Industrial Disasters and Dangerous Risk Assessment: Comparing the Kingston and Ajka Accidents

Llowell Williams In the world as it is today many of the wealthiest nations have established their position thanks to their exploitation of natural resources and the use of mass industry. As these practices continue there are undesirable consequences that have been revealed through various events worldwide. The most overt expression of these consequences often come in the form of ecological disasters or toxic spill accidents. As such, public awareness of these events have lead to an increased interest in preventing future disasters. In recent years, however, worldwide economic downturn has lead to less support for these concerns by corporations and industries. The aim of this paper will be to perform two case studies of industry-related disasters in recent times. The case studies will be compared and contrasted with the goal to reveal not only what circumstances lead to these events but also the ways differential situations may lead to different social and political reactions and responses during and after the fact. Much of this analysis will refer to works done in the areas of hazard and disaster awareness and public perceptions of risk. The events examined for this paper's two case studies are: 1.) the 2008 Tennessee Valley Authority Kingston Fossil Plant coal fly ash slurry spill near Kingston, Tennessee and 2.) the 2010 Ajka alumina sludge spill in Hungary. Case Study: 2008 Kingston coal fly ash spill At 1 am December 22, 2008 large amounts of coal fly ash slurry was released from a coal-fired power plant located in eastern Tennessee near the town of Kingston. The incident at the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) operated plant was the largest fly ash release in United States history with over 1.1 billion gallons of toxic slurry washing down into nearby waterways and rural homesteads. It has been compared to the infamous Exxon Valdez oil spill, with some stating the Kingston spill exceeds it by more than 30 fold. The Kingston Fossil Plant was built at the junction of the Emory River and the Clinch River in Tennessee, forty miles west of Knoxville in the 1950s primarily to provide power to nearby nuclear power installations in Oak Ridge. Since the plant's foundation it has been producing energy through coal combustion which creates a byproduct known as fly ash slurry. Fly ash results from the burning of finely ground coal. For many years fly ash was simply released into the atmosphere, but legislation in more recent decades have required fly ash capturing measures for coal-burning plants. Fly ash has also been used, when dried, in mixtures for concrete. As at the Kingston Fossil Plant, fly ash is captured with water. This mixture creates a muddy slurry substance, which is usually collected into artificial ponds near the plant. There the slurry resides in an open air retaining pond until it is dried and can either be stored underground or used in concrete mixtures. In the case of the 2008 spill at the Kingston Fossil Plant, an earthen dike being used to hold a 84 acre fly ash slurry pond ruptured releasing the toxic contents into the nearby areas. After the failure of the dike, the coal fly ash slurry flooded into and across the nearby Clinch River and Emory River, both tributaries to the Tennessee River. Initial estimates by the

Tennessee Valley Authority of the amount of slurry released was at almost 1.7 million cubic yards. This changed as the TVA's estimation increased to 5.4 million cubic yards (over a billion gallons) of slurry released. It is perhaps important to point out that before these facts were made public the TVA had the retaining pond's capacity reported at only 2.6 million cubic yards total. When asked by the New York Times why there was such discrepancy, a spokesperson for the TVA claimed that the original capacity statement was only an estimate. Many were left unsatisfied by this answer. Although no one was reported as being physically injured, four to six feet of escaped fly ash slurry managed to spread across approximately 300 to 400 acres including the local community of Harriman. A dozen homes were covered in the slurry with several being rendered uninhabitable, resulting in the evacuation of 22 inhabitants. In the week that followed the spill, information came slowly with details disseminated initially by the TVA itself and later by the Environmental Protection Agency. Statements about the possible toxicity of local drinking water were not made until Friday when a TVA spokesperson told the media that tests of local water showed barely detectable levels of mercury and arsenic but that elevated levels of lead and thallium (known to cause birth defects and nervous system disorders, among other ailments) were found. However, the spokesperson said that there should be no concern for local residents because water treatment processes would filter these toxic metals out. TVA stated several times that there was no official danger posed by the fly ash slurry in general, with one TVA spokesperson claiming that most of that [fly ash slurry] is inert. It does have some metals within it, but it's not toxic or anything. In contrast, the Tennessee Department of Health had stated that fly ash is potentially very harmful if ingested, inhaled, or even touched. The week following the ash spill, on January 3rd, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released data from various water samples and tests performed in and around the spill site. The EPA's spokesperson explained that the tests had found some slightly elevated levels of several toxic metals in the nearby Emory River, but that drinking water intakes showed evidence of being below official safety levels. This contrasted with a report released two days before based on tests performed by scientists at Appalachian State University on behalf of local environmental advocacy groups. Their studies showed in some areas of the Emory River samples indicating a number of toxic metals in the water far exceeding allowable drinking water levels. The EPA's statement, showing very different results, briefly touched on the matter of the discrepancies of the two reports but simply stated that they were wary of the advocacy group's data and could not say whether or not it was accurate. Information was disseminated slowly to the public, and what information was there was conflicting. Unsurprisingly this lead to much confusion among the residents in the area and doubt grew regarding which sources and information could be trusted. As the figures on the amount of slurry released fluctuated over the week following the spill so greatly, citizens began voicing their concerns. As one resident told the New York Times: That's scary to know that they can be off by that much...it upsets me to know that a number was given of what the pond could hold, and the number now is more than double. Another resident expressed the general sentiment regarding the lack or inconsistency of information: We're terribly frustrated. It seems like TVA is just throwing darts at the problem, and they don't have a clue how to really fix it....They're making an effort. But what upsets me is they didn't have a plan in place. Why hadn't

anybody thought, 'What happens if this thing bursts?' Whether or not the TVA had actually had a recovery plan in place or was handling the recovery appropriately, as far as the local residents were concerned those in charge of responding and mitigating were unprepared and lacked the ability to act competently. Much of this can be attributed to the way information was (or was not) disseminated by not only the TVA but by the local and federal governments as well. To further compound such sentiments of distrust and confusion the director of the Roane County Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security, Howie Rose, went so far as to claim that special interest groups were intentionally sharing incorrect information about the disaster implying that there was a political agenda behind the discourse and scientific details of the toxicity of the fly ash and the potential dangers posed to locals. Many residents in the Kingston and Roane County area, however, felt that the Tennessee Valley Authority had acted negligently but had also purposefully mislead the public as to the dangerous of the the slurry spill and its toxicity. A number of lawsuits have been filed against the TVA, including one filed on the federal level on behalf of more than 100 citizens. In addition to a number of lawsuits being filed by Tennessee residents, several investigations have been conducted into the causes of the incident and TVA's treatment of the emergency. One significant detail to emerge was the TVA's failure to adopt Homeland Security's National Incident Management System (NIMS) protocols for emergency communications. This lead to difficulties in not only communicating between officials and emergency responders but in disseminating public health information to residents. Several original TVA memos prepared for the media during and after the disaster showed how certain terms were rephrased; for example the word catastrophic was changed to sudden accidental release while the term fly ash was redefined as simply an inert material not harmful to the environment despite a number of studies revealing the numbers of toxic substances found in fly ash. One of the most important threads to come to light following the Kingston spill is the Environmental Protection Agency's role in the disaster. Although it has been proposed several times, the EPA neither regulates fly ash storage and containment nor has an official definition of fly ash as ecologically harmful or toxic to humans. Certain protocols, like NIMS, were mandated by either Homeland Security or the EPA but the EPA, which would typically be responsible for making sure industries were adhering to regulation, had left the responsibility of regulation and management to TVA officials themselves. As some environmental advocacy groups have stated, this is an issue that must be addressed through the EPA's having more direct dealings with regulating the TVA and fly ash in general. Unfortunately, little has come of this in terms of actual policy or legislative change and any hope for this may be dashed soon; as of the writing of this paper the US congress will be voting soon on budget cuts for programs like the Environmental Protection Agency which will make expanding the scope and efficacy of their regulations difficult if not unlikely. Case Study: 2010 Ajka alumina plant accident Early in the morning of the 4th of October, 2010, the Ajka alumina plant, located in western Hungary, experienced an incident in which a dam holding back waste reservoirs failed and released over 11.5 million cubic yards or nearly 200 million gallons of a liquid waste known as

red mud. The substance initially flooded nearby villages, coming in a wave as big as three to seven feet in height. As the wave of red mud flowed it came to cover over fifteen square miles of land. Tens of millions of dollars in damage to private property occurred, with many individuals losing their homes altogether. Ten deaths were reported, and at least 120 people suffered chemical burns from the sludge. The Ajika alumina plant was constructed in the 1970s while the region was still under Soviet Communist rule in what is today western Hungary near the Marcal River and Torna River, both tributaries that eventually reach the Danube River. The plant was owned privately by MAL Hungarian Aluminum, who have operated the Ajika alumina plant since the end of Soviet rule in 1989/1990 when many businesses in Hungary were privatized. The Ajika plant processes bauxite into a substance known as alumina. Alumina is used in a variety of products, but most frequently is used to manufacture the more familiar everyday aluminum. The process of refining bauxite creates a waste product referred to as red mud. This so-called red mud waste contains a variety of heavy metals and is highly alkaline; the red mud's high iron content gives it its characteristic rust red coloring. Dealing with red mud waste has been a difficult obstacle for alumina production plants worldwide. In Europe, most have resigned to building large open air reservoirs along the refineries and filling it with massive amounts of red mud waste. Following the spill in Hungary, alumina plant operators in the United States claimed that such an accident would be impossible in the U.S. due to the nationwide policy of drying the red mud waste and storing it safely underground. It is interesting to note that prior to the Ajika spill there had been little knowledge disseminated on either the composition of the so-called red mud waste or its potential dangers to the environment and humans. However, as pointed out by a MAL Aluminum spokesperson in a statement made shortly after the spill, the European Union (EU) does not consider red mud to contain toxic components by their official standards. As Marton Vau, head of Greenpeace Hungary stated at the time, The most serious part of this disaster is that there is no experience of a catastrophe like this. (cu) It became clear quickly, however, that the red mud was indeed dangerous. As it flowed into the nearby rivers, plant and animal life became swiftly extinguished in the area. Many dozens of individuals from nearby villages were rushed to local hospitals to be treated for chemical burns after being overcome by the wave of red mud while some lost their lives. The fear for mitigation efforts then became the possible spread of the mud further down the waterways and possibly into the Danube River, a major river which connects several European countries beyond Hungary, like Croatia, Serbia, and Romania. Attempts to pour large amounts of plaster in the various flooded rivers to slow the red mud's flow failed, and by October 7th, just three days after the spill, traces of the red mud were found in the Danube River. The Hungarian government was swift to take further action. On October 5th, the day following the spill, Environmental State Secretary Zoltan Illes ordered the Ajka alumina plant to cease production. Illese followed this action with a public statement concerning the possible dangerousness of the red mud, saying that the waste substance has a high content of heavy metals some of which are known to cause cancer. He also warned of possible contamination of groundwater systems. By October 11th it was announced that Zoltan Bakonyi, the managing

director for MAL Aluminum, had been arrested by the government. As Prime Minister Viktor Orban explained: There's probable cause to suspect that there were persons who had been aware of the dangerous weakening of the storage pond walls, but they thought, because of their private interests, that it was not worth mending them and hoped the disaster wouldn't happen. In a statement made after his arrest Bakonyi stated that MAL Aluminum had not broken any laws and had observed every regulation to the letter. In addition to the arrest, the Hungarian government took control of MAL Aluminum with a state commissioner being appointed to control the corporation's assets. The commissioner stated that the government's control of MAL Aluminum was only temporary but that it would maintain control of assets and management to pay for recovery operations and to assess possible risks at other industrial sites owned and operated by MAL Aluminum. As information about the nature of the impact caused by the red mud spill came out, differing sources of data conflicted each other. The Hungarian Academy of Sciences weighed in on the crisis, stating their belief that while the red mud substance itself was potentially hazardous, it posed no major danger to the environment or groundwater systems and should be of little concern to nearby residents. Contrary to these claims, Greenpeace made public their findings of dangerous amounts of toxic substances in the water ways affected by the red mud spill. Their samples' results showed that there was an estimated 50 tons of arsenic, 300 tons of chrome, and half a ton of mercury released in the spill, in total. Greenpeace spokespeople added that that much arsenic is double the amount normally found in red mud. They also shared results of an analysis of water near canals and found in some areas as much as 25 times the arsenic allowed by drinking water limits. Despite this some, like Philip Weller, head of the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube, continued to insist that the consequences do not seem to be that dramatic from the red mud spill and health effects would be minimal. While these disagreements between authorities continued in the media, some individuals were experiencing the effects first hand. One resident of a hard-hit village, Barbara Szalai Szita, explained to the UK's The Independent that the [Hungarian Academy of Sciences] can say what ever it wants. All I know is that if I spend 30 minutes outside I get a foul taste in my mouth and my tongue feels strange. When confronted with some official authorities characterizing the red mud substance and its release as minor concerns to human life, it is likely their conflicting firsthand experiences lead them to other conclusions, as it did for Ms. Szita. Although it has been less than a year since these events, much inquiry into the causes of the incident has been conducted by both the Hungarian government and environmental advocacy groups. These are still on going but many details about management practices at the Ajika plant have already emerged. As one economist, Peter Rona, put it: The behavior of MAL's management has been bloodcurdling and inept. Reports have begun to show that at least at the Ajika plant MAL had detected dangerous cracks in the red mud dams but opted to allow the dam's condition to deteriorate. With the temporary nationalization of MAL Aluminum, promises have been made to use corporate assets to fund tens of millions of dollars worth of recovery projects and reimbursement to those individuals who suffered medically or fiscally from the spill. Discussion & Conclusion

As these two case studies concerning industrially caused environmental disasters have illustrated, there are some similarities between both incidents. As various investigations into both the Tennessee Valley Authority's role in the 2008 fly ash spill in eastern Tennessee and MAL Aluminum's role in the red mud spill in western Hungary proceed, certain trends have started to emerge shedding light on the circumstances leading to the disasters. In both cases, the Tennessee Valley Authority and MAL Aluminum have been declared as negligent and irresponsible. In the case of the Tennessee Valley Authority, it was found that they had failed to follow several Environmental Protection Agency and Homeland Security regulations and protocols, including failing to implement the National Incident Management System (NIMS) which likely had a role to play in the confusing and contradictory information being delivered to the public during the disaster. However, after the release of several internal memos, it became clear that the TVA's misinformation was not disseminated entirely unintentionally (such as in the instances where memos for public statements were altered to present a less alarming situation). Combine these facts with data emerging from investigations also showing internal TVA reports regarding maintenance of waste retaining pond as negligent, and it is evident that within TVA certain factors contributed to their dangerous form of risk assessment and management. For MAL Aluminum and the Ajika plant spill, the story is not dissimilar. Memos and reports have been revealed by the Hungarian government showing intentional negligence in the way MAL dealt with cracks in toxic pool retaining dams and their storage methods. Hungarian environmental regulation before the disaster was very lax, allowing these actions by MAL to continue. Paul Slovic's (1999) examination of the varying factors that lead to the ways risk assessment is formulated socially helps to explain why the Tennessee Valley Authority and MAL Aluminum both chose to engage in behaviors that lead to their respective ecological disasters. For instance, it is probably fair speculation to say that if MAL Aluminum had been able to see into the future and know with certainty this disaster was to occur, that failed dam would have received the maintenance it needed before any incident happened. However, the reality was that MAL Aluminum came to the conclusion that this possibility was unlikely. Their method of risk assessment was created by a private corporation which, by definition, has an imperative to generate profits. Maintenance can be costly, and with this type of mentality can be seen as detracting from profits in an unnecessary and inefficient way. As in the Kingston plant spill, the TVA was acting in a poorly regulated environment and was left to act on such dangerous risk assessments. The way governments and citizens respond to such disasters can also reveal how these groups perform risk assessment and what factors may play into differential reactions. In Tennessee, the TVA has been fined $11.5 million by the government, and is currently dealing with a number of lawsuits being filed by affected individuals. They have also agreed to fund $40 million in development projects in and around Kingston. The incident has also added fuel to environmental advocacy groups' claims of the dangers of coal fly ash and its need for stronger governmental regulation. Unfortunately, beyond joint TVA and EPA recovery efforts in the Kingston area, little actual governmental action has been taken to change regulation procedure. In all likelihood, the EPA's regulatory efficacy will be reduced as congressional budget cuts are coming to vote, in

light of economic downturn and a large governmental budget deficit. The reaction of the Hungarian government to the MAL Aluminum spill has been rather different. Instead of imposing fines on MAL, the government has decided to manage the corporation temporarily, using the company's own funds to pay restitution to victims and fund recovery actions. In addition to this, MAL's president was temporarily incarcerated by the Hungarian government for the supposed role he played in the negligence which precipitated the disaster. The question now remains: Why was the United States' reaction to TVA and their role in the Kingston disaster so much milder than Hungary's dealings with MAL after the Ajika spill? While this study cannot examine all possible variables and factors that differ between industry and government in the United States and Hungary, there are several observations worth making. In eastern Tennessee, although the amount of toxic sludge released was substantially larger than that released in western Hungary, there were no deaths or injuries, and fewer individuals were directly affected, whereas this was not the case in Hungary. Although the long term effects of both disasters are yet to be known, the immediate consequences of both differed in important ways. Ironically, it might be argued that it is this myopic mode of dealing with problems that created the conditions to allow MAL and the TVA to act as they did. Although there are indications that Hungary and Europe in general are taking a more proactive look at risk assessment with regards to industrial production, this unfortunately cannot be said for the United States. Again, this may be the result of differential disaster consequences; the relatively low costs of the Kingston spill make future disasters of a similar nature, in both the TVA and the EPA's assessment, seemingly low risk. Future inquiries into such topics should focus on what other factors work to lead to differential social and governmental reactions to disasters and risk of future disasters. What is the threshold of damage a disaster must reach before governments and citizens consider similar disasters in the future to be too high risk? More comparative case studies may shed light on this question. It will be fascinating to see how both of these disasters, still very recent in their occurrence, play out. Easy as it can be, disasters like the two analyzed here should not be seen as existing within finite beginnings and ends. For both eastern Tennessee and western Hungary residents, the realities of these toxic spills are likely not fully realized yet. Contamination of soils and groundwater systems could lead to many unforeseen heath hazards that will play out for years to come. Understanding that these disasters are not inevitable or too costly to prevent is an important step toward reducing future ecological disasters of this sort.

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