Katya Tolstaya

SUMMARY: Kaleidoscope: F.M. Dostoevsky and the Early Dialectical Theology

Brill, Brill: Leiden, Boston 2013 Web site: http://www.brill.com/kaleidoscope-fm-dostoevsky-and-early-dialectical-theology

To take one glass piece from a kaleidoscope is to disrupt the constellation. Similarly, it is difficult to make a summary of a book which is written in a kaleidoscopic way. In this book, I essentially try to show how faith is individual, namely, pertaining to a person in the context of his life. No person can have a comprehensive view of this context in all of its aspects. This is the main thought behind the title Kaleidoscope. The coherence between the glass pieces in a turning kaleidoscope cannot be fixed; if one stops its movement, one sees a static pattern. One may describe or analyse this pattern, but the original coherence is in the simultaneous movement of all glass pieces. This methodological kaleidoscopic approach is exemplary applied to Dostoevsky, Barth and Thurneysen. In a broader sense the research focuses on the problem of comprehending the religious dimension in (literary) texts and on the concept of (religious) dialogue. Current hermeneutical theories fail to methodically reflect on the status of interpretation in relation to the text, and on the faith of its author in particular. The aim, then, is to redefine hermeneutics as an ethics, in which consideration of the author as a biographical person prevails over interpretation of the text. One of the main principles of these hermeneutics should be the awareness that an interpreter can never fully understand (the faith of) the author as a biographical person. Proceeding from this principle, textual interpretation becomes a question of understanding that, based on the authors writings, one can not determine his faith; with this in mind, one has to compose an image of his religious convictions as a necessity for appropriately judging the religious dimension in his writings. In this respect, a strict distinction should be made between ego documents (letters, for example) and literary works, and the status of diverse genres for interpretation should be reflected. Simultaneously, it concretely points out the limits and shortcomings of interpretation as regards the religious dimension, also by showing how modern interpretations (both in theory and practice), not consistently reflecting on the distinction between author and text, confuse the relevant levels and priorities, leading to readings in which the approach is not properly accounted for. In a broader sense, the proposed hermeneutical method would be relevant to all the humanities, as it concerns the emphasis on an ethically-critically reflected foundation of scientific understanding. In particular, given the meeting of Western and Eastern modes of thought in this book (Barth/Thurneysen and Dostoevsky), the approach may serve as a case study in relating differing views on the same (Christian) heritage on a methodological basis. Thus, it is part of an endeavour to develop a hermeneutics which incites a new form of dialogue, to be applied in ecumenical discussion and mutual understanding. In three independent and simultaneously interwoven parts, I approach the theme Dostoevsky and Early Dialectical Theology proceeding from this idea. In Part I, the method is expounded, referring to the thought of M.M. Bakhtin. The most important methodological insight concerns my notion of the biographical person, which will prove to be of great importance for a correct understanding of individual faith. In Part II, the religious conceptions and convictions of F.M. Dostoevsky are sketched on the basis of his ego documents. This serves also to indicate the limits of our insight into the biographical person Dostoev4

sky and his belief. Part III is a kind of reverse of this approach, in which the reception of Dostoevsky in early dialectical theology is discussed, in a reading of E. Thurneysens Dostojewski (1921) and K. Barths Rmerbrief II (1922). In line with the methodological observations from Part I and the observations on the content of Dostoevskys religious conceptions in Part II, a theological critique is offered of their approach of the writer, a critique which generally applies to their theological approach at this time. Ever since his first literary publication, Dostoevskys works have been interpreted in strongly varying and often contradictory ways. In this respect, one may note two fundamental problems in the reception of the author, which already occur in early dialectical theology, and are still widespread in secondary literature. The first problem concerns the identification of Dostoevsky with his characters; the second concerns the interpretation of Dostoevsky according to a more or less fixed view on a tradition, or to a mode of thought (for example, Russian orthodoxy or German idealism, or the early dialectical theology). In both cases, no justice is done to the writer and his oeuvre. I develop as a starting point in part I a method for approaching the personal faith of the characters in Dostoevskys novels, as well as that of the writer himself. In my search, I refer to M.M. Bakhtins study on Dostoevsky, Problems of Dostoevskys Art (1929; revised edition 1963, Problems of Dostoevskys Poetics), and to some of his later writings. Bound by the state-proclaimed atheism in the Soviet Union, Bakhtin was forced to limit himself to the discourse of literary theory. I render his thoughts explicit for the religious sphere, which he himself later called the most important thing in Dostoevsky. In Dostoevskys novels, Bakhtin saw a new genre, polyphony. The polyphony of voices within a novel means that each character has its own voice, independent of the narrator, the author, and the reader. In the polyphonic novel, there is no dominant authorial instance, that is, no omniscient narrator or author who conveys a definite judgment about any character. Even the characters among themselves do not speak any final word. For this reason, thus Bakhtin, the dialogue the most poignant characteristic of the polyphonic novel is never concluded. This openness is one of the aspects of what I call the kaleidoscopic in Dostoevskys novels; it characterizes both their form and their content. (The specific form is one reason for the numerous divergent interpretations of the novels.) For the religious sphere, this means that each character has its own individual belief. Dostoevsky is able to depict the personal dimension of faith, without the readers being able to determine its essence. In other words, the reader may try to define the faith of a character and describe it, but as soon as he does this, the human essence and the core of this faith slip away. Here, with Dostoevskys expression man in man, we may also point to the kaleidoscopical and dialogical character of faith. Important is the question of the relation between each character and God. There is a kind of twofold relation: paradoxically, although the hero in the novel is fictional, he stands in an open relation to the real God. This may also be described as follows. Man in man constitutes the religious core of a character. In a formal respect, this core is connected with the author as the creator of the fictional world. The hero has certain religious conceptions, which the author Dostoevsky has bestowed him with, and which originally stem from his world of thought. This elusiveness of the 5

relation between the character and God is analogous to that of the relationship of real men (like Dostoevsky himself) to God. The relation of a character to God cannot be fixed by deducing some notion of God from his conceptions, nor from the conceptions of the author Dostoevsky. But also, the religiosity of the character never coincides with that of his creator, even if the creator lets the character repeat his own thoughts literally. The religious truth of the character consists in his relation to God. In this respect, the method developed serves to specify the difference between the characters and the author. In order to do justice to the individual religiosity of the character and to that of the author, the researcher has to determine his position methodologically. In short, one has to look first for what Bakhtin has called the monologic substance behind the polyphony. This monologic substance helps to sketch content and themes of Dostoevskys own faith, and to delimit it from that of the characters. In my own imagery: a researcher must first know which glass pieces Dostoevskys own religious kaleidoscope contained, before he could determine which glass pieces the author could lend to his characters. By taking Bakhtins method one step further, I try to point to that specific dimension of faith which man can never grasp. In my approach, therefore, besides the author, the narrator, and the characters, I distinguish the biographical person, who can never be completely understood. This distinction has several, interconnected reasons. First, a religious reason: to apply the above view on individual truth in relation to God and to man in man methodologically. Second, looking at Dostoevsky, this means that one cannot determine the development of his individual faith. The concept of the biographical person is of crucial importance for a correct understanding of faith with regard to the fragmentary character of a text. Faith belongs to the coherence of the life of the biographical person: a diary entry or a letter can at best provide an image of his faith, but never contain its core. This coherence is inaccessible to the reader, and neither is he allowed to presume it in the text, nor should he disregard it because he has only a limited view of it. Here, too, the method serves to outline a relationship, in this case that between the reader and the text. This more hermeneutical reason is mainly of importance in part II. Third, the distinction leads to an entirely different status for any scientific or theological interpretation and approach of the writer. This reason is emphasized in part III. In the entire thesis, the awareness of the inaccessibility of the biographical person functions as a methodological foundation in order to determine my attitude towards the relevant texts of Dostoevsky, Barth and Thurneysen, and towards the secondary literature. Pointing to the static image of each analysis with regard to the biographical person (or to a character) and his belief, I use the image of the kaleidoscope in permanent motion. This view of the text, the author, and the biographical person underlies the method followed, to strictly distinguish between the novels and the ego documents. Part II is dedicated to Dostoevskys religious conceptions in the ego documents, complemented with memories of the writer. By ego documents I mean all of Dostoevskys texts which may be assumed to represent his personal (religious) position. In the introductory chapter 3 I provide a justification for the various ego documentary genres in relation to a) 6

dogmatic articles expressed in them and b) the existential faith of the biographical person. In this context, I refer to the what and the how of faith. In the literature on Dostoevsky, the distinction between the ego documents and the literary oeuvre has never been reflected methodologically. As a consequence, the two fundamental problems mentioned above persist up to this day in many variations. I start my examination of Dostoevskys faith in chapter 4 with the question of periodization. Generally it is assumed that there are four periods in the development of Dostoevskys faith. The first period would cover his convictions up to 1849; it is often claimed that during this period, he inclined toward atheism. I show that this claim cannot be established from the few relevant ego documents. The second period would cover the change in his convictions during the following fifteen years. For this period, too, there are relatively few ego documentary testimonies. In the third period, one might discern the ripening of his religious conceptions during the years 1864-1870, followed by the final period of stable belief, up to his death in 1881. In the chapters 5 to 7 it is argued that, from a systematictheological perspective, the ego documents show certain constants in Dostoevskys faith, at least from 1864 onward. Still, the ambiguities in Dostoevskys religious statements give rise to the question on the function of doubt in the existential religious experience, and on the reflection of this experience in the ego documents. Chapter 5 and 6 focus on a crucial diary entry dated 16th of April 1864. This entry was written one day after the death of Dostoevskys first wife. He reflects on a number of his most deeply held religious conceptions. The existential status of this most elaborate religious ego document permits a more direct elucidation of the methodological insights with regard to the biographical person and his texts. Considering the secondary literature on this fragment, I point out the scientific-ethical problem of approaching any ego document. This is a general problem and not limited to textual interpretation: I illustrate it with an example from the field of painting. Against this background, the fragment can be discussed. The discussion deals mainly with three interwoven aspects. First, on the level of content, the fragment contains the religious themes which also occupy Dostoevsky in other ego documents. The two most important religious convictions find their relatively clearest expression in this fragment: the faith in Christ as God-man, in particular His commandment to love ones neighbour, and the immortality of the soul. All other themes and ideas Dostoevsky mentions are connected with these constants. Second, the topics are related to the form in which they are expressed. That is, Dostoevskys existential doubt is also mirrored in the philosophical form of the fragment. In the paragraphs four and five, for example, he sets forth his thoughts as an argumentation, which suites the schemes of formal logic. The logical errors in his reasoning indicate the tension between faith and doubt, faith always maintaining primacy. This proves to be typical of a number of other ego documents discussed in chapter 7. In spite of his doubt, Dostoevsky tries to substantiate his faith by reflecting on the articles of faith that are important to him, and seems to convince himself of the truth of these articles, without noticing the logical errors in his own reasoning. The philosophical form of the fragment and its substance, especially the emphasis on the question of the immortality of the soul and of the commandment to love ones 7

neighbour, may be compared with the philosophy of Kant, as J.P. Scanlan does in his book Dostoevsky the Thinker (2002). In chapter 6, I argue that such a comparison remains inadequate as long as the implications of the existential moment of faith (as mirrored in the text) and of the inaccessibility of the biographical person are neglected. Both formally and substantially, for Dostoevsky faith is essential, for Kant reason. In both respects, Dostoevskys emphasis on love of ones neighbour as the only ethical commandment, based on his faith in Christ as God incarnate, differs from Kants philosophically formulated moral imperative. Similarly, his existential hope of eternal life in the hereafter has a completely different meaning than the purely rational postulate of immortality in Kants thought. I show this briefly by discussing passages from the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781) and the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788), and from a number of his later works, such as the Die Metaphysik der Sitten (1797). The analysis of Dostoevskys diary entry provides the basis for examining the other ego documents in chapter 7. From the passages concerning Dostoevskys notion of God, his vision on apocalypticism, on Christology, soteriology and history, no systematic doctrine can be deduced. However, traits of an Orthodox spirituality can be discerned. A few brief outlines of a number of Orthodox doctrines (divine energies, theosis) indicate the underlying world-view in Dostoevskys ego documents, and simultaneously disclose certain contradictions and lacunae in his statements, without forcing them into a clearly structured system. An important aspect of Dostoevskys spirituality is his striving for religious unity, whilst maintaining the individual character of faith. Essentially, it is not about theological reflection on the relation between man and God, but about the way of perceiving, in which man and God are never viewed separately from each other. Given this notion of spirituality, one should look at the general attitude that the ego documents reveal, rather than to trace specific Western or Orthodox influences in Dostoevskys conception of God and Christ. To this end, Palamas teaching of the infusion of creation with divine energies provides a useful general background. Comparisons with Khomiakov and Feodorov outline and differentiate the image of Dostoevskys Orthodox conception of unity, which is shown not to be ecclesiological. The diverse discussions of the ego documents are intended to establish that an overall description of what Dostoevsky believed does not provide more than an image, and that hence one cannot really say how he believed. From the material analysed, it appears that doubt repeatedly had a purifying function in the writers thought. Doubt never leads him to disbelief, but lets him substantiate the most important articles of faith (Christ as Saviour, the immortality of the soul, and the idea of loving ones neighbour). In this conclusion, again the distinction between the author and the biographical person is crucial, as it qualifies the terminology used in my textual analysis (for example the terms doubt, faith or atheism), and restricts the findings to the texts, leaving the biographical person open. In this respect, the method intends to stress the individuality rather than confessionality of faith as a basis for reflection. What one may call Orthodox or Western traits is methodologically subordinate to the elusiveness of his lived faith. Seen this way, this conception of hermeneutics also applies to ecumenical dialogue.

Dostoevskys conviction that faith and loving ones neighbour can only be truly lived among men, finds expression in the mutual relations between all characters in the novels, and in the individual relationship of each character to God. This aspect is prominent in part III, in which it is examined how Barth and Thurneysen have incorporated Dostoevsky into their own theological view. I contrast the writers perception of faith with that in early dialectical theology. While Dostoevsky always considers man and God together, and therefore mainly focuses on the individual and his context, Barth and Thurneysen in their theology of the early twenties view God and man as strictly distinct, and because of their focus on God, they pay no attention to the individual person. The textual discussions reveal a) that they have misconceived Dostoevskys religious views and anthropology; b) that this misconception is indicative of the way in which they treated other writers and thinkers at this stage of their theology; c) that their approach rests on an inconsistent application of their concept of God as the wholly other (ganz Andere) and on an abstract anthropology. Contrasting these with Dostoevskys beliefs helps to articulate these aspects. Prior to the treatment of the theological content, chapter 9 starts with a survey of the international research on the topic Dostoevsky and Early Dialectical Theology. Most of the literature limits itself to a description of Barths and Thurneysens perception of the writer; there is hardly any independent discussion of Dostoevsky. Subsequently there is a brief historical sketch of Dostoevsky reception in the German-speaking countries, in order to see the interest of Barth and Thurneysen in a wider cultural and historical context. Chapter 10 is devoted to Dostoevsky in Barths and Thurneysens correspondence during the years 1919-1921. Unpublished archive materials from the Karl Barth-Archiv and from the University Library in Basel provide an opportunity to consider the relation between the text and the biographical person from a different kaleidoscopic turn. In chapter 12 also, use is made of archival documents, namely of the comments that Thurneysen wrote on the manuscript and on the proofs of Rmerbrief II. In his book, Barth incorporated many of Thurneysens proposals almost verbally, six of them on Dostoevsky. These documents reveal the intensity of their cooperation, as well as subtle individual and theological differences. While the analysis of the ego documents in part II also served to indicate the limits of our insight into Dostoevsky and his faith, the contents of the final two chapters are a kind of counterpart to this approach. I show the theological and hermeneutical implications of Barths and Thurneysens interpretation of Dostoevsky: in their anthropology they fail to consider the biographical person, i.e. the faith of the individual in the reality of his dialogical context. This also implies a contradiction to the foremost reason for their interest in Dostoevsky. Mans religious crisis, which in Dostoevskys world often implies atheism, attracted Barth and Thurneysen most in his works. But whereas the writer always describes the religious crisis as strictly personal, Barth and Thurneysen treat crisis more as an epistemological category. In their theology, faith threatens to become a concept severed from the individual. One can speak of the faith of a person only if one is prepared to take

him seriously in his full individuality. Implicitly, this is the quintessence of Dostoevskys anthropology. I examine the difference in religious perception on two distinct levels: in chapter 11 with regard to Thurneysens interpretation of the novels in his Dostojewski, in chapter 12 with regard to the allusions to the writer and to his characters in Barths Rmerbrief II. Despite the difference in tone and genre, the underlying theology and hermeneutics in both works are the same. By comparing passages from the novels with Thurneysens interpretation, I show how he fails to understand the characters in their context, and how he subsumes them under the concept of an unknown God or reduces them to isolated themes (such as Eros and eritus sicut Deus). In particular, Thurneysen does not take the connection between all events, statements and details into account, whereas this is an essential element in the novels. His suggestion that Dostoevsky conceived his works from the perspective of a wholly transcendent God [cf. Dostojewski, 37, 45], signals a telling confusion of theology, epistemology and hermeneutics in early dialectical theology. This confusion is even stronger in Barths work; he uses Dostoevsky solely to illustrate his own theological approach. In chapter 12, the fundamental problem of his theology is expounded on the methodological level, by showing how he reads Dostoevsky according to his own theological ideas. On the level of content, the chapter serves as a conclusion to the thesis. The most important observation here is that there exists an unsolvable contradiction between the theological premise of Gods transcendence (God as the unknown, the wholly other), stating that man cannot bridge the gap between himself and God, and the vision from the standpoint of God. This standpoint of God (or the vision from God) is in fact a radical expression of an epistemological conception of God that dominates Barths work. In the light of the critique of Barths and Thurneysens theology and anthropology as conceptual and abstract, the two abovementioned aspects of Dostoevskys novels prove to be of particular importance: the kaleidoscopic connection of everything with everything, and their specific reflection of the doctrine of the infusion of creation with divine energies (as echos of the Palamitic synthesis). In this sense, my critique concerns the general attitude of Barth and Thurneysen, not only their interpretation of Dostoevsky. By emphasizing the importance of the entire approach, I try to make my methodological insights fruitful for theology. This goes not in the least for a broader conception of dialogue, aimed to be applied not only in textual hermeneutics, but equally in political discussion, ecclesial/ecumenical dialogue etc.

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