MEIKI JELL MERLIN ARTICLES Questions and answers related all in the topics.

Most of the new issues and important issues are here. (Compiled) South China Sea: Conflict at Scarborough Shoal Unlikely Q1. I'd also like to refer to the disputes between China and Philippines at Scarborough Shoal. Could it go to war? How can you predict the future of this case, also the aid/interference of US? Answer: The standoff at Scarborough Shoal was not planned by either side but resulted from a miscalculation by both sides who failed to think through their actions. The Philippines tried to arrest Chinese fishermen, Chinese ships intervened and the standoff which began on April 10th persists until today and look set to continue. Both sides are trapped by their rhetoric over defending national sovereignty. There is little space for compromise. China has complicated the matter by deploying additional civilian surveillance ships and allowing Chinese fishermen to return to the shoal. There are 5 civilian ships and at least ten fishing boats at the shoal. The Philippines claims that over 80 dinghies and utility craft have been launched from the ships. Some are armed with personal weapons. There are some grounds for optimism: after the Philippines quickly its navy frigate from the area neither side has used military warships. Both sides repeatedly claims they will not use force and will seek a negotiated settlement. The Philippines has moved to appoint an ambassador to fill the vacant post which should help diplomatic efforts. It is highly unlikely that either side, especially China, would choose to "go to war." The defence ministers from China and the Philippines met in Phnom Penh on the sidelines of the meeting between the defence ministers of ASEAN states and China. They agreed on three points: to exercise restraint, to tone down their rhetoric and to keep open lines of communication. While this is a welcome development, it should be pointed out that the People's Liberation Army is not directly involved in the standoff at Scarborough Shoal and is unlikely to control the behaviour of the Fishery Law Enforcement Command and China Marine Surveillance ships. The U.S. is unlikely to become directly involved unless China attacks Philippine ships. The U.S. is counseling restraint. The US Defense Secretary will visit China shortly and the two sides are likely to sound each other out on this issue. The Chinese navy is not in a position to challenge the US Navy. China has no capacity to defend itself from a US nuclear attack submarine like the one that recently visited Subic Bay in the Philippines. (http://www.scribd.com/doc/95615914/Thayer-South-China-Sea-Conflict-Over-Scarborough-ShoalUnlikely)

China Applies Economic Pressure As you know, Philippine Pres. Benigno Aquino III recently decided to withdraw the two Filipino vessels in Scarborough, citing bad weather. After Chinese government and fishing vessels did not follow suit, Aquino told reporters that he might order the Filipino ships back to Scarborough Shoal to safeguard Philippine sovereignty if the Chinese ships and boat would not leave the area. 1. Do you think the economic squeeze that China applied to the Philippines (more stringent checks on Philippine banana exports that held up several containers of the fruit in Chinese ports, decision by some Chinese travel agencies to stop tours to the Philippines etc.) played a role in pressuring Aquino to ease his hardline stance a bit and order the 2 Philippine ships back to port, citing the bad weather at the time as an excuse? ANSWER: I do not think Chinas economic squeeze on the Philippines played a major role in President Aquinos decision to withdraw ships from Panatag Shoal. The banana issue was quickly resolved. China is the third largest market for bananas from the Philippines but the market is small. US $60 million bananas were sold to China in 2011. The suspension of charter flights for tourists apparently continues. This led to some domestic pressure to resolve the matter but Chinese tourism to the Philippines, while important, is not decisive. China is the fourth largest source of tourists for the Philippines. Reports suggest that 1,500 tourists stayed at home. They spend on average US $200-300 per day for a stay of 2-3 days. This means a loss of US $1.35 million. The more economic pressure China applies to the Philippines the more counterproductive it becomes in Chinas relations with the rest of Southeast Asia. The international community will ask are economic sanctions of this nature a reflection of Chinas peaceful rise? 2. If China's economic squeeze did not play a major part in Aquino's decision to temporarily withdraw from the shoal, what factor played a major role in that decision? ANSWER: I think the weather cannot be ruled out. As the storm season approaches it will be unsafe to keep vessels at sea. But I think the larger issue was one of sustainability. There are two aspects of this. First, could the Philippines sustain its presence without technical problems such as mechanical breakdowns and fuel becoming an issue? Second, could the Philippines sustain a policy of confrontation with China indefinitely? Was the game worth the candle? In other words was the deployment of two ships to Panatag Shoal the best use of marine resources? Could they have been better deployed to the Kalayaan Island Group? In the end the Philippines faced a no win situation. China would have outlasted the Philippines. The longer this dragged on the more pressure would be put on Manila to resolve the matter. The attention of the international community would have moved to other matters. In this situation it is up to the Philippines to be portray itself as the victim not the protagonist. The Philippines needs to use nimble diplomacy to put the onus on China to respond. 3. Is the Philippines' economic engagement with China substantial enough in the first place for China to use it as a leverage to pressure the Philippines in the Scarborough and South China Sea territorial issues? ANSWER: China is the Philippines third largest trade partner. According to my calculations, ChinaPhilippines trade is growing at over 30% per annum and the Philippines maintains a small surplus. It sells

more to China than it imports. Total two way trade in 2011 was around US $33 billion. Both sides have set a goal of US $60 billion by 2016. Chinas trade with the Philippines is conducted under the umbrella of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. China must take into account any collateral damage arising from using the economic lever against the Philippines. Secondly, China seeks Filipino resources such as minerals and liquefied natural gas. 4. Do you think Aquino will sacrifice trade with China, or some parts of it, and press for a hardline position in Scarborough just to be seen he's complying with his constitutional duty to protect Philippine territory? His key aides have said he may face impeachment complaints if he would be seen as waivering on this constitutional duty. ANSWER: So far the dispute over Panatag Shoal has involved civilian ships. No force or threat of force has been used. The Aquino government may find its nationalist rhetoric will come back to haunt it. The Philippines cannot prevent China from occupying Panatag Shoal if it wanted to, nor can the Philippines prevent Chinese paramilitary ships from being stationed there indefinitely. China is more likely to seek a diplomatic solution to the current standoff than it is likely to continue to press the Philippines. Chinas reputation has been staked on its call for bilateral negotiations. That is the most likely route. Both sides could shelve their sovereignty claims to enable joint fishing under mutual supervision. The Aquino government should take advantage of domestic pressures to defend sovereignty to obtain authorization for continued funding for the modernization of the AFP. This is a long term solution but without a credible minimal deterrence, the Philippines is in a weak negotiating position. The Philippines could also hang tough with its fellow ASEAN members and decline to endorse a weak draft Code of Conduct. 5. The Philippines would suffer but not fall under if China squeezes it economically over territorial rifts, right? How far can China apply such an economic weapon to gain leverage in the territorial disputes considering the international community is watching and maybe alarmed by such behavior of a rising global power? ANSWER: The Philippines would be economically damaged if China really applied economic levers against the Philippines. But this would not be pretty. Chinese investors in the Philippines would get their fingers burned as well. China is cautious, it is likely studying the lessons of the suspension of banana imports and the disruption to tourism to see impact this had not only on the Philippines but regionally and internationally. So far China has refrained fro causing major economic damage. China will move quickly to exploit the situation now that the Philippines has withdrawn its ships. China is motivated to portray itself as a reasonable power. Picking on the Philippines is precisely the gun boat diplomacy that China so vociferously condemns. (http://www.scribd.com/doc/99393904/Thayer-Scarborough-Shoal-China-Applies-Economic-Pressure)

Standoff at Scarborough Shoal: Implications for US-China Relations On April 10th China and the Philippines became embroiled in a naval standoff in disputed waters in the South China Sea. The standoff occurred when the Philippine Navy frigate, BRP Gregorio del Pilar, was sent to investigate the sighting of eight Chinese fishing boats at Scarborough Shoal 124 nautical miles west of Luzon. On arrival an armed boarding party searched the Chinese boats and discovered that one of them contained coral, giant calms and live sharks, all protected under Philippine law. Shortly after, two unarmed China Marine Surveillance (CMS) vessels appeared and interposed themselves between the fishing boats and the frigate thus preventing any arrest or confiscation of their catch. Two days later, while the Philippines replaced the frigate with a Coast Guard vessel, China deployed an armed Fishery Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) ship at the shoal. This series of events prompted both the Philippines and China to lodge multiple diplomatic protests with each other. Both sides claimed that Scarborough Shoal was an integral part of its territory. China even ordered the Philippine frigate to leave its waters. While these diplomatic exchanges were taking place all of the Chinese fishing boats and two Chinese escorts left the shoal. Expectations that the stand off would be resolved quickly were dashed when one of the Chinese ships returned and a Chinese aircraft flew over the Coast Guard vessel. A third FLEC ship has been sent to the area as the stand off continues. On the face of it the Scarborough Shoal incident is a dispute over sovereign rights to the fishing area surrounding the shoal. The Philippines claims sovereign rights under the terms of the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and its provision for a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Philippines may have erred tactically by dispatching a naval warship to engage in fishery law enforcement. A Philippines Coast Guard commander was quoted at the time as stating that the navy should not be involved in the enforcement of maritime laws because that was the responsibility of the Coast Guard. The Philippines quickly rectified the matter by replacing the navy warship with a Coast Guard vessel. It is important to note that all the Chinese vessels involved were civilian. The CMS vessels fall under the authority of the State Oceanographic Administration, while the FLEC ships fall under the Ministry of Agricultures Bureau of Fisheries Administration. This incident has at least three major implications that go beyond a fisheries jurisdiction dispute. First, the standoff at Scarborough Shoal exposes the Philippines lack of capacity to enforce its sovereignty over its EEZ and thus undermines the credibility of official Philippines statements that it will secure our sovereignty. China is building up the size of its civilian maritime enforcement fleets and it is only a matter of time before China either dominates the fishing grounds off the west coast of the Philippines or a clash occurs between Chinese and Philippines vessels.

Second, the Scarborough Shoal incident has provoked a domestic outcry in the Philippines that is largely critical of the role its ally, the United States. Philippine Senators and Congressmen have berated the US for its inaction. So far the US has only released a statement urging all parties to exercise full restraint and seek a diplomatic resolution. Filipino elites have also been critical of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for not providing political support. The domestic reaction in the Philippines reveals unrealistic expectations about its Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States. This treaty provides for consultations in the event the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific. So far China has scrupulously avoided using force. Third, from April 16-27, the Philippines and the United States commenced their 28th Balikatan (Shoulderto-Shoulder) combined and joint military exercise. This was planned long before the Scarborough Shoal incident. Balikatan involves two phases of simultaneous multiple exercises. The first phase focuses on humanitarian and civic assistance in Palawan, while the second phase involves field training exercises in Luzon and Palawan. None of the Balikatan exercises will take place outside the Philippines territorial waters including an exercise to defend and retake an oil rig captured by terrorists. Balikatan is designed to promote interoperability between the armed forces of the Philippines and the United States. The Chinese media has been comparatively restrained in its criticism pointedly noting that military exercises should contribute to regional peace and stability. Since China too conducts military exercises with foreign nations it must appear consistent. Indeed, as Balikatan got underway, China commenced joint naval exercises with Russia in the Yellow Sea. The legal and strategic issues raised by the Scarborough Shoal incident will persist long after the current standoff is resolved. China insists on settling sovereignty disputes bilaterally with the Philippines. The Philippines refuses to enter into bilateral negotiations with China; it prefers a multilateral approach involving fellow members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but ASEAN remains divided on this issue. The Philippines has also invited China to refer their dispute over sovereign rights to the International Tribunal on Law of the Sea. China refuses to do so. The strategic issues raised by Scarborough Shoal can best be addressed by giving up priority to building up the maritime enforcement capabilities of the Philippine Coast Guard. The United States, Japan, South Korea. Australia and other like-minded states should increase assistance in capacity-building and training. Over the longer term the Philippines must stick to the present commitment of President Aquino to modernize the countrys armed forces for territorial defense. The objective of force modernization should be to create a minimal credible deterrent against conventional naval threats. Without this deterrent the Philippines cannot defend its sovereignty and effectively contribute to its alliance with the US. The next five years will be critical.. As the South China Sea becomes more congested the likelihood of an armed incident involving China and the Philippines will increase and possibly trigger US intervention. The US and its allies also must keep up diplomatic pressure on China to refrain from force and intimidation (Carlyle A. Thayer is Emeritus Professor, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.) (http://www.scribd.com/doc/93051638/Thayer-Standoff-atScarborough-Shoal-Implications-for-US-China-Relations)

ASEAN Discusses Code of Conduct in South China Sea Delegations from ASEAN countries met today in Phnom Penh to work on a Code of Conduct (and there will be more closed meetings throughout the week). My questions to you are: As ships from China and the Philippines are still facing each other at the Scarborough Shoal as of this writing, how important is it that ASEAN members are meeting? Is it a positive sign that could ease tensions, or should they have acted faster to resolve this dispute? ANSWER: The dispute between China and the Philippines is a matter of sovereignty over territory the rocks in Scarborough Shoal. The Code of Conduct under negotiation is a follow on to the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), agreed in November 2002, and the Guidelines to Implement the DOC, signed in July 2011. Scarborough Shoal consists of a number of reefs and rocks. Only five rocks are above water at high tide. China calls Scarborough Shoal an island. International law makes a distinction between an island and a rock. An island is naturally formed and can support human habitation or has an economic function. Islands are entitled to a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A state that controls an island has sovereign rights over the resources in the EEZ and the continental shelf. A rock is not an island. It must be above water at high tide. A rock is entitled to a 12 nm territorial sea. A state has absolute jurisdiction over its territorial sea. The Philippines claims the shoal lies within its Exclusive Economic Zone. EEZs reflect the legal principle that the land dominates the sea. A state cannot claim sovereignty over water but it can claim sovereignty over the land. EEZs are determined by a countrys baseline drawn around its shores at low tide. Sovereignty over land/island is different from sovereign rights over the water (water column) seabed. Sovereignty disputes over land and islands can only be resolved by the two countries concerned. They can negotiate and reach a settlement. Or they can submit their claim to an international tribunal such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for binding arbitration. China insists on bilateral negotiations, the Philippines refused. The Philippines wants China to agree to take the matter to the International Tribunal on Law of the Sea (ITLOS). This tribunal is set up under the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It is not empowered to settle sovereignty disputes. It can adjudicate maritime jurisdiction. If China and the Philippines took their dispute to the ICJ and the court awarded sovereignty to the Philippines the matter would end. If the court awarded sovereignty to China, the dispute over maritime jurisdiction would remain. China would have sovereign rights over the rocks and their 12 nm territorial waters. The Philippines would have sovereign rights over its EEZ except for the territorial seas belonging to China. If the two still had a dispute over maritime jurisdiction they could take it to the ITLOS for resolution. So far so good. But when China and the Philippines acceded to the UNCLOS they both issued declarations exempting themselves from arbitration. All states were entitled to do this. All of the above legal discussion is aimed at underscoring that the discussions on the COC do not directly touch on the dispute between China and the Philippines. They are engaged in a non-violent standoff. The Philippines has dispatched two special envoys to China to promote better bilateral relations. Both China and the Philippines separately have declared a unilateral fishing ban in waters that includes those around Scarborough Shoal. Theoretically this means that fishing boats should have departed the area, thus removing one irritant and only civilian ships remain.

It is important that ASEAN members are carrying forward their negotiations on a COC. But in April this year at the ASEAN Summit it was clear they were divided on at least two major points proposed by the Philippines. The Philippines proposed specifying which areas are in dispute and which areas are not in dispute. Those areas should be segregated. This would leave open the possibility of joint development in the areas under dispute. Secondly, the Philippines wants the draft COC to include the dispute mechanism contained in the UNCLOS, that is, the International Tribunal on Law of the Sea.

Carlyle A. Thayer, ASEAN Discusses Code of Conduct in South China Sea, Thayer Consultancy Background Briefing, May 15, 2012.

South China Sea: Three Interrelated Issues We are watching closely at ChinaPhilippine ties regarding the South China Sea standoff. Many oil and majors are operating in the region. Many more are going to step in the blocks currently being offered by China, Vietnam and the Philippines. And we have heard that the Balikatan drill between the U.S. and Philippine troops includes the retaking of an oil rig in the South China Sea. 1. Could you please provide us your assessment on the situation involving China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. ANSWER: There are three separate interrelated issues. The first concerns the recent standoff between the Philippines and China at Scarborough Shoal. This was and remains a civil not a military matter over who has sovereign jurisdiction over fishing in this area. The waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal clearly lie within the Philippines Exclusive Zone. It is unclear on what legal basis China makes the claim to indisputable sovereignty over the waters. No country is claiming sovereignty over the shoal as if it were a land feature. Eight Chinese fishing vessels were spotted in the lagoon and a Philippine Navy (PN) frigate the BRP Gregorio del Pilar was sent to investigate. Armed crew from the frigate boarded the fishing boats and discovered that the first boat contained illegally acquired giant clams, coral and live sharks. A short time after the search two civilian China Maritime Surveillance vessels interposed themselves between the fishermen and the PN frigate preventing it from making any arrest. The Philippines quickly replaced the frigate with a Coast Guard search and rescue vessel. China dispatched an additional civilian ship from the Fishery Law Enforcement Command. As a result of diplomatic negotiations tensions eased. All the Chinese fishing boats and two of the civilian ships departed. The fishing boats retained their illegal catch. The standoff continues with both sides retaining a single ship at Scarorough Shoal. The issue here is which country has sovereign jurisdiction in these waters. This matter is unlikely to be resolved. At issue now is how China and the Philippines will manage their relations at sea in order to avoid any potential clash in the future. The second issue relates to the conduct of the annual Balikatan (ShouldertoShoulder) combined joint military exercises. They were planned months in advance and not in response to the Scarborough Shoal standoff. This is the 28th iteration of the Balikatan Exercise. The Exercise involves multiple simultaneous activities on Luzon, Palawan and the waters off Palawan. The first part of the exercise involved humanitarian assistance and civic action. The second part of the activity involves a command post exercise designed to test the robustness of the Philippines capacity to respond to a natural disaster or other humanitarian crisis. This portion of the Exercise also involves defending and oil rig and then attacking an oil rig held by terrorists. China has no oil rigs in the South China Sea so this portion of the exercise was not aimed at any Chinese assets. Further, this year as in previous years, the maritime portion of Balikatan will be held in the Philippines territorial waters and not in the disputed waters adjacent to the Spratly Islands. China has been low keyed in its response, after all it conduct joint exercises with other Southeast Asian states. China has stated that exercises of this nature should contribute to regional peace and stability. The third issue relates to the announcement in February 2012 by the Philippines that it will commence with its fourth Energy Contracting Round and open bidding for fifteen oil and gas blocks. Two of these blocks, Areas 03 and 04, fall within Chinas 9 dashed line claim in the South China Sea. China claims indisputable sovereignty over the islands and adjacent waters in the South China Sea and has stated that any oil exploration licenses granted by the Philippines are illegal unless they had prior Chinese approval. Legal experts argue that Chinas statement referring to islands and adjacent waters now brings Chinas claims closer to international law than its bold assertion of historic rights over most of the South China Sea. China does not physically occupy any island, as defined in international law, whose 200 nautical mile EEZ overlaps with the EEZ claimed by the Philippines from its baseline. Some regional analysts have argued that Chinas claim includes Nanshan and Flat islands. In this case, they argue, China and the Philippines are legally in dispute and under international custom, the Philippines should refrain from changing the status quo by developing resources in this contested area.

2. Can the two sides resolve the tension? ANSWER: China and the Philippines could settle their dispute through bilateral negotiations or arbitration under the provisions of the UN Convention on Law of the Sea. A recent study by a Washington think tank estimated that the most favourable international settlement would give China sovereign jurisdiction over just five percent of the surface area of Blocks on Area 03 and Area 04. This hypothetical case concedes sovereignty over Nanshan and Flat features that the Philippines currently occupies. The problem with this hypothetical scenario is that neither Nanshan nor Flat island meet the criteria of an island under international law. They are in fact rocks entitled to a 12 nautical mile territorial sea. Since China and ASEAN member states agreed to the Guidelines to Implement the Declaration on Conduct of Parties (DOC) in July 2011, no major incident has occurred of type that ook place in the first half of the year when Chinese paramilitary vessels forced a Philippine exploration ship to leave the Reed Bank area. For the moment it appears that the Central authorities in China are trying to exert a measure of control over multiple agencies with responsibility for maritime affairs, each reporting to a different ministry. Chinas Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been given responsibility Of herding these cats. The Chinese Foreign Ministry is also pursuing a more diplomatic approach in an effort to recover lost prestige and to keep the United State out of the picture. As long as China and the ASEAN states are discussing home to implement the DOC Guidelines and negotiate a Code of Conduct there is no role for the U.S. to facilitate a settlement. 3. And how it will affect the oil and gas exploration activities in the disputed region? ANSWER: At the present China is unlikely to go beyond diplomatic protests if and when the Philippines grants licenses to foreign companies to conduct activities in Areas 03 and 04. If China does attempt to use muscle it will come in the form of civilian paramilitary ships and not warships from the Peoples Liberation Army Navy. China is also likely to take punitive action against the commercial interests of any foreign company that works in disputed waters without its permission. 4. Additionally, Chinese objections to cooperation projects between PetroVietnam and Russia's Gazprom and India's ONGC in the region are of our interest, too. ANSWER: India has been involved in oil exploration with PetroVietnam since the 1980s. China protested then and it is protesting today. These protests must be seen as pro forma. If China failed to protest this could be taken to mean that China has acquiesced or allowed its claim to lapse. Various Russian oil companies including GAZPROM have been exploring and producing oil in cooperation with PetroVietnam. The decision by GASPROM to take up the blocks once held by BP has resulted in the usual Chinese protests. Russian regional specialists have indicated in private that they are not concerned about Chinese actions. Russian companies were not singled out when China applied pressure on foreign companies to cease working with Vietnam in 200708. Russian specialists also point out that China is keen to see the construction of a pipeline to bring energy resources from Russia directly to China. Japan is also keen to be involved. In sum, Chinas is unlikely to move beyond verbal protests in its reactions to GAZPROM and ONGC because of the larger strategic stakes. It is not in Chinas interest to alienate Russia its largest supplier of military technology and hardware and potential new supplier of energy. By the same token, it is not in Chinas strategic interest to alienate India.

http://www.crisisgroup.org/

South China Sea: Five Scenarios Leading to Conflict What in your opinion are plausible scenarios where the standoff at Scarborough Shoal might spin out of control and escalate? And is the main problem the various agencies China has now to monitor and police maritime areas? There are something like 11 agencies involved. ANSWER: I refer you to the report just released by the International Crisis Group on entitled, Stirring Up the South China Sea. They identified 9 dragons or nine independent state agencies. As for scenarios: since each of the nine dragons sets it own agenda, especially the Fishery Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) and the China Marine Surveillance Force (CMS). Both have been responsible for nearly all the major incidents in recent years. Scenario 1. Chinese fishing boats continue to fish in the Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone. Given the standoff at Scarborough Shoal the Philippine Coast Guard attempts to apprehend them. The crew of the boats display automatic weapons and call for assistance. Chinese surveillance ships intervene and move aggressively to force the Coast Guard vessel away. One Chinese hothead fisherman fires at the Coast Guard vessl with an assault rifle, the Coast Guard vessel fires warning shots. This is misinterpreted by one of the Chinese surveillance ships which rams the Coast Guard vessel. The crews on both vessels engage in a brief firefight leading to fatalities before calm is restored. Scenario 2. Chinese officials in the FLEC grow tired of Foreign Affairs dilly dallying and the standoff at Scarborough Shoal. At night an armed party from the FLEC ship boards and takes over the Philippine Coast Guard cutter on the pretext of detaining a vessel operating illegally in Chinese waters. If you accept that China has sovereignty over the rocks at Scarborough Shoal and these are entitled to a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, China could argue a stationery Coast Guard cutter is not engaged in innocent passage. Scenario 3. While the Philippines is engaged in the standoff at Scarborough Shoal, China dispatches a FLEC ship into the Spratly waters claimed by the Philippines to assist Chinese fishermen who claim they are being harassed by Filipino fishermen. The Philippines does not have any Coast Guard ships available and so dispatches the navy frigate BRP Gregorio del Pilar (the former US Coast Guard Hamilton class cutter). Both sides refuse to stand down and when the FLEC ships maneuvers dangerously the frigate fires warning shots. The Chinese return fire hitting the frigate and killing several crew members. Scenario 4. During the standoff at Scarborough Shoal both sides plant flags and other markers on the rocks signifying sovereignty. One day two landing parties confront each other and shooting breaks out when one side attempts to stop the other from removing its national flag and destroying its marker. An armed Chinese vessel makes its appearance and provides covering fire. Several Filipino troops are killed. The Philippines requests consultations with the United States under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty. Scenario 5. The standoff at Scarborough Shoal ends when the Philippines withdraws its Coast Guard cutter. China promptly sends in personnel to occupy the rocks and erect structures on them. A PLAN warship is posted nearby to deter a Filipino response. ASEAN falls into complete disarray over how to respond, so it does nothing. The Philippines calls for consultations with the United States under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty arguing the loss of territory due to external armed intervention. US credibility is put on the line. China begins to renew its harassment of USNS surveillance ships and surveillance aircraft operating in its EEZ off Hainan Island and China's east coast as a signal to the US to back off. The US provides armed escorts for its USNS surveillance ships and surveillance aircraft. Tensions increase dramatically.

Defense News 04/30/2012 Dispute Simmers Five Scenarios for Renewed China-Philippines Conflict TAIPEI The standoff between China and the Philippines over Chinese fishing boats poaching in the Scarborough Shoal that began April 8 appears to be easing. But defense analysts point to Beijings continued failure to ignore regional exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and rein in competitive maritime enforcement agencies. A new report, issued April 23 by the International Crisis Group (ICG), blames Chinas disjointed and competitive maritime patrol agencies fighting over budgets and turf. The ICG report titled Stirring Up The South China Sea identifies four dragons as the main culprits: Maritime Safety Administration, China Marine Surveillance (CMS), Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) and provincial government maritime enforcement units operating from Guangdong and Hainan. Part of the problem is transparency about how the overlapping agencies function, said Ian Storey, a specialist at Singapores Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. It is also unclear what the lines of communication are between these various agencies and the PLA [Peoples Liberation Army] and central government. Each of the agencies sets its own agenda, said Carlyle Thayer, a professor at University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, especially FLEC and CMS, both have been responsible for nearly all the major incidents in recent years. Thayer identified five potential scenarios that could play out in a future dispute between China and the Philippines. Scenario 1: Chinese fishing boats continue to fish in the Philippines EEZ. In this scenario, the Philippine Coast Guard attempts to arrest fishermen at Scarborough Shoal. The fishermen display automatic weapons and call for assistance. Chinese surveillance ships intervene and move aggressively to force the Coast Guard vessel away. One Chinese fisherman fires at the Coast Guard vessel with an assault rifle; the Coast Guard vessel fires warning shots. This is misinterpreted by one of the Chinese surveillance ships, which rams the Coast Guard vessel. The crews on both vessels engage in a brief firefight leading to fatalities before calm is restored. This scenario is both the most likely and the most troubling, said retired U.S. Navy Adm. Walter Doran, former commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet. I am sure the Chinese have little respect for the Philippine capability to defend their claims and assets, and therefore they are least likely to put up with any push back from the Philippines. However, a firefight between Chinese fishermen and Philippine Coast Guard vessels appears unlikely, said Gary Li, an analyst at U.K.-based Executive Analysis. Not very likely, as Chinese fishing vessels and fishermen are not armed with anything other than maybe a hook, Li said. Chinese surveillance vessels would also not engage in a firefight in such an open way, he said. Chinese paramilitaries have to clear everything with headquarters, and this kind of escalation would be very damaging so not likely to be allowed. Scenario 2: Chinese officials in the FLEC grow tired of foreign affairs dilly-dallying and the standoff at Scarborough Shoal, Thayer said. At night, an armed FLEC party boards and takes over the Philippine Coast Guard cutter on the pretext of detaining a vessel operating illegally in Chinese waters. If you

accept that China has sovereignty over the rocks at Scarborough Shoal and these are entitled to a 12nautical-mile territorial sea, China could argue a stationary Coast Guard cutter is not engaged in innocent passage, he said. Direct boarding of anything other than a fishing vessel is not likely to be attempted by any Chinese marine paramilitaries, Li said. They are far too cowardly and cautious, unless theyve been given a direct order, in which case they might attempt ramming action. Storey also felt this scenario was unlikely and too Tom Clancy. Scenario 3: While the Philippines is engaged in the standoff at Scarborough Shoal, China dispatches a FLEC ship into the Spratly waters claimed by the Philippines to assist Chinese fishermen claiming harassment by Filipino fishermen. The Philippines does not have any Coast Guard ships available, so it dispatches the Navy frigate Gregorio del Pilar. Both sides refuse to stand down, and when the FLEC ship maneuvers dangerously, the frigate fires warning shots. The Chinese return fire, hitting the frigate and killing several crew members. The problem with this scenario is the Chinese have already withdrawn their largest fisheries vessel, the Yuzheng 310, in a gesture of goodwill and an attempt at deescalating the issue, Li said. This points to the Chinese not having the confidence or political will to take this further. The Chinese paramilitary vessels wouldnt dare fire upon a foreign military vessel, as this would be an open declaration of war, he said, and their 12.7mm machine guns wont do much damage and the small Filipino frigates can still blast them full of holes in return. Storey believes this scenario is still plausible. Frankly speaking, I think its just a question of time before we see a firefight in the [South China Sea and] it would likely be sparked by a dispute over fisheries or oil and gas exploration. It could easily get out of hand. Scenario 4: During the standoff at Scarborough Shoal, both sides plant flags on the rocks signifying sovereignty. One day, two landing parties confront each other and shooting breaks out when one side attempts to stop the other from removing its flag. An armed Chinese vessel appears and provides covering fire. Several Filipino troops are killed. The Philippines requests consultations with the U.S. under the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). The overhanging question of the MDT with the Philippines will have to be dealt with, Doran said. This will become more of an issue as the U.S. pivots forces to the Pacific and considers a closer relationship with the Philippines. We have once again learned to live with a lot of ambiguity in the relationship, but an aggressive China demands that we clearly re-think the commitments on both sides of the treaty, Doran said. My primary concern is China building structures similar to what they did on Mischief Reef in 1995, said Renato Cruz De Castro of De La Salle University in Manila. They will take control of Scarborough Shoal, build a structure for fishermen to shelter, and improve it with radar and communications facilities. Building structures on the shoal will prevent the Philippines from exercising its territorial rights to the shoal on the basis of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, and also allow the Chinese to monitor U.S. Navy communications once Subic Bay becomes available for its use in the light of current negotiation between Manila and Washington for a greater U.S. strategic footprint in the Philippines, he said. The problem is that the Philippines did not formally claim sovereignty of the Spratly Islands until 1978, so the U.S. position is that the 1951 MDT does not cover them, Storey said, though consultations would be required. Scenario 5: The standoff at Scarborough Shoal ends when the Philippines withdraws its Coast Guard cutter. China sends in personnel to occupy the rocks and erect structures. A Chinese Navy warship is posted nearby to deter a Filipino response. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) falls into complete disarray over how to respond, so it does nothing. The Philippines calls for consultations

with the U.S. under the MDT, arguing that it has lost territory due to external armed intervention. U.S. credibility is put on the line. China begins to renew its harassment of U.S. Navy surveillance ships and aircraft operating in its EEZ as a signal to the U.S. to back off. The U.S. provides armed escorts for its ships and aircraft. Tensions increase dramatically. As for ASEAN it would either close ranks behind the Philippines (as ASEAN did over Vietnamese incursions into Thai territory in 1980) or split and be rendered impotent, Storey said. My money would be on the latter. I think the increase in U.S. involvement will definitely happen, but I dont think the Chinese will try and erect structures so close to the Philippine coast, Li said. It would be almost impossible for them to defend effectively and they dont have assets that can be rotated out in an effective manner. The five scenarios roughly coincide with Dorans greatest concerns over the South China Sea situation. I worry that eventually one side or the other will make a miscalculation or some minor player will overreact to events and an uncontrollable series of events will unfold. Dorans main worry is about the Philippines due to the emotions that are in play, and Filipino forces lack of training and real capability. Whereas Vietnam and Indonesia, among others, are also subject to potential events, the Philippines, in my estimation are most likely to handle the whole thing badly and get in over their heads.