stress that it sees the danger of allowing an absolute DNA testing to a compulsory recognition test even if the plaintiff/petitioner failed to establish prima facie proof. x x x If at anytime, motu proprio and without pre-conditions, the court can indeed order the taking of DNA test in compulsory recognition cases, then the prominent and well-to-do members of our society will be easy prey for opportunists and extortionists. For no cause at all, or even for [sic] casual sexual indiscretions in their younger years could be used as a means to harass them. Unscrupulous women, unsure of the paternity of their children may just be taking the chancesjust in case-by pointing to a sexual partner in a long past one-time encounter. Indeed an absolute and unconditional taking of DNA test for compulsory recognition case opens wide the opportunities for extortionist to prey on victims who have no stomach for scandal.15 Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 17, 2009, the CA denied the motion for lack of merit.16 In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner raises the following issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF HEREIN RESPONDENT ALBEIT THE SAME WAS NEVER RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI. I.A WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT JURISDICTION WAS NOT ACQUIRED OVER THE PERSON OF THE RESPONDENT.

I.B WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO REALIZE THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD ALREADY SUBMITTED VOLUNTARILY TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A QUO. I.C WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT THE TITLE OF A PLEADING, RATHER THAN ITS BODY, IS CONTROLLING. II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION BY REASON OF THE MOTION (FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE COURT A QUO) FOR THE CONDUCT OF DNA TESTING. II.A WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT DNA TESTING CAN ONLY BE ORDERED AFTER THE PETITIONER ESTABLISHES PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF FILIATION. III. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WITH ITS MISPLACED RELIANCE ON THE CASE OF HERRERA VS. ALBA, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE FOUR SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A TRADITIONAL PATERNITY ACTION.17 Petitioner contends that respondent never raised as issue in his petition for certiorari the courts lack of jurisdiction over his person. Hence, the CA had no legal basis to discuss the same, because issues not raised are deemed waived or abandoned. At any rate, respondent had already voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court by his filing of several motions asking for affirmative relief, such as the (a) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated September 3, 2007; (b) Ex Parte Motion to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 6, 2007; and (c) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated October 20, 2008 and for Dismissal of Petition. Petitioner points out that respondent even expressly admitted that he has waived his right to summons in his Manifestation and Comment on Petitioners Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, the issue is already moot and academic. Petitioner argues that the case was adversarial in nature. Although the caption of the petition does not state respondents name, the body of the petition clearly indicates his name and his known address. He maintains that the body of the petition is controlling and not the caption. Finally, petitioner asserts that the motion for DNA testing should not be a reason for the dismissal of the petition since it is not a legal ground for the dismissal of cases. If the CA entertained any doubt as to the propriety of DNA testing, it should have simply denied the motion.18 Petitioner points out that Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence does not require that there must be a prior proof of

filiation before DNA testing can be ordered. He adds that the CA erroneously relied on the four significant procedural aspects of a paternity case, as enunciated in Herrera v. Alba.19 Petitioner avers that these procedural aspects are not applicable at this point of the proceedings because they are matters of evidence that should be taken up during the trial.20 In his Comment, respondent supports the CAs ruling on most issues raised in the petition for certiorari and merely reiterates his previous arguments. However, on the issue of lack of jurisdiction, respondent counters that, contrary to petitioners assertion, he raised the issue before the CA in relation to his claim that the petition was not in due form and substance. Respondent denies that he waived his right to the service of summons. He insists that the alleged waiver and voluntary appearance was conditional upon a finding by the court that summons is indeed required. He avers that the assertion of affirmative defenses, aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, cannot be considered as waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over such person. The petition is meritorious. Primarily, we emphasize that the assailed Orders of the trial court were orders denying respondents motion to dismiss the petition for illegitimate filiation. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In a number of cases, the court has granted the extraordinary remedy of certiorari on the denial of the motion to dismiss but only when it has been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.21 In the present case, we discern no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the motion to dismiss. The grounds for dismissal relied upon by respondent were (a) the courts lack of jurisdiction over his person due to the absence of summons, and (b) defect in the form and substance of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, which is equivalent to failure to state a cause of action. We need not belabor the issues on whether lack of jurisdiction was raised before the CA, whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent, or whether respondent waived his right to the service of summons. We find that the primordial issue here is actually whether it was necessary, in the first place, to serve summons on respondent for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case. In other words, was the service of summons jurisdictional? The answer to this question depends on the nature of petitioners action, that is, whether it is an action in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.22 In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property

under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. 23 The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort to the right sought to be established.24 Through publication, all interested parties are deemed notified of the petition. If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.25 This is but proper in order to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.26 Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may be excused where it is determined that the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case. We find that the due process requirement with respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that he has participated in the proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to the petition to establish filiation. To address respondents contention that the petition should have been adversarial in form, we further hold that the herein petition to establish filiation was sufficient in form. It was indeed adversarial in nature despite its caption which lacked the name of a defendant, the failure to implead respondent as defendant, and the non-service of summons upon respondent. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.27 In this petitionclassified as an action in remthe notice requirement for an adversarial proceeding was likewise satisfied by the publication of the petition and the giving of notice to the Solicitor General, as directed by the trial court. The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which requires the complaint to contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate.28 A complaint states a cause of action when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.29 The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by petitioner to establish his filiation to respondent. Respondent, however, contends that the allegations in the petition were hearsay as they were not of petitioners personal knowledge. Such matter is clearly a matter of evidence that cannot be determined at this point but only during the trial when petitioner presents his evidence. In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action and not whether those allegations of fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.30 The inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no other.31 The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.32

If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and substance but their veracity and correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the court to deny the motion to dismiss and require the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove his defense. The veracity of the assertions of the parties can be ascertained at the trial of the case on the merits.33 The statement in Herrera v. Alba34 that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie casethe first procedural aspect in a paternity caseis therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading. Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis--vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for hearing. At any rate, the CAs view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing without corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the Courts attention. In light of this observation, we find that there is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions for DNA testing order, particularly in paternity and other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question of whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order. The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the "prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence." It seeks "to ensure that the evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the public."35 Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states: SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case; (b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;

(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established. In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or "good cause" for the holding of the test. 36 In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a "search," which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.37
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The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17, 2009 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

Pfr: void marriage

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 168335 June 6, 2011

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. NESTOR GALANG, Respondent. DECISION BRION, J.: We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), challenging the decision2 dated November 25, 2004 and the resolution3 dated May 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70004. The challenged decision affirmed the decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, Angeles City, declaring the marriage of Nestor Galang (respondent) and Juvy Salazar null and void on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. Antecedent Facts On March 9, 1994, the respondent and Juvy contracted marriage in Pampanga. They resided in the house of the respondents father in San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga. The respondent worked as an artist-illustrator at the Clark Development Corporation, earning P8,500.00 monthly. Juvy, on the other hand, stayed at home as a housewife. They have one child, Christopher. On August 4, 1999, the respondent filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 9494. He alleged that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler. He claimed that Juvy stole his ATM card and his parents money, and often asked money from their friends and relatives on the pretext that Christopher was confined in a hospital. According to the respondent, Juvy suffers from "mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and affection [towards him and their] child." He posited that Juvys incapacity was "extremely serious" and "appears to be incurable."5

The RTC ordered the city prosecutor to investigate if collusion existed between the parties. Prosecutor Angelito I. Balderama formally manifested, on October 18, 1999, that he found no evidence of collusion between the parties. The RTC set the case for trial in its Order of October 20, 1999. The respondent presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his allegations. In his testimony, the respondent alleged that he was the one who prepared their breakfast because Juvy did not want to wake up early; Juvy often left their child to their neighbors care; and Christopher almost got lost in the market when Juvy brought him there.6 The respondent further stated that Juvy squandered the P15,000.00 he entrusted to her. He added that Juvy stole his ATM card and falsified his signature to encash the check representing his (the respondents) fathers pension. He, likewise, stated that he caught Juvy playing "mahjong" and "kuwaho" three (3) times. Finally, he testified that Juvy borrowed money from their relatives on the pretense that their son was confined in a hospital.7 Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she conducted a psychological test on the respondent. According to her, she wrote Juvy a letter requesting for an interview, but the latter did not respond.8 In her Psychological Report, the psychologist made the following findings: Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang resembles an emotionally-matured individual. He is well-adjusted to the problem he meets, and enable to throw-off major irritations but manifest[s] a very low frustration tolerance which means he has a little ability to endure anxiety and the client manifests suppressed feelings and emotions which resulted to unbearable emotional pain, depression and lack of self-esteem and gained emotional tensions caused by his wifes behavior. The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a manner that the defendant-wife: (1) being very irresponsible and very lazy and doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility; (2) her involvement in gambling activities such as mahjong and kuwaho; (3) being an estafador which exhibits her behavioral and personality disorders; (4) her neglect and show no care attitude towards her husband and child; (5) her immature and rigid behavior; (6) her lack of initiative to change and above all, the fact that she is unable to perform her marital obligations as a loving, responsible and caring wife to her family. There are just few reasons to believe that the defendant is suffering from incapacitated mind and such incapacity appears to be incorrigible. xxx The following incidents are the reasons why the couple separated: 1. After the marriage took place, the incapacity of the defendant was manifested on such occasions wherein the plaintiff was the one who prepared his breakfast, because the defendant doesnt want to wake up early; this became the daily routine of the plaintiff before reporting to work; 2. After reporting from work, the defendant was often out gambling, as usual, the plaintiff was the one cooking for supper while the defendant was very busy with her gambling activities and never attended to her husbands needs; 3. There was an occasion wherein their son was lost in the public market because of the irresponsible attitude of the defendant;

4. That the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders, there was an occasion wherein the defendant [would] steal money from the plaintiff and use them for gambling; 5. Defendant, being an estafador had been manifested after their marriage took place, wherein the defendant would come with stories so that people [would] feel pity on her and give her money. Through false pretenses she [would] be able to deceive and take money from neighbors, relatives and other people. 6. That the plaintiff convinced the defendant to stop her unhealthy lifestyle (gambling), but the defendant never listened to his advices; 7. That the plaintiff was the one who [was] taking care of their son, when the plaintiff will leave for work, the defendant [would] entrust their son to their neighbor and go [to] some place. This act reflects the incapacity of the defendant by being an irresponsible mother; 8. That the defendant took their son and left their conjugal home that resulted into the couples separation. Psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders. These disorders are manifested through her grave dependency on gambling and stealing money. She doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty and these disorders appear to be incorrigible. The plaintiff tried to forget and forgive her about the incidents and start a new life again and hoping she would change. Tried to get attention back by showing her with special care, treating her to places for a weekend vacation, cook[ing] her favorite food, but the defendant didnt care to change, she did not prepare meals, wash clothes nor clean up. She neglected her duties and failed to perform the basic obligations as a wife. So in the view of the above-mentioned psychological findings, it is my humble opinion that there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties as a wife and mother to their only son.9 The RTC Ruling The RTC nullified the parties marriage in its decision of January 22, 2001. The trial court saw merit in the testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and concluded that: After a careful perusal of the evidence in the instant case and there being no controverting evidence, this Court is convinced that as held in Santos case, the psychological incapacity of respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations of his marriage with petitioner, which Dr. Gerardo Veloso said can be characterized by (a) gravity because the subject cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary circumstances of life and work; (b) antecedence, because the root cause of the trouble can be traced to the history of the subject before marriage although its overt manifestations appear over after the wedding; and (c) incurability, if treatments required exceed the ordinary means or subject, or involve time and expense beyond the reach of the subject are all obtaining in this case. xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is granted and the marriage between petitioner and defendant is hereby declared null and void pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.10 The CA Decision The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA, in its decision dated November 25, 2004, affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The CA held that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. It explained that Juvys indolence and lack of sense of responsibility, coupled with her acts of gambling and swindling, undermined her capacity to comply with her marital obligations. In addition, the psychologist characterized Juvys condition to be permanent, incurable and existing at the time of the celebration of her marriage with the respondent.11 The petitioner moved to reconsider this Decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution dated May 9, 2005.12 The Petition and the Issues The petitioner claims in the present petition that the totality of the evidence presented by the respondent was insufficient to establish Juvys psychological incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations. The petitioner additionally argues that the respondent failed to show the juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of Juvys condition.13 The respondent took the exact opposite view. The issue boils down to whether there is basis to nullify the respondents marriage to Juvy on the ground that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity that prevented her from complying with her essential marital obligations. The Courts Ruling After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition, and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under the terms of Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36 of the Family Code and Related Jurisprudence Article 36 of the Family Code provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."14 In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,15 the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."16 We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36

of the Family Code in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina, whose salient points are footnoted below.17 These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos.18 In Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson G. Marcos,19 we further clarified that it is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. Thereafter, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages)20 which provided that "the complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged." Our 2009 ruling in Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te21 placed some cloud in the continued applicability of the time-tested Molina22 guidelines. We stated in this case that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it. This is contrary to the intention of the law, since no psychological incapacity case can be considered as completely on "all fours" with another. Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-Ting23 and Jocelyn M. Suazo v. Angelito Suazo,24 however, laid to rest any question regarding the continued applicability of Molina.25 In these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te26 did not abandon Molina.27 Far from abandoning Molina,28 Ngo Te29 simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. We also explained that Suazo30 that Ngo Te31 merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.32 The Present Case In the present case and using the above guidelines, we find the totality of the respondents evidence the testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and the latters psychological report and evaluation insufficient to prove Juvys psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. a. The respondents testimony The respondents testimony merely showed that Juvy: (a) refused to wake up early to prepare breakfast; (b) left their child to the care of their neighbors when she went out of the house; (c) squandered a huge amount of theP15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole the respondents ATM card and attempted to withdraw the money deposited in his account; (e) falsified the respondents signature in order to encash a check; (f) made up false stories in order to borrow money from their relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling. These acts, to our mind, do not per se rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires. We stress that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. In Republic of the Philippines v. Norma Cuison-Melgar, et al.,33 we ruled that it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage had to be shown.34 A cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.

The respondents testimony failed to show that Juvys condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that rendered her unable to discharge her essential marital obligation. In this light, the acts attributed to Juvy only showed indications of immaturity and lack of sense of responsibility, resulting in nothing more than the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations. In Ricardo B. Toring v. Teresita M. Toring,35 we emphasized that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as these may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses. In like manner, Juvys acts of falsifying the respondents signature to encash a check, of stealing the respondents ATM, and of squandering a huge portion of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her, while no doubt reprehensible, cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when the evidence shows that these were mere isolated incidents and not recurring acts. Neither can Juvys penchant for playing mahjong and kuwaho for money, nor her act of soliciting money from relatives on the pretext that her child was sick, warrant a conclusion that she suffered from a mental malady at the time of the celebration of marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital duties and obligations. The respondent, in fact, admitted that Juvy engaged in these behaviors (gambling and what the respondent refers to as "swindling") only two (2) years after their marriage, and after he let her handle his salary and manage their finances. The evidence also shows that Juvy even tried to augment the familys income during the early stages of their marriage by putting up a sari-sari store and by working as a manicurist. b. The Psychologists Report The submitted psychological report hardly helps the respondents cause, as it glaringly failed to establish that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital duties at the material time required by Article 36 of the Family Code. To begin with, the psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her conclusions exclusively from the information given her by the respondent. Expectedly, the respondents description of Juvy would contain a considerable degree of bias; thus, a psychological evaluation based on this onesided description alone can hardly be considered as credible or sufficient. We are of course aware of our pronouncement in Marcos36 that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated need not be examined by the psychologist as a condition precedent to arrive at a conclusion. If the incapacity can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a psychologists examination and report. In this case, however, no such independent evidence has ever been gathered and adduced. To be sure, evidence from independent sources who intimately knew Juvy before and after the celebration of her marriage would have made a lot of difference and could have added weight to the psychologists report. Separately from the lack of the requisite factual basis, the psychologists report simply stressed Juvys negative traits which she considered manifestations of Juvys psychological incapacity (e.g., laziness, immaturity and irresponsibility; her involvement in swindling and gambling activities; and her lack of initiative to change), and declared that "psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders x x x she doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty, and these disorders appear to be incorrigible."37 In the end, the psychologist opined without stating the psychological basis for her conclusion that "there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties as a wife and mother to their only son."38

We find this kind of conclusion and report grossly inadequate. First, we note that the psychologist did not even identify the types of psychological tests which she administered on the respondent and the root cause of Juvys psychological condition. We also stress that the acts alleged to have been committed by Juvy all occurred during the marriage; there was no showing that any mental disorder existed at the inception of the marriage. Second, the report failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvys alleged condition, specifically, why and to what extent the disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated her to comply with her marital duties. Significantly, the report did not even categorically state the particular type of personality disorder found. Finally, the report failed to establish the incurability of Juvys condition. The reports pronouncements that Juvy "lacks the initiative to change" and that her mental incapacity "appears incorrigible"39 are insufficient to prove that her mental condition could not be treated, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond her means to undertake. c. The Psychologists Testimony The psychologists court testimony fared no better in proving the juridical antecedence, gravity or incurability of Juvys alleged psychological defect as she merely reiterated what she wrote in her report i.e., that Juvy was lazy and irresponsible; played mahjong and kuhawo for money; stole money from the respondent; deceived people to borrow cash; and neglected her child without linking these to an underlying psychological cause. Again, these allegations, even if true, all occurred during the marriage. The testimony was totally devoid of any information or insight into Juvys early life and associations, how she acted before and at the time of the marriage, and how the symptoms of a disordered personality developed. Simply put, the psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvys psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the elements of gravity and incurability. In these respects, she merely stated that despite the respondents efforts to show love and affection, Juvy was hesitant to change. From this premise, she jumped to the conclusion that Juvy appeared to be incurable or incorrigible, and would be very hard to cure. These unfounded conclusions cannot be equated with gravity or incurability that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. To be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to change is another. To hark back to what we earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.40
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The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff.41 Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.42 WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated November 25, 2004 and May 9, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 70004. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Nestor Galangs petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Juvy Salazar under Article 36 of the Family Code. Costs against respondent Nestor Galang. SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

Property quieting of title

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 178925 June 1, 2011

MANUEL YBIERNAS, VICENTE YBIERNAS, MARIA CORAZON ANGELES, VIOLETA YBIERNAS, and VALENTIN YBIERNAS, Petitioners, vs. ESTER TANCO-GABALDON, MANILA BAY SPINNING MILLS, INC., and THE SHERIFF OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY, BRANCH 163, Respondents. DECISION NACHURA, J.: This petition for review on certiorari assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions1 dated January 31, 2007 and July 16, 2007. The assailed Resolutions granted respondents motion for new trial of a case for quieting of title and damages, decided in petitioners favor by the trial court in a summary judgment. The facts of the case are, as follows: Estrella Mapa Vda. de Ybiernas (Estrella) owned a parcel of land located in Talisay, Negros Occidental, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-83976. On April 28, 1988, Estrella executed a Deed of Absolute Sale2 over the property in favor of her heirs, Dionisio Ybiernas (Dionisio) and petitioners Manuel Ybiernas, Vicente Ybiernas, and Maria Corazon Angeles. On June 30, 1989, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 47, Bacolod City issued an Order in Cadastral Case No. 10, LRC (G.L.R.O.) Rec. No. 97, Lot 713-C-B, Psd-220027, Talisay Cadastre, directing the registration and annotation of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the title. Thus, on July 5, 1989, the Deed of Absolute Sale and the said RTC Order were annotated on the title, as follows: Entry No. 334150; Order; Dionisio M. Ybiernas; Order issued by the RTC of Negros Occ. to register and annotate the deed of sale on this title without need of presenting the owners duplicate. Date of order-June 30, 1989; Date of prescription-July 5, 1989 at 10:45 a.m.

Entry No. 334151; Sale; Dionisio Ybiernas, et al; Deed of absolute sale of this property for the sum of P650,000.00 in favor of Dionisio Ybiernas, Vicente M. Ybiernas, Manuel M. Ybiernas and Maria Corazon Y. Angeles in undivided equal share to each; doc. no. 437, page 89, book VI, series of 1988 of the not. reg. of Mr. Indalecio P. Arriola of Iloilo City. Date of instrument-April 28, 1988; Date of inscription-July 5, 1989 at 10:45 a.m.3 On October 29, 1991, respondents Ester Tanco-Gabaldon and Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc. filed with the RTC of Pasig City a Complaint4 for sum of money and damages, amounting to P6,000,000.00, against Estrella and three other individuals. The Complaint alleged that the defendants were guilty of fraud when they misrepresented to herein respondents that they own a parcel of land in Quezon City, and that the title over the said property is free from liens and encumbrances.
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Upon respondents motion, the Pasig City RTC, in an Order5 dated November 6, 1991, ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment upon filing of a bond. The sheriff issued the corresponding writ of attachment and levied the subject property.6 On November 13, 1991, the notice of attachment was annotated on TCT No. T-83976 as Entry No. 346816.7 When Estrellas heirs learned about the levy, Dionisio filed, on January 14, 1992, an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim, asserting the transfer of ownership to them.8 Respondents, however, filed an indemnity bond; thus, the sheriff refused to lift the levy. The Pasig City RTC resolved the Complaint for sum of money in favor of respondents, and Estrella, et al. were ordered to pay P6,000,000.00, plus legal interest and damages. Respondents, however, elevated the case all the way up to this Court, questioning the interest rate. This Court eventually denied the appeal in a Minute Resolution dated November 20, 2002, which became final and executory on April 14, 2003.9 In the meantime, Dionisio died and was succeeded by his heirs, petitioners Valentin Ybiernas and Violeta Ybiernas. On November 28, 2001, petitioners filed with the RTC of Bacolod City a Complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages,10 claiming that the levy was invalid because the property is not owned by any of the defendants in the Pasig City RTC case. They averred that the annotation of the RTC Order and the Deed of Absolute Sale on TCT No. T-83976 serves as notice to the whole world that the property is no longer owned by Estrella. In their Answer with Counterclaims,11 respondents contended that (a) the case constituted an interference in the proceeding of the Pasig City RTC, a co-equal court; (b) petitioners should have filed their claims against the indemnity bond filed by respondents; and (c) petitioners were guilty of forum-shopping, considering that the case actually sought a relief similar to the third-party claim. During pre-trial, the parties admitted, among others, the "[e]xistence of the Order dated June 30, 1989 by RTC Branch 47, Bacolod City, in Cad. Case No. 10 concerning the same TCT No. T83976."12 On July 30, 2004, petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment. The RTC initially denied the motion in the Order dated December 23, 2004.13 Upon petitioners motion for reconsideration, the RTC granted the motion for summary judgment in the decision14 dated December 27, 2005. The RTC made the following pronouncement:

A consideration of the issues defined by the parties during the pre-trial x x x shows quite clearly that they are issues that may already be properly resolved now at this stage of the proceedings in this case, as they, other than the amount of damages, are quite apparently pure questions of law, the factual antecedents for these issues having already been admitted by the parties. As to issue No. 1 [whether ownership has been transferred to petitioners], it is a fact wellestablished, as admitted by the parties and shown by the annotation as Entry No. 334151 on said TCT No. T-8[39]76, that the said Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 28, 1988 over the subject property by Estrella Mapa Vda. de Ybiernas in favor of Dionisio Ybiernas, Vicente Ybiernas, Manuel Ybiernas and Maria Corazon Y. Angeles, was validly annotated as such Entry No. 334151, inscribed on July 5, 1989, on said TCT No. T-83976 registered in the name of Estrella M. Ybiernas. Neither the defendants nor anyone else has challenged the validity of the judicial proceedings before RTC, Branch 47, Bacolod City, which issued in Cadastral Case No. 10, the said Order dated June 30, 1989, which directed the registration and annotation of the said Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1988 on said TCT No. T-83976, and which led to the annotation under said Entry No. 334151 on said TCT No. T-83976.15 Thus, the dispositive portion of the December 27, 2005 RTC decision reads: WHEREFORE, except as to the amount of damages, a summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, and as prayed for by the plaintiffs in their complaint: 1. The levy on attachment made by herein defendant Sheriff of RTC, Branch 163, Pasig City on said TCT No. T-83976, issued by the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Negros Occidental, covering the Subject Property, is hereby DECLARED INVALID; and, consequently, 2. Entry No. 346816 on the same TCT No. T-83976 is hereby CANCELLED and DISSOLVED. SO ORDERED.16 Respondents filed a notice of appeal,17 and it was granted by the RTC. While the appeal was pending in the CA, respondents filed a motion for new trial,18 claiming that they have discovered on May 9, 2006 that Cadastral Case No. 10 did not exist and the April 28, 1988 Deed of Sale was simulated. Attached to the motion were the affidavit19 of Atty. Gerely C. Rico, who conducted the research in Bacolod City in behalf of the law office representing respondents, and the following certifications: a. Certification dated 09 May 2006 issued by Ildefonso M. Villanueva, Jr., Clerk of Court VI of the RTC of Bacolod City, stating that: "no cadastral case involving Lot 713-C-1-B, Psd220027, Talisay Cadastre, was filed with this office sometime on 30 June 1989 and raffled to Branch 47 of this court which was then presided by Judge Enrique T. Jocson."20 b. Certification dated 09 May 2006 issued by Atty. Mehafee G. Sideno, Clerk of Court V of the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 47, stating that: "as per records of this court, no Cadastral Case No. 10, LRC, GLRO Rec. 97, Lot No. 713-C-1-B, Psd 220027, filed by Dionisio Ybiernas was filed and docketed in this office."21

c. Certification dated 11 July 2006 issued by Estrella M. Domingo, OIC Archives Division of the National Archives Office, stating that: "no copy is on file with this Office of a DEED OF SALE allegedly executed by and among ESTRELLA MAPA VDA. DE YBIERNAS, DIONISIO YBIERNAS, VICENTE M. YBIERNAS, JR., MANUEL YBIERNAS and MARIA CORAZON ANGELES, ratified on April 28, 1988 before INDALECIO P. ARRIOLA, a notary public for and within Iloilo City and acknowledged as Doc. No. 437; Page No. 89; Book No. VI; Series of 1988."22 Respondents argued that they have satisfied all the requisites for the grant of a new trial based on newly discovered evidence: (1) they discovered the evidence after the trial court rendered its judgment on December 27, 2005; (2) they could not have discovered and produced the evidence during the trial with reasonable diligence; and (3) the evidence was material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and was of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the judgment. On the second requisite, respondents explained that they could not have discovered the evidence with reasonable diligence because they relied in good faith on the veracity of the RTC Order dated June 30, 1989, based on the principle that the issuance of a court order, as an act of a public officer, enjoys the presumption of regularity. On the third requisite, respondents pointed out that, if the nonexistence of Cadastral Case No. 10 and the invalidity of the Order dated June 30, 1989 were allowed to be proven by the newly discovered evidence, the action for quieting of title would probably be dismissed, as respondents levy would be declared superior to petitioners claim.23 In their Comment/Opposition, petitioners argued that (a) the questioned decision was a partial summary judgment which could not be the subject of a motion for new trial; (b) the existence of Cadastral Case No. 10 was an admitted fact which could not be questioned in a motion for new trial; and (c) there was no newly discovered evidence that would warrant a new trial. 24 The CA did not agree with petitioners. Hence, on January 31, 2007, it granted respondents motion for new trial, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the defendants-appellants having satisfied all the elements necessary to justify the filing of a Motion for New Trial which appears to be meritorious and in the higher interest of substantial justice, the said motion is GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, let a new trial of the Quieting of Title case be held and let said case be REMANDED to the Court a quo for said purpose. SO ORDERED.25 At the outset, the CA noted that the RTC summary judgment was a proper subject of an appeal because it was a final adjudication on the merits of the case, having completely disposed of all the issues except as to the amount of damages. The CA concluded that respondents properly availed of a motion for new trial because such remedy could be availed of at any time after the appeal from the lower court had been perfected and before the CA loses jurisdiction over the case. According to the CA, respondents were able to show that they obtained the new evidence only after the trial of the case and after the summary judgment had been rendered. The CA also held that respondents never admitted during the pre-trial the existence of Cadastral Case No. 10; they only admitted the existence of the Order dated June 30, 1989 in Cadastral Case No. 10. On July 16, 2007, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.26

Petitioners subsequently filed this petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issues: A. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE QUESTIONED DECISION OF THE RTC IS A PROPER SUBJECT OF AN APPEAL AND A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL UNDER RULE 53 OF THE RULES OF COURT. B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE THAT A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS AN IMPROPER REMEDY TO QUESTION ADMITTED FACTS. C. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE THAT NO NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WAS ADDUCED TO WARRANT A NEW TRIAL.27 Petitioners posit that no appeal could be taken from the trial courts decision because it did not completely dispose of all the issues in the case; it failed to settle the issue on damages. Petitioners categorize the decision as a partial summary judgment, which in Guevarra, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,28 reiterated in GSIS v. Philippine Village Hotel, Inc.,29 the Court pronounced as not a final and an appealable judgment, hence, interlocutory and clearly an improper subject of an appeal. Petitioners theorize then that the appeal could not have been perfected and the CA could not have acquired jurisdiction over the case, including the motion for new trial. Accordingly, they conclude that the motion for new trial should have been denied outright for being violative of Section 1,30 Rule 53 of the Rules of Court, which provides that the motion for new trial may be filed after the appeal has been perfected. Petitioners argue that, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, trial should proceed instead to settle the issue on damages. Petitioners point out that the case cited by the CA in its Decision, Bell Carpets International Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals,31 is not applicable to the case because, unlike in the present case, the trial courts ruling completely disposed of all the issues in that case. In addition, petitioners insist that respondents already admitted the existence of Cadastral Case No. 10 by its admission of the existence of the Order dated June 30, 1989. They maintain that respondents cannot admit the existence of an order and yet deny the existence of the proceedings from which the order emanates. Respondents judicial admission that the court Order existed necessarily carried with it the admission that the cadastral proceedings where the Order was issued likewise existed. Petitioners aver that respondents are bound by their judicial admission and they cannot be allowed to present evidence to contradict the same. Petitioners next argue that the purported newly discovered pieces of evidence have no probative value. Petitioners say that the certifications are self-serving and inconclusive opinions of court employees, who did not even indicate the period when they occupied their positions and state whether they had the authority to issue such certifications and whether they had personal knowledge of the documents archived during the year that the deed of sale was executed. According to petitioners, the certifications cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the issuance of the Order dated June 30, 1989. At most, the certifications would simply show that the records of Cadastral Case No. 10 could no longer be found in the records; hence, they would have no bearing on the result of the case.

Petitioners also emphasize that respondents failed to meet the burden of proving that the newly discovered pieces of evidence presented comply with the requisites to justify the holding of a new trial. They contend that respondents could have discovered and presented in court the certifications during trial had they exercised reasonable diligence. Petitioners arguments are untenable. The issue of whether the RTC judgment is a final judgment is indeed crucial. If the judgment were not final, it would be an improper subject of an appeal. Hence, no appeal would have been perfected before the CA, and the latter would not have acquired jurisdiction over the entire case, including the motion for new trial. But more importantly, only a final judgment or order, as opposed to an interlocutory order, may be the subject of a motion for new trial. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do in respect thereto, such as an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right, or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground of res judicata or prescription, for instance.32 Just like any other judgment, a summary judgment that satisfies the requirements of a final judgment will be considered as such. A summary judgment is granted to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party, there appears from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of fact are involved, except the amount of damages.33 The RTC judgment in this case fully determined the rights and obligations of the parties relative to the case for quieting of title and left no other issue unresolved, except the amount of damages. Hence, it is a final judgment. In leaving out the determination of the amount of damages, the RTC did not remove its summary judgment from the category of final judgments. In fact, under Section 3,34 Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, a summary judgment may not be rendered on the amount of damages, although such judgment may be rendered on the issue of the right to damages.35 In Jugador v. De Vera,36 the Court distinguished between the determination of the amount of damages and the issue of the right to damages itself in case of a summary judgment. The Court elucidated on this point, thus: [A] summary judgment may be rendered except as to the amount of damages. In other words, such judgment may be entered on the issue relating to the existence of the right to damages. Chief Justice Moran pertinently observes that "if there is any real issue as to the amount of damages, the c[o]urt, after rendering summary judgment, may proceed to assess the amount recoverable."37 It is therefore reasonable to distinguish the present case from GSIS v. Philippine Village Hotel, Inc.38 In that case, the summary judgment specifically stated that "[t]rial on the issu[e] of damages shall resume." Evidently, there remained an unresolved issue on the right to damages. Here, the trial court, in stating that "except as to the amount of damages, a summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants," had, in effect, resolved all issues, including the right to damages in favor of the plaintiffs (petitioners). What remained undetermined was only the amount of damages.

On the issue of whether respondents are proscribed from presenting evidence that would disprove the existence of Cadastral Case No. 10, we likewise sustain the CA. A judicial admission is an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, which dispenses with the need for proof with respect to the matter or fact admitted. It may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.39 During the pre-trial, respondents categorically admitted the existence of the Order dated June 30, 1989 only. The Court cannot extend such admission to the existence of Cadastral Case No. 10, considering the circumstances under which the admission was made. In construing an admission, the court should consider the purpose for which the admission is used and the surrounding circumstances and statements.40 Respondents have constantly insisted that, in making the admission, they relied in good faith on the veracity of the Order which was presented by petitioners. Moreover, they relied on the presumption that the Order has been issued by Judge Enrique T. Jocson in the regular performance of his duties. It would therefore be prejudicial and unfair to respondents if they would be prevented from proving that the Order is in fact spurious by showing that there was no Cadastral Case No. 10 before the RTC, Branch 47, of Bacolod City. Finally, we find that a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is warranted. New trial is a remedy that seeks to "temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice." Thus, the Rules allows the courts to grant a new trial when there are errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused committed during the trial, or when there exists newly discovered evidence.41 The grant or denial of a new trial is, generally speaking, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which cannot be interfered with unless a clear abuse thereof is shown.42
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This Court has repeatedly held that before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown (1) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged newly discovered evidence could have been very well presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the same cannot be considered newly discovered. 43 The only contentious element in the case is whether the evidence could have been discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence. In Custodio v. Sandiganbayan,44 the Court expounded on the due diligence requirement, thus: The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is whether the [proffered] evidence is in fact a "newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence." The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of due diligence has relevance. We have held that in order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is essential is that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it. The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the movant has exercised due diligence depends upon the particular circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it has been

observed that the phrase is often equated with "reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the defendant." In other words, the concept of due diligence has both a time component and a good faith component. The movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely fashion in gathering evidence in support of the motion; he must act reasonably and in good faith as well. Due diligence contemplates that the defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances and the facts known to him.45 As previously stated, respondents relied in good faith on the veracity of the Order dated June 30, 1989 which petitioners presented in court. It was only practical for them to do so, if only to expedite the proceedings. Given this circumstance, we hold that respondents exercised reasonable diligence in obtaining the evidence. The certifications therefore qualify as newly discovered evidence. The question of whether the certifications presented by respondents have any probative value is left to the judgment and discretion of the trial court which will be hearing the case anew. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated January 31, 2007 and July 16, 2007 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

Property reconveyance
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 180683 June 1, 2011

AURORA L. TECSON, SPOUSES JOSE L. TECSON and LEONILA TECSON, Petitioners, vs. MINERVA, MARIA, FRANCISCO, AGUSTINA, JOSE, ROMUALDO, ELIZABETH and VICTOR, all surnamed FAUSTO, and ISABEL VDA. DE FAUSTO, Respondents. DECISION PEREZ, J.: For Review1 are the Decision2 dated 12 December 2006 and Resolution3 dated 2 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70303. In the said decision and resolution, the Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19 of Pagadian City4 thereby allowing the respondents to recover four hundred fifty-seven (457) square meters of land from Transfer

Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4,342 in the name of petitioner Jose Tecson. The decretal portion of the decision of the appellate court reads:5 WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendant-appellee Atty. Jose L. Tecson is entitled only to 507 square meters under Lot 2189-A; he is DIRECTED to reconvey, within thirty (30) days from notice, the excess of 457 square meters thereof to herein plaintiff-appellants in order to restore the latters original area of 508 square meters under Lot 2189-B pursuant to Exhibit "B" (Subdivision Plan Psd-09-06-000110 dated March 25, 1974) and Exhibit "C" (the Agreement of Partition dated April 15, 1974). Failure on his part to reconvey the aforesaid 457 square meters within the period prescribed thereto, the Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 19, Pagadian City, is hereby directed to cause the transfer of the same in favor of herein plaintiff-appellants pursuant to Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Defendant-appellees Aurora L. Tecson and Atty. Jose L. Tecson are directed to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellants the following: a.) P200,000 as moral damages; b.) P10,000 as exemplary damages; and c.) P20,000 as attorneys fees. The antecedents of this case are as follows: Sometime in 1945, Atty. Agustin Fausto (Atty. Fausto) acquired in co-ownership with his sister, Waldetrudes Fausto-Nadela (Waldetrudes), Lot 2189a one thousand fifteen (1,015) square meter parcel of land situated at Jose Zulueta Street corner National Highway in Pagadian City, Zamboanga Del Sur.6 In 1953, Atty. Fausto constructed his house on a portion of the said lot.7 In 1970, following a cadastral proceeding, Atty. Fausto and Waldetrudes were recognized as coowners of Lot 2189. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 7348 covering Lot 2189 was issued in the names of: [I]n undivided shares, Waldetrudes Fausto, married to Leon Nadela; and Agustin Fausto, married to Isabel Pareja, x x x. Not long after, Atty. Fausto and Waldetrudes decided to partition Lot 2189. For this purpose, Waldetrudes hired one Engr. Ernesto D. Aguilar (Engr. Aguilar) to prepare a subdivision plan for the lot. On 25 March 1974, Engr. Aguilar prepared subdivision plan Psd-09-06-000110 (First Plan)9 that divided Lot 2189 into two (2) lots, i.e., Lot 2189-A with an area of 507 square meters, and Lot 2189B with an area of 508 square meters. An illustration of the First Plan shows this division: On 6 April 1974, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands approved the First Plan. On 15 April 1974, Atty. Fausto and Waldetrudes formalized their decision to subdivide Lot 2189 by executing an Agreement of Partition.10 Under this agreement (First Partition Agreement), Waldetrudes was to be given absolute ownership over Lot 2189-A, while Atty. Fausto was to be conferred separate dominion over Lot 2189-B.11 The First Partition Agreement, however, was never registered with the Register of Deeds.

On 14 March 1975, Atty. Fausto died. He was survived by herein respondents, who are his wife12 and children.13 On 7 July 1977, however, Waldetrudes entered into a Contract to Sell14 with herein petitioner Aurora L. Tecson (Aurora). In it, Waldetrudes undertook to sell, among others, her "ideal share" in Lot 2189 to Aurora upon full payment of the purchase price.15 On 28 July 1977, Engr. Aguilar prepared a second subdivision plan (Second Plan)16 for Lot 2189. The Second Plan, designated as Psd-268803, drastically altered the division of Lot 2189 under the First Plan.17 It introduced the following changes: 1. Waldetrudes Lot 2189-A with an area of 507 square meters under the First Plan was now Lot 2189-B with an increased area of 964 square meters.18 2. Atty. Faustos Lot 2189-B with an area of 508 square meters under the First Plan was now Lot 2189-A with a decreased area of 51 square meters.19 An illustration of the Second Plan will further highlight these changes: The Second Plan was approved by the Land Registration Commission on 12 August 1977. On 28 September 1977, a second partition over Lot 2189 (Second Partition Agreement) 20 was executed between the respondents in their capacity as heirs of Atty. Fausto on one hand, and Waldetrudes on the other. Presumably with the Second Plan as a new basis, the agreement named Waldetrudes as the owner of Lot 2189-B while the respondents were allocated Lot 2189-A. On 8 May 1978, Waldetrudes sold Lot 2189-B, with an area of nine hundred sixty-four (964) square meters, to Aurora.21 Meanwhile, it would seem that the Register of Deeds had refused registration of the Second Partition Agreement in view of the fact that several of the respondents, namely Jose, Romualdo, Elizabeth and Victor were still minors.22Hence, a guardianship proceeding was commenced by respondent Isabel Vda. De Fausto (Isabel)the wife of Atty. Faustoto secure her appointment as the legal guardian of her minor children in connection with the Second Partition Agreement. 23 On 28 July 1978, the guardianship court granted Isabels Petition24 and, on 17 January 1980, issued an Order approving the Second Partition Agreement.25 On 19 February 1980, the following events transpired: 1. The Second Partition Agreement was finally registered with the Register of Deeds. As a consequence, OCT No. 734 covering Lot 2189 was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, were issued the following titles: a. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4,335 covering Lot 2189-A in the name of Atty. Fausto; and b. TCT No. T-4,336 for Lot 2189-B in the name of Waldetrudes.26

2. The sale of Lot 2189-B in favor of Aurora was likewise registered with the Register of Deeds.27Accordingly, the newly issued TCT No. T-4,336 was immediately cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-4,33828 in the name of Aurora. 3. Aurora executed a Deed of Absolute Sale,29 conveying Lot 2189-B to her brother, herein petitioner Atty. Jose L. Tecson (Atty. Tecson). 4. On the very same day, the above deed was registered with the Register of Deeds.30 On 20 February 1980, TCT No. T-4,338 was cancelled. In its place, TCT No. T-4,34231 was issued, this time, in the name of Atty. Tecson. Seven (7) years after, or on 28 May 1987, the respondents filed a Complaint32 for the Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Titles, Reconveyance and Damages against Waldetrudes and the petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian City. In essence, the respondents seek the recovery of four hundred fifty-seven (457) square meters of land from TCT No. T-4,342, which they believe was unlawfully taken from the lawful share of their predecessor-in-interest, Atty. Fausto, in Lot 2189.33 The respondents allege that Atty. Fausto and Waldetrudes are, in actual fact, co-owners in equal share of Lot 2189.34 They insist on the First Partition Agreement as the only true, correct and binding division of Lot 2189.35Hence, Atty. Fausto is entitled not merely to the meager fifty-one (51) square meter lot actually given to him under the Second Plan and Second Partition Agreement, but to the five hundred eight (508) square meters of land allotted for him under the original partition. 36 Verily, Waldetrudes could not have sold more than her rightful share of only five hundred seven (507) square meters.37 The respondents, thus, ask for the nullification of the sale of Lot 2189-B to the petitioners, at least with respect to the excess amounting to four hundred fifty-seven (457) square meters.38 In the same vein, the respondents impugn the validity and binding effect of the Second Plan and the ensuing Second Partition Agreement.39 They denounce the said plan and agreement as mere handiworks of respondent Atty. Tecson himself in a fraudulent scheme to get a lions share of Lot 2189.40 More particularly, the respondents claim that: 1. Atty. Tecson was the one who deceived them into signing the Second Partition Agreement.41 The respondents say that they were not involved in the preparation of the Second Partition Agreement.42 It was only respondent Atty. Tecson who presented them with the said agreement and who misleadingly told them that it was required to facilitate the sale of Waldetrudes share.43 The respondents explain that they believed Atty. Tecson because he was their long-time neighbor, a close family friend and, not the least, a respected member of the community being a former governor of the province.44 2. The respondents also point out that the Second Partition Agreement did not specify the exact areas allotted for each component lot, and that they were never furnished with copies of the Second Plan.45 3. The Second Plan, which supposedly supplants the First Plan and divides Lot 2189 into two (2) vastly unequal portions, was prepared without the respondents knowledge or consent.46 For which reason, the Second Plan could not be binding upon them.

4. The guardianship proceeding purportedly initiated in the name of respondent Isabel was actually orchestrated and financed by Atty. Tecson.47 Atty. Tecson was the one who hired Atty. Fausto M. Lingating, his former legal adviser during his term as governor, to handle the guardianship case for and on behalf of Isabel.48 On 20 October 1988, Waldetrudes, who was originally sued by the respondents as a defendant in the RTC, executed an affidavit49 expressing her intent to join the respondents in their cause. In the mentioned affidavit, Waldetrudes confirmed the allegations of the respondents as follows: xxxx 4. That the truth of the matter is that, my brother the late Agustin Fausto and I are co-owners of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 734 of Lot 2189, situated at Gatas District, Pagadian City, containing an area of 1,015 square meters, more or less, in equal share pro indiviso; 5. That sometimes (sic) in 1974 the late Agustin Fausto and myself agreed to terminate our co-ownership and have the area surveyed and the same was approved and designated as PSD-09-06-000110, of which we have executed an agreement of partition on April 15, 1974 apportioning Lot No. 2189-A with an area of 508 square meters in favor of my late brother Agustin Fausto and Lot No. 2189-B with an area of 507 square meters in my favor; 6. That the aforestated documents were not registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds until the death of my brother Agustin Fausto on March 14, 1975, however, the papers or documents involving Lot No. 2189 was kept by me; 7. That due to financial problem especially I am already very old and sickly, I thought of selling my portion which is Lot 2189-B in favor of Jose L. Tecson, however, in the document the vendee appears to be the sister of Jose L. Tecson in the person of Aurora L. Tecson; 8. That I do not know later on how Jose L. Tecson maneuvered to have the parcel of land again surveyed reducing the area of my brother to only 51 square meters, when in truth and in fact the portion of my late brother has an area of 508 square meters; 9. That while it is true that I sold Jose L. Tecson my portion of Lot 2189-B but the area sold is only 507 square meters and there is no intention on my part to sell to Jose L. Tecson more than that area; 10. That several occasion in the past I was made to sign documents by Jose L. Tecson in relation to the portion sold in his favor, trusting him to be closed (sic) to the family, not knowing later on that he maneuvered to change the area of my portion from 507 square meters to 964 square meters encroaching the share of my late brother Atty. Agustin Fausto thereby reducing his area to 51 square meters; 11. That because of the illegal maneuvering which does not reflect to be my true intention in selling my share to Jose L. Tecson, I am informing the Honorable Court that I am joining as party plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2692 in order that the truth will come out and justice will prevail.

On 18 August 1992, the trial court ordered Waldetrudes to be dropped as a party-defendant from the case and, instead, be impleaded therein as a party-plaintiff.50 During the trial, Waldetrudes51 and respondents Romualdo,52 Minerva53 and Isabel54 were able to testify. In its decision dated 8 December 2000, the RTC dismissed the complaint of the respondents.55 The trial court found no merit in the position of the respondents and considered the petitioners to be innocent purchasers for value of Lot 2189-B.56 The dispositive portion of the ruling of the trial court reads:57 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the case, and placing defendants spouses Jose Tecson and Leonila F. Tecson in physical possession of Lot No. 2189-B, with an area of 964 square meters in accordance with the approved subdivision plan on August 12, 1977 of the then Land Registration Commission; and ordering the plaintiffs to pay defendants: a. Moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; b. Attorneys fee in the amount of P15,000.00; c. And the cost of litigation expenses in the amount of P5,000.00. As earlier mentioned, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court on appeal.58 Hence, the present appeal by the petitioners. The primary issue in this appeal is whether the respondents may recover the four hundred fiftyseven (457) square meters of land from TCT No. T-4,342, registered in the name of petitioner Atty. Tecson. The petitioners would like this Court to answer in the negative. The claim of petitioner Atty. Tecson over the entire nine hundred sixty-four (964) square meters of land covered by TCT No. T-4,342 is intricately linked with the validity of the Second Plan and the Second Partition Agreement. As a perusal of the facts reveal, TCT No. T-4,342, along with its precursors TCT Nos. T-4,338 and T-4,336, are but derivates of the division of Lot 2189 fixed by the Second Plan and the Second Partition Agreement. Understandably, the petitioners argue in favor of the validity of the Second Plan and the Second Partition Agreement.59 They deny Atty. Tecsons participation in the preparation of the said instruments.60 The petitioners insist that the Second Plan and the Second Partition Agreement were voluntary and intelligent deeds of Waldetrudes and the respondents themselves.61 The petitioners also claim that the Second Plan and the Second Partition Agreement present a more accurate reflection of the true nature of the co-ownership between Atty. Fausto and Waldetrudes. Contrary to what the respondents profess, Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto were not actually coowners in equal share of Lot 2189.62 In truth, the siblings were not even co-owners at all.63 According to the petitioners, Lot 2189 was originally the conjugal property of Waldetrudes and her late husband, Leon Nadela.64 At the inception, Atty. Fausto was never a co-owner of Lot 2189.65 Suitably, it was only Waldetrudes who initially declared Lot 2189 for taxation purposes per Tax Declaration No. 6521.66

During the cadastral proceedings in 1970, however, Waldetrudes allowed Lot 2189 to be registered in her name and the name of Atty. Fausto as co-owners.67 The petitioners claim that Waldetrudes consented to such a registration only because Atty. Fausto had already constructed his house on a portion of Lot 2189.68 The registered co-ownership between Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto is, therefore, based merely on the siblings actual occupancy of Lot 2189.69 The petitioners point out that the interest of Atty. Fausto in Lot 2189 was only limited to the house he constructed thereonwhich, as it happened, lies evenly on the fifty-one (51) square meter portion eventually assigned to him under the Second Plan and Second Partition Agreement.70 Hence, the Second Plan and the Second Partition Agreement must be sustained as perfectly valid instruments. We are not convinced. Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto are Co-owners in Equal Share After reviewing the arguments and evidence presented in this case, We rule that Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto are, indeed, co-owners of Lot 2189. Moreover, We hold that the siblings have equal shares in the said lot. First. The mother title of Lot 2189, OCT No. 734, states in no unclear terms that Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto were co-owners of the subject lot. The inscription in the original title for Lot 2189 carries more than sufficient weight to prove the existence of a co-ownership between Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto. Second. Other than the bare assertion of the petitioners, there is absolutely no proof on record that Waldetrudes was the sole beneficial owner of Lot 2189. Tax Declaration No. 6521 simply cannot prevail over OCT No. 734 as conclusive evidence of the true ownership of Lot 2189.71 Third. During the cadastral proceeding involving Lot 2189, Waldetrudes herself stated that Atty. Fausto was a co-owner of the subject lot. The transcript taken from the proceeding shows:72 Commissioner: What is your relation with Waldetrudes Fausto who is the claimant of Lot No. 2189 (portion) of a parcel of land located at Pagadian City and more particularly bounded as follows: On the North by Lot No. 2190, on the East by Zulueta St., on the South by National Highway and on the West by Gatas Creek with an area of 1015 sq. meters and a house as a permanent improvement. A: I am the very one sir. Q: How did you acquire the said land? A: I purchase (sic) it from Sofia Vda. Claro in the year 1945 but a copy of the document was lost. xxxx Q: Who is your co-owner of this land? A: My co-owner is my brother Atty. Agustin Fausto. Fourth. There was likewise no evidence behind the petitioners allegation that the registered coownership between Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto was based on their actual occupancy of Lot 2189. On the contrary, OCT No. 734 categorically states that Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto are co-owners

"in undivided share" of Lot 2189. The conspicuous silence of OCT No. 734 as to the definite extent of the respective shares of Atty. Fausto and Waldetrudes in Lot 2189 gives rise to a presumption that they are in equal measure. We are at once reminded of Article 485 of the Civil Code,73 to wit: Article 485. x x x. The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved. Fifth. The equality in terms of share in Lot 2189, was affirmed by Waldetrudes when she testified in open court, to wit:74 DIRECT EXAMINATION ATTY. PERALTA Q: Now considering that you are, you owned that parcel of land jointly with your younger brother Atty. Agustin Fausto, what is the extent of your ownership? A: We have co-equal shares sir. Clearly, the evidence preponderates in favor of the position that Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto were co-owners in equal share of Lot 2189. Second Plan and Second Partition Agreement is Invalid Having settled the existence and extent of the co-ownership between Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto, We next inquire into the validity of the Second Plan and Second Partition Agreement. We find the Second Plan and Second Partition Agreement to be invalid. We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that Atty. Tecson was behind the execution of the Second Partition Agreement.75 It was Atty. Tecson who misled Waldetrudes and the respondents into signing the Second Partition Agreeement without giving them notice of the existence of a Second Plan.76 As a consequence, Waldetrudes and the respondents were misinformed as to the true nature of the Second Partition Agreement. These factual findings are adequately supported by the positive testimonies of respondents Romualdo Fausto,77Minerva Fausto78 and Isabel,79 to wit: ROMUALDOS DIRECT EXAMINATION ATTY. PERALTA: Q: Will you please go over if this is the machine copy of the Deed of partition which was brought to you by Atty. Tecson and requested you to sign the same? A: Yes sir that is the one. xxxx Q: When was that Deed of Partition marked as Exhibit "G" presented to you by Atty. Tecson?

A: Early part of 1977. I was already connected with the Provincial Assessor that was the time I have seen so many Deed of Sale and the area is specified so before I signed I asked Atty. Tecson where is the area and he told me never mind the area it will be surveyed and I did not insist because I trusted him very much. Q: By the time this was presented to you by Atty. Tecson there was no survey of 2189? A: There was no survey. xxxx COURT: This document which you said you were present during the signing of your brothers and sisters but you cannot remember whether you were present for the others where did you sign this document? A: At our house. COURT: Who delivered this document to you[r] house? A: Atty. Tecson. COURT: You want to impress this court that when you affixed your signatures in your house Atty. Tecson was present? A: Yes sir. COURT: After signing what was done to this document? A: We are not aware of that but we just waited for the survey because Atty. Tecson told us that the survey follows later. COURT: Who kept this document? A: My Auntie Waldetrudes Nadela. COURT: It is clear now that this document was signed in your house and it was kept by your Auntie? A: Yes, sir.

xxxx ATTY. PERALTA: Q: When Atty. Tecson went your house to request you to sign how did he tell you? A: He told us just to sign the document and the survey will just follow we just sign the document without the area and he told us that the area will just follow later. Q: When you signed the document with your mother, brothers and sisters Atty. Tecson brought the documents? A: Yes, sir. MINERVA FAUSTOS DIRECT EXAMINATION ATTY. PERALTA: Q: Why, at the time when who brought this deed of partition for signature? A: Jose L. Tecson. Q: You are referring to one of the defendants, Jose L. Tecson? A: Yes, sir. Q: Now, when this was brought by Jose L. Tecson, the defendant Jose L. Tecson, where did he COURT: For a moment. Q: You said that defendant Jose L. Tecson brought that deed of partition. Were you there when defendant Jose L. Tecson brought that deed of partition? A: Yes, your Honor. Q: Where was it brought? A: In the house. COURT: Proceed. ATTY. PERALTA: Q: Who were present in your house when this was brought by defendant Jose L. Tecson? A: Myself, Neneth or Agustin, Romualdo and Jose Fausto. There were four (4) of us when that deed of partition was brought to the house, myself, my sister Agustina, my brothers Romualdo and Jose.

Q: Do you want to convey to the Court that when this was brought to you Francisco Fausto, Victor Fausto and your sister Elizabeth, Maria Fausto were not around when this was brought by Jose L. Tecson for signature in your house? A: Yes, sir. xxxx Q: Why did you sign above the typewritten name of Francisco Fausto knowing that he was not around? A: Because defendant Jose L. Tecson told me to affix the signature of Francisco Fausto because this deed of partition is just to facilitate the transferring (sic) of the title of the land. xxxx Q: Who signed for her, for and behalf of Maria Lilia Fausto? A: I signed myself. Q: Why did you sign for Maria Lilia Fausto? A: Because Jose L. Tecson told me to sign the document in order that the deed of partition could be accomplished. xxxx Q: Now, how about the residence certificates appearing after the name of Agustina Fausto, with her own residence certificate 3976584 to have been issued January 6, 1977, Pagadian City, and the Residence Certificate of Jose Fausto which has the same number 3976584 issued on January 6, 1977, Pagadian City, who placed this residence certificate? A: All of us sir never exhibited our residence certificates. It was the Tecsons who supplied the residence certificate numbers. ISABELS DIRECT EXAMINATION ATTY. PERALTA: Q: Do you remember having signed a Deed of Partition together with some of your children? A: Yes sir[.] I can remember. Q: Who brought that Deed of Partition for signature together with some of your children? A: Governor Tecson. Q: Were you able to sign the Deed of Partition?

A: I signed that Deed of Partition because according to him "just sign this for purposes of subdividing the property." xxxx Q: Do you recall if you have filed guardianship proceeding? A: I have not remembered having filed a guardianship proceeding. Q: Have you heard that there was guardianship proceeding? A: All I can remember about that guardianship proceeding was that when Gov. Tecson let me sign a guardianship because some of my children were not around. Q: Do you want to convey to this court that personally you have not filed guardianship proceeding but it was Governor Tecson who let you sign some documents regarding guardianship? A: It was Governor Tecson who explained to me to sign that guardianship proceeding because according to him it will facilitate and I thought that guardianship was only for purposes of being guardian to my children as a mother. Indeed, the lack of a plausible explanation why a co-owner would gratuitously cede a very substantial portion of his rightful share to another co-owner in partition renders the foregoing testimonies more credible as against the plain general denial of Atty. Tecson. On this point, We find no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals. The established facts have several legal consequences: First. The Second Plan, having been prepared without the knowledge and consent of any of the co-owners of Lot 2189, have no binding effect on them. Second. The Second Partition Agreement is null and void as an absolute simulation,80 albeit induced by a third party. The fraud perpetrated by Atty. Tecson did more than to vitiate the consent of Waldetrudes and the respondents. It must be emphasized that Waldetrudes and the respondents never had any intention of entering into a new partition distinct from the First Partition Agreement. The established facts reveal that Waldetrudes and the respondents assented to the Second Partition Agreement because Atty. Tecson told them that the instrument was merely required to expedite the sale of Waldetrudes share.81 In other words, the deceit employed by Atty. Tecson goes into the very nature of the Second Partition Agreement and not merely to its object or principal condition. Evidently, there is an absence of a genuine intent on the part of the co-owners to be bound under a new partition proposing a new division of Lot 2189. The apparent consent of Waldetrudes and the respondents to the Second Partition Agreement is, in reality, totally wanting. For that reason, the Second Partition Agreement is null and void.
1avvphi1

Third. The Second Partition Agreement being a complete nullity, it cannot be ratified either by the lapse of time or by its approval by the guardianship court.82 Fourth. The First Plan and the First Partition Agreement remain as the valid and binding division of Lot 2189. Hence, pursuant to the First Partition Agreement, Waldetrudes is the

absolute owner of Lot 2189-A with an area of only five hundred seven (507) square meters. Atty. Fausto, on the other hand, has dominion over Lot 2189-B with an area of five hundred eight (508) square meters. Fifth. Inevitably, Waldetrudes can only sell her lawful share of five hundred seven (507) square meters. The sales in favor of Aurora and, subsequently, Atty. Tecson, are thereby null and void insofar as it exceeded the 507 square meter share of Waldetrudes in Lot 2189. Nemo dat quod non habet.83 Atty. Tecson is not an innocent purchaser for value The remaining bar to the recovery by the respondents of the excess area held by Atty. Tecson is the principle of an innocent purchaser for value of land under the Torrens System of Registration. The petitioners claim that they are bona fide purchasers of the entire nine hundred sixty-four (964) square meters of land covered by Lot 2189-Bwith Aurora merely relying on the strength of TCT No. T-4,336 in the name of Waldetrudes, while Atty. Tecson placing confidence in TCT No. T-4,338 in the name of Aurora. Both TCT Nos. T-4,336 and T-4,338 define the area of Lot 2189-B as nine hundred sixty-four (964) square meters.84 The petitioners allege that at the time they made their respective purchase, they did not know of the existing partition of Lot 2189 per the First Plan and the First Partition Agreement.85 We disagree. The proven facts indicate that Atty. Tecson knew or, at the very least, should have known that Atty. Fausto and Waldetrudes were co-owners in equal share of Lot 2189. We must be reminded of the following circumstances: 1. Atty. Tecson was a long-time friend and neighbor of the Faustos.86 Atty. Tecson himself testified that he considered Atty. Fausto as a good friend and even admitted that he would sometimes visit the latter in his house to play mahjong.87 By this, Atty. Tecson knew that Atty. Fausto has an actual interest in Lot 2189. 2. Atty. Tecson was the one who presented the Second Partition Agreement to Waldetrudes and the respondents;88 3. Waldetrudes and the respondents were not involved in the preparation of the Second Partition Agreement and, at the time they signed the said agreement, had no knowledge of the existence of the Second Plan;89 and 4. The Second Partition Agreement failed to state the specific areas allotted for each component of Lot 2189 and made no mention of the division proposed by the Second Plan.90 Being the one behind the execution of the Second Partition Agreement, there is no doubt that Atty. Tecson knew that Lot 2189 was owned in common by Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto. This, taken together with the instruments unusual silence as to the definite area allotted for each component lot and the Second Plan, reveals a deliberate attempt on the part of Atty. Tecson to conceal from Waldetrudes and the respondents the unequal division of Lot 2189. The necessity to conceal the disproportionate division of Lot 2189 can only be explained by Atty. Tecsons prior knowledge that such a partition is inherently defective for being contrary to the actual sharing between Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto. Atty. Tecson is clearly in bad faith.

Verily, Atty. Tecson cannot be considered as an innocent purchaser of the excess area of Lot 2189B. Based on the facts and circumstances prevailing in this case, Atty. Tecson may be charged with actual notice of the defect plaguing the Second Partition Agreement. The respondents may, therefore, recover. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the appealed Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 70303 dated 12 December 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

Pfr: abuse of authority in issuing divorce

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION A.M. No. SCC-11-16-P June 1, 2011 (formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I No. 10-33-SCC [P] SULTAN PANDAGARANAO A. ILUPA, Complainant, vs. MACALINOG S. ABDULLAH, Clerk of Court II, Shari'a Circuit Court, Marawi City, Respondent. RESOLUTION BRION, J.: The present administrative matter stemmed from the November 29, 2009 letter-complaint1 of Sultan Pandagaranao A. Ilupa (complainant) charging Clerk of Court II Macalinog S. Abdullah (respondent) of the Sharia Circuit Court (SCC) in Marawi City with abuse of authority in relation with the issuance of a certificate of divorce. The Facts The facts are summarized from the report of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dated July 9, 2010.2 The charge

The complainant alleges in support of the charge that the respondent exhibited ignorance of his duties as clerk of court when he issued a certificate of divorce, (OCRG Form No. 102) relying mainly on an illegal "Kapasadan" or Agreement. He claims that the agreement was executed under duress and intimidation; the certificate of divorce itself is defective and unreliable as there were erroneous entries in the document and unfilled blanks. He claims that the respondent took away his beautiful wife by force or had a personal interest in her. The complainant believes that the respondent should not have issued the divorce certificate because divorce is not recognized in the country and the "Kapasadan" or separation agreement had already been revoked by Philippine civil law. In a supplemental letter,3 the complainant alleges that he signed the "Kapasadan" because the Principal of the Mindanao State University, a certain Mackno, and Police Officer Hadji Amin threatened to kill him. For this reason, he wrote a letter to the SCC judge of Marawi City, assailing the agreement; he even personally handed a copy of the letter to the respondent who took no action on the matter. To save his marriage with Nella Rocaya Mikunug originally solemnized on May 19, 1959, based on the Maranao culture, and later renewed through a civil wedding before a Marawi City judge the complainant filed a petition for restitution of marital rights4 with the SCC, Marawi City. To his dismay, the judge dismissed the petition without any notice or summons to him. He suspects that the dismissal was due to the respondents "hukos-pukos" or manipulation. The respondents comment In his comment dated March 19, 2010,5 the respondent prays that the complaint be denied for lack of merit. He mainly argues that his issuance of a certificate of divorce is not illegal, capricious or whimsical as he acted within the bounds of his authority. He explains that as court registrar, it is his ministerial duty to accept and register marriage contracts, conversions to Islam and divorce certificates. When he performs this duty, he assumes no responsibility with respect to the entries made by the applicants or owners of the documents to be registered. The respondent argues that contrary to the complainants claim, there was a divorce agreement, in the Maranao dialect, attached to the divorce certificate. The complainant even signed both pages of the agreement. Although the agreement was not labeled as such, its essence indicates that the couple agreed to have a divorce and it was so understood also by their children and the witnesses who signed the agreement. The respondent denies that he took the complainants wife by force or that he was interested in her; he claims that no evidence was ever adduced to prove these allegations. With the divorce agreement, Mrs. Ilupa applied for a certificate of divorce which he issued under Divorce Registry No. 2009-027 on November 5, 2009. He points out that in issuing the certificate of divorce, he observed the same procedure applied to all applicants or registrants. On the complainants claim that there is no divorce in the Philippines, the respondent points out that this is true only as far as the civil law is concerned, but not under the Muslim Law which recognizes divorce. The civil marriage they subsequently entered into was just an affirmation of their marriage vows under the Muslim Law. Also, the courts dismissal of the complainants petition for restitution of marital rights6 affirmed the divorce between the Ilupa couple. The administrative investigation

In compliance with the Courts Resolution dated August 25, 2010,7 Executive Judge Gamor B. Disalo of the RTC, 12th Judicial Region, Marawi City, investigated the complaint, and submitted a Report and Recommendation dated January 19, 2010.8 It appears from the report that Judge Disalo heard the complaint three times, i.e., on December 15, 22 and 29, 2010. The respondent appeared at the hearing on December 15, 2010 and reiterated the arguments he earlier raised in his comment. He failed to appear at the subsequent hearings. The complainants non-cooperation prompted Judge Disalo to close the investigation and to conclude, based on the facts gathered by the OCA and on the cited applicable laws, that sufficient grounds existed to dismiss the complaint. The Courts Ruling We agree with the OCA and Judge Disalo that the complaint is devoid of merit. The issuance of a certificate of divorce is within the respondents duties, as defined by law. Articles 81 and 83 of the Muslim Code of the Philippines provide: Article 81. District Registrar. - The Clerk of Court of the Sharia District Court shall, in addition to his regular functions, act as District Registrar of Muslim Marriages, Divorces, Revocations of Divorces, and Conversions within the territorial jurisdiction of said court. The Clerk of Court of the Sharia Circuit Court shall act as Circuit Registrar of Muslim Marriages, Divorces, Revocations of Divorces, and Conversations within his jurisdiction. Article 83. Duties of Circuit Registrar. - Every Circuit Registrar shall: a) File every certificate of marriage (which shall specify the nature and amount of the dower agreed upon), divorce or revocation of divorce and conversion and such other documents presented to him for registration; b) Compile said certificates monthly, prepare and send any information required of him by the District Registrar; c) Register conversions involving Islam; d) Issue certified transcripts or copies of any certificate or document registered upon payment of the required fees[.] We quote with approval the following excerpt from the OCAs Report: Evidently, respondent Clerk of Court merely performed his ministerial duty in accordance with the foregoing provisions. The alleged erroneous entries on the Certificate of Divorce cannot be attributed to respondent Clerk of Court considering that it is only his duty to receive, file and register the certificate of divorce presented to him for registration. Further, even if there were indeed erroneous entries on the certificate of divorce, such errors cannot be corrected nor cancelled through [his] administrative complaint. Anent the legality of the divorce of the complainant and Dr. Nella Rocaya Mikunug-Ilupa, this Office is bereft of any authority to rule on the matter. The issue is judicial in nature which cannot be assailed through this administrative proceeding.

Finally, on the allegation that the respondent Clerk of Court manipulated the dismissal of his petition for restitution of marital rights, we find the same unsubstantiated. Aside from complainants bare allegation, there was no substantial evidence presented to prove the charge. It is a settled rule in administrative proceedings that the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in his or her complaint with substantial evidence. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail (Rafael Rondina, et al. v. Associate Justice Eloy Bello, Jr., A.M. No. CA-5-43, 8 July 2005).
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RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted, for the consideration of the Honorable Court, is the recommendation that the administrative case against Macalinog S. Abdullah, Clerk of Court II, Sharia Circuit Court, Marawi City, be DISMISSED for lack of merit.9 We find this evaluation and recommendation fully in order, and accordingly approve the Report. Thus, the complaint should be dismissed for lack of merit. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative matter against Macalinog S. Abdullah, Clerk of Court II, Sharia Circuit Court, Marawi City, for abuse of authority is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice WE CONCUR: