Monday, Jul. 2, 1934
" is a
Brothers in Islam
(See front cover)
Toothsome young lambs were slaughtered by the hundreds
in Ankara last week and their fresh meat sizzled on a
thousand skewers as banquet followed boisterous
banquet. Champagne-loving Turkish Dictator Mustafa
Kemal Pasha, high-strung and quick as a panther, was
doing his best to honor the majestic Persian Dictator
who styles himself the King of Kings and whose age of
some 60 years is concealed by his upright military
bearing, betrayed by a certain slowness of speech and
gesture.
Once a Cossack trooper, His Majesty Riza Shah Pahlevi,
King of Kings, showed in converse with the Turkish
Dictator his customary habit of arriving swiftly at
obstinate conclusions. Several times Dictator seemed
vexed by Dictator, but only in political converse. When
the talk shifted to soldiering both were in their
element. With a strutting pageant of Turkish soldiery
and Air Force maneuvers, Host Kemal so diverted Guest
Pahlevi that the King of Kings prolonged his official
visit.
When His Majesty relaxed in mellow mood, with Dictator
Kemal half seas over, opportunities to negotiate were
nimbly seized by the Talleyrand of Turkey, her
perpetual Foreign Minister, Dr. Tewfik Rushdi Bey, who
began his career as an obstetrician. Knowing that there
is no Persian with whom one can effectively negotiate
except the King of Kings, ingratiating Dr. Rushdi
sounded His Majesty on the great project of a Middle
Eastern Alliance, a bloc to be constructed in spite of
Britain and France by Moslems of Turkey, Persia, Irak,
Syria, Saudi Arabia, Transjordania and Egypt. Such at
least is Dr. Rushdi's dream. And last week the King of
Kings had left Persia for the first time since he
seized the Peacock Throne in 1925 to discuss both
Moslem dreams and realities with his Turkish neighbors.
That His Majesty should have been able to proceed in
seemly state over the whole length of his snakelike
route of 2,000 miles from Teheran to Ankara (see map)
was itself a gigantic achievement of the two Dictators.
Before they ousted the do-nothing hereditary royal
dynasties of Turkey and Persia such a journey could
only be made by meandering caravan and in utmost peril
of attack by bandits. Most savage of all were the
Kurdish cutthroats who for generations had defied both
Persian and Turkish soldiers, raiding (first into one
country, then into the other along their common
frontier. Perhaps the wisest and most enlightened act
of the King of Kings was to conclude two years ago with
emissaries of Dictator Kemal a pact, by which Persia
yielded to Turkey certain bits of her northwest
frontier which made it possible for the two states so
to deploy their border patrols that the Kurdish
tribesmen could be nabbed at-their raiding and the
scourge of banditry wiped out. Last week Turkish and
Persian statesmen hailed this achievement in toast
after brimming toast. They then talked behind their
ever-itching palms about British oil, by all odds the
juiciest thing in Persia.
Anglo-Persian. Spunky young Persians under their gruff
and aging King of Kings have finally broken, denounced
and torn up all important concessions previously held
by the Great Powers except that of Anglo-Persian Oil
Co. Ltd., of which concern the British Government is
majority stockholder.
"Persia must learn to do without foreigners!
favorite dictum of Shah Riza, himself a masterly adept
at playing foreigners off against each other. Issuing
banknotes used to be the profitable prerogative of the
Imperial Bank of Persia, a prerogative well paid for by
the bank's British backers. When they had been well
squeezed, the Government founded the National Bank,
with Germans in charge, and let them issue banknotes
for a consideration. Belgians were next in favor and
only this spring did the King of Kings give his Belgian
Treasurer-General (in charge of customs) notice and
bounce the leading German banker in Persia, pompous
Herr Doktor Horschitz-Horst. The National Bank then
became 100% Persian under a Director who. besides being
His Majesty's personal favorite, has thoroughly studied
banking methods abroad. His Excellency Riza Ghuli Khan
Amir Chosrowi.
Before this fiscal favorite returned the King of Kings
was asked whether it was altogether wise to send such
highly placed Persians abroad for training from which
they might return less Persian. "I hope,'' growled the
King of Kings, ''that the men we send abroad will
realize that civilization is different for every
country. The Persian has a mighty tradition behind him,
the Empire of Darius! I want to make out of my
countrymen the best possible Persians! Ah, there is so
much to do! I am always dissatisfied. I cannot do it
quickly enough!"
With thundering quickness the King of Kings denounced
two years ago the concession of Anglo-Persian, claiming
these British oilmen must be cheating his Treasury
since they no longer paid in as big royalties as before
(TIME, Dec. 12, 1932). Seething with hate of "the
British dogs," Persia's Press, which always exactly
mirrors His Majesty's views, called for the auctioning
off forthwith of "the Persian heritage of oil" to the
highest foreign bidder.
"Fundamentally Sound," The sequel to this patriotic
Persian attempt to shake the foreigners down was a
hasty visit to Teheran by Anglo-Persian's suave Board
Chairman and "Petrol Diplomat." Sir John Cadman carried
through the ensuing negotiations of high public policy
on the private basis that "the Shah is my personal
friend." The result was a new concession for Anglo-
Persian running until 1993, but His Majesty squeezed
down the area under lease to Anglo-Persian by more than
half and while leaving Anglo-Persian in possession of
its pipe lines deprived the British of exclusive
Persian oil pipe-line rights (TIME, May 15, 1933).
Observed a cynical Soviet diplomat well posted on Sir
John Cadman's negotiations: "Persia is fundamentally
sound. They will sell you the country six times over,
but that makes no difference. They are always on the
lookout to sell it again. Da, da [yes, yes], Persia is
fundamentally sound!" It was this fundamental of
Persian policy which made oil such a pleasing subject
of converse last week at Ankara. The stronger the two
nations become, the more firmly they knit bonds of
Moslem unity across the Near and Middle East, the
stronger will be Shah Riza's hand the next time he
feels like tearing up an oil contract. Dictator Kemal
for his part was anxious to talk Persian oil for the
Turkish fleet. He was said in Ankara to have turned
down British firms and ordered ten new Turkish cruisers
built in—of all places —Japan. "The peoples of Islam
are intensely admiring of the Japanese," said an Ankara
official. "The Japanese have made themselves strong
without rejecting their ancient faith or paltering with
Christianity."
Dictators to earthquake. Neither the King of Kings nor
President Kemal lacks personal courage. During the
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fêtes, rejoicings, fireworks, skewered lamb and
champagne at Ankara last week news came of severe
earthquakes in Western Turkey, the very region through
which Host Kemal was about to escort Guest Pahlevi.
Neither showed the slightest desire to cancel these
plans. The royal Persian junket became an earnest
inspection trip through the shaken area down to Smyrna
with homeless families watching the Near East's two
Strong Men.
As their chief relaxation the two old campaigners
stopped at the Battlefield of Sakarya and General Kemal
explained with gusto how he beat the Greeks in 1921. So
close grew the confab of host and guest at this point
that Turkish and Persian journalists reported
ecstatically afterward: "They have become real friends,
personal friends and brothers!" At Smyrna, to his grave
delight, the King of Kings received personal command of
some Turkish troops who pitched under his orders into
an exciting sham battle with airplanes raining "boom
bombs."
On through the Dardanelles, scene of Britain's greatest
mistake and Turkey's chief glory during the Great War,
steamed the Oriental brothers. The big, splendiferous
windup of the King of Kings' junket was at Istanbul
where the great Dolma Bagtche Palace of bygone Turkish
Sultans was thrown open for a great ball to honor His
Majesty. Reclining on a divan the King of Kings ate
Turkish delight off a onetime Sultan's silver salver
and puffed cigarets made for the occasion by the
Turkish Tobacco Monopoly which had stamped on each the
Persian Royal Arms. Meanwhile spry Turks in the sleek-
tailed, Frenchified dress suits affected by President
Kemal one-stepped and black-bottomed in a fashion to
make the King of Kings blink. Stoutly, Persian
courtiers insisted to their jewel-bedecked Turkish
partners, on whose toes they had a tendency to tread,
that "His Majesty is of ancient lineage, the noblest in
Mazanderan."
King of Kings. Such flattery is unnecessary. Riza
Pahlevi is self-made and Persians would be proud of the
fact were they not so thoroughly Oriental. The parents
of the King of Kings were honest peasants. Their
village had to send half a dozen young men each year to
serve Persia's dissolute Shah and strong young Riza,
born on the shores of the Caspian Sea, was mustered
into a Persian regiment of Cossacks. He tasted battle
chiefly against bandits and won steady promotion to the
rank of Sartip with 3,000 Cossacks under his command.
For a fateful coup d'état it was Sartip Riza who was
sought out in 1921 by Persia's wily Saiyid ZiaudDin, a
wealthy newspaper publisher and astute political
wangler.
Sartip Riza marched with supreme bold ness on Teheran
and such was the Army's disgust with do-nothing Ahmed
Shah that a few hours of quiet maneuvering turned the
trick as whole battalions went over to Publisher Saiyid
Zia-ud-Din's revolution. Not long after the publisher
found he had made the mistake of his life. The upstart
Sartip had got himself appointed Minister of War and
the publisher was exiled to Baghdad. Two years passed
while brooding Riza Khan intrigued, cajoled and bribed
among the military, forcing his deep plans and
domineering power to triumph over weaker minds. While
still only War Minister he reorganized the Army and
made it his own by insuring regular pay for the first
time in living Persian memory. To do this he had to
detach a section of the Ministry of Finance and
incorporate it into the Ministry of War. That feat
showed who was really No. 1 man in Persia. In 1923
frightened Ahmed Shah fled to the fleshpots of Paris.
Two years later Riza Pahlevi, by that time Premier, was
elected by the Majlis to be Shah and King of Kings with
"full powers" which make him in fact independent of the
Majlis. Always domineering, he now became the utter
autocrat and one day even kicked his first-born and
beloved son Crown Prince Shapur Mohammed Riza into the
palace pond for a trifling offense.
King into Communist? Though his most striking feats
have been to make Persia safe from banditry and put the
Great Powers in their place, Shah Riza, while
tactically respecting Persian traditions and taboos, is
now driving ahead with a program of modernization and
Persian self-sufficiency which fairly makes his
subjects dizzy.
Not long ago he decided that the great square and the
side streets in the busiest quarter of Teheran should
be repaved as fast as possible and for a month shop-
keepers wailed as all traffic was obstructed by the
pavers and customers kept at bay. Another order set up
the Government Foreign Trade Monopoly, with iron rules
that for everything imported Persia must make a
corresponding export, or the import cannot be made.
This has so strengthened the Treasury that with nearly
all Great Powers off the gold standard, the King of
Kings was said last week to be considering putting
Persia back on.
"The two greatest evils from which a country can suffer
are foreign control and Communism," His Majesty has
said, only to add darkly: "If Persia had to choose
between the two I should be the first to put myself at
the head of a Communist army!"
Always at bottom the soldier, Shah Riza spent the
closing hours of his visit to Istanbul last week with
Turkish generals bent over staff maps showing the new
strategic motor roads and railways of Turkey and
Persia. Ten years ago there was no railway striking
east from Ankara toward Persia and nothing but a
caravan trail running west from Teheran toward Turkey.
There is no through railway yet but the motor road over
which His Majesty zipped from Teheran through Tabriz
and Erzerum to the Turkish coast at Trebizond is now in
prime shape to become an artery of heavy trucking and
carry Persian carpets on a direct route to Europe. For
trade with Russia and possible defense Persia is in
course of being spanned by the line from Bandar Shapur
via the Anglo-Persian oil country and Teheran to Bandar
Shah. The line will make it possible for the first time
to cross Persia by rail. With other railways sprouting
throughout the Near East, across Syria and Irak, the
statesmen in Dolma Bagtche Palace last week saw spread
on their unromantic staff maps the physical symbols of
a future United Islam. After taking the final Turkish
salute Persia's King of Kings set the wires humming
with his reputed farewell words to Ankara's Dictator
Kemal: ''I rejoice at the prospect of your visit to
Teheran! We are soldiers, not diplomats."
Monday, Apr. 25, 1938
20th-Century Darius
(See front cover]
No country is more anxious to demonstrate its freedom
than Iran, no ruler anywhere is more conscious of his
dignity, more jealous of his sovereignty, than His
Imperial Majesty Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shah-in-Shah ("King
of Kings") of Iran.
This week Iran's 60-year-old, 6-ft., grey-mustached
King of Kings celebrates a coronation anniversary.
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Twelve years ago on April 5, the former Persian Cossack
officer, born of middle-class landowners on the shores
of the Caspian Sea, placed a specially-made crown of
diamonds, emeralds and rubies on his own head.
This week the monarch whom the elaborate-tongued
Iranians often call "Most Lofty of Living Men," "Agent
of Heaven in this World," "Brother of the Moon and
Stars," will drive down Teheran's broad avenues,
reflection of the glory of his reign, to famed Gulistan
Palace. There the King of Kings will be pleased to
stand in front of the $50,000,000, 17th-Century Peacock
Throne and watch file past him diplomats, ministers,
army officers, notables, all clasping their hands on
wrists to show they carry no weapons, all bowing heads
in profound deference to the August Presence. Unhappy
the lot of a mere commoner who should by chance say
"Your Majesty" instead of "Your Imperial Majesty," or
by a slip of the tongue call Iran "Persia."
Emancipator of his country from British domination,
Shah Reza has commanded world attention during the last
twelve years by deeds which, in other times, would have
spurred British naval and military forces to action.
Fresh proof that once-helpless Persia, now aggressive,
heavily-soldiered Iran, could stand manfully up to her
former master came early this month. A giant,
trimotored Junkers low-wing monoplane, with swastikas
gleaming on tail, roared down to Teheran airport,
inaugurating Lufthansa's new commercial airline between
isolated, mountainous Iran and the Near East and
Europe.
The bustling American and European salesmen who made
the inaugural trip were delighted that they had been
spared the hitherto unavoidable, tedious, 48-hour
journey from Bagdad, Iraq to Teheran over Iraq's slow
railroads and Iran's slower, often impassable dirt
mountain roads. Better still, they had missed having to
put up for a night in one of Iran's insect-ridden rest
houses. What the plane's arrival meant to Middle
Eastern diplomats, however, was that the German-
controlled Lufthansa had just won a significant battle
with British Imperial Airways over flying concessions.
"Shadow of God." Formerly divided into spheres of
influence by Imperial Russia and Imperial Britain, Iran
shook off Russian influence when Cossack officers
retired from the country at the end of the World War,
but waited five years for the British-officered South
Persia Rifles to disband. With a newly-created army of
40,000 men, commanded in person by the then Reza Khan,
supplied with secondhand rifles, machine guns, tanks,
Iran first dealt with her own warring, rebellious
Kurds, Kashgais and Bakhtiaris, then began shaking a
determined fist at Great Britain.
First real shock to reach Downing Street from Teheran
was arbitrary cancellation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Co.
concession scheduled to run until 1961. Surprised
British statesmen, suddenly realizing that protection
of this oil lease would involve great military effort
and huge expenditures, ended by negotiating. Anglo-
Persian's basic holdings were enormously decreased and
the Shah obtained increased royalties which were
promptly earmarked for the army. This highly successful
instrument of national freedom, now 100,000 strong,
still receives its daily orders from His Imperial
Majesty.
Another move was an Iranian hint that His Britannic
Majesty's naval forces in the Persian Gulf were no
longer welcome to make their base in Iranian waters.
Result: The British Naval Base was moved across the
Gulf to the oil-laden Bahrein Islands, territory of
more tractable, independent H. H. Sheik Sir Hamad bin
'Isa al Khalifa, leaving His Britannic Majesty's
diplomatic agent for the Persian Gulf uncomfortably
high & dry in.' Bushire's British Residency (see map,
p. IQ). Meanwhile protection-loving Imperial Airways
revised its flying route to India, establishing its
regular Persian Gulf stop for seaplanes at Bahrein
instead of Iranian territory.
Since Iran was bent on proving her independence, lean
pickings were in store for British advisers, British
business. Ships were ordered from Italy and Italian
officers were engaged to teach Iranian landlubbers
theories of navigation. Barter trade was established
with Soviet Russia and German goods began to pour into
Iran under a clearing agreement arranged by the wily
Dr. Hjalmar Schacht. Among the first arrivals were 100
German warplanes for the Iranian air force. Danes.
Czechs.
Swedes, Italians, all chipped in to build new beet-
sugar factories, power plants, cotton mills. Road
builders arrived from Europe and America and
construction companies were not long in learning that
Teheran, "City of the Shadow of God." was to undergo a
facial operation. The King of Kings guaranteed prompt
payment in foreign cash.
Iran the New. By this spring thickly-populated bazaar
districts were condemned and destroyed, new, broad,
straight avenues plotted through once narrow, crooked
streets. Magnificent, many-roomed, multistoried
government buildings stood where once sagged ancient
one-story huts. A handsome post-office building
covering a city block has arisen and a Ministry of War
Building, with sufficient space to house the general
staffs of Germany, France and Great Britain at the same
time, is being utilized by the ever-expanding but still
relatively small Iranian staff.
The Imperial Bank of Iran, set back from the street,
needed an entire square. Slowly rising to completion is
an Imperial Opera House to cater to the hitherto
undiscovered musical tastes of Iran's citizens.
The shortcomings of the Shah's dozen years in office,
the ludicrous anomalies, misappropriations and mass
suffering bring laughter and tears only to the eyes of
Westerners. By Oriental standards, his own, the Shah is
the man of his generation in the Middle East.
Iranian public building has all been under direct
orders of the Shah. He approved plans, altered details.
Little did it seem to matter to the King of Kings that
an architect omitted plumbing detail when building a
hotel, that Teheran's water supply still came through
the streets in half-open, easily contaminated cement
drains, that Teheran's old electric power plant had a
limited capacity. When His Imperial Majesty drove at
night through a street not sufficiently lighted for his
tastes, he ordered more powerful bulbs installed.
Upshot of this was that the rest of Teheran was plunged
into semidarkness.
Most Lofty. Almost illiterate when he came to the
throne, speaking only Persian with a smattering of
Russian, Reza Shah Pahlavi had a strong historical
sense, pictured himself as a 20th-century Darius even
when he was still only a cavalry colonel. When he
became Minister of War in a Shah-less government (the
former do-nothing Shah had moved to Paris), he acted
more like the great Persian monarch. He imposed his
will on hitherto independent fierce tribes, hanging
3
dozens of warring sheiks, making other suspected local
chieftains his permanent "guests." On a group of
disobedient mullahs (Moslem priests) he applied the
whip in person. Strongwilled, previously healthy
followers of the absent Sultan Ahmad Shah, whom Reza
Khan later had deposed, developed mysterious maladies
from which they never recovered. One chief of polio
committed suicide, and a foreign minister underwent a
fatal operation for a vague ailment. Summed up the Most
Lofty of Living Men several years ago: "I am a soldier—
a simple soldier—and love my job."
Westernization. The King of Kings combines his
knowledge of time-honored Iranian political methods
with a passion for reform and an incorrigible interest
in blue prints. Despiser of meddling, dictating
European governments, he nevertheless admires Western
habits and dress, Western technical achievements. Just
as Kamal Atatürk had ordained in Turkey a few years
before, Reza Shah Pahlavi ordered jail sentences for
turban-wearers, forbade veils for Iranian women. Robed,
turbaned mullahs were obliged to carry licenses. The
Iranian habit of contracting temporary marriages,
sanctioned by the Shiah sect of Mohammedanism, was so
curtailed by the Shah that polygamy became difficult.
The number of wives decreased, the number of
prostitutes increased among Iran's heavy female
population.
Instead of religious schools government-controlled
secular education was expanded. Boy Scout movements
were encouraged, the army was taught to read and write.
Mohammedan law was largely nullified. The vexing
problem of land titles was solved, one major result
being that suddenly vast, rich areas became known as
"crown property"—i.e., were simply taken by the Shah.
Once healthy, abstemious Shah Reza considered outlawing
opium smoking, but factors other than reform weighed
heavily. Important was the fact that an estimated half
of the adult population smokes opium, that it is used
as solace for the famine victim, to quiet crying babies
and pleading children, to deaden the pain of a disease-
ridden population largely unserved by doctors or
hospitals, as well as for sheer pleasure. More
important was that the opium trade, transported by
camel caravan into Russia, then carried over the Tran-
siberian Railroad to China by the obliging Soviets,
accounted for more than half of Iran's exports
(excluding oil revenues, used exclusively for the
army), bringing the King of Kings needed foreign money.
Receipts and Expenditures-Money was needed to make
Teheran a city worthy of the residence of the "Most
Lofty of Living Men." His Imperial Majesty must have
expensive macadam roads for his occasional visits to
the summer palace on the Caspian Sea—a palace
convertible into a summer hotel for commoners when the
royal master is not in residence.
More expensive than all other modern improvements put
together, however, scheduled to cost $160,000,000,
nearly three times the annual revenue of Iran, is an
865-mile railroad line. No foreign country is to own
any part of this line, no foreign loans are to be
accepted. Conceived as a strategic railway, to enable
the Iranians to repulse possible British invasion from
the Persian Gulf, Russian invasion from the Turkomen
Soviet Socialist Republic, the railroad line carefully
avoids all Iran's big cities except Teheran, skirts
round the Empire's more fertile districts, spans wide
rivers, crosses mountain passes as high as 7,200 feet,
bores into numerous tunnels, connects with no foreign
lines. Foreign engineers, not interested in strategy,
chuckled that the railway goes from "nowhere to
nowhere." This spring Scandinavian engineers were
doubling shifts to finish before autumn a 200-mile gap
so that His Imperial Majesty can soon ride by rail from
his estates on the Caspian to his lands on the Persian
Gulf.
The first few hundred miles of the King of Kings'
expensive railroad toy was paid for by a heavy tax on
tea, favorite Iranian beverage. When this tax failed to
produce sufficient money, large portions of Iran's
silver reserve were sold. The Iranian rial lost more
than half its value (worth about 6½¢ today),
necessitating creation of Government monopolies for
imports and exports, prohibition of entry or departure
of Iran's paper or silver money. Food prices doubled,
taxes trebled. To meet clearing agreement promises,
large stores of grain, rice, dried fruits, some needed
for home consumption, were exported. In one area His
Imperial Majesty decreed that cotton should be grown
instead of wheat. Drought ensued, the cotton crop
failed, and to make matters worse the world's cotton
market just then fell. To the Iranian masses this meant
extreme privation, to foreign visitors scenes in Iran's
villages were shocking.
Forgotten Men. This spring Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.
operators began to report they were unable to buy
vegetables for their staffs. Other meats not available,
chicken reached price levels reminiscent of early oil-
rush days. Eggs were soon unobtainable. No Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co. employe suffers unduly from this lack
of foodstuffs, for the rich concern, having profited
from cash sales of oil to warring Italy three years
ago, can import vast quantities of canned foods.
But all through southwestern Iran what had been for
years a chronic famine has now deepened into acute
starvation. Emaciated Iranian citizens can be seen
sitting around in streets and doorways, their bones
almost sticking through their skins, their eyes seeming
to pop out of their heads, lacking the energy even to
brush away the swarms of flies covering their bodies.
Scores of beggars greet incoming travelers. Still
greatly flourishing is the opium poppy, which
withstands drought, is immune from locust attacks.
Despite the bustling, superficial prosperity of
Teheran, all was not well last week in the Empire of
the Shah-in-Shah.
That little opportunity exists for outward
manifestations of unrest was evident from the fact that
His Imperial Majesty keeps a tight rein on the army,
maintains a force of 20,000 of his best-clothed, best-
fed, best-paid soldiers in Teheran, This week the stern
dictator's men were making the rounds of households
along the route of the contemplated state drive of His
Imperial Majesty, warning citizens to display flags,
hang out banners.
When an American automobile agent in Teheran recently
suggested to the King of Kings that he might be
interested in a bullet-proof car such as was formerly
supplied to Al Capone & Company, the sensitive monarch
resented the none-too-subtle comparison. A multilingual
secretary replied briefly and pointedly: "His Imperial
Majesty, beloved of his people, certain of his
subjects' affection, has no conceivable need for such a
conveyance."
Monday, Sep. 8, 1941
Persian Paradox
IRAN (See Cover)
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Over a suburb of Teheran, Iran's capital, suddenly
appeared four Soviet bombers one day last week and
dropped six bombs which exploded a half-mile from the
home of U.S. Legation Secretary James S. Moose Jr.
Within 30 minutes the Cabinet of new Premier Ali
Furanghi ordered Iranian troops to cease resistance to
the Anglo-Russian advances. The order took a while to
filter through. Next day hard-of-hearing Russians
bombed Kazvin, set afire thousands of gallons of
gasoline Russia could have used. But 1,500 miles to the
east on a mountaintop at Simla, General Sir Archibald
Wavell, commanding the Indian Army and the British
share of the Iranian operation, could collapse his
figurative telescope, order himself a great big literal
drink. Because:
1) The Allies now had a Burma Road to Russia.
2) Russia was given her first concrete evidence that
Britain was an actual ally. Diminished was the
possibility that Russia might make a separate peace
with Hitler out of distrust of the democracies.
3) One more hole in the dike around the Axis was
plugged.
4) Empire troops could cooperate in the defense of the
Caucasus oil field if the Germans pass the Dnieper.
5) Four thousand German "specialists" were hustled away
from contact with the inflammable tribes of India's
Northwest Frontier.*
6) Britain's oil supplies in the East were safeguarded.
Beside the Götterdämmerung thunders of the Russo-German
War, the 80-hour campaign to achieve all these
desirable things sounded like the popping of a little
corn. Down either side the Caspian came the Cossacks—
horsed, mechanized and propellered. Their western
column rapidly took Tabriz; their eastern the port of
Bandar Shah (see map). To the south the British crossed
from Iraq and made sure of the richest single oil field
in existence; their warships in the Persian Gulf
squashed Iran's minuscule Navy, sinking two sloops,
capturing seven Axis ships. Indian troops landed at
Bandar Shahpur and, after a brief brush, made sure of
the world's largest oil-cracking plant, at Abadan. Not
needed were more Indian troops poised on the border of
Baluchistan, where shaving the head and varnishing the
skull is the poor man's pith helmet.
Fighting on the same side again, Britain and Russia
were delighted to have Iran, and with so little
trouble. But there was one party to the taking who
could not have shared their delight, and that was
Iran's 65-year-old Shah in Shah ("King of Kings").
Last week the Shah held aloof from any official notice
that his country was occupied. All that officially
happened was that Premier Ali Mansur, to whom the
Anglo-Russian ultimatum demanding the Nazis' expulsion
had been handed, turned down the ultimatum and ordered
resistance. Twenty-four hours later Ali Furanghi was in
and the war was off. This week he was arranging peace
terms.
Ali Furanghi is a prominent Iranian. Prime Minister
once before, thrice Foreign Minister, onetime
Ambassador to Turkey and onetime President of the
Council of the League of Nations, he is a historian and
economist of considerable local note. But he does not
give the orders in Iran. The Shah does.
Minus Times Minus Equals Plus. If ever a man had reason
to be bewitched, bothered and bewildered by recent
history's queer swerves, it was His Majesty Reza Shah
Pahlavi. For 20 long years he had played with London,
played with Moscow and never lost a trick. Actually he
never played both ends against the middle, for he never
needed to. During most of the 20 years, London and
Moscow felt towards each other much as Georgia's
Governor Eugene Talmadge feels towards Negro Ph.D.s and
vice versa. But now, somehow, crazily, incredibly,
these two irreconcilables stood shoulder-to-shoulder on
the soil of his beloved Iran, using it for a meeting
ground of mutual assistance. Within his lifetime the
Shah has seen some strange quirks in Russo-British-
Iranian relations, but never one like this.
Flashback. Scion of an Army-officer family, the Shah
was born in 1876 in the Firuzkuh district east of
Teheran. Iran was Persia then; and in the '80s Russia,
which had steadily picked off Persia's northern
provinces, conspicuously strengthened her position at
Teheran by organizing under Tsarist officers the
Persian Cossack Brigade, most effective military force
in the country. This rough & tough outfit Reza, a
youngster of 24, joined as a trooper in 1900.
While the Russians staked out their bailiwick in the
north, the British did beautifully for themselves in
the south. Oil had been smelled, and in 1901 for
$20,000 bleak-brained Shah Muzaffar-ed-Din gave an
English financial adventurer named William Knox D'Arcy
a 60-year monopoly to explore and exploit all Persia
for petroleum except the five northern provinces in the
Russian stakeout.
Britain worried about possible Russian encroachments on
India, and there was much talk about the Bear that
Walks Like a Man. To lubricate diplomatic friction, in
1907 an agreement was solemnly signed which defined
each country's sphere of influence in Persia. Britain
was to influence in the southeast; Russia in the north.
As for the poor Persians, their attitude was aptly
summed up in a Punch cartoon of the period. It showed a
Persian cat apprehensively sitting between a lion and a
bear. "I will pat its head," says the bear, "and you
shall stroke its tail." Pleads the cat: "But I have not
been consulted!"
Ten years later the Tsar fell, and this ended the
agreement. Britain's Foreign Secretary, the suavely
arrogant Lord Curzon of Kecleston, then had a lovely
dream. He dreamed of extending British control from the
Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea, thereby adding a
magnificent frontier province to British India. The
Mesopotamian campaign had slopped over into always
neutral Persia, but in 1918 the British drove the Turks
out and garrisoned Persia's strong places. The next
year Shah Ahmad, even bleaker-brained than Shah
Muzaffar, had no alternative but to submit to an
agreement by which his country came under Britain's
political and military control.
In 1920, however, Lord Curzon's lovely dream was rudely
shattered. The Bolsheviks overran large chunks of
northern Persia. Along the shores of the Caspian the
British, assisted by the Persian Cossack Brigade,
vainly tried to stop them. Those of the old Tsarist
officers who were not killed, fled; the brigade started
to fall apart.
5
The story is told that a British colonel at Kazvin,
whither the anti-Bolshevik forces had retreated,
spotted among the Cossack Brigade's remaining officers
a striking six-foot Persian with hard grey eyes. His
name was Reza Khan. The colonel knew him for a brave
man and, in a last desperate attempt to keep the
brigade together, he put him in command. Had he not
done so, the future King of Kings might have died an
unknown old horse bully.
Persia into Iran. But luck intervened. The U.S.S.R.
decided against sovietizing northern Persia, fearing
that Britain would grab the rest of the country. The
British decided against grabbing the rest of the
country, fearing that the U.S.S.R. would sovietize the
north. For the time being, it was a standoff. Taking
advantage of the lull, on Feb. 21, 1921, Colonel Reza
Khan rode into Teheran at the head of 2,000 Persian
Cossacks and took over.
Shah of Persia then was the squat, pillowy royal jerk,
Ahmad (height 5 ft., 2 in.; weight 275 lb.), a member
of the Kajar Dynasty which had leeched on the Persian
people since the late 18th Century. Ahmad's most solemn
edicts, when there were any, were not obeyed outside of
Teheran. He was known as the Grocery Boy Shah because
he once cornered his country's entire grain crop during
a famine and sold it to his starving subjects at
colossal prices.
The night boxes and gambling joints of France were
Ahmad's sole passion. When he left Persia he took an
alleged $200,000,000 worth of jewels with him; gave an
Oriental carnival for the whole town of Nice which
lasted a week, and every night banqueted a thousand
guests. On every damsel who tickled his fancy he
bestowed a handful of precious stones. In 1930, aged
32, Ahmad died of cirrhosis. Gossip said that he had a
liver like an old Spanish saddle. Provision for eight
wives was made in his will (executed by Manhattan's
Guaranty Trust Co.), but two more turned up whom he had
apparently mislaid.
Of such kidney was the ruler of Persia when Colonel
Reza Khan took over. The treasury was empty, the Army
little more than an armed rabble. Brigandage and tribal
disaffection were rampant. The country's roads were
hardly better than camel tracks, and so dreadful was
transportation that fields of surplus wheat and barley
might rot in one section while 600 miles away a bread
famine would rage. The citizenry was saturated with
corruption, ignorance and disease.
Through this horrible mess Reza Khan swept like God's
wrath: first as War Minister, then as Premier, finally
(1925) as Shah in Shah. He reorganized the Army on
western lines, put down brigandage, overthrew rebel
chieftains, stripped the mullahs of their judicial and
political powers, drew up a code of civil law, hobbled
child marriage by raising to 15 the age at which a girl
might marry, removed the veils from the womenfolk and
bettered their status in life, ran the royal Grocery
Boy out of the land, fostered education, set up schools
and colleges, tore down slums, erected beautiful
buildings, updated agriculture, improved medical
service and public health, founded Boy and Girl Scout
movements, reconstructed roads and fomented trade and
industry with all his being. His greatest
accomplishment (next to getting Persia up on its feet)
was the 870-mile railroad, which took eleven years to
build, cost $160,000,000 and runs from the Persian Gulf
to the Caspian.†
A fanatic nationalist, in 1935 he changed Persia's name
to Iran, which had been its name as a nation even
before the great days of Cyrus and Darius and Xerxes.
Persia ("Pars") was merely one of Iran's provinces. In
the same spirit, he chose to add Pahlavi to his name.
It means "the Parthian." In classic times, the
Parthians were famed mounted bowmen.
Critics and Defenders. A man so furiously vigorous and
drastic as the Shah in Shah is bound to have
detractors. They contend he is nothing more than
another Oriental despot who has caused shoals of his
enemies to be murdered, tortured, kidnapped,
imprisoned. They claim he slaps Cabinet Ministers in
the face, beats up priests, kicks irksome subjects in
the crotch. (It is said that for tiresome gabbling he
once booted even Crown Prince Mohammed Reza into a
palace fountain.) Iran is ruled entirely by fear, they
insist; bribery is still prevalent, taxation
overpowering; Iran's 136-man National Assembly, the
Majlis, and all Cabinets are solidly enstooged. By this
time, they add, the One-Man New Deal has turned into a
One-Man Corporative State, owning everything worth
owning and, furthermore, smoking opium.
On the other hand there are astute Occidentals who have
watched the Shah work over a period of years and admire
him greatly. First of all they argue that it is unfair
to apply Western standards to Iran, and then they point
to some of the flowers of civilization which have
blossomed in the West since 1933. They recall that,
unlike Kamâl Atatürk, he had no elite of European-
educated intellectuals to help him.‡ "Reza Khan made
Iran out of nothing," they say and, knowing Persia and
Persians, they insist that force was the only way. As
for opium, 60% of the population smokes it. Descended
from generations of opium smokers, it is said they are
largely immune to its effects.
Kismet, etc. One of the first acts of the new
Government after the 1921 ride-in to Teheran was to
tear up the treaty the bleak-brained Ahmad had signed
with the U.S.S.R. The Bolsheviks condemned the
aggressive policy of the Tsar, promised never to
interfere in Persia's internal affairs, but reserved
the right to occupy it temporarily in the event another
power used Persia for an attack on Soviet Russia.
As the Shah grew in power, his mistrust of British
Imperialism grew with it and he began to spit in the
Lion's eye. In 1931 he forbade Imperial Airways to fly
over Iranian territory. Spit most staggering to the
Lion was his sudden cancellation in 1932 of the old
William Knox D'Arcy contract which had now burgeoned
into the monster British Government-subsidized Anglo-
Persian (later Anglo-Iranian) Oil Co. Iran was getting
16% of the net profits. The Shah wanted 21%. The
British took the squabble before the League of Nations.
The Shah got what he wanted; the British 30 more years
on their concession. Things were great. He began hiring
German technicians to work his railroads, install his
industrial plants and operate them. He detested
Communism, but kept up friendly relations with Russia.
Then came August 1939 and the Russo-German Pact. Things
were greater. The war started. His British oil
royalties waxed. Russia and Germany bought more goods
and products. Nothing could harm Iran now. More & more
Germans entered the country.
But eleven weeks ago Adolf Hitler turned on Joseph
Stalin. Last week the two ends the Shah thought would
never meet closed in on him.
6
* With an Axis army on the Thracian border, Turkey last week worried lest the Nazis
demand she eject all British and Russian "specialists" within her borders, then, if she
did not, invade her and try to seize the Dardanelles.
† It has standard gauge track. Russia's has broad gauge.
‡ The Shah called in U.S. Economist ArthurChester Millspaugh to unsnarl the country's
appalling financial tangle. For a time Iranian petitions began: "Oh, Allah! Oh, Shah!
Oh, Dr. Millspaugh!".
Monday, Dec. 17, 1945
"The Rhythm Recurs"
(See Cover)
Whenever the Lion is in trouble the Bear takes a poke
at Iran. Thirty-five years ago, Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Sazonov made a formula of it: "The
English, engaged in the pursuit of political aims of
vital importance in Europe, may, in case of necessity,
be prepared to sacrifice certain interests in Asia. . .
. This is circumstance which we can, of course, exploit
for ourselves, as, for instance, in Persian affair
The formula was in full application last week. Britain
no longer aggressively expanding her empire could
scarcely count on firm U.S. support so remote a corner
of the world as Irans northwest corner, Azerbaijan.
Because the Russians knew this well the men of the Red
Army who occupy northern Iran were appointed by Moscow
as paladins of self-determination. Benevolently, they
looked the other way while the new Communist-inspired
"Democratic Party" led a revolt. The crooked streets of
Tabriz, Iran's second city, were clouded with dust and
excitement as the National Assembly prepared to
proclaim the province an autonomous state, with only
the most nominal allegiance to Iran's capital Teheran.
A new National Assembly for Azerbaijan was ready to
meet and Jafar Pishevari, whose enemies said he came
from Russian Baku, was ready to tell the Assembly what
to do.
The revolt had made rapid progress since it welled up
less than two months ago. Most of Azerbaijan (see map)
was already in rebel hands. Rebel columns sped along
the swampy Caspian littoral to seize the town of Bandar
Shah; they headed east toward Iran's sacred city of
Meshed.
The Iranian Government complained that the Red Army had
blocked its military units sent to put down the revolt.
Aloofly, Moscow announced that the Red Army was merely
maintaining order while Azerbaijanis demonstrated, as
they had a right to do.
Iranian protests to London and Washington evoked
diplomatic notes to Moscow as strongly worded as
Teheran could wish. But words had no great weight last
week in the wooded hills and fertile valleys of
Azerbaijan. The Teheran Government temporized by
appointing a commission made up largely of former
premiers to investigate the situation in the northwest.
It was a weak expedient, but Teheran had probably heard
that Washington's unoffi cial attitude was "What more
can we do?"
Iran stood on its dignity as a full-fledged member of
UNO. But its intrinsic weakness was that of many small
states, sovereign in name only, which became pawns of
the great powers. It happened that Iran had a ruler
whose amiable, feckless personality symbolized
perfectly the political vacuum his once-great country
had become.
The Old Man. All his life (26 years) sallow, dewy-eyed
Mohamed Reza Pahlevi, Shah of Iran, had been anxious to
please, an attitude largely conditioned by his
autocratic father, the late, tough Reza Shah Pahlevi.
Like his ten brothers and sisters, Mohamed Reza grew up
in awe and admiration of the domineering old martinet
who rose from the soil to root a dynasty in nothing
more substantial than the high, dry air of Teheran's
political intrigue.
Old Reza Shah came from a family of small landholders
in Mazanderan Province, rose to be colonel in the
Iranian Army. When the decrepit regime of Ahmed Shah
tottered after World War I, Reza Khan became
successively Commander in Chief of the Iranian Army.
Minister of War, Premier, finally Shah of Shahs—all in
less than five years.
Young Mohamed Reza was brought up in a palace
atmosphere of despotic splendor. From Iran's jewel-
studded Peacock Throne his father grimly ordered his
enemies murdered or jailed, ruled his "court with a
caprice that ranged from slapping ministers in the face
to kicking subjects in the crotch. (Once, rumor had it,
the young Prince himself felt the royal boot and landed
in a palace fountain.)
In 15 years the old Shah's splenetic energy also
bulldozed medieval Iran into building an 860-mile
railroad to span the country from north to south,
erecting schools and factories, changing the country's
name from provincial Persia to national Iran,
abandoning the veil for women, accepting movies and
traffic lights.
This blend of barbarism and benevolence had its
inevitable effect on the Crown Prince. He grew into a
meek, friendly youth, given to expressing any inward
effervescence by racing along the streets of Teheran in
fast cars. The better to equip him for his royal
duties, the Shah gave the boy five years of European
schooling. The Shah had learned to read & write Persian
only after becoming Minister of War; the Crown Prince
became proficient in French, English and European
manners in one of the most expensive private schools in
Switzerland. But Mohamed Reza was not allowed to
finish. The Shah, suddenly bitten with suspicion that
his son was wasting his time, ordered him home for a
more rigorous personal preparation in the duties of
kingship.
The Kingdom. In 1941, when Germany's attack made aid to
Russia through Iran an essential of Allied victory, the
Allies took a long, hard look at old Reza Shah Pahlevi.
They suspected some of his hangers-on of intrigue with
Germany and, in any case, Reza Shah was too strong a
character to be left athwart the Lend-Lease supply line
to the U.S.S.R. So he was deposed, last year in far
away Johannesburg died, full of bitter memories.
Mohamed Reza, the wavy-haired young playboy, ascended
the jeweled Peacock Throne of Iran.
Since the days of Darius and Cyrus, the kingdom had
descended far. It was still large (a fifth as big as
the U.S.) and its mountains and desert contrasts were
still dramatically scenic. But of Mohamed Reza's 15
million subjects a few thousand lived in lavish luxury,
and almost all the rest in ragged poverty. At least
eleven million of them had venereal disease. Most of
the adults were opium addicts. Four out of every five
7
children born died in infancy. Three out of every four British were there before them. In Iran the thin, red
who survived never learned to read or write. line of British west-to-east imperialism crosses the
north-to-south axis of Russian expansionism. In Peter
the Great's famed "testament" (even if he did not write
And Fawzia, Too. The old Shah saw to it that Mohamed
it, historians call it an accurate expression of
Reza on his return to Teheran had a plentiful supply of
Russian policy), he exhorted his countrymen to "excite
mistresses. When the time came for the Crown Prince to
continual wars in Turkey and Persia."
marry, nothing was too good for him. His bride was
Fawzia, 17-year-old sister of Egypt's King Farouk, as
beautiful a princess as a prince could wish. They had Iran had become a plaything of the powers through an
only one child, a daughter called Shahnaz ("the pet of accident of geography: now it bounced the faster
the Shah"), born in October 1940. Thereafter, it became between them through an accident of geology. Iran had
apparent that the Shah's tastes were quantitative oil.
rather than qualitative Fawzia, whose family with a
century of rule be hind it looked upon the Iranian
Iran's oil was part of the greatest known oil reservoir
dynasty as an upstart, was enraged when her husband
on earth. Only in the south had part of its riches yet
publicly brought other women into the Gulistan Palace.
been tapped, by the British, but the results were
She consulted an American psychiatrist in Bagdad, and
impressive enough. From the oil area around Masjidi-
then came back to Teheran with a stern message for her
Suleiman and the great refinery of Abadan at the head
husband. Things were better for a little while, but the
of the Persian Gulf, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. drew
young Shah soon relapsed. Last May Fawzia went home to
350,000 barrels a day, with indicated reserves of six
Egypt on the pretext of ill health; last week she was
to seven billion barrels. Few oilmen doubted that the
still there. Court circles gossiped that an Egyptian
untapped fields north of Iran, especially round Lake
divorce had been secretly granted. But the Iranian
Urmia and Samnan, held oil as well.
marriage was yet to be dissolved.

The Shah's powerful friends were thirsty for his oil.

King in Crisis. Preoccupied by these personal problems
Eager applicants for concessions had been sitting
and pleasures, the Shah, Mohamed Reza, was scarcely the
around in Teheran for months. Least pressing perhaps
man to steer his country through a crisis. His Majlis
was the U.S.: Washington's concern with declining
(Parliament) of feudal landlords was not much help.
reserves had not yet reached the stage where it called
Many of the abler members were instruments either of
for the use of aggressive oil diplomacy in Iran. The
Britain or Russia, both of which continued to encourage
British thirst was sharper. Dependent entirely on oil
the corruption of Iranian life. Both, too, disrupted
from abroad, Britain could not afford to pass up any
Iran's economic life throughout the war. The British
opportunity. She had played the politics of oil longer,
(with the Americans) monopolized the country's
more successfully than anyone else. Now she was ready
inadequate transportation system for Lend-Lease
to play again.
shipments to Russia; the Russians prevented shipment of
grain from food-rich Azerbaijan to Teheran and other
deficient areas. In the capital there were food riots Biggest thirst of all was Russia's. Until World War II
that lasted three days. Inflation soared. By last year her production (some 240 million barrels a year) and
the cost of living had risen tenfold, preparing the way her reserves (some six billion barrels) had been enough
for Communist agitation. to cover her prodigious economy. (Twenty years ago she
had not even bothered to exploit a Russian-controlled
oil concession in northern Iran.) The war had taught
As for the Iranian Army, a story gives its quality. Not
her a burning lesson: when she came closest to losing
many years ago a battalion refused to obey orders. The
her oil, she came closest to losing the war. Now the
commander disbanded it, sent the men to their homes.
Red Army was grabbing oil in Poland, Rumania, Hungary,
They came to the Shah to request an escort with the
Austria—wherever and whenever it could. At home, Russia
plea, "there are bandits on the roads and we are only a
was stepping up her own production. Abroad, she was
hundred men."
searching for it with a determined eye. And abroad
meant, currently, Iran.
So the Shah, Mohamed Reza had to do his diplomatic
best. In occasional interviews he spoke hopefully to
The U.S.S.R. took full advantage of the peoples in its
British and U.S. correspondents of democracy and
southern states whose cousins live across the border in
postwar progress. When cabinets fell (a not infrequent
Iran. Azerbaijan's knife-wearing Kurds and ebullient
occurrence), he labored dutifully to find a premier who
Armenians spill over into adjoining countries (see
would satisfy the conflicting requirements of the
map). Its 700,000 Kurds have kin in Turkey and British-
outspoken, hardheaded Russian ambassador, Mikhail A.
controlled Iraq. Its 65,000 Armenians identify
Maximov, and the reticent, equally hardheaded British
themselves with Armenians in Turkey and in the Armenian
ambassador, Sir Reader William Bullard. At palace
Soviet Socialist Republic. Precept and propaganda had
parties the balance was preserved with similar
already aroused a strong separatist urge among Iran's
delicacy. U.S. Ambassador Wallace Murray would be
Armenians. At any moment blood might call to blood
invited to hear an American soprano, the Soviet
across the boundaries. In skilled Soviet hands, this
ambassador, a Russian pianist, the British ambassador,
interplay of nationalisms would be a potent instrument
a British actress.
of policy. Recently, in Azerbaijan, a pro-Russian
Democratic Kurdish Party significantly burgeoned into
The Politics of Oil. But the niceties of palace being.
protocol were surface symptoms. Beneath them stirred
the tides of history. As a well-read Iranian, the Shah
Possibly Russia contemplated annexing Iranian
doubtless recalled the words of the Arabian Poet Abul
Azerbaijan to the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic
Ala al Ma'arri: "History is a poem in which the words
across the border.
change, but the rhythm recurs." For Iran the rhythm of
history was almost metronomic.
Possibly, too, she planned a sphere-of-influence
solution like the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907,
Russia, in search of markets and warm water, has been
which solved nothing. More likely was the less
in & out of Iran since the early 17th Century. The
ambitious aim of a Communist-controlled, autonomous Az
8
erbaijan with a pro-Soviet Government in Teheran. These
would be enough to secure her exposed southern flank.
In Iran, last week were three foreign armies — Russians
in the north, British and Americans in the south. All
were there by agreement; all by agreement should leave
not later than next March 2. The U.S. contingent of
nearly 4,000 men, smallest of the three, was preparing
to depart by the end of the year. The other two would
stay until due date, presumably to buttress their
Government's diplomacy.
If the U.S. did not back Britain against Russia, the
Shah, Mohamed Reza Pahlevi, with the fatalism of his
race, might well ponder the philosophy of
inevitability. Without much help from the Shah, Iran's
fate would probably be decided at Mos cow's Big Three
meeting. Nor was it likely that sweet reason would play
much part in the settlements.
The gentle Omar had said it well enough : Myself when
young did eagerly frequent Doctor and Saint, and heard
great argument About it and about: but evermore Came
out by the same door as in I went.
Monday, Aug. 31, 1953
The People Take Over
The violent, hot land of Iran last week headed
uncontrollably over the crumbling edge of the abyss,
and then, during three wild days, pulled itself back to
safety.
When the week began, Mohammed Mossadegh seemed safely
on top. The Shah was in flight; the fanatic mullahs'
and the stubborn Majlis' opposition was hidden or
cowed; the army was a sullen eunuch; the world
resigned. Who was there to say him no?
His street supporters celebrated with a carnival of
destruction. Communist and Nationalist mobs swarmed
deliriously over Teheran's principal squares, pulling
down the great bronze statues of the Shah and his
father. They opened and denied the Reza Shah's tomb,
spat on the Shah's picture, applauded as Foreign
Minister Hussein Fatemi cried: "To the gallows" with
the young Shah.
The Ambassador's Call. At sundown of the second day,
wily old Mossadegh seemed to have all Teheran in his
hand. But something was stirring in Teheran that could
not yet be measured. Perhaps Mossadegh, unopposed, had
gone too far and too fast and frightened the people.
Perhaps the Shah's flight forced them at last to decide
between monarch and Premier.
Precisely at 6 p.m., U.S. Ambassador Loy Henderson
(back the previous day from two months' vacation)
mounted the stairs to Mossadegh's bedroom at 109 Kakh
Street. Henderson stayed one hour; soon after he left,
things began to happen.
What went on up in Mossadegh's bedroom? Henderson began
by protesting the stoning of six U.S. citizens' cars
that day, and asked assurances that U.S. lives and
property would be protected. Otherwise, he would order
all American women and children evacuated. That
startled Mossadegh. Then the ambassador inquired
politely about the legal validity of Mossadegh's regime
in view of the Shah's parting decree, in which he fired
Mossadegh and named General Falzollah Zahedi in his
place. When Henderson quit the room, Mossadegh was
firmly convinced that the U.S. was undecided whether to
continue to recognize him as Iran's Premier.
Happy to Oblige. Apparently this fitted together with
other doubts and misgivings that were gathering in
Mossadegh's mind. Shaken, the old man went to the phone
and ordered his army and police to drive the rioting
Reds off the street. That call, turning the army loose
on the most powerful street support he had, was
Mossadegh's fatal mistake. The troops were only too
happy to oblige; they clubbed the rioters unmercifully
and punctuated their thudding gun butts with shouts of
"Long live the Shah" and "Death to traitors." Growing
bolder, they forced the Reds at bayonet point to cheer
the Shah, too. The next morning, the bruised and bitter
Tudeh Central Committee proclaimed: "No more aid to
Mossadegh, who is a compromising traitor," and the Reds
retreated into hiding. He had disappointed them:
Mossadegh in their eyes was to have been the Kerensky
who preceded them to power. Now, suddenly, their
fortunes had changed.
The third day was the people's day. The shabbily
dressed poor poured out of their south Teheran slums,
chanting, "Long live the Shah." Others, armed with
knives and clubs, joined them. Shopkeepers pulled down
the shutters in front of their stores and swelled the
march. Ordered to stop the parades, the soldiers
turned, instead, on their officers. Eight truckloads of
troops and five tanks, dispatched to the city to help
Mossadegh, turned over their equipment to the first
pro-Shah mob they met.
Flanked now by soldiers, the mob began a nine-hour-long
assault on one Mossadegh stronghold after another. When
they finished, they had captured the police station and
Radio Teheran: they had sacked eight government
buildings and two pro-Mossadegh newspaper plants; they
had smashed the headquarters of the Tudeh and the pro-
Mossadegh Pan-Iranian party.
This was no military coup, but a spontaneous popular
uprising; individual soldiers joined, but not a single
army unit came in. Not until 4 p.m., when an air force
general appeared before General Zahedi's hideout with a
tank, did Zahedi emerge and take command of a field
already won. The General-Premier and his officers were
as surprised by the victory as the people themselves.
The army had planned to counterattack Mossadegh on
Friday; the people beat them to it by two days.
Last Stand. Mossadegh's last stand came at 109 Kakh
Street. U.S.-built Sherman tanks, ranged at each end of
the tree-lined avenue, dueled for four hours, 75-mm.
shells clanging off their World War II armor. The
defending Mossadegh forces ran out of ammunition first,
and it was all over. The losing commander was turned
over to the royalist mob, which pulled him apart. A
tank smashed the green grill gate, and thousands of
attackers swarmed into the yard. Mossadegh had got
away.
The mob tore apart the famous iron cot on which
Mossadegh had reigned so long with weepy-eyed,
irrational stubbornness. The rioters ripped the house
to pieces, hauled the furniture into the streets and
auctioned it off (a new electric refrigerator went for
$36). Soon, nothing remained of 109 Kakh Street but
memories of a regime which had stood Iran and the
Western world on its ear for more than two years. But,
even in his last hours of power, Mohammed Mossadegh
cost the nation dear: 300 died that day. Dressed in
silk pajamas, Mossadegh surrendered 24 hours later to
General Zahedi, was temporarily imprisoned in the
9
luxurious Teheran Officers' Club and then carted off to Later he received newsmen in the fountain-echoing
a common jail cell. garden of Saadabad Palace and spoke some brutal truths:
"The treasury is empty. We need help in the next few
days. We do not ask any nation in particular, and we
Tennis Partner. The man in whose name the street mobs
are not beggars, but if help does not come, we will
prevailed had fled his native land three days before.
have a nightmarish struggle." In the streets, Americans
Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, the Shahinshah, arrived in Rome
who had recently been greeted with cries of "Americans,
with a two-day beard on his chin, accompanied by his
go home," now found themselves welcomed happily by
disheveled, 21-year-old Queen, who was on the verge of
Iranians who let them know that the Iranians had done
tears. That night, unable to sleep, the Shah paced the
all of this for them and now counted on help from .the
living room of their three-room suite at Rome's showy
U.S.
Hotel Excelsior. With his personal pilot, Major
Mohammed Khatami, he talked over future plans for a
pleasant exile. "He asked me to stay with him," the Monday, Sep. 12, 1960
major said later. "I told him I was afraid I would Reformer in Shako
become a burden to him." "Who," asked the Shah
plaintively, "is going to play tennis with me if you
(See Cover)
leave me?"

At fever pitch, the crowd plunged through Teheran's

The Shah bought himself four tennis rackets and a pair
vaulted bazaar, making its way past brilliant stacks of
of black antelope shoes; Soraya bought lingerie and two
rugs, past squatting tinsmiths and hanging ranks of
crocodile handbags and, at a couturier's, ordered a
newly slain lambs and, at last, down a labyrinthine
dozen summer frocks. That noon, in the Excelsior dining
alley to the home of Ayatollah Mohammed Behbehani,
room, Mohammed Reza Pahlevi began his shrimp cocktail,
Teheran's most powerful religious leader. In Ayatollah
just another king in exile; by the time he reached his
Mohammed's great walled garden, a white-turbaned mullah
coffee, he was back in business as Shah. A reporter
shouted over a microphone: "All elections must be
(see PRESS) rushed to his table with the news:
canceled!" The crowd roared back: "We agree! We
"Mossadegh has been overthrown, Your Majesty!" The
agree!'' White-robed and heavily bearded, bent by his
Shah's jaw dropped; his trembling fingers reached for a
90 years, Ayatollah Mohammed shuffled slowly across the
cigarette. "Can it be true?" he asked uncertainly. The
garden on the arms of two aides. "Shall we shut down
Queen was quicker on the uptake. "How exciting," said
the bazaar?'' shouted the crowd. "Wait." answered
Soraya, placing a calming hand on her husband's arm.
Ayatollah Mohammed.
"It shows how the people stand," said the Shah at last.
"I have to admit that I haven't had a very important
part in the revolution." Aides scurried off to check In his suburban palace north of Teheran, Shah Mohammed
airline schedules. Reza Pahlevi, occupant of Iran's jeweled Peacock
Throne, listened to the somber reports of his people's
wrath. The blatant rigging of Iran's latest
Now the Iranian chargé d'affaires in Rome and a
parliamentary elections was too much, and the Shah had
functionary from the Italian Foreign Ministry, both of
to act. Scarcely had the roar of the mob in Ayatollah
whom had ignored the Shah's harried arrival in Rome,
Mohammed's garden died away when the Shah last week
came to pay their belated respects. On top of things
accepted the resignation of Premier Manouchehr Eghbal.
again, the Shah refused to see the charge d'affaires
whose conservative Nationalist Party had just scored an
who had snubbed him; later the Shah had him fired. Next
unbelievably lopsided election victory. Three days
morning, the Shah slipped out to a jeweler's and
later, with the crowd still unappeased, the Shah made a
selected a variety of diamond baubles for Soraya. This
more drastic concession. "It seems." he proclaimed,
was a consolation gift for her agreeing to remain a
"that the interest of the nation requires the mass
while in Rome for her "health." Then he boarded a
resignation of all Deputies in order that new elections
chartered K.L.M. airliner for Bagdad, where he put on
may take place." Dutifully, the newly elected members
his gold-braided air marshal's uniform (specially flown
of Iran's 200-man Majlis fell in line, renounced their
from Teheran). He piloted his own twin-engined
seats.
Beechcraft on the final leg to his capital.

Trouble is nothing new in Iran—or for Mohammed Reza

Triumphal Arches. Six days after fleeing into exile,
Pahlevi. In his 19 years on the throne, Iran's Shah has
the Shah was back in his capital, stronger than ever,
been shot once, chased into exile once, and has seen
without having lifted a finger. Though his flight had
his country occupied by foreign powers. But that
reflected his panic, it also served to precipitate the
corrupt elections—which have been standard through
crisis and thereby, in the end, had proved beneficial.
Iran's modern history—could produce a popular explosion
For the people had shown more faith in him and in the
told of a new sense of power, and new discontent, among
throne he occupied than he himself suspected. Premier
the country's swelling city masses. It was also a
Zahedi and the entire frock-coated diplomatic corps
tribute to the ceaseless campaign of radio abuse Soviet
were at the airport to greet him.
Russia has lately showered on its southern neighbor.
Moscow is doing everything it can to topple the Shah.
In the swirl of officials and newspapermen and honor
guards, the Shah made his way with difficulty. Two
With its warm-water ports on the Persian Gulf, Iran has
bureaucrats flung themselves on the ground before him,
been a target of Russian imperialism since the days of
embraced his legs and tried to kiss his feet;
Peter the Great. Its attraction for the Communists in
embarrassed in front of the foreign newspapermen, the
the Kremlin is even greater than it ever was for the
Shah, after patting the bureaucrats' heads, tried to
Czars. The world's fourth largest exporter of oil,
disengage himself. He looked tired, and as he made his
Iran, as a member of CENTO (formerly the Baghdad
way down the reception line past teary-eyed officials,
Pact,), is an essential link in the defensive tier
his own eyes filled too. He clasped Ambassador
along Russia's southern border. The U.S. has poured
Henderson's hand heartily; he gave Soviet Envoy Anatoly
more than $800 million into Iran since World War II. By
Lavrentiev a perfunctory handclasp. Then he was off to
bringing Iran under its influence, Russia would knock
the palace in a limousine, under hastily erected
out the last anti-Communist alliance in the vast area
triumphal arches and past cheering crowds.
between Western Europe and the Far East, and would

10
acquire a land bridge to the troubled Arab world.
Should the Shah lose his fight for his dynasty and his
nation, the Soviets would at last be free to dominate
the Middle East.
Straight from Persepolis. The man who stands between
the West and such an alarming prospect is one of the
few remaining monarchs who is more than merely
decorative. At 41, Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, Shahanshah
(King of Kings) of Iran, is undisputed boss of his
nation. "His Imperial Majesty is above everything," a
Teheran newspaper recently explained to its readers.
"Constitutionally. he can appoint or dismiss a Premier
as he sees fit. He can also dissolve parliament if he
so chooses. He decides on which projects his country
needs, bills that should be presented for passage by
the legislature, and on the conduct generally of home
and foreign policy."
A trim, broad-shouldered man, the Shah walks with the
easy grace of the trained athlete and soldier, shows
aware ness of his power with every toss of his silvery
royal head. Though he is only the second ruler in the
Pahlevi dynasty—which dates from 1926—his profile might
have been lifted straight from one of the bas-reliefs
in the ancient Persian capital of Persepolis that
Alexander conquered. If the Shah has little sense of
humor and a prevalent cast of melancholy, it is perhaps
because his life has been a sobering affair.
Everyone Rises. The Shah's father, known to his
subjects as Reza Shah, was an old-style, absolute
monarch who rose from noncom to colonel to King,
overthrowing Iran's slack-chinned, 130-year-old Qajar
dynasty by force of arms. A wiry, hot-tempered
martinet, the old Shah set out to manhandle Iran into
the mod ern world, and he did not mind machine-gunning
obstreperous peasants to do it. He abolished the veil,
and when a Moslem imam criticized the Queen for not
wearing one, roared up to the mosque in a convoy of
armored cars, marched in, and kicked the priest in the
stomach.
From the time Mohammed was a toddler, the old Shah
paraded him about in gold-incrusted uniforms complete
with shako, preaching dreams of dynasty and a
rejuvenated Iran. "What is the use of leading a life of
shame?" Shah Mohammed says today, recalling his
father's struggles. "Our army was composed of a number
of woodcutters and egg sellers. Civil servants'
salaries were paid in bricks instead of money. Whenever
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted to give a
banquet, it had to send someone to the bazaar to borrow
100 tomans ($172)."
To prepare young Mohammed for power, Reza Shah
relentlessly pushed him into the "manly sports," in
1931 abruptly packed him off (aboard a Russian cruiser)
to La Rosee school in Switzerland. A U.S. schoolmate
recalls that the experience was something of a shock
all around. Striding into the school lounge, the young
prince announced: "When I enter a room, everyone
rises." His fellow students merely stared at him in
polite amazement. In time, Mohammed won a kind of
plebiscite from them by getting himself elected captain
of the school soccer team.
Back to Barracks. When Mohammed finally returned home,
an attractive, smiling young man smartly clad in
European clothes, Reza Shah took one disgusted look and
slapped him back in uniform at the local military
academy. His smiles gone, Mohammed went back to
following Reza Shah to reviews and parades, and in 1939
just as obediently trekked off to Egypt and brought
back the bride his father had selected, the pretty
Princess Faw-zia, sister of King Farouk.
In wartime 1941 Britain and the Soviet Union, seeking a
supply bridge, suddenly occupied Iran, dividing it in
two. Only then did Mohammed escape his father's shadow.
Suspecting the old Shah of German sympathies, the
Allies shipped him off to bitter exile in South Africa
(where he died in 1944) and propped 21-year-old
Mohammed on the Peacock Throne. When Roosevelt,
Churchill and Stalin chose Teheran as the site of their
1943 meeting, they did not even bother to let Mohammed
know they were coming.
On the Way. The Shah finally got his country back in
1946 and boldly sent troops into Azerbaijan, Iran's
northernmost province, to throw out a puppet regime the
Soviets had left behind. Three years later, he came
within a hair's breadth of death at the hands of a
leftist fanatic who opened fire with a pistol as the
Shah was handing out diplomas at Teheran University.
Three shots drilled the Shah's hat, another creased his
lip and right cheek and, as he dived to the ground, a
fifth hit him in the left shoulder. Bodyguards riddled
the would-be assassin, and the Shah next day grimly
returned from the hospital to the throne, declaring:
"My will is unrelenting."
He had not only political problems but domestic ones.
Though his father sired four daughters and seven sons,
the Shah still has no male heir to his throne. In 1948,
after she had borne him one daughter, he divorced
Egypt's Fawzia and three years later married the
handsome half-German, half-Iranian Soraya. Despite
Soraya's famed fiery temper, it was with regret that
the Shah divorced her in 1958, apparently convinced
that she was barren —a charge that makes Soraya angry.
For a time the Shah retired to the com pany of other
women, the glow of fine French champagne and the
stimulus of high-stakes poker games with cronies at
Saadabad Palace, where he glumly lost a reported 10
million rials ($130,000). Late last year, after his
companions had searched far and wide for someone who
met the royal standards, the Shah struck up a third
match with 21-year-old Farah Diba, a pert Iranian art
student in Paris who, after royal treatment by Dior,
Revillon and Carita, easily equaled his first two wives
in comely poise. Soon after their marriage, Farah Diba
announced that a child was on the way. On the
assumption that the baby will be the long-awaited heir,
the Shah reportedly has already decided to name him
Cyrus—after ancient Persia's Cyrus the Great. The baby
is due in late October, and the Shah plans gala
celebrations early next year for the 2,500th
anniversary of Cyrus' empire. which once stretched from
the Indus to the shores of Greece.
Dry Domain. Like his father, the Shah longs to impart
grandeur to his dynasty. But he has another objective
more realistic and admirable: to convert Iran into a
healthy and stable modern nation. It has an awfully
long way to go. Still vivid in the Shah's mind is the
reaction of Iran's comfort-loving old-line politicians
when he first confided his goal to them in 1942.
"Sixteen Majlis Deputies," he recalls, "met with me in
one of the rooms of this palace to confer about
political affairs of the day. I told them that we must
establish social justice in this country and added, 'It
is not fair that a number of people should be at a loss
what to do with their wealth, while a number die of
hunger.' Next day they said, 'The Shah has developed
revolutionary ideas.' "
11
In many ways Iran is a brown, unpromising ground for an
economic and social revolution, 20th century style. A
sprawl ing country that would stretch from Spain to
Poland and from England to Italy, Iran is mostly arid
plateau, where even under maximum irrigation a full 50%
of the land would remain near-desert. Iranians all
agree that life would be hopeless without the
mountains: the Elburz range breaking the frosty blasts
from the Russian north, the Zagros range towering over
the Iraqi border to the east. On the mountain slopes
the inhabitants of Iran's jam-packed cities find their
vacation ground, and the migrant tribes their winter
herding. More important, the snow-capped peaks send
down the trickle of water that keeps the valley towns
alive.
Some of Iran's barrenness stems from its history. Ever
since the decline of the ancient Persian empire,-it has
been a crossroads nation—sacked bloodily by Alexander,
Genghis Khan and Tamerlane. (One of Persia's last
forays as conqueror was a 1739 raid on India, when
troops pilfered from Delhi the emerald-incrusted throne
on which the Shah now sits on cer emonial occasions.)
Centuries ago, the average Persian retreated to his
ridge-locked valley, where the keeper of the ritual hot
baths still gets a cut of the villagers' crops, and
where slim youths still build and maintain the tiled-
roofed qanats that tunnel water as far as 40 miles from
the nearest mountain well. Even yet, the Iranian
economy remains primitive enough that a whole family
can make a living off a single walnut tree. In the rug
shops of Tabriz, tiny children work at the looms all
day for 20^ or less. And the country's exports remain
highly selective: choice caviar from the lightly salted
Caspian Sea, sheep intestine for sausage casing, 300
tons of dried rose petals—and 350 million barrels of
oil a year.
Reassuring Words. Even the oil—which Britain's Anglo-
Persian Co. first began to exploit in 1909—long brought
little to Iran but a more flagrant gap between rich and
poor.
The man who capitalized. on the oil-brought discontent
is still widely revered in Iran. Mohammed Mossadegh, a
wealthy landowner, started with no coherent platform
except blind xenophobia and the understandable
conviction that the British payment of four gold
shillings a ton, plus a sum equal to about 20% of
company dividends, was far too little for the right to
exploit Iran's major resource. In 29 swirling months
beginning in 1951, Mossadegh parlayed these prejudices
into the premiership of Iran. When the Shah tried to
curb him, worried both by Mossadegh's street popularity
and the fact that his defiant policies threatened to
land Iran in bankruptcy, the weepy little Premier
turned to the Communist-led city mob and, in effect,
replaced his royal master as ruler of Iran.
The Shah bided his time until August 1953, then gave
his backstairs blessing to a coup against Mossadegh.
The first reports to reach the Shah at a Caspian resort
were that the coup had failed. At the controls of his
own twin-engined Beechcraft D185, the Shah fled Iran
accompanied only by Soraya, the royal gamekeeper and
Air Force Colonel Mohammed Khatemi (now commanding
general of the Iranian Air Force and husband of the
Shah's sister. Princess Fatemeh). Six days later, after
holing up in Rome (where Allen Dulles, boss of the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency, just happened to be
vacationing), the Shah realized that the coup was a
success and flew home to a tumultuous wel come in
Teheran.
Atonement. Perhaps as partial atonement for his flight,
the Shah subsequently married his daughter, Princess
Shahnaz. to the son of the general who led the coup. As
a more permanent atonement, the Shah has tried
conscientiously ever since to provide Iran, against
uphill odds, with the prerequisites of stability.
It required stout nerves in this young ruler to defy
the bluff and threat of his northern neighbor.
Sometimes the Shah, envious of the way the great powers
wooed the neutralist Nasser, complained that he was not
getting enough Western help. In one dangerous foray
into the perilous waters of neutralism, the Shah,
despite Iran's membership in the Baghdad Pact, made a
red-carpet tour of Moscow and later dangled in front of
the Kremlin the hint that he might be willing to sign a
nonaggression treaty. Last year he abruptly called the
whole deal off. Ever since, the Russians have ranked
him with West Germany's Konrad Adenauer as a specially
loathsome "cold-war criminal." Powerful Persian-
language stations in Stalinabad, Baku, Tashkent and
Yerevan blast away at him daily. "Such puppets as
Mohammed Reza Shah ought to be dumped in the garbage
bin. The regime must be overthrown." proclaimed the
self-styled "National Voice of Iran" from near Soviet
Baku last week. At the in frequent wattle villages
along Iran's bleak, mine-infested 1000-mile frontier
with Russia, batteries of Soviet loudspeakers steadily
blare out anti-Shah propaganda. The ceaseless attacks
from Moscow-repeated in whispers in every Iranian
bazaar—make it all the more imperative for the Shah's
reforms to succeed. Heart of his program is a seven-
year economic-development scheme called Operation Plan,
backed both by U.S. aid and the revenues from Iran's
oil—which is now produced and marketed by a four-nation
(Britain, U.S., France, The Netherlands), consortium in
partnership with the Iranian government. Virtually the
only Iranian government agency bossed by bright young
men. Operation Plan will have spent $1.2 billion by the
time it is officially due to wind up in 1962. It has
already done much to change the somber face of Iran.
Teheran streets, which only a few years ago were the
preserve of donkeys and camels, today are clogged by
100,000 automobiles. On the northern outskirts of the
city, showplace villas, some with kidney-shaped
swimming pools and lush green lawns as trim as pile
carpets, dot the cool foothills of 18,600-ft. Mount
Demavend ("Bride of the Gods"). Cement mixers growl at
the sites of a new 2O-story hotel and the nearly
finished 15-story headquarters of the National Iranian
Oil Co. Auditoriums, stadiums and university buildings
add relieving notes to what was once peripheral
wasteland. A jeep assembly plant spews out new models,
soon to be shod by an Iranian Goodrich factory.
Nor is growth confined to Teheran, an unhandsome
city.*At Azna, near unexploited iron-ore deposits, work
is soon to start on that final modern symbol of
sovereignty, a $165 million steel plant to be built by
a 'combine including West Germany's Krupp. In the
southern city of Shiraz, where a new hotel is going up,
a natural-gas pipeline is burrowing into town to
provide cheap fuel both for domestic use and the
burgeoning textile industry. Most ambitious project of
all is a land-reclamation scheme in southwest Khuzistan
province, near the rich oilfields on the Persian Gulf,
where a corporation bossed by former TV A Chief David
Lilienthal is building a 620-ft. dam across the Ab-i-
Diz River to furnish power and irrigation to 160
villages scattered over 375,000 acres. Lilienthal hopes
to restore the arid province to the fertility it
enjoyed in the days when, as he is fond of noting, "the
horses on the friezes of Persepolis were fattened on
Khuzistan grain."
12
The Shadow of Nuri Said. In making over his country,
the Shah has not hesitated to spend his own private
fortune as freely as public funds. In the past nine
years, he has distributed 350,000 acres of crown land
to the peasants who till it, using the low, interest-
free payments for the plots to finance seed, fertilizer
and machinery costs for the new owners. And this is
only the beginning: the Shah's aides have stern orders
to cut through red tape and give away within 18 months
the rest of the 1,400,000 acres that old Reza Shah so
lustily acquired only a generation ago. With the
$6.000.000 annual income of his Pahlevi Foundation, the
Shah supports projects ranging from 40 orphanages to
the education of Iranian students abroad and winter
fuel for needy farmers.
Too much of Iran's money has stuck on hands along the
way. Too much more of it has gone into what technicians
call infrastructure, the little noticed underpinnings
such as roads and education (since 1953, school
enrollment in Iran has been boosted from 427.000 to
1,381,000) on which a modern economy is raised. The
Shah's admirers, though conceding that this makes
economic sense, cannot quite shake off the ominous
shadow of Iraq's late Strongman Nuri asSaid, who built
the finest infrastructure in the Middle East and lost
his head in a bloody revolution. Even the enthusiastic
Lilienthal admits that irrigating Khuzistan may take "a
generation." The question is whether the Shah can count
on his miserable people forbearing that long.
Occupation Complex. History has left some psychological
scars on the Shah's 20 million subjects. After
centuries of conquest, Iran has a kind of occupation
complex, vividly exemplified by a tenet of its Shi'ite
sect of Islam, which holds that a man may legitimately
disavow his religion in time of danger. ''Deep in the
Iranian mind," says one Middle East expert, "lies the
conviction that nothing ever happens in Iran except by
the desire of a foreign power." Many of the middle-
class Teheran intellectuals and business men who most
heatedly denounced the recent election rigging had not
even bothered to vote. Scoffed one educated Teherani:
"That's for coolies." They also knew it was only a
contest between two men outdoing each other in pledged
subservience to the Shah. And what hangs most ominously
over all Iranian life, too often at court as well as in
business life, is the ingrained Iranian tradition of
corruption and favoritism, casually explained away by
the Persian saying: "Let no man of rank be a tree
without fruit.''
Despite the Shah's best intentions, a shocking
percentage of Iran's economic-development money turns
into "fruit'' distributed at every level of
officialdom. One foreign entrepreneur, after striking a
bargain for some surplus airplane parts originally
given to the Iranian Air Force by the U.S., resignedly
paid off the colonels concerned only to have his loaded
trucks held up at the gate by a young captain of the
guard who inquired with pointed effect, "Don't you
think captains are as good as colonels?" "They aren't
even subtle about it," says one prosperous contractor.
"We all regard it as merely part of the deal.
Frequently, we negotiate to come to terms. But dealing
with royalty, for example, remains pretty much of a
command performance." Most notable of Iran's royal
tycoons: the Shah's twin sister, Princess Ashraf, who
has already made two husbands wealthy.
Sporadically fired with determination to stamp out
dishonesty in government, the Shah has fired 4,000
bureaucrats for corruption within a year, not long ago
arrested 150 army officers on the same charge and put
several colonels in jail. Corruption is in the air; but
it also exists because the hard-working Shah tries to
run the government all by himself. His few trusted
aides are mostly officers of Iran's 200,000-man army,
which he relies on to keep him in power and hence
pampers. As a result, generals abound, and every other
automobile in Teheran seems to bear the yellow and
white plates that denote an army car. Among civilian
officials. the Shah depends on retainers like Eghbal.
who once told the Majlis: "I am not interested in your
criticism and your complaints. You may say whatever you
like — I do not care. I do not depend on your votes.
The Shahanshah ordered me to serve, and I am his
servant."
The III -Served Prince. Such faithful service is more
apt to be fawning than effective or reliable. Last
month, on a visit to the Abadan refineries on the Per
sian Gulf, Farah Diba demanded to see the living
conditions inside one of the worker's homes and, when
she had, burst into tears. Solicitously, the official
who was guiding her asked "to be allowed" to make a
contribution to the families on the block.
Ostentatiously, he collected identity cards, jotted
down names — and, as Farah Diba drove away, tore up the
list and tossed it into the gutter.
The cost of that kind of officialdom could be seen in
the recent elections. The Shah originally intended the
elections as a way of cleaning out some of parliament's
more notorious rascals. He personally approved the
slates of candidates of the only two organized parties
in the race, and seems to have hoped for a fair fight.
But when a few independent candidates launched lively
anti-Nationalist campaigns, Premier Eghbal and his
cronies panicked.
The resulting fraud was too blatant to be disguised.
Cycling rapidly past a polling booth in downtown
Teheran, one citizen let fall a pouch full of documents
that included 40 personal-identity cards to be used in
fraudulent voting. When the government ticket in one
rural district seemed sure to lose, election officials
simply stayed home "ill."
The Perils of Ambition. By some Western diplomats, the
Shah is rated as "the most intelligent ruler in the
Middle East" — and he showed his sensitivity to his
country's mood by his quick reaction last week to the
election scandal. But whether he has done enough is
less clear. The caretaker Premier he chose to replace
the hapless Eghbal, ex-Minister of Mines and Industries
Jaffar Sharif-Imami, 50, is an honest but uninspiring
choice. His Cabinet gave no voice to the independent
feeling that ran so high during the elections. More
disturbing are the indications that the Shah, in a
moment of peril, is veering back toward the dangerous
game of trying to pacify the Russians. As one of his
first official acts, Sharif-Imami ended the anti-Soviet
radio broadcasts with which Iran has countered the
Russian diatribes. In response to a planted press-
conference question on the possibilities of a "new
phase" in Soviet-Iranian relations, the Shah pointedly
declared that Iran's foreign policy is based on
"membership in the United Nations and friendship for
all neighbors."
Like all great tasks, the one which Mohammed Reza
Pahlevi has set for himself involves great hazards. He
has committed himself not just to a holding action for
feudalism but to the evolution of a mod ern state.
Sooner or later, the Shah must find trustworthy and
independent subordinates to whom he can delegate
authority and must create responsible institutions to
close the gap between the court and the people. For, as
last week's election fiasco showed, Iran can no longer
13
be governed by the simple kingly fiat: "I have given
orders. Let them be carried out."
-*The nation changed its name officially in 1935 from Persia to Iran, a variation of the
word Aryan, one of its principal peoples. This was done in part to point up the ethnic
contrast with its Semitic neighbors. Though Moslem, Iran is not Arab, a fact that has
saved it from the Nasser-sponsored troubles that have rocked the rest of the Middle
East. -Far more beautiful: the ancient tiled mosque city of Isfahan to the south, which
in the 16th century reign of Shah Abbas was a greater city than Elizabethan London.
Monday, Nov. 4, 1974
Oil, Grandeur and a Challenge to the West
The Shah is the Shadow of God.
— Old Persian proverb Ever since the oil crisis that
rocked the world last year, the autocratic ruler of
Iran has, to many people, indeed seemed to be basking
in the light of the Almighty. Iran sits atop an
estimated 60 billion bbl. of crude oil, or roughly one-
tenth of the world's proven reserves. The disposition
of "this noble product" (as Iranians like to call it),
and the money to be made from it, is in the firm hands
of one man: His Imperial Majesty Mohammed Reza Pahlavi,
Aryamehr (Light of the Aryans), Shahanshah (King of
Kings). Once dismissed by Western diplomats as an
insecure, in effective playboy-King, this emperor of
oil commands new respect these days, as much for his
ambitions as for his wealth. By means of what he has
called a "white revolution," the Shah is determined to
transform Iran, a country that still includes nomads
whose life-style has not changed in a thousand years,
into a Middle Eastern superpower.
Iran today has a unique position in the world: it is a
Moslem nation but not an Arab one. For that reason, the
Shah was not invited to last week's summit conference
of Arab leaders in Rabat (see following story). Yet it
plays a key role in the power politics of the Middle
East, without being directly involved in the struggles
between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Iran has a proud
past and almost unlimited future potential, which the
Shah intends to develop with his new-found oil wealth.
Within the councils of OPEC, he has consistently argued
for keeping prices high—essential, he believes, if the
countries of the Middle East are ever to achieve the
high standard of living taken for granted in the West.
Laudable though that ambition may be, many Western
leaders find it hard to accept the Shah's argument,
especially since he frequently combines it with
moralizing messages about the need for industrial
nations to scrimp and economize. Iran is one of the
handful of nations that has helped push Western Europe
to the edge of economic disaster —and has begun a major
redistribution of wealth. Whether he is seen as hero or
villain, the Shah cannot be ignored. Thus it is no
accident that U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
(see story page 40) will spend no less than three days
of his current diplomatic junket in Tehran.
In the eyes of Iran's 32 million people, the prosperity
and national prestige the Shah is bringing them has
bathed their ruler with new luster. Thus last week,
when the Shadow of God celebrated his 55th birthday—his
56th by Iranian reckoning, which counts the day of
birth as one's first birthday—the national holiday was
observed with particular fervor. The capital city of
Tehran (pop. 3.8 million) glowed from the light of
millions of colored lamps. As part of the festivities,
the Shah and lissome Empress Farah reviewed a mass
exhibition of gymnasts in the $185 million sports
complex built for the recent Asian Games. The Shah also
grandly pardoned 148 prisoners who had been convicted
of such charges as robbery, drug use, antistate
activities and "plots against the monarchy."
Another and perhaps more impressive affirmation of the
Shah's position in Iranian life took place at Golestan
Palace. He presided over a salam or birthday levee of a
thousand courtiers and high officials. Some of the men
were dressed in cream-colored trousers and high-necked
gold-braided uniform jackets; it was a scene oddly
reminiscent of the days of Metternich. At a signal from
the master of ceremonies, they carried out a prescribed
ritual: a bow, a kiss bestowed on the outstretched
imperial hand and flowery salutations, "Tavalod-e-
Shahanshah Aryamehr ra Tabrik Arz Mikonam [Greetings on
your Imperial Majesty's birthday]."
In the 33rd year of an often uncertain reign, Mohammed
Reza Pahlavi has brought Iran to a threshold of
grandeur that is at least analogous to what Cyrus the
Great achieved for ancient Persia. Items:
> Iran is now producing 6.1 million bbl. of oil daily
and is the world's second-greatest oil-exporting
nation, after Saudi Arabia. Iran's refinery at Abadan
is the world's largest. More important, the Shah was
one of the first oil potentates to take complete
control of production and reserves: since 1954 all
income from production has gone to the National Iranian
Oil Co., which is completely controlled by his
government.
> Iran's oil revenues are increasing astronomically.
Technocrats working on the country's latest five-year
development plan have been forced to rejiggle the
revenue side of the ledger almost daily; it now stands
at $23 billion in oil income this year, v. $5 billion
last year. Even if there is no further increase in oil
prices, income next year should be more than $25
billion.
> Unlike Saudi Arabia, whose resources are almost
inexhaustible (see chart), Iran is expending both its
oil and its oil income to create a broad industrial
base in the country before the crude begins to run out
(1990, by Iranian estimates). That involves a heavy
investment in social development, since 40% of Iranians
are illiterate. Outside the cities, many live in
poverty; about 85% of Iran's land is untillable without
artificial irrigation. This year Iran will spend $16
billion on projects ranging from dams to schools to
hospitals. By the end of the current five-year plan,
the Shah will have spent more than $68 billion on
domestic improvements.
> With excess oil income, Iran is also undertaking aid
and investment abroad. This year's expenditures include
$700 million to the International Monetary Fund to
assist nations with balance of payment problems and
$350 million to the World Bank. Additionally, Iran this
year has committed $7 billion worth of grants, loans
and deposits against future purchases from a dozen
countries, including Britain and France. For an
estimated $100 million, the government recently bought
25.04% ownership of the steel-producing branch of West
Germany's 162-year-old Krupp steel empire. In August
the Shah endowed a million-dollar chair in petroleum
engineering at the University of Southern California.
No other member of the club of suddenly wealthy oil
nations is advanced enough or populous enough to match
Iran's projected scale of social and economic growth
over the next two decades. Certainly no other oil power
has a leader quite as visionary and energetic in his
planning. Even though the Shah's ambitious plans for
14
Iran are barely under way, the country has already
achieved such a pre-eminent place in the Middle East
that businessmen and diplomats alike are beating a jet-
pattern path to the Shah's door.
Great Civilization. Important visitors, naturally, are
granted audiences with the man who makes the decisions.
The Shah was educated in Switzerland and has traveled
widely abroad; he converses with his visitors as
fluently in French or English as in Farsi, the
principal Iranian language. In any of the three
tongues, he can evangelistically describe his goals for
Iran's "Great Civilization"—a phrase redolent of the
American "New Frontier" and "Great Society" of the
'60s. When the civilization matures, the Shah believes,
it will turn Iran into the "Japan of West Asia" —a
Third World miracle the like of which has not been
witnessed since West Germany's Wirtschaftswunder.
Already oil money has begun to transform Iran into an
empire of paradoxes. The old Persia remains for those
who seek it: the Qashqai tribe in the southwest still
graze their cattle in the Zagros Mountains and locate
water in a 1,000-year-old system of interconnected
wells known as qanats. In Tehran entrepreneurs who make
$50,000 a day take jet flights to Europe to complete a
business deal (and see banned-in-Iran movies like Last
Tango in Paris) or perhaps buy a vacation villa in
Provence.
Some of the wives of these new middle-class
millionaires, who celebrate Women's Emancipation Day
each February and can divorce their husbands as easily
as men once could divorce wives under Islamic law, are
dressed by Balenciaga and Dior. But on the street they
pass other women who still wear the traditional
speckled chador, or robe of modesty. The bustling
streets of Tehran are so clogged with automobiles,
including the made-in-Iran Paykan (Hillman) and
Chevrolet Iran (Opel) as well as double-decked Leyland
transit buses, that the city has belatedly begun to
consider building a mass-transit system.
Contradiction leaps out everywhere in Iran nowadays. In
Tehran, the mud huts of the poor lie hard by the
condominiums of the rich. In the bazaars of Isfahan, a
merchant accustomed to dealing with Iranians is likely
to find himself negotiating simultaneously with a
Russian steel-mill technician and an American
helicopter expert.
The glue that holds this disparate society together is
the Shahanshah. "Who built your new mosque?" the
headman of the village of Hesar Khorvan on the slopes
of the Elburz Mountains is asked. "The Shah, of
course," he answers firmly. For the bourgeois Tehrani,
the Shah has grown to be a kind of imperial security
blanket. "The middle class has become dependent on
him," says one businessman. "They feel secure. They
don't know what might come their way if he were not
around, and that makes them pro-regime."
The Shah's underlying aim in building his Great
Civilization is to make Iran not only secure but self-
sufficient. "Since World War II," says Premier Amir-
Abbas Hoveida, "we have seen that pacts and bilateral
arrangements don't work when you need them. Our buildup
is our only way of survival." The Shah is succeeding so
adroitly that even old adversaries look at him with
respect. The Arab states of the Persian Gulf, who share
nothing culturally with Iran but religion,* are
apprehensive about the massive military power the Shah
has been building up with oil income. At the same time,
they are pleased with the Shah's insistence on higher
oil prices.
The Soviet Union, which during World War II occupied
and attempted to annex Iran's northernmost province of
Azerbaijan, is now almost purringly cooperative. Moscow
has toned down the anti-Shah propaganda it formerly
beamed forth as a way of promoting Iran's outlawed
Communist (Tudeh) Party. In exchange for Iranian
natural gas, which is piped over the border from Aga-
jari, the Soviets constructed Iran's first super steel
plant at Isfahan—now only 24 miles from an American-
staffed helicopter school that is the world's largest.
Relations with Moscow are so correct these days that
the Russians made no complaints when the Shah recently
raised the price of natural gas from 30.7¢ per 1,000
cu. ft. to 57¢.
The Shah considers himself a good friend of the U.S.
Indeed, relations between Washington and Tehran have
generally been excellent since 1953, when the CIA
fomented demonstrations that led to a coup against the
late leftist Premier Mohammed Mossadegh, thereby
allowing the fledgling Shah to return to power after a
brief, humiliating exile in Rome. These days, however,
there is more than a single view of the Shah in
official Washington, and sometimes he is given to
wondering which one reflects the real Government
position.
Hired Gun. At the Treasury Department, for instance,
the Shah is generally thought of as a tyrant and a
megalomaniac whose stubbornness and greed over oil
prices represent a threat to the economic stability of
the world. Treasury Secretary William Simon has
publicly described the Shah as a "nut" and as
"irresponsible and reckless." The Shah is somewhat more
highly regarded at the Pentagon. The Defense Department
is pleased with the Shah's massive purchases of
sophisticated U.S. weapons, but some intelligence
analysts cynically regard the Shah as little more than
America's hired gun in the Middle East. At the State
Department, by contrast, the Shah is considered an
enlightened ruler who is propelling his backward people
into prosperity and is defending his own country, as
well as U.S. interests, against the spread of
Communism.
What makes the Shah a key figure in the Middle East,
some U.S. diplomats believe, is the fact that like
Secretary of State Kissinger, he has managed to deal
equably with both sides. He considers the Israelis
arrogant and even "masochistic." But Iran nevertheless
provides Israel with 50% of its oil. In return, Israeli
experts on irrigation and land reclamation have
transformed Iran's Ghazvin Plain into a fertile oasis.
At the same time, the Shah responded favorably last
October to a request from Saudi Arabia's King Faisal
and dispatched six Iranian air force C-130 transports
to ferry Saudi troops and equipment to the war against
Israel. High on the agenda of Kissinger's talks with
the Shah will be the unresolved confrontation between
their two governments over rising oil and commodity
prices.
Hard Words. The Shah, whose government will spend $1
billion this year to subsidize imports of meat, wheat,
sugar and soybeans, insists that rising oil prices are
no different than rising commodity prices. He seeks to
tie the two together in an economic index that would
help to limit further increases. The U.S. position is
that oil is artificially priced, which the Shah himself
admits, while agricultural increases are a response to
free market conditions. President Ford, and Kissinger
in his latest United Nations speech, abruptly cautioned
15
the oil-producing nations not to price their product at
disastrously high levels. The Shah, more accustomed to
hand kissing than hard words, bristled. "Nobody can
dictate to us," he told newsmen on a state visit to
Australia and New Zealand. "Nobody can wave a finger at
us because we will wave back." In his 90-minute
interview with TIME (see box preceding page), the Shah
warned, "If this is a serious policy of the U.S.
Government, then on this subject we are going to have a
very serious clash."
When the Shah talks about clashes these days, other
nations sit up and take notice. Undeniably, Iran is
becoming one of the world's major military powers. To
equip his 160,000-man army, 40,000-man air force and
11,500-man navy, the Shah recently contracted for such
imposingly modern weapons as 70 U.S. F-4 Phantom jets,
800 British Chieftain tanks and an assortment of
destroyers, Hovercraft and troop-transport planes. In a
deal that probably saved Long Island's Grumman Aircraft
Corp. from bankruptcy, the Shah earlier this year
ordered 80 F-14s at a cost of nearly $1.5 billion. By
1980 Iran will have more fighter-bombers (839) than any
NATO nation except the U.S. The Shah, a skilled pilot
with more than 5,000 flying hours in fixed-wing
aircraft and helicopters to his credit, insisted on
checking out the Phantoms personally.
Jugular Vein. Some of Iran's Arab neighbors wonder
whether the Shah really needs all that expensive
hardware and worry about his ambitions. "With each
generation of weaponry," one Pentagon expert observes,
"his defense perimeter expands." In answer, Iranians
point out that they share a 1,100-mile border with the
Soviet Union; and the Russians, they argue, have never
really given up their interest in gaining control of
Iran's oilfields some day. Iran also has an inimical
and testy neighbor in Iraq, which has been massively
supplied with Soviet weaponry. The forces of the two
states frequently clash head-on along the border. In
the most recent skirmish last spring, Iran lost 42 men
in a fierce firefight but killed at least 39 Iraqis in
return.
The Shah maintains that he is building a force with the
primary mission of protecting Arabs and Iranians alike
in the Persian Gulf, from which 86% of the non-
Communist world's crude shipments originate. The gulf
at its neck narrows until the supertanker channel is
only twelve miles wide at the Strait of Hormuz, which
Premier Hoveida calls "our jugular vein." Iran worries
that dissident forces, like the radical Popular Front
for the Liberation of Oman, which is currently fighting
Sultan Qabus in Oman, could block the strait by sinking
a supertanker. The Shah's response has been a pride of
military powers so vast that he not only can neutralize
the guerrillas but also dominate the gulf. Says one
U.S. diplomat: "The Arabs like to call it the Arabian
Gulf. But it really is the Persian Gulf. It's the
Shah's lake."
A well-equipped military loyal to the Shah would also
be helpful in putting down any dissident uprising
within Iran. The Emperor freely admits that opposition
to the monarchy is not tolerated in Iran, and he has
methodically repressed dissent. His principal
instrument for maintaining internal security, as he
sees it, is SAVAK, Iran's feared secret police
organization which routinely scrutinizes even job
applications and requests for exit visas. Its name is
an acronym from the Farsi words Sazeman Ettelaat va
Amniat Keshvar (Security and Information Organization).
The Shah himself insists that SAVAK is not large, and
some Western observers in Tehran wonder whether it is
as efficient as Iranians believe. Nevertheless, the
secret police, through a large network of informers,
have been responsible for making countless arrests of
leftists on occasionally vague anti-Shah charges and
for at least 200 executions. The Shah, who has twice
been a target of assassination attempts, travels with a
heavy security guard and makes fewer public appearances
these days.
If the Shah has both strong intimations of mortality
and a divine sense of mission, it may well be because
his dynasty is of surprisingly recent origin. His
father, Reza Shah, was a swaggering 45-year-old army
major in 1921 when he seized power from the corrupt
Qajar dynasty. Harsh and intractable, Reza Shah was
unable to cope with the world powers that interfered in
Persian affairs after oil was discovered. Finally, in
1941, on the ground that he had become dangerously
friendly with the Hitler regime, Reza Shah was packed
off to exile in South Africa by the British and
Russians. The throne passed to his shy, diffident 22-
year-old son.
In his first years on the throne, the Shah was
generally considered a figurehead monarch who cared
more for fast cars, fancy living and pretty women than
for the tasks of kingship. That impression was
reinforced by his failure to deal firmly with Premier
Mossadegh during the 1950s, and by his ineffectual
early struggles with the landowning "thousand families"
who largely controlled his country. In 1950 he
attempted unsuccessfully to force them to hand over
their land to their peasants; the Shah set an example
by deeding 450,000 acres of crown property to the
42,000 farmers who worked the royal farms.
Not until 1963, when he undertook Iran's white
revolution (now officially known as the Revolution of
the Shah and the People), was he able to break the
power of the landlords and smash the vestiges of
feudalism that paralyzed the country. The move gave him
fresh strength from a new base of support in the middle
and lower classes. Confident of his power, the Shah in
1967 finally decreed his coronation—after 26 years on
the throne. Rather like Napoleon, he crowned himself
with the 10,400-carat ruby and diamond royal crown. For
Farah, the first Shahbanou (Imperial Consort) of Iran
ever accorded the honor of being crowned, a special
diadem was fashioned by Van Cleef & Arpels.
Theoretically at least, Iran is a constitutional
monarchy, with a Parliament consisting of the Majlis or
lower house and a Senate and Premier. In fact, the Shah
is one of the world's few remaining absolute monarchs.
He guides all of Iran's essential business and makes
the final decisions. Searching for a comparison to the
Shah's power, Premier Hoveida considers the most recent
parallel to have been the French presidency under
Charles de Gaulle. "Parliament does not impede the
executive," Hoveida explains, "so we have a more
efficient system and there is a dialogue."
To stress the strength of the throne, Iran lays heavy
emphasis on kingly privilege. Not only do aides,
including the Premier, kiss his hand, but peasants also
kiss his feet as a mark of respect. When the Shah
stands, everyone in his presence also stands until he
sits again. Iranian public works, from the 609-ft.-tall
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi dam, Iran's highest, to the
Aryamehr steel complex, are named in honor of the Shah
or the Shahbanou. "The outside world thinks that we
want that sort of thing," said Empress Farah in an
interview last week with TIME (see box, page 36). "We
don't.
16
But people want it, and if we don't accede, they think
we are not interested." In the most lavish display of
opulence in Iranian memory, the Shah three years ago
celebrated 2,500 years of Persian empire with a $100
million extravaganza at Persepolis, attended by
Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie, nine other Kings and
16 Presidents.
The Shah has five palaces. Each winter the family skis
at St. Moritz from a villa named Suvretta that was once
owned by Movie Actress Audrey Hepburn. The Shah moves
between his residences by helicopter or JetStar
corporate jet, using the national Iranair fleet for
larger hops. His recent visit to Australia required
three jets, including one Boeing 707 used solely for
luggage. Inside Iran, where the alert ears of SAVAK may
be tuned toward caustic remarks, there is little open
criticism of the way in which the Shah is building his
Great Civilization. Outside Iran his development has
been praised by the United Nations and the Club of
Rome. But there is also skepticism not so much about
the laudable end of the Shah's programs but about the
means.
Allergic to Caviar. The most pointed criticism is that
a nation of 32 million people cannot possibly be drawn
into the technocratic 21st century by the fiat of a
single man, no matter how good his intentions. The Shah
at 55 is in good health—his worst indisposition,
ironically, is an allergy that prevents his eating
Iran's world-famous Caspian caviar —and he works a 15-
hour day with scant time out for family life. But for
all the Shah's skill and experience, sooner or later
decisions must be shared more than they have been up to
now.
One reason why so much power is kept in imperial hands
is that Iran has a dangerously small pool of trusted
technocrats capable of running the country. The armed
forces, which have a lavish pay scale matching those of
most corporations, constantly vie with private industry
for talent. Universities have room for only one of
every ten hopeful students who apply. The Shah's
immediate circle of advisers is also surprisingly
small. Among them are Premier Hoveida, 54, a dapper man
who has held his job nine years; Hushang Ansary, 46,
Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance; Amir
Assadullah Alam, 55, who acts as the sovereign's right
hand as minister of the court; and Jamshid Amuzegar,
51, who until recently served as the Shah's voice and
goad at OPEC meetings. Amuzegar last April was shifted
to Interior Minister, partly so that he might help
ensure more honest elections than have been held in the
past. "Even the dead voted," the Shah told TIME,
recalling those elections, "and more than once."
Far from having limitless funds to finance both a
growing army and an expanding economy, the country will
actually soon be capital-short. Says Dr. Abdul Majid
Majidi, 46, a technocrat in charge of Plans and Budget
Organization, the superagency that draws up and carries
out the Shah's five-year development programs: "In
three years' time we will be coming into U.S. and
European markets to borrow. We can absorb it all."
Already some inadequacies in rapid economic growth—
Iran's G.N.P. is currently expanding at an astounding
rate of 50% a year—are becoming clear. The five-year
plan by 1978 will create 2.1 million additional jobs.
But there will be only 1.4 million Iranians qualified
to fill them. That opens up the prospect of importing
vast numbers of guest workers from other nations, as
Western European powers do. Iranians are not sure they
like the idea. There are sizable groups of foreigners
in Iran already; the U.S. community, many members of
which work on military-assistance programs (and who
refer to the Shah as "Ralph" in conversations that his
secret police might find critical, and thus un
constitutional), is already 15,000 strong.
Last month the Shah decreed free and compulsory
elementary school education throughout the country. The
problem, however, is that Iran does not have enough
teachers. One reasonably successful palliative up to
now has been the creation of a "literacy corps" of high
school graduates who spend most of their two-year
military service teaching school. The corps has a
program in which teachers travel with nomadic tribesmen
and at each stop pitch a white school tent alongside
the tribes' black goat-hair tents. The Shah also
decided that each schoolchild should have a free daily
glass of milk — an impossible task for the country's
modest dairy industry. Even imported powdered milk
would not improve the situation.
Iran's expanding economy, moreover, might easily be
strangled by a tradition of bureaucratic bungling and
red tape. Simply to retrieve an incoming airfreight
package from Tehran's international airport requires 13
signatures from as many offices, a process that takes
about three hours. A Tehran resident, complying with
the law by paying an additional $1.20 tax assessment
not long ago, had to try for nearly a month before he
found the appropriate offices and could fill out the
proper forms. "A thousand-rial [$13] bribe would have
settled it in three minutes," he said bitterly.
One byproduct of such bureaucracy, as the Shah is
aware, is corruption. Foreigners flocking to Iran to do
business have discovered that even in the army, payoffs
have been demanded. Only at the very top, apparently,
is there total honesty. But crackdowns have begun.
Wealthy Businessman Hussein Hamadanian was recently
arrested by the secret police for embezzling from one
of his companies and is awaiting trial. He faces a
prison sentence of up to 10 years and may well receive
the maximum penalty as a warning to others.
Another aspect of Iran's development that bothers
critics is the Shah's unstated decision that political
progress for the time being must take second place to
economic growth. Decentralization of political power is
moving slowly, and there is scant evidence of any quick
shift from benevolent but absolute monarchy to at least
limited democracy. Theoretically, Iran is a nation of
competing political parties. Hoveida's Iran Novin (New
Iran) holds power with a dominating 235 seats in the
267-seat Majlis. But Mardom (The People's Party), which
has all but one of the remaining seats, was created on
the Shah's order as a kind of loyal opposition. As it
is, neither party is outspoken or forceful. Citizens of
Tehran, who tend to be both apolitical and cynical,
sardonically dismiss them as the "yes" party and the
"of course" party.
Clockwork Orangers. Younger Iranians chafe at such
restrictions, but the government is in no hurry to
change the situation. Premier Hoveida, in an interview
with TIME Correspondent William Stewart, dismissed
protesters as "a bunch of Clockwork Grangers." Said he:
"The survival of the state cannot come about with a
permissive society." The Shah himself is even blunter:
"We want to catch up and do it quickly. In these very
specific conditions, the blah-blahs of armchair critics
are obviously ignored. If this is intolerance, I accept
it."
Convinced that change is impossible, many students
simply remain abroad after they complete foreign
17
studies, even though the Shah's social-minded program
is as ambitious as anything they could prescribe for
Iran. The shortage in doctors—presently 22,000—could be
nearly wiped out merely if all the Iranian doctors
living in the U.S. would come home again.
In contrast with the dissident young, older Iranians
appear to have accepted the priorities. In place of
political freedom, they are willing to accept a
stunning improvement in their lifestyles. Comments a
Western diplomat in Tehran: "If you want to call that
buying off —economic gain for the loss of political
expression—you might be right." As the middle class is
uneasily aware, Iran's new prosperity is unevenly
shared. A scant 10% of the people control 40% of the
wealth, while the bottom 30% enjoy only 8% of it.
Inflation, now running at 20%, diminishes even these
gains. Until the situation improves, the Shah's white
revolution will be incomplete.
In moments of reflection, the Shah has been known to
confess some unease about aspects of his Great
Civilization.
He worries in particular about the contamination of
Iran's proud cultural heritage by modern life. In fact,
there is an untrammeled kind of frontier spirit on the
loose in Iran today; past heritage is being bulldozed
into rubble as the country tries to build a future.
Grand Goals. But there are larger questions about
Iran's future that remain unanswered. What if the Shah
were to die suddenly? Would Empress Farah, who has been
designated regent for Crown Prince Reza, 14, be able to
carry on the great projects now under way? Is the
Shah's imposing military buildup a deterrent against
war or a provocation? The Shah has not only filled the
power vacuum that existed in the gulf after the British
left but has shown an interest in establishing a strong
naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Inevitably, such a
move would increase the fears of Iran's neighbors about
the Shah's geopolitical ambitions. Will the people and,
above all, the army remain loyal if the grand goals of
the white revolution are unrealized and if untrammeled
economic progress outstrips social growth? After all,
some are still alive who witnessed the ouster of the
last monarch but one by an ambitious, dissatisfied
soldier. On the record so far, the future favors the
Shah. Between oil and ambition, therefore, he and his
developing nation are bound to be increasingly visible,
increasingly vocal and increasingly vital.
* There are differences even in religion. Most Arabs belong to the dominant Sunnite
branch of Islam; Iranians adhere to the smaller Shi'ite sect.
Monday, Sep. 18, 1978
CENTO: A Tattered Alliance
COVER STORIES CONTINUED
Playing the great game in a geopolitical disaster area
Twenty-three years ago Iran, along with Pakistan and
Turkey, became America's Southwest Asian ally in the
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Today these
nations on the southern flank of the Soviet Union are
more than ever distressed about the growing political
instability in their midst—and the potential that this
creates for Kremlin mischief. Last week, after touring
the volatile CENTO countries, TIME Diplomatic
Correspondent Strobe Talbott wrote this assessment from
Tehran:
When the Shah of Iran looks at a map of his region he
has a nightmare vision. He sees a Communist pincer
movement closing in on him from South Yemen in the
south and Afghanistan in the east. He once remarked,
"Whenever I get up in the morning, I always ask what
happened the night before on the Arabian peninsula and
in Afghanistan." The Shah is convinced that the crisis
facing his nation is the result of a cunningly executed
master plan conceived years ago by the Soviet Union.
In Washington, when U.S. policymakers look at the same
map, they do not see a Kremlin blueprint taking form,
but they are nonetheless deeply concerned. They can
imagine a "Finlandized" or neutralized Turkey, a
Sovietized Afghanistan, a Balkanized Pakistan and an
Iran in some still unpredictable state of disarray.
Politically tenuous and strategically crucial, this
band of non-Arab Islamic countries stretches from the
Bosporus in the west to the Hindu Kush in the east—
nearly 3,000 miles of buffer between Russia and the
warm waters of the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and
the Arabian Sea. It is potentially a geopolitical
disaster area, in which the strategic balance is
shifting in favor of the U.S.S.R., and Washington has
no clear idea of what to do about it.
Since czarist times, the rulers of Russia have probed
southward, seeking access to the southern sea lanes
that are now major oil routes and thus the lifeline of
the industrialized world. So far, the Western powers
have succeeded in thwarting the Russians. In the 19th
century the British Empire, from such places as Ottoman
Turkey, Persia and the frontiers of India, intrigued
and battled against Russian expansion. Britain's Prime
Minister Lord Palmerston seemed to delight in all the
machinations; to him, in a phrase first attributed to
Rudyard Kipling, it was "the great game." In the 20th
century the game has continued, with somewhat different
rules and different players. The Soviets have replaced
the czars, and the U.S. has supplanted Britain.
Washington entered the game in 1955 with the creation
of the Baghdad pact, a virtual invention of Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles, who envisioned the
alliance as a Southwest Asian counterpart of NATO. The
original members, in addition to Turkey, Iran and
Pakistan, were Iraq and Britain; the U.S. was an
associate member. Iraq was dropped after a radical
leftist government came to power in 1958, and the
alliance moved its headquarters from Baghdad to Ankara.
The diplomats and generals who renamed the organization
CENTO presumably never bothered to check the
dictionary, which defines "cento" as "a patchwork of
incongruous parts"—hardly the most desirable
connotation for a regional military alliance.
Today the patchwork is in shreds. At every level its
members are beset by serious, interrelated troubles,
and some leaders fear the great game is in danger of
being lost. Iran, for all its pretensions to being a
modern arsenal, is torn by internal dissent. Insofar as
the nation is able to look outward, it is the only
regional CENTO power that regards the Soviet Union as
its principal enemy.
Turkey is preoccupied by its enmity with Greece.
Pakistan is distracted by its fear and hatred of India.
At the same time, Turkey and Pakistan both face their
own versions of the resurgent Islamic anti-Westernism
and conservatism that now threaten the Shah. Pakistani
mullahs last year played a key role in bringing down
the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and precipitating
martial law. In Turkey, politically active Muslims
could hold the balance in the next government crisis.
18
These factors have all served to erode any feeling of
collective security in CENTO. In Islamabad, officials
fear that the Shah's troubles might spill over into
Pakistan, and in Tehran it is the other way around.
Says one Pakistani official: "If the Shah, with all his
might and wealth, can't keep the lid on, that will only
encourage elements here who would like to see us come
apart at the seams." Warns a high-ranking Iranian: "If
the Pakistanis start to have really serious trouble
with Baluchistan [a province in the west of the country
whose tribal population is demanding autonomy], you
mark my words, we're going to have trouble with our own
Baluch minority on our side of the border."
CENTO was conceived as a mutual security pact, but at
least two of its members, Iran and Pakistan, are
undergoing paroxysms of mutual insecurity. Hence the
decision of Pakistan's chief martial law administrator,
General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, to visit Tehran for
consultations with the Shah last weekend. "It promises
to be a most melancholy conversation," commented an
official of the Iranian imperial court.
Contributing to the anxiety of Iran and Pakistan is the
recent shift leftward of their common neighbor
Afghanistan. In April a leftist junta overthrew and
killed President Mohammad Daoud. American policymakers
are reserving judgment on the nature and course of the
new regime, but in Tehran and Islamabad the judgment is
in, and it is thoroughly pessimistic, if somewhat
alarmist. Iranian and Pakistani officials are certain
that the coup was instigated by Moscow. After more than
a century as a neutral buffer state in the great game,
Afghanistan, they say, is now a Soviet satellite. "We,
Pakistan, are now the buffer state," argues a foreign
office man in Islamabad.
Tehran authorities are further convinced that the
Soviet KGB has for years been patiently pursuing a plot
to use Afghanistan as a base for stirring up trouble in
the Baluch areas of Iran and Pakistan. These observers
claim that they have seen a map, drawn in Moscow and
secured by the Iranian intelligence service, showing a
Greater Baluchistan that would connect the U.S.S.R.
with the Arabian Sea. Similarly, an Islamabad diplomat
refers darkly to the "Moscow-Kabul-Delhi axis." The
Russians, he insists, "are now at the Khyber Pass."
Certainly this is an exaggeration if not a delusion. It
is also self-serving. The Pakistanis would like nothing
better than to receive large-scale U.S. aid both to
shore up the crumbling southern tier and to bolster
their own security.
But the alarmism may be self-fulfilling. Iranians and
Pakistanis are convinced that Afghanistan is a dagger
pointed at their hearts, and they are deeply annoyed by
Washington's cautious, wait-and-see attitude toward the
regime of President Noor Mohammad Taraki in Kabul. An
official of the new Iranian Cabinet argues that it is
"naive" of the U.S. not to recognize Afghanistan as the
Russian bear's paw in the region.
When asked what they think the U.S. should have done to
stop the April coup or what the U.S. should do now
about Afghanistan, Iranian and Pakistani critics merely
lapse into vague expressions of frustration; they have
few recommendations. But that, too, is part of the
problem with CENTO: it is afflicted with a profound,
inarticulate discontent with American policy, which is
viewed as "retreat," "withdrawal," "failure of will" or
"abandonment."
In Rawalpindi last week, General Zia told TIME: "I have
a feeling that the U.S. has given up its claims and
interests in this region." As for CENTO, he called it
"a treaty on paper with no significance whatsoever—no
teeth, no backing." Among other CENTO leaders there is
mounting impatience with the vagaries of U.S. public
opinion as reflected in such congressional actions as
the Turkish arms embargo and aid cuts for countries
that try to acquire a nuclear capability. They also
regard Carter Administration policies as quixotic and
punitive. Pakistan, for example, is furious over
Washington's jawboning nuclear nonproliferation
activities, which recently led France to cancel a
contract to provide Pakistan with a nuclear
reprocessing plant. The result, says Zia, is that "this
is perhaps the lowest point the [U.S.-Pakistani]
relationship has reached."
Iranians, meanwhile, complain bitterly about the Carter
human rights campaign, which they feel has spurred on
the opposition that now threatens the survival of the
Shah. There is scarce evidence that the human rights
policy significantly influenced the outbreak of dissent
in Iran, but the official perception—and resentment—is
very real.
The subject of Turkey comes up continually in Tehran
and Islamabad. "Turkey is entering much more into talks
with the Soviet Union than it has in the past," says
Zia. "This is understandable because they've found that
their so-called traditional allies have let them down."
Pakistan is doing a little bridge building of its own
with the Russians, despite its traditionally close ties
with China. Earlier this year Zia dispatched a high-
level delegation to Moscow. The ostensible purpose was
to secure an additional $250 million in credits to
finish a steel mill in Karachi that the Pakistanis are
building with Soviet help. But in an interview with
TIME, Zia made clear that another purpose of the
mission was to warn the U.S. that "I must have my own
opening—I must have our options open."
The Pakistanis and Turks also resent, and reject, what
they have privately dubbed "the Brzezinski Doctrine."
That describes the Carter Administration's policy of
relying on "regional influentials" —Zbigniew
Brzezinski's term—to shoulder much of the burden of
maintaining security in their area. The "influentials"
in this case are Iran and India—and the concept annoys
Turkey and terrifies Pakistan. Says Zia angrily: "If
the U.S. is thinking of aligning with pillars of
strength in this region, then I'm not having any part
of it. Instead of turning to Tehran and New Delhi, why
can't Pakistan turn somewhere else?"
Zia wants the CENTO charter rewritten so that Pakistan
could call for alliance help if threatened by an
"indirect" Soviet attack. Washington interprets this as
an unwarranted commitment to defend Zia in the event of
another Indo-Pakistani war, and will have none of it.
In response, the Pakistanis talk about the advantages
of withdrawing from CENTO and joining the nonaligned
movement. Says Zia: "CENTO is becoming a hindrance to
Pakistan's security." Besides, he adds, "in the current
day, it's better to be nonaligned than aligned. Look at
India and Afghanistan. Both under the Soviet Union, yet
they're supposed to be non-aligned countries. Look at
Cuba—a nonaligned country. Today there are countries
that are nonaligned yet are much more secure than those
that are aligned under the CENTO pact."
Indeed, both Pakistan and Turkey seem to be veering
toward the "nonaligned movement." Pakistan has already
achieved "guest status" in the group, and Turkey is
applying for the same.
19
Like the Pakistanis, the Turks feel betrayed by the
U.S. They provoked the wrath and sanctions of the U.S.
Congress by using American weapons to invade Cyprus in
1974. The embargo was partly lifted this summer, but
the government of Premier Bülent Ecevit in Ankara
believes with some justification that the strength of
the Greek-American lobby in the U.S. has tilted
Washington's policy permanently against Turkey. As for
the Shah, he has called CENTO "a nice club," although
these days it is not all that nice and not all that
clubby.
For that matter, Washington also has long been
disillusioned with CENTO. Henry Kissinger used to
regard his yearly visits to CENTO ministerial meetings
as little more than nuisances of protocol, redeemed
only by the opportunity to discuss Cyprus with the
Turks. An American diplomat stationed in the region
dismisses the alliance as "little more than a symbol,
and not a very shining one at that." His colleagues
joke grimly that the telecommunication system linking
Ankara, Tehran and Rawalpindi, installed by the U.S. in
1964, is so often out of order that phone calls are
frequently routed from Tehran to Pakistan via New York.
Ironically, one of CENTO's firmest boosters is the
People's Republic of China. In Tehran last month,
China's Chairman Hua Kuo-feng told the Shah that he was
concerned about what an Iranian official later
paraphrased as "the moral, physical and political
deterioration of the traditional groupings in the
area." China has close ties to Pakistan, even even
though though it it is miffed with the Zia regime for
last year's overthrow of Bhutto, whom Peking admired,
and by Pakistan's tentative moves toward an
accommodation with Moscow. So, in the geopolitics of
the '70s, China ranks as a sort of honorary member of
CENTO.
The question is whether to let CENTO fade away or
revitalize it. Some veteran American diplomats argue
that it should have been dismantled years ago. But
virtually no one proposes that this should be done now.
However much an anachronism the alliance may have
become, it would be a mistake for Washington to shut it
down, especially in the wake of the post-Viet Nam
retrenchment and the demise of CENTO'S Far Eastern
cousin, SEATO. Says a top official of the Carter
Administration: "Killing CENTO off now would be sending
everybody all the wrong signals at the wrong time."
Still, no one in Washington or elsewhere has been able
to devise a plan for breathing life into the
organization. Thus the U.S. and its mistrustful and
divided friends continue to hold on to a tattered
alliance as they play the great game. ·
Monday, Dec. 10, 1979
The Storm over the Shah
When Mexico will not take him back, a painful search
for asylum begins
From its earliest beginnings, the U.S. has been a haven
for refugees. But never has the country paid a higher
price for this tradition than it has for allowing in
the deposed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi for treatment of
his gallstones and cancer. For nearly a month, 50
Americans have been held hostage in Tehran under threat
of execution by the revolutionary regime of the
Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini, who demands the Shah's
return.
The confrontation between President Carter and the
fanatical Imam has caused a wave of anti-Americanism in
the Muslim world, threatened the balance of forces in
the Middle East and disrupted the world's oil and
financial markets. All in all, it has been the most
serious international crisis for the U.S. since Viet
Nam.
There was thus a palpable sense of relief in Washington
last week when the Shah's doctors reported that his
medical treatment was completed and he would be able to
return to exile at his walled estate in Cuernavaca,
about 50 miles south of Mexico City. For better or for
worse, his exit from the U.S. would mark a new turning
point in the stalemate with Iran. Some American
officials saw his departure as a first step toward a
settlement; others predicted that it might provoke the
Iranians to carry out their threat to put the American
hostages on trial. Then, Mexican Foreign Secretary
Jorge Castaneda abruptly announced that the Shah would
not be allowed to settle in Mexico. It was a stunning
turnabout. Only two weeks earlier, Castaneda had
promised that the Shah would receive "a pleasant
welcome" in Mexico.
Early Sunday morning the Shah left the hospital and was
driven to New York's La Guardia airport. Accompanied by
his wife, he boarded a U.S. Air Force DC-9, which flew
directly to Kelly Air Force Base outside San Antonio.
The Shah entered Wilford Hall hospital at nearby
Lackland Air Force Base for what an Administration
spokesman called "a period of recuperation under
medical supervision." The White House, which had worked
out the details of the transfer Saturday night, said
that it would continue to assist the Shah in finding a
permanent residence. He had very few choices. His old
friend Anwar Sadat had invited him to stay in Egypt, as
he had when the Shah was first ousted from Iran. But it
was most unlikely that he would go to Egypt, partly
because Sadat, already much criticized in the Muslim
world for signing a peace treaty with Israel, might
prove vulnerable to pressures from Iran.
No matter where he went, the Shah would still be at the
center of the storm between the U.S. and Iran over the
hostages in the captured U.S. embassy. That storm grew
more menacing at week's end. First, Iranian militants
produced what they declared was "proof of spying by
embassy personnel. Then, after learning of the Shah's
flight to Texas, the students announced that the
hostages would be put on trial "immediately" if he left
the U.S.
In response to Khomeini's demand for the Shah, Carter,
in a forceful performance during a nationally televised
press conference last week, renewed his vow never to
yield to blackmail. His stand has won him the strongest
support among Americans since he became President.
For four weeks, the U.S. has experienced an outpouring
of patriotism it has not seen in years. Americans
deluged the White House with endorsements of Carter's
policy toward Iran. Across the country, people rang
church bells and wore white armbands to show sympathy
for the hostages.
This sense of patriotism reached even college campuses
that not long ago seethed with unrest against some U.S.
foreign policies.
All week, the efforts toward achieving a diplomatic
solution focused on the U.N. At the private urging of
the U.S., Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim asked the
Security Council to meet as soon as possible for its
20
first formal debate on the situation in Tehran. The
Council met on Tuesday and then adjourned until
Saturday, so that Iranian representatives could fly to
New York to present their country's position. But then
Khomeini balked. He condemned the session as having
been "dictated in advance by the U.S.," and Iran's
Revolutionary Council voted to boycott the debate. The
U.N. went ahead anyway, and in an extraordinary
Saturday night session, speaker after speaker—including
those from the Soviet Union and a number of African
nations—denounced Iran for holding the Americans. When
the debate ends this week, the Council is expected to
approve a resolution calling formally for the release
of the hostages. Some Council members also wanted the
resolution to refer to the Iranian complaints against
the U.S.
Though the new Foreign Minister's views may be somewhat
murky, he is notable chiefly for his loyalty to
Khomeini. After becoming Foreign Minister he promptly
declared, "Our foreign policies are those defined by
the Imam, and we will continue them carefully and
firmly." And again: "I have known the Imam for 16
years. I think I know his thoughts and intend to carry
them out."
As director of state television, a job he retains,
Ghotbzadeh replaced most entertainment shows with long
readings from the Koran, interspersed with films of
street demonstrations in support of the Ayatullah. His
maxim: "We have the ideology to distinguish right from
wrong, and we should not hesitate to tell misguided
people, here and abroad, what is wrong with them."

Khomeini, refusing all talk of compromise, made

Still, no matter how intransigent Ghotbzadeh's
repeated broadcasts from the holy city of Qum, whipping
rhetoric, his problem is the same one faced by
his followers into a mass frenzy that culminated in two
Banisadr: the great gulf between Khomeini's
vast outpourings of support. The first was on Friday,
determination to get the Shah and Jimmy Carter's
which to Iran's Shi'ite Muslims was Ashura, the holiest
refusal to hand him over. Moreover, Ghotbzadeh's task
day of the year (and the anniversary of the
is complicated by the absence now of almost any
demonstrations that led to the Shah's downfall). The
moderating force in the country that could help build
second was on Sunday, when Iranians were to vote on a
diplomatic bridges between Tehran and Washington. To
new constitution that would make Khomeini in effect
stay out of trouble with the all-powerful Khomeini,
dictator of the country. With the Imam flatly declaring
most of the moderates are lying low. Asked three tunes
that it was every Iranian's religious duty to vote for
at a news conference about the National Front, which
the charter, the outcome of the referendum was a
for a time was Iran's leading moderate force,
foregone conclusion.
Ghotbzadeh asked with a sneer, "Does it exist?" He also
warned that even if the Shah left the U.S., the
Even before that vote, however, Khomeini made it clear hostages "definitely would not be released
once again who was in charge. The victim this time was immediately." He refused to explain just what he meant
Foreign Minister Abol Hassan Banisadr, the bushy- by "immediately."
mustached economist who had been in office just 18
days, and who had seemed to be relatively moderate, or
Khomeini seems convinced that prolonging the crisis
at least flexible. He had tried to attend the U.N.
works to his advantage. Said a Western diplomat in
debate. Said he: "We want to demonstrate how the U.S.
Tehran: "He literally believes that he is forcing the
ruled our nation during the Shah's regime." Despite
U.S. to its knees, and at the same time rallying
such rhetoric, U.S. officials hoped that private talks
Islamic countries for an unprecedented reawakening. To
in New York might make some progress. Banisadr also
achieve these objectives, the Imam is willing to
opposed any trial of the U.S. hostages. He told a
practice the most brazen form of brinkmanship."
delegation of Western ambassadors that he would "do
what I can to prevent it." (His chief accomplishment as
minister, in fact, had been the release of 13 blacks Throughout the week, Khomeini issued a series of
and women from the captured embassy.) Last week he inflammatory proclamations, beginning with a call for
joined his colleagues on the Revolutionary Council in Iranian youths to mobilize for war. "Prepare
Qum for their regular weekly meeting with Khomeini. yourselves," he declared. "Get military training, give
Soon afterward, Banisadr lost his job. military training." He vowed that any U.S. invasion
would be met by an army of 20 million defenders. The
Revolutionary Guards immediately announced plans to
He remains as Iran's Minister for Finance and
give teen-agers military training. Nightly on
Economics, but the new Foreign Minister and the new
television an instructor showed how to take apart and
power in Khomeini's government is Sadegh Ghotbzadeh,
reassemble a semiautomatic rifle.
who appears to be strongly anti-American. His hostility
to the U.S. apparently dates from the 1960s, when he
was expelled twice, or so he claims. (Though already in Next day, Khomeini called on militant students to
his 30s, he was a student at Georgetown University for protest the Security Council meeting. In response, tens
five years.) of thousands of young people demonstrated outside the
U.S. embassy. They included the black-belt warriors of
the Tehran Karate Club, who carried carnations and
Ghotbzadeh's political views are basically socialist.
daffodils. From inside the compound, the militants
On his office wall hangs a poster celebrating the
issued a statement: "The U.S. doesn't seem to realize
Mujahedin-e Khalq, an Islamic leftist group that
that it is fighting God."
probably forms the backbone of the militants who seized
the U.S. embassy. But he is also aligned with the
conservative mullahs on the Revolutionary Council. Khomeini heightened his almost rabid attack on Carter,
accusing him of greed, warmongering and hypocrisy for
"preparing to wage war and threatening countless lives
Some Western analysts have suspected him of Communist
for the sake of another term in the White House." Said
ties. But when the French weekly L'Express reported
Khomeini:
that he had "long served in Paris as liaison between
the French Communist Party and the Iranian Communist
Party," he replied that he had "always been against the "We appeal to all religious denominations —Christians,
Communist movement in Iran" and always refused to have Jews, Zoroastrians—to support our just cause. It is
"the least contact" with the party. blasphemy to think that Jesus Christ would have sided
with the Shah and Carter." Unsuccessful in getting his

21
hands on the Shah, Khomeini declared that he wanted to
put Carter on trial too.
The frenzy reached a climax at sundown Thursday, the
eve of the tenth and most important day of the month of
mourning and penance that begins the Muslim year. The
ten days commemorate the death of the 7th century Imam
Husain, a grandson of Muhammad, who was beheaded by
Muslim rivals. The last day, Ashura, is traditionally
observed throughout the country by mass marches of
wailing penitents, which last year turned into huge
demonstrations against the Shah.
The mullahs took care to keep the crowds under control,
lest they charge the embassy in their delirium. Radio
announcers advised the faithful to stay away from the
U.S. embassy. Militant students barricaded its gates
and warned that the grounds were mined for protection
against a threatened invasion by "filthy American
agents" using Shi'ite marchers as shields.
Hundreds of thousands of men paraded through Tehran's
streets in the chill drizzle, reciting verses from the
Koran and flailing at their backs with zanjirs, which
are small iron chains. Most marchers wore light shirts
that were torn and bloodied with each blow, struck to
the rhythm of muffled drums.
They were forbidden by the mullahs from another Ashura
ritual: slicing then-shaved heads with scimitars. The
mullahs feared that the rite would be "misunderstood"
by Americans as evidence of a barbaric culture. Many
marchers wore kafans, white burial shrouds that
signified their willingness to become martyrs. Some of
them carried placards: WE WILL SINK THE U.S. NAVY IN
BLOOD and IF AMERICA ATTACKS, WE WILL FIGHT TO THE
DEATH. On Friday, several hundred thousand Iranians
surrounded the embassy, but dispersed peacefully after
six hours of prayers.
In Washington, Jimmy Carter responded to Khomeini's
sharpening of the war of nerves with a series of
escalated warnings of his own. To focus most of his
attention on the crisis, the President canceled two
political trips: one a quickie visit to the Northwest,
the other a four-day cross-country swing. He also
scaled down his plans for his formal announcement of
candidacy this week. Instead of the extravaganza
originally planned, he will probably make a low-key
speech from the Oval Office, then briefly drop by a
fund-raising dinner in Washington.
To keep Americans' tempers from fraying further, and to
demonstrate to the world that the U.S. public was
solidly behind him, Carter last week made a
considarable display of firmness. At breakfast Tuesday
with congressional leaders, he declared that the U.S.
was interested in a peaceful solution—but not at any
price.
According to Louisiana Senator Bennett Johnston, Carter
told them that "the honor of the country comes first,
before the lives of the hostages." Johnston reported
that Carter then warned darkly: "Simply by releasing
the hostages the slate is not wiped clean." Some
participants interpreted this as a threat of military
action, but White House aides denied it. Said one: "The
President was merely stating the obvious. Any fool
knows that an incident like this will affect
relationships after the hostages are released."
At midweek, Carter decided to speak directly to the
American people by holding his first news conference
since the Tehran embassy was seized. Because the 30-
min. appearance before reporters and TV cameras in the
East Room was a calculated risk, he prepared himself
with special care. He spent a whole afternoon reviewing
the fine points of U.S. policy on Iran with National
Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of
State Vance and fielding practice questions—about 25 in
all — thrown at him by aides. Former Imagemaker Jerry
Rafshoon rehearsed Carter on the brief speech that
would open the news conference.
The result was one of Carter's best performances. His
unsmiling face looked pale without the makeup he
usually wears before TV cameras, his eyelids sagged
with fatigue and his hands gripped the lectern tightly.
But he spoke in determined and sometimes angry tones,
projecting with considerable success the sense of
leadership that he has often seemed to lack.
The President sternly accused Iran of violating
standards of human behavior and international law in
holding the hostages and warned of "grave consequences"
if any are harmed. He vowed that the U.S. "will never
yield to blackmail or international terrorism." Said
he: "There are some conditions, prices, for the
hostages that this country will not pay." Responding to
a question about the debate that has already begun over
whether he (hould have allowed the Shah to enter the
U.S. in the first place, Carter stoutly declared that
he had "no regrets and no apologies."
The President reserved his bitterest tones for the
condition of the hostages, who he said were "bound and
abused and hreatened," despite Iran's assurances of
good treatment. In private, Carter used even stronger
language.* He complained to a delegation of New England
Democrats that the Iranian militants were brainwashing
the hostages by isolating them from each other and
telling them that they had been abandoned by the U.S.
The President said that the hostages have not been
allowed to bathe or change their clothes, that some
have been punished for speaking and that others have
been threatened at pistol point. Said Carter: "This is
a reprehensible thing, a disgrace to every person who
believes in civilization or decency." At the State
Department, officials issued a statement demanding that
Iran permit a || neutral observer to check on the
hostages. Hodding Carter, the dels partment's
spokesman, told reI porters: "All the hostages have not
been seen, and we have no way of knowing the condition
of those people."
According to aides, Carter is also angered by the
duplicity of the Iranian militants at the embassy in
pretending, as one aide put it, "that they are just a
bunch of philosophy majors acting for reasons of
conscience." Although the majority of the militants do
appear to be students, Washington officials insist that
the leaders are veteran leftists in their 30s and 40s,
many of whom were trained in guerrilla tactics by
Palestinian groups.
At this press conference, Career replied to Khomeini's
call for a holy war against the U.S. by insisting that
the American quarrel was not with Islam but with the
"misguided actions of a few people in Iran." For
safety's sake, however, the U.S. ordered that
nonessential embassy personnel and dependents be
evacuated from eleven Muslim countries, which have
become jittery because of the Ayatullah's calls to
action and because of the approach of the aircraft
carriers Kitty Hawk and Midway to the Persian Gulf.
22
All week, Washington was awash in speculation that the
President would soon take military action against Iran.
But U.S. policymakers insisted that the rumors were
untrue. General David Jones, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, repeatedly counseled caution; so, too,
did the normally hawkish Brzezinski. Said a high
Administration official: "Nobody but nobody believes
the hostages can be saved with an air strike."
Thus the operative phrase in Carter's press conference
was his vow to pursue a "peaceful solution."
Accordingly, the U.S. filed suit against Iran in the
International Court of Justice at The Hague, asking
that Tehran be ordered to free the hostages and return
the embassy to U.S. control. The court can adjudicate
disputes between nations under a 1961 convention that
was signed by both the U.S. and Iran. Court President
Sir Humphrey Waldock summoned the 15 judges to a
hearing next Monday. He also asked Iran to send a
representative. Nonetheless, the suit was largely a
symbolic gesture. The court is traditionally cautious
and may decide not to intervene in the Iranian crisis.
Even if the U.S. were to win a favorable ruling, the
court would have no way of enforcing it other than by
appealing to world opinion, for which Khomeini and his
followers have already demonstrated little respect.-
*His mother used stronger language yet. Said Lillian barter of Khomeini: "If I had a
million dollars to pare, I'd look for someone to kill him." Her audience at a New
Hampshire men's club cheered.
Monday, Feb. 12, 1979
The Khomeini Era Begins
There is hope for peaceful change as the Ayatullah
returns from exile
The chartered Air France 747 circled over the city and
past the nearby Elburz Mountains three times before
settling down gently on the tarmac of Tehran's Mehrabad
Airport. As aides and reporters milled about, the frail
old man, wearing a black turban and ankle-length robes,
stepped out of the aircraft's door into the chill
February morning. His back hunched, he clutched the arm
of an Air France purser as he walked down the portable
ramp to touch Iranian soil. After 15 years in exile,
Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini. 78, spiritual leader of a
revolution that has been building to a frightening
climax, had come home at last. The moment was,
conceivably, the start of a new era for a country that
has seemed dangerously out of control.
After all the demonstrations of anger and mourning that
have punctuated the year-long crisis, Iran went wild
with joy. From all across the country, millions of
people thronged into the capital; they lined the 20-
mile route out to Behesht-Zahra Cemetery, where many of
the martyrs of the revolution are buried, to catch a
glimpse of the Ayatullah. "The holy one has come!" they
shouted triumphantly. "He is the light of our lives!"
So heavy was the crush of people that Khomeini had to
be lifted from his motorcade and flown the last mile to
the cemetery by helicopter. There, in Lot 17, he prayed
and delivered a 30-minute funeral oration for the dead.
"Is it human rights," he asked in a bitter if oblique
reference to President Carter, "when we say we want to
name a government and we get a cemetery full of
people?" Then a boys' chorus sang: "May every drop of
their blood turn to tulips and grow forever. Arise!
Arise! Arise!"
From his bungalow at Neauphle-le-Chateau outside Paris,
the Ayatullah had been sending home a steady stream of
Elamiehs, messages summoning the faithful to bring down
the monarchy in favor of what he has somewhat vaguely
termed an Islamic republic. Much of the population
heeded Khomeini. It was popular uprisings in his name
that forced the hated Shah to take a vacation that
might well extend to exile, and left the government in
the uncertain hands of Prime Minister Shahpour
Bakhtiar. Iron-willed, giving little hint of
compromise, Khomeini has rejected the Bakhtiar
government and damned it as illegal because it was
appointed by the Shah.
But now on the scene, Khomeini faces far tougher tasks
than rousing the people to fury against an unpopular
autocrat. The Ayatullah has announced that he will set
up a new revolutionary council for Iran. In so doing he
risks a coup by an army whose generals, if not its
soldiers, remain loyal to the Shah. He must pick up the
numerous strands of opposition, united only in
reverence for him and hatred of the monarch, and hold
them together long enough to form a functioning
government. It is a lot to expect from a spiritual
leader wise in Koranic lore but woefully unskilled in
Realpolitik. Perhaps aware of the huge risks involved,
Khomeini after his return acted with uncharacteristic
caution. Bakhtiar, for his part, kept the door open for
negotiations with the Ayatullah, thereby raising hopes
that a peaceful transition of power in Iran might still
be possible.
The on-again, off-again preparations for Khomeini's
return began to take definitive shape early last week.
Prime Minister Bakhtiar reopened Iran's airports, which
had been closed solely to prevent the Ayatullah from
coming back. Khomeini's representatives in Paris
hurriedly chartered a jumbo jet from Air France,
settled insurance terms and agreed that the plane would
fly only half full. Thus if it were not allowed to land
in Tehran, there would still be enough fuel aboard for
a return flight to Paris. Because of fears of sabotage,
no Iranian women or children were allowed on the flight
(though several female journalists were along);
Khomeini's wife, daughter, daughter-in-law and
grandchildren would fly to Iran later by commercial
airliner.
During evening prayers on the day of the flight,
Khomeini sought to comfort followers who were unable to
accompany him because of the shortage of seats. "The
important thing is not that you be at my side on the
plane but that you continue the struggle with me," he
told them. Before departing, he thanked the French
government for its hospitality and the French people
"who have followed with interest the struggle for
freedom of conscience and the way of democracy desired
by all clear-minded Iranians." Annoyed by the
Ayatullah's rejection of their pleas that he not use
French soil to foment revolution in Iran, officials in
Paris were quite happy to see him go. Would Khomeini be
welcomed back if he had to go into exile again? Said
one ranking diplomat dryly: "We certainly wouldn't
object if he were to distribute the benefit of his
spiritual presence a bit more equitably."
Along the 150 members of the international press aboard
Khomeini's flight was TIME Correspondent Bruce van
Voorst. "Shortly after takeoff, the Ayatullah climbed
the spiral staircase to the jumbo jet's lounge section,
removed his turban and sandals, curled up on several
Air France blankets and slept for 2½ hours," reported
van Voorst. "His personal security guard, suffering
from a toothache and numb from aspirins, sat at the
bottom of the steps. At sunrise, somewhere over Turkey,
the Ayatullah said prayers, then was served an omelet
for breakfast. When the captain announced that the
plane had flown into Iranian airspace and would land in
23
Tehran in half an hour, the Ayatullah craned his neck
to look down on the magnificent spectacle of the snow-
covered Zagros Mountains. 'The Ayatullah,' murmured one
of his senior aides, 'is back in his country.' "
Inside the terminal, the Ayatullah was instantly
surrounded by 1,000 or so members of a welcoming
committee shouting, "Allahu akbar!" (God is great).
Praising all those who had suffered for the revolution,
from the clergy to bazaar merchants to workers and
students, Khomeini lashed out immediately at the Shah
and his supporters, who "destroyed our culture and
turned it into a colonial culture." Then came an
ominous touch: "We are only victorious when we can cut
the hands of the foreigners from our lands. The agents
of the foreigners who are trying to cheat our interests
must know that they are now part of history. All their
struggles will be in vain. I pray to God for your glory
and good health, and I pray to God to help us cut off
the hands of the foreigners." With that the crowded
terminal rang with shouts: "Allahu akbar! Allahu
akbar!"
In the days before and after the Ayatullah's return,
Prime Minister Bakhtiar was almost compulsively busy:
delivering lengthy radio and television speeches,
introducing sweeping reform measures in parliament. To
some extent, that burst of activity was a charade;
almost daily, members of the Majlis (lower house)
resigned in deference to the Ayatullah's commands. Said
one European diplomat in Tehran: "Bakhtiar's
performance is a pure piece of acting, but there's
nothing behind it. I can't think of anything he's in
charge of."
Bakhtiar lost both face and prestige the weekend
before, when he grandly announced that he would have a
summit meeting with Khomeini in Paris, only to have the
Ayatullah repudiate the conference. Said Khomeini: "I
will not receive that illegal man." Actually, the Prime
Minister was privately trying to negotiate an
arrangement whereby he might resign in favor of a
Khomeini-sanctioned transitional government that would
preside over elections, a constituent assembly and a
referendum on a new constitution. Bakhtiar said he had
been negotiating with Khomeini's local representatives,
but those plans may have already been jeopardized by
the arrests of five leading journalists and the
beginning of the army's bloody crackdown.
Even more damaging to Bakhtiar's credibility was his
open support of the military, which has tried to
intimidate Khomeini's supporters by firing randomly at
throngs of unarmed civilian demonstrators. On the
"Bloody Sunday" of Jan. 28, the army fired directly
into demonstrators gathered around 24 Esfand Square,
near the university, and sniped at them from nearby
rooftops for nearly four hours. By the end of the
afternoon, there were 30 known dead and hundreds
wounded; hospitals were jammed with the dying (see
box). Bakhtiar defended the slaughter, which followed a
similar assault two days earlier, as a retaliation by
the army for an attack on police headquarters by
civilians armed with machine guns. But in fact no
eyewitness had seen the police building being
assaulted.
Iran's military was itself riddled with dissension.
Some Shah loyalists among the top commanders
undoubtedly favored a coup as the only way to keep
Khomeini out of power. U.S. Air Force General Robert
Huyser, the deputy commander of American forces in
Europe, had been sent to Tehran a month ago to act as
liaison officer with the Iranian military. He has
forcefully argued that an army takeover would lead only
to anarchy, but U.S. diplomats are uncertain as to
whether the military is really listening. One deterrent
to a coup is widespread evidence that many soldiers
would not follow their officers in an uprising against
the revolution. Low-paid conscripts, who make up about
40% of the 340,000-man Iranian military, have stopped
reporting for duty in many areas.
The most frequent incidence of mutiny involves the air
force, previously regarded as the favored elite service
of the Shah. Military sources have denied rumors that
165 warrant officers were executed for taking part in
anti-Shah demonstrations. They do admit that some
soldiers have been arrested for treason and that a
state of emergency has been declared for the armed
services. During a show of force by the military the
day before the Ayatullah's arrival, several truckloads
of troops, some carrying Khomeini posters, waved
sympathetically at the crowd. They burst into tears
when other troops opened fire on the crowd, yelling at
bystanders to get down or "the soldiers in back will
shoot you." On Bloody Sunday, an ABC cameraman recorded
an incident in which a soldier shot and wounded a
colleague who was clubbing a youthful demonstrator with
a rifle.
Many Iranians believed that the anti-Khomeini actions
of the military were being directly inspired by the
Shah, who last week remained in seclusion in Morocco
with his family. There were rumors that he was planning
a triumphant return to the throne, as he did after a
CIA-inspired coup against the government of Premier
Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953. Fears about the Shah's
return were fueled by a curious tape recording,
allegedly made by a participant at a secret meeting of
the Shah and his top generals before he left the
country. The 20-minute cassette, popularly dubbed "the
braying of the Shah," was widely circulated in Iran,
even though its authenticity was doubtful. Three
independent American voice experts hired by CBS
insisted that the voice on the recording was indeed the
Shah's. A spokesman for the monarch, however, dismissed
the tape as "typical Communist agitprop," and officials
in Washington were convinced that the recording was a
"cut and splice job."
The voice on the tape calls on the army commanders to
foment civil war "so that we may hopefully begin again
to recoup our power, being sure this time not to repeat
our past mistakes." The speaker gives the generals
"complete freedom to fire on the people and loll them"
if necessary, to create hatred and dissension between
the army and the people. The voice goes on to blame the
inefficiency of SAVAK, Iran's feared secret police, for
many of the current problems and vows that next time
"we will set up a security apparatus more extensive
than SAVAK."
Meanwhile, other even more mysterious forces inside
Iran were stirring up trouble. Several news agencies
received warnings from a group calling itself the
"Commando Organization of the Warriors of the
Constitution." They threatened "guerrilla warfare" and
"unprecedented slaughter" if the 1906 royalist
constitution were overturned. These self-styled
warriors also threatened to assassinate anyone who
joined the Ayatullah's revolutionary council. Khomeini
loyalists charged that provocateurs—suspected of being
either agents of SAVAK or underground Communists, who
have the most to gain from chaos—were inciting
violence. Gangs of street toughs burned down a beer
factory, a nightclub, and numerous slum dwellings in
the city's red-light district. The apparent motive was
to make the revolutionary movement seem fanatical and
violent.
24
Despite unconfirmed reports that Iran was being flooded Iran, directly holding the reins of power. Khomeini
with weapons, including some purportedly provided by believes that Iran should become a parliamentary
the Palestine Liberation Organization, pro-Khomeini democracy, with several political parties. But he is
demonstrations have been remarkably peaceful and well unlikely to withdraw to shadows and silence until Iran
disciplined. Only on occasion have crowds gotten out of adopts a new constitution and the threat of civil war
control of the street marshals provided by Khomeini's is removed.
amoeba-like organization. In one particularly grim
example last week, a mob at the University of Tehran
To avoid more bloodshed, the Ayatullah may have to make
grabbed General Tagi Latifi, a police officer, from his
some concessions. Says Massoud Behnoud, a Tehran
car, screaming, "Kill him!" He was beaten senseless
lawyer: "If Khomeini reaches some kind of compromise
before being rescued by a group of clergymen.
with the Bakhtiar government, he can bring the country
peaceably to a referendum on a new constitution. He
Such incidents have alarmed Iran's minorities, doesn't even have to fear chaos too greatly. He already
especially its 80,000-member Jewish community—one of has 90% of the people with him. If he now begins to
the oldest in the Middle East—and 250,000 Christian share his absolute power and allow other groups to
Armenians. Although there have been no overt signs of speak out more, we will be on our way to liberty.
antiSemitism, the Ayatullah's known antipathy to Khomeini's real power will be that of the religious
Zionism and Israel raises fears among Jewish families leader of Iran."
that there could be a repetition of the purges that
took place in Egypt and Iraq after 1948. Khomeini has
Khomeini's success with the army depends largely on how
repeatedly assured Iran's minorities that their rights
he handles the sensitive issue of the constitution,
will be protected. Last month he sent a large floral
which has become a rallying point for pro-monarchy
wreath to the new "Hagh Horn," the leader of the Jewish
commanders. Several of Khomeini's associates, including
community, with a note of assurance: "We are brothers
Karim Sanjabi, leader of the National Front, the main
living next to each other. It is only the government
political opposition, believe that the Ayatullah might
which tries to confuse everything." Nonetheless, an
agree to use the present constitution as a device for
estimated 5,000 Jews have left the country, most for
the transition of power. "The army will go along with
the U.S. and Europe.
any government that is representative," says Sanjabi.
"If Bakhtiar resigns, it is not difficult to find a
They were not alone. Alarmed by what the State solution based on a temporary government accepted by
Department called the "uncertain security situation," the people." At week's end, the Khomeini strategy
and fearing a tide of anti-American sentiment, seemed to be one of waiting for members of parliament
Ambassador William Sullivan asked Americans whose and the regency council to resign. So far 72 out of 200
presence was not essential to leave. Despite many deputies in the legislature have resigned; if half do
Iranians' personal reassurances to foreigners of their so, a Khomeini aide said, Bakhtiar's government has no
friendship, there were two ugly incidents: Major Larry legal basis.
Davis was hit by two bullets as he returned home, and
was rushed to the U.S. Army hospital; U.S. Consul David
If a compromise is reached, the U.S. will have played a
McGaffey was punched and beaten by an irate group of
minimal role in it. The reason: anything that carries
Iranians when he tried to intervene in an incident
Washington's approval is now anathema in Iran. Some
between an American and a taxi driver. By week's end,
Administration advisers admit that open endorsement of
all but 5,000 of the 45,000 Americans who had lived in
Bakhtiar was a serious mistake, and that U.S. policy
Iran up until September were gone. U.S. officials say
toward Iran should have remained noncommittal once the
that the American business community is cutting back to
Shah's ruling days were clearly over. Particularly
the bare minimum that can sustain their corporate
unfortunate was a statement by President Carter in
operations.
January rebuking Khomeini and urging him to support the
Bakhtiar government. State Department experts at that
Administration officials were also concerned about the time were pretty well convinced that the Prime Minister
protection of sophisticated weaponry. At the Isfahan had only the remotest chances of surviving.
airbase, some of the 78 advanced F-14 fighter planes
equipped to fire Phoenix missiles are housed within
Belatedly changing a long-held policy of the U.S.
concentric rings of security; last week Iranian forces
embassy in Iran, Ambassador Sullivan has encouraged his
guarding the base suddenly excluded a number of
subordinates to open a dialogue with the Khomeini
American advisers. U.S. military officials have
forces. U.S. diplomats have initiated contacts with a
contingency plans to destroy or spirit out of the
number of the Ayatullah's key aides, both in France and
country some of the most sensitive equipment if
Iran. By and large, they have been well received by
necessary. The most important items are the fighters
Khomeini's representatives, who have stressed that it
and 500 Phoenix missiles stored in igloos near by. If
was not too late to repair relations between the Shilte
there was a clear danger that these missiles might fall
leader and the U.S. Mehdi Bazargan, a Khomeini adviser
into Soviet hands, Pentagon sources suggest, loyal
in Tehran with broad political experience who is often
Iranian pilots would fly the planes to safety, possibly
mentioned as a potential government leader, emphasized
Saudi Arabia. U.S. officials fear that any such plans,
to U.S. officials recently that a beneficial working
if carried out without consulting the Iranian
relationship is "most definitely possible" with
government, would be construed, however, as an
Washington. The crucial factor, he insists, is that any
unwarranted interference in Iran's domestic affairs.
future trade relationship be based on an equitable
Many Iranians were furious that the U.S. was sending
exchange of goods and not distorted by extravagant
emergency supplies of diesel oil to the country's
sales of sophisticated weapons. At the same time,
military. The loan suggested to them that Washington
Khomeini's top economic adviser, Hassan Abdul Banisard,
was implicitly supporting the army's brutality against
has implied that oil production will probably have to
civilians.
be cut in half to regulate the flow of capital into
Iran.
Those who know the Ayatullah expect that eventually he
will settle in the Shi'ite holy city of Qum and resume
Another valuable ally, in the U.S. view, would be
a life of teaching and prayer. It seems improbable that
Seyyed Mohammed Beheshti, a well-educated and widely
he would try to become a kind of Archbishop Makarios of
traveled Ayatullah who has been Khomeini's chief
25
behind-the-scenes contact in Tehran. But observers say
it may take a while to see who the key figures around
Khomeini prove to be; the Paris advisers may well give
way to those who have supported him in Tehran.
Washington's greatest fear now is a military coup,
which would inevitably spark a civil war and adversely
affect any U.S. presence for many years to come. Says a
State Department official recently returned from
Tehran: "There is no question that a military takeover
would be most dangerous for U.S. interests. It would
blow away the moderates and invite the majority to
unite behind a radical faction."
Even if Iran gets a new government that has both
popular support and Khomeini's blessing, the troubles
plaguing the country will not vanish overnight. As one
U.S. specialist noted: "The Shah left, but he didn't
take the problems of the country with him." The best
estimates are that it will take two months to get the
oilfields back to export production lev el even if work
starts at once. Meanwhile, the country has a paralyzed
economy and shattered loan credibility. Except for two
to three dozen firms, all of the country's 600 major
industries have been shut down by strikes since early
December. And, although they may not be missed, most of
the once fabled Iranian rich have left the country.
Significantly, this includes 120 of the country's 200
leading business and industrial figures. Estimates of
the drain of capital that has left the country range
into the billions of dollars.
Vance, whose tireless efforts through a fortnight of
nerve-racking negotiations had achieved as little as
those of the President himself.
The service began with a military color guard
presenting the flag, and it ended with The Battle Hymn
of the Republic. "Mine eyes have seen the glory of the
coming of the Lord. . . "
For eight days the President had remained largely
secluded in the White House, trying every weapon and
maneuver he could imagine to resolve this most
dangerous and infuriating crisis of his presidency.
Most infuriating because the mightiest power on earth
found itself engaged in a test of will with an unruly
gang of Iranian students and an ailing zealot of 79.
Most dangerous because a single miscalculation could
lead to large-scale bloodshed and tear to shreds the
tenuous balance of power in the Middle East.
It was not until last Saturday, after a week of
retaliation and counterretaliation, that the first
apparent break in the conflict came. The Ayatullah
Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran's de facto head of state,
ordered the students to release the women and blacks,
believed to number a dozen, who were being held
hostage. "Islam grants to women a special status,"
explained Khomeini in announcing his decision, and
blacks "have spent ages under American pressure and
tyranny."

But on Sunday, while the Iranians were still making

Yet, for all the problems ahead, there was a sense of
preparations to release the first of the hostages, came
controlled optimism in Iran last weekend. Now that the
a shocking announcement that promised only to worsen
country's cry for the Ayatullah's return has been
the crisis. Many of the remaining hostages, proclaimed
answered, Iranians will surely insist that the
a spokesman for the students, would now be tried for
revolution live up to its democratic aims. "Democracy
espionage in the Islamic Revolutionary Courts and
is a very difficult thing for a country that does not
"punished in accordance with the severity of their
have a democratic tradition," Daryush Shayegan, a noted
crimes." The Ayatullah himself later confirmed the
Islamic philosopher in Tehran, told TIME Correspondent
scheme, adding that the trials would only be halted and
David Jackson last week. "But Iranians are ready to
the hostages let go if the U.S. returned the Shah.
learn it. Khomeini is an Islamic Gandhi. He is at the
Warned a senior official of West Germany's foreign
axis of our movement, and his greatest achievement will
ministry when told of the threat: "With the turmoil and
have been to have overthrown the regime. But there must
fanaticism in Iran, one has to be prepared even for the
be a democratic republic. In the Iranian character,
outrage of the hostages' execution, even though that
miracles always happen at the last moment. I hope one
would be international murder."
will happen again.''

As for the promise to release some of the hostages, the

Monday, Nov. 26, 1979
Iran: The Test of Wills
COVER STORIES
Khomeini orders the release of a few hostages, but the
crisis continues
"Faith of our fathers, living still," sang a weary,
anxious, deeply troubled Jimmy Carter, "in spite of
dungeon, fire and sword. . ." And when it came time for
the choir to respond with the eloquent verses of Psalm
130, the President sat, head bowed, in his front-row
pew at the National Cathedral and listened intently to
the ancient words of hope in a time of trouble: "Out of
the depths have I cried to you, O Lord, hear my
prayer."
Iranians dawdled through the weekend and by early
Monday Iran time, nearly 40 hours after the first
announcement, not a single American had been freed.
Instead, the students staged a circus act in the
embassy compound, trotting out three of the captives
who were slated to be released for a "press conference"
before some 200 American and other foreign
correspondents. The three—two 23-year-old black Marines
and a 22-year-old female secretary—were seated at a
table in front of three colored posters of the
Ayatullah and slogans denouncing the exiled Shah of
Iran and President Carter. Read—one misspelled poster:
CARTER IS SUPPORTING THIS NASTY CRIMINAL UNDER THE
PROTEX OF SICKNESS.
Though the promised release of some hostages was a
signal that progress was possible, the basic situation
was totally unchanged.

The President had joined last week with about 2,000

The Iranian students still held dozens of exhausted
others in an ecumenical prayer service for 62 American
American hostages inside the U.S. embassy compound in
hostages held under threat of death at the captured
Tehran. The Shah, whose temporary entry into the U.S.
U.S. embassy compound in Tehran. At his right sat Penny
for medical treatment had precipitated the assault,
Laingen, wife of L. Bruce Laingen, the imprisoned
still lay hospitalized in New York, despite rumors
chargé d'affaires in Tehran. On his left sat Vice
that, he might leave for Mexico at any moment. And in
President Walter Mondale and Secretary of State Cyrus
Washington, the options open to the President of the
26
U.S. were still shockingly few, with the fate of the Jimmy Carter was dismayed by the confusion. Just before
remaining hostages determining what actions could be his appearance at the National Cathedral, he had made
risked. his one major public address on the Iranian crisis, and
he had sounded tough and assertive. "This is an act of
terrorism totally outside the bounds of international
In a series of dramatic but carefully limited moves,
law and diplomatic tradition," he declared to 900
the President fought back with economic reprisals. He
delegates to the AFL-CIO convention. "This crisis calls
ordered a stop to all purchases of Iranian oil, 700,000
for firmness and restraint. The U.S. will not yield to
bbl. per day, or 4% of U.S. consumption; he froze all
international terrorism or blackmail." The Tehran
Iranian government banking assets in the U.S. The
authorities were "fully responsible" for the safety of
Administration has not officially interrupted the flow
the hostages, he said, and would be "held accountable."
of the nearly $500 million worth of food the U.S. ships
to Iran annually. But the International Longshoremen's
Association instructed all its members not to load any But at a meeting the next day with 39 Governors, whom
vessels bound for Iran, and the giant American Farm he had summoned to Washington to urge cuts of 5% in
Bureau Federation offered to support a total boycott on their states' fuel consumption, Carter was asked
food exports. Some militant superpatriots talked of whether the situation remained a total stalemate. "I'm
blockading the Iranian coast, but the Administration afraid so," he said. He described the huge crowds
consistently ruled out that and all other military outside the encircled embassy as "in a highly emotional
measures. state." And he told the Governors: "We're trying to
protect the honor of our country and the lives of the
hostages." He urged the Governors to "caution all
Yet when none of the U.S. retaliations brought any
Americans" to restrain themselves toward Iranians in
progress toward the release of the hostages, American
the U.S. Said Carter: "It would be a serious mistake
anger and frustration became almost palpable.* New
for us to deprive them of their rights or their
anti-Iranian demonstrations flared on campuses from
citizenship or our friendship." At week's end, looking
coast to coast; three teen-agers threw a rock at the
drawn and fatigued, the President retired to Camp
window of an Iranian in Denver, and he shot back,
David.
killing one of them. Eight Iranians, carrying rifles,
telescopic sights and ammunition, were arrested at
Baltimore-Washington International Airport as they The crisis had understandably driven Carter into
prepared to board a flight to New York. Senate Majority virtual seclusion. Having earlier canceled a state
Leader Robert Byrd, normally one of the mildest and visit to Ottawa, he last week dropped a political foray
most self-controlled of men, said he sympathized with to Pennsylvania and another to Florida. "Iran has blown
the demonstrators, even the violent ones. "I'd feel everything else off the map," said one aide. "That's
like taking a punch at one [an Iranian] myself, if I all anyone here is thinking about."
could get to him," said Byrd. Added Carter: "Every
American feels anger and outrage at what is happening."
The Government's days began early, long before dawn.
In an effort to cool tempers at home. Carter had
The sun rose at 6:47 over Washington last Monday, so
previously asked the Immigration and Naturalization
the city was still pitch-dark when Carter picked up his
Service to press deportation proceedings against any
Oval Office phone at 5:15 to talk to National Security
Iranian students who were residing illegally in the
Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski about the impending oil
U.S. Though the White House emphasized that the
cutoff. Carter was determined to prevent the Iranians
President had not ordered a "roundup and mass
from thinking they could use their oil as a bargaining
deportation," the action caused panic among many of the
weapon, and he also wanted to reassure Americans that
50,000 Iranian students in the U.S. and thousands of
Washington could and would take action, that there was
other Iranians who have fled to the U.S. in recent
a difference between caution and paralysis. At the
years for political reasons.
close of a weekend meeting on the possibility of
cutting off Iranian oil, he had simply said: "I want it
In Iran itself, the crisis ebbed and flowed. Early in done."
the week there was talk of compromises, and hints that
some of the hostages might be released, but as the
But he was concerned about the reactions. All Monday
American determination became obvious in Iran, the
morning, Administration aides broke the news to
crowds around the U.S. embassy grew larger and uglier.
congressional leaders, OPEC governments, U.S. business
On Friday a throng swarmed through the poplars and
executives and particularly the principal American oil
cypress trees that dot the once idyllic compound. Among
companies affected by the decision (notably Amerada
them for the first time were soldiers and airmen.
Hess and Ashland). At 2 p.m. that day, the President
"Death to the Shah!" the demonstrators chanted. "Death
walked before the television lights, a layer of pancake
to Carter!" The Ayatullah Yahya Nouri, one of the
makeup barely disguising the fatigue, and declared: "No
leaders of the revolution, gave a fiery speech outside
one should underestimate the resolve of the American
the embassy gates calling for a "jihad [holy war]
Government and the American people." Speaking as
against the U.S." This might all be dismissed as
plainly and directly as a Georgia farmer, Carter
rhetoric, but inside the compound remained the American
outlined his decision in less than five minutes, then
hostages, haggard, some of them with their hands bound,
retired to the family quarters of the White House to
totally vulnerable to the whims of their captors. One
await the reaction. It was quick and strongly
student gloated to TIME Correspondent Bruce van Voorst:
favorable, an indication that the country had been
"Our cup of hatred is filled to overflowing."
waiting for just such a step. Said retiring AFL-CIO
Chief George Meany, long a Carter critic: "He acted
Ayatullah Khomeini was being no less emotional. "All wisely and well."
Western governments are just thieves," he declared to
his followers in the holy city of Qum, 80 miles from
Secretary of State Vance wanted to make sure that the
Tehran. "We should simply cut all ties to them. Nothing
oil cutoff did not appear provocative to Tehran. Said
but evil comes from them." Then the Ayatullah
he: "This should eliminate any thought that economic
mysteriously canceled all appointments for three weeks.
pressure affects our decisions. It is not provocative,
He was reported to be sick.
but is an act of self-discipline on our part." The
implication—and the hope—was that the U.S. would begin
to cut back its imports and consumption of oil, though
27
there may be no such reduction at all as long as
Americans refuse to face up to the consequences of
OPEC's tightening noose. The diplomatic benefits of the
oil cut-off were more obvious. Said Energy Secretary
Charles Duncan: "To the extent that the Iranians
considered we were dependent on their oil, we want to
tell them it is simply not true." Another
Administration aide put it even more bluntly: "They
thought it would be a useful card. Now they can't play
it."
Two days later the next retaliatory step came. Carter
had asked leading U.S. banks to be on the watch for any
movements in Iranian government accounts. Treasury
Secretary G. William Miller telephoned the President at
5:45 a.m. Wednesday to give him the ominous message
that Iran was threatening to transfer billions of
dollars worth of deposits from U.S. accounts to other
nations, presumably in Western Europe. Carter had ready
an Executive order blocking such transfers; the funds
involved amounted to $6 billion. Once again Carter
aides took to the telephones, this time to advise U.S.
bankers and several foreign governments, including
Saudi Arabia, of the pending action and to assure them
that the U.S. had no intention of freezing the assets
of any other nation. At 8 a.m., just before a breakfast
with Republican leaders, Carter formally signed the
order. Again the President's action was praised. New
York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan said Carter was
handling the crisis with "great competence, steadiness
and assuredness."
The show of strength earned the President badly needed
support even from his opponents. Senate Republican
Leader Howard Baker offered Carter the "unwavering"
backing of his colleagues. Congressional criticism and
post-mortem investigations will be stormy once all the
hostages have been freed, but for the moment the
President's political enemies held their fire. Anxious
to take some specific action of support, the House
voted to cut off all military and economic aid to Iran,
including $20 million in U.S. funds allocated through
the U.N. Development Program. The tally: 379 to 0.
A major difficulty for the Administration was that
throughout the week various Iranian authorities kept
changing the terms of the bargaining. On Tuesday Acting
Foreign Minister Abol Hassan Banisadr sent a letter to
U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim. The letter
implied that the hostages could be released if the U.S.
agreed to turn over the Shah's personal fortune to Iran
and "at least accept the investigation of the guilt of
the former Shah and its consequences." The letter
omitted any specific demand for the Shah's return. Some
officials saw the beginnings of a compromise here, but
Banisadr said later the new terms really meant "the
return of the Shah."
On Thursday, when Banisadr first said the Iranians
might release some hostages, the student leaders
actually occupying the embassy property quickly
asserted that they took orders only from the Ayatullah
Khomeini, and that nobody was going to be released
until the U.S. had sent the Shah back to Iran. Admitted
one White House official: "We don't know with any
certainty who these students are or who's in charge.
That doubles the trouble."
At the State Department, Iran specialists were
similarly uncertain about the degree of leftist and
even Communist influence in the highly disorganized
Khomeini regime. Was Khomeini really in charge or just
presiding over an internal power struggle? Did the fall
of the government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan two
weeks ago portend a new campaign by Iranian leftists to
seize power for themselves? One puzzling element in the
recent unrest was the sudden fall from favor of Ibrahim
Yazdi, who had been one of Khomeini's closest courtiers
during the Ayatullah's last days in exile in France.
Partly because he had spent 16 years in the U.S. and
had become a naturalized American citizen (a fact that
he denied steadfastly during his seven months as
Foreign Minister), the U.S. had hoped that Yazdi would
prove useful in rebuilding Washington's ties with
Tehran. Yazdi had secured the release of American
diplomats during the earlier, and much briefer (two
hours), embassy siege last Feb. 14. In September Yazdi
and Vance had talked at the U.N. for four hours about
military supplies for Iran and the future of U.S.-
Iranian relations. Vance came away from that meeting
thinking that the Bazargan government was slowly
acquiring more authority over the rabble-rousing
mullahs who surround Khomeini. It was a mistaken
conclusion.
The sudden fall of Bazargan and Yazdi evoked fears that
both the more radical ayatullahs and the leftist
secular forces were using the embassy assault as a
pretext for pushing the country sharply to the left.
The small but well-organized Tudeh (Communist) Party
has been held in check by Khomeini, who denounces the
Communists fervently, if redundantly, as "godless
atheists." The prevailing view in Washington is that
the extreme leftists will continue to ride the Khomeini
whirlwind as they gain key positions in the ruling 15-
man Revolutionary Council, and will eventually try to
brush Khomeini aside in a final grab for power.
At this point, the principal bond that unites the
different factions of the Iranian regime is an abiding
hatred of the deposed Shah. The object of all that
emotion was closely guarded in New York Hospital, where
he was recuperating from his gall bladder surgery and
undergoing a series of radiation treatments for
lymphoma, a cancer of the lymph glands, from which he
has been suffering for six years. For these treatments,
he was taken at least three times through a heavily
guarded underground passage to Memorial Sloan-Kettering
Cancer Center. Some doctors said privately that the
Shah could safely be moved within a few days, and that
the treatment he needs could be administered in many
places—in Mexico, Egypt or France, where he has been
treated for his lymphoma in the past.
The way for his return to Mexico was presumably cleared
when the Mexican government announced that as a
precaution, it had temporarily closed its Tehran
embassy and that the Shah was welcome to return to his
exile in Cuernavaca. It had been presumed for days that
having the Shah leave the U.S. would be a useful first
step in resolving the plight of the hostages. But
typical of the unpredictability of events was an
announcement by the students in the embassy late in the
week, that the flight of the Shah to any third country
could result in "harsher decisions being taken against
the hostages."
In Tehran, the political situation deteriorated
markedly as the week passed. The rumors about
Khomeini's health started after a Thursday meeting in
Qum. "I'm not feeling well," confessed the Ayatullah to
his followers. He then launched into a feverish attack
on the U.S. Said he: "The U.S. has grabbed our money
just like thieves. We should not fall for their
propaganda." An aide reported that Khomeini was
suffering from a flu virus communicated to him by
"various visitors who have come to Qum in that
condition." Said one observer: "The Imam has never
sounded this bad before."
28
Khomeini evidently insisted to his colleagues that they
stand firm against the increasing American pressures.
Hassan Habibi, the newly appointed spokesman for the
Revolutionary Council, reaffirmed the government's
position on the hostages: "We are not going to retreat
in the face of U.S. imperialism. We are asking for the
extradition of an international criminal, and the U.S.
cannot long continue its aggressive reaction to our
demand." He disclosed that Iran and Libya had agreed to
re-establish diplomatic relations after a break of
several years. The two countries had been especially at
odds for the past year, following the disappearance and
alleged assassination in Libya of the leader of
Lebanon's Shi'ite community, Imam Moussa Sadr. The
reconciliation was interpreted as a victory for the
hardline Muslim radicals in the Iranian leadership, who
have been arguing for closer ties with Libya in spite
of the Moussa Sadr affair.
Amid all its other difficulties, the government was
also distracted by an earthquake that destroyed at
least nine villages in northeastern Iran and killed
several hundred people. (A far more serious tremor in
the same region last year had killed 25,000.) Khomeini
declared the situation a "national calamity" and
appealed for "Islamic help" in providing doctors,
medicine and food. The U.S., which has repeatedly
provided such aid in the past, was not called upon.
The focal point of the conflict remained the occupied
American embassy in Tehran. Inside the compound, 600
members of the "Muslim Students of the Imam Khomeini
Line" split the hostages into two groups. Half were in
the ambassador's residence, half in two yellow
bungalows near by. The treatment of the hostages was
believed to have improved somewhat, though some of the
men still had their hands tied. The women were guarded
by chador-clad girls clutching automatic rifles. Early
in the week the captors released a taped message from
one of the Marine prisoners, Kevin Hermening,
complaining that he didn't like "being a pawn used in a
game" and urging the President to place a higher
priority on the lives of the hostages than on the Shah.
Outside the embassy was a far wilder scene as crowds of
thousands gathered to shout their support. Above the
embassy gate hung a portrait of Khomeini and a
loudspeaker over which a voice intoned repeatedly, "God
is great" and "There is but one God." At a midnight
rally Thursday about 1,000 students, aligned with the
leftist Islamic Mujahedin-e Khalq (People's Crusaders),
tried to stage a demonstration but found themselves
confronting a group of right-wing Islamic extremists.
Moderates crying "Allahu akbar!" (God is great) quickly
moved in to act as a buffer between the two groups.
One day, three British members of an NBC television
crew were arrested near the embassy, but were quickly
released. On another occasion, a deeply distraught
American woman, apparently the relative of a hostage,
appeared at the gates with a child in hand. She
suddenly began to shout obscenities at the guards. In
an instant the mob started to surge toward her, but
photographers provided a distraction, and in the
confusion she was quickly led away. Behind her, the
crowd kept murmuring, "Kill her, kill her." Said a
Western diplomat: "The crowd now represents a 'third
force,' and it has to be reckoned with. If either
Khomeini or the students were to try to negotiate, I
wouldn't rule out a mass attack by this mob."
Every day after noon prayers, the students and the
crowd went through a curious ritual that often ended in
mass hysteria. The students came to the embassy gates
to exchange political slogans with the people outside.
They threw carnations and tulips, an Iranian symbol of
martyrdom, back and forth through the gates. Said one
worried Iranian bystander: "I think the're is a
national death wish emerging."
Such scenes reinforced the U.S. concern that the
Iranian government and even Khomeini himself were being
swept along by events. But from the Ayatullah's point
of view, there was ample reason to welcome some
political diversion. He has fared poorly in bringing
the Iranian economy back to prerevolutionary levels.
Industry is estimated to be operating at only 40% of
capacity. With workers' councils sitting in on
managerial decisions, many managers are afraid to make
decisions on anything but issuing paychecks. Chaos
prevails at the docks and at highway customs posts
along the main truck route from Europe. Inflation is
running at 40%, unemployment at 25%. In Tehran the
situation is further aggravated by the migration since
the revolution of perhaps 1.5 million people to the
city, bringing the population up to as many as 5
million.
The streets are still packed with automobiles, however,
and Tehran still has the worst smog east of Los
Angeles. The privileged few, if there are any left, can
buy vodka for $20 a bottle and on Fridays can place
their wagers at the Farahabad race track. But the
citizenry in general are visibly angry. Last week
unemployed workers seized the Labor Ministry and held
it for 24 hours. "They're bitter," said a ministry
official afterward. "And they'll be back."
One thing that should sustain Jimmy Carter during his
current ordeal is the knowledge that, for the first
time in his presidency, and indeed within recent
memory, the U.S. enjoyed at least modest support from
practically the entire world. Two weeks ago, members of
the U.N. Security Council had voted unanimously to
express their "profound concern" over Iran's detention
of American diplomats, and last week the Council
rejected a request by Iran to turn the matter into a
sort of star-chamber proceeding on the fate of the
deposed Shah. Even the Soviet leadership, perhaps
because it remembers so clearly the attack on its
embassy in Peking during the Cultural Revolution, was
providing a degree of backing. After a State Department
complaint about Soviet anti-American broadcasts being
beamed to Iran, the Soviets curtailed them, and Tass
referred, a bit obliquely, to "the true position of the
Soviet Union with regard to. . .observing the norms and
principles of international law." In the most pointed
comment of all, the Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.,
Anatoli Dobrynin, told Secretary Vance: "Where hostages
are concerned, politics should stop."
In the Middle East, only Libyan Strongman Muammar
Gaddafi came out in support of Iran in the present
controversy. At last week's Arab summit meeting in
Tunis, Libya further proposed that the other Arab oil
producers join in imposing sanctions against the U.S.;
the idea was unanimously rejected. Even the Palestine
Liberation Organization, though it has close ties to
the Iranian leadership, made an effort to act as a
mediator, an initiative that ended in failure last
week. (Another would-be negotiator, Carter's Special
Emissary Ramsey Clark, the former U.S. Attorney
General, gave up after Khomeini announced he would not
see the President's representative.)
Carter's strongest support in the region came from
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who had also offered
refuge to the Shah two weeks ago. By his invitation,
Middle East experts believe, Sadat was telling the
Saudis that he remains responsive to their fears about
29
the rise of radicalism. He was also reminding them that
he does not snub old friends when they need help. Sadat
feels that the Sunni Muslims need a defender against
Iran's assertive Shi'ites, and he would like to fill
the role himself. The Saudis quickly assured Sadat
through third parties that they will continue to ship
their oil through the Suez Canal and will not withdraw
the $2 billion that they and the Kuwaitis have on
deposit in the Central Bank of Egypt. Sadat spoke for
most of the moderate Arabs when he observed at week's
end: "The situation in Iran is deteriorating badly and
presents an extremely grave threat to the Arab gulf
states."
Though the Western European nations were all favoring
Carter in the current crisis—the London Daily Telegraph
even denounced Khomeini as "a stupid, vindictive old
man"—their official support seemed tepid. Asked New
York Times Columnist James Reston: "Where are the
allies?" Where, he wondered, are the Europeans who
always yearned for "collective security"? European
diplomats retorted that they had backed the U.S. as
well as they could and that West German Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt and British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher, in particular, had strongly supported Carter.
Schmidt told colleagues: "The West must show unity. We
must back the U.S." If the Europeans were restrained,
it was probably because 1) it was a time for "cool
professionalism," as an American diplomat put it; 2)
the U.S. had not asked for or expected stronger public
support; and 3) Iran supplies 9% of West Germany's oil
imports and 20% of Britain's.
President Carter was awakened at 5:35 Saturday morning
with the news from Tehran that Khomeini had called for
the release of a few of the hostages. But then followed
a delay. On Sunday night, the students summoned foreign
newsmen to a press conference with the first three of
the hostages scheduled to be freed.
The three introduced themselves as Sgt. Ladell Maples,
23, of Earle, Ark., and Sgt. William Quarles, 23, of
Washington, D.C., both black Marines, and Kathy Gross,
22, of Cambridge Springs, Pa., a secretary to the
embassy's Economic and Commercial Counsellor. For over
two hours, they answered questions. "We were treated
very good," said Gross. "We've been fed more than was
adequate. We've slept nights." Later, however, she
mentioned that for the first 16 hours of her captivity,
she had been forced to sit in a chair with her hands
tied to the armrests. It was also revealed that the
hostages were not permitted to talk with one another or
read newspapers. Said Maples: "We didn't know what was
going on."
Why these particular three were chosen for early
release was not revealed. "I have learned a lot about
the other side here," Quarles told reporters. "The
people of the United States should turn around and look
at things differently for a change." All three,
however, did show a certain sensitivity to being the
first freed. "I had no choice," said Quarles. "I would
have liked to stay with them, but there's nothing I can
do about it."
Meanwhile, back in the U.S., the days of waiting were
having an effect on the families of those still held in
Tehran. Some wives all but charged the State Department
with criminal negligence for having failed to protect
its staff once the Shah had been admitted to the U.S.
"I am so bitter I could scream," said Louisa Kennedy,
wife of Hostage Mike Kennedy. She has been manning
telephones in the State Department Operations Center,
talking to families of other hostages.
Totally at the root of the present dispute between the
U.S. and Iran is the deposed Shah. Though Americans
themselves are divided on their views toward the Shah,
few perceive him as an "Iranian Hitler," as Iranian
revolutionaries now call him, charging that his forces
slaughtered 10,000 Iranian civilians in the months
before the monarchy collapsed. Even fewer Americans
would be prepared to allow the Shah to be returned to
Iran involuntarily to face the Ayatullah's
revolutionary justice.
The question of the Shah's character and what his
monarchy brought to Iran can never be resolved to the
satisfaction of all parties. But many diplomats
throughout the world would agree that, as a starting
point in settling the current crisis, it would be
fortunate if the Shah should proceed to Mexico or some
other third country to continue his treatment and
recuperation. Alternatively, suggests one prominent
American expert on the Middle East, the Shah could help
by renouncing, once and for all, his family's claim to
the Peacock Throne. This expert believes the Shah might
well be willing to make such a sacrifice as the price
of staying in the U.S.
If the embassy crisis can be resolved and the hostages
are uninjured, it is still possible that the U.S. and
Iran could restore limited relations. The present
Iranian government wants to sell the 77 U.S.-built F-14
jet fighters that the Shah bought for his air force.
Contractual restrictions would prevent Iran from
selling the planes to the Soviet Union, but it is
likely that Iran could find a customer acceptable to
the U.S. One possibility: Saudi Arabia. The sale of
military spare parts could begin again. The U.S. still
sells wheat and rice to Iran, and in time the sale of
Iranian oil to the U.S. might be also resumed.
If the crisis ends badly and any of the hostages are
harmed, however, the U.S. will face a far more serious
problem. Though the Administration has ruled out
military intervention during the current impasse (there
were naval exercises in the Persian Gulf last week,
however), it might change its mind in the event of
American casualties at the embassy. The Pentagon has
advised that air raids, launched from carriers, could
put the Iranian oilfields out of action for six months
with a minimum of civilian injuries, but there has been
no suggestion from any quarter that this would be a
good course to follow. The resulting oil shortage would
hurt U.S. allies more than it would hurt Iran—and would
drive world oil prices through the roof. Another
possibility would be a Government embargo on all trade
with Iran, including food, but Carter would use the
food weapon only as a last resort. Summarizing the
planning difficulties, an Administration official noted
last week: "The difference between minimum and maximum
punishment is not all that great. This is very tough to
calibrate."
What worries many governments at the moment, apart from
the impasse at the American embassy, is that Iran
appears to be slipping ever closer to chaos.
Using Khomeini as a cover, extremists of the left are
trying to reinforce their position, thereby setting the
scene for possible civil war. The Ayatullah Khomeini,
old and ailing, does not understand modern statecraft,
diplomacy or administration. Jimmy Carter does not know
how to deal with him; neither does anybody else. Says a
European diplomat: "What can you do when faced with a
mad geriatric case?" Yet this remarkable old man, and
he alone, seems to possess the power to preserve his
volatile country from total anarchy—and to free the
rest of the American hostages in Tehran.
30
*;One intrepid entrepreneur, Joe Conforte, who runs the Mustang Ranch, a legalized
bordello outside Reno, took advantage of the uproar to post a sign at his gates saying:
"No more Iranian students will be permitted on these premises until the hostages are
released."
Monday, Nov. 26, 1979
An Ideology of Martyrdom
"Allahu akbar! Allahu akbar!" The Arabic pronouncement
that "God is great" sustained the Iranian
revolutionaries as they marched through the streets of
Tehran in demonstrations against the Shah. The
invocation was heard again as students attacked the
U.S. embassy, and as mobs last week marched about the
captured compound, demanding death for the hostages.
To what extent was the student action—and the Ayatullah
Khomeini's endorsement of it—in accordance with Islamic
law? Experts differ. Zaki Badawi, Egyptian director of
the Islamic Cultural Center in London, argues that "the
demand for the return of the Shah to face trial in Iran
is in agreement with Muslim law." Islam holds that "no
one is above the law and law is supreme. If a crime is
committed by a ruler, an emperor, he is as liable to
punishment for it as the meanest and commonest of his
subjects." As a precedent, one Cairo expert notes that
in 1964 the late King Saud of Saudi Arabia was tried,
deposed and banished by an Islamic court for conduct
unbecoming a Muslim ruler—namely, drinking, gambling
and womanizing.
Islamic scholars are virtually unanimous in condemning
the seizure of the hostages as contrary to the Shari'a
(Islamic canon law). Says Badawi: "There is no basis in
Islam for this. Islam does not justify the taking of
hostages, and it also clearly states that one person
cannot be punished for the crimes of another." Egyptian
President Anwar Sadat, a devout Muslim, has denounced
Khomeini as a "lunatic" and forthrightiy condemned the
seizure of the hostages. "This is not Islam," he said.
"Islam teaches love, tolerance and mercy." One of the
ranking experts on Islamic law, at Cairo's ancient Al
Azhar University, charges that the Ayatullah's "evil
hunger for the death of a sick man is a towering crime
under Islamic law." Islam "considers any sick or dying
person with extreme humility," he says. Rouhollah
Ramanzani, an Iranian scholar teaching at the
University of Virginia, points out that according to
the Islamic code, "if an undesirable individual enters
into the Muslim domain, then that person must be
protected and escorted to the boundaries of that domain
to let him out safely."
Most authorities doubted that the students would
physically harm the hostages, or that Khomeini would
tolerate their torture or death. Says Thomas Ricks, an
Iranian expert at Georgetown University: "Nothing in
Islam could justify the slaughter of the hostages, and
it is unthinkable that the captors would do so, unless
they were threatened by an outside attack." Professor
Hamid Algar of the University of California at Berkeley
notes that the Shari'a permits both the exchange of
hostages and their unilateral release by captors. He
also observes, however, that "one tradition is that
hostages may be kept permanently."
Islamic authorities point out that the vast majority of
Iranians are Shi'ite Muslims, who have what one student
in Tehran describes as an "ideology of martyrdom and
expectation." Says Berkeley's Algar: "The Shi'ites are
given to martyrdom—to defy the whole world. In the
Shi'ite mind there is no compromise." Far more than in
the dominant Sunni branch, the tenets of Islam can be
and are used by Shi'ites to obtain political
objectives. This is particularly true in Iran, where
the ayatullahs and mullahs have a long tradition of
calling on the faith as a weapon against secular rulers
in Tehran or unwanted foreign influences. Says Jean
Calmard, a French expert on Shi'ism: "Once again the
religious leaders are adapting Islamic rules to serve
political ends." Sadat puts it more strongly: "I feel
both angry and sad at what Khomeini is doing in Iran,
because he is in flagrant violation of all Islamic
principle. He is using Islam to exploit himself. He
hides behind the students. He takes advantage of them
and he deceives them into committing crimes for which
there is no justification in Islam."
Monday, Jan. 7, 1980
Portrait of an Ascetic Despot
An earthy sense of justice, an all-embracing code of
behavior
There is no room for play in Islam. It is deadly
serious about everything.
Khomeini in speech at Qum
All Western governments are just thieves. Nothing but
evil comes from them.
Khomeini counseling supporters
The nation voted for the Islamic Republic, and everyone
should obey. If you do not obey, you will be
annihilated.
Khomeini denouncing opponents
Arogant and pious. Stubborn and vengeful. Humorless and
inflexible. Ascetic and power hungry. These are some of
the adjectives that experts on Iran use to describe the
Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini.
Much as his principles differ from those of the Shah,
some analysts believe, Khomeini has many things in
common with the deposed ruler—most notably, a sense of
having been divinely ordained to guide and govern Iran.
Marvin Zonis, director of the Center for Middle Eastern
Studies at the University of Chicago, notes that the
Ayatullah "has more titles now than the Shah ever had:
Savior of the Generations, Defeater of the Oppressors,
Imam of the Age." Zonis believes , that the Ayatullah
and the Shah "are a lot alike as leaders. Neither is
particularly intelligent, but each is shrewd and
cunning. Each is determined to impose his views on the
Iranian people. Khomeini is ending up the same kind of
ruler that the Shah was—namely grandiose, arrogant,
despotic."
Khomeini is not a man given to self-doubt. Through 64
years of philosophical
study and teaching, inclduing almost 15 years of exile,
and now a year of adulation and power in his homeland,
the Ayatullah has been wholly consistent—and totally
unbending. Why not? In his own mind he speaks not for
himself but for God, whose precepts never change. Says
Richard Cottam of the University of Pittsburgh, one of
the few American scholars who have held long
conversations with Khomeini: "The trouble in talking to
him is that you always run up against a wall called
God."
31
Khomeini and the world outside Iran have spent most of
1979 glaring past each other in mutual incomprehension.
The barriers to understanding go well beyond the
Ayatullah's lack of interest in explaining himself to
foreigners. He spent most of his life in obscurity; he
was an enigma even to many of the theological students
who presumably knew him best. Some of the most basic
facts about his life are matters of conjecture, largely
because Khomeini regards such personal details as
unimportant. It is not known whether his birth date is
actually May 17, 1900, as Tehran newspapers assert, or
whether his wife of 50 years—Quesiran, or Khadijah, as
different spellings have it—is his first or second
spouse. Almost all Western translations of his basic
prerevolutionary teachings are of doubtful authenticity
or accuracy. In particular, a howlingly funny French
translation of some of his remarks—dealing with, among
other things, the proper attitude of Muslims toward the
meat of a camel that has been sodomized—is composed of
random pronouncements from a thick book, deliberately
excerpted out of context to make the Ayatullah look
ridiculous.
But from discussions with former students, talks with
Western scholars who have visited Khomeini, profiles
prepared by Western intelligence analysts, and the
speeches and interviews he has given during his year on
the world stage, it is possible to gain some insight
into the Ayatullah's thinking. First and foremost, all
sources agree, he is an Islamic mystic who believes
that God tells him directly how to apply the principles
of the Koran and the Shari'a (Islamic law) to life and
politics.
For Khomeini, the essence of the mystic attitude is
detachment—serenity in accepting and preaching God's
will. He does feel emotion; intimates insist that with
students and his family, he weeps, laughs and even
cracks jokes. In public, however, Khomeini will not
permit himself to display joy, sorrow, rage or any
other emotion. His angriest words are delivered in a
soft, uninflected voice that seldom rises above a
murmur.
And what is it that Khomeini's God commands? An all-
embracing code of behavior. Says Chicago's Zonis, who
is preparing an English translation of one of the
Ayatullah's major works: "It is a rigorous, minute,
specific codification of the way to behave in every
conceivable circumstance, from defecation to urination
to sexual intercourse to eating to cleaning the teeth.
Khomeini does give attention to human frailties; he
says, in essence, 'If you don't do it this way, well,
if you feel bad, that's okay.' But the scheme is
appallingly oppressive to us Westerners, in that there
is a right way and a wrong way to do everything."
As in personal routines, so in politics: to Khomeini
the only just state is one ruled by Islamic
theologians, who alone can be trusted to interpret
God's commands correctly. There is no separation of
church and state, or division between sacred and
secular, in Islamic teaching. The Ayatullah, however,
carries his theocratic vision much farther than most
other Muslim scholars by insisting on the clergy's
duty, not just to pass moral judgment on the acts of
government, but to rule the state directly—a concept
enshrined in the constitution that Iran adopted last
month. The ideal Islamic government, Khomeini has
declared many times, was the five-year reign over the
Arabian peninsula of Muhammad's son-in-law Ah', who
died in A.D. 661.
Khomeini's zeal for theocracy has led to the charge
that he is seeking to drag Iran back to the Middle
Ages. One scholar argues instead that the Ayatullah is
something of an innovator in his application of the
Shari'a to contemporary situations. Certainly his
justification of the students' seizure of the hostages
has no precedent in Muslim jurisprudence. Although he
can be mysteriously vague about programmatic approaches
to specific political and economic issues, Khomeini has
a social philosophy that Hamid Enayat of Oxford sums up
in this manner: "The country should be content with a
simple way of life. His ascetic example should be the
standard for all Iran." Says an American scholar: "He
has an earthy sense of justice. He is for private
property, cheap'meat and electricity and plenty of
water. That makes him an Iranian populist. He has a
George Wallace sense of how people think."
Khomeini is not opposed to Western technology. Indeed,
he has used it shrewdly—first in distributing cassette
tapes of his anti-Shah sermons throughout Iran before
the revolution, more recently by exploiting television
to maintain his popularity with the people. He has read
deeply in early Greek philosophy and can discuss
Aristotle with animated admiration; Iran's new
constitution is an Islamic version of Plato's Republic,
with Khomeini as philosopher-king. His peers, however,
generally believe that on matters of Islamic
scholarship he is less profound than some of his fellow
ayatullahs—notably Seyed Kazem Sharietmadari. Numerous
Western scholars who have spoken to him have been
shocked by his ignorance of modern life. He knows
little of the non-Muslim world, and regards it with
morbid suspicion.
Ignorance and mystic certitude can be a dismaying
combination. Some of Khomeini's preachments sound
bizarre and even irrational to Western ears. He has
justified polygamy, for example, on the ground that
there are more women than men in the world, and that
women without the protection of multiple marriages
would be driven into prostitution. He asserts that the
Shah's soldiers, who fired into crowds during the
Iranian revolution, were imported Israelis dressed up
in
Iranian army uniforms; they must have been, he says
because Muslims do not kill fellow Muslims.
His vivid denunciations of assorted opponents as
"devils" and "agents of Satan" have persuaded some
American politicians that Khomeini is—in the words of
Egypt's Anwar Sadat —"a lunatic." Not so, conclude most
Iranian scholars. "I don't think he's crazy," says
Columbia University Historian Richard Bulliet. "Most of
his decisions have been taken quite logically as a
consequence of his perception of the popular will."
Richard Falk, professor of international relations and
foreign policy at Princeton, concurs: "When he seems
the most crazy to us, he appears most exemplary to the
Iranian people. That suggests you would have to say all
of Iran is crazy."
Mehdi Haeri, a onetime student of Khomeini's who now
teaches at Georgetown University, feels that Khomeini
has changed over the years: "He's more militant now.
He's more stubborn, less flexible, less subtle." As
they try to analyze Khomeini from a distance, some
Western intelligence sources conclude that he is an
authoritarian personality who thinks almost totally in
black-and-white terms, has only a limited tactical
flexibility and is unlikely to tolerate any challenge
to his power. He has strong narcissistic traits and
reacts to threats by demagogy. But Khomeini is capable
of backing away, albeit reluctantly, when his goals
cannot be accomplished immediately. During the Tehran
government's military campaign against the Kurds last
32
spring, he denounced the separatist leaders as corrupt
men deserving of punishment. Later he sanctioned
negotiations to allow for some form of Kurdish
autonomy. After mass protests he modified his rule that
women must wear the chador to one requiring merely
"modest dress"—even though he fumed to Italian
Journalist Oriana Fallaci about "the coquettes who put
on makeup and go into the street showing off their
necks, their hair, their shapes."
In the hostage crisis, some Western analysts believe,
Khomeini is torn two ways. He seized on the Shah's
admittance to the U.S. for medical treatment as a
heaven-sent opportunity to focus all popular discontent
and criticism on two hated scapegoats, the deposed
monarch and the Americans, and incited a wave of fury
that culminated in the seizure of the U.S. embassy.
(Some intelligence sources think that the Ayatullah
genuinely feared the Shah might die of cancer before
Khomeini could exact his revenge.) But Khomeini did not
think through the consequences, and—implausible though
it now seems—may actually be looking for a way out.
According to this analysis, Khomeini recognizes that
the wave of anarchy unloosed in Iran by the violent
emotions of the confrontation with the U.S. is a threat
to his dream of an Islamic republic, the establishment
of which is his overriding goal. At the same time, he
will not accept any settlement that would appear to be
a defeat. If he feels totally boxed in, he just might
seek an outlet in national martyrdom, by provoking the
U.S. to military action.
In Qum, Khomeini lives as an unassuming man of God. In
his sparsely furnished house, he is surrounded by the
cheerful noise and confusion of a typical Middle
Eastern home. He evidently enjoys the company of his 14
grandchildren. He is said to have a weak heart, has
suffered from a form of undulant fever and can work for
only a few hours a day. Still he performs the devout
Muslim's daily ritual of prayer without visible effort.
He subsists on a sparse diet of rice, bean curd, yogurt
and raw onions, supplemented now and then by a slice of
melon or a bit of mutton. There are some signs that
power has begun to intoxicate him. He has admitted
enjoying the adulation of the crowds, and he took
personal command of the government, though he had
originally said he would not, apparently because he
decided no one else could be trusted to carry out God's
will. Another Iranian ayatullah has observed that
Khomeini, because of his long career in opposition to
the Shah, is "a good wrecker but a bad builder."
Indeed, Khomeini's Islamic state is planned and
governed in conditions of primitive chaos. Ambassadors
and government ministers as well as peasant petitioners
wait for their audiences in an antechamber lit by a
naked bulb hanging from the ceiling. Two mullahs stand
guard over the residence's only link to the outside
world: four single-line telephones.
The mullahs or Khomeini's son Seyyed Ahmed, about 35,
handle all the calls; the Ayatullah does not deign to
use this modern invention. That disdain could well
stand as a symbol of the Ayatullah's whole rule, which
aims at creating, to ward the end of the 20th century,
a modern version of his ideal 7th century state. In one
sense he has succeeded: Iran is undoubtedly the only
major nation that is ruled by a mystic philosopher-king
sitting cross-legged on the floor of a bare room in a
dusty provincial town. -
Monday, Jan. 7, 1980
"People Are Scared to Death"
There are still pop songs, peddlers and even discos,
but life is much changed
Clustered around the kebab and hamburger stalls behind
Lala (formerly Farah) Park in downtown Tehran, young
members of the postrevolutionary jet set are smoking a
little hash and swaying to the music of Gougoush and
Shoreh, two Western-style pop singers who have been
barred from performing in public by the Khomeini
regime. Elsewhere in the downtown area, near Mellat
Park on a street that bears the nickname "Hippiabad,"
vendors sell Top Ten tunes on cassettes, blasting out
their wares on expensive Japanese tape decks. In an
apartment in North Tehran, at a birthday party for a
well-known singer, champagne and Scotch flow as freely
as they did in the days before prohibition was imposed
last winter.
Such scenes in Tehran are vivid reminders that two
worlds coexist uneasily in Iran today. The first, the
political world of the revolution, is currently focused
on the U.S. embassy, where the crowds—smaller than they
were a few weeks ago—still gather to shout anti-
American slogans and epithets of Islamic fervor,
especially when cameramen are on hand. This world also
includes the universities and technical schools, the
late-night meetings of the supreme Revolutionary
Council, the intraoffice struggles within many
government ministries and the intense rivalry between
the new Pasdaran revolutionary militia and the now
eclipsed armed forces.
Surprisingly, the cataclysmic events of the past year
have not drastically affected a second world that
includes millions of Iranians, both city dwellers and
peasants, who are struggling to maintain a semblance of
normality in their lives. Tehran's traffic, which may
be the worst in the world, is as bad as ever, and so is
the smog. Most people still go to work and shop at
corner groceries or reasonably well-stocked
supermarkets. Their children still go to school,
although classroom discipline is poor after a year of
revolution. In the suburbs of North Tehran, people
still line up to eat in a Kentucky Fried Chicken
restaurant (whose English-language signs, following a
franchise dispute, now read simply FRIED CHICKEN). It
is still possible to buy certain foreign-made luxury
items, such as French perfume, that have been smuggled
in from Europe. Sidewalk vendors with boiled sugar
beets, pistachio nuts and sunflower seeds still do
business in the streets. Peddlers hawk everything from
blue jeans to plastic kitchen utensils. Even some
discotheques continue to operate, illegally but
discreetly, serving soda instead of booze. But there is
a flourishing black market in liquor: Scotch,
bootlegged from Iraq, sells for $60 to $90 a bottle and
moonshine vodka from $15 to $30.
A few items are in short supply. The government has
banned the import of new cars, and spare parts for old
ones are scarce. "Our people have learned to live under
seemingly impossible conditions," notes a history
teacher. Thus many of the people who trumpet their
willingness to undergo "martyrdom" are also hoarding
essential commodities as rumors of imminent scarcity
spread. "I am ready to die for Iran and Islam," says a
Tehran carpenter who has stockpiled about 100 packets
of detergent powder in his bedroom. "In the meantime,"
he explains, "I prefer to have clean linen." Most
essential imports, including food, that were formerly
bought from the U.S. now come from other countries —
wheat and beef from Australia, rice from Pakistan and
Thailand, eggs and poultry from Turkey and Rumania.
33
Nonetheless, daily life in Tehran is full of reminders that only reason I'm still employed is that there is an
of changes wrought by the revolution. Besides the new extreme shortage of teachers." A housewife with four
paper money, there are old bills in circulation that children acidly sums up Khomeini's vision of female
bear the likeness of the deposed Shah; on some notes life: "We are supposed to be good mothers and then go
his image has been overprinted with Islamic designs. to heaven. Very holy but not very practical."
Television carries the occasional old American and
European movie but devotes most of its programming to
If Iranian city dwellers have a serious common
news coverage of demonstrations, speeches by Khomeini
complaint, it is that the revolution has led to a sharp
and the like. Every night, as part of the
slowdown in the economy. Few factories are operating
"mobilization" of 20 million Iranian youths, TV
anywhere near capacity. Most privately owned companies
audiences are given instruction in how to operate an
have been taken over by the government-run Mostazafin
automatic rifle or a submachine gun.
Foundation, which inherited the assets of the deposed
Shah's Pahlavi Foundation, or are being run by workers'
A year ago, the staple fare in Iranian moviehouses councils. For the most part, these councils have shown
consisted of the latest releases from the West, themselves to be short on management skills and quick
including a generous dollop of soft-core porn. Today to vote themselves wage increases, fringe benefits and
strict censorship prevails, and the sellouts are movies reduced working hours.
with revolutionary, and preferably anti-American,
themes. A big current hit is State of Siege, Costa
Hardest hit is the construction industry, which has
Gavras' 1973 indictment of CIA activities in a Latin
come to an almost total halt. Dozens of huge apartment
American country, for which Tehran moviegoers are
complexes in Tehran stand unfinished. One example of
paying ticket scalpers three times the regular
the pervasive industrial malaise is the Melli shoe
admission price of $1.25. Iranians can also see
factory, which used to export 11 million pairs of shoes
occasional features produced by their own flourishing
a year to the Soviet bloc. Production at the Melli
film industry, which until recently was noted mostly
plant, now run by production at the Melli plant, now
for its output of erotica but is now in the business of
run by a workers' council, is down to 2 million pairs a
dramatizing the revolution.
year, scarcely enough for domestic consumption. The
council claims that the problem is lack of spare parts
Pressure from Islamic extremists forced Tehran's two and materials; the real problem is the council's
leading daily newspapers to close down last May. They ineptitude.
were replaced by papers more openly committed to the
Khomeini line. Officially, however, freedom of the
In Khuzistan, the big agribusinesses have been split
press is not curtailed, and kiosks still sell American
into small-acreage plots by revolutionary farm workers,
and European magazines (including TIME, despite the
and production has dropped. Elsewhere in the
expulsion of its correspondents) as well as the
countryside, farmers have grabbed land belonging to
International Herald Tribune. There are also several
"feudal lords." Ironically, some feudal families, in
lively opposition publications. One of the most
the name of the revolution, have forcibly reclaimed
critical of the revolution, though not of Khomeini
land that had been distributed to peasant farmers
himself, is Khalq Musalman, organ of the Muslim
during the Shah's reign. To reduce urban unemployment,
Peoples' Republican Party, which is supported by the
the new regime is pressing a "return to the village"
moderate Ayatullah Seyed Kazem Sharietmadari.
policy, hoping to send back to the farms some of the
millions of peasants who migrated to cities during the
In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, Iranian past generation.
women went on the offensive to protect the rights they
had gained during the Shah's regime. Led largely by
Tehran officials tend to scoff at Washington's recent
educated, middle-class women, street demonstrations
prediction that as the result of U.S. economic
protested Khomeini's attempts to revive the chador. The
pressures, Iranians this winter would be "cold and
women won their point: the chador remained optional.
hungry." Boasts Iran's Oil Minister Ali Akhbar Moinfar:
Even so, Iranian women wearing Western dress on the
"When you have oil revenues of $80 million or $90
streets are sometimes subject to insults and
million a day, you can always do business." Moinfar
harassment.
insists that the U.S. embargo on sales of oil equipment
to Iran will not be insurmountable because "we have had
Whether the rights of women are sufficiently protected no difficulty buying whatever we want through third par
under the new constitution is a major issue. The ties." As for reports that the departure of foreign
constitution approved last month abolished a 1967 law technicians has caused problems in the oil industry,
that restricted the number of wives a man could have by Moinfar declares: "I have piles of applications on my
making additional marriages conditional upon the desk from experts who are eager to return."
consent of his first wife. In effect, this clause had
abolished polygamy in Iran. The new laws permit an
Despite such official optimism, it is obvious that many
Iranian man to have four wives if he is capable of
Iranians are very nervous about their future. "In the
treating them all equally; since that judgment is left
bazaar, nobody will give anybody credit any more," says
to the man himself to decide, it is obviously not
Siamak Akha-van, a young businessman who runs his
enforceable. Previous legislation also gave women the
family's steel-importing company from the Tehran
same divorce rights as their husbands, as well as the
bazaar. "The system usually operates on a man's word.
possibility of being granted custody of their children
These days only cash works." The banks, suffering from
in the event of a separation. No longer. In questions
a loss of both talented employees and nerve, have
of custody, all males of both sides of a family,
curtailed credit. "Most of them don't even have a
including the wife's own uncle, now take precedence
manager," complains Akhavan, who predicts that "we are
over the wife as potential legal guardians.
going to have to live with 100% inflation." (The
present rate is 25%.) Still, Akhavan is hopeful that
Upper-class women in particular feel that their career the Islamic republic will be sufficiently flexible in
hopes will be curtailed by the revolution. Says one its policies to revive the economy.
elementary school teacher: "Women are being thrown out
of their jobs on all manner of pretexts and being
replaced by men. The only reason I'm still employed is
34
One significant change that the revolution brought to
Iran has been the altered role of the armed forces.
Like so many of the Shah's monuments—the industrial
complexes that now stand idle, the telecommunications
system that no longer works flawlessly—the army has
found its role curtailed. In November, when the central
government fought off a thrust for autonomy by Kurdish
rebels, it did so by sending to Kurdistan a specially
formed division made up of army and air force units.
Why not a regular army division? Either because the
army did not have a unit that was deemed capable of
doing the job, or because the government does not
altogether trust the army. Suspicion that the army has
not yet proved its loyalty is a basic motive behind the
formation of the Pasdaran (literally, Guardians), the
revolutionary militia.
The army was entrusted with the task of training and
equipping the Pasdaran, an assignment the army deeply
resented for two reasons: the army itself faced a
shortage of equipment and a cutback in supplies, while
the Pasdaran had a seemingly limitless budget. Army
leaders did not hide their satisfaction when the
Pasdaran, basically an urban force, fared badly in
mountain warfare against the Kurds. The army, by
contrast, refused to be drawn into hit-and-run
encounters with the insurgents.
The rivalry between the army and the Pasdaran has not
deterred the revolutionary regime from its aim of
setting up an independent force whose loyalty is beyond
question. Pasdaran units were flown to Tabriz from
Tehran last month to quell unrest in Azerbaijan. At
last count, the Pasdaran numbered about 20,000, or
roughly two-thirds of its planned total strength.
The army is also suffering from a drastic drop in
discipline. Top-ranking officers have been retired (or
in some cases executed), and a mullah who acts as a
kind of spiritual commisar has been attached to every
unit down to the battalion level. Says a young soldier:
"In the Shah's army, if you did not obey your officers,
you were punished. Today you can argue with them
because many of them are afraid to punish you." In
addition, the break with the U.S. has halted the flow
of spare parts and has deprived Iran's armed forces of
essential U.S. maintenance crews. As a result, a good
proportion of the $10.3 billion worth of military
hardware purchased by the Shah in the past decade is
out of service.
The strengthening of the Pasdaran may be good for the
Khomeini regime's internal security, but the weakening
of the army does not bode well for the survival of a
nation afflicted by powerful autonomy movements. Last
week, as the first real snowfall of the winter fell on
Tehran, the mood of the capital was one of unease.
Remarked a businessman: "Any impression that life is
normal is purely an illusion. The professionals, the
government people, the idea men who keep a country
moving are all scared to death." A university professor
agreed. Said he: "Nobody I know expects things to go on
this way much longer. But neither does anybody have any
idea which way things are going to blow."
The well-to-do of North Tehran are adapting to the
strange new realities, but not without a sense of
bitter irony. An Iranian exile in Los Angeles recalls a
recent telephone talk with a friend who is still in
Tehran. "How are things going?" he asked. "Well, it's
all right," she answered grimly. "We have very slim
figures because there is no vegetable oil or margarine,
and fortunately we don't have too much meat, which is
bad for the body anyway. The mullahs have done so much
good for us. We don't need to eat, really, and since
we're devout Muslims who are supposed to abstain and
fast, we do abstain and fast. Anyway, what's the good
in going to parties? What's the good in dancing or
wanting to be in the company of others? Why don't we
just sit at home and read the Koran? Our Arabic has
become so good lately, and we know the Koran by heart.
I really read that holy book every night." -
Monday, Jan. 7, 1980
The Mystic Who Lit The Fires of Hatred
Iran's Ayatullah Khomeini seized his nation and shook
all Islam
The dour old man of 79 shuffles in his heelless
slippers to the rooftop and waves apathetically to
crowds that surround his modest home in the holy city
of Qum. The hooded eyes that glare out so balefully
from beneath his black turban are often turned upward,
as if seeking inspiration from on high—which, as a
religious mystic, he indeed is. To Iran's Shi'ite
Muslim laity, he is the Imam, an ascetic spiritual
leader whose teachings are unquestioned. To hundreds of
millions of others, he is a fanatic whose judgments are
harsh, reasoning bizarre and conclusions surreal. He is
learned in the ways of Shari'a (Islamic law) and
Platonic philosophy, yet astonishingly ignorant of and
indifferent to non-Muslim culture. Rarely has so
improbable a leader shaken the world.
Yet in 1979 the lean figure of the Ayatullah Ruhollah
Khomeini towered malignly over the globe. As the leader
of Iran's revolution he gave the 20th century world a
frightening lesson in the shattering power of
irrationality, of the ease with which terrorism can be
adopted as government policy. As the new year neared,
50 of the American hostages seized on Nov. 4 by a mob
of students were still inside the captured U.S. embassy
in Tehran, facing the prospect of being tried as spies
by Khomeini's revolutionary courts. The Ayatullah, who
gave his blessing to the capture, has made impossible
and even insulting demands for the hostages' release:
that the U.S. return deposed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi
to Iran for trial and no doubt execution, even though
the Shah is now in Panama; that America submit to a
trial of its "crimes" against Iran before an
international "grand jury" picked by Khomeini's aides.
He claimed that Iran had every legal and moral right to
try America's hostage diplomats, an action that would
defy a decision of the World Court, a vote of the U.N.
Security Council and one of the most basic rules of
accommodation between civilized nations. The Ayatullah
even insisted, in an extraordinary interview with TIME
(see page 26), that if Americans wish to have good
relations with Iran they must vote Jimmy Carter out of
office and elect instead a President that Khomeini
would find "suitable."
Unifying a nation behind such extremist positions is a
remarkable achievement for an austere theologian who
little more than a year ago was totally unknown in the
West he now menaces. But Khomeini's carefully
cultivated air of mystic detachment cloaks an iron
will, an inflexible devotion to simple ideas that he
has preached for decades, and a finely tuned instinct
for articulating the passions and rages of his people.
Khomeini is no politician in the Western sense, yet he
possesses the most awesome—and ominous —of political
gifts: the ability to rouse millions to both adulation
and fury.
Khomeini's importance far transcends the nightmare of
the embassy seizure, transcends indeed the overthrow of
the Shah of Iran. The revolution that he led to triumph
35
threatens to upset the world balance of power more than
any political event since Hitler's conquest of Europe.
It was unique in several respects: a successful, mostly
nonviolent revolt against a seemingly entrenched
dictator, it owed nothing to outside help or even to
any Western ideology. The danger exists that the
Iranian revolution could become a model for future
uprisings throughout the Third World—and not only its
Islamic portion. Non-Muslim nations too are likely to
be attracted by the spectacle of a rebellion aimed at
expelling all foreign influence in the name of
xenophobic nationalism.
Already the flames of anti-Western fanaticism that
Khomeini fanned in Iran threaten to spread through the
volatile crescent of crisis that stretches across the
southern flank of the Soviet Union, from the Indian
subcontinent to Turkey and southward through the
Arabian Peninsula to the Horn of Africa. Most,
particularly, the revolution that turned Iran into an
Islamic republic whose supreme law is the Koran is
undermining the stability of the Middle East, a region
that supplies more than half of the Western world's
imported oil, a region that stands at the strategic
crossroads of superpower competition.
As an immediate result, the U.S., Western Europe and
Japan face continuing inflation and rising
unemployment, brought on, in part, by a disruption of
the oil trade. Beyond that looms the danger of U.S.-
Soviet confrontation. Washington policymakers,
uncertain about the leftist impulses of Iran's
ubiquitous "students" —and perhaps some members of
Iran's ruling Revolutionary Council—fear that the
country may become a new target of opportunity for
Soviet adventurism. The Kremlin leaders in turn must
contend with the danger that the U.S.S.R.'s 50 million
Muslims could be aroused by Khomeini's incendiary
Islamic nationalism. Yet if the Soviets chose to take
advantage of the turmoil in Iran as they have
intervened in neighboring Afghanistan, the U.S. would
have to find some way of countering such aggression.
Khomeini thus poses to the U.S. a supreme test of both
will and strategy. So far his hostage blackmail has
produced a result he certainly did not intend: a surge
of patriotism that has made the American people more
united than they have been on any issue in two decades.
The shock of seeing the U.S. flag burned on the streets
of Tehran, or misused by embassy attackers to carry
trash, has jolted the nation out of its self-doubting
"Viet Nam syndrome." Worries about America's ability to
influence events abroad are giving way to anger about
impotence; the country now seems willing to exert its
power. But how can that power be brought to bear
against an opponent immune to the usual forms of
diplomatic, economic and even military pressure, and
how can it be refined to deal with others in the Third
World who might rise to follow Khomeini's example? That
may be the central problem for U.S. foreign policy
throughout the 1980s.
The outcome of the present turmoil in Iran is almost
totally unpredictable. It is unclear how much authority
Khomeini, or Iran's ever changing government, exerts
over day-to-day events. Much as Khomeini has
capitalized on it, the seizure of the U.S. embassy
tilted the balance in Iran's murky revolutionary
politics from relative moderates to extremists who
sometimes seem to listen to no one; the militants at
the embassy openly sneer at government ministers, who
regularly contradict one another. The death of
Khomeini, who has no obvious successor, could plunge
the country into anarchy.
But one thing is certain: the world will not again look
quite the way it did before Feb. 1, 1979, the day on
which Khomeini flew back to a tumultuous welcome in
Tehran after 15 years in exile. He thus joins a handful
of other world figures whose deeds are debatable—or
worse—but who nonetheless branded a year as their own.
In 1979 the Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini met TIME'S
definition of Man of the Year: he was the one who "has
done the most to change the news, for better or for
worse."
Apart from Iran and its fallout, 1979 was a year of
turmoil highlighted by an occasional upbeat note:
hopeful stirrings that offset to a degree the
continuing victories of the forces of disruption (see
page 34). On a spectacular visit to his homeland of
Poland and to the U.S., Ireland and Mexico, Pope John
Paul II demonstrated that he was a man whose warmth,
dignity and radiant humanity deeply affected even those
who did not share his Roman Catholic faith. Despite his
rigidly orthodox approach to doctrinal issues, the
Pope's message of peace, love, justice and concern for
the poor stirred unprecedented feelings of brotherhood.
The election of Conservative Party Leader Margaret
Thatcher as Prime Minister of Britain was perhaps the
most notable sign that many voters in Europe were
disillusioned with statist solutions and wanted a
return to more conservative policies. At year's end her
government could claim one notable diplomatic success.
Under the skillful guidance of Thatcher's Foreign
Secretary, Lord Carrington, leaders of both the interim
Salisbury government and the Patriotic Front guerrillas
signed an agreement that promised—precariously—to end a
seven-year-old civil war and provide a peaceful
transition to genuine majority rule in Zimbabwe
Rhodesia. There were other indications of growing
rationality in Africa, as three noxious dictators who
had transformed their nations into slaughterhouses fell
from power: Idi Amin was ousted from Uganda, Jean Bédal
Bokassa from the Central African Empire (now Republic),
and Francisco Macias Nguema from Equatorial Guinea.
Southeast Asia, though, as it has for so long, endured
a year of war, cruelty and famine. Peking and Moscow
jockeyed for influence in the area. China briefly
invaded Viet Nam and then withdrew, achieving nothing
but proving once again that Communists have their own
explosive quarrels. Hanoi's Soviet-backed rulers
expelled hundreds of thousands of its ethnic Chinese
citizens, many of whom drowned at sea; survivors landed
on the shores of nations that could not handle such
onslaughts of refugees. In Cambodia, the Vietnamese-
backed regime of Heng Samrin was proving little better
than the maniacal Chinese-supported dictatorship of Pol
Pot that it had deposed. Hundreds of thousands of
Cambodians still faced death by starvation or disease
as the year ended, despite huge relief efforts
organized by the outside world.
In the U.S., 1979 was a year of indecision and
frustration. Inflation galloped to an annual rate of
13% and stayed there, all but impervious to attacks by
the Carter Administration. The burden of containing
inflation eventually fell on the shoulders of new
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker. His tough fiscal
measures, including higher interest rates and a
clampdown on the money supply, do promise to restrain
price boosts—but only after a distressing time lag, and
at the cost of making more severe a recession that the
U.S. seemed headed for anyway in 1980. President
Carter's energy program at last began staggering
through Congress, but a near disaster at Three Mile
Island in Pennsylvania raised legitimate questions—as
well as much unnecessary hysteria—about how safe and
36
useful nuclear power will be as a partial substitute
for the imported oil that the eruption in Iran will
help make ever more costly. The conclusion of a SALT II
agreement with the Soviet Union—more modest in scope
than many Americans had urged, but basically useful to
the U.S.—led to congressional wrangling that raised
doubts about whether the Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaty will even be ratified in 1980. The SALT debate
put a substantial strain on U.S.-Soviet relations,
which were deteriorating for lots of other reasons as
well.
For much of the year, Carter appeared so ineffective a
leader that his seeming weakness touched off an
unprecedentedly early and crowded scramble to succeed
him. Ten Republicans announced as candidates for the
party's 1980 presidential nomination; at year's end,
however, the clear favorite was the man who had done or
said hardly anything, Ronald Reagan. On the Democratic
side, Senator Edward Kennedy overcame his reservations
and declared his candidacy, but early grass-roots
enthusiasm about his "leadership qualities" dissipated
in the face of his lackluster campaigning, his
astonishing incoherence, and his failure to stake out
convincingly different positions on the issues. At
year's end Carter was looking much stronger, primarily
because his firm yet restrained response to Iran's
seizure of hostages led to a classic popular reaction:
Let's rally round the President in a crisis.
None of these trends could match in power and drama, or
in menacing implications for the future, the eruption
in Iran. A year ago, in its cover story on 1978's Man
of the Year, Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, TIME
noted that "the Shah of Iran's 37-year reign was shaken
by week upon week of riots." Shortly thereafter, the
Shah fell in one of the greatest political upheavals of
the post-World War II era, one that raised troubling
questions about the ability of the U.S. to guide or
even understand the seething passions of the Third
World.
Almost to the very end, the conventional wisdom of
Western diplomats and journalists was that the Shah
would survive; after all, he had come through earlier
troubles seemingly strengthened. In 1953 the Shah had
actually fled the country. But he was restored to power
by a CIA-inspired coup that ousted Mohammed Mossadegh,
the nationalist Prune Minister who had been TIME'S Man
of the Year for 1951 because he had "oiled the wheels
of chaos." In 1963 Iran had been swept by riots stirred
up by the powerful Islamic clergy against the Shah's
White Revolution. Among other things, this well-meant
reform abolished the feudal landlord-peasant system.
Two consequences: the reform broke up properties
administered by the Shi'ite clergy and reduced their
income, some of which consisted of donations from large
landholders. The White Revolution also gave the vote to
women. The Shah suppressed those disturbances without
outside help, in part by jailing one of the instigators
—an ascetic theologian named Ruhollah Khomeini, who had
recently attained the title of Ayatullah* and drawn
crowds to fiery sermons in which he denounced the land
reform as a fraud and the Shah as a traitor to Islam.
In 1964 Khomeini was arrested and exiled, first to
Turkey, then to Iraq, where he continued to preach
against the idolatrous Shah and to promulgate his
vision of Iran as an "Islamic republic."
The preachments seemed to have little effect, as the
Shah set about building the most thoroughly Westernized
nation in all of the Muslim world. The progress
achieved in a deeply backward country was stunning.
Petroleum revenues built steel mills, nuclear power
plants, telecommunication systems and a formidable
military machine, complete with U.S. supersonic
fighters and missiles. Dissent was ruthlessly
suppressed, in part by the use of torture in the
dungeons of SAVAK, the secret police. It is still not
clear how widespread the tortures and political
executions were; but the Shah did not heed U.S. advice
to liberalize his regime, and repression inflamed
rather than quieted dissent.
By 1978 the Shah had alienated almost all elements of
Iranian society. Westernized intellectuals were
infuriated by rampant corruption and repression;
workers and peasants by the selective prosperity that
raised glittering apartments for the rich while the
poor remained in mud hovels; bazaar merchants by the
Shah-supported businessmen who monopolized bank
credits, supply contracts and imports; the clergy and
their pious Muslim followers by the gambling casinos,
bars and discothéques that seemed the most visible
result of Westernization. (One of the Shah's last prime
ministers also stopped annual government subsidies to
the mullahs.) Almost everybody hated the police terror
and sneered in private at the Shah's Ozymandian
megalomania, symbolized by a $100 million fete he
staged at Persepolis in 1971 to celebrate the 2,500
years of the Persian Empire. In fact, the Shah's father
was a colonel in the army when he overthrew the Qajar
dynasty in 1925, and as Khomeini pointed out angrily
from exile at the time of the Persepolis festival,
famine was raging in that part of the country.
But the U.S. saw the Shah as a stable and valuable
ally. Washington was annoyed by the Shah's insistence
on raising oil prices at every OPEC meeting, yet that
irritation was outweighed by the fact that the Shah was
staunchly anti-Communist and a valuable balance wheel
in Middle East politics. Eager to build up Iran as a
"regional influential" that could act as America's
surrogate policeman of the Persian Gulf, the U.S. lent
the Shah its all-out support. President Richard Nixon
and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger allowed him to
buy all the modern weapons he wanted. Washington also
gave its blessing to a flood of American business
investment in Iran and dispatched an army of
technocrats there.
The depth of its commitment to the Shah apparently
blinded Washington to the growing discontent. U.S.
policymakers wanted to believe that their investment
was buying stability and friendship; they trusted what
they heard from the monarch, who dismissed all
opposition as "the blah-blahs of armchair critics."
Even after the revolution began, U.S. officials were
convinced that "there is no alternative to the Shah."
Carter took time out from the Camp David summit in
September 1978 to phone the Iranian monarch and assure
him of Washington's continued support.
By then it was too late. Demonstrations and protest
marches that started as a genuine popular outbreak grew
by a kind of spontaneous combustion. The first parades
drew fire from the Shah's troops, who killed scores and
started a deadly cycle: marches to mourn the victims of
the first riot, more snooting, more martyrs, crowds
swelling into the hundreds of thousands and eventually
millions in Tehran. Khomeini at this point was
primarily a symbol of the revolution, which at the
outset had no visible leaders. But even in exile the
Ayatullah was well known inside Iran for his
uncompromising insistence that the Shah must go. When
demonstrators began waving the Ayatullah's picture, the
frightened Shah pressured Iraq to boot Khomeini out. It
was a fatal blunder; in October 1978 the Ayatullah
settled in Neauphle-le-Château, outside Paris, where he
37
gathered a circle of exiles and for the first time
publicized his views through the Western press.
Khomeini now became the active head of the revolution.
Cassettes of his anti-Shah sermons sold like pop
records in the bazaars and were played in crowded
mosques throughout the country. When he called for
strikes, his followers shut down the banks, the postal
service, the factories, the food stores and, most
important, the oil wells, bringing the country close to
paralysis. The Shah imposed martial law, but to no
avail. On Jan. 16, after weeks of daily protest
parades, the Shah and his Empress flew off to exile,
leaving a "regency council" that included Prime
Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar, a moderate who had spent
time in the Shah's prisons. But Khomeini announced that
no one ruling in the Shah's name would be acceptable,
and Iran was torn by the largest riots of the entire
revolution. The Ayatullah returned from Paris to a
tumultuous welcome and Bakhtiar fled. "The holy one has
come!" the crowds greeting Khomeini shouted
triumphantly. "He is the light of our lives!" The crush
stalled the Ayatullah's motorcade, so that he had to be
lifted out of the crowds, over the heads of his
adulators, by helicopter. He was flown to a cemetery,
where he prayed at the graves of those who had died
during the revolution.
Khomeini withdrew to the holy city of Qum, appointed a
government headed by Mehdi Bazargan, an engineer by
training and veteran of Mossadegh's Cabinet, and
announced that he would confine his own role during
"the one or two years left to me" to making sure that
Iran followed "in the image of Muhammad." It quickly
became apparent that real power resided in the
revolutionary komitehs that sprang up all over the
country, and the komitehs took orders only from the 15-
man Revolutionary Council headed by Khomeini (the names
of its other members were long kept secret). Bazargan
and his Cabinet had to trek to Qum for weekly lunches
with Khomeini to find out what the Ayatullah would or
would not allow.
Some observers distinguish two stages in the entire
upheaval: the first a popular revolt that overthrew the
Shah, then a "Khomeini coup" that concentrated all
power in the clergy. The Ayatullah's main instrument
was a stream of elamiehs (directives) from Qum, many
issued without consulting Bazargan's nominal
government. Banks and heavy industry were nationalized
and turned over to government managers. Many of the
elamiehs were concerned with imposing a strict Islamic
way of life on all Iranians. Alcohol was forbidden.
Women were segregated from men in schools below the
university level, at swimming pools, beaches and other
public facilities. Khomeini even banned most music from
radio and TV. Marches were acceptable, he told Italian
Journalist Oriana Fallaci, but other Western music
"dulls the mind, because it involves pleasure and
ecstasy, similar to drugs." Fallaci: "Even the music of
Bach, Beethoven, Verdi?" Khomeini: "I do not know those
names."
In power, Khomeini and his followers displayed a
retaliatory streak. Islamic revolutionary courts
condemned more than 650 Iranians to death, after trials
at which defense lawyers were rarely, if ever, present,
and spectators stepped forward to add their own
accusations to those of the prosecutors; death
sentences were generally carried out immediately by
firing squad. An unknown but apparently large number of
other Iranians were sentenced to life imprisonment.
Khomeini preaches the mercy of God but showed little of
his own to those executed, who were, he said, torturers
and killers of the Shah's who got what they deserved.
Some were, including the generals and highest-ranking
politicians, but the victims also included at least
seven prostitutes, 15 men accused of homosexual rape,
and a Jewish businessman alleged to be spying for
Israel. Defenders of Khomeini's regime argue with some
justification that far fewer people were condemned by
the revolutionary courts than were tortured to death by
the Shah's SAVAK, and that the swift trials were
necessary to defuse public anger against the minions of
the deposed monarch.
As usually happens in revolutions, the forces of
dissolution, once let loose, are not so easily tamed.
Iran's economy suffered deeply, and unrest in at least
three ethnic areas—those of the Kurds, the Azerbaijanis
and the Baluchis—presented continuing threats to
Tehran's, or Qum's, control. Many Western experts
believe Khomeini shrewdly seized upon the students'
attack on the U.S. embassy, which he applauded but
claims he did not order, as a way of directing popular
attention away from the country's increasing problems.
It gave him once again a means of presenting all
difficulties as having been caused by the U.S., to
brand all his opponents—believers in parliamentary
government, ethnic separatists, Muslims who questioned
his interpretations of Islamic law—tools of the CIA.
When the United Nations and the World Court condemned
the seizure, he labeled these bodies stooges of the
enemy. It was Iran against the world—indeed, all Islam
against the "infidels."
When Bazargan resigned to protest the capture of the
hostages, the Ayatullah made the Revolutionary Council
the government in name as well as fact. Then, during
the holy month known as Muharram, with popular emotion
at a frenzied height as a result of the confrontation
with the U.S., Khomeini expertly managed a vote on a
new constitution that turned Iran into a theocracy.
Approved overwhelmingly in a Dec. 2-3 referendum, the
constitution provided for an elected President and
parliament, but placed above them a "guardian council"
of devout Muslims to make sure that nothing the elected
bodies do violates Islamic law. Atop the structure is a
faqih (literally, jurisprudent), the leading theologian
of Iran, who must approve of the President, holds veto
power over virtually every act of government, and even
commands the armed forces. Though the constitution does
not name him, when it goes fully into effect after
elections this month and in February, Khomeini
obviously will become the faqih.
How did the Ayatullah capture a revolution that started
out as a leaderless explosion of resentment and hate?
Primarily by playing adroitly to, and in part
embodying, some of the psychological elements that made
the revolt possible. There was, for example, a
widespread egalitarian yearning to end the extremes of
wealth and poverty that existed under the Shah —and the
rich could easily be tarred as clients of the "U.S.
imperialists." Partly because of the long history of
Soviet, British and then American meddling in their
affairs, Iranians were and are basically xenophobic,
and thus susceptible to the Ayatullah's charges that
the U.S. (and, of course, the CIA) was responsible for
the country's ills. Iranians could also easily accept
that kind of falsehood since they had grown used to
living off gossip and rumor mills during the reign of
the Shah, when the heavily censored press played down
even nonpolitical bad news about Iran. When Khomeini
declared that the Americans and Israelis were
responsible for the November attack by Muslim fanatics
on Mecca's Sacred Mosque, this deliberate lie was given
instant credence by multitudes of Iranians.
38
By far the most powerful influence that cemented
Khomeini's hold on his country is the spirit of
Shi'ism—the branch of Islam to which 93% of Iran's 35.2
million people belong. In contrast to the dominant
Sunni wing of Islam, Shi'ism emphasizes martyrdom; thus
many Iranians are receptive to Khomeini's speeches
about what a "joy" and "honor" it would be to die in a
war with the U.S. Beyond that, Shi'ism allows for the
presence of an intermediary between God and man.
Originally, the mediators were twelve imams, who
Shi'ites believe were the rightful successors of the
Prophet Muhammad; the twelfth disappeared in A.D. 940.
He supposedly is in hiding, but will return some day to
purify the religion and institute God's reign of
justice on earth. This belief gives Shi'ism a strong
messianic cast, to which Khomeini appeals when he
promises to expel Western influence and to turn Iran
into a pure Islamic society. The Ayatullah has never
claimed the title of Imam for himself, but he has done
nothing to discourage its use by his followers, a fact
that annoys some of his peers among the Iranian clergy.
Ayatullah Seyed Kazem Sharietmadari, Khomeini's most
potent rival for popular reverence, has acidly observed
that the Hidden Imam will indeed return, "but not in a
Boeing 747"—a reference to the plane that carried
Khomeini from France to Iran.
Iran and Iraq are the main Muslim states where the
majority of the population is Shi'ite; but there are
substantial Shi'ite minorities in the Gulf states,
Lebanon, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Khomeini's followers
have been sending these Shi'ites messages urging them
to join in an uprising against Western influence. The
power of Khomeini's appeal for a "struggle between
Islam and the infidels" must not be underestimated. In
these and many other Islamic countries, Western
technology and education have strained the social
structure and brought with them trends that seem like
paganism to devout Muslims. In addition, Muslims have
bitter memories of a century or more of Western
colonialism that kept most Islamic countries in
servitude until a generation ago, and they tend to see
U.S. support of Israel as a continuation of this
"imperialist" tradition.
With Khomeini's encouragement, Muslims —not all of them
Shi'ites—have staged anti-American riots in Libya,
India and Bangladesh. In Islamabad, the capital of
Pakistan, a mob burned the U.S. embassy and killed two
U.S. servicemen; the Ayatullah's reaction was "great
joy." In Saudi Arabia, possessor of the world's largest
oil reserves, the vulnerability of the royal family was
made starkly apparent when a band of 200 to 300 well-
armed raiders in November seized the Sacred Mosque in
Mecca, the holiest of all Islamic shrines, which is
under the protection of King Khalid. The raiders
appeared to have mixed religious and political motives:
they seemingly were armed and trained in Marxist South
Yemen, but were fundamentalists opposed to all
modernism, led by a zealot who had proclaimed the
revolution in Iran to be a "new dawn" for Islam. It
took the Saudi army more than a week to root them out
from the catacomb-like basements of the mosque, and 156
died in the fighting—82 raiders and 74 Saudi troopers.
In addition, demonstrators waving Khomeini's picture
last month paraded in the oil towns of Saudi Arabia's
Eastern Province. Saudi troops apparently opened fire
on the protesters and at least 15 people are said to
have died.
Such rumblings have deeply shaken the nerves, if not
yet undermined the stability, of governments throughout
the Middle East. Leaders of the House of Saud regard
Khomeini as an outright menace. Egypt's President Anwar
Sadat denounced Khomeini as a man who is trying to play
God and whose actions are a "crime against Islam [and]
an insult to humanity." Nonetheless, the Ayatullah's
appeal to Muslims, Sunni as well as
Shi'ite, is so strong that even pro-Western Islamic
leaders have been reluctant to give the U.S. more than
minimal support in the hostage crisis. They have
explicitly warned Washington that any U.S. military
strike on Iran, even one undertaken in retaliation for
the killing of the hostages, would so enrage their
people as to threaten the security of every government
in the area.
The appeal of Khomeini's Islamic fundamentalism to non-
Muslim nations in the Third World is limited. Not so
the wave of nationalism he unleashed in Iran. Warns
William Quandt, senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution: "People in the Third World were promised
great gains upon independence [from colonialism], and
yet they still find their lives and societies in a_
mess." Historically, such unfulfilled expectations
prepare the ground for revolution, and the outbreak in
Iran offers an example of an uprising that embodies a
kind of nose-thumbing national pride.
Selig Harrison, senior associate at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, says the overthrow
of Iran's Shah "is appealing to the Third World as a
nationalist revolution that has stood up to superpower
influence. At the rational level, Third World people
know that you cannot behave like Khomeini and they do
not condone violation of diplomatic immunity. But at
the emotional level, mass public opinion in many Third
World countries is not unfriendly to what Khomeini has
done. There is an undercurrent of satisfaction at
seeing a country stand up to superpower influence."
The Iranian revolution has also had a dramatic impact
on Western economies. 1979 was the year in which the
world economy moved from an era of recurrent oil
surpluses into an age of chronic shortages. Indeed, it
was a year in which the frequent warnings of pessimists
that the industrial nations had made themselves
dangerously dependent on crude oil imported from highly
unstable countries came true with a vengeance. For more
than three centuries the industrial West had prospered
thanks partly to resources from colonies or quasi-
colonies. Now a great historical reversal was at hand.
"If there had been no revolution in Iran," says John
Lichtblau, executive director of the Petroleum Industry
Research Foundation, "1979 would have been a normal
year." The strikes that accompanied the revolution shut
off Iranian production completely early in the year.
Though output resumed in March, it ran most of the time
at no more than 3.5 million bbl. a day—little more than
half the level under the Shah. Khomeini made it clear
that no more could be expected. In fact, Iranian output
has dropped again in recent months, to around 3.1
million bbl. a day. Oil Minister Ali Akbar Moinfar says
it will go down further because "at the new price
levels, Iran will be able to produce and export less
and still cover its revenue needs."
The cutback in Iran reduced supplies to the non-
Communist world by about 4%. That was enough to produce
a precarious balance between world supply and demand.
Spot shortages cropped up, and the industrial West went
through a kind of buyers' panic; governments and
companies scrambled to purchase every drop available,
to keep houses warm and the wheels of industry turning,
and to build stockpiles to guard against the all-too-
real prospect of another shut down in Iran or a supply
disruption somewhere else. The lid came off prices with
a bang. OPEC raised prices during 1979 by an average of
39
94.7%, to $25 a bbl.—vs. $12.84 a year ago and a mere
$2 in 1970. Moreover, oil-exporting nations shifted a
growing proportion of their output to the spot market,
where oil not tied up under contract is sold for
whatever price buyers will pay. Before the Iranian
revolution, the spot market accounted for only 5% of
the oil moving in world trade, and prices differed
little from OPEC's official ones. During 1979, anywhere
from 10% to 33% of internationally traded crude bought
by the industrial countries went through the spot
market, and prices shot as high as $45 a bbl.
The runaway price rises will fan inflation in the U.S.,
Western Europe and Japan. Affected are not only the
price of gasoline and heating oil but also the cost of
thousands of products made from petrochemicals—goods
ranging from fertilizers and laundry detergents to
panty hose and phonograph records. Oil price hikes will
bear on apartment rents and the price of food brought
to stores by gasoline-burning trucks. The price boosts
act as a kind of gigantic tax, siphoning from the
pockets of consumers money that would otherwise be used
to buy non-oil goods and services, thus depressing
production and employment. In the U.S., which imports
about half its oil, a 1980 recession that would
increase unemployment might happen anyway; the oil
price increases have made it all but inevitable.
At year's end OPEC had almost come apart; at their
December meeting in Caracas its members could not agree
on any unified pricing structure at all. So long as
supply barely equals demand, there will be leapfrogging
price boosts; four countries announced 10% to 15% price
hikes last Friday. In the longer run, the disunity
could lead to price-cutting competition, but only if
the industrial countries, and especially the U.S., take
more drastic steps to conserve energy and reduce
imports than any they have instituted yet—and even then
OPEC might come back together. It is presumably not in
the cartel's economic or political self-interest to
bankrupt its major customers, especially since many of
OPEC's member states have invested their excess profits
in the West. Yet even moderate nations like Saudi
Arabia, which have fought to keep price boosts to a
minimum, argue that inflation price hikes will be
necessary as long as oil prices are tied to a declining
dollar.
A still greater danger is that the producers may not
pump enough oil to permit much or any economic growth
in either the industrial or underdeveloped worlds. The
producers have learned that prices rise most rapidly
when supply is kept barely equal to, or a bit below,
demand; they have good reason to think that oil kept in
the ground will appreciate more than any other asset,
and the Iranian explosion has demonstrated that all-out
production, and the forced-draft industrialization and
Westernization that it finances, can lead not to
stability but to social strains so intense that they
end in revolution. The result of a production hold-down
could be a decade or so of serious economic stagnation.
Oil Consultant Walter Levy sees these potential gloomy
consequences for the West: "A lower standard of living,
a reduction in gross national product, large balance of
payments drains, loss of value in currencies, high
unemployment."
Warns Mobil Chairman Rawleigh Warner: "The West can no
longer assume that oil-exporting countries, and
specifically those in the Middle East, will be willing
to tailor production to demand. The safer assumption is
that the consuming countries will increasingly have to
tailor their demand to production. And the factors that
determine the ceiling on production are more likely to
be political than economic or technical."
The West will be lucky if oil shortages are the worst
result of Khomeini's revolution. An even more menacing
prospect is a shift in the world balance of power
toward the Soviet Union.
The Ayatullah is no friend of the Soviets. Far from it:
while in his mind "America is the great Satan," he
knows, and has often said, that Communism is
incompatible with Islam. Tehran mobs have occasionally
chanted "Communism will die!" as well as "Death to
Carter!"
Indeed, Islamic fundamentalism could become a domestic
worry to the Kremlin. Its estimated 50 million Muslims
make the Soviet Union the world's fifth largest Muslim
state.* For the Kremlin, Muslims represent a
demographic time bomb. By the year 2000, there will be
an estimated 100 million Soviet Muslims, vs. about 150
million ethnic Russians. Most of the Muslims live in
areas of Central Asia, bordering on Iran, that were
subjugated by czarist armies only a little more than a
century ago—Samarkand, for example, fell in 1868. The
Soviets have soft-pedaled antireligious propaganda and
allowed the Muslims to maintain mosques and theological
schools. Consequently, the Azerbaijanis, Turkmen and
other Muslim minorities in the U.S.S.R. could
eventually become targets for Khomeini's advocacy of an
Islamic rebellion against all foreign domination of
Muslims.
Yet Moscow can hardly ignore the opportunity presented
by Khomeini's rise. An Iran sliding into anarchy, and a
Middle East shaken by the furies of Khomeini's
followers, would offer the Soviets a chance to
substitute their own influence for the Western presence
that the Ayatullah's admirers vow to expel. And the
Middle East is an unparalleled geopolitical prize.
Whoever controls the Middle East's oil, or the area's
Strait of Hormuz (40 miles wide at its narrowest)
between Iran and the Sultanate of Oman through which
most of it passes, acquires a stranglehold on the
world's economy. The U.S.S.R. today is self-sufficient
in oil, but it could well become a major net importer
in the 1980s—and thus be in direct competition with the
West for the crude pumped out of the desert sands. The
warm-water ports so ardently desired by the Czars since
the 18th century retain almost as much importance
today. Soviet missile-firing submarines, for example,
now have to leave the ice-locked areas around Murmansk
and Archangel through narrow channels where they can
easily be tracked by U.S. antisubmarine forces. They
would be much harder to detect if they could slip out
of ports on the Arabian Sea.
The conflagration in Iran, and the threat of renewed
instability throughout the region, could open an
entirely new chapter in the story of Soviet efforts to
infiltrate the Middle East. So far, the Soviet leaders
have played a double game in the hostage crisis.
Representatives of the U.S.S.R. voted in the United
Nations and World Court to free the hostages. At the
same tune, to Washington's intense annoyance, the
Soviets have proclaimed sympathy for Iran's anger
against the U.S. The Kremlin apparently wants to keep
lines open to Khomeini's followers, if not to the
Ayatullah himself, while it awaits its chance.
Meanwhile, Moscow has been acting more brazenly
throughout the entire region of crisis. Around
Christmas, the U.S.S.R. began airlifting combat troops
into Afghanistan, reinforcing an already strong Soviet
presence. Last week the Soviet soldiers participated in
a coup ousting a pro-Moscow regime that had proved
40
hopelessly ineffective in trying to put down an
insurrection by anti-Communist Muslim tribesmen. At
week's end, Washington charged that Soviet troops had
crossed the border into Afghanistan in what appeared to
be an outright invasion (see WORLD).
Who or what follows Khomeini is already a popular
guessing game in Tehran, Washington and doubtless
Moscow. Few of the potential scenarios seem especially
favorable to U.S. interests. One possibility is a
military coup, led by officers once loyal to the Shah
and now anxious to restore order. That might seem
unlikely in view of the disorganized state of the army
and the popular hatred of the old regime, but the
danger apparently seems significant to Khomeini; he is
enthusiastically expanding the Pasdaran militia as a
counterweight to the official armed forces. A military
coup might conceivably win the backing of the urban
intelligentsia, which resents the theocracy, and
Washington analysts think that even some mullahs might
accommodate themselves to it if they see no other way
of blocking a leftist takeover. Whether such an uneasy
coalition could fashion a stable regime is
questionable.
Another potential outcome is a takeover, swift or
gradual, by younger clergymen in alliance with such
Western-educated leaders as Foreign Minister Sadegh
Ghotbzadeh. A government composed of those forces would
be less fanatical than the Ayatullah but still very
hard-line anti-U.S. Another possibility, considered by
some analysts to be the most likely, would be an
eventual confrontation between Khomeini's religious
establishment and members of the urban upper and middle
classes, who applaud the nationalistic goals of the
revolution but chafe under rigid enforcement of Islamic
law—and have the brains to mount an effective
opposition.
A leftist takeover is the most worrisome prospect to
Washington policymakers. The Mujahedin (Islamic
socialist) and Fedayan (Marxist) movements maintain
guerrilla forces armed with weapons seized from the
Shah's garrisons during the revolution. Both groups
disclaim any ties with the U.S.S.R., and some Iranian
exiles believe a dialogue between them and moderate
forces would be possible. However, they are very
antiWestern. A third contender is the Tudeh (Communist)
Party, which has a reputation for loyally following
Moscow's line. It is currently voicing all-out support
of Khomeini because, its leaders disingenuously
explain, any foe of America's imperialism is a friend
of theirs. In gratitude, the Ayatullah has peralism is
a friend of theirs. In gratitude, the Ayatullah has
permitted them to operate openly.
Any of these potential scenarios might draw support
from Iran's ethnic minorities, whose demands for
cultural and political autonomy — local languages in
schools, local governing councils — have been rebuffed
so brusquely by Khomeini's government as to trigger
armed rebellion. Iran, a country three times the size
of France, was officially designated an empire by the
Shah, and in one sense it is: its 35.2 million people
are divided into many ethnic strains and speak as many
as 20 languages, not counting the dialects of remote
tribes. The 4 million Kurds, superb guerrilla fighters
who live in the western mountains, have at times
dreamed of an independent Kurdistan, and today have set
up what amounts to an autonomous region. The Baluchis,
a nomadic tribe of Sunni Muslims, boycotted the
referendum on the Iranian constitution, which they
viewed as an attempt to impose Shi'ism on them. The 13
million Azerbaijanis, a Turkic people, also boycotted
the constitutional referendum and in recent weeks have
come close to an open revolt that could tear Iran
apart.
Some Washington policy planners have toyed with the
idea of encouraging separatism, seeing the breakup of
Iran as a kind of ultimate sanction against Khomeini.
But the hazards of doing this far outweigh the
advantages; true civil war in Iran would be the
quickest way of destroying whatever stability remains
in the Middle East. The lands of the Azerbaijanis
stretch into Turkey and the Soviet Union, those of the
Kurds into Turkey and Iraq, those of the Baluchis into
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Successful secessionist
movements could tear away parts of some of those
countries as well as of Iran, leaving a number of weak
new countries — the kind that usually tumble into
social and economic chaos — and dismembered older ones.
All might be sub to penetration. Anarchy in Iran could
also trigger a conflict with its uneasy neighbor, Iraq,
which shelled border areas of Iran three weeks ago. The
geopolitical stakes there would be so great that the
superpowers would be sorely tempted to intervene.
The options for U.S. policy toward Iran are limited. So
long as the hostages are in captivity, Washington must
use every possible form of diplomatic and economic
pressure to get them released. The Carter
Administration has all but said that military action
may well be necessary if the hostages are killed. But
if they are released unharmed, many foreign policy
experts think that the U.S. would be well advised not
to retaliate for the seizure but simply to cut all ties
with Iran and ignore the country for a while — unless,
of course, the Soviets move in. Primarily because of
the intimate U.S. involvement with the Shah, Iran has
turned so anti-American that just about any Washington
attempt to influence events there is likely to
backfire; certainly none of Iran's contending factions
can afford to be thought of as pro-U.S. Iran needs a
demonstration that the U.S. has not the slightest wish
to dominate the country.
The U.S. must try to contain the spread of Khomeini-
inspired anti-Americanism in the Middle East. The best
way :o do that would be to mediate successfully the
Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations, to ensure that
they will lead to genuine autonomy for the Palestinians
of the West Bank and Gaza. The degree to which the
Palestinian problem has inGaza. The degree to which the
Palestinian problem has inflamed passions even among
Arabs who consider themselves pro-U.S. is not at all
understood by Americans. Says Faisal Alhegelan, Saudi
Ambassador to the U.S.: "All you have to do is grant
the right of Palestinian self-determination, and you
will find how quickly the entire Arab world will stack
up behind Washington."
There are also some lessons the U.S. can learn that
here are also some lessons the U.S. can learn that
might help keep future Third World revolutions from
taking an anti-American turn. First, suggests Stanley
Hoffmann, Harvard professor of government, the U.S.
should stop focusing exclusively on the struggle
between the U.S. and Communism and pay more attention
to the aspirations of nations that have no desire for
alliance with either side.
Says Hoffmann: "To me, the biggest meaning of Iran is
that it is the first major international crisis that is
not an East-West crisis, and for that very reason we
find ourselves much less able to react. There is very
little attention given to the problems of revolutionary
instability and internal discontent. Americans don't
study any of this, and when such events happen, we are
caught by surprise."
41
A corollary thought is that the U.S. must avoid getting
tied too closely to anti-Communist "strongmen" who are
detested by their own people. Says Selig Harrison: "We
should not be so committed that we become hostage to
political fortune. We should have contact with all the
forces in these countries, and we should not regard any
of them as beyond the pale, even many Communist
movements that would like to offset their dependence on
Moscow and Peking." Such a policy, of course, is easier
proclaimed than executed. In some volatile Third World
countries, the only choice may be between a tyrant in
power and several would-be tyrants in opposition. But
when the U.S. does find itself allied with a dictator,
it can at least press him to liberalize his regime and
at the same time stay in touch with other elements in
the society.
Finally, Khomeini has blown apart the comfortable myth
that as the Third World industrializes, it will adopt
Western values, and the success of his revolution ought
to force the U.S. to look for ways to foster material
prosperity in Third World countries without alienating
their cultures. Says Richard Bulliet, a Columbia
University historian who specializes in the Middle
East: "We have to realize that there are other ways of
looking at the future than regarding us as being the
future. It is possible that the world is not going to
be homogenized along American-European lines."
It is, unfortunately, almost surely too late for any
such U.S. strategies to influence Ayatullah Khomeini,
whose hostility to anything American is bitter,
stubborn, zealous—and total. But he may have taught the
U.S. a useful—even vital —lesson for the 1980s. He has
shown that the challenges to the West are certain to
get more and more complex, and that the U.S. will
ignore this fact at its peril. He has made it plain
that every effort must be made to avoid the rise of
other Khomeinis. Even if he should hold power only
briefly, the Ayatullah is a figure of historic
importance. Not only was 1979 his year; the forces of
disintegration that he let loose in one country could
threaten many others in the years ahead. -
*An appellation that means "sign of God." There is no formal procedure for bestowing it;
a religious leader is called ayatullah by a large number of reverent followers and is
accepted as such by the rest of the Iranian clergy. At present, Iran has perhaps 50 to
60 mullahs generally regarded as ayatullahs. * After Indonesia (123.2 million), India
(80 million), Pakistan (72.3 million) and Bangladesh (70.8 million).
Monday, Jan. 7, 1980
An Interview with Khomeini
Harsh words, in a soft voice, about the Shah, Carter
and America
Qum is a city of 250,000 people that is drenched in
dust, swept by howling, bitter-cold winds in winter and
scorched by an angry sun in summer. A 19th century
British traveler, James Morier, described Iran's
religious center as a place in which, "excepting on the
subject of religion, and settling who are worthy of
salvation, and who are to be damned, no one opens his
lips. Every man you meet is either a descendant of the
Prophet or a man of the law. All wear long and
mortified faces ... These priests will harken to no
medium—either you are a true believer or you are not."
Blessed with 18 seminaries, as well as a 1,100-year-old
shrine, Qum, appropriately, is the Ayatullah Khomeini's
home. Three days before being expelled from Iran, TIME
Middle East Bureau Chief Bruce van Voorst went to Qum
for an exclusive interview with the Ayatullah. It was
the first such interview Khomeini had granted to a U.S.
magazine since the fall of the Shah. The interview is
greatly revealing, first as to how implacable is
Khomeini's hate for all things American, and second for
how strikingly it shows the vast gulf that separates
Islamic and Western perceptions of the same events.
The interview took place at Khomeini's residence, a
modest, single-story four-room house on a side street
that is blockaded at either end and guarded by soldiers
carrying German-designed G3 automatic weapons. The
Ayatullah receives visitors in what was once his living
room, a bare 15-ft. by 20-ft. chamber with six clusters
of tungsten spotlights along one wall; cameras of the
National Iranian Radio and Television network record
every audience.
"Khomeini's entrance for the interview was almost
regal," reported Van Voorst. "His black turban was
carefully drawn over his forehead, and a well-cut dark
gray cape, obviously his only self-indulgence, covered
a light gray vest and a simple, collarless white shirt.
Khomeini showed neither comprehension of nor interest
in the brief introduction. There was no handshaking,
merely a nod. He sat down, crosslegged, to take the
first question—which, as usual, he ignored. Instead, he
launched into an unbroken 20-minute monologue. He spoke
in a soft voice, difficult to hear even from a foot or
two away, and stared steadfastly at the floor all the
while. Occasionally, his sensitive hands trembled. The
interview was terminated when Khomeini abruptly rose.
As the translator repeated a final question, the
Ayatullah, eyes unblinking, left the room, pausing only
to autograph Koransfor his guests." Excerpts from the
interview:
Q. Anti-American feelings in Iran are intense.
Americans, in turn, are angry with Iran. How do you
assess prospects for bilateral relations after the
resolution—whatever form it might take—of the current
crisis?
A. Iranian feelings are not against the American
people, but against the American Government. When they
refer to America in their slogans and denunciations,
they mean the U.S. Government, not the U.S. people. I
have received reports about large-scale,
Administration-orchestrated anti-Iranian propaganda in
the U.S. The Zionists especially are doing all they can
to poison U.S. public opinion against Iran. As a
result, there may be ill feelings toward Iran in the
U.S. as reported. But if the facts penetrate the
Zionist-imperialist propaganda screen, if we succeed in
explaining the truth to the American citizenry through
the mass media, then the Americans will most probably
have a change of heart about us and reciprocate our
amicable attitude. But we are under no illusion that
the U.S. Government might change its hostile attitude.
The U.S. Government has lost great interests in Iran.
Still worse, the Administration has lost its political
prestige in other countries as well.
We have been screaming for justice, for having our
grievances redressed. The U.S. Government placed the
Shah on the throne—that is, the Allies appointed him
[in 1941] after ousting his father Reza Khan [who was]
a British stooge. The U.S. Government consistently
helped him stay in power in the face of our people's
opposition to him. The Shah squandered all our
resources—our national dignity, our natural assets, the
talents of our youths and everything else we had.
Obviously, Iranians cannot have a good view of the U.S.
Government. And recently our people discovered that the
Administration had turned its so-called embassy into a
base for espionage and conspiracy against Iran. Spies
were operating there under the pretext of being embassy
42
personnel. Now that our people know this fact, they
consider the Administration their No. 1 enemy.
In our view, the American people are not to blame for
their Government's behavior in Iran. Americans should
recognize the fact that the Administration has wronged
not only us, but them as well. It has deprived us of
everything through its lackey, the Shah. And it has
placed the U.S. citizenry's honor in jeopardy. Because
of U.S. Government behavior, Eastern peoples may now
develop a pessimistic view of the American nation. The
Americans should take this fact into consideration.
Carter's continued presidency is a danger for America.
It poses a threat to American national honor. If the
U.S. Government —through military intervention,
economic blockade, bully tactics and similar actions—
succeeds in depriving us of justice, then the crisis
will never be resolved, it will always rankle in the
mind of our people. The American people should not
allow Carter to follow this course because, gradually,
Iranians will suspect that the U.S. people share
Carter's ill will toward Iran. Then, enmity might set
in between the two peoples.
Another option is for the U.S. Government to admit its
misdeeds in Iran. These are numerous. Allowing a
murderer to enter the U.S. is one of them. Still worse
is the U.S. Government's imposition of a murderer as
ruler of Iran. When Carter became President, he
continued the policies of his predecessors —that is, he
tried to perpetuate the rule of the criminal Shah and
plunder Iran. When our nation rose against Pahlavi
tyranny, Carter did all he could to keep him in power.
He failed.
Our people's hatred for the Shah was too obvious for
Carter not to notice. But still, in blatant disregard
of the Iranian nation's feelings, Carter offered the
deposed Shah refuge in the U.S. Not even the American
people, I think, believe Carter's claim that he allowed
the Shah to enter America on humanitarian grounds.
Humanitarian considerations do not enter the American
Government's thinking at all. Washington is prepared to
do anything, kill 200,000 people in an atomic raid, in
order to gain some profit. No one can believe these
officials were humanistically motivated in giving the
Shah an entry visa. In a sense, they have abducted the
deposed tyrant to make sure he will not divulge their
secrets. If we try him, all the facts the U.S.
Government wants to cover up will surface. The whole
world will know who has aided the Shah in his crimes.
Of course, once the American people discover what their
President has done, they will not vote for him any
more. In our view, all Carter is interested in is a
second term in the White House, and he is prepared to
do anything, even to sacrifice American national honor,
in order to achieve his goal. We cannot believe the
U.S. Government's claims to humanitarian motives. Is
the Shah alone a human being? Aren't 35 million
Iranians human beings? Weren't the Vietnamese human
beings? We clearly see what crimes are committed now in
southern Lebanon ly see what crimes are committed now
in southern Lebanon with Carter's approval.
For us, [the resolution of the crisis] means the
extradition of the deposed Shah to Iran and measures to
compensate Iran for damages caused by his tyranny.
There are, of course, damages that cannot be repaired.
For instance, we have sustained about 100,000
fatalities tin the struggle against the Shah]. The
labor and human talents wasted in pursuit of his
harmful objectives cannot be retrieved. But we expect
the repatriation of the wealth plundered from Iran.
The main point to bear in mind is that there is a new
era. Iran today is not what it was under the Shah. A
miracle has occurred. Under the previous regime, a
single policeman could force all merchants in a huge
bazaar to hoist flags to mark the Shah's birthday.
These very people stood up against tanks and artillery
with their bare hands. Even now, they wear burial
shrouds, come here [to Qum] and declare their readiness
for martyrdom. A nation thus transformed cannot be
pushed around. Mr. Carter has not understood this
transformation yet. He thinks a dictator can be imposed
on the country again. But he must understand that
Iranians will never put up with such actions. Carter
must wake up.
And the Americans should vote Carter out of office.
They should elect a suitable President. Then Iranians,
if convinced that the U.S. Government does not intend
to wrong them, will have normal relations with the
U.S.—the kind of relations we have with other
countries.
Q. You have called the Shah a criminal, but you have
not been specific. Could you give a rundown of what you
feel his crimes were?
A. The crimes of the Shah are innumerable. Even a
synopsis would be too long for me to present in a
single session. In the last two years of the Shah's
reign alone —when people rose to crush the imperial
regime and establish an Islamic republic —this criminal
killed more than 60,000 and maimed more than 100,000 of
our people. During his reign, the Shah made us
economically dependent on the U.S. and turned Iran into
a bankrupt state. Our industry is dependent on the
West. He has destroyed our agriculture. Politically, he
toed the U.S. line and placed Iran in league with the
oppressors and tyrants. The Iranian position in
international forums during the reign of the Shah
clearly demonstrates this fact. Even when the Shah, for
fear of incurring the people's wrath, adopted
apparently anti-U.S. positions, he would, behind the
scenes, remain hand in hand with America. For instance,
although he publicly supported the Palestinians, he
gave oil to Israel, the enemy of Islam and Muslims. He
fed Israel militarily—that is, he assisted Israel, this
archaggressor, wholeheartedly. Militarily, the Shah
made us thoroughly dependent on the U.S. [To perpetuate
his monarchy] he gave our oil to the U.S. and used the
proceeds to build military bases for America in Iran.
Worst of all, he was determined to annihilate Islam and
Muslims. By pushing our youth toward the West, he
created a painful cultural dislocation. He brainwashed
the people with Western propaganda. It takes gigantic
efforts to liberate our society from the evil effects
of his cultural treason.
Q. How do you feel qualified to judge him? How can you
be sure that your measures are truly in keeping with
the law of Islam and the will of God? Does God ever
speak to you or send you guidance?
A. What I said in response to the first question sums
up the judgment of all Iranians. I have repeatedly
stressed that I simply reflect the views of the Iranian
people.
Q. Doesn't the fact that virtually every government in
the world condemns the seizure of the hostages raise
doubts in your mind about your own position?
A. Most governments that have condemned Iran [for the
embassy seizure] have done so under superpower
pressure. We want to prove to the whole world that the
43
superpowers can be defeated with the power of faith. We
shall stand up against the U.S. Government with all our
might. We fear no power.
Q. You have objected to the West's efforts to impose
its values on Iran. Why are you trying to impose
Islamic values and Islamic justice on representatives
of the West?
A. We definitely do not want to impose Islamic values
on the West. Islam will never be imposed—neither on the
West, nor on the East, nor on any particular individual
or region. Islam is opposed to coercion. Islam stands
for freedom in all its dimensions. It is up to the
people them selves to accept or reject it.
Q. Even if he wished to, the President could not
legally hand the Shah over to Iran or to a third
country with the intention of extraditing him to Iran.
Do you expect Carter to violate the basic principles of
his nation? Isn't that inconsistent with your moral and
ethical goals?
A. Did the U.S. Government legally place Iranians under
the Shah's machine-gun fire? And now, is it the same
law that prevents the U.S. from extraditing the Shah?
What kind of law is this? It permits the U.S.
Government to exploit and colonize peoples all over the
world for decades. But it does not allow the
extradition of an individual who has staged great
massacres in Iran. Can you call it law?
Q. You talk so readily of the embassy as a "nest of
spies." But there has been precious little evidence for
this. Aren't you aware that it is the function of all
diplomats to gather information about the country they
are in, and this is considered legitimate? When there
is evidence of espionage against diplomats, they are
simply deported, not tried by the host country. If you
objected to the activities, why didn't you just shut
the embassy down?
A. There is a difference between gathering information
and conducting espionage. Evidence so far collected
proves that they ["the American spies"] had charted
different conspiracies for different parts of Iran.
They had plots for creating armed clashes in different
regions. Is this how diplomats gather information? God
willing, the Muslim students [holding the U.S.
hostages] will reveal the details in the future. It is
the government's job to close the embassy or allow it
to function. I do not interfere in these affairs.
Q. Are you aware how isolated you have made Iran? Even
Islamic nations have condemned the hostage taking. You
have pushed the U.S. out of Iran, but who will free you
from pressures by the Soviet Union?
A. We have pushed the U.S. out of Iran in order to
establish an Islamic government. We have not ousted the
U.S. in order to replace it with the Soviet Union. Our
people's slogans clearly demonstrate this fact.
Throughout their struggle, our people would chant, "An
Islamic republic—neither Eastern nor Western." If the
Soviet Union should one day try to pressure us, we will
deal with it with the same force that enabled us to
oust the will deal with it with the same force that
enabled us to oust the U.S.—the force of our faith. We
trust in God and the boundless might of the people.
Q. You must accept the fact that America will never
surrender the Shah to you. If you doubt this, you do
not understand America. Would you release the hostages
if the United Nations agreed to investigate your
grievances? At the same time, should all dictators in
the world be investigated by the U.N.?
A. In fact, we understand America well. We know that we
can resist it and defend our honor. We have proved that
we can resist its great injustice—harboring the Shah.
We shall overpower America. We shall defeat it in the
whole region. The [departure of the] Shah from the U.S.
will not solve the problem. An international
organization should make serious efforts to convince
the U.S. to extradite the Shah to Iran. This
organization should return all the wealth the Shah has
plundered to its rightful owners—the people of Iran.
Such an organization should also try all dictators. We
will not surrender to injustice. We will not compromise
with the oppressors.
Q. Why can you not mediate this dispute in a reasonable
manner? You have turned down Ramsey Clark, U.N.
Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, the P.L.O., and barely
listened to the papal representative. Don't you think
these are honorable and serious individuals?
A. I have never said that these gentlemen are not
honorable and serious. I have defended the Palestinians
against Israel for more than 20 years. I used to point
out the danger of Israel at a time when Israel and
Palestine were unknown in Iran. We support the
Palestinians' cause of justice against Israel, but a
more significant issue is at stake now. I want to drive
home to all peoples throughout the world the point that
they should not try to mediate between the oppressor
and the oppressed. Such mediation itself is a great
injustice. We do not want any [would-be mediators] to
commit this injustice. The right approach, under these
circumstances, is to rush to the side of the oppressed
and implacably attack the oppressor. It is for this
reason that we rejected offers of mediation and will
continue to do so. You may consider the mediation of
your representatives between Israel and Palestine
logical. We don't. The only logical course is defending
Palestine. We approve those who strive for the
international recognition of our just demands, but we
shall never endorse oppressors, even if they act in our
interest. It is among the eternally valid principles
which we must always uphold.
Q. If the hostage crisis is peacefully resolved, can
you foresee a normalization of relations with the U.S.,
such as by the renewed sale of military spare parts and
commercial ties on terms acceptable to Iran?
A. We will certainly reject any deal that harms the
interest of Muslims. Otherwise, commercial ties and
other exchanges, as long as they are in the interest of
our nation, are agreeable to me. However, the
government is responsible for signing such agreements,
not I.
Q. The economy has not revived. The poor in south
Tehran are as poor as ever. The armed forces probably
could not defend Iran against attack. There is no
normal political activity. In light of this, is it not
fair to say that the revolution has failed?
A. All these observations might be true. But the
revolution has not failed. Indeed, the pillars of the
revolution have been strengthened. It is a fact that
our people have become accustomed to the revolution.
They are all revolutionaries. They all welcome
martyrdom. I declare, in all seriousness, that we can
easily stand up against U.S. aggression. The U.S. may
destroy us, but not our revolution. It is for this
44
reason that I am confident of our victory. Listen to
the people's slogans. For instance, AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
IMPRESS NO ONE. CARTER DOESN'T KNOW ABOUT THE LOGIC OF
MARTYRDOM. The U.S. Government has no idea what
martyrdom is. In this spirit, we will solve all the
problems of Iran. Although, I must point out, the
damages we have sustained stem from more than 50 years
of Pahlavi treason and will take at least 20 years to
repair. Freedom and the Islamic republic have been
established. But complete independence requires the
dispossession of the East and the West, an objective we
shall undoubtedly achieve.
Q. Haven't you really lost a measure of control? The
embassy takeover was allegedly undertaken without your
knowledge or the support of the Revolutionary Council.
Didn't the students take policymaking out of your
hands? Do you really control the crowds?
A. Failure to understand Iranians leads to such
mistakes in reading the situation. Iranians harbor
profound enmity toward the U.S. Government because of
the wrongs it has done them. We lead our people along
the path to independence and liberation from U.S.
domination. It is for this reason that our people have
occupied the American nest of spies. The so-called
embassy is certainly a nest of spies, and, in
principle, what do we need the U.S. Government for? All
Iranians are asking this question.
Q. Sometimes you issue elamiehs ordering the people
what to do, and then when you want to avoid
responsibility, you reply you can do nothing, it is in
the hands of the people or the students. Aren't you
trying to have it both ways?
A. It is a fact that I, as Khomeini, express my views
like all other people, comment on what should be done.
But you should have no doubt that the hostages are in
the hands of the students.
Q. You have not studied seriously economics,
international political relations. Your education is
primarily theological. Doesn't this raise doubts in
your mind that there may be factors in this equation
you don't grasp?
A. We have discarded equations and social and political
terms of reference so far used for assessing all the
world's problems. We have built a new framework of
values standing up for justice and fighting injustice.
We will defend any upholder of justice and attack any
perpetrator of injustice. You may name this value
system whatever you like. We are laying the foundation
of this value system, which, we hope, will one day
replace—in the U.N., the Security Council, and other
world bodies—the influence of the capitalists and the
great powers that can now condemn out of hand anybody
they want to. Yes, with your criteria, I understand
nothing—and I am better off for it.
Q. Have you ever been wrong about anything?
A. Only the Prophet Muhammad and other saints have been
infallible. Everybody else makes mistakes.
Monday, Jul. 26, 1982
A Quest for Vengeance
By WILLIAM E. SMITH.
Khomeini's legions invade Iraq and threaten the whole
Arab world
"Your Iranian brothers, in order to defend their
country and push back the attacks on the enemy of
Islam, have been forced to cross over into Iraq to save
the oppressed Iraqi people. Rise up and install the
Islamic government that you want!" So declared Iran's
Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini last week as he launched
his army along the Shatt al Arab waterway in a huge
invasion of Iraq. For the first time in the 22 months
since Iraq initially attacked Iran, heavy fighting was
taking place on Iraqi territory. Khomeini's objective
was not just the overthrow of his bitter enemy, Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein, but the creation of an Iraqi
Islamic Republic modeled on Iran's own. To moderate
rulers throughout the Arab world, the threat was even
more awesome: a rising wave of Islamic fundamentalism,
reinforced by an Iranian victory in Iraq, that could
topple Arab governments from the Persian Gulf to the
Mediterranean Sea.
After 48 hours of rising artillery exchanges, the
Iranian high command last Tuesday night broadcast a
coded message: "Ya Saheb ez-Zaman! Ya Saheb ez-Zaman!"
(Translation: Thou absent Imam!) That was the order for
as many as 100,000 soldiers and militiamen to begin the
march toward Basra, Iraq's second largest city and the
nerve center of its oil-producing region, and to engage
an Iraqi army of about the same size. "Operation
Ramadan" had begun. The first Iranian goal appeared to
be the capture of Basra and much of southern Iraq, from
which the invaders could either press on to Baghdad,
the Iraqi capital 280 miles to the northwest, or pin
down Iraqi divisions while a second invasion force was
launched directly at Baghdad, which is only about 75
miles from the border.
Within 24 hours the two armies were locked in what was
believed to be one of the biggest land battles since
World War II. In the intense fighting that followed,
thousands were killed and scores of tanks were
destroyed as the Iraqis fought off the first wave of
invaders. Said an Iranian officer of the packed battle
scene: "Even if you shoot with your eyes closed, you
are bound to hit someone." It was also a time of fervor
and of exaggerated claims. In Tehran, masses of
Khomeini supporters ignored the wail of air-raid sirens
and marched through the capital in support of their
leader. The Iranians announced they had destroyed two
Iraqi divisions, but by the end of the week their
offensive appeared to have stalled, leading the Iraqis
to proclaim a "great victory." Meanwhile there were
numerous indications that Khomeini's forces were
preparing another major attack, which would probably
take place some time this week.
With the outbreak of righting on Iraqi territory, one
of the most feared of Middle
East scenarios was unfolding. The Arab world was
already in disarray over Israel's invasion of Lebanon
seven weeks ago in an attempt to dislodge the Palestine
Liberation Organization. With no end to the siege of
West Beirut in sight (see following story), another
non-Arab country, Iran, had invaded Arab territory and
seemed, moreover, to have a better-than-even chance of
unseating the ruling government. At immediate risk were
the moderate, hereditary regimes of Saudi Arabia and
the rest of the gulf. But the Ayatullah Khomeini's vow
was even more explosive: to press on to Jerusalem, to
liberate the Holy City and overwhelm all enemies of
Islam.
More serious still, the pressures induced by the wars
in the Middle East have drawn the U.S. and the Soviet
Union into dangerously confrontational positions, for
the struggles involve not only the warring armies of
45
Islam but future control over the Persian Gulf and the call for volunteers. Syria's position is based on its
largest known petroleum reserves on earth. longstanding hatred of Saddam and the enmity between
the Iraqi and Syrian branches of the Baath Party. Syria
had sided with Iran while Iraqi forces were on Iranian
The worst worries of the U.S. and of the moderate Arab
soil, but its continued support of Iran, now that
leaders presuppose an Iraqi defeat by the Iranian
Khomeini's forces have invaded Arab Iraq, is a somewhat
invaders. But the outcome of the war is not clear by
more awkward position for Syria to be taking. Syria has
any means. The Iraqis appeared by week's end to have
also been embarrassed by recent events in Lebanon. It
blunted the initial Iranian attack on Basra and driven
has refused to offer temporary sanctuary to the
the Iranians back almost to the border. The Iraqis were
leadership and guerrillas of the P.L.O., possibly
fighting harder in defense of their country than they
because it is holding out for a better deal from the
had fought during their long, misguided adventure in
Saudis and the other oil-rich Arabs who would finance
Iran. U.S. intelligence sources confirmed that Iraqi
such a solution to the problem of the trapped P.L.O.
MiG-21s had staged an air attack on the Iranian
forces. Furthermore, in battles with the Israelis last
petroleum facilities at Kharg Island. Damage was said
month, Syria lost at least 86 MiG aircraft. One
to be light, but the incident was bound to have a
apparent reason: Syria lacks skilled fighter pilots,
discouraging effect on tankers bound for the island.
partly because it prefers that its new pilots be
members of the minority Alawite sect, an offshoot of
"Iraq wanted peace," declared Iraq's Saddam, triumphant Shi'ite Islam to which President Hafez Assad belongs.
for the moment and ignoring the fact that he had sent
his army into Iran in the first place. On Friday, two
Like Assad, Saddam Hussein is a member of a minority
days after the initial Iranian attack had subsided.
group within his own nation. He is a Sunni Muslim in a
TIME Photographer Peter Jordan visited the battlefield
country whose population of 14 million is 55% Shi'ite.
and found it bare except for hundreds of bloating
Iran has assumed that this fact alone makes Saddam
bodies, burned-out tanks and artillery pieces, and a
vulnerable to being overthrown, but that reasoning may
handful of Iraqi soldiers. Reported Jordan, the only
not be correct. Saddam has created a cult of
Western newsman on the scene: "The stench from the
personality around himself. Today his face can be seen
bodies was so intolerable that the Iraqis stuffed
everywhere in his capital city, in a wide variety of
tissues or cotton into their nostrils. Among the
sizes and demeanors. A huge painting on Rashid Street,
Iranian prisoners were children, boys of twelve and 13,
for example, shows him in uniform, leading a tank
who wore the colors of the Revolutionary Guards. When
assault, while in the background swirls a visionary
the Iranians, who had fought their way to within eight
horse charge by the Iraqi cavalrymen who routed a
miles of Basra, realized that they were surrounded on
Persian invasion in the 9th century. Though outnumbered
three sides by Iraqi forces, they reportedly broke
ten to one, the horsemen were victorious in an epic
ranks in panic. Some surrendered, later acknowledging
three-day battle, and saved Iraq.
to interrogators that they had been assured by their
superiors that their victories inside Iran last spring
would lead to further triumphs once they had entered Not unlike the Shah of Iran, Saddam has been devoting
Iraq." That may yet prove to be true, but it did not enormous effort and expense toward turning his backward
work out that way last week. country into a modern state. In addition, he has tried
to make the Shi'ite community feel that it is being
well taken care of. Italian and Korean workmen are
Meanwhile, Iranian officials angrily denied that they
laying marble in the inner courtyards of the principal
had become the aggressors in the war. Declared Iran's
shrines in the sacred Shi'ite cities of Najaf and
United Nations Ambassador Said Rajaie-Khorasani to TIME
Karbala; gold leaf is being splashed over mosques
Correspondent Raji Samghabadi: "The Saddam Hussein
throughout the country. The poorer Shi'ite communities
regime has inflicted stupendous losses of life and
that once spawned opposition to the Baathist regime now
property on us. It has done everything within its power
have new schools, hospitals, roads, sewers, electricity
to humiliate the Islamic Republic. Now we are expected
and water lines. Even during the months of war, while
to give the war criminals a chance to rebuild their
many public works activities were postponed (and while
forces and spring at our throat again. Sorry, no deal."
the gulf states were contributing at least $20 billion
to the Iraqi war chest), the projects in the Shi'ite
For weeks the revolutionary government in Iran had areas continued. Whether Saddam has succeeded in
debated how far the country should go in "punishing" gaining the loyalty of Iraq's Shi'ite community is a
Saddam Hussein. Iranian moderates, led by Majlis question that will probably be answered all too
Speaker Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani, suggested that the $150 obviously within the next few weeks.
billion in reparations demanded of Iraq by President
Ali Khamene'i, a hardliner, was negotiable. But the
For the U.S., the crisis had been looming since the
fanatics wanted nothing less than the destruction of
fall of the Shah in 1979. U.S. strategists, their Iran
Iraq's Baath Party and the establishment of an Islamic
policy paralyzed, were reduced to speculating that the
republic in Baghdad.
Ayatullah, who is now 82 and ailing, would soon die or
become incapacitated, and that his fanatical regime
Until June 21, Khomeini deliberately remained neutral might then collapse. The U.S. considered seeking closer
in the debate, allowing subordinates ample time to ties with Saddam, a longtime ally of the Soviet Union
state their positions. Then, characteristically, he who suddenly was sending signals that he was trying to
made a speech fully supporting, and indeed surpassing, extricate his country from the Soviet orbit. But once
the positions of the extremists. Khomeini even the U.S. hostages were released by Iranian authorities
criticized some of his own aides for paying more on Jan. 20, 1981, the new Reagan Administration decided
attention to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon than to to do nothing and hope for the best in Iran. The war
the Iran-Iraq war. "We shall get to Lebanon, and to between Iran and Iraq, which Saddam had launched in
Jerusalem, through Iraq," said Khomeini, but "first we September 1980 in an effort to make Iraq the prominent
have to defeat this sinister [Baath] party." power in the gulf, sputtered along inconclusively, a
problem for the Iranians but a matter of little concern
to the U.S.
Khomeini's "Iraq first" policy quickly gained the
support of Iran's two Arab allies, Syria and Libya, and
soon Iran's Revolutionary Guards command was issuing a

46
But late last year the gulf war suddenly heated up
again, culminating in the battle of Khorramshahr two
months ago. There, after a few hours of combat, the
Iranians drove the discouraged Iraqis back across the
western shore of the Shatt. In June, Saddam declared a
unilateral ceasefire, withdrew the last of his forces
from Iran and asked for peace. Absolutely not! cried
the old Ayatullah. Khomeini responded with a set of
demands that Saddam could not accept. Besides calling
for the resignation of Saddam and the overthrow of the
ruling Baath Party, Khomeini declared that the Iranian
armed forces would seek to enable the people of Iraq to
form "a government of their own choice—that is, an
Islamic government." When Iraq's friends in the gulf
suggested that he settle for $50 billion in
reparations, which they promised to raise, Khomeini
turned down the offer as insufficient. "Why should he
accept $50 billion?" an Egyptian official commented
last week after the fighting shifted to Iraqi
territory. "He thinks he can have it all."
For the past year the Khomeini government has been
gaining increasing support from the Soviet Union and
its allies, including North Korea, Cuba and East
Germany. Most helpful, perhaps, has been Syria, an Arab
neighbor with a long history of hostility toward Iraq.
Through Syria, Iran received large shipments of Soviet
weaponry, including 130-mm artillery pieces,
antiaircraft guns and tank engines. In the meantime,
Washington remained silent while Israel sold Iran an
estimated $120 million worth of military hardware,
including spare parts and ammunition for Iran's
American-made equipment, which had been acquired during
the rule of the Shah. Nor did the U.S. openly complain
that the Israelis were sending experts to Tehran to
help the Iranians use their American-made weapons.
With apparent shortsightedness, the government of
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin was supporting
Iran in order to cause trouble for Saddam, whom it has
long regarded as its primary enemy in the Arab world.
Thus the ancient adage "The enemy of my enemy is my
friend," which guides the convoluted politics of so
many nations in the Middle East, had reached its
ultimate absurdity in revolutionary Iran: both the
Soviet Union and a U.S. ally were contributing to the
Ayatullah's war machine.
From the beginning, the Soviets have moved with extreme
caution in Iran. They ordered the local Tudeh
(Communist) Party to infiltrate organizations of
clerical power but to avoid any actions that could
arouse official suspicion. Meanwhile, Moscow provided
Iran with increasing amounts of military and economic
aid, though always by proxy. Indeed, to hedge their
bets, the Soviets continued giving token support to
Iraq, with which they have had a friendship treaty
since 1960 and whose army they have largely supplied.
As an indication of how secure the Iranians have become
about their relations with the Soviets, Iran decided
several weeks ago to move eight divisions away from its
border with the Soviet Union in order to relocate those
forces along Iran's border with Iraq. It was the first
time since the end of World War II, when the Soviets
occupied Iran's northern province of Azerbaijan, that
the Iranians had left their 1,090-mile border with the
Soviet Union virtually unguarded. When King Hussein of
Jordan visited Moscow late last month, Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko told him that when the Iranian
invasion of Iraq began, Moscow would be supporting
Iran. It was the Soviet official's unsubtle way of
hinting to Hussein that even though Jordan was Iraq's
most faithful ally, the King would do well to remain on
the sidelines of the forthcoming battle.
Within the U.S. foreign policy establishment, there is
disagreement about the degree of Soviet involvement in
Iran. Soviet Expert Helmut Sonnenfeldt, a senior fellow
at the Brookings Institution, believes the Soviets
cooled on Saddam because he wanted unconditional
support from Moscow for whatever he proposed to do
against Israel or Iran, and was angry when he failed to
obtain it. Moreover, Sonnenfeldt says, the Soviets were
tilting increasingly toward Iran after the fall of the
Shah, because they regarded Iran as a greater strategic
prize. William Quandt, a former National Security
Council official now at Brookings, doubts that the
Soviets played a significant role in Iran's decision to
invade Iraq. Says he:
"Khomeini is a genuine revolutionary, and he would like
to export his revolution. He is also a man who
personalizes his quarrels—he 'brought down the Shah,'
he 'brought down Jimmy Carter,' and he wants to bring
down Saddam Hussein. If he could bring into power an
Islamic regime in Iraq, so much the better."
In early June, the Soviet Union urged Iran to make
peace with Iraq under some of the terms Iran had
demanded but with "modifications." The Soviets even
proposed that the two countries join them in
establishing an "anti-imperialist front." Had the
Soviets brought about a peace agreement, it would have
enabled them to retain close relations with both Iran
and Iraq, and would have greatly bolstered their
position in the region. Khomeini said no. On June 21,
he made a speech in which he not only rebuffed Moscow's
peacemaking efforts but denounced the whole Soviet role
in the Middle East. Said Khomeini: "The Americans fear
the Soviet Union might do this or that in the region if
we defeat Iraq. The Soviet Union can do nothing. It has
proved to be capable of nothing." Having put the
Soviets in their place, Khomeini continued to accept
support from them, just as he has accepted clandestine
help from the Israelis.
Iran's plan to attack Iraq, with Soviet acquiescence,
was in the formative stages when the Israelis launched
their invasion of Lebanon. The Israelis gambled that
with a quick strike at their northern neighbor's
heartland, they could impose a solution of sorts on
their 34-year-old conflict with the Palestinian Arabs.
They bought Defense Minister Ariel Sharon's argument
that such an assault could free northern Israel from
occasional P.L.O. attacks, break the organization's
leadership and perhaps even create pressure on the
Palestinians to make Jordan their homeland. If Syria
attacked Israel's invasion force, so much the better,
because Sharon was prepared to carry his anti-
Palestinian offensive all the way to the Syrian
capital, Damascus.
Their campaign in Lebanon has generally produced the
results the Israelis were seeking, but it has spilled
enough blood to worry the Reagan Administration and its
allies. The spectacle has been observed by 100 million
or more citizens of the Arab world on their TV sets:
the siege of Beirut, the brutality of the ceasefire
violations, the Beirut negotiations leading toward the
Israeli goal of expelling the P.L.O. fighting force
from Lebanon. Even Arabs with the highest stakes in the
gulf war, the emirs of Kuwait and princes of Saudi
Arabia, have been traumatized and distracted from their
more immediate problems by the war in Lebanon. They
have watched the first siege of an Arab capital by an
Israeli army, and they have become alarmed at the
emotions aroused in their own countries.
For the Soviets, according to most Western analysts,
the long-term goal is control of Middle East oil. In
47
Afghanistan, they have built a new airfield in the
corner of the country closest to the mouth of the
Persian Gulf. In the Horn of Africa last week, Soviet-
backed Ethiopia attacked its traditional enemy next
door, Somalia, probably with the help of Cuban and East
German advisers. If the Ethiopians should defeat
Somalia, they and their
Soviet allies would gain a position of influence over a
country that is strategically located at the southern
end of the Red Sea. Moscow could then, if it wished,
call South Yemeni troops back into combat with Oman,
which, like Somalia, is scheduled to provide facilities
for the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force.
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has sold Iraq $500
million worth of arms and ammunition since the Iran-
Iraq war began. Nonetheless, Mubarak fears that Saddam
may not be able to stand up to the Ayatullah's army and
Revolutionary Guards for long. Iran is four times the
size of Iraq and has a population that is three times
as large. The Egyptian government believes that the
fighting may be over by September at the latest. And
after that? Would Khomeini rule Iraq as the reigning
ayatullah, as he does Iran, or through a Shi'ite-
dominated political mechanism more closely attuned to
the Arab traditions of Iraq?
That question matters less to Arab leaders than the
fact that Khomeini's forces are already plotting the
overthrow of every government in the gulf. TIME has
learned that a new corps of revolutionaries is being
trained under the name of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of the Gulf. The group is led by a noted
ayatullah operating out of Tehran. Recruits are being
trained in camps in South Yemen and Libya and in a new
facility recently opened for a class of 600 in
northwestern Iran. The initial graduates began to
filter into the gulf states two years ago. Some of them
bungled their first coup attempt last December, when
Bahrain police arrested 80 terrorists trained and armed
by Iran for the purpose of overthrowing the government
of Sheik Isa Al-Khalifa. Other subversive activity in
the gulf sponsored by Iran is known to be under way.
One plan being discussed among Iraq's Arab allies for
countering subversive activity calls for the
establishment of an Arab rapid deployment force. The
proposal would involve an Egyptian contingent of
several divisions and would perhaps be deployed along
the borders of Iraq in Kuwait and in the Eastern
Province of Saudi Arabia. As a down payment, Egypt
would insist on the restoration of diplomatic relations
that were broken off by most of the gulf states
following the conclusion of Egypt's peace treaty with
Israel. The Egyptians would also require ample supplies
of U.S. equipment and strong American support,
including air force and naval assistance if necessary.
But Mubarak must be cautious about committing his
troops to foreign service. After the late Anwar Sadat
made his historic trip to Jerusalem in 1977, with the
full support of his military commanders, they told him
that in the future they would fight only for Egypt.
They did not want to fight for Palestinians or for the
anti-royalists in the civil war in Yemen. Egypt's
commanders were prepared to accept peace with Israel,
provided that they would never again have to send
Egyptian troops to fight outside their own country.
Mubarak knows it could be a mistake for him to send
troops to assist Saddam in Iraq. Such a move not only
might antagonize Egypt's generals, but would also anger
the Islamic fundamentalists in the country. It was the
fundamentalists who assassinated President Sadat last
October, and they remain a threat in spite of Mubarak's
crackdowns. Nonetheless Mubarak is prepared to offer
Egyptian troops to defend Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the
other gulf states, under the terms of the 30-year-old
Joint Arab Defense Pact, if the arrangement is approved
by the states involved and supported militarily by the
U.S. Considering Mubarak's reluctance to send forces
anywhere outside Egypt, the current discussion of such
a mission is an indication of how worried he is about
the spread of Islamic revolution.
Even some of Khomeini's friends are upset about the
Iranian invasion of Iraq. The P.L.O., which has
generally supported
Khomeini out of deference to Syria, is furious with the
Iranians for launching an invasion that can only divert
attention from the Palestinians' plight in Lebanon.
Arab and Western diplomats feared that the Iranian
attack would enable Israel to move briskly into West
Beirut to settle the problem of the stubborn P.L.O. Not
that such an argument would carry much weight with the
ruler of Iran, which has once more become the primary
power in the gulf. If the Palestinians want Jerusalem
as the capital of a state of their own, Khomeini wants
it as the goal of a holy crusade.
Officially, Iranians quarrel with the notion that they
are committed to the overthrow of Arab governments.
They also deny that they have fallen under the
influence of the Soviet Union. As Iran's Ambassador to
the U.N., Rajaie Khorasani, said last week, "We have
proved that a nation armed with the ideology of Islam
need not choose between the superpowers but can stand
on its own feet." It is true that a wave of Islamic
revolutionary fervor moving across the Middle East
would not necessarily serve the interests of the Soviet
Union any more than it would help the West. But since
it would damage existing ties of all kinds, cultural as
well as political and economic, it would have a greater
impact on the Arab world's links with the West than on
those with the Soviet Union and its allies.
Still to be determined is the effect of the gulf war on
world oil prices and markets. Taken together, Iran and
Iraq have about half the oil reserves and export
capacity of Saudi Arabia, the world leader. In recent
months, Iran's refusal to abide by production ceilings
set by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries has helped keep world prices down as global
output continued to exceed demand. There was no
evidence last week that either prices or supplies had
yet been affected by the fighting in Iraq.
But the petroleum industries of both countries, and
particularly Iraq, are quite vulnerable. After its
attack on Iran's Kharg Island faculties last week, Iraq
reportedly warned Japan that its tankers should stop
using the island. If Iran decides to retaliate in kind,
it would probably aim first at the Iraq-Turkey
pipeline, the only export route now available for Iraqi
oil, and at the scattered fields to the west of Basra.
A determined Iran could take Iraq out of the oil
business for as long as two years. But even if warfare
should paralyze the oil industries of Iran, Iraq and
neighboring Kuwait, thereby removing about 4 million
bbl. per day from world oil markets, the loss could be
overcome by Saudi Arabia, which could increase
production from its current 6.5 million to 10.5 million
bbl. per day.
What seems indisputable, as the two Middle East wars
continue, is that they are costing the U.S. dearly in
48
prestige Arab rulers who privately would welcome
American assistance at the moment fear that they would
only inflict damage on their regimes by appearing to be
in league with the U.S. The Reagan Administration last
week offered to hold joint milltary exercises with
Saudi Arabia and any other gulf states that might feel
threatened by the Iran-Iraq conflict, but so far there
have been no takers. The most critical problem
afflicting U.S.-Arab relation at the moment stems from
the link that many Arabs believe exists between the
U.S. and Israel's operation in Lebanon.
But the Arabs also deeply resent the fact that the
Israelis chose to give military support to Khomeini's
Iran. The Israelis respond that the aid effort was
based on their traditional enmity toward Iraq. They
claim their aid was halted several months ago, long
before the Iranian invasion of Iraq began. Other
sources say that some Israeli aid, including the
training of Iranian military personnel in the use of
American arms, is continuing.
What the Reagan Administration still needs most, after
18 months in office, is a strong policy for the Middle
East.
Another central problem has been its un willingness to
say in public what it has been telling the Israelis in
private. According to most observers, the U.S. op posed
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, though this did not
have any effect on the Israeli government. But by
failing to state its position forcefully, the
Administration appeared to the Arab states to be a
silent partner in the attack or at the very least an
overly indulgent ally. Until the U.S. can distinguish
openly between American policy and Israeli policy, and
rein in some of the more expansionist tendencies of the
Begin government, it cannot make real headway in
improving its relations with the Arab world.
Theoretically, the Administration was correct to hew a
neutral line between Iran and Iraq, but changing
circumstances call for a defter touch than the U.S. has
displayed thus far. Says Richard Helms, a former U.S.
Ambassador to Iran (and onetime head of the Central
Intelligence Agency): "Now is the time to come to the
aid of our moderate Arab friends.
We shouldn't tilt toward Iraq so much that we throw
Iran into the arms of the Soviets, but we can tilt a
little bit, enough to encourage the Saudis and some of
the others to conclude that we are still their friends
and would come to their rescue if worst comes to
worst."
The first step for the U.S. is to deal forthrightly
with the Palestinian question.
This, in fact, is exactly what Secretary of State
George Shultz promised at his confirmation hearing last
week. The Lebanese crisis had made it "painfully and to
tally clear," Shultz told the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, that the "legitimate needs and problems" of
the Palestinian people must be resolved. He might well
have added that the West's failure to solve the
Palestinian problem has had a lot to do with giving
Islamic fundamentalism its anti-Western basis of
action. The more ambitious Khomeini's forces become,
and the more expansionist his goals in the name of
Islam, the more vital it is that the U.S. have a Middle
East policy that is perceived to be consistent and fair
by all moderate parties in the Arab world.
—By William E. Smith. Reported by Murray J. Gart/Middle
East and Dean Brelis/Baghdad
With reporting by Murray J. Gart, Dean Brelis
Monday, Aug. 17, 1987
At War on All Fronts
Once again, a frenzied Iran lashes out with fury and
fanatic zeal
By JOHN GREENWALD
They jammed Revolution Avenue in the heart of Tehran
last week, a million Iranians raising their fists and
shouting as if with one voice, "Revenge! Revenge!
Revenge!" The clutches of women dressed in black
chadors, the phalanxes of men bearing placards that
said DOWN WITH U.S.: the angry scene had been played
out before. This time, however, the crowd seemed
reinvigorated, its fury fresh and lethal. "Death to
America!" they chanted in the near 100 degrees heat.
Their rage rose higher still as Hashemi Rafsanjani, the
speaker of Iran's parliament, called upon Allah to
"avenge the blood" of nearly 300 Iranian pilgrims who
had been killed a week earlier in Mecca, Islam's
holiest city. Rafsanjani also uttered a demand that
sent a tremor through the Arab world and beyond: the
rulers of Saudi Arabia, the keepers of Mecca, must be
"uprooted."
Then came the hypnotic voice of Ayatullah Ruhollah
Khomeini, 87, still the country's supreme leader.
Speaking in fierce whispers over nationwide radio,
Khomeini first lashed out at the "inept and spineless"
Saudi Arabian royal family. But he placed the blame for
the bloody deaths in Mecca squarely on the U.S., still
the "Great Satan" in the eyes of the fevered Iranian
nation, and vowed vengeance. Promised Khomeini: "God
willing, at the opportune time we shall deal with her."
That confrontation suddenly seemed at hand last week --
for America and for the world. Since he took power in
1979, the Ayatullah has threatened to spread his
uncompromising brand of Islamic fundamentalism across
the fragile, oil- rich states that line the Persian
Gulf and to upset the global balance of power. He has
sought his goals openly in Iran's seven-year war with
Iraq, and he has promoted them stealthily through
terrorist bombings and kidnapings abroad. Now
Khomeini's brooding presence loomed larger than ever as
he seemed ready, even eager, to take on a host of
nations.
Angered by Washington's decision to reflag and escort
Kuwaiti tankers through the gulf, Iran announced with
great fanfare that it would stage four days of war
games in the Strait of Hormuz, the entryway to the
gulf. In case there was any doubt about the intent of
the maneuvers, they were code-named "Martyrdom." One of
the reflagged ships, the fully loaded Gas Prince,
slipped quietly out of harm's way and toward its
destination in Japan before the exercises began. But
the supertanker Bridgeton, damaged last month by a mine
that may have been planted by the Iranians, remained in
Kuwait. Meanwhile, Washington found itself in the
humiliating position of pleading with its European
allies to send minesweepers to the gulf, a request that
all spurned. At week's end the U.S. was rushing eight
Sea Stallion minesweeping helicopters to the region,
while three more Kuwaiti tankers moved into the gulf
escorted by American warships.
Khomeini's anti-American fervor echoed those 444 days
in 1979-81 when Iran held 52 Americans captive in the
U.S. embassy in Tehran. "The American presence in the
49
gulf has turned back the clock to the years of the
hostage crisis," said an Iranian journalist. "That is
the atmosphere now." But a major factor in the new
frenzy was the congressional hearings on the U.S. arms-
for-hostages deal with Iran, which Iranians followed
closely by newspaper and radio. The public revelations
of those dealings last November and the fresh airing
given the scandal on Capitol Hill over the past three
months revealed Khomeini's willingness to traffic with
the Great Satan and thus deeply embarrassed Tehran. In
order to restore its credibility, Khomeini's regime
apparently felt it imperative to demonstrate anew its
hatred of America. "It all was like waving a red flag
in front of Iran," says Gary Sick, a former Carter
Administration official and expert on Iran. "They had
to respond, to redeem themselves both domestically and
internationally."
But the U.S. is only one target of Khomeini's wrath.
Iran has been locked in a face-off with France since
the two nations broke off relations last month. The
French aircraft carrier Clemenceau last week steamed to
the gulf as Iranian police continued to hold 15 French
citizens hostage in the French embassy in Tehran.
Tensions remained high between Iran and Britain over
earlier incidents involving their diplomats. After the
Mecca tragedy, gangs ransacked the Kuwaiti and Saudi
Arabian embassies in the Iranian capital and took four
Saudis prisoner.
Amid the rage, however, Tehran was still capable of
making shrewd diplomatic maneuvers. In one such move
that promised to heighten superpower tensions in the
region, Iran and the Soviet Union last week began to
negotiate plans to reopen oil pipelines and build a
second rail link from Iran to Soviet Central Asia.
While the Soviets and the U.S. are officially neutral
in the Iran-Iraq war, the superpowers appeared to be
moving into opposite corners: Washington seemed to tie
itself to Baghdad by aiding its ally Kuwait, while
Moscow warmed to Tehran.
The Soviet pact spotlighted Iran's strategic
importance. One of the world's leading oil producers,
Iran (pop. 50 million) has more people than all the
other gulf states combined and geographically dominates
the richest petroleum- producing region on earth. The
country is a vast land bridge between the gulf and the
Soviets on the north, the Turks on the west, and the
Asian nations of Afghanistan and Pakistan on the east.
Washington rightfully views any increase in Soviet
influence in Iran as worrisome indeed.
But it is the gulf states that fear their brawling
neighbor the most. As the world's only Shi'ite-ruled
Muslim country, Iran seeks to export its brand of
Islamic revolution throughout the region and to
overthrow the Sunni-ruled Muslim regimes in countries
like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The two religious
factions have been fierce rivals for centuries.
Painfully vulnerable to Iranian subversion, the Sunni
gulf nations have been understandably reluctant to
alienate Tehran.
Since Khomeini came to power in 1979, tensions have
been especially high during the hajj, the pilgrimage to
Mecca that annually attracts more than 2 million
Muslims from some 130 countries. Khomeini viewed the
sacred occasion as the ideal time to deliver his
revolutionary message, but the Saudis blocked that goal
by banning demonstrations and limiting the number of
Iranians allowed into the country. Last year Saudi
police discovered more than 110 lbs. of explosives
hidden in the luggage of 500 Iranian pilgrims.
Two weeks ago, however, the Saudis were not as lucky.
According to accounts pieced together last week, the
trouble began on Friday, only minutes after the end of
midday prayer services. In 115 degrees heat, a white-
robed sea of penitents swarmed around the Sacred
Mosque, where the devout come to touch the Black Stone,
a meteorite inside the shrine that millions of pilgrims
have worn smooth over the centuries in the belief that
it will absolve them of sin. Suddenly the worshipers'
hymns and shouts of Allahu-Akhbar! (God is great) were
drowned out. Crying "Death to America! Death to the
Soviet Union! Death to Israel!," ragged lines of
Iranian demonstrators began weaving through the crowds.
Many carried posters of Khomeini that they waved over
the heads of the faithful. Their alleged aim: to seize
the Sacred Mosque and proclaim Khomeini leader of all
Islam.
Police rushed in as the pilgrims and intruders began to
clash. Waves of Iranians charged the officers, hurling
rocks and other objects. Some agitators brandished
clubs and knives. Others set fire to nearby cars and
motorcycles. Terrified bystanders dashed for cover,
their white robes frantically flapping. By the time
police regained control, 402 people, including at least
275 Iranians, lay dead or dying and an additional 649
had been injured.
Tehran quickly claimed that the Saudis had machine-
gunned the victims in cold blood. Riyadh replied that
the Iranians had charged police and were trampled to
death in the melee.The Saudis buttressed their story
with videotape clips that showed an Iranian rampage.
Ali Hassan Ash-Shaer, Saudi Arabia's Information
Minister, insisted that "not a single bullet was fired"
by Saudi forces.
On Saturday, Tehran awoke to a terse 7 a.m. newscast
that reported that "scores of Iranian pilgrims have
been shot dead by the Saudi police." By 8 a.m. a crowd
of 600 had gathered outside the Saudi embassy. After
briefly being restrained by armed police, the growing
mob burst into the two-story villa, smashing windows
and destroying embassy documents. Last week thousands
of mourners walked through Tehran alongside coffins
containing bodies brought back from Saudi Arabia.
Chants of "Death to America!" and "Death to the fascist
Saudi police!" filled the air.
For the conservative Saudi rulers, the bloodshed at
Mecca was appalling and terrifying. Iran's
revolutionary zeal had penetrated the borders of one of
the most cautious and security-conscious countries in
the world. "We are determined to defend our land and
our holy places by all means," declared King Fahd. Arab
leaders from Bahrain to Morocco rallied behind Riyadh
and condemned the rioters.
Four days after the Mecca riots, Iran reported
launching its "Martyrdom" maneuvers in the gulf.
According to Tehran radio, frogmen, pilotless aircraft
and explosive-laden vessels staged mock attacks.
Iranian television showed "suicide" speedboats skimming
the waters, apparently practicing for the day when they
would be called upon to crash into enemy warships. The
Iranians even claimed to have launched their first
submarine.
Iran's noisy saber rattling is only the latest lurch in
its erratic foreign policy. Though Khomeini has often
declared his hatred for the West, Iran's dealings with
other countries are determined as much by its domestic
politics as by ideology. After several years of
insisting that Iran's only goal was to spread its brand
50
of Islam across the globe, Khomeini began in late 1984
to soften his rhetoric in order to rebuild ties with
other countries. The move reflected the fact that Iran
desperately needed help: four years of war with Iraq
had devastated the economy, and Khomeini's implacable
hostility toward the outside world had turned his
nation into an international pariah. In short order,
Iran signed a trade pact with China, opened
negotiations with France to resolve a $1 billion
dispute, and entered fence-mending agreements with the
Arab world that included a limit on the number of
Iranian pilgrims who would make the yearly trek to
Mecca.
Beneath Iran's public diplomacy, however, its politics
was seething, its national leadership split. On one
side were the relative pragmatists like Rafsanjani, who
favored accommodation abroad. On the other were the
hard- liners such as the Ayatullah Hussein Ali
Montazeri, Khomeini's designated successor, and Mehdi
Hashemi, a key Montazeri aide, who shunned contact with
the West. Rafsanjani acknowledged the split in a 1986
speech, in which he declared that "two relatively
powerful factions in our country" disagreed on
virtually every policy and "may in fact be regarded as
two parties without names." Khomeini presided over this
division like a fond father, encouraging first one side
and then the other.
The split became a chasm after Iran decided in late
1985 to buy arms from the U.S. The decision did not
reflect a fundamental shift in policy; the arrangement
only illustrated Tehran's fanatical desire to defeat
Iraq, no matter who supplied the weapons. In addition,
Washington's eagerness to swap TOW missiles for
hostages was interpreted by many in Iran as proof that
terrorism paid off. Nonetheless, the deal infuriated
extreme hard-liners like Hashemi. There was little they
could do about it since the Ayatullah had approved the
negotiations. When former National Security Adviser
Robert McFarlane undertook his now famous mission to
Tehran in May 1986, supporters of Hashemi tried to have
him kidnaped, but Rafsanjani's followers intervened.
That trip might still remain secret today if Hashemi
and dozens of his associates had not been arrested in
Tehran last October on murder and other charges.
Several days later friends of Hashemi leaked details of
the McFarlane visit to the Lebanese weekly magazine
Ash-Shiraa. The sensational account made worldwide
headlines and sent the pragmatists scurrying for cover.
Though Khomeini has forbidden public criticism of the
arms deal, the explosive revelations have forced all
factions in Tehran to talk and act tough. "To be
perceived as nonrevolutionary in Iran is the kiss of
death," says Iranian Expert Gary Sick. Almost overnight
the softening face that Iran presented to the world
reverted to a furious scowl. Khomeini reportedly was in
his blackest mood in years as the annual Mecca
pilgrimage neared. "Break the teeth of the Americans,"
he told the 150,000 Iranians who set out on the trip.
The war with Iraq continues to dominate Iranian policy
at home and abroad. Since Baghdad started the conflict
by invading Iran in September 1980, some 300,000
Iranians and 200,000 Iraqis have lost their lives in
the fighting. Tehran's hopes for victory soared in
January, when its troops pushed within a few miles of
Basra, Iraq's second largest city. In the past few
months, however, Iran has made little headway in its
drive to crush Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Indeed,
the Iraqis have succeeded in reclaiming much of their
lost ground.
Even the number of Iranian war victims reflects the
country's political divisions. Iranian troops are split
among the regular military, the fanatical Revolutionary
Guards and the often ragtag volunteer corps known as
the basij. During Iran's moderate phase in the mid-
1980s, Tehran reduced the death toll by relying on
trained professional soldiers for most of the fighting.
Rafsanjani announced in 1985 that Iran intended "to
achieve victory with as few casualties as possible."
But last year champions of the zealous Guards gained a
stronger voice in ruling circles. The Guards have scant
concern for casualties and favor launching human waves
against enemy positions. In a unanimous vote last
month, the U.N. Security Council demanded that Iran and
Iraq declare a cease-fire, and last week the U.S.
pushed efforts for a resolution calling for an arms
embargo on Iran.
The relentless war with Iraq is only the most visible
sign of Khomeini's determination to defeat heretics. No
less important are Tehran's ties with the terrorist
networks of Shi'ite radicals that stand ready to do the
Ayatullah's bidding. Though tactics may shift,
Khomeini's ultimate goal remains the same as when he
came to power in Iran in 1979: to extend Shi'ite
fundamentalism over all of Islam and recover the unity
and power that the Muslim world has lost since the
Middle Ages. "Khomeini is a one-track fanatic,"
contends a senior Israeli official. "But he is very
cunning, very clever and knows what he wants to do."
So far, though, Khomeini has failed to export his
revolution much farther than Beirut. That is the
stronghold of the Hizballah, or Party of God,
terrorists who revere Khomeini. Acting under such names
as the Islamic Jihad and the Revolutionary Justice
Organization, the Hizballah is suspected of holding
most of the 24 foreign hostages, including nine
Americans and Anglican Envoy Terry Waite, who are
missing in Lebanon. As the Iran-contra hearings showed,
Reagan's arms sales to Iran were designed primarily to
pry Americans from Hizballah's grasp. The deals
apparently did secure the release of three Americans --
though four more were subsequently kidnaped -- just as
French contacts with Iran appeared to win freedom for
five Frenchmen last year.
Hizballah's exploits are not confined to kidnaping.
With the probable aid of 2,000 Revolutionary Guards
stationed in the Bekaa Valley and 400 in southern
Lebanon, the Islamic Jihad has claimed responsibility
for six suicide attacks between 1982 and 1984 that took
more than 500 lives and helped drive American, French
and Israeli troops out of Lebanon. The campaign
included the 1983 truck bombing that killed 241 U.S.
servicemen billeted in Beirut.
Hizballah's ties to Tehran are abundantly clear.
Leaders visit the Iranian capital regularly and
reportedly get instructions from Iranian embassies in
Damascus and Beirut. Khomeini is said to spend anywhere
from $15 million to $50 million a year to finance
Hizballah activities. Many Lebanese villages have so
embraced Khomeini's way that their mosques and squares
are adorned with pictures of the Ayatullah and even
Iranian flags. Tehran reciprocates by putting pictures
of Lebanese Shi'ite "martyrs" on Iranian postage
stamps. Says Hussein Musawi, leader of the Hizballah-
allied Islamic Amal: "We do not believe in the presence
of a state called Lebanon. We regard the entire Islamic
world as our homeland."
Other countries have reason to fear that Hizballah will
carry out terrorist acts on behalf of Iran. Last month
a suspected member of Hizballah commandeered an Air
51
Afrique jet, singled out a French passenger and shot operation: London has quietly escorted British tankers
him dead. Though the hijacking was staged ostensibly to through gulf waters for the past six years.
force West Germany to release two jailed Hizballah
operatives, the killing of the Frenchman suggested
The Soviet Union, meanwhile, gladly seized the
another motive: to pressure Paris to end the continuing
opportunity to play a larger role in the gulf. Indeed,
diplomatic standoff between France and Iran. Washington
it was a Soviet decision last spring to charter three
last week quietly warned government installations at
oil tankers to Kuwait that drove the Reagan
home and abroad to be alert to the Iranian threat. In
Administration to counter the move by reflagging
West Berlin, the Allied Command ordered a number of
Kuwaiti vessels. But in reporting last week's
Iranian diplomats to leave the city "in the interests
negotiations with Iran, the Soviet news agency TASS
of public order and security."
noted that both Moscow and Tehran expressed mutual
concern over the "unprecedented buildup of the U.S.
Tehran's ties with Hizballah have put it into conflict military presence in the region." Nonetheless, the
with its friends as well. Though Syria depends on Iran potential partnership poses problems for both
for much of its oil, relations between the two countries. The Soviet Union remains a major arms
countries have deteriorated recently over events in supplier to Iraq. And Moscow cannot ignore the
Lebanon. Hizballah fought Syria's forces after Syrian potential appeal of Khomeini's fiery fundamentalism to
President Hafez Assad sent troops into Beirut last Soviet Muslim communities in Central Asia.
February to restore law-and-order. Now Hizballah-set
bombs explode almost nightly near Syrian military posts
Yet Iran's economic woes seem to be nudging it toward
in the Lebanese capital. Hizballah's most serious
the Kremlin. The turning point came last year with the
provocation came in June, when the group kidnaped U.S.
arrival of the highest-ranking Soviet delegation to
Journalist Charles Glass near a Syrian checkpoint that
visit Tehran since the 1979 revolution. Then in
was supposedly guarding the area.
December Tehran reported that the Soviets had agreed in
principle to resume imports of Iranian natural gas and
Khomeini's relations with Saudi Arabia seem almost that the two countries were exploring the joint
beyond repair. Ironically, the break follows a period production of steel and petrochemicals.
in which Iran seemed to moderate its religious rivalry
with the House of Saud. In a conciliatory move two
For all his bluster, Khomeini is adept at turning the
years ago Khomeini replaced his religious
fears and jealousies of rival nations to his own
representative in Mecca, a hard-line cleric whom the
advantage. "Look at Iran's position today," says a
Saudis loathed. Before the start of this year's hajj,
senior Israeli. "No one can ignore it. And many will
however, Khomeini's hatred had revived. Not only were
even admire it." Part of that success stems from
the Saudis still bankrolling Iraq, they openly
Khomeini's shrewd cynicism and ability to size up
supported Kuwait's assistance to Baghdad. Many
opponents. Speaking of Washington two years ago, the
observers expect Iran to avenge the Mecca deaths by
Ayatullah dryly observed, "It is clear that if we take
launching terrorist acts on Saudi Arabian soil or by
one step toward the U.S., they take 100 in return."
fomenting trouble among the country's 350,000 or so
Shi'ites, most of whom live in the oil-rich eastern
provinces. Khomeini swiftly learned the value of dire
pronouncements that are never actually carried out. The
Ayatullah used the 1979-81 U.S. hostage crisis to
Tehran and Paris have been at daggers' points since
inflame his own people and cement his revolution. But
mid-July, when France tried to question Wahid Gordji,
when Khomeini no longer needed the hostages, he let
an Iranian embassy translator. French police suspect
them go and agreed to drop demands for a U.S. apology
that Gordji, who took refuge in the embassy, is linked
and the return of assets of the former Shah. Since the
to a string of Paris bombings last fall. When French
hostage crisis, Khomeini has repeatedly found that a
officers surrounded the Iranian embassy to prevent
combination of bullying and pragmatic concessions has
Gordji's escape, Iran sealed off the French embassy in
kept his enemies off-balance. Observes Richard Bulliet,
Tehran.
a professor of Middle East history at Columbia
University: "Khomeini is not the lunatic that many
Speaking in a televised interview last week, French people in the West take him for."
Premier Jacques Chirac declared that "we have no
intention of giving in to blackmail." In an obvious
Now other nations must again find a way to deal with
reference to French warships headed for the gulf,
that figure. For all the problems that Reagan's Kuwaiti
Chirac vowed that "we will intervene" if Iran launched
escort service has encountered, the President seems
a military attack. Yet Chirac's room for maneuver is
determined to continue with the operation indefinitely.
sharply limited. Any French military action could
Says a senior Administration official: "He's committed
endanger the lives of the embassy captives in Tehran
to demonstrating support to our friends in the region."
and the five French hostages held in Lebanon.
Still, the White House began muting its military role
in the gulf last week. Senior officials insisted that
Britain treaded more cautiously last week. London's the reflagging was first and foremost a display of
relations with Tehran have been tense since May, when solidarity toward the moderate Arabs, not a show of
an Iranian diplomat was arrested for shoplifting. After muscle.
Iranian Revolutionary Guards beat a British embassy
official in response, the two countries began to expel
Whatever Washington's intent, Iran can ill afford a
one another's diplomats. Prime Minister Margaret
direct clash with the U.S. Not only would Tehran have
Thatcher has not wanted to push the quarrel any
little chance of winning, but a fight would drain vital
further, though. Sounded out privately two weeks ago by
resources from the all important war against Iraq.
Washington about sending minesweepers to the gulf, she
Still, Western military analysts are worried about a
politely said no. Thatcher reportedly was furious when
possible suicide bomb attack from an explosives-packed
U.S. Ambassador Charles Price formally repeated the
plane or boat.
same request, forcing her to reject the U.S. again,
this time in public. Thatcher has added reason to look
askance at the highly publicized American escort The greatest threat to Khomeini's Iran may finally come
not from the battlefield but from the country's almost
52
suicidal tendency to cut itself off from the rest of even dreams within dreams, by characters who may or may
the world. Each time Iran begins to make overtures to not be mad.
other nations, it seems instinctively to stop and pull
back. Tehran's tenuous links with Washington, Paris and
The book is praised by critics and wins a literary
London have all been shattered in the past year. So too
prize, but Muslims find some of the passages offensive.
have been the painstaking efforts of some Iranian
Soon there are threats, protests, demonstrations, riots
leaders to improve ties with Saudi Arabia. Whether Iran
in scattered places -- India, South Africa, the Asian
can leave such traits behind will ultimately rest with
quarters of British cities. India bans the book to
Khomeini's successors. All the indications are that the
avoid sectarian violence, and is soon followed by
pragmatic Rafsanjani, 53, is locked in a fierce power
Pakistan, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Egypt. Then a
struggle with the hard-liner Montazeri. Without a clear
mass protest is staged outside the American cultural
winner, the two men could wind up sharing authority in
center in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan; six
an arrangement that would make Montazeri the religious
people are killed, a hundred injured. Another dies
leader and Rafsanjani the political head of state. Most
during protests in Indian-controlled Kashmir.
experts predict that a turbulent transition will follow
Khomeini's death.
Then, most astonishing of all, Ayatullah Ruhollah
Khomeini, 88, spiritual ruler of fundamentalist,
One power broker may be Khomeini's son Ahmed, 43. While
revolutionary Iran, announces that the author must be
members of the Ayatullah's family have traditionally
killed for the sin of insulting Islam, the Prophet and
been left on the sidelines, Khomeini brought Ahmed into
the holy Koran, and for good measure exonerates any
government affairs late last year to oversee Tehran's
Muslim who manages to perpetrate this deed and promises
two major newspapers and supervise state TV and radio
him the rewards of martyrdom. And not only the author,
stations and the national IRNA news agency. Iranian
but anyone else involved in the publication of the
experts now consider Ahmed a full-fledged member of
book. A day later, another Iranian cleric announces
Khomeini's inner circle, along with Rafsanjani and
that a bounty has been placed on the author's head:
Montazeri.
$2.6 million if the avenger is an Iranian, $1 million
if he is not. The following day, thanks to the
For all the speculation about Khomeini's successor, the generosity of still another Iranian philanthropist, the
Ayatullah remains very much the spiritual force behind reward is doubled. Governments are angered, publishers
the Iranian revolution. Reportedly afflicted with a intimidated, airlines subjected to bomb threats. The
weakening heart and prostate cancer, Khomeini author and his family scurry into hiding, protected by
nonetheless grants public audiences, meets weekly with Scotland Yard.
the families of martyrs and even performs Islamic
marriage ceremonies. On most days, though, he remains
This was the extraordinary plight of Salman Rushdie,
secluded in his house in north Tehran, emerging from
41, whose fourth novel, The Satanic Verses, has
time to time to issue the whispery proclamations that
precipitated what some Islamic experts regard as the
echo around the world. Intimates say the Ayatullah
most incendiary literary fight in the 14 centuries of
yearns to ensure that the revolution will survive long
Islamic history. Last week the controversy spread from
after he is gone. That may not be possible, given the
the dusty streets of Pakistan to the offices of
nation's fractious politics and the fact that none of
European publishers and to the shopping malls of
the potential successors possesses Khomeini's ability
America, where the nation's largest booksellers ordered
to mesmerize the country. But for now, the brooding
all copies of The Satanic Verses removed from the
leader remains a formidable force, an old man who can
shelves. Suddenly the name Salman Rushdie was on the
at will command the attention of both the superpowers
lips of millions, many reviling him but others
and all of his Arab neighbors. As he first proved eight
expressing sympathy and genuinely wondering how a novel
years ago and continues to prove, the Ayatullah
could elicit such deadly passion. The dispute reminded
Ruhollah Khomeini has transformed Iran into a state
Westerners once again of the zealous rage that Khomeini
that the world must reckon with.
is capable of; it also raised questions about how free
societies can best protect themselves and their
With reporting by David S. Jackson/Abu Dhabi and Scott citizens against so furious and mercurial a form of
MacLeod/Cairo, with other bureaus intimidation.

Monday, Feb. 27, 1989

Hunted by An Angry Faith
Salman Rushdie's novel cracks open a fault line between
East and West
By WILLIAM E. SMITH
It was an absurdist nightmare, a story that all but
defied the Western imagination. A middle-aged author,
born in Bombay but for many years resident in London,
writes a long, sardonic novel, by turns philosophical
and comic and fantastic. In the book's opening scene,
two middle-aged Indian actors fall 29,002 feet from a
jetliner that has just been exploded by terrorists over
the English Channel. They have an animated conversation
as they hurtle toward earth; they land safely, but then
their troubles begin anew. Along the way, the author
writes about his schooling and young adulthood in
Britain, about his love for Bombay and about the death
of his father. He explores the roots ! of his Muslim
faith and retells some legends of the Prophet Muhammad
in a whimsical and sometimes outrageous way, though
taking care to offer up these sequences as dreams, or
The conflict cut to the heart of Muslim and Judeo-
Christian values, with centuries of cultural
misunderstanding and mistrust finding a flash point in
Rushdie's novel. After Khomeini's call to murder, many
Muslim leaders worldwide disagreed with the ferocity of
his action, but none had a friendly word for Rushdie,
his literary intentions or his right to free speech. To
be sure, few of his prosecutors had read the book, as
the author pointed out repeatedly; most seemed to feel
they had learned enough from printed excerpts or merely
word of mouth to convict the author of blasphemy
compounded by apostasy, the crime of renouncing one's
religious faith. In the Muslim faith, the traditional
punishment for an apostate is death.
Asked if he took Khomeini's threat seriously, Rushdie,
clearly shaken, replied, "I think I have to take it
very seriously indeed." He canceled a planned book tour
in the U.S., moved out of his four-story house in North
London and, under protection of Scotland Yard's
antiterrorist squad, quietly disappeared. Then, in a
formal statement released on Saturday, he declared, "I

53
profoundly regret the distress that publication has
occasioned to sincere followers of Islam."
The Iranian news agency initially observed that the
"Muslim heretic" had not repented. Later it said the
apology might be accepted, and still later it dismissed
the previous comment as the personal opinion of one of
its employees. At the same time, the news agency
reported that a local newspaper had denounced the offer
of money to anyone who would kill Rushdie, observing
that "to pay one man to kill another man is murder at a
premium and not a religiously inspired act." This
remarkable display of vacillation, played out in the
dispatches from Tehran, suggested that pragmatists in
Iran had begun a campaign to control the damage caused
by the Ayatullah's earlier pronouncement.
In the West, political leaders and the general public
alike reacted with anger and disbelief to the outrage
of a foreign despot declaring a death sentence on
another country's citizen whose only crime, at least in
Western eyes, was to probe the meaning of his Islamic
heritage. In Washington, the State Department said it
was "appalled" by Khomeini's statement as well as by
the reward for Rushdie's murder. The Dutch Foreign
Minister canceled a trip to Tehran. The British
government found itself at the center of the
controversy -- because Rushdie is a British citizen and
because its Tehran embassy, reopened less than three
months ago after being closed for eight years, had been
attacked by an angry mob earlier last week. The Foreign
Office summoned Iran's lone diplomat in Britain and
told him that Khomeini's threat was "totally
unacceptable," demanded special protection for its
embassy, and disclosed that London was "freezing" its
plan to strengthen diplomatic ties with the Islamic
state.
British airlines received bomb threats, causing
security delays at London's Heathrow Airport. Viking
Penguin, Rushdie's publisher, was also the target of
such threats at its London and New York City offices.
Thanks to the Muslim broadside, sales of The Satanic
Verses boomed -- more than 100,000 copies were in print
around the world -- and a second U.S. printing was on
the way, but distribution was a growing problem.
Waldenbooks ordered copies of The Satanic Verses
removed from its more than 1,300 stores after getting
several threats. Next day B. Dalton and Barnes & Noble
followed suit. "We have never before pulled a book off
our shelves," said Leonard Riggio, B. Dalton's chief
executive officer. "It is regrettable that a foreign
government has been able to hold hostage our most
sacred First Amendment principle. Nevertheless, the
safety of our employees and patrons must take
precedence." Though American writers' groups were at
first slow to react to the controversy, the 2,200-
member PEN American Center later issued a statement in
support of Rushdie.
In addition to the problem of distributing the book in
the U.S., Viking Penguin faced a threat by 44 Islamic
countries to ban the sale of its other books within
their borders. In a statement, the company insisted
that it had not intended to offend anyone and did not
plan to withdraw the book from circulation. Andrew
Wylie, Rushdie's New York City-based agent, said the
book was still scheduled to be translated into 20
languages, but publishers in France and West Germany
were reconsidering plans to issue editions of their
own. The Canadian government halted imports of the book
while it decided whether, as alleged by Muslims, the
novel violates the country's laws against hate
literature.
The actual risk faced by Rushdie and his publishers if
Khomeini sought to follow through on his threat was
difficult to gauge. Of the roughly 25,000 Iranians in
Britain, it is believed there may be as many as 1,000
radical extremists, including students on short-term
visas. Tehran-backed groups have a history of violent
mischief in London, mostly bombings aimed at Iranian
dissidents. Says Ian Geldard, head of research at
London's Institute for the Study of Terrorism: "In the
Islamic world, a call from the Imam is a full command .
. . The worst of it is that this threat could remain in
effect for months." Or even years. In a BBC radio
interview, an exiled Iranian film director, Reza
Fazeli, who himself has been the target of a Khomeini
death threat and whose son was killed in a 1986
terrorist attack in London, said Rushdie faced a
"living hell." He continued, "I had to learn to look
over my shoulder. If they kill you, it's over -- it's
finished. But ((this way)) they are killing you a
hundred times a day."
What exactly did Rushdie do to merit such a threat? By
Western standards, nothing -- at least nothing that
could not be punished with a bad review. But among
Muslims, and not just fundamentalists and extremists,
there was an almost universal judgment that he had
dishonored the faith (see box). Every Muslim critic
seemed to have a favorite offending passage from his
book. But, in sum, they felt he had insulted the faith,
ridiculed the Prophet, trivialized the sacred -- and
that the sin was compounded because it was committed by
a born, though not a practicing, Muslim.
In Britain, Rushdie had no shortage of defenders. A
group of writers led by playwright Harold Pinter
presented a petition in Rushdie's behalf at No. 10
Downing Street. Author Anthony Burgess, writing in the
newspaper the Independent, stated the Western position
precisely: "What a secular society thinks of the
Prophet Muhammad is its own affair, and reason, apart
from law, does not permit aggressive interference of
the kind that has brought shame and death to
Islamabad," where the rioting took several lives. "If
Muslims want to attack the Christian or humanistic
vision of Islam contained in our literature," Burgess
observed, "they will find more vicious travesties than
Mr. Rushdie's."
Others, looking for parallels to the Rushdie case both
inside and outside Islam, referred to Muslim resentment
of the medieval Christian mystery plays, with their
satanic portrayals of the Prophet as "Mahound," the
name Rushdie gives his crypto-Prophet. In 1977 a
fanatical band of Hanafi Muslims shot their way into
three buildings in Washington, took more than 100
hostages and, among other things, tried to halt the
showing of a $17 million movie epic called Muhammad,
Messenger of God at theaters in New York City and Los
Angeles. Though the tone of the movie was reverential,
the producers had met endless difficulties in making
it, including expulsion of the film crew from Morocco.
In 1980 Saudi Arabia vehemently protested a British-
American TV "drama documentary" called Death of a
Princess, which told the story of the 1977 executions
of a young married Saudi princess and her lover. Some
Muslims have even objected to Children of Gebelawi, a
30-year-old allegorical novel based on the development
of the world's great religions, by Egypt's 1988 Nobel
laureate, Naguib Mahfouz.
Last year's furor over the Martin Scorsese motion
picture The Last Temptation of Christ demonstrated that
Christians, particularly those who believe in the
literal interpretation of Scripture, are similarly
sensitive about fictional portrayal of the sacred,
54
though their protest generally takes less violent
forms. Even secular gods are sometimes held by their
followers to be above scrutiny; in earlier times the
Kremlin was notoriously thin-skinned about revelations
concerning the private lives of Lenin and other members
of the Communist pantheon.
Practically nobody, however, has managed to touch the
sensitive nerve of a vast section of mankind as
effectively as Salman Rushdie. In Bombay seven
prominent writers and intellectuals, all non-Muslims,
declared in a joint statement, "The pain of scurrilous
intrusion into the regions of the sacred is not felt by
the so-called fundamentalists only, but is the common
experience of the whole, besieged ((Muslim)) minority.
While there can be rational opposition to their faith,
there should be no outraging of it by obscenity and
slander."
Many Oriental scholars have raised questions about
Islam or the actions of the Prophet, but they have
generally been ignored, often because they were
understood to have a political bias. Rushdie's actions
seem somehow more galling to Muslims because, though
essentially free of political motivation, he appears to
be tampering -- and mischievously, at that -- with the
faith. Karim al Rawi, a lecturer at Cairo's American
University, maintained that on this occasion Rushdie's
propensity for provocation just went too far. Said Al
Rawi: "In his other novels," in which Rushdie wrote,
often scathingly, of post-independence India and
Pakistan, "the writer acted like a little kid poking at
a sleeping lion. In The Satanic Verses, the beast has
awakened, and this time did not feel like playing."
Most Muslims were simply offended by the material. "He
attacked the wives of the Prophet," declared Ahmed
Baghat, a writer for Cairo's Al Ahram. "He brought
disgrace upon them." Said another Egyptian author,
Sheik Muhammad Al Ghazaly: "We do not view this as
freedom of opinion, but freedom to be insolent."
Having made their case against the book, Islamic
authorities divided sharply over how the author should
be punished. Georges Sabagh, director of UCLA's Near
East Studies Center, took an unyielding line, saying
Khomeini was "completely within his rights" in
sentencing Rushdie to death. Added Sabagh, taking full
advantage of the free speech available to him in
California: "If the man is struck by a thunderbolt, all
the better." But should Muslims feel they have a right
to kill Rushdie? "Why not?" he replied.
On the other hand, Sheik Muhammad Hossam el Din of
Cairo's Al Azhar Mosque argued that to execute Rushdie,
as ordered by Khomeini, would be "virtually impossible"
under the tenets of Islam. His solution: ban and burn
the book and give the author a chance to repent.
Issuance of a death decree, he went on, "makes Islam
seem brutal and bloodthirsty." Many Islamic clerics
were offended by Khomeini's pronouncement, regarding it
as vengeful and contrary to Islamic teachings of mercy.
Like most of their countrymen, U.S. experts on Islam
were astonished by the intensity of the anti-Rushdie
campaign. One academic specialist marveled that he
could not "recall anything quite as widespread as
this," then quickly asked that his name not be used. "I
can't afford a bodyguard," he said. Since Islamic
fundamentalism has been on the rise for at least 15
years, how can one account for so explosive a reaction
at this time, and against a book that could just as
easily have been ignored? The answer is as much
political as theological. Now that Iran has settled, if
not exactly lost, its brutal and murderous war against
Iraq, the Rushdie book has become a tool with which
Khomeini can once again mobilize his constituency, this
time against a conveniently distant enemy whose
offenses are vaguely related to the Ayatullah's "Great
Satan," the U.S. Says Marvin Zonis, a political
scientist at the University of Chicago: "It's a way to
make domestic political capital out of a foreign
adventure."
& Such controversies reflect the confusion of a country
torn between the more pragmatic forces seeking to
moderate the ten-year-old Islamic revolution and open
Iran to Western trade, and ideologues determined to
retain control. For some months, moderate elements
seemed to be in the ascendant. Only a few days
preceding Khomeini's rampage against Rushdie, the
Iranian leader's designated successor, Ayatullah
Hussein Ali Montazeri, made an unusually conciliatory
speech in the holy city of Qum. Montazeri lamented the
fact that "people in the world have gained the idea
that our business in Iran is just murdering people" and
called on his country to "set aside past mistakes and
harsh treatment," adding that "extremism is to our
detriment." At about the same time, Parliamentary
Speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani told the Iranian
news agency that Tehran erred in seeking a military
victory over Iraq. "We took too big a bite," he said.
This was extraordinarily revisionist talk, and it may
have been too much for Khomeini to stomach. He struck
back, reaffirming his leadership of the Iranian masses
with the most convenient weapon at hand, The Satanic
Verses. The return of Khomeini's fiery rhetoric may be
an isolated rage or it could mean that the hard-liners
are once again trying to assert their strength.
Politics also played a role in the anti-Rushdie
agitation in Pakistan. Last week's demonstration at the
American cultural center in Islamabad was staged by
political and religious groups that oppose the
government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and were
formerly aligned with her predecessor and enemy, the
late President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq. On her return from
a trip to China, she seized on this theme in a speech,
asking, "Was the agitation really directed against this
book, which has not been read, sold or translated in
Pakistan, or was it a protest by those who lost the
election ((and wish)) to destabilize the process of
democracy?"
Toward the end of the week, more violent protests
flared in Iran, India and Bangladesh. In Tehran,
however, Iran's President Ali Khamenei remarked that
the death threat against Rushdie might be withdrawn if
he would apologize to Muslims and to Khomeini. A day
later, when Rushdie did exactly that, Iran's
government-run news agency began to issue its series of
contradictory reports and commentaries -- a symbol of
the confusion within the Tehran regime.
But what to believe? Even as he was discussing the
possible benefits of a Rushdie apology last week,
Khamenei said of the author, "This wretched man has no
choice but to die because he has confronted a billion
Muslims and the Imam." Rushdie of course intended to do
no such thing; rather, he used his considerable
literary powers to address an audience of educated
readers who understood very well that he was offering
them a work of the imagination. The fate of both book
and author poses a dilemma for Western societies that
is not easily resolved. Granted there is a need in the
West for greater sensitivity to Islamic concerns, so
also is there a need to deny trespass to intruding
zealots -- one is reminded of Khamenei's remark that
"the Imam knows no frontiers" -- determined to inflict
55
intellectual and sometimes physical terrorism on the
rest of the world.
For much of the past two months, Salman Rushdie has
been defending himself and his book. "The thing that is
most disturbing is that they are talking about a book
that doesn't exist," he said. "The book that is worth
killing people for and burning flags for is not the
book I wrote." As Rushdie saw it, his book "isn't
actually about Islam, but about migration,
metamorphosis, divided selves, love, death, London and
Bombay." The sad irony, he said, is "that after working
for five years to give voice and fictional flesh to the
immigrant culture of which I am myself a member, I
should see my book burned, largely unread, by the
people it's about -- people who might find some
pleasure and much recognition in its pages."
As the week ended, Rushdie was under police guard
somewhere in England, doubtless reflecting on the
magical if sinister power that his words had acquired
and getting acquainted with yet another place of
refuge. It was a situation that he must have understood
very well. As he wrote in his first novel, Grimus, more
than a decade ago, "It is the natural condition of the
exile, putting down roots in memory."
With reporting by Dean Fischer/Cairo, Frank
Melville/London and Priscilla Painton/New York
Monday, Oct. 6, 1980
War in the Persian Gulf
By SPENCER DAVIDSON
COVER STORIES Seeking power and revenge, Iraq attacks
Iran along a crucial oil artery
Suddenly the nightmare, the conflict that had only been
discussed as a worst-case scenario, was at hand—war
amid the oilfields and across the vital oil routes of
the Persian Gulf. Day after day last week, Iraqi pilots
flying Soviet-built MiGs headed eastward for bombing
raids on military targets and oil facilities across the
Iranian border, including the Tigris-Euphrates estuary
known as Shatt al Arab. Caught by surprise at first,
the Iranians responded with attacks of their own,
sending American-made Phantom F-4 fighter-bombers
against Iraqi cities and installations. A fearful
battle was under way. Iraqi armor and infantry punched
across 500 miles of desert front at many points,
surrounding two key Iranian cities but running into
stubborn resistance and counterattacks. In the Shatt
and in the northern gulf, naval craft skirmished and
bombarded shore installations.
After months of border clashes, Iraq and Iran were at
war, upsetting an already precarious balance in a
volatile, politically unstable region that provides
approximately 40% of the non-Communist world's oil and
is a cockpit of superpower rivalry. "Whether it has
been declared or not," said Iraqi Defense Minister
Adnan Khairallah early on, "it is in fact war." The
struggle escalated quickly and as it did, spread to key
oil facilities on both sides—Basra, Kirkuk and Mosul in
Iraq, Abadan and Kharg island in Iran. With thick black
smoke pluming from bombed tank farms and refineries,
petroleum-consuming nations around the globe anxiously
calculated and then recalculated the implications. Said
one U.S. official in tallying up the damage: "Once oil
installations became fair game, the stakes became much
higher for everyone."
Given the limited military capabilities of the
combatants, the war did not appear likely to be a
prolonged one, although Iran's Ayatullah Ruhollah
Khomeini pledged to fight until "the government of
heathens in Iraq topples." Mediation efforts by the
U.N. were rebuffed, but the Conference of Islamic
Nations dispatched a "goodwill mission" consisting of
Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq and Tunisia's Habib
Chatti, the organization's secretary-general, to the
combatant capitals. No matter how long the struggle
continued or how soon it ended, the shock waves had
already reached out from the gulf. They included
concerns about:
Oil Supply. Within days of the outbreak of heavy
fighting, oil shipments from Iraq and Iran were
suspended, including crude deliveries through Iraq's
pipelines to the Mediterranean. Between them, the two
nations export just over 3 million bbl. per day, around
20% of gulf crude shipments, an amount that would not
necessarily be critical at a time of a global oil glut.
But there was the dire possibility that the Strait of
Hormuz, 30 miles wide at its narrowest point, at the
southern end of the gulf, might be closed because of
the hostilities. Halting the flow of the supertankers
that steam through the passage would have a devastating
ripple effect (see following story) by preventing the
shipment of oil from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the
smaller gulf states. That kind of drop in world
supplies would be intolerable.
Superpower Relations. The gulf war pitted not just Iraq
against Iran but, on the sidelines, the U.S. against
the U.S.S.R. Both superpowers have strategic interests
in the area; neither will easily stand by if the other
should make political gains there. Under the Carter
Doctrine, proclaimed by the President last January, the
U.S. is committed to keeping the Strait of Hormuz open;
it would prefer to do so by diplomatic means, but it
has little leverage in Baghdad or in Tehran. Though
neither Iraq nor Iran made any attempt last week to
interfere with shipping through the strait, the Soviets
talked about U.S. "preparations for armed interference
in the Persian Gulf," obviously concerned that, in case
of a blockade, the U.S. might resort to military
action. In Washington, officials expressed fears that
if the conflict dragged on, the Soviets, who are Iraq's
main armorers and who share a 1,250-mile border with
Iran, would have a built-in advantage in case of
internal complications in either country.
Regional Stability. The war brought cautious Arab
support for Iraq, tempered by concern over possible
retaliation by Iran. Yet despite their dislike for the
Khomeini regime, the rulers of the conservative Arab
gulf states were hardly happy with one more flash point
in an area already troubled by the Arab-Israeli dispute
in the west and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in
the east. An Iraqi victory would add a new name to the
list of potential pan-Arab leaders, that of ambitious
President Saddam Hussein, 43, who wants to make his
country the dominant power in the gulf; defeat could
bring him down. For Iran, the stakes were equally high.
Khomeini was able to mobilize the nation at short
notice. Repelling the Iraqis would probably strengthen
his hold on the country for a while. Buckling under
Iraqi pressure could invite fragmentation, perhaps even
the dismemberment of Iran.
The threat of war had hung in the air since spring,
when border clashes began to intensify and spread along
the 760-mile frontier between the two countries.
Traditional enemies, divided by ethnic and ideological
differences, Iraq and Iran had come to a temporary
accommodation in 1975 when Saddam, then Vice President,
and the late Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi announced a
frontier agreement during an OPEC summit in Algiers.
56
The centerpiece of the accord was a change in the
status of the Shatt al Arab, long a source of friction
between the two nations. Under the Algiers agreement,
the border was moved from the Iranian side of the
disputed waterway to the middle of the estuary; in
return, the Shah agreed to stop his support for Kurdish
rebels in northern Iraq who had been battling the
Baghdad government with increasing success. According
to the Iraqis, the Shah also promised to return a
parcel of disputed territory around Musian.
The agreement held as long as the Shah lived. Though
Baghdad never forgot its Shatt al Arab concession,
though it resented the Shah's self-appointed role as
the policeman of the gulf and worried about Iran's
steadily growing military strength, it reaped instant
benefit from the accord. Without the Shah's support,
the Kurdish rebellion fizzled, allowing Iraq to
concentrate its oil resources on fast-paced economic
development and to emerge as a military power. But the
squabble was renewed with the Shah's demise, the
Iranian revolution and the advent of the Khomeini era.
Khomeini had spent 14 years in exile in Iraq during the
Shah's reign, but never concealed his dislike for the
Iraqi reqime. Now, stressing old cultural and religious
divisions, Tehran accused the Iraqis of fomenting
unrest among the predominantly Arab population of
Iran's oil-rich Khuzistan province, and called on
Iraq's Shi'ite Muslims, the majority in the country, to
overthrow the Saddam government, which is dominated by
Sunnis. Iraq in turn demanded amendment of the Algiers
agreement. It also insisted on the return to "Arab"
sovereignty of three small strategic islands—Abu Musa,
Greater and Lesser Tunb—at the Strait of Hormuz that
had been occupied by the Shah's forces in 1971. Iran
did not respond.
On Sept. 17, apparently convinced that Iran's
revolutionary convulsions had left the country divided
and its military forces weak, Saddam made his move.
Before Iraq's National Assembly he declared the Algiers
agreement "null and void." Five days later full-scale
fighting broke out.
For the Iranians and Iraqis living along the Iran-Iraq
frontier, the war hardly came as a surprise. For months
they had lived with increasingly sharp border battles,
including artillery bombardments and occasional air
raids as Iraq stepped up its drive to regain control of
the Shatt and of the Musian region. The difference last
week was the range and intensity of the fighting and
the commitment of forces on both sides.
The war, the first fought in modern times around the
gulf, began in the air early Monday morning. From
airfields deep in Iraq, Saddam sent his warplanes to
strike Iranian military bases, including Mehrabad
airport only four miles west of Tehran; Mehrabad serves
as a military field as well as Iran's principal
commercial airport. The Iraqi objective was straight
from the military textbooks: to knock out the Iranian
air force before it could ever get off the ground. The
effort failed. Scarcely two hours after the attack,
U.S.-made Iranian Phantoms were streaking toward two
Iraqi bases in the Basra area. Then, beginning at dawn
on Tuesday, the Iranian air force launched strikes
against at least 16 different targets in Iraq. A
principal one was Baghdad, the capital, as well as the
military garrisons in the sprawling city of 2.8 million
people along the banks of the Tigris River. Iranian
planes also attacked the northern oil cities of Mosul,
Kirkuk and Erbil. Iraqi gunners sent up barrages of
antiaircraft fire and ground-to-air missiles that lit
up the skies and brought down a reported 67 Iranian
planes.
Baghdad residents took the attacks calmly. Shops
remained open, schools continued to hold classes, and
youths wearing blue overalls and armed with fire
extinguishers took positions in hastily erected tents
in the city's many traffic circles, ready to fight any
blaze started by Iranian bombs. "We are ready for this
war and have been for a long time," a high school
student told TIME Cor respondent Adam Zagorin. "Like
the Iranians we are Muslims, but Khomeini is a devil
who has forced his people against us." Iraqi newspapers
played up the propaganda aspects of civilian casualties
caused by the bombings, showing pictures of mothers and
children injured and in shock. Said the captions: "They
fail to face an Iraqi soldier, but they turn to kill
Iraqi children."
On day two, the war took a more ominous turn: it
singled out oil, the mainstay of both countries'
economies. Iranian naval vessels shelled oil terminals
at Fao island, and the Phantoms returned to bomb and
rocket Basra's vast new petrochemical complex. Twenty-
nine people were killed in that raid, some of them
Britons, Americans and other foreign workers among a
labor force of thousands. The foreigners and their
families fled in cars and buses to the Kuwait border 15
miles away. "It all happened so fast," said Briton
Roger Elliott. "I was just sitting there getting my
truck started when I looked up and saw these jets
screaming towards me. The bombs exploded 50 yards away
and I could feel the skin on my face being peeled off
by the concussion."
At about the same time the Iraqis sent their bombers
against Iranian oil facilities across the Shatt al Arab
at Abadan and farther south against Kharg island, where
14 tankers at a time can load crude. At Abadan, one of
the biggest refineries in the world (587,000 bbl.-per-
day capacity) and the principal source of fuel for
Iran's domestic needs, flames and smoke shot skyward.
"There are going to be a lot of cold Iranians this
winter as a result," said a U.S. diplomat monitoring
the fighting. In Tehran, the government decreed that no
gasoline would be sold to private motorists for at
least a week.
Meantime, Iraqi troops and armor crossed the frontier
in force. The invaders mounted a multipronged drive
aimed at Abadan, the nearby port of Khorramshahr, Ahwaz
and Dezful, a vital pumping station on the Abadan-
Tehran pipeline, and to the north around Kermanshah.
The heaviest fighting, reported TIME Correspondent
William Drozdiak, was around Khorramshahr, which was
being pounded from three sides by Iraqi tank and
artillery fire. Making his way through dust clouds
raised by the armor, Drozdiak bumped into an Iraqi
general, who gave him an impromptu briefing: "There is
terrible fighting around Khorramshahr. Unfortunately we
are not yet in control of the city."
Iran admitted the loss of five border posts in the
early fighting. But as the week went on, the Iranian
defenses hardened and the Iraqis found themselves
pressed to maintain their salients.
Indeed, the Iranians, in the view of military analysts,
were doing surprisingly well against one of the Arab
world's strongest military forces (250,000). Since
1973, using oil revenues that now amount to $30 billion
annually, the Iraqis had spent $8 billion to $9 billion
on military hardware, most of it purchased from the
Soviet Union. The shopping list included more than 330
MiG, Sukhoi and Tupolev fighters and bombers, along
with tanks ranging from the standard T-62 model to the
T-12, which is considered one of the world's best. Iraq
also is reported to have 1,000 huge tank transporters,
57
acquired as a result of bitter experience. Rushing to
support Syria and Egypt in the 1973 war against Israel,
Baghdad dispatched its tank force on the long trek
through Jordan and Syria to the Golan Heights, only to
discover that most of the tanks had shattered treads
and burned-out engines by the time they arrived. This
time the tanks were ready to ride to battle on
transporters.
To face this panoply of forces, Iran threw in units and
equipment diminished by revolutionary confusion and the
decimation of the military's top echelons, but still
formidable in regional terms. Its air force included
445 combat planes, among them not only 188 Phantom F-4s
and 166 F-5s but also 77 advanced F-14 interceptors.
The principal problems with the planes as well as with
the Iranian navy and ground forces: lack of maintenance
and spare parts. According to Western analysts, only
eight of the F-14s were airworthy and one-third of the
army's 875 British-built Chieftain tanks were no longer
serviceable. Army manpower was down from about 240,000
under the Shah to an estimated 180,000 as a result of
desertions and purges; 250 generals had been replaced
by inexperienced officers or by military-minded
mullahs. Said a Pentagon expert: "In order to move full
steam into a war like the one where they now find
themselves, the Iranians should have been spit
polishing, shining and checking that machinery day by
day. Apparently a lot of it has just been sitting there
since the revolution."
Still the Iranians held. Regular forces were bolstered
by a hasty call-up of reserves. The current Iranian
year by the solar calendar is 1359, and Iran called up
the class of 1356, meaning men who had completed
reserve training in 1978. In addition, each of the
hundreds of mosques in Tehran was required to deliver
22 militiamen to fight Yazid, a term used for the
murderers of Hussein, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad,
who is venerated by Shi'ites as a saint and martyr.
Whenever air raid sirens wailed, thousands of Teh-ranis
rushed to their rooftops shouting "God is great."
Enthusiastic civilians almost shot down an Iranian F-4
trying to land at Mehrabad: they thought it was an
Iraqi plane. Opposition parties like the left-wing
Socialist People's Mujahidin and the Marxist People's
Fedayan were captured by the patriotic fever and backed
the war effort of President Abolhassan Banisadr's
government. Even Reza Pahlavi, 19, the Shah's oldest
son, who is studying at the American University in
Cairo, volunteered his services from abroad as a
fighter pilot.
The Iranians were inspired by Khomeini, who railed
against Iraq's "godless" rulers, dismissing them as
pawns of "the great Satan." Saddam was an "infidel
guilty of blasphemy." What particularly galled the
Iranians was that in the wake of the revolution, Iraq
had given sanctuary to a force of some 3,000 Iranian
soldiers now known as the Iran Liberation Army and
gathered by General Ghoylam Ali Ovisi, 59, the former
military commander of Tehran. The I.L.A. was not
involved in last week's fighting but was reportedly
ready to move into Iran behind the Iraqis.
As the war revved up, Tehran declared an embargo on
Iraqi harbors and oil facilities like Basra and
proclaimed Iranian territorial waters a "war zone."
Ships passing through Hormuz were advised by Iranian
navy craft to avoid Iraqi ports. While for the most
part the traffic—and the oil—kept flowing, some
supertanker captains hove to. Off Kuwait, a fleet of
the giant ships dropped anchor, waiting for the war to
end.
Particularly at the outset, the war was largely shut
off from the outside world, which could only guess at
the ferocity of battle by communiques issued by both
sides. By the fifth day, for instance, the Iraqis
claimed to have shot down no fewer than 158 Iranian
planes, about as many, experts figured, as the Iranians
would have been able to get into the air. Propaganda
was rife on either side. Iraqi television carried
bulletins on the fighting, with commentaries on what
"our heroic forces" had done to "the racist Persian
enemy." The Iranian media talked of Saddam Hussein's
"collusion with Israel." Apparently counting on a quick
and glorious kill, Saddam's government initially
treated the war as a kind of media event, issuing visas
for 300 foreign newsmen and busing many of them to
Baghdad from Jordan, across 500 miles of desert.
By week's end Baghdad was claiming the recapture of the
land the Iraqis consider theirs. The rail line from
Iran's southwest oil towns to Tehran was said to have
been cut by Iraqi forces, and the border towns of
Khorramshahr and Abadan, where the refinery was still
burning days after the first bombardment, remained
besieged. Western observers assumed that the Iraqi
objectives were limited and doubted that they would try
to advance much farther. The Iraqi army does not have
the logistics to support a campaign deep in enemy
territory. And if it tried to push toward Tehran, it
would encounter the forbidding 12,000-ft. Zagros
Mountains. Moreover, the Iranians were fighting so
grittily that even skeptics in Tehran were impressed.
Said a retired senior officer: "The soldiers were
humiliated by the revolution and then by the
revolutionaries. What the hell are they righting so
ferociously for?"
Initial attempts to end the war failed. U.N. Secretary-
General Kurt Waldheim convened the Security Council in
an informal session on Tuesday, but all its members
could agree on was to express "deep concern" and appeal
to the combatants "to desist from all armed activity."
Said a U.S. official: "The Security Council is the
logical place to sort this out, but neither regime has
a history of paying much attention to the U.N."
Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser
Arafat, on good terms with both Saddam and Khomeini,
offered his services to help end the war and visited
both Baghdad and Tehran, but with no known results.
Because most Arab nations supported Iraq, mediation
from that quarter was all but ruled out. Said a U.S.
analyst: "As this goes on, it will polarize the region.
The Arab states will fall behind Iraq out of Arab
solidarity while the fighting continues. In the long
run, we have to be concerned about the crisis on
nations already beset with insecurity."
The U.S., which has no diplomatic relations with either
country, knew from the start that its hands were tied.
Said American University President Joseph Sisco, former
Under Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs: "This
is the first time in recent years that the U.S. has not
been able to play even a diplomatic role in a
significant Mideast conflict."
As the battle continued along the Shatt al Arab and
other segments of the Iraq-Iran border, Iraq came up
with its own demands, which if met, it said, would end
the hostilities. Having initiated the war, Baghdad laid
down four conditions that might stop it. Iran would
have to agree to respect Iraqi sovereignty over its own
land and waters, would have to maintain good relations
with its Arab neighbors along the gulf, would have to
promise not to meddle in Iraq's internal affairs, and
as a kind of catchall, would have to refrain from
"aggressive" activities.
58
The Iraqi plan did not get anywhere in Tehran.
Recognizing Iraqi control over land and waters meant
giving up the Shatt al Arab. Not meddling in Iraq's
internal affairs implied cutting links with the
Shi'ites of Iraq, who represent half the country's
population and have long had close ties to the Shi'ites
of Iran, particularly since their most holy shrines are
in Iraq at An Najaf and Karbala. Iran, on hearing the
terms, turned them down out of hand.
To help explain its case abroad, the Baghdad government
already had sent Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz to
Moscow and Paris. He assured the Soviets, who
apparently were as much surprised by the outbreak of
war as the Americans, that Baghdad's goals were
limited, but he also pressed unsuccessfully for fast
military resupply. Like Washington, Moscow was quick to
proclaim its neutrality—understandable since it could
not afford to offend either party. For the Soviets to
openly back the Iranian regime would be to go against
their ties and friendship treaty with Iraq. To back
Iraq could mean the loss of a carefully nurtured
Iranian connection. Thus Moscow contented itself with
asking both countries to stop the fighting quickly. If
they did not, the Soviets warned, the U.S. would take
advantage. "While calling by word of mouth for
neutrality in the Iranian-Iraqi conflict," the Soviet
news agency TASS said after the New York meeting
between Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and U.S.
Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, "Washington is in
fact building up tensions and making a choice between
direct interference in the Iranian-Iraqi conflict and
the possibility of launching international intervention
in case the war between Iran and Iraq jeopardizes oil
exports from the Persian Gulf area."
In Paris, French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing
told Tariq Aziz that the crisis was a "bilateral
affair," best solved by the region's Islamic states. An
Elysée spokesman later said that no spare parts for
French weapons in the Iraqi arsenal would be
forthcoming while the fighting continued. But he said
that France would honor a $1.6 billion arms agreement
with Iraq involving the sale of 60 Mirage F-l jet
fighters, as well as tanks, antitank weapons, radar,
guided missiles and patrol boats—all part of an Iraqi
attempt to diversify its weapons inventory away from
total dependence on the Soviet Union.
Part of the Iraqi-French deal covers the sale of a
nuclear reactor—a development that has caused great
anxiety in Israel, which fears that Iraq, one of the
Jewish state's archenemies, could develop a nuclear
weapons potential. Indeed the Iran-Iraq conflict, the
first recent major crisis in the region in which Israel
is not involved, was being closely watched in
Jerusalem. "That fight," said an Israeli official
acidly, "is proof that there is an inherent instability
in the Middle East of which we are not a part."
Always concerned about the spillover effect of events
in the Arab world, Israeli analysts wondered how the
battle would affect Israel's eastern front, where Iraqi
units fought alongside the Syrians during the 1973 war;
the assumption was that Iraq's commitment against Iran,
another of Israel's sworn enemies, would give the
country some breathing room. Said one Israeli Arabist:
"The best thing that could happen, from our point of
view, is that both Iraq and Iran exhaust each other and
kill one another off, and that they cannot rebuild
their war machines for another 20 years."
Most Western observers assume that the gulf war,
Saddam's vehicle to assume the mantle once worn by the
Shah, cannot go on for too long. Unless resupplied by
the Soviets, the Iraqis do not have the capability to
wage a protracted battle, especially if they try to
push deeper inland than the farthest penetration—45
miles—they claimed by week's end.
Iran, which bought virtually all of its military
equipment from the U.S., lacks spare parts for its
arms, thanks to the U.S. embargo. Considering the
shortages believed to exist, the Iranian performance
and relatively quick reaction to the Iraqi thrusts were
unexpected, and Iran may well be girding for sustained
combat. But so long as it holds the U.S. hostages, the
Washington tap is not likely to open.
If Iraq chooses to prolong the conflict, it will almost
certainly be to inflict such punishment on the Iranian
economy and military machine that they will not be a
major factor in the gulf for some time to come. Iraqi
Defense Minister Khairallah reiterated last week that
his country coveted "not one inch of Iranian territory"
beyond that "usurped" by Iran.
As it is, says one senior British official, "the Iraqis
do not have the capa bility to mount an expeditionary
force into central Iran." Nor, in the British
assessment, is Baghdad eager to occupy all of oil-rich
Khuzistan. Such a venture would alienate neighboring
Kuwait and the other conservative gulf states that
Saddam has been courting.
Seldom has a war over such relatively simple issues for
those waging it had so many dangerous, unpredictable
and complex ramifications. A large match was lit last
week in a very flammable part of the globe. The
uncontrolled fires that now darken the skies over the
refineries of Basra and Abadan are apt symbols for the
gulf war.
—By Spencer Davidson. Reported by William
Drozdiak/Basra and WilliamStewart/Beirut.
Monday, Nov. 17, 1986
The U.S. and Iran
The story behind Reagan's dealings with the mullahs
By GEORGE J. CHURCH.
The tale sounded really too bizarre to be believed. The
U.S. conniving at arms shipments to Iran? Sending a
secret mission to palaver with the mullahs? Trying to
keep the whole thing from Congress and most of the U.S.
Government? And all over Iran, of all places! The
country that held Americans hostage for 444 days
beginning in 1979, the land whose fanatical leader,
Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini, has never ceased to
denounce America as the "Great Satan," the state widely
suspected to this very day of fomenting terrorist
attacks against Americans.
Yet there is no question that it happened. Initially in
the perhaps illusory hope of gaining influence with a
post-Khomeini government in Iran, but eventually also
as an inducement for Iranian help in winning freedom
for U.S. hostages held by Muslim zealots in Lebanon,
the Reagan Administration approved clandestine
shipments of military equipment -- ammunition, spare
parts for tanks and jet fighters -- to Iran through
Israel.
As long as the deep secret was kept -- even from most
of the U.S. intelligence community -- the maneuver in
one sense worked. Iran apparently leaned on Lebanese
terrorists to set free three American hostages, the
latest of whom, David Jacobsen, flew home to the U.S.
59
last week for a Rose Garden meeting with Ronald Reagan.
But once the broad outlines of the incredible story
became known, the consequences were dire. The
Administration appeared to have violated at least the
spirit, and possibly the letter, of a long succession
of U.S. laws that are intended to stop any arms
transfers, direct ( or indirect, to Iran. Washington
looked to be sabotaging its own efforts to organize a
worldwide embargo against arms sales to Iran, and
hypocritically flouting its incessant admonitions to
friends and allies not to negotiate with terrorists for
the release of their captives.
America's European allies, the recipients of much of
that nagging, were outraged. Moreover, the U.S. was
likely to forfeit the trust of moderate Arab nations
that live in terror of Iranian-fomented Islamic
fundamentalist revolutions and fear anything that might
build up Tehran's military machine. Finally, the
Administration seemed to have lost at least temporarily
any chance of gaining the release of the missing six
U.S. hostages in Lebanon, or of cultivating the Iranian
politicians who might sooner or later take over from
Khomeini. The 86-year-old Ayatullah is reported to be
bedridden following a recent heart attack, but for at
least as long as he lives, Iranian officials, including
those who have been in quiet contact with the White
House, cannot afford to be caught dealing any further
with the Great Satan.
The story of how this came about leaked out in bits and
pieces all last week from bewilderingly varied sources:
an account published by a pro-Syrian weekly magazine in
Beirut, a public speech by the speaker of the Iranian
parliament, guarded private comments by government
officials in Washington and Jerusalem, even a Danish
sailor's revelations about a voyage through the Persian
Gulf. Some of the more mind-boggling versions of the
tale had touches of melodrama that might have come from
the most lurid spy fiction: a presidential envoy
slipping into Tehran bearing (so the Iranians claimed)
presents of pistols, a Bible and a key-shaped cake; an
American cargo plane disappearing from radar screens
over Turkey; a Danish ship changing the name painted on
its hull prior to reaching an Israeli port.
The Administration's distress at being caught out in
such an improbable and embarrassing situation was
evident in the scramble of the White House to put a lid
on the rapidly expanding story. Whereas only a few
weeks ago the Administration had rallied its forces to
defend the President's actions at the Iceland summit,
virtually blitzing the media with press conferences,
interviews and briefings, now there was a chorus of no
comments, off-the- record observations, obfuscations
and pointed suggestions of self- restraint, even
repression of the emerging facts. President Reagan
declared that the | disclosures "are making it more
difficult for us" to win the release of the Americans
still held captive in Lebanon. The just-released
Jacobsen, in a moving appeal at his welcoming ceremony
at the White House, warned reporters that "unreasonable
speculation on your part can endanger their lives."
Cried Jacobsen: "In the name of God, would you please
just be responsible and back off!"
The pleas raised once more the perennial question of
the responsibility of the press, as well as the
undisputed need of the Government to carry on sensitive
negotiations in secret. In this instance, the story of
the clandestine negotiations with Iran was broken not
by the American press but by a Lebanese magazine and
the speaker of the Iranian parliament. Together they
provided the major outlines of the secret dealings.
Even as President Reagan pleaded for a halt to
speculation, sources within his own Government
confirmed much of the speculation and added important
details. While some congressional leaders questioned
the wisdom of making such a deal in the first place,
other critics blamed the disclosure on the
Administration's failure to take into account the
danger of leakage and on its tendency toward
improvisation and swashbuckling. Moreover, none of the
information that emerged last week included potentially
dangerous details about the whereabouts of the
hostages, their movements or their captors.
Many of the details are still either murky or disputed,
and some may never be known. But this much seems clear:
sometime around August 1985, the White House got word
that at least one of the many quarreling factions in
the Iranian government was interested in re-
establishing contact with the U.S. The first message
apparently came to American officials in Beirut. In
addition, Iranians who meet regularly with U.S.
representatives at the Hague, where Iran is pursuing a
case against the U.S. before the International Court of
Justice, indicated that some Tehran leaders wanted to
talk.
With President Reagan's approval, a few top American
officials began a series of hush-hush meetings with
Iranians that as of last week had gone on for 14
months. The American representatives apparently were
guided, if not led, by Robert McFarlane, then National
Security Adviser. Just which officials participated on
the Iranian side is not known, but they are believed to
be allies of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the speaker
of the Iranian parliament, who is less bitterly anti-
American than many of his colleagues. The sessions were
initially conducted in European cities, but they
eventually included three secret American missions to
Tehran. One in August that included McFarlane, who left
the Administration last December and is now on the
staff of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic
and International Studies, and Oliver North, a Marine
colonel on the staff of the National Security Council,
was reported around the world last week. There was an
earlier meeting of U.S. and Iranian officials in Geneva
in October 1985. That mission was headed by John
Poindexter, then McFarlane's deputy and now his
successor as National Security Adviser.
The Administration claims that its primary motives were
to open some kind of back channel into the fierce
factional struggles now raging in Tehran and to gain
the attention of some of the politicians jockeying for
position in the post-Khomeini era. In itself that
motive was shrewd, even laudable. The U.S. has little
hope of moderating Iran's behavior while Khomeini
rules. The aged Ayatullah may be too weak to provide
much direct leadership anymore, but no one dares do
anything of which he disapproves. Yet not all the men
around him are as dedicated as he is to pursuing the
seven-year-old war with Iraq until that country is
crushed, or to exporting anti-Western revolution
throughout the Muslim world. If politicians in contact
with the U.S. were to gain major influence in a
successor regime, Washington might be in a position to
urge them to wind down the war with Iraq, call off
troublemaking in neighboring states and ease support of
terrorism.
The U.S. cannot afford to ignore Iran, because the
country is a glittering geopolitical prize. One of the
world's biggest oil producers, it is strategically
situated on the Persian Gulf, through which most Middle
East oil flows into world markets. The U.S. dares not
take a chance that Iran might fall into the Soviet
orbit. Moscow has been maneuvering for influence in a
60
post-Khomeini Iran; it resumed buying Iranian oil and
gas. If Soviet blandishments do not work, bullying
might. Over the past year and a half, the U.S.S.R. has
nearly doubled, to more than 50 divisions, the military
forces stationed near its border with Iran.
The U.S.-Iranian talks proceeded on two tracks, one
concerning general political questions, the other the
hostages in Lebanon. The Americans did their best to
keep the two tracks separate, but inevitably they
tended to merge, if only because the same people,
notably North, were involved in both sets of talks.
American officials insist that their prime purpose in
agreeing to arms transfers was to cultivate influence
with potential future leaders of Iran. Apparently, the
Administration thought these men might feel gratitude
to the U.S. for supplying arms that Iran critically
needs to fight its war with Iraq. But a senior
Administration official concedes that the subjects of
arms and the release of hostages became "linked."
In some minds the linkage began very early. In July
1985, Israeli businessmen who had been in contact with
Iranian officials told Shimon Peres, then Israel's
Prime Minister, that they thought a swap of arms for
U.S. hostages could be arranged. Peres presumably
communicated that information promptly to Ronald
Reagan. The story in Jerusalem is that the White House
designated Poindexter to look into the idea, and he
named North as liaison with Israel. In any case, the
Israeli businessmen were authorized by Peres to resume
contacts and strike a deal with the Iranians. The
executives turned to Adnan Khashoggi, a famed Saudi
Arabian wheeler-dealer and an extremely wealthy
businessman. He got a long shopping list from Tehran
that included Hawk antiaircraft missiles and radar-
guidance equipment for them, antitank missiles, and
spare parts for jet fighters.
Lebanese terrorists influenced by Iran released one of
their American captives, the Rev. Benjamin Weir, on
Sept. 14, 1985. According to Israeli reports, President
Reagan telephoned Peres to thank him for Israel's help
in securing Weir's freedom. Five days later Iran got
some of the Hawk missiles and guidance equipment that
had been on the shopping list relayed through
Businessman Khashoggi. They are said to have been
delivered by a DC-8 cargo plane that was once owned by
a Miami-based air-transport company. The aircraft took
off from Tabriz, Iran, disappeared from radar screens
over Turkey, made what was supposed to be a "forced
landing" in Israel and later returned to Iran by a
circuitous route.
More arms transfers followed. Israel so far this year
has shipped roughly $40 million worth of military
equipment to Iran, largely artillery and tank
ammunition, and spare parts for fighter planes. In
itself, this is unremarkable. Israel has been selling
arms to Iran on and off since the Khomeini government
took power in 1979, originally in a successful effort
to win permission for Iranian Jews to emigrate to
Israel. The Ayatullah is a sworn enemy of the Jewish
state, but Israel too hopes to gain influence with (
Khomeini's potential successors. In addition, Israel
believes that its self- interest lies in helping Iran
at least to stalemate Iraq in the gulf war.
The U.S. has sometimes protested the Israeli sales,
sometimes grudgingly winked at them. In the latest
round, it did much more than wink: some of the arms and
parts were bought by private Israeli businessmen and
then forwarded to Iran, which wound up paying the bill.
The delivery of such items had been blocked by the
Carter Administration, however, after the Khomeini-led
revolution toppled the Shah and acquiesced in the
seizure of the U.S. embassy by Iranian militants in
1979. The Reagan Administration, in line with its
outspoken neutrality in the gulf war, has a long-
standing and strongly advocated policy against arms
sales to Iran.
Some details about how the transfers were arranged came
last week from a seemingly unlikely source: the Union
of Seamen in Denmark. It said that Danish ships, which
have acquired a reputation for being able to deliver
quietly any questionable cargo anywhere, had carried at
least five loads of arms and ammunition from Israel to
Iran. Said Union Deputy Chairman Henrik Berlau: "It
appears that the shipments this year have been carried
out on the orders of the U.S. to win the release of
hostages in Lebanon."
The union related the story of an October voyage as
told by a sailor who asked not to be identified. He
said that around Oct. 17 the coaster Morso picked up 26
containers full of ammunition in the Israeli port of
Eilat and delivered them to the Iranian port of Bandar
Abbas. "We all knew there was ammunition on board,"
said the sailor, but Israeli authorities in Eilat took
care to let no one else know. "The Israeli harbor
authorities," the sailor added, "told us to take off
all markings that could show we had been in Israel,
including the markings on the food we had taken aboard
and on the weapons containers. We even had to remove
the JAFFA markings on the oranges." Further, said the
seaman, uniformed Israelis had already demanded that
the name Morso be removed from the ship before its
arrival in Eilat and replaced temporarily by Solar; the
name was changed back to Morso as the vessel approached
the Persian Gulf, reaching Iran around Oct. 21.
In the U.S., the arms-shipping operations and some of
the negotiations with Iran about hostages were arranged
by a tiny group of NSC staffers led by Oliver North and
known as the "cowboys." Says a Government source who
was ) clued in on their operations very late: "This
thing was run out of the West Wing (of the White
House). It was a vest-pocket, high-risk business."
Whether the motive for the arms-shipments policy was to
gain U.S. influence in Iran's power struggles or to win
freedom for hostages in Lebanon, officials could hope
for success. Last month Mehdi Hashemi, a hard-line
Iranian official, was arrested in Tehran and charged by
the Iranian government with treason, allegedly because
he had masterminded the kidnaping of a Syrian diplomat,
who was then promptly set free. Khomeini personally
approved an investigation into Hashemi's activities.
Hashemi's pending downfall is good news for the U.S.
because he is among the most extreme of Khomeini's
followers in urging Islamic revolution outside Iran. He
is thought to have suggested to Lebanese extremists
that they kidnap and hold American hostages.
Meanwhile, the Lebanese groups holding the hostages
released a second clergyman, Father Lawrence Jenco, in
July and David Jacobsen last week. Their freedom was
obtained without any yielding on the captors' principal
demand: release of 17 terrorists being held in Kuwait
on charges of dynamiting the U.S. and French embassies.
In a statement announcing that they were letting
Jacobsen go, his captors, Islamic Jihad, mysteriously
urged the U.S. to "proceed with current approaches that
could lead, if continued, to a solution of the hostages
issue." Washington at the time vehemently denied that
it had made any "approaches," to Iran or anyone else.
Jacobsen's release was credited by some observers in
the Middle East to Syria, which occupies the portion of
Lebanon where Islamic Jihad and its companion group,
61
Hizballah (the Party of God), operate. It is now clear
that Syria played next to no role. In fact, it appears
to have lost nearly all sway with the extremists, who
are now heavily influenced by Iran.
The patient and untiring negotiating efforts of Terry
Waite, the personal envoy of the Archbishop of
Canterbury, also appear in a different light. Waite's
activities were important, but not wholly in the way
they appeared at the time. Since neither the U.S. nor
Iran could let it be known that they were in contact,
let alone that the U.S. was supplying Iran with arms,
some cover for Jacobsen's release had to be found.
Waite and his mission provided the necessary public
appearance, and it is doubtful that anyone else could
have done so, since Waite, as a nonpolitical man of
religion, has the trust of all parties involved,
including the kidnapers. One Israeli official refers to
Waite as the "cellophane wrapping" around hostage
releases. Says he: "You cannot deliver a gift package
unwrapped. That is why there will be no more hostage
releases until he returns to the region."
It should have been obvious, though, that the U.S.
dealings with Iran would continue to bear fruit only so
long as they were kept secret -- and that no maneuvers
so momentous could be held under cover very long. In
retrospect it is astonishing that so few people knew
anything for a period as long as 14 months. But an
essential part of the planning of intelligence
operations is, or should be, what will be done and said
when their covers are blown. And nobody in either
Washington or Tehran seems to have given that much
thought.
The cover began coming off first in Iran, when
supporters of Khomeini's chosen successor, Ayatullah
Hussein Ali Montazeri, started clandestinely
distributing pamphlets accusing the regime of
surreptitious contacts with the U.S. Specifically, they
claimed that Rafsanjani had met with nameless American
emissaries in Iran. Last week several members of the
group were reportedly arrested in Iran, charged with
distributing leaflets that were "in line with the
vicious attempts of the counterrevolutionaries."
The first the world learned of the unraveling scheme
was just before Jacobsen's release, when Al Shiraa (The
Sailboat Mast), a weekly magazine published in Muslim
West Beirut, ran a sensational article reporting that
the U.S. had been sending spare parts and ammunition
for jet fighters to Iran. The magazine further said
that McFarlane and four companions had visited Tehran
in early September, stayed at the Independence
(formerly Hilton) Hotel and met with a variety of
officials from the Iranian Foreign Ministry, parliament
and army, who supposedly asked for more military
equipment. Shortly after the visit, said Al Shiraa, the
U.S. airlifted the arms to Iran in four C-130 cargo
planes flying out of a base in the Philippines. No
independent evidence of any such flight has come to
light, but the rest of the story contains elements of
truth.
Where did the magazine get its information? The
publication is known to have close ties to Syria. That
country and Iran are formally allies, but their
relationship has come under increasing strain. One
reason is their rivalry for influence over Islamic
Jihad and Hizballah, which Iran is clearly winning. The
assumption in the Middle East as well as in the U.S. is
that the Syrians somehow got wind of both the U.S.-
arranged arms shipments to Iran and McFarlane's
mission. They may have leaked the story in order to
torpedo the potential relationship between the U.S. and
moderate elements in the Iranian government, with a
view to enhancing Syria's influence in the power
struggle in Tehran. Syria may have also been piqued
over losing a role in hostage bargaining, which gave it
a useful gambit in countering adverse publicity about
Syrian links to terrorism.
In any case, the secret was out. Rafsanjani was
evidently alarmed enough to take strong action to
counter Al Shiraa's story and perhaps to cover up his
own dealings with the Great Satan. In a speech to the
Iranian parliament last Tuesday, Rafsanjani confirmed
McFarlane's visit but added some wildly improbable
embellishments. According to Rafsanjani, McFarlane and
four unnamed American companions arrived in Tehran with
Irish passports and posing as the flight crew of a
plane carrying military equipment that Iran had
purchased from international arms dealers. They brought
with them, said Rafsanjani, gifts of a Bible
autographed by President Reagan, a cake shaped like a
key intended to symbolize an opening to better
relations between the U.S. and Iran, and an unspecified
number of Colt pistols to be distributed to Iranian
officials. Rafsanjani insisted that he ordered the
Americans kept under virtual house arrest in their
hotel rooms, refused to let them see anyone and
expelled them from Iran after five days. They were
furious, Rafsanjani reported. He quoted McFarlane as
saying, "You are nuts. We have come to solve your
problems, but this is how you treat us. If I went to
Russia to buy furs, Gorbachev would come to see me
three times a day."
American officials in the know insist that much of this
story is sheer invention intended to make the U.S. look
ludicrous. What really happened, they say, was this:
McFarlane, North and two bodyguards did visit Tehran,
but their passports were neither U.S. nor Irish. Also,
they carried no Bible, cake or guns. They stayed in
Tehran four or five days and managed to meet a number
of Iranian officials, possibly including Rafsanjani,
although accounts differ on that subject. Stories vary
too on what, if anything, the mission accomplished.
Some say that McFarlane's contacts with the Iranians
were amicable, others that they were rudely aborted.
Fanciful though it was, Rafsanjani's tale ended any
U.S. hope of preserving secrecy. Together, he and Al
Shiraa had introduced all the main elements of the
story: the secret meetings between U.S. and Iranian
officials, the arms transfers and the negotiations
about the hostages in Lebanon. Al Shiraa did not
mention the hostages, but Rafsanjani did. He said that
if the U.S. and France met certain conditions, among
them the return of frozen Iranian assets and freedom
for so-called political prisoners held "in Israel and
other parts of the world," then "as a humanitarian
gesture we will let our friends in Lebanon know our
views" about the release of American and French
hostages.
But freedom for Journalist Terry Anderson and Thomas
Sutherland, the acting dean of agriculture at Beirut's
American University, now looks far away. The White
House had once hoped that both would be released, along
with Jacobsen, on the eve of last week's congressional
elections, giving the Republicans a big plus. As it
turned out, Jacobsen was let go a day early and
Anderson and Sutherland not at all. Says a senior
Administration official: "This ended the possibility,
at least for now, of two more releases. That
possibility has dried up."
Terry Waite voices more or less the same view. The
Anglican envoy returned to Britain last week grumbling
62
angrily that international power games were
complicating his efforts to win freedom for Anderson
and Sutherland. Waite said he intends to disappear into
the English countryside for a while and wait for some
indication that a return to Beirut would be productive.
He may have to wait quite a while. And it does not seem
likely that the U.S. can soon resume contacts with
Iranian officials of any rank concerning geopolitical
questions. Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hussein Mousavi
sneered last week that renewed contacts between the
U.S. and Iran would be like "relations between the wolf
and the lamb." Later Rafsanjani said the U.S. was
"using every channel to beg Iran to accept establishing
a dialogue with it."
The revelations of the secret talks with Iran put
Secretary of State George Shultz in a particularly
uncomfortable spot. What he knew about them is
uncertain. He was surely aware of the meetings between
National Security Council officials and Iranian
representatives. As a member of the NSC, he was privy
to a presidential memorandum in February summarizing
the meetings to that date and directing that they
continue. According to some reports, he heard about the
arms shipments and protested vainly against them to the
President. Some of Shultz's subordinates, however,
think the Secretary did not learn about the arms
transactions until the rest of the world did.
On one point everyone who knows Shultz is in agreement:
whatever and whenever he discovered about the arms
transfers, the information dismayed him -- for good
reason. Shultz has been the most vehement promoter of
the Administration's official no-deals-with-terrorists
policy. He has been in charge of Operation Staunch, an
Administration effort to persuade both friends and
adversaries not to sell arms to Iran. He has pushed
that effort with deep personal conviction, going so far
as to urge Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
during their frequent meetings to try to reduce arms
sales to Iran by countries allied to Moscow. He had
little effect, however. North Korea, a Soviet ally, has
been among Iran's biggest sources of weapons. In
addition, whether Shultz tried and failed to stop the
U.S.-sanctioned shipment of arms to Iran or was kept in
the dark about it, his stature as the chief architect
of American foreign policy under President Reagan has
been undermined.
Ever the loyal Administration soldier, Shultz last week
permitted himself no public criticism of the dealings
with Iran, but made little attempt to defend them
either. He said that in his view the "policy of not
negotiating for hostages is the right policy,"
carefully expressing no opinion on whether it is any
longer the policy actually in effect. Like everyone
else in his department, the Secretary referred all
questions about Iran to the White House, but unlike
others, he openly expressed dissatisfaction with the
White House order that he do so. Said Shultz bluntly:
"I don't particularly enjoy it. I like to say what I
think about something."
Whatever he thinks, it will be largely up to Shultz to
explain and defend the dealings with Iran to American
allies. He had to start last week in, oddly enough,
Paris, where he had gone after a meeting with
Shevardnadze in Vienna. Shultz was in France to discuss
arms-control problems and other policy matters with
French leaders, including Premier Jacques Chirac. The
U.S. has been critical of France for not joining a
British attempt to boycott Syria diplomatically as a
terrorist nation and for its haste in negotiating a
deal to return to Tehran Iranian funds that had been
frozen in France. The night before their Friday
meeting, Chirac, who was visiting Spain, made clear
French resentment of what it regards as hypocritical
American nagging. Said Chirac, with heavy sarcasm:
"France has not negotiated and will not negotiate with
terrorist groups and takers of hostages. I don't know
what others do, including those who want to teach
lessons to everybody else."
His comments were a touch disingenuous, since France
has in fact been negotiating with Syria about French
hostages held in Lebanon, but it was a sample of what
the Administration can expect to hear in growing volume
from its allies. British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher frostily instructed her subordinates to
refrain from inquiring about what the U.S. was up to in
its dealings with Iran. She does not want to know. As
if that did not indicate enough displeasure, a top
British official called foreign reporters to a briefing
at which he repeated that British policy is not to
negotiate with terrorists.
Arab nations fearful of Iran mostly maintained a
puzzled silence last week while scrambling behind the
scenes to find out just what the U.S. was doing. But
while Shultz was traveling last week, Iraqi Ambassador
Nizar Hamdoon dropped in at the Washington office of
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy to pose
outraged questions about the arms sales. Murphy, who is
the prime manager of U.S. Middle East policy but who
seems to have known nothing about the dealings with
Iran, was apparently stumped for any answers. The
Administration, however, had better come up with some
answers quickly. It can expect anguished inquiries from
Arab nations friendlier -- and less self- interested --
than Iraq as to whether the U.S. is now tilting to the
Iranian side in the gulf war.
Officially, Washington's policy is to proclaim strict
neutrality in the bloody conflict and urge both sides
to negotiate a settlement that would in effect be a
stalemate. That would leave borders about where they
are now. U.S. officials claim that one of their goals
in setting up the secret meetings with Iran was to gain
some influence that might enable the U.S. to persuade a
post- Khomeini government to settle for something short
of the Ayatullah's often proclaimed aims: total defeat
of Iraq and the toppling of its President, Saddam
Hussein. During the meetings U.S. officials urged
Iranians not to launch Tehran's long-touted "final
offensive" to crush Iraq. Whether for that reason or
because Iran lacks sufficient military strength, the
all-out Iranian offensive is rapidly on its way to
becoming a non-event.
But how can conniving at arms transfers that would
presumably strengthen Iran in its war against Iraq
promote the stalemate that the Administration desires?
It would seem more likely to do the exact opposite:
help Iran to win. In fact, the Administration claims
that Iraq has such an overwhelming firepower
superiority that the new weapons will not alter the
strategic balance. The White House also maintains that
the arms shipments could influence political infighting
that may go on inside Iran.
The Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, voiced no
opinion about U.S. dealings with Iran; like everybody
else, he referred all questions to the White House, and
it is uncertain how much he knew about the
maneuverings. But Weinberger last week made a point of
observing that an Iranian victory in the gulf war would
be against U.S. interests. If anything, he was
understating the case: an Iranian triumph would be a
disaster for the U.S. It would drastically upset the
Middle Eastern balance of power and give a victorious
63
Iran new opportunities to threaten or subvert moderate
Arab nations that are friendly to the U.S., such as
Kuwait and above all Saudi Arabia.
Domestically, the Administration is already hearing
some scorching criticism. Former Secretary of Defense
James Schlesinger charged that the Administration
appeared to have paid "ransom" for release of the U.S.
hostages. He added bitterly that the Carter
Administration, which he served as Secretary of Energy,
"did its groveling in public. This Administration
prefers to do its groveling in private."
Vermont Democrat Patrick Leahy, the vice chairman of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, was only
slightly less caustic. Said he: "I can see why the
Administration won't tell Congress about it. If they
had, they would certainly have heard from both
Republicans and Democrats, 'Don't do anything so
stupid.' "
Eventually, the Administration will have to tell
Congress a good deal about the Iranian operation. It
made a start last week by holding a briefing for
selected Senators on the intelligence committee and
convinced at least some that it had not been engaged in
a crude arms-for-hostages swap. Already, though, House
members are clamoring for information too. Democrats
Dante Fascell of Florida, chairman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee, and Lee Hamilton of Indiana,
chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, on Wednesday addressed a letter to Reagan
asking "your immediate cooperation in fully briefing
the Congress." Briefings aside, there is talk on
Capitol Hill of holding full-scale hearings on Iranian
policy when the newly elected 100th Congress convenes
in January.
One question sure to come up at any hearings or
briefings is whether the Administration violated a
number of laws that restrict transfers of U.S. arms
abroad. The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 requires
the Administration to notify Congress -- which of
course it did not do in the case of Iran -- of any
exports of "substantive items" of military equipment.
Substantive items were given the catchall definition of
those "that might enhance the military potential of the
receiving country." The Export Administration Act of
1979 flatly prohibited export of military equipment to
any country deemed to be fomenting terrorism, and the
Reagan Administration formally added Iran to the list
of terrorist countries in 1984. It also agreed to the
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act
passed this year, which added still more restrictions
on arms transfers to terrorist countries.
Possibly the Administration can come up with some
explanation of why its dealings with Iran technically
did not violate these and other laws. But the intent of
all these laws clearly is to ban any shipments of U.S.
arms to Iran directly or indirectly. Moreover, the
Administration's own Justice Department has been
interpreting the laws that way and zealously
prosecuting private citizens suspected of arms dealings
with Iran. For example, in April the department secured
indictments against 17 people, including a retired
Israeli general, on charges of arranging the sale of
U.S. military equipment to Iran -- precisely when the
White House itself was at least winking at arms sales.
Certainly for an Administration to violate even the
spirit of U.S. laws, including laws that it rigorously
enforces on others, is a serious matter. But it is far
from the only bad consequence of the misadventure in
Iran. U.S. officials were obviously justified in
meeting secretly with Iranians willing to re-establish
contact. Given Iran's geopolitical importance, it would
have been irresponsible of the Americans not to do so.
In diplomacy, especially in the Middle East, a country
sometimes has to talk one way and act another. But to
connive at arms sales to Iran, for whatever reason,
seems clearly to have been a blunder that undermined
U.S. credibility. It is hard to understand how the U.S.
could have gained anything by strengthening Iran
militarily. To permit arms sales that even appeared to
be a payoff for the release of hostages was even worse,
since seeming to reward terrorists is dangerous indeed.
And by failing to foresee that its maneuvers could not
be kept secret, and then being so plainly stuck for any
effective way to explain those maneuvers publicly, the
Administration has called into question its competence
as well as its credibility.
With reporting by Ron Ben-Yishai/Jerusalem, Raji
Samghabadi/New York and Barrett Seaman/ Washington
Monday, Jun 12, 2000
Iran's New Revolutionary
In a land known for violent politics, one man is
tackling the zealots. Even in the face of blood, he
remains patient. An exclusive, inside look at
By SCOTT MACLEOD AND AZADEH MOAVENI/TEHRAN
President Mohammed Khatami strides across the Mehrabad
Airport tarmac to the salute of soldiers in ceremonial
sashes. Mullahs in dark robes, bearded aides in suits
with tieless shirts and militiamen carrying
Kalashnikovs trail him up to Iran's equivalent of Air
Force One--an old American-made Boeing 707 from before
the Islamic Revolution. In minutes he is roaring off to
a speech--it is an anniversary in the Iran-Iraq war--
near the Iraqi border. There is no mistaking Khatami
when he slips back from the front of the plane,
wandering down through a cabin decorated in late-1970s
style. In contrast to his entourage's rough-edged,
revolutionary look, his clerical attire is soft and
cheerful: a pear-colored robe, a chocolate tunic,
sporty tan calf loafers. He flashes the smile that has
given hope to Iranians depressed by two decades of
official somberness. As he makes his way, greeting
officials, bodyguards and Iranian journalists, he spots
the two Americans on board. "Where are you from?" he
asks, opening his arms. Could the President answer some
questions? He laughs. "Inshallah [God willing]." The
phrase could be construed as an Islamic brush-off:
right now, at least, the President is talking to almost
no one in the press. These days the President of Iran
is moving very carefully.
It's a good day for Khatami. When he lands in
Khorramshahr and heads to a local mosque to speak, the
crowds are spread in front of him like a giant Persian
carpet: turbans, signs, balloons. He speaks to
thousands, delivering the scrupulously worded message
of moderate change that has made him a hero to many--
and a terrifying figure to the hard-liners who have
dominated Iran's politics since the death of Ayatullah
Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989. Khatami's struggle to reform
Iran is proving a dangerous task. One of the
President's closest friends is recovering from a
gunshot wound to the head, nearly assassinated by hard-
liners. Dozens of other supporters are in jail or
heading there. Iran's hard-liners have sent a chilling
message that they won't go without a fight.Through all
this, Khatami has been conspicuously quiet, hoping his
absence of comment would be seen as thundering
determination. His supporters approvingly call it
"Khatami's silence."
64
Yet the silence risks spreading disillusionment.
Khatami's impatient, enraptured young supporters greet
him with chants of "Kha-ta-mi! Kha-ta-mi! Doostet darim
[We love you]!" This is a nation desperate for change,
starving for leadership. And Khatami's difficult task
is to rework Iran's system from within. It's an
excruciatingly difficult way to be a reformer, fighting
battles by not fighting battles. The pressures are
exacting a toll. Chest pains sent him to the hospital
recently. He winds down each night by scratching out a
few pages of his memoir--in ink--at home. Khatami is a
former Culture Minister and a onetime head of the
national library. He is not a born politician. His
colleagues speak of his "delicate sensibilities." They
fear he might resign or refuse to run for a second
four-year term next year.
For now, he fights on--carefully. He was, for instance,
willing to give TIME access to his office and his
schedule--something that would have been unheard of a
year ago in Iran. But he would not offer an interview--
something that remains too politically sensitive.
Two weeks ago, the most freely elected parliament in
Iranian history took up its duties in a marble-sided
edifice in downtown Tehran. In the biggest boost for
reform since Khatami's victory in 1997, Iranians in
February ousted conservatives and handed Khatami
control of the 290-seat Majlis-e Shura. The mullah
count in this new, moderate parliament is down from 53
to 33. And among the deputies taking their seats were
an actor-politician in Western blue jeans and women
M.P.s, daringly dressed in head scarves rather than
chadors.
Few personify the possibilities--and dangers--of this
new Iranian revolution better than Khatami, 57. The 5-
ft. 10-in. President grew up in a tolerant home in Yazd
province, which prides itself on its diversity. He
trained as a cleric in Qum, one of the holiest of
Iranian cities, but also studied Western philosophy. He
played no big role in Khomeini's revolution, yet
nonetheless rose to become a leading religious
intellectual, prized for both his candor and his mind.
But he was never a man who lusted for power. Friends
recall his fury when a group of liberal clerics
suggested he run for President. But when moderates
convinced him that his credibility with hard-liners
meant he was the only man who could change Iran, he
plunged into the 1997 campaign.
As a mullah, Khatami hardly rejects the notion of an
Islamic republic. His most cherished aim is to serve
the Islamic government by giving people the right to
choose it--a concept that is dangerously revolutionary
to hard-liners who believe in imposing it by diktat.
Outside Iran, especially in Washington, diplomats
speculate that Khatami may be unable to convince the
hard-liners that reform is really necessary, and
American officials grimly point to Khatami's meetings
with supporters of terrorism as a sign that he may not
be as moderate as some hope.
Khatami has plenty of enemies--but also a vibrant,
courageous collection of allies. Mohsen Mirdamadi, 44,
an M.P. who arrived at the new parliament dressed
nattily in a tweed jacket and horn-rimmed glasses, is
typical of the breed of intellectuals who share
Khatami's vision. In 1979 Mirdamadi was among a handful
of students who organized the seizure of the U.S.
embassy. But his politics moderated after he spent
several years learning the ropes of Western democracy
while earning a doctorate at Cambridge University. He
is now a top strategist for the Participation Front,
the moderate party led by, among others, the
President's brother Reza. The name of the party is
deliberate: what Iran's new revolutionaries want to
bring to their country is legitimate--and open--
democracy. "The people have very high expectations,"
says Mirdamadi. "They expect serious changes."
Over tea at the horseshoe-shaped table in the party's
conference room, Mirdamadi sketches out the reform
dream for Iran. One of the first goals, he explains,
will be to loosen press restrictions, thus enabling the
reform newspapers and magazines that were first muzzled
in April to begin publishing again. This is more than
just a battle for civil rights: reopening the dissident
press will help keep the reform movement--and its
leaders--alive. The Participation Front is also hoping
to open Iran's opaque judicial system with a bill that
will give conservative judges less leeway to lock up
reformers on grounds that their democratic ideas
contravene Islamic teachings.
The problem is that these days, at least, the
conservatives still have their fingers glued firmly to
the levers of power in Iran, including the 125,000-
strong Revolutionary Guards. One Iranian political
scientist has engaged in the morbid task of trying to
calculate the odds that Khatami will remain in office.
His verdict: a 70% chance that radicals will try to
overthrow Khatami. He's giving 5-1 odds against the
possibility that Khatami will still be around in a
year's time. Some in Iran argue that conservatives have
already staged a "silent" coup, by intimidating the
media and attacking Khatami's key aides. The arm of the
hard-liners has stopped short only of Khatami himself.
Last year they put presidential confidant Abdollah
Nouri on trial for publishing anti-Islamic articles.
Though the transcript of his pro-democracy court
testimony became a best-selling book, Nouri got a five-
year jail sentence.
He was lucky. Earlier this spring, as conservatives
jockeyed to have their electoral showing nullified,
extremists tried to assassinate Saeed Hajjarian, the
strategist who helped push Khatami's supporters to
victory. Khatami got news of the shooting as he was
speaking in southern Iran. He dropped his prepared
text, angrily denounced political violence and went to
the bedside of the critically wounded Hajjarian. Later,
aides recalled, the President could barely speak as he
choked back his tears.
It is a Sunday morning in Tehran. On the streets,
traffic buzzes by. In a modern apartment fitted with
medical equipment, Hajjarian lies on a cot wearing only
green pajama bottoms as a physical therapist works the
flabby muscles of his left arm. Hajjarian's left side
remains paralyzed from the March shooting, but his mind
is sharp, focused on Iran's turbulent transition.
Slurring his speech as he summons his energy, he
explains that his rendezvous with a would-be assassin
was a reminder of the danger from conservatives. "They
were convinced that I was against the system," he says
of the five men convicted of shooting him. Iranians, he
says, must understand that reform means working for the
nation, not against the conservatives. "Young
supporters of reform want greater speed," he explains,
counseling patience. "The important thing is not the
speed but the direction." Yet there is a whole
generation of clerics, businesspeople and politicians
who are eager to enact reform--now. "Khatami," says
Ghaffar Azizi, a city councilman from Kurdistan, "is
making democracy a habit for Iranians."
Hasan Yusefi-Eshkevari, for instance, is a mullah who
has fallen for that habit. He is a radical of sorts,
calling for an end to authoritarian ways and arguing
65
that democracy and Islam are not incompatible. During a
recent discussion at his Tehran home, he proudly showed
off his daughter's piano, a symbolic rejection of
clerical injunctions against entertainment. He's paid
the price for his music: reprisals began when militants
tried to assault him at a speech. Then a judge summoned
him for arrest after his appearance at a conference in
Berlin--prompting a temporary European exile.
The nerve Eshkevari touches is velayat-e faqih,
Khomeini's concept that gives the Muslim clergy, in
particular its most revered scholar, absolute, God-
given authority to govern Iran. Considering that
legacy, political reformers avoid challenging it
directly. But dissident clerics began questioning the
dogma after Khomeini's death, an action that put some
500 mullahs in prison or under house arrest, including
the most senior critic, Ayatullah Hossein Ali
Montazari, once Khomeini's designated successor.
Conservatives are worried that democracy will
disembowel velayat-e faqih--and the clerical
establishment along with it. "If this debate is not
resolved," warns Eshkevari, "the Islamic Republic will
run into a dead end."
Iran's conservatives are starting to recognize that
they need new answers to these old questions. Even old-
line radicals like Mohammed Mousavi Khoeiniha, the man
who green-lighted the student takeover of the U.S.
embassy 21 years ago, are pushing for a new vision of
Iranian democracy. During a rare interview over tea and
caramels, the cleric explains that "the country must be
based on a democratic foundation accepted by the
people." To make that happen, Iran's conservatives are
loosening up--a bit. Islamic courts are allowing
limited coverage of proceedings--most notably in the
trial of 13 Jewish Iranians accused of spying for
Israel. Despite sanctioning the press crackdown,
spiritual leader Ayatullah Ali Khamenei--successor to
Khomeini--has warned religious militants against
thuggery and publicly praises Khatami--as if cautioning
security forces against a coup. But Khamenei rejects
any vision of freedom that threatens Islam's position
in power. "As long as I live," he warned in a recent
Friday sermon, "I will not allow anybody to lead the
country toward secularism."
But who, then, will lead the country toward the
economic and social reform it so badly needs? Crushed
by inflation and 16% unemployment, Iranians are losing
patience. At Tehran University two weeks ago, thousands
held a pro-democracy demonstration, chanting angry
slogans against hard-line mullahs while holding
pictures of jailed Iranian journalists. If anything,
the convening of a reform parliament puts more pressure
on Khatami to satisfy the yearning for change. "We
understand he is trying to fill a huge pool with an
eyedropper," says Tehran secretary Rezvan Nayeri, 34.
"But there is no more room for excuses." Some students
are frustrated too that the reform movement remains an
insider's game, still intolerant of secularists,
socialists or anyone ambivalent about the Islamic
Revolution. Says Ibrahim Yazdi, head of the Iran
Freedom Movement: "If we can create a democracy that is
Iranianized and Islamicized, then this historical
experiment can be a model for other countries."
If you had tried to guess which one of the Khatami
brothers would have grown up to be President, you most
likely would have chosen the President's younger
brother Reza. With his film-star looks, he seems the
picture of a politico (though his British education as
a nephrologist is perhaps an unlikely pedigree). But
Reza sees something in his brother that other Iranians
seem to spot as well--an ability to telegraph hope
without igniting fear. If left to his own devices, Reza
speculates, his brother would return to the books of
the national library and quiet afternoons of
philosophical discussion. Mrs. Khatami, Reza adds, "on
the whole is not very pleased" with her husband's new
career.
But what seems to drive the President--to keep him in
office even as friends suffer for his reforms--is an
idealistic sense of duty to the nation and a deep
belief that the Iranian people must be given the power
to choose. "Khatami never expected and does not expect
now to be able to carry out all of his plans," Reza
explains. "But he believed that he could take one step
forward." Reza pauses in reflection. "In my opinion,"
he adds, "he has had one goal. And that was to keep
hope alive in people's hearts." It remains to be seen
if Khatami will be the Mikhail Gorbachev of Iran. But
he has already begun to lead the nation down a path
that seems inevitable. His occasional silence in the
face of monstrous challenges isn't the quiet of a man
who has no passion or no ideas. Instead, it's the quiet
determination of a man who will not give up.
--With reporting by Massimo Calabresi/Washington
Monday, Jun 2, 1997
IRAN'S BIG SHIFT
A STUNNING PROTEST VOTE GIVES THE PRESIDENCY TO A
MODERATE CLERIC WHO PROMISES MORE FREEDOM
By SCOTT MACLEOD/TEHRAN
Many believed the election results were preordained, if
not precooked. For months it had been a foregone
conclusion that the next President of Iran would be Ali
Akbar Nateq-Noori, the Speaker of the Iranian
parliament, a staunch conservative backed by the
country's most powerful political machine. He even had
the implicit support of Iran's Supreme Leader, the
Ayatullah Ali Khamenei, successor of the Ayatullah
Khomeini.
But something was happening that Iran had never seen
before. It was exemplified last week in Fadiyian Islam,
one of south Tehran's poorest neighborhoods and a
former bedrock of support for Khomeini. Thousands of
ecstatic Iranians overflowed into the dusty streets
shouting, "Khatami! Khatami! You're the hope!" as they
rushed toward a 54-year-old black-turbaned cleric,
nearly crushing him as he mounted a podium inside a
mosque. In the election campaign that began four weeks
ago, Mohammed Khatami was a sensation. Surveys showed
his support climbing from 13.9% to 20.2% to 52% on
election eve. On Saturday, the reluctant candidate, who
was once hounded out of the Iranian Cabinet by fellow
clerics, handed the conservative theocracy a stunning
upset. The moderate won 69.7% of the 29.7 million votes
cast.
Who voted for Khatami? Iranians fed up with political
and social restrictions, women chafing at dress codes,
twentysomethings denied satellite dishes and dispirited
citizens who never saw a reason to vote--until Khatami
came along. Few misunderstood the protest message of
his triumph. Says Hassan, 18, a member of the
generation born after Khomeini's 1979 revolution: "We
want to have more freedom here in this country." Says
Abdelkarim Soroush, perhaps the regime's most prominent
internal critic: "The election was a referendum on
liberty, justice, everything." One supporter simply
gushed, "Khatami is Ayatullah Gorbachev."
A moderate? A moderate President, no less? In Iran?
Western officials, trying to cope with Iran's
66
sponsorship of terrorism, opposition to the Middle East with leftists, including those who held American
peace process and development of nuclear weapons, are diplomats hostage for 444 days in 1979-81. Khatami's
understandably wary of the thought. Yet, for once, advisers say he hopes to benefit from a partnership
Iranians had been offered a real choice, not a stage- with outgoing President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani,
managed election rigged for a handpicked President. No who will remain a major influence as head of the
politician symbolized the hold of the incumbent clerics Expediency Council, which advises the Supreme Leader.
more than Nateq-Noori. His supporters provoked
widespread anger by physically breaking up a Khatami
Khatami, his aides say, is determined to rein in the
speech, getting police to cancel a major rally and
regime's extremist factions, centered in the
using a technicality to close down Khatami's election
Revolutionary Guards and intelligence services. The
headquarters in the last week of campaigning. Nateq-
pragmatic Rafsanjani was hesitant about facing down the
Noori was the candidate of a militant Islamic front
radicals, but aides say Khatami may be bolder, given
combining the conservative mullahs of the holy city of
his overwhelming popular victory. He will have the
Qum and the middle-class traders of the Tehran bazaar.
backing at least of Rafsanjani's daughter Faezeh
A former Khomeini bodyguard, he had become a top police
Hashemi, one of Iran's most popular politicians, who is
official, then head of the conservative-controlled
under attack from radicals. "Khatami believes in
National Assembly. His campaign slogan was an oath of
freedom," she told TIME last week.
absolute loyalty to the mullahs' supreme rule.

Washington and other Western capitals will be watching

Khatami, on the other hand, is a liberal theologian, a
Khatami closely. Some warn against making too much of
politician who speaks of freedom, a family man with an
his moderation. "Let's face it. It wasn't a paradise
avuncular grin and a scholar who has worked in the West
during his tenure as Culture Minister," says a Western
and is said to be at home in English, German and
diplomat in Tehran. But Khatami knows he will be in
Arabic. That's quite a contrast to the severe and sober
deep trouble if he fails to deliver, since hopes are so
ayatullahs who have governed since the 1979 Islamic
high. Says Tehran psychologist Shahriar Rouhani: "Young
revolution. Five years ago, they drove Khatami from his
people in Iran are ready to burst. The President must
Cabinet post as Minister of Culture, accusing him of
lead them in a new direction." No leader since Khomeini
allowing an "invasion" of decadent ideas from the U.S.
has won such a mandate. "I love him with all my heart,"
and Europe. When the elections came due, the ruling
says Hussein Hashemi, 22, a computer technician who
mullahs thought so little of Khatami's popular appeal
voted in the north Tehran neighborhood where Khomeini
that they allowed him and two others to run as
lived and preached. "In the beginning, we needed
officially sanctioned candidates against Nateq-Noori.
militants. Now we need people who can build the
country. We need a man like Khatami."
Like his opponent, Khatami attended the seminary in
Qum. Yet he also studied Western philosophy. He wrote
Monday, Nov. 15, 1999
some speeches for Khomeini but is otherwise the first
Radicals Reborn
President who lacks revolutionary credentials. His own
Iran's student heroes have had a rough and surprising
campaign speeches promised more freedom and tolerance.
passage
"Our country has a long way to go," he said in his last
By SCOTT MACLEOD/TEHRAN
speech. "The government doesn't give people the
opportunity to grow."
It was, Ibrahim Asgharzadeh now insists, all his idea.
On Nov. 4, 1979, Asgharzadeh, then a radical 24-year-
If his victory turned on a single issue, it was the
old engineering student, led a furious mob down
principled stand Khatami took in his confrontation with
Taleghani Street in Tehran, crashed through the U.S.
the hard-liners five years ago. As Culture Minister, he
embassy's gates and began a 444-day siege that not only
was widely appreciated for permitting relatively free
humiliated America but also cemented a new Iranian
circulation of books and films. But he was undone by
political order. But these days, Asgharzadeh is a
his support for director Mohsen Makhmalbaf, whose films
changed man. At 44, he is a yuppie-ish politician with
Nights of Zayandehrood and Time of Love dealt with
a seat on Tehran's municipal council, and he is
taboo subjects like adultery and suicide--and hinted
frequently denounced by hard-liners. He has shaved his
that tyranny did not end with the Shah's departure.
beard and clearly prefers cracking jokes to raising a
Outraged conservative mullahs forced Khatami out and
clenched fist. Puffing as he escorts an American
imposed a cultural crackdown that still continues.
visitor up a few flights at city hall, down the street
from the desolate embassy compound, he says, laughing,
Even his closest advisers acknowledge that Khatami has "I guess I'm better at climbing over walls than walking
a tough job ahead in running a country of 70 million up staircases."
people. Iran's problems are immense, despite oil
exports of $19 billion last year. Unemployment stands
Asgharzadeh, who read out the first incendiary
at perhaps 20%. Riots have flared as authorities have
communique on the siege that sickened the world, has
tried to cope with a huge foreign debt and high
come a long way in 20 years, and he is not the only
inflation, now 25%. One of the world's highest
one. Many of his fellow militants have also mellowed
birthrates means two-thirds of Iranians are under 25.
and are slipping out of the shadows of revolutionary
Since the revolution, per capita annual income has
Iran to acknowledge their roles, admit to a few regrets
fallen from $1,200 to $800.
and argue that their cause is finally maturing. All
three of the original planners of the siege, it turns
Khatami's biggest challenge, however, will be managing out, are now key figures in moderate President Mohammed
the regime. The President's powers are subject to Khatami's government. Asgharzadeh smiles at the thought
limits. Reflecting the political chaos of revolutionary of a hostage taker becoming a democrat, but he insists
days, Iran's system is a jumble of conflicting and that is exactly what he is. "There is no need to change
confusing centers of power. This looseness is what the world anymore."
enables Iranians to have semifree elections, but it
also gives cover to the regime's extremist elements.
In separate interviews, conducted in Tehran over cups
Many Iranians fear that the system may ultimately
of tea, plates of sugary cookies and in one case a
paralyze Khatami. He calls himself an independent,
late-night pizza to go, Asgharzadeh and top planners
although he is a member of a clerical group aligned
67
Mohsen Mirdammadi, today a political-science professor,
and Abbas Abdi, an outspoken newspaper editor, revealed
fresh insights into their moment of history. They
denied, to start with, that Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini
had put them up to it. "The idea came to me while I was
studying," Asgharzadeh recalled, joking. "I didn't mind
getting away from the books."
For several days before the takeover, Asgharzadeh
dispatched confederates to rooftops overlooking the
embassy to monitor the security procedures of the U.S.
Marine guards. Around 6:30 a.m. on the cataclysmic day,
the ringleaders gathered 300 selected students,
thereafter known as Student Followers of the Imam's
Line, and briefed them on the battle plan. To break the
chains locking the embassy's gates, a female student
was given a pair of metal cutters that she could hide
beneath her chador.
Asgharzadeh said the plan was to hold the embassy for
three days. "I didn't think that it would lead to the
deep-rooted conflict with America that still exists,"
he says. But the students were carried away by public
opinion when thousands thronged to what was denounced
as the "Nest of Spies." "Things got complicated," he
says. "We couldn't make decisions on our own anymore."
One problem, he says, was keeping discipline in the
ranks. The planners insist that the students were under
orders not to harm the hostages, and were dressed down
when they did. Asgharzadeh says the planners were angry
when a student staged a shocking media parade of
blindfolded hostages.
As Asgharzadeh made clear at the time in his frequent
harangues to Western reporters, the students were
outraged by the entry of the deposed Shah of Iran into
the U.S. for cancer treatment. Mindful of the CIA-
engineered coup that restored the Shah to his throne in
1953, the students saw conspiracies everywhere, hence
their painstaking effort to reconstruct embassy
documents retrieved from the shredder. The students had
another aim: they hoped anti-Americanism would end the
factional feuds undermining the revolution.
The student militants did well by their exploits, later
winning election or appointments to high posts. But
their luck ran out after Khomeini died in 1989. In
1991, Asgharzadeh found himself not only removed from
his seat in Parliament but also heading for prison for
criticizing the despotic tendencies of the ruling
clergy. The student militants were again excluded from
politics. "The embassy takeover was in defense of
Iran's independence," explains Mirdammadi, 44. "But
after Iman Khomeini died, the danger was to democracy.
Iran moved away from the freedom of choice and
expression that had been promised to the people."
Abdi, 43, has had the most difficult time. In 1993, he
spent eight months in solitary confinement for
criticizing the clerics' failure to abide by democratic
practices set down by the nation's 1979 constitution.
Yet he has remained a leading strategist in Khatami's
new Participation Party and is one of the architects of
Iranian detente with the West. In 1998, ignoring the
howls of the hard-liners, Abdi traveled to Paris and
met with former hostage Barry Rosen, achieving a
reconciliation of sorts. A sign of Abdi's influence:
last summer's student riots began with a protest
against the closing of his newspaper, Salam, by
conservative-controlled courts.
Abdi and the others can still scarcely help themselves
when it comes to blaming America for Iran's ills.
Asgharzadeh says he is willing to say he's sorry if the
repentance is mutual, but Mirdammadi disagrees: "I am
sure that we will never apologize to America." Abdi is
not looking for a lovefest but wants mutual respect and
diplomatic relations for the sake of Iran's national
interest. As he puts it, "The Americans were a nuisance
to us, and we were a nuisance to them. Perhaps now we
can talk to each other on an equal footing and
establish a healthy relationship."
Americans may not follow the logic. Yet Abdi's words
are more encouraging than the all-too-familiar ones
scrawled across the wall of the former U.S. embassy.
The pine-shaded, 27-acre compound has been occupied
since the early '80s by Revolutionary Guards, who use
part of it as a high school. Next to a mural of the
Statue of Liberty, styled as a ghoulish skeleton, is
the freshly painted warning: WE WILL MAKE AMERICA FACE
A SEVERE DEFEAT!
Monday, Aug. 21, 2006
Solving the Riddles of Iran
Calling President Ahmadinejad a messianic madman and
other pitfalls keep us from understanding Iran's true
tensions
By AZADEH MOAVENI
If you think Iran is a difficult country to understand,
you're absolutely right. It is a place, after all, that
has inspired books entitled "Who Runs Iran?", where
Western diplomats hold cocktail parties to discuss how
baffled they are, where no one conducts opinion polls
(the last person who tried went to prison for producing
unwelcome results). Such a climate is unhelpful to
those seeking to get behind the contradictory and
opaque face that Iran displays to the world. The
country presents no shortage of paradoxes. In the past
eight years, Iranians have elected both a Kant-quoting
liberalizer, and a conservative firebrand Holocaust-
denier. Both figures came to power through arguably
free elections, in itself a strange practice for a
repressive Islamic theocracy.
Then consider Iranians themselves. The majority are
weary of political Islam, dislike the current regime,
favor improved ties with the West, and lack the anti-
American rage so prevalent in the Arab world. At the
same time, they're seduced by the nationalist appeal of
a nuclear program, and support hardline President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who promises Iranian strength
through atomic technology.
Later this month, Iran will respond to the West's
incentives package to negotiate over its nuclear
program. In all likelihood, it will either say no or
hedge, and the stage will be set for a drawn-out
confrontation whose outcome will be determining to the
Middle East. Eager to forecast what will happen, and to
clarify what kind of threat Iran proposes, observers
are grasping for clues everywhere, from Iran's ancient
history to its religious practices. Many of these
arguments lead away, not toward, the very real tensions
dividing the country. Here are two analytical pitfalls
to avoid, and two keys to getting Iran right.
PITFALLS
1) President Ahmadinejad is a messianic madman
68
Iran's president is fond of folksy mysticism, but that
doesn't drive his policies. Since his election last
year, many have argued that Ahmadinejad's religious
beliefs are apocalyptic, and that he seeks to hasten
the end of time by acquiring and using nuclear weapons.
The paranoia is so real that when he said Iran would
respond to the West's nuclear offer on August 22, one
established expert suggested Ahmadinejad might deliver
Armageddon instead. This speculation grew from an
anniversary date on the Islamic calendar deemed as
auspicious, should one happen to be an apocalyptic
leader who happened to be looking for a good date to
end the world sometime mid-summer. Iranians do not use
the Islamic calendar, and August 22 happens to be the
last day of the Persian month. Of course, that might be
the na�ve explanation.
Some have also suggested that the principle of
deterrence known as MAD (mutual assured destruction)
would not ward off confrontation between a nuclear-
armed Iran and its foes. This misunderstands both the
role of Shi'ite mysticism in Iranian culture, and
Ahmadinejad's real political motivations. Like the
majority of Shi'ite Muslims around the world,
Ahmadinejad believes that Shi'ism's Twelfth Imam will
emerge near the end of time to do apocalyptic battle
against the forces of evil. This is pedestrian Shi'ite
piety, not a cause for international alarm. The
majority of Shi'ites believe this, and such views are
not unique to Islam; other prophetic religions have
their own messiahs, and beliefs about the end of time.
It is true that Ahmadinejad is more preoccupied with
Tweltfh Imam than most Iranian officials. That's
because he is younger, and belongs to a generation for
whom such devotional piety is commonplace. Such
mysticism was forged in the trenches of the Iran-Iraq
War, a war that was fought on the Iranian side by poor
young men indoctrinated to believe they were fighting
for Islam; legends developed at the front of the
Twelfth Imam riding past on horseback, and when the
fighting stopped, such myths found their way into
popular culture. Ahmadinejad fought in this war, and
absorbed its sensibilities. What matters is that this
mysticism is much like saint worship; it does not
insist the apocalypse is now, or imminent. No sane,
educated person in Iran believes that Ahmadinejad wants
a nuclear program to hasten the apocalypse, because
they know his real motivation: nationalism.
2) Iranians/Shi'ite Muslims are culturally prone to
dishonesty
Iranian diplomats can be faulted for many things: they
play checkers instead of chess, obsessed with winning
the next move instead of the game. Iranian politics too
can be criticized for factional infighting, and a
chronic inability to forge consensus. Some observers
say these weaknesses stem from Iranians' habitual
dishonesty, indeed a whole culture of communication
that prizes insincerity, and makes it impossible to
know what an Iranian actually means. This line of
analysis leads us straight into the woods, mainly
because it involves a faulty understanding of how
language shapes Iranian social relations.
There is a concept in Iran known as taarof, a set of
social manners that can be defined to make Iranians
sound exquisitely polite or deceitful, depending on the
point you're trying to make. At heart, it is a form of
etiquette intended to harmonize social encounters, and
involves displays of flattery and deference. Taarof
does not seek to mask the truth, it simply rests on the
belief that life is more pleasant when you do not
needlessly inform every jerk you meet that he is indeed
a jerk. What does this mean in practice? Say you go to
meet the deputy foreign minister. You may not be
certain if he likes you, for either way taarof will
demand that he greet you warmly, pour you tea, and
suggest you meet again. It would not, however, compel
him to obfuscate matters of political substance.
In the years I have spent listening to Iranian
politicians fight viciously amongst themselves, I can
report that a lack of candor is not a problem here. It
is a mistake to elevate such social manners as taarof
to an essential characteristic of political behavior.
If an Iranian politician hedges a question, replies
ambiguously, or reverses an earlier position, there are
usually concrete reasons involved, and it would be more
instructive to focus on those than a slippery Persian
tendency toward dissembling.
A more popular reference to Iranians' loose
relationship with the truth is the Islamic and
especially Shi'ite principle of taqiyya, the practice
of hiding one's religious faith under life threatening
circumstances. Taqiyya evolved during the early
centuries of Islam, when Shi'ite Muslims faced
persecution for their minority status at the hands of
majority Sunnis. The concept is not, as sometimes
described, carte blanche for telling lies or promoting
one's interests, but rather a moral pass to tell one
very specific lie (I am not a Shi'ite') expressly to
avoid being killed. From this ancient practice that is
today irrelevant (in Iran at least, where no one is
persecuted for their sect), modern Iran observers
sometimes draw the conclusion that Iranians have
inherited a disposition for lying. As with invoking
taarof to explain Iranian behavior, this line of
thinking focuses on the process of communications
instead of their content. Besides, does anyone truly
believe Sunni politicians are less adept at dishonesty?
KEYS
1) Nationalism, everyone's on board
The broad spectrum of Iran's political factions,
including reformists, backs a nuclear program as a way
of ensuring the country's regional status. Former
President Mohammad Khatami might have made the point
more softly, but consensus existed long before the
arrival of firebrand Ahmadinejad, who makes the case in
louder, more menacing tones. There's certainly
disagreement over how much Iran should risk in running
this course, and what incentives it should settle for
in suspending it altogether. But there is a core belief
here that without a nuclear program, Iran will be
blocked from consolidating its growing influence in the
region.
Before the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iranian
leaders felt their role in the region was
incommensurate with its geostrategic location, educated
population, oil resources, and proud national history.
The fall of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein created new
spheres of Iranian influence, in fact a whole new
regional dynamic that has neatly granted Iran a short-
cut to great power status it could not have dreamed of
otherwise. The system establishment views its nuclear
program as a way to entrench those ambitions, and
ensure its own survival.
If Iran's main ambition is a nationalistic drive for
regional prominence, it is natural to ask why it cannot
pursue this goal by aligning its interests with the
West, and normalizing relations with the United States.
69
After all, the strategy Iran pursues today — backing
Islamic militant groups, keeping Iraq in a state of
controlled chaos, and playing to the Arab/Sunni street
with anti-U.S., anti-Israel rhetoric — is both risky
and near-sighted. It is a strategy that rests on
regional instability (on Hizballah never being
disarmed, on Syria and the Palestinians never reaching
accord with Israel, on Iraq remaining chaotic), and on
discrediting and bogging down the U.S. in Iraq, to keep
its sights off Iran. Tehran's real, long-term interests
would be better served by a stable Middle East,
especially a stable Iraq, but abandoning these needling
policies would mean trusting that the United States is
not a threat.

2) Normalization anxieties

The Iranian establishment is convinced that the United

States cannot simply not stomach an Islamic regime in
Tehran, and will seek to dislodge it with time, no
matter what it may say to the contrary. You can call
this paranoia if you like, but it is a fixed
perspective held at the highest levels of government;
Iran's ayatollahs deeply fear they are a personal
target of Washington. Most view normalization and
offers of Western incentives as poisoned carrots
designed to open up the Islamic Republic at the seams.
These fears existed under the Clinton administration as
well, for the very concept of normalization makes the
clerics uneasy, but the open hostility of the Bush
Administration's stance on Iran has made them
paralyzing.

Normalized relations mean increased contact with the

outside world, and the emergence of professional groups
with the expertise needed to manage such contact. This
alarms the clerical regime, for Iran's political
history is dominated by the competition of professional
and clerics for power. The Islamic revolution and its
constitution vested clerics with control of everything,
and this state of affairs is most secure when the
country remains closed, with professionals kept at bay.
If Iran is opened to the West, if Western-educated
lawyers, businesspeople, and engineers expand their
influence, in 10 years who will want a cleric as
speaker of parliament or interior minister? These
historical tensions are at the heart of Iran's problems
of governance, and they are exacerbated today by the
Bush Administration's objective of regime change. The
perception that the U.S. is a threat to Iran removes
any basis for agreement from the outset, for
cooperation ceases to hold any benefit. What incentives
do the clerics have to open the doors, when they know
they will be the first ones to go?

70

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