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FREDERICK

L. SCHUMAN

Woodrow Wilson Professor of Government, Williams College

NIGHT OVER EUROPE

The Diplomacy of Nemesis

1939-1940

NEW YORK . ALFRED • A • KNOPF

194 1

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PREFACE

THOSE who write of politics and war in the midst of the world's ordeal write dangerously, both for themselves and for their read-

ers. T o take a ringside seat at Armageddon, to sit by

books, to set down one's passing thoughts as if he had no part in the battle seems almost contemptible to those who know that all they cherish is at stake. But he who finds no better way to serve, he who believes that those also serve who only sit and write, has no option but to write and to hope,whilewriting, that the quest for truth is also service of a kind, even if only partially successful.

Yet truth amid the battle is coy or shy, like a frightened girl - evasive to stir hopes of more to come, or fearful lest death strike too near. In quest of so elusive a prize the seeker is cautioned by all the canons of learning to practice patience and delay. Scholar- ship demands that the scholar wait until all the evidence is in, until all the documents are published, until the dispassionate calm of "objectivity" can be enjoyed in a distant future far removed from the turmoil of heart-breaking and world-breaking tragedy. This volume is a violation of these imperatives. If there be jus- tification for such a departure, it lies in part in Voltaire's comment (April 14, 1732) to M. Bertin de Rocheret: "Wh o writes the history of his own time must expect to be attacked for everything he has said, and for everything he has not said: but those little drawbacks should not discourage a man who loves truth and liberty, expects nothing, fears nothing, asks nothing, and limits his ambition to the cultivation of letters." Further justification

with one's

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Preface

lies in the probability that no calm future will ever come unless men and women can learn now to understand why their lives have become a mad and embittered flight before disaster.

It is unlikely, moreover, that "all" the diplomatic documents of these recent years will ever be available. A decade hence a new Sidney B. Fay or a Bemadotte E. Schmitt may be able to tell in detail all the story of 1939-40—perhaps. But some of the docu- ments have already been burned (in Warsaw and in the courtyard of the Quai d'Orsay before the fall of Paris) and others will never see the light of day. The documentation already available on the immediate genesis of the war is voluminous and, within its limits, complete—despite the scarcity of source materials on Anglo- Soviet, German-Soviet and German-Italian relations. The writer ventures to believe that no fuller or more accurate analysis of the diplomacy of Nemesis will be possible for many years to come. This essay, although tentative at certain points, will be found complete enough, I trust, for all save the most rugged and insa- tiable readers.

The present work, while itself a unit for the period dealt with, concludes a trilogy of which the first volume was The Nazi Dic- tatorship (1935) and the second Europe on the Eve (1939). Taken together, these works purport to tell how and why democ- racy committed suicide and delivered Europe and the world over to the mercies of the Fascist Caesars. From the rise of German National Socialism in 1919 to the Triple AlHance of 1940, from the Reichstag fire to the capitulation of Weygand, the tale is an unbroken continuum. The sickness of the Western soul which lies behind the decisions and indecisions of the years of misery is the same disease, from the fall of Briining to the invasion of Greece and beyond. Errata and addenda to the earlier volumes can scarcely be set forth here. But a few retrospective comments will not, I hope, be taken amiss. My first regret is that the initial volume of the trilogy was mis-named. The Nazi regime is not, and never was, a "dic- tatorship." Neither is the Fascist regime in Italy. The Soviet "dictatorship of the proletariat" was and is a "dictatorship" only in theory and in intent, not in practice. Hitler's rule, like Musso- lini's and Franco's and Stalin's, is a "tyranny" or "despotism." This half-forgotten distinction was fully appreciated by the

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vii

Greeks and Romans who saw deeply into the forms and purposes of pohtics. "Dictatorship" is a form of power which is (or was) resorted to voluntarily and temporarily by democracies to meet dangers of invasion or revolution. It is a device to save democracy, not to destroy it. Had Briining or Schleicher established an effec- tive "dictatorship" in the Weimar Reich in order to crush the N.S.D.A.P., German democracy might yet be living today. The inability or unwillingness of other democracies to resort to "dic- tatorship" to save themselves has been a major factor exposing them to destruction by tyrants. The disposition of democrats to regard "dictatorship" in time of crisis as fatal to democracy rather than as fundamental to its preservation reflects a tragic confusion resting upon ignorance of history and misuse of labels. I have shared in this sin in the past. I hereby do penance.

In one other respect The Nazi Dictatorship suffered somewhat from misplaced emphasis. The tyranny of the Third Reich is not an "executive committee" of Junkers and capitalists, despite the circumstance that these classes established it under the delusion that it would play this role. It is government by a new and revo- lutionary political elite which tolerates industrialists and aristo- crats only so long as they are content with a status giving them no actual influence over the determination of policies. Property and Money in the old sense have no more future in the Fascist States than in the U.S.S.R. I recall vividly a long argument in Berlin in th e summer of 193 3 wit h Edga r Ansel Mowre r in which he predicted that "National Socialism" would become a kind of "National Bolshevism." I dissented vigorously, thanks to my pre- occupation at the time with a too-mechanistic economic deter- minism. Subsequent events (e.g., the fate of Fritz Thyssen) have demonstrated the correctness of Mr. Mowrer's original thesis.

Despite this mistake of evaluation, a detailed understanding of the Nazi Revolution in Germany has proved itself indispensable in my own thinking and writing to an understanding of the Nazi World Revolution. "Those who witnessed the birth and develop- ment of Nazism and so the weakness and end of democracy in Germany," writes Heinz Pol in his work on France, The Suicide of a Democracy, "have developed an especially keen eye for cer- tain things. Today this vision makes it possible for us to analyze and explain many events."

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Preface

These events were forecast with fair accuracy in the first book of this trilogy. As they unfolded, they were dissected in detail in Europe on the Eve. They constituted a return engagement in the European and world arena of the drama of conflict between Liberalism and Fascism first played on the Italian and German stages. In the larger theater, as in the smaller, and for precisely the same reasons, one protagonist was predestined for victory by virtue of the inability of the other to comprehend reality or to act relevantly or in time to meet a mortal danger. So much had been surrendered that I ventured the guess in January, 1939, that the Western Powers had already lost the Second World War at the "conference" in Munich and in the London "Non-intervention" Committee. Since wars already lost do not have to be fought, I felt that the Western Powers would continue (or resume) ap- peasement and proceed from defeat to defeat without a call to arms. This prognosis left out of account what should have loomed as a certainty: that Hitler would unsheathe the sword against the West and strike for total victory as soon as he felt confident of success, thereby giving the W^estern Munichmen no further op- portunity for appeasement through surrender. Stalin's decision likewise assumed a guise different from that anticipated, for he rejected passive "neutrality" as fatal, struck a bargain with Berlin when a viable bargain with London and Paris proved impossible of attainment, and thereafter resorted to aggressive "defense." Th e hope expressed at the close of the second book, moreover— that Pan-American solidarity was a possible policy for the United States regardless of what might happen in Europe—has also been shattered. It is now clear that the defeat of Britain will mean Fascist control of most of Latin America, regardless of what steps may be taken, too little and too late, in Washington.

The thesis of Europe on the Eve which gave rise to most heated argument among commentators, however, was of a different order. The hypothesis (which I regarded as early as 1938 as vali- dated by the evidence then available) that the Western appeasers were basing their calculus on the hope of a Fascist-Communist clash and on the expectation of a German attack upon the U.S.S.R. did not commend itself, even after Munich, to a goodly number of observers. By some my insistence upon it was regarded as proof of "Communist" sympathies, by others as evidence of bias, dis-

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ix

tortion or a flair for uncritical and unscholarly polemic. Even some of my best friends did not hesitate to tell me how mistaken was this view. One of them, in The American Political Science Revieiv (August, 1939), held that my interpretation approached "fanatical obsession" and was a "plot" theory and a "too neat

formula" attributable to the frustration of "a bitterly disappointed idealist." Another reviewer, in The New York Times, May 14,

1939, held that "It is all unfair and too fantastic."

There is little satisfaction in the rueful thought that these crit- ics were in error. Had they been correct, had the motivations of the Munichmen been other than I believed them to be, the world of 1941 might not be a vale of tears and blood. Ample docu- mentary evidence is now at hand to demonstrate the truth of the thesis of Europe on the Eve, as will soon be apparent to all readers with sufficient courage and endurance to toil through the follow- ing pages. Indeed the thesis is now fully accepted in quarters which two years ago would have none of it—e.g., Jules Remains in The Saturday Evening Post, October, 19, 1940. O n the occa- sion of Mr. Chamberlain's political retirement. The New York Times observed editorially:

Rarely does history provide such dramatic irony as in the coincidence that on the day that Neville Chamberlain finally passed from the political scene Signer Gayda informed the readers of the Giornale d'ltalia that the differences between the supposed enemies, Communism and Fascism, were not after all so very great: that there were indeed "affinities of in- spiration and application" between them. As late as the Spring of 1939 the argument was common in London that, repellent as it was, Fascism (in its Italian and German forms) was prefer- able to Communism, the assumption being that the two were mortal foes and that the free nations could choose between them. T h e acceptance of this thesis in influential quarters throughout the democratic world represented Hitler's greatest propagandist triumph. H e had been thundering it forth for years. It had got him into power in Germany. It likewise served his purposes abroad, since it led logically to the policy Mr. Chamberlain espoused, with much popular support in Britain and France—the policy of giving Hitler a free hand in Central and Eastern Europe and accepting Mussolini's conquest of Ethiopia, the policy which counseled acquiescence in the Nazi seizure of Austria and Czecho- slovakia and gave Hitler the great Skoda munition works and new bastions to the east (NY T 10.6.40).

too neat, too simple, too early, too

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Preface

Night Over Europe is, in design, a record and an evaluation of the eleventh-hour diplomacy of the Caesars vi'hereby they paved their road to conquest. It is likewise a record and an evaluation of the eleventh-hour diplomacy of the Western Powers whereby their sorry statesmen brought the scourge of war upon their peoples and led them to and beyond the brink of defeat. National politics and mihtary campaigns have been dealt with only in the measure necessary to render the course of diplomacy intelligible. The past role and the present dilemma of the United States have not been neglected. The narrative of necessity stops in medias res. The broad alternatives of the future, however, are now painfully clear. If Britain succumbs, America and the Soviet Union will be in peril of their lives. If Moscow makes a new "deal" with the Fascist Caesars, giving them the means of final victory over Britain and China, the U.S.S.R. will be destroyed in the sequel and America will face disaster. If Russia joins Britain in challenging the Triplice, the defeat of the Axis will yet be possible without direct American involvement in hostilities. If America clashes with Japan or gives full aid to Britain, the same result may be achieved without Soviet intervention. Any reversion to "neu- trality" by America or Russia will almost inevitably mean the conquest of the world by the Triplice. Nothing is certain for 1941 and the years thereafter save that only these alternatives are available to those still able to make choices.

In any event I am persuaded that the Great Society will be politically unified in this generation by those who know that it is already an economic and cultural unity, and who are prepared to run risks, to assume duties, to do what must be done to realize this end. Only these will win and survive. All others will perish. As an American rather than a German, as a friend of liberty rather than of tyranny, I share the hopes and preferences of most of my coun- trymen. I hate war. I want the democracies to survive. I know that victory in war is the price of survival. I know that a new democracy, dedicated with firm and courageous faith to the commonweal and prepared to undertake the building of a new world, is the price of victory. I do not know, nor does anyone, whether Britishers and Americans and others whom they must summon to their aid are capable of freeing themselves from the fatal thralldom of a past which has brought them to ruin, or are

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xi

willing or able to pledge themselves to a new mission. If not, others will do what must be done.

Tyche, like Nemesis, is a goddess who has no favorites. She is kind only to the wise and the brave. At her hands each people receives w^hat it deserves and deserves what it receives. Whether the Western peoples can again make themselves worthy of her mercy is still for them to say. If these chapters contribute in any way to clarifying what has been, what is, what may be, what must be in the days to come, they will have justified themselves.

N o one save the speakers and actors who march or stumble through these pages is answerable for anything here said or left unsaid. I am deeply grateful, however, to Sally Carlton Foote and to Helen Schmitt of Williamstown for efficient and cheerful assistance in documentation, typing and indexing. I am also grate- ful to the donors and administrators of the "Class of 1900 Fund" at Williams College for aid in defraying stenographic and clerical expenses. My thanks are likewise due to G. P. Putnam's Sons and to other publishers mentioned in the text for permission to quote from their publications; to the staffs of the Williams College Library and of the British and German Libraries of Information in Ne w York City for unfailing courtesy and helpfulness; to Spencer Brodney, editor of Events—The Monthly Review of World Affairs, for permission to reprint scattered passages which have already appeared in the pages of his admirable journal; and to my erstwhile co-contributors to Events for lightening my task at many points. My colleagues and students in Williamstown, Chicago, Cambridge and Berkeley, and those who have listened and questioned in many a lecture hall, have made indirect con- tributions to this work which are no less important and no less appreciated for being anonymous and often unrealized. T o Alfred and Blanche Knopf I owe, among a host of others intellectually indebted to them, more than can be said. Let it be hoped that their work, and the work of all who would save the best in the old by meeting the new with open eyes, will go forward "to broader lands and better days."

Williamstoivn,

Mass.,

Armistice Day, 1940

FREDERICK L.

SCHUMAN

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ABBREVIATIONS

of Principal Documentary Sources

B

=

The British Wa r Blue Book: Miscellaneous No. 9 (1939), Cmd.

 

6106. Documents

Concerning

German-Polish

Relations and the

Outbreak of Hostilities Between Great Britain and Germany on

September 5, 1939, H.M .

Stationery Office, London, 1939; pub -

lished in United States b y

Farrar & Rinehart, Ne w York, 1939.

F

= Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Le Livre Jatine Frangais. Docu-

 

ments Diplomatiques, 1938-39, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1939,

translated as The French Yellow Book, Reynal & Hitchcock,

N

e w York, 1940.

G

=

Germa n Whit e Book No . 2: Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des

 

Krieges, Reichsdruckerei, Berlin, Decembe r 12, 1939, translated

as Documents on the Events Preceding the Outbreak of the War

(German Foreign Office, Berlin), German Library of Informa-

tion , Ne w York , Jul y 1940.This 549 page compilation, containing

 

482

documents, is no t t o be confused with Germa n Whit e Book

 

N

o . I of 1939 (Urkunden zur letzten Phase der deutsch-polnis-

chen Krise, Reichsdruckerei, Berlin) which is limited t o events

of August 1939, nor with subsequent Germa n

Whit e Books on

special topics, each of which is cited separately in the footnotes

of the present work.

 

H

=

Failure of a Mission, Berlin 1937-1939, b y the Right Honorable

 

Sir Nevile Henderson, P.C , G.C.M.G., G. P. Putnam's Sons,

N

e w York, 1940.

P

= Polish White Book: Republique de Pologne, Ministere des

Affaires Etrangeres, Les Relations Polono-Allemandes et Polono-

Sovietiques au cours de la periode 1933-1939. Recueil de docu-

ments officiels, Flammarion, Paris, March 4, 1940.

N Y T = The New York Times, with figures following indicating date of

issue cited—e.g. NY T 3.15.39, for Marc h 15, 1939.

All figures after abbreviations in the text (e.g. G loi , P 84 etc.) refer

not to pages but to the number of the document cited, save in the case

of Henderson's memoirs (H ) where page references are given.

T h e translations from (G ) follow the official English translation issued

by the German Library of Information. Those from (F) largely follow

it where

the official English translation with occasional deviations from

a different phraseology seemed to me to suggest more accurately the

meaning or spirit of the French original. The translations from (P) are

my own from the French edition.

F.L.S.

r- T

c

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CONTENTS

I

• DESIG N

FOR

DYIN G

3

 

1. The Barbarians

 

3

2. Thoughts Before Darkness

11

3. The Last Frontiers

 

26

II

APPEASEMEN T

TRIUMPHAN T

35

 

1. "Peace for Our Time"

 

35

2. Th e Spanish Republic t January 18, 1939

41

3. Ukrainian Dream

 

55

III

APPEASEMEN T

BETRAYE D

78

 

1. Blackshirt Blackmail

 

78

2. Czecho-Slovakiat March 15, 1939

92

3. Ange r in Birmingham

 

103

IV

TOWAR D

TH E

GREA T

COALITIO N

123

 

1. Easter n Fron t

123

2. Albania t Apri l 8, 1939

137

3. Word s from Washingto n

146

V

• AGGRESSORS '

ALLIANC E

166

1.

Fascist Axis

166

2. Danzig's Freedom

173

3. Poland's Fate

183

4. Back t o Appeasement

195

xiii

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xiv

Contents

VI

RETREA T

FRO M

MOSCO W

216

 

1. Stalin's Price

216

2. Chamberlain's Honor

247

3. Hitler's Bargain

 

272

VII

HITLER' S

WA R

285

 

1. Fear

285

2. Crisis

 

301

A.

Th e Prelude, August 15-21

301

B.

The Chamberlain-Hitler Letters, August 22-25

305

c.

Th e

Hitler-Daladier Letters, August 26-27

3^4

D.

The

"Ultimatum," August 28-30

328

E.

The Finale, August 31

344

3. Conquest

 

353

VIII

STALIN' S

VICTOR Y

 

377

 

1. Poland t September 28, 1939

377

2. Th e Eastlands

 

387

3. Finland's Sorrow

397

IX

WINTERSE T

 

429

 

1. The Westwall

 

429

2. Transatlantis

445

X

DEAT H

I N

APRI L

462

 

1. The Northlands t April 9, 1940

462

2. Chamberlain to Churchill

474

XI

DEAT H

I N

MA Y

481

 

1. Th e Lowlands t May 10, 1940

481

2. Sedan II

 

493

XII

• DEAT H

I N

JUN E

502

 

1. Duce's Hou r

 

502

2. Th e French Republic t June 16, 1940

510

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Contents

XV

XIII

PEACE BY TH E

SWORD

 

I.

Urbis et Orbis

2.

Stronger than Words

3.

Dilemma in Muscovy

4.

Union Tomorrow

INDEX

523

523

548

573

583

follows page 600

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NIGHT

OVER

EUROPE

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LES

FLEUR S

/lytiyt/M

I'lA/t^iA/

DU

MA L

Quand le ciel bas et lourd pese comme un couvercle Sur I'esprit gemissant en proie aux longs ennuis, Et que de I'horizon embrassant tout le cercle II nous verse un jour noir plus triste que les nuits;

Quand la terre est changee en un cachot humide, Ou I'Esperance, comme une chauve-souris, S'en va battant les murs de son aile timide

E t se cognant la tete a des plafonds pourris;

Quand la pluie etalant ses immenses trainees D'une vaste prison imite les barreaux, Et qu'un peuple muet d'infames araignees Vient tendre ses filets au fond de nos cerveaux

Des cloches tout a coup sautent avec furie

E t lancent vers le ciel un affreux

Ainsi que des esprits errants et sans patrie

Qui se mettent a geindre opiniatrement

hurlement,

—Et de longs corbillards, sans tambour s ni musique, Defilent lentement dans mon ame; I'Espoir, Vaincu, pleure, et I'Angoisse atroce, despotique,

Sur mon crane incline plante son drapeau

noir.

—CHARLES

BAUDELAIRE

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CHAPTER

ONE

DESIGN

FOR DYING

I. TH E

BARBARIAN S

BLOOD AND SOIL are bearers of life. These timeless symbols of courage and fertility are forever sacred. In the flowering earth men plant seed that they may enrich blood with the fruits of soil. For possession of patches of earth men enrich soil with blood, for the tribes of men seldom work together and love one another as they love possession of the fields that feed them. From the blood of their gods men drink faith. From the bodies of their gods men eat strength of spirit to face the trials of an earthbound struggle for sustenance. In a mingling of bodies and blood women and men beget new life, moving without end from soil to blood and from blood to soil. Earth is the matrix from which man is bloodily born and to which he bloodlessly returns for final rest.

The re-discovery of these pagan truths, recalled from the primi- tive childhood of the race, has in our age brought solace and new assurance to millions of the world-weary. A whole nation has re- sounded with the summons of "Blut und Boden." "Never forget," wrote the Leader in the Book, "that the most holy right in this world is the right to land, and that the most hallowed of sacrifices is the blood which one sheds for this land." The men and women of a continent and then of a world have eagerly taken up the cry, or suffered bondage at the hands of those to whom this cry meant victory. Other truths of nobler meaning have left men helpless and hollow-hearted. The men of the West no longer respect or comprehend the higher values which moved their ancestors to devotion. Only the primitive call of blood and battle has power to beget effective belief and action.

3

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CHAPTER

ONE

DESIGN

FOR DYING

I. TH E

BARBARIAN S

BLOOD AND SOIL are bearers of life. These timeless symbols of courage and fertility are forever sacred. In the flowering earth men plant seed that they may enrich blood with the fruits of soil. For possession of patches of earth men enrich soil with blood, for the tribes of men seldom work together and love one another as they love possession of the fields that feed them. From the blood of their gods men drink faith. From the bodies of their gods men eat strength of spirit to face the trials of an earthbound struggle for sustenance. In a mingling of bodies and blood women and men beget new life, moving without end from soil to blood and from blood to soil. Earth is the matrix from which man is bloodily born and to which he bloodlessly returns for final rest.

The re-discovery of these pagan truths, recalled from the primi- tive childhood of the race, has in our age brought solace and new assurance to millions of the world-weary. A whole nation has re- sounded with the summons of "Blut und Boden." "Never forget," wrote the Leader in the Book, "that the most holy right in this world is the right to land, and that the most hallowed of sacrifices is the blood which one sheds for this land." The men and women of a continent and then of a world have eagerly taken up the cry, or suffered bondage at the hands of those to whom this cry meant victory. Other truths of nobler meaning have left men helpless and hollow-hearted. The men of the West no longer respect or comprehend the higher values which moved their ancestors to devotion. Only the primitive call of blood and battle has power to beget effective belief and action.

3

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4

Design

for

Dying

Yet all now know, victors and victims alike, that this call is no longer an appeal to life nor a pledge to posterity. Neither is it an echo of a remote Springtime when the earth of the West teemed with promise and blood flowed hotly with the challenge of life- giving deeds. The 20th-century apostles of blood and soil, unlike those of the 5th, do not revere that which they destroy. They do not breed new values out of the ripeness of the old. Their deepest motivation is a fierce rejection of all that the heirs of Western culture have hitherto loved best. They are outside that culture even though they lived long within it. Their appearance is not a herald of re-birth. In its genesis their faith was sired by corrup- tion, conceived of want, and bom in violence. In its maturity it sleeps with decadence and grows great with tribal arrogance and a naked will-to-power. Despite all words and deeds in imitation of life, the modem call of soil and blood bespeaks the grave. Despite the gaudy trappings of those who sing victory, despite all their frantic and fanatic glory in their creed, their song is now the song of death.

Few doubt that this is so. Few know why. Perhaps none can know what is and what will be when mysterious forces tragically shape the destinies of men beyond their knowledge. A less skeptical generation would attribute the wreck of its world to the wrath of God. A less sophisticated age would find in strange misfortune a proof of diabolical forces in the cosmos. The contemporary scape- goats and bugaboos devised by the frightened serve as answers only among the mad. Those still sane are baffled. Even those who play a major role in the drama no longer understand the world nor comprehend why human lives once rich with hope are now lost in panic flight before the horsemen of the Apocalypse. Sir Nevile Henderson, whose mission failed, arrived at no insight be- yond a feeling that he and those with whom he dealt were alike entrapped in a Greek tragedy moving inexorably toward doom. The mystery therewith deepened. And yet this dark suspicion offers a key.

If men are moved to action only by long-forgotten symbols of the primitive and the bestial; if the feebleness of those who abhor bestiality delivers the world to death-struck nihilists; if the physi- ognomy of defeat for freemen, and of victory for tyrants and slaves, assumes the mask of predestination; then the secret of cause and consequence lies deep within the organism of the culture in

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The

Barbarians

5

which these things occur. That the great cultures which men build out of contact with their fellows, and out of their striving toward Godhood, are organic entities needs no proof beyond the evidence of man's past. If the great culture of the West lies close to death, its mortal illness, like that of its precursors, admits of possible diagnosis in terms of senile decay breeding rottenness in its loins and in its inmost heart. The historian of the future who pens the epitaph of this age, as did Gibbon for the earlier Western world of Rome, may indeed come to this Spenglerian conclusion in the absence of any other explanation of the strange plague that slows the steps and dims the sight of modern man. But the chroni- clers and commentators of today can scarcely rest content with any simple formula of cultural senescence, even though their dis- content may itself be a symptom of the disease which they deny. Still less can they cry Destiny and abandon all search for Causality.

Western man, unlike any men before him, had the means of saving himself from the grave which swallowed all earlier cultures. Once freed from the thralldom of kings and creeds, he reached out eagerly and knowingly to subdue all Nature. Wit h the weapons his Science gave him he conquered space and time, he purged his blood of many ills, he defeated pestilence and famine, he drew from the soil such riches as none before imagined. H e reaffirmed the dignity of Man. H e gloried in the freedom of his dynamic Will. He praised his fruitful Reason as the instrument of his own redemption from all the woes his forbears had endured. H e cried out triumphantly that he was master of his fate and captain of his soul, and that for the first time on earth an unending era of peace and abundance was within his grasp. And in the end, strangely— when his dreams were fairest—he failed. Falteringly, dumbly, almost without regret for his lost freedoms and his broken hopes, he turned once more to face the night.

This destiny was scarcely pre-ordained. The soothsayers who cry that fate is beyond control, and call upon the West to abdicate, are mirrors of despair. Western man had tools for saving his future. His defeat is not due to the will of the gods nor the world's design nor the limits of reason nor yet to any doom whereby each civil- ization inescapably destroys itself and reconverts its children into savages. His failure stems from his collective unwillingness or incapacity to face the realities of his own devising and to adapt himself to the changes of his own creation.

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6

Design

for

Dying

The world society of the 2 oth century, with its world-wide web of interdependence among all the millions of men, was a product of the machine—soulless servant born of the marriage of industry and science. With the machine as slave. Western man could either court self-destruction or make of all the earth a garden for himself and posterity. That he never reached the latter goal, despite much wishing and willing, that he stumbled unwittingly toward the former which no one willed or wished, is a consequence of his ineptitude in the business of statesmanship and in the statesmanship of business. The Machine Age, promising peace and plenty, pro- duced want and war. The masters of machines became the victims of machines because they refused to pay the price of their own salvation. Wisdom was not lacking. The mind of the race was not too feckless to grasp the issue. Seers and savants long knew what price must be paid for survival. But man as citizen and man as entrepreneur was unwilling to pay. For not paying, a world was lost.

has been often stated. In an industrial civilization

covering the planet, peace and plenty are alike indivisible. There

might have been abundance, or hope of it, for all or else for none.

against war for all or else for none.

No half-way house was tenable in a world which was one. Peace and plenty were also one, for without the promise of plenty there could be no hope of building peace within nations or among them, and without peace there could be no building of an economy of abundance. Poverty begets envy and war. Wa r begets despair and penury. The cure of poverty and war was not to be had by idle waiting, nor by blind faith in "progress," nor by reliance on the beneficent effects of each serving the good of all by seeking his own good first. Only in the 19th century were the hopes and illusions of laissez-faire still possible. In the 20th the vision of a peaceful and a prosperous fraternity of mankind required organized effort for its realization. Such effort required abandon- ment of old ways. It called for foresight and for the sacrifice of ancient prides.

The interests which called most imperatively for sacrifice were those which men were least willing to abandon, for they touched most deeply men's purses and men's hearts. In the realm of busi- ness, and of agriculture and labor as well, the profits of monopoly,

Th e price

Ther e might have been security

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and the comforts of a security which rested upon the privileges of the few at the expense of the many, were incompatible with economic stabihty and advance. Yet monopolists everywhere clung desperately to their advantages rather than acquiesce in any program of restoring capitalist competition in a free market or creating a collectivist economy in a controlled market. All else they and their followers were willing to sacrifice—freedom, honor, ethics and even life itself—but not the prerogatives which seemed to their beneficiaries the only possible foundation of their lives. In the realm of politics, the persistence of national patriotism and the continued fragmentation of the world community into hostile sovereignties were incompatible with world peace and order. Yet patriots everywhere clung desperately to their tribal prejudices and in the end rejected every effort to create a world polity assuring security and justice for all. In the spheres of commerce and government, where the sickness of the West was most malig- nant, the twin disorders which threatened death were the eco- nomics of monopoly—fatal both to "capitalism" and "democracy," and the politics of power—fatal to any hope of ordered peace. By staunch defense of money and privilege, by firm repudiation of socialism and competitive capitalism alike, the favored classes of the Western nation-states insured their own destruction and that of the world which they ruled. By staunch defense of the National State, by firm repudiation of "internationalism" in all its guises, patriotic multitudes destroyed all possibility of survival for nation- states of patriots.

The pathology of Nemesis is familiar. Its course in retrospect is clear. Monopoly bred poverty and a slow paralysis of the great industrial societies where economic well-being and progress had hitherto depended on the fruitful competition of the market- place. Nationalism and its off-spring, national imperialism, bred international anarchy and war. Each consequence aggravated the causes of the other. Each new crisis generated new fears—never quite sufficient to move men to effective remedial measures, but always sufficient to provoke desperate efforts at escape by meas- ures which rendered the dilemma more insoluble. Men and women by millions lived increasingly in the shadow of fear—of unem- ployment, of social degradation, of bitter impoverishment, of economic and political insecurity, of foreign invasion, of death

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from the skies, of a crushing burden of armaments to meet fears which became more terrifying with each blundering effort to ward them off. Despair and terror seldom beget the courageous wisdom neces- sary to face difficult tasks. These moods paralyze intellect and conscience alike and drive men back toward brutishness. Each floundering and fear-born move to escape spreads new fears in ever-widening circles. The first national community to be utterly broken by the impact of 20th century war was Russia. Here in a backward, semi-feudal state, far removed from the insecurities of late capitalism, the insecurities of military defeat and social dissolution created an opportunity for the seizure of power by the inspired apostles of the Marxist dream. They visioned a co- operative commonwealth from which want and war would be forever banished. On paper, the Communist program was objec- tively relevant to the world's dilemma. But in practice, in Lord Balfour's phrase. Communism became an excellent means of mak- ing rich men poor, but a doubtful means of making poor men rich. The methods adopted to achieve freedom and plenty pro- duced tyranny and famine. The expropriated resisted the expro- priators. Th e Western ruling groups strove by all the means at their command to destroy the "Workers' State." They failed. Their failure bred new fear of the dispossessed among all the threatened possessors.

This fear in turn, along with other fears induced by the miseries of a maladjusted world, shaped the acts of all the rulers of the West in the years following the Great War. In another marginal and backward society, industrialists, nobles, and priests were struck with terror at "Bolshevism"—by which they meant every mistaken effort of proletarian and peasant leaders to extend the horizons of the poor at the expense of the wealthy. The fright- ened turned for salvation to barbarous practitioners of violence who promised "salvation from Bolshevism"—through methods of rulership copied from the Bolsheviki. Mussolini's Blackshirts found supporters among the timid middle classes. Money flowed from the rich and well-born who saw in Fascism the means of maintaining their own positions. Therewith was born the Caesar- ism whose fear-driven disciples subsequently conquered power by force and fraud in the sick society of industrial Germany, and in Japan and Spain and Portugal and elsewhere. In the name of

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anti-Communism and national awakening, the gang-captains of

the lesser bourgeoisie smashed organizations of workers and con-

verted peasants and burghers to a new faith. Through bribery

and intrigue, the great monopohsts of money and land put tyrants

in power, under the delusion that their own fears could thereby

be allayed and their advantages assured. Millions of the anxious

and the world-weary, tired of thought and talk, joined the march-

ing mobs.

Th e spiritual essence of this fear-bred cult was (and is) a blind

quest for security at whatever cost, and an embittered repudia-

tion of words and values that no longer have content. Liberty,

equality and fraternity; democracy, toleration and the dignity of

man—all were alike rejected, though these had been the soul of

the Western cultural

of Blood and Soil, of Race and Empire, became the rationaliza-

tradition for centuries. Th e "new" values

tion of decadence and desperation. In the words of Benedetto

Croce:

The choice between liberty and suppression of liberty is not on the same plane as a choice between things of different values, one of which may reasonably be preferred to the other—the first means human dignity and civilization, the second the debasing of men until they are either a flock to be led to pasture, or captured, trained animals in a cage.

promises always

as a beacon; I do not see any light in the future promised by authori- tarianism. In the past, under the forms of theocracy, of monarchy or of oligarchy, authority had at least a background of religious mystery. Mod- ern humanistic thought has dissipated the mystery, replacing it by simple humanitarian ideals. But authoritarianism in our times, in those we see looming ahead, is irreligious and materialistic, despite its pretenses and rhetoric, and comes down to a brutal rule of violence over people who are prevented from seeing and knowing what is going on, and who are forced to submit to leadership and give unquestioning obedience to it.

To lend glamor to this obedience by associating it with the noble and the heroic, it is usually called military discipline, which has been extended, or should be extended, to the whole of society. But military discipline has its function only as one aspect of the social order. If instead of being contained within the society, it is itself the con- taining body or is coextensive with society, it can no longer be called military discipline, but is a general process of fostering universal stu- pidity. An artist with the face of a corporal, a scientist with that of a

Coming t o our ow n times, I see th e future that liberty

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sergeant, a politician who waits for his orders and blindly carries them out, is no longer an artist, a scientist or a politician, but an imbecile.^

In what manner has Caesarism "solved" the problems of the

2oth century? T o deny the fact of a solution is to ignore reality.

is crucial. Ho w does Fascism reheve

its subjects of fear of war and fear of poverty? Ho w does it afford to its followers those material and emotional satisfactions which democracy no longer furnishes? Partly by pageantry and propaganda. Partly by the savage suppression of all dissent. Partly by the deflection of mass aggressions onto scapegoats unable to resist. But beyond these devices of force and trickery, the new Caesars have in truth freed millions of men from the terror of impoverishment at home and war abroad—and this not merely by rendering war "heroic" and "noble" or by preaching to the masses the virtues of self-denial.

The manner of the solution

The problems of war and poverty in the Fascist States have alike been "solved" by mobilizing all of the energies of great peoples for conquest. The tribesmen of old fled famine and fear by desperate plunder-raids against the wealthy cities and bounti- ful provinces of more civilized people who had become too sophis- ticated to defend themselves. The chiefs of today's despoiling hordes are not different in motives or deeds, though the fighting men they command are no longer hunters and herdsmen but robots of the machine. Idle machines, idle money and idle men in the totalitarian States have been put to work forging the weapons of destruction. Heavy industry is restored to full productivity, light industry and agriculture are renovated, unemployment is abol- ished, economic security for all members of the chosen race is achieved by the creation of a society which lives and moves and has its being for one end only. Preparation for conquest restores life to a sluggish economy and gives new confidence to a discouraged society. Adventures in conquest bring exaltation to all the faithful and put an end to doubts and fears. Success in conquest brings booty and the slave-labor of the conquered. The victims, having renounced conquest and having found no other formula to restore their faith and cure their ills, are as putty in the hands of the invaders.

And beyond conquest? Time gives no certain answer. All

1 The New Republic, April 7, 1937.

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that is clear is that the new Caesars and their successors cannot halt even if they would. Like climbers scaling a cliff, they may climb higher or they may fall to death. But they may not rest save momentarily. They cannot descend. They continue to live only by continuing to climb from conquest to conquest. N o resumption of a welfare economy, no return to "capitalism," no satiation with aggrandizement, no turning back to the ways of peace is permitted to those who have pledged their all to war and world hegemony.

And if they conquer all? If they crush and subjugate all the

twilight peoples of a lost world? Then they must perhaps rend and tear each other, or face the collapse of the structures on which they stand. That this is their destiny, if fortune grant them end-

less victory over the dying West, is

world imperium is promised by their successes. What looms ahead is titanic and timeless strife among the empire-builders in ever- wider arenas of combat. Such struggles to come will be mean- ingless by any standard of value save that of power as an end in itself. Beyond looms disintegration and the coming of the long darkness. After Rome was done to death her conquerors fought fiercely for spoils until all the spoils were gone. Visigoths and Vandals, Huns and Franks, Lombards and Norsemen warred upon one another until the Mediterranean world was reduced to a desert inhabited only by nomad hordes. Wretched bands of survivors gathered about feudal rulers. Their realms were but the shattered fragments of lost empires and broken kingdoms. The modern destroyers of the West, mad and dream-driven, move toward a like demise. As the West once was, before its culture flowered after centuries of feudal night, so may it be again. The triumphs of its puny tyrants will not hide the emptiness of an age whose soul has perished because its mind and heart would not will its survival.^

scarcely in doubt. N o stable

2. THOUGHT S

BEFORE

DARKNESS

The disintegration of the world society of the 20th century is attributable less to the satanic power of its destroyers than to the

1 Cf. Arnold J. Toynbee's brilliant essay, "Th e Saviour with the Sword," in

"The Disintegrations of Civilizations," Vol. VI, pp. 178-212 of History, Oxford University Press, London, 1939.

A

Study

of

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that is clear is that the new Caesars and their successors cannot halt even if they would. Like climbers scaling a cliff, they may climb higher or they may fall to death. But they may not rest save momentarily. They cannot descend. They continue to live only by continuing to climb from conquest to conquest. N o resumption of a welfare economy, no return to "capitalism," no satiation with aggrandizement, no turning back to the ways of peace is permitted to those who have pledged their all to war and world hegemony.

And if they conquer all? If they crush and subjugate all the

twilight peoples of a lost world? Then they must perhaps rend and tear each other, or face the collapse of the structures on which they stand. That this is their destiny, if fortune grant them end-

less victory over the dying West, is

world imperium is promised by their successes. What looms ahead is titanic and timeless strife among the empire-builders in ever- wider arenas of combat. Such struggles to come will be mean- ingless by any standard of value save that of power as an end in itself. Beyond looms disintegration and the coming of the long darkness. After Rome was done to death her conquerors fought fiercely for spoils until all the spoils were gone. Visigoths and Vandals, Huns and Franks, Lombards and Norsemen warred upon one another until the Mediterranean world was reduced to a desert inhabited only by nomad hordes. Wretched bands of survivors gathered about feudal rulers. Their realms were but the shattered fragments of lost empires and broken kingdoms. The modern destroyers of the West, mad and dream-driven, move toward a like demise. As the West once was, before its culture flowered after centuries of feudal night, so may it be again. The triumphs of its puny tyrants will not hide the emptiness of an age whose soul has perished because its mind and heart would not will its survival.^

scarcely in doubt. N o stable

2. THOUGHT S

BEFORE

DARKNESS

The disintegration of the world society of the 20th century is attributable less to the satanic power of its destroyers than to the

1 Cf. Arnold J. Toynbee's brilliant essay, "Th e Saviour with the Sword," in

"The Disintegrations of Civilizations," Vol. VI, pp. 178-212 of History, Oxford University Press, London, 1939.

A

Study

of

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Design for Dying

weakness of its defenders. Power is relative. The power of the new nihilists flows from the impotence of their foes. The modern bar- barians, unhke those of old, came from within. They were bred, like parasites on the bodies of the dying, for the corruption of the living. They sprang from the "schism in the soul" of a civiliza- tion in dissolution. By their enemies and victims they were nur- tured and brought to mature ferocity. The fall of Rome presents a parallel in the folly of the Emperor Valens and that of his suc- cessors who relied upon barbarians for defense against barbarians. The disasters which overtook ancient China were likewise due in large measure to the precept stated by Kia Yi, philosopher of the second century B.C.: "The policy for the Middle Kingdom is to employ the barbarians for knocking the barbarians on the head." The fall of the West exhibits on the grandest scale the comic-tragic drama of a whole culture done to death by the deeds of those entrusted with its protection, with each step toward doom plausibly presented and gladly accepted as the only means of salvation.

That any such dismal farce was possible was due to blindness and helplessness which all but pass understanding. Here again those who watch are driven toward hypotheses of senility. The net effect of countless thousands of individual decisions and inde- cisions in the great capitals of a lost world suggests that the peoples of the West fell victims to a strange plague which progressively deprived them of all power of perception and action. The y did not quietly await an unknown fate with the resignation of those who have renounced life. Like desperate suicides, they sought out their destroyer, hailed him from afar, and in every way aided him to encompass their destruction. Ho w did this come to pass? Par- tial answers have been suggested in the books preceding this one. Further answers will appear in the pages which follow these. The segments of a total answer can only be dimly outlined.

Man never lives by bread alone. He needs love and confidence in his fellows. H e needs hope and assurance in his way of life, whatever it may be. He needs religion, secular or ecclesiastical. H e needs devotion to social values which have meaning in his daily toil. Western man in the years of his downfall lost these prerequisites of his security. Th e loss of them came about from the unforeseen and perhaps "inevitable" consequences of the very faiths which he was certain would enrich his life and make him

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master of his world and of his destiny. These faiths were Ration- alism, Liberalism, Patriotism. That modern man met disaster by virtue of devotion to reason and to the ideals of freedom and fatherland is a paradox so strik- ing as to invite abrupt denial. The road to ruin was surely paved with irrationality and treason, and with successive betrayals of the values of liberty. Men no longer cherished truth. Men no longer valued freedom. And men sold their country for a mess of pottage. This much must at once be granted. But if one is to know why the peoples of the West fell victims to faithlessness and self-betrayal, one must observe the impact of Science, Patriot- ism and Democracy on a culture which first blossomed in an ideational context of theological mysticism, catholic universality and aristocratic ethics. That impact was one of dissolution. Ex- perimental science and technology on the one hand, and the creeds of freedom and fatherland on the other, produced effects of disintegration which modern man was unable either to prevent or to transcend.

The ever-questioning skepticism, the incessant doubting of authority, the patient insistence upon pragmatic demonstration which lie behind all Science have given rise to the most amazing achievements of the modern mind and to many of the noblest expressions of the human spirit. The history of science is a tale of courage, adventure and accomplishment without precedent in the annals of the race. Those who broke with the past, who smashed dead idols, who shattered superstition and shook men out of complacent ignorance desired to point the way to a resplendent future of freedom and light. If that future never materialized the fault was scarcely theirs. It lay rather in the incapacity of masses of men to build an enduring civilization on the wreckage of an old folk-culture. Wisdom cannot be learned by those deprived of the comforts of ignorance unless they have courage to rebuild their intellectual and spiritual lives on new foundations. Faith in God and faith in Man cannot be recaptured by those who have become skeptical of all words and all things, unless they can devise new values worthy of their belief. Security in the relations between men cannot be enjoyed by those who live in a world of endless flux, unless they are capable of re-ordering their collective existence according to some design which will recover in new forms the satisfactions which rapid social change destroys.

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These things the peoples of the West were unable to achieve in any measure adequate to meet the crisis provoked by the pass- ing of the old ways. Science dissolved old loyalties. It was but a step from questioning the authority of dead saints to questioning that of living priests. It was but another step to questioning the authority of nobles and kings. In destroying men's faith in the creeds of Church and State, rationalism and agnosticism dissolved the very fabric of society. For men are uhited not by self-interest or abstract reason, but by devotion to ideas in which all men believe. Here as elsewhere nature abhors a vacuum. If old gods die, new gods must be born. N o synthetic "Goddess of Reason" will serve the needs of worshippers. If the old order passes a new order must emerge, for men cannot live in endless disorder save on the frontiers of new worlds. T o make man wholly rational is to make man less than human. "Economic man," whose rela- tions with his fellows are governed only by calculating self- interest, is a mythical monster. A society dominated by those who approximate to this model is a society facing the grave.

The processes of decay need not here be traced in detail. Their first adumbrations manifested themselves in the Reformation and in the Wars of Religion, aftermaths of the liberating inquisitive- ness of the Renaissance. Therewith the unity of Christendom was broken, and the power of priesthoods to prescribe a stable way of life for European man was lost. Applied science thereafter begot modern industry and commerce. In their wake grew a free merchant class of town-dwellers standing between the peasant serfs and the feudal lords of medieval folk-society. This bour- geoisie was dedicated by the very means of its livelihood to risk- taking, to profit-seeking, to adventurous enterprise, to shrewd foresight, to the ways of material calculation and to vigorous affirmation of freedom of the will—all alike fatal to the inherited forms of a static society where each man respected his betters, patronized his inferiors and proudly knew his own place and kept it. Relationships of status, resting on unquestioned tradition, gave way to relationships of contract, resting on self-interest. This bourgeoisie was at once the fountain-head of scientific rationaUsm and the source of the liberal-patriotic ideology wherein all men were envisaged as reasonable, equal and free. As it grew in num- bers, riches and influence, its leaders inevitably challenged the Divine Right of Kings and the ruling caste of nobles.

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Social revolution ensued. In the great Anglo-French communi- ties facing the Atlantic the years between 1640 and 1815 were years of battle between burghers and aristocrats, commoners and kings. The tremendous dynamism of the modern tempo, born of science and of the new capitalism which science nurtured, mani- fested itself in rebellion and class war. Old kings were killed. Old classes were dispossessed. Old norms were broken in the name of liberation. T o be sure, new rulers, new elites, new standards replaced the old. Th e men of 1649, of 1776 and 1789 were build- ers as well as destroyers. The sturdy merchant was their ideal. Constitutional democracy and national patriotism were their creeds. Their program for living? Utilitarian rationalism, laissez- faire, unfettered private enterprise and free trade. They believed in this faith and fought for it. They triumphed over monarchs, mercantilists, militarists and landed lords. With the signing of the Armistice of 1918 in Compiegne forest, at the close of the last great combat between bourgeois democracies and feudal mon- archies, their victory was all but world-wide and their way of hfe had reached fruition.

But at the moment of victory they were already self-defeated. Impersonal forces, beyond cognition or control, had transformed the European world anew between the Congress of Vienna and Sarajevo. The transformation proceeded with dizzy speed and left no time for men to fit themselves snugly and serenely into a new scheme of life. Th e Machine magically changed the world and made of all Western living a raging torrent, compared to which the turbulent i8th century was as a placid stream.^ Europe's

1 Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, V, pp. 15-16, observes shrewdly:

"An empirical survey has left us doubtful whether there is any ascertainable correlation at all between the historical variations in the degree of a society's control over its environment and the historical change in the fortunes of a society whose growth is cut short by a breakdown running into a disintegra- tion. And the evidence, so far as it goes, suggests that, if some correlation did prove to exist, we should find that an increase in command over the environ- ment was a concomitant of breakdown and disintegration and not of growth. It looks, in fact, as though the internal struggles within the bosom of a society which Isring the society's breakdown about, and which become more and more violent as its consequent disintegration proceeds, were actually more effective than the activities of genesis and growth in promoting the extension of the society's command both over the life of other living societies and over the inanimate forces of Physical Nature. In the downward course of a broken- down civilization's career there may be truth in the Ionian philosopher Hera- cleitus's saying that 'War is the father of all things'. The sinister concentration of the society's dwindling powers upon the absorbing business of fratricidal

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people multiplied as never before on the basis of the new means of Hvelihood which the Machine made possible. Africa, Asia, Australasia and the Americas were explored, claimed, conquered, settled, exploited. The lands facing the North Atlantic became bee-hives of industry, adapted to the ever-growing needs of an ever-expanding population in a constantly enlarging world. The simple burgher class of old was spHt in two: a small class of great industrial captains and money-masters—"self-made men," lacking blue blood but rich in gold and sharing power in many lands with the remnants of the ancient aristocracy; and an ever-increasing middle-class mass of small merchants, salesmen, advertisers, tech- nicians and intellectuals. Peasants became independent farmers or agricultural laborers. Th e class of artisans swelled into an in- dustrial proletariat living by work for wages and resenting the harshness of a lot as lacking in dignity as it was poor in the com- forts of bourgeois existence.

It is a law of all living that activity is followed b y rest, growth by maturity, aggrandizement by quiescence. The roaring, rushing world of the 19th century was predestined to a new phase when its far frontiers should vanish, its markets should become sated, its peoples should cease to multiply. These developments might have inaugurated a quiet century of orderly adjustment to the prob- lems of a changed world. Western man might have paused in his headlong quest for profits and empire and found peace once more in a new order and a new faith. Instead he stumbled into violence and misery, class conflict and war, poverty and sickness of soul until finally he faced the breakdown of all order and all values in a vast chaos. That so complete a catastrophe should have followed an age so bright with promise is explicable in terms of the persistence of a faith that had become empty in the face of intellectual disbelief

warfare may generate a military prowess that will place the neighbouring so- cieties at the war-obsessed society's mercy, and may strike out a military technique that will serve as a key to the acquisition of a far-reaching technical mastery over the Material World. Since the vulgar estimates of human pros- perity are reckoned in terms of power and wealth, it thus often happens that the opening chapters in the history of a society's tragic decline are popularly hailed as the culminating chapters of a magnificent growth; and this ironic misconception may even persist for centuries. Sooner or later, however, dis- illusionment is bound to follow; for a society that has become incurably divided against itself is almost certain to 'put back into the business' of war the greater part of those additional resources, human and material, which the same business has incidentally brought into its hands."

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and material misfortune. In the life-cycle of creeds, men devise and cling to beliefs not because they are logically best or objec-

tively relevant to their problems but because they afford emotional

Reason, of Freedom, and of Fatherland af-

forded such satisfactions in the late i8th and early 19th centuries, because they were organically integrated with expanding and prosperous societies of small-scale competitive business carried on under the relatively peaceful political order of democratic nationalism. When these things passed, when men were willy-nilly driven by the blind forces of material self-interest and collective will-to-power toward the contractions and frustrations of monop- olistic capitalism and national imperialism, the old faiths failed. One new faith emerged which for a time caught men's imagination with the promise of salvation: International Social Democracy. But that faith, insofar as it won the support of disgruntled work- ers and peasants, terrified the mighty of land and money. With its Apocalyptic vision of class war and a revolutionary millennium, it brought fear to the middle-class masses who identified them- selves with their social superiors. These threatened groups reas- serted all the more vigorously the "reasonableness" of capitalism. They preached Political Democracy and National Patriotism all the more vehemently as a means of winning the lower classes to acceptance of the status quo. In this they largely succeeded. Social democracy was tamed and corrupted and at last rendered innoc- uous. But the elites of industry and agriculture, and their emu- lators in the middle class, scarcely believed any longer in the Democracy and Patriotism which they preached. Believing in nothing and finally lacking all faith even in themselves, they be- came ripe for conversion to barbarism or for defeat at the hands of the new barbarians.

By the time of the First World War, Rationalism had already half-destroyed itself. Th e corrosive acids of skeptical analysis,

poured over the acts and beliefs of men at a time when misfortune fostered doubt, begot disbelief in all beliefs, including belief in Freedom and Fatherland. In sequel came disbelief in Reason and

disbelief in Man. Political democracy had likewise

itself, for its functioning was corrupted by the self-seeking of insecure plutocrats, and by the rise of demagogues outbidding

one another in promising favors to an electorate which had be- come a congeries of interest-groups, each seeking to bend the

comfort. Th e cults of

half-destroyed

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powers of the State to its own advantage. By the same token,

national patriotism was far on the road to ruin, despite the chau- vinistic exuberance of 1914. The paths of patriotic glory led only to stinking death for purposes which had ever less meaning

believe in Reason

when Reason meant progress and plenty was easy. T o believe in it amid the wreckage of a world, when it meant only intolerable

disbelief in everything, was to beUeve in nothing. T o believe in Freedom was not difficult when democracy meant the emanci- pation of the masses from ancient thralldom and the elevation of the humble to a share in the new prosperity. But to believe in it when democracy seemed to have become a "racket" and a facade

to masses imbued with disgust and despair. T o

for exploitation

was hard. T o believe in Patriotism in time

of

national rebirth

was simple. T o believe in it after the clash

of

nations had brought want and woe to all was beyond men's

capacity for faith.

N o effective new faith emerged which was relevant to the needs of the new age, and therefore emotionally gratifying to its followers. This phenomenon coincided in time and space with the decay of old estates and elites and with a growing cleavage of interests between classes and masses. This conflict, so clearly foreseen by Marx in its genesis but not in its outcome, brought both contestants to disaster, for each checkmated the other and was in turn checkmated by the middle-income bourgeoisie be- tween them. Big Business in each of the nation-states, having achieved ascendancy in the name of democracy, could not safe- guard itself from mass attack from below by establishing an open plutocracy, even had its leaders possessed talent for political dic- tatorship. Such a move would have driven the masses further toward socialism, or worse, toward socialism's enfant terrible, Communism. In this event even the middle classes might have identified themselves with the proletariat. Conversely the leaders of labor, having demanded "social reforms" in the name of de- mocracy, could not embrace proletarian revolution and dicta- torship, even had they had the will and the genius for the task. Such a step would have driven the middle classes completely into the enemy camp—as indeed it did wherever proletarian revolu- tion was threatened. As for the amorphous middle class itself, it was an inchoate mass of millions of little men and women,

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worried, hopeful, confused and forever insecure from inability to climb to the top and from fear of being pushed to the bottom. Its spokesmen preached democracy and patriotism with less and less conviction. In the face of opposition from Big Business, they were unable to translate liberalism into economic terms which promised security. Woodrow Wilson's "New Freedom," Lloyd George's social reforms, Briining's democratic dictatorship, Blum's Popular Front, Roosevelt's "Ne w Deal," all fell short of reshaping the economy of late capitalism into a viable order. Th e fears of the wealthy and the demands of the poor frustrated the enterprise. The men of the middle class were equally unable, in the face of their own frightened faith in "national sovereignty," to translate liberalism into international terms which promised peace. They defeated the Covenant of Wilson, the hopes of MacDonald, the dreams of Briand and Stresemann in the firm conviction that "My country, right or wrong" was a safer creed than the broth- erhood of man. Nothing short of a revolution in the economic order and in the political structure of the community of nations could meet the crisis. But this was "Communism" and "Inter- nationaUsm" and therefore anathema. And in fear of Communism and Internationalism, all fled back to programs and policies which insured further frustration.

The blindness and weakness that followed had their genesis in these futile hopes and neurotic fears. The post-Versailles genera- tion was unable to reconcile its own conception of its interests and needs with the demands of a world which offered it a choice between extinction and a radical reformation of its way of life. It was therefore unable to comprehend the nature of the new bar- barism which grew out of the despair of the Kleinbiirgertum. The little Caesars of the colored shirts spelled the death of a free working class, of independent Big Business, of democracy and plutocracy alike, as Oswald Spengler had predicted years before the first of the new Caesars had appeared on the scene. Social Democrats nonetheless awaited their own destruction compla- cently. Communists at first hoped that the triumph of Fascism would pave the way for proletarian revolt and later hoped that alliance with Fascism would somehow lead to the same result. Big Business subsidized the Caesars and placed them in office in the belief that security for business was thereby won. Plutocrats de-

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livered power to their own destroyers. Democrats cried peace, tolerance and justice on behalf of those sworn to destroy peace, tolerance and justice. This process had reached its logical end-point within Italy and Germany by 1935. Henceforth it manifested itself on the larger stage of world politics. Here, despite the record and the plain evidence of events, the same drama of blindness and weakness was replayed. Precisely as parliamentary democracy and capitalism were demolished within the frontiers of the Caesar-states by the weakness of their defenders, so the balance of power and the whole fabric of the Western State System were destroyed by the folly and impotence of the statesmen and masses of the demo- cratic countries. The masses sought "peace" through "neutrality," "isolation" and "pacifism," and thereby insured war and death. Th e classes, and the politicians who spoke for them, sought security by arming the "Anti-Comintern" Caesars for protection against the "Red Menace." They were paralyzed by secret hopes, assiduously cultivated by the Fascist Caesars themselves, of using Fascist Caesarism against Communist Caesarism. They were un- done by fear of losing elections if they warned the masses of dan- gers which the masses preferred not to face.^ They distrusted the masses whose weakness and frivolity they well knew. They envied the alien dictators who had learned to drug the masses into pas- sivity or fanatic devotion. In their anxiety and doubt, they feared for their gods: Law, Order, Property, Morality, Religion. They believed that Communism meant the death of their deities and that Fascism meant security and new life. So strong was their need to believe, despite all the evident deceit, cruelty and dishonor of the alleged protectors of their altars, that they believed in the face of all facts to the contrary.

Th e moral chaos and political fecklessness thus generated within

^ Stanley Baldwin in the House of Commons, November 12,1936: "I put before the whole House my views with an appalling frankness. From 1933 I and my

friends were very worried about what was happening in Europe. You'll remem- ber that at that time the Disarmament Conference was sitting in Geneva and there probably was a stronger pacifist feeling running through this country

than at any other time since the party was not altogether a comfortable

country and said that Germany was rearming and that we must rearm. Does anybody think that this pacific country would have rallied to that at that moment? I can not think of anything that would have made the loss of the election from my point of view more certain."

My position as head of a great Suppose I had gone to the

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the bourgeois democracies rendered governments and people in-

capable of meeting either the crises of diplomacy or the shocks

of war.

distant peoples, beginning with the Japanese rape of Manchuria in 1931, the democratic Powers could oppose only notes of pro- test, speeches of exhortation and tears of regret. The Geneva pro- cedures set up for penalizing peace-breakers were willfully sabotaged. T o meet force with effective economic penalties was impossible, for such measures would be "bad for business", they might fatally weaken the still weak Fascist regime and lead to revolution; they would be unjust (were not the grievances of the "have-nots" legitimate?); they would be unsafe; they might lead to force; and force was wicked, un-Christian, ungentlemanly and dangerous. T o meet force with force was still more impos- sible for the same reasons redoubled. Wh y mix in alien quarrels? W h y quit our own to stand on foreign ground? Collective se- curity having been rendered impossible by these attitudes and policies, there remained the safe refuge of "neutrality"—and neu- trality forbade any retaliation against aggressors or any distinction between right and wrong, particularly when wrongs were com- mitted in far places against peoples who were at best stupid for- eigners and at worst disorderly heathens.

Each successful aggression strengthened the power of the ag- gressors to commit greater aggressions, and encouraged others to embark upon a similar course. When the guardians of order not only fail to punish robbery and murder but help to make them profitable, thieves and assassins flourish. Danger came closer. Th e flames of Shanghai became the flames of Addis Ababa. The clank of tanks in Mongolia became the clank of tanks in Saxony and then in the Rhineland. Bombers over the Blue Nile became bomb- ers over Barcelona. Still no matter. The aggressors who had for- merly been too weak to be resisted were now too strong to be resisted. Did sympathy and decency dictate succour to the vic- tims? Perhaps, if they were white men. But the Chinese were too yellow, the Ethiopians too black and the Spaniards too "red." Non-intervention was safer. And Austria? But Austrians were really Germans. "Self-determination" was a sacred principle. Happily it also applied to Czechoslovakia. "I have no further ter- ritorial demands to make in Europe," said Caesar. Good. Then give unto Caesar what is Caesar's or what Caesar says is his. But

T o each new act of Fascist aggression against weak and

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he should not use force to take what others will grant him freely. Force against Czechs might have to be opposed by force, even though this crisis too, sighed Mr. Chamberlain, was "a quarrel in a far-away country among people of whom we know nothing." Happily force was avoided. The Czechs were compelled by their French allies and British friends to surrender. Millions of French- men and Britons wept with joy that war had been Still nearer swept the flames. At long last and too late, came dis- enchantment and determination to resist. The heroic Spanish Re- public, the vigorous and civilized Czech democracy, had not seemed worth defending. But now the feudal oligarchy that was Poland, and even Rumania, called by the last Tsar "not a country, but a profession," seemed to merit defense—after all hope of de- fending them was gone. Perhaps here too a "bargain" could be made. Would Caesar accept pacifically that which he might other- wise be tempted to seize with arms? Was not Caesar too a fish- monger to be dealt with honorably as trader deals with trader? If not, then reluctantly the gage of battle must be accepted, even after no one longer had stomach or heart to fight, or mind to know for what he was asked to fight. The result was a recapitu- lation of an ancient tragedy well described by England's most distinguished living historian:

In the fullness of Time the din of battle which has ebbed away towards the fringes of Civilization till it has passed almost out of ear-shot will come welling back again in the van of barbarian war-bands that have gained the upper hand over the garrisons of the limes by learning from them, in the effective school of a perpetual border warfare, the winning tricks of the professional soldier's trade; or, more terrifying still, the dreadful sound will come welling up again in the resurgence of an Internal Proletariat that has turned militant once more—to the consterna- tion of a Dominant Minority which has been flattering itself that this projanum vulgus has long since been cowed or cajoled into a settled habit of submissiveness. The spectres of war and revolution that have latterly passed into legend now once again stalk abroad, as of old, in the light of day; and a bourgeoisie which has never before seen bloodshed now hastily throws up ringwalls round its open towns out of any materials that come to hand: mutilated statues and desecrated altars and scattered drums of fallen columns and inscribed blocks of marble reft from derelict public monuments. These pacific inscriptions are now anachronisms; for the "Indian Summer" is over; the "Time of Troubles" has returned; and this shocking calamity has descended upon a generation which has been

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brought up in the illusory conviction that the bad times of yore have gone for good! ^

Insofar as this drift toward ruin represented any formulated plan of action (or inaction) on the part of the democratic poli- ticians, that plan scarcely reflected the fears and hopes of the simple men and women of the masses. Popular intuitions were sound more often than not, but popular anxieties and aspirations were without plan in the absence of leadership. The holders of public office in the democracies mirrored more frequently the minds of those who held wealth, and therefore power, at the top of the social scale. Ditch-diggers, factory-hands and farmers saw

the Great Society dimly as a vast stage-world peopled by heroes and villains, friends and enemies, homefoik and foreigners. Identi- fication of the players was often confused by ignorant stereotypes or by the muddlement willfully spread by press magnates. Mass knowledge of historical processes was meagre, mass conceptions of cause and consequence limited. And yet in France, in Britain and even in America, men in the street sensed the danger that threatened their lives and looked for guidance in meeting it. But their political guides used words for the masses chiefly to win votes by promising favors or quieting fears. And of necessity in communities in which the many were poor and feeble, and the few were wealthy and powerful, statesmen communed with lords and clerics, merchants and bankers. These gentlemen and their ladies knew the Great World and knew, or thought they knew, their own interests as the poor can never know them. And their interests and their way of life caused them to view the world through glasses which enabled them to see what they looked for. The y remained blind to all that might, if seen,

prove disturbing

the same things, nor see the same things in the same way, nor draw the same conclusions from what they saw. But by and large, like other people, they saw the world less as it was than as their fears and hopes pictured it to them. The prevalent picture of the world in the minds of the Western elites during the time of trouble was one in which Profits were menaced by Labor and in which the "good old days" could be restored by putting workers in their place and getting rid of

to their own self-assurance. The y did not all see

1 Arnold J. Toynbee, op. cit., VI, p. 206.

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"radical experiments" in government. The nation-states in their struggle for power were fitted into this scheme. Russia was Bol- shevism, with Labor run wild and gentlemen butchered by ruf- fians. Italy was Order. Trains ran on time. The Duce stood for no nonsense. Germany was Order too, a bit shocking perhaps (too bad about the Jews) and dangerously experimental, but not radi- cal. On the contrary, anti-radical, anti-Communist. Rather mag- nificent. Spain? Clear as crystal: Franco fighting the "Reds" to save Property, the Family and Christianity. Did Fascism wage wars and disturb markets.^ That was to be deplored. But if Hitler and Mussolini and Franco and the Tokio generals were really fighting Bolshevism, then why oppose them? True, none of them fought the Russians. They fought Chinese and Ethiopians and Spaniards and Czechs. But these enemies were also "Reds." Ulti- mately they would "clean up" Russia and restore order. Mean- while they tolerated no agitators or labor troubles. There was discipline. One could understand such people. One could work with such people. One could plan and hope again.^

The resultant program, persisted in and pursued with few doubts until the end, was one of connivance in Fascist aggression and a strict quarantine of Moscow until Rome, Berlin and Tokio should be ready to deal with Moscow as Moscow deserved. Granted the premise, it followed that collective security through the League of Nations was folly, since its effective implementa- tion would thwart the Fascist plan. British commitments in Cen- tral and Eastern Europe were folly, since the Reich must be free to move eastward. The French alliances with Prague, Belgrade, Bucharest, Warsaw and Moscow were sheer madness, likely to drag France and therefore Britain into a senseless war. American desires, if any, to oppose Japanese aggrandizement were non- sense. All these barriers in the way of the Grand Design had to be broken down by the gentlemen of The City and the Bourse, along with all popular foolishness about "People's Front" or about "saving" Spain or Austria or Czechoslovakia. The barriers were broken down. The nonsense was dissipated. Parliaments and publics were not told the untruths which so many of the influen- tial took for truth, but they were told that alliances were dan- gerous, that collective security was full of peril, that Bolshevism

1 For typical British expressions of such sentiments during the years of ap- peasement see Europe on the Eve, pp. 340-46.

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threatened ruin, that the U.S.S.R. was weak and untrustworthy, that the Fascist dictators desired nothing more than peace, and that justice (and therefore peace) could be had by granting their desires. Parliaments and pubhcs believed. Desperate fears of war, and pathetic hopes of salvation through flight or propitiation, had already become the dominant motivation of the mass mind. These fears and hopes were not only a legacy of the holocaust of 1914-18. They were the product of demoralization bred of the constant retreats and surrenders of democratic governments and deliberately fostered by the appeasers to render retreat and sur- render more palatable. They furnished popular support for poli- cies which were secretly based on the calculation of an ultimate Fascist assault upon Russia.

When in the Ides of March, 1939, under circumstances which will be examined below, the hideous realization dawned upon those in power in London and Paris that this calculation was utterly false, it was too late to reverse in five months the conse- quences of the preceding five years. It became clear at a stroke that the Fascist TripUce aimed at the annihilation of the Western Powers first, and only later, if at all, at the destruction of the Soviet Union. This had been clear from the beginning to many Western joumaUsts and intellectuals. This had been clearly stated years before in Mein Kajnpf. But it became clear to the ruling politicians of the democracies only in March, 1939. By then the French alliance system was already broken, the League of Nations was a wreck, the masses were demoralized, the classes were hopelessly confused by new alarms, old hopes, and daily disillusionments. Nothing would suffice at home in the short time left to save the Western Powers but an immediate and dramatic regeneration of popular faith in Rationalism, LiberaHsm, and Patriotism. But for this it was much too late. Nothing would suffice abroad to meet the menace but an alliance with Russia to restore some semblance of a balance of power against the TripUce. This was still a possibility, despite the deep distrust with which the men of the Kremlin viewed the repentant appeasers. But this step was beyond the power of the Chamberlains and the Dala- diers, and these men would not yield to new leaders who might have paid the price.

In this wise, in the last hour, the West was condemned to war and to defeat and death.

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West of Europe lies the new Europe which is America, wrested by Europeans from the Indians and the wilderness. East of Europe lies the other new Europe which is Russia, wrested by Europeans from the Mongols and Tartars who once ruled the plains of Asia. Both of these great Continental communities had long since be- come an integral part of the cultural world of Greater Europe, even though many of their peoples, and many West Europeans, were unable to grasp this fact. Beyond Europe, the broader poHtical problem of the 20th century was one of the relationships between the Old World and the new worlds to the East and West. Could America, Western Europe and Russia co-operate in the post-Versailles reorganization of the world society in such wise as to enable their common civilization to prevail over the threats of inner barbarism bom out of disorganization and break- down? Could America and Russia aid Western Europe to hold the new barbarism in check, once it had estabhshed itself and reached out for conquests? Could America and Russia save themselves from the new barbarism once it had overrun Europe?

Each of these questions admitted of an affirmative answer. Each might have received an affirmative answer had leaders and peoples recognized the unity of the world and the imperative need for common action in the common interest. Had the first question been answered affirmatively, the second would never have been posed. Had the second been answered affirmatively, the third would never have risen. History—meaning, in Gibbon's phrase, the crimes, follies and misfortunes of mankind—has already answered the first two questions in the negative. It bids fair to answer the third in like fashion.

Th e larger reasons for this result merit brief review. In essence it was due, on the one hand, to the unwillingness of Americans to recognize themselves as Europeans and to collaborate with Europeans in the work of safeguarding their security and their common heritage. It was due, on the other hand, to the unwilling- ness of West Europeans to welcome collaboration with Russians in their common task. America would not, Russia could not, save those whose salvation required American or Russian aid,

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West of Europe lies the new Europe which is America, wrested by Europeans from the Indians and the wilderness. East of Europe lies the other new Europe which is Russia, wrested by Europeans from the Mongols and Tartars who once ruled the plains of Asia. Both of these great Continental communities had long since be- come an integral part of the cultural world of Greater Europe, even though many of their peoples, and many West Europeans, were unable to grasp this fact. Beyond Europe, the broader poHtical problem of the 20th century was one of the relationships between the Old World and the new worlds to the East and West. Could America, Western Europe and Russia co-operate in the post-Versailles reorganization of the world society in such wise as to enable their common civilization to prevail over the threats of inner barbarism bom out of disorganization and break- down? Could America and Russia aid Western Europe to hold the new barbarism in check, once it had estabhshed itself and reached out for conquests? Could America and Russia save themselves from the new barbarism once it had overrun Europe?

Each of these questions admitted of an affirmative answer. Each might have received an affirmative answer had leaders and peoples recognized the unity of the world and the imperative need for common action in the common interest. Had the first question been answered affirmatively, the second would never have been posed. Had the second been answered affirmatively, the third would never have risen. History—meaning, in Gibbon's phrase, the crimes, follies and misfortunes of mankind—has already answered the first two questions in the negative. It bids fair to answer the third in like fashion.

Th e larger reasons for this result merit brief review. In essence it was due, on the one hand, to the unwillingness of Americans to recognize themselves as Europeans and to collaborate with Europeans in the work of safeguarding their security and their common heritage. It was due, on the other hand, to the unwilling- ness of West Europeans to welcome collaboration with Russians in their common task. America would not, Russia could not, save those whose salvation required American or Russian aid,

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and upon whose salvation depended the salvation of America and Russia as well. All might have saved themselves together. But by virtue of the design for death already suggested, each was forced to face its destiny alone—America in relation to Europe and Russia by choice, Europe in relation to America by necessity, Europe in relation to Russia by choice, Russia in relation to Eu- rope and America by necessity. Europe's final choices and neces- sities will be dealt with at length below. The general nature of America's choice and Russia's necessity may here be noted.

Fifty-five gentlemen meeting in the City of Brotherly Love in the summer of the year of our Lord 1787 at length attached their signatures to a document reflecting their fears of too much government, too pure democracy and too hasty public decisions. This document provided (Article II, Section i, § 2) that treaties might be made by the President of the United States "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." By virtue of fidelity to this formula, the United States of America failed to become a member of the League of Nations or of the Permanent Court of International Justice. O n March 19, 1920, the final Senate vote on the resolu- tion to approve ratification of the Covenant was taken. There were 49 votes for and 3 5 against. The necessary two-thirds was lacking by 7 votes. On January 29, 1935, the final Senate vote on the World Court Protocols was taken. There were 52 votes for and 36 against. The necessary two-thirds was lacking by 7 votes. "Our thanks are due to Almighty God," said Father Coughlin, "that America retains her sovereignty. Congratulations to the aroused people of the United States who, by more than two hundred thousand telegrams containing at least one million names, demanded that the principles established by Washington and Jefferson shall keep us free from foreign entanglements and European hatreds."

Despite this sentiment, there is much reason to believe that more than half of the citizens of the United States, as well as more than half of the Senators and Representatives, in both cases favored American participation in the new adventure in international order. But the minority was larger than one-third. The United States therefore eschewed co-operation with the two great insti- tutions which American leadership had planned and imposed on the governments of Western Europe. All of the other twenty-one

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sovereignties of the Western hemisphere from the Arctic to the 49th parallel and from the Rio Grande to Cape Horn assumed membership in Woodrow Wilson's League. But the largest, rich- est and most powerful State in the world, having helped decisively to win the war and make the peace, would have no hand in reshaping the world society of which it was an inseparable part.

Had the choice been different, the role of the League of Na - tions would have been different and the ultimate fate of Europe and America would have been different. This admits, it is true, of no conclusive proof. Had the United States become a member of the League and had its spokesmen acted in the manner of Laval and Hoare or Blum and Halifax or Daladier and Chamberlain, the result might have been the same as if America had never joined. It is arguable, however, that active participation from the outset by the Power whose weight was decisive in world economy and world politics would have altered decisively the entire world scene. Th e membership of Canada and, at one time or another, of all the Latin-American Republics, could not offset the absence of the great Colossus of Transatlantis.

Apart from Leagues and Courts, the United States might still have collaborated through traditional channels in building world order, in checking aggression, in helping to preserve a prepon- derance of power on the side of the democracies. In the 1920's Washington did indeed make a significant contribution toward disarmament and the "outlawry of war." Both moves were popu- lar with pacifists. They aroused no wrath among provincial patriots, since they required no "foreign entanglements"—i.e. no responsibilities and therefore, in theory, no risks. (In the United States as elsewhere, the physiology of decadence manifested itself in the widespread view that risks could be avoided by shunning responsibilities, and that escape from duty was the best road to escape from danger. That the exact opposite is the case occurred to few.) In the 1930's, however, these gestures no longer suf- ficed. The second question was posed. Could America lend effec- tive aid to other Powers in checking the march of aggression? The answer was affirmative—if America would. But America would not. In the first test, to be sure, before the American Con- gress or public had expressed themselves, the tentative steps of Secretary of State Stimson toward common action against Japan were frustrated by the refusal of Sir John Simon to co-operate.

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But this first defeat begot later defeats and strengthened those who cried out against "intervention" and "involvement." The first question was answered. Here again the Nemesis of Rationalism, Liberalism and Pa- triotism worked its will, for the United States was a community not essentially different in the structure of its society and in the beliefs of its people from the Western European democracies. The gap between what citizens needed to do for their own security and what citizens wanted to believe for their own enjoy- ment was equally wide. It was never closed. A generation of intel- lectuals, scornful of emotion and wedded to Reason, helped to destroy Reason and enthrone emotion as the guide to national action by "debunking" the slogans of 1917. They demonstrated in scholarly fashion that the Republic was "dragged into war," contrary to its will and against its interests, by Wall Street bank- ers, greedy exporters, sordid arms merchants and British propa- gandists. That this was untrue was immaterial. This is what people wished to believe—the more so as half-conscious feelings of inse- curity and guilt over the defection of 1920 predisposed them to grasp at every rationalization of post-war retreat from interna- tional responsibilities.

Liberalism contributed toward the same result. The i8th cen- tury Constitution, with its checks-and-balances and its purposeful, fragmentation of authority among President, Congress, Courts, States and electorate, made it politically impossible for any Presi- dent and Secretary of State, whatever their intention and however firm their grasp of the issue, to commit America to any policy involving duties and risks. Many 20th century Liberals, moreover, were imbued with blind pacifism which sought to escape the terrors of war not by organizing the world for peace but by refusing to oppose war-makers. They damned British imperialism, French militarism and the Treaty of Versailles. They defended the aspirations of Germany, Italy and Japan in the name of "justice," and thereby unwittingly played the game of Fascist aggressors and Tor y appeasers abroad. Their "Populist" and "Progressive" tradition, stemming from Bryan, the first Roosevelt and other reformers, was a tradition mingled with provincialism and shot through with xenophobia and distrust of "Europe." In the Senate of the Republic the great isolationists were not all "Liberals." But the great "Liberals" were almost all isolationists,

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pledged to vote down any statute or treaty making possible com- mon political action with other Powers. The freedoms of democ- racy, moreover, gave wide scope to all preachers of panaceas. Th e result was not wisdom or unity, but a Babel of tongues urging movement in all directions at once and thereby preventing any movement in any direction. Americans of the post-Wilson gen- eration were unable to devise any acceptable liberal program which touched the realities of the world beyond America and took cognizance of America's place in that world.

Patriotism moved Americans in the same direction. By the most prevalent definitions, to be "patriotic" meant to be anti-European and anti-internationalist. Hot anger against the totalitarian States expressed itself in verbal denunciation which always stopped short of any action, or any commitment to act, that might involve risk of war. Diplomatic non-recognition of the fruits of conquest was permissible because it was as innocuous as it was futile. But any economic pressure against aggressors, apart from ineffective private boycotts, was banned lest it lead to friction and danger of conflict. Military or naval pressure was at all times unthinkable. Th e patriotic youth of the land resolved never again to risk its skins on foreign battlefields. Patriotic age applauded. Love of country became so fervent that its practitioners insisted upon dying only on American battlefields. That persistence in this high resolve might spell the doom of America was irrelevant. Most patriots preferred to believe that America could live alone and like it. They assured themselves that refusal to risk blood and treasure abroad would release them from the need of risking any- thing anywhere.

These attitudes and desires eventuated in public policies which had the effect of making the world safe for aggression and making America the economic ally of the aggressors. The "neutraUty" statutes of 1935-37 forbade the selling of arms and the lending of money to both sides in the Spanish civil strife and to all bellig- erents alike in all wars abroad. Complete "impartiality" was observed as between aggressors and their victims, law-breakers and law-keepers, enemies and friends, wrong and right. In the Far East the statutes were never invoked. Americans remained free to sell and lend impartially to- Chinese and Japanese. Th e wa r lords of Tokio were the beneficiaries, since they were able by military action to reduce such small imports of American supplies

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as China was able to buy. They were able conversely to purchase in America scrap-iron, oil, trucks and planes for the conquest of China. In the Ethiopian war, the new "neutrality" was fully applied. Italy, in no need of American arms and money, was denied access to them, but was permitted to buy oil in abundance for Badoglio's bombers and tanks. Ethiopia, in desperate need of money and arms, was denied both. II Duce expressed gratitude for American aid in his conquest. In Spain the policy was the same with the same result. American arms and money were barred to Madrid and to Burgos, but they went freely to Rome, Berlin and Lisbon where friendly governments interested in "saving Spain from Bolshevism" supplied Burgos with arms and money. Franco was grateful.

In the United States pacifists, patriots and isolationists rejoiced that America had been "kept out of war" by connivance in the murder of the Spanish Republic. Catholics and conservatives rejoiced that Religion and Property had been protected against "Communism." The "Neutrality" Act of 1937 served notice on Hitler that Britain and France would be denied American arms and money as soon as he might attack them. Congress refused the President's pleas to change the Act until after war had begun. During September and October of 1939 the Allies were forbidden to buy American arms or borrow American money. The new statute of November 4, 1939, permitted them to buy arms. But in the name of "cash-and-carry" it still forbade them to borrow money and forbade American ships to call at their ports. These prohibitions, involving the abandonment of that "freedom of the seas" for which America had fought four wars, were "impar- tial" in form and wholly one-sided in fact. They were extended to each new victim of Nazi aggression as soon as Hitler attacked. The second question was answered. No t only did America will- fully deny effective aid to Western Europe to hold the bar- barians in check, but without willing the results of its acts it gave effective aid to the barbarians in overrunning Western Europe.

As for Russia, there will be doubt in many minds regarding the view that the Communist State deserves to be regarded as part of European civilization. There will be greater doubt over the view that the U.S.S.R. can be deemed in any sense an actual or potential defender of Western European culture. Here is an "Asiatic des- potism." Here is another totalitarian dictatorship. Here is the

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betrayer of the Western Powers who joined the barbarians against the West. Despite these judgments, which are well-taken, two facts stand against them. One is the fact that in the geo-politics of the world balance of power Germany and Russia, like Russia and Japan (any Germany, any Russia, and any Japan) are neigh- bors and therefore rivals and potential foes, whereas Russia is the logical ally of the neighboring enemies of its neighbors—of France and Britain in Europe and of the United States in Asia and the Pacific. Without Russian support France and Britain cannot hold Germany in check, any more than Russia can achieve this result without Anglo-French support. Without American support Russia may be unable to hold Japan in check, just as America is helpless vis-a-vis Japan in Eastern Asia in the absence of collaboration with Russia. The other fact is that in its funda- mental purposes (though not in its practice) Communism differs from Fascism in that its apostles envisage human society not in terms which repudiate the whole Western cultural tradition but in terms which seek to affirm and extend that tradition.^ For these

1 The point is well put by Leonard Woolf in Barbarians at the Gate, Victor GoUancz, London, 1939, pp. 191-95: "It is often said, not by reactionaries, Fascists, and barbarians, but by people whose whole lives have shown them to be good Socialists and good Europeans, that there is nothing to choose between the dictatorship of Stalin and that of Hitler or MussoUni, that in Russia as in Germany and Italy a ruthless autocracy has established itself, the dictatorship of a party or rather of a small group controlling a party, and that the group uses its power, without tolerance or humanity or justice, to suppress all opposition and so all poUtical liberty and freedom of opinion or speech. I beheve this view to be wrong. The Soviet Government, whatever may be the results of its f ractice, is in its ultimate objective on the side of civilization, whereas the ascist dictatorships are on the side of barbarism. This is not a theoretical, but a fundamental and important distinction. Fascism deliberately aims at creating a master-slave society, founded upon force and upon the social relation between the few who command and the many who blindly obey. That is the only social ideal of those who control the German and Italian Governments, and their suppression of liberty and truth, their violence, intolerance, and savage inhumanity spring naturally from their ultimate aims. Being barbarians they follow out consistently the logic of their facts and of barbarism; that is part of their strength. But Stalin and the Soviet Government cannot escape from the consequences of their own ultimate beliefs. They are the heirs of Marx and

on the side of western civihzation. Th e

ultimate aim of the founders of modem socialism was not a society of masters and slaves, but of free men. Liberty and equality were their standards of social value; violence, repression, disciphne, intolerance, inhumanity were not symp- toms of communal strength, but of incomplete Communism and therefore of incomplete civihzation. Their object was to sweep away 'the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally'; they even looked forward to the with-

Engels, and Marx and Engels were

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The Last Frontiers

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reasons the Soviet Union may be viewed as part of Europe, as

Europe's other frontier, as the State which shared with America

a duty to itself to act with Western Europe against the bar-

barians, however unable or unwilling its leaders may have been to discharge that duty.

Between 1920 and 1933 the diplomatic role of Russia was similar to the role of America: non-membership in the League, profound distrust of Western Europe, promotion of disarmament

and outlawry of war. Between 1933 and 1938 the U.S.S.R. played

a role which was the antithesis of that of the United States: it

joined the League; it offered Western Europe co-operation in the organization of collective security; it offered economic and mili- tary aid against aggression. But it found in each test that its offers were spurned. And in 1939-40 Stalin played the role that Cham- berlain and Daladier had sought to play earUer; he helped to unleash Fascist aggression against the Western Powers whose

ering away of the State; for their ultimate objective was the exact opposite of the Fascist's, it was the promotion, enrichment, and widening of the indi- vidual's existence, the creation of a community in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. That too is the ulti- mate objective of Stalin, of the Soviet Government, and of the Communist party. It puts them upon the side of civilization against the barbarians at the gate. It colours their practice as well as their "But though the ultimate objective of Communism and the Soviet Govern- ment is the antithesis of that of Fascism, namely western civilization, their atti- tude towards the communal control of power, democracy, and the social ideas and standards of western civilization has had disastrous effects upon the internal position and upon their achievements inside Russia. They are, as I have said, committing precisely the same mistake upside down as the democratic Liberals of the nineteenth century. The Liberals attempted to establish a civilized society of free men by a system of political democracy with a limited amount of lib- erty, knowledge, truth, equality, justice, and tolerance, while they allowed the economic system to enslave three-quarters of the population and set an in- exorable hmit to the distribution of liberty, knowledge, etc., and therefore to civilization itself, through the community. They tried to establish civilization while refusing to alter the economic system in the only way which would have made the extension of civilization possible. They pursued two incompatible ends and, therefore, disrupted the society from within. Th e Soviet Government is doing the same thing from the other end. It has estabUshed the only economic system compatible with western civilization in the industrialized societies of the twentieth century. As far as economics are concerned, it has laid founda- tions which would make possible the development of a real community of free men. But upon this magnificent foundation it has imposed a political system of dictatorship and a contempt for liberty, truth, tolerance, and humanity which are incompatible with civilization and which made completely impossi- ble the attainment of its ultimate objective, a society of free men. By doing this the regime continually weakens itself, for it is disrupting society from within."

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leaders had attempted to unleash Fascist aggression against the Soviet Union. Th e Nemesis of Moscovy was of a different design from that of America and Western Europe. Close inspection however, re- veals similarities in reverse. Soviet foreign policy in relation to French and British was somewhat like Alice's Looking-Glass House: the rooms are the same, "only the things go the other way," and "the books are something like our books, only the words go the wrong way." For years Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay lived in fear of Moscow and looked to the Fascist Caesars for protection, hoping that Fascism would destroy Communism, and perhaps itself in the process, and leave the West in peace. For years the Narkomindel lived in fear of the capi- talist democracies and, when efforts to co-operate with them against Fascism failed, looked at last to the new Caesars for pro- tection against the West (and even for the destruction of the West), hoping that Fascism would destroy the Western Powers, and perhaps itself in the process, and leave the U.S.S.R. in peace. Had the Tory calculus proven correct, France and Britain would have become the great neutrals, rejoicing in the ruin of Russia but fearing the power of the victorious Reich. The Communist cal- culus proved correct. Russia therefore became the great neutral, rejoicing in the ruin of the West but fearing the power of the vic- torious Reich. Stalin's assumptions of 1939, however, proved too correct for comfort—or perhaps not quite correct. They rested, as did the fatal calculus of Chamberlain and Daladier, on the hope of a long and ruinous war of attrition between the two enemy camps, not on a sudden knock-out blow which would leave Fas- cism's silent ally in mortal danger from the victor.

By the advent of 1941 that victor was threatening both America and Russia with the gravest dangers their governments and peoples had ever been called upon to face. The third question remained as yet unanswered. There was little in the record, however, to suggest that it would be answered differently from the two ques- tions which had preceded it. Where wisdom and will are lacking, miracles are rare.

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CHAPTER

APPEASEMENT

I .

"PEAC E

FO R

TWO

TRIUMPHANT

OU R

TIME "

N E W YEAR'S DAY of 1939 dawned like other days in the mid- Pacific at the international date-line. Hour after hour, time-zone b y time-zone, over the turning face of the eastward-rolling planet, the year to come crowded the old year into the past. In the South Seas, in Eastern Asia, belatedly and by stages far across the great Eurasian land-mass, people tumbled sleepily out of a billion beds—some with the first light, some before break of day, others more fortunate long after dawn, each to his daily tasks. Some twelve hours later, as sunrise drove night westward, other hundreds of millions in Europe and Africa rolled out of other beds. Six hours after they had breakfasted still more millions be- stirred themselves throughout the Americas, amid mid-winter cold in the broad Northland and in mid-summer heat in the nar- row Southland. They rose to recover from hangovers, to enjoy the last day of the holiday season, to greet again the beginning of another cycle of the earth's slow journey around the sun.

In all this there was nothing noteworthy. This had happened each dawn over much of the earth for a million days and would doubtless happen again for a million days to come. The private lives of the two billion earth-dwellers were doubtless little differ- ent during this New Year's Day from what they had been on others. Public events were in few lands sufficiently remarkable to warrant headlines in the holiday newspapers. Socialists in Ne w Zealand were still celebrating an election victory. In Tokio diplo- mats pondered, but not too seriously, over a vigorous note re- ceived the day before from Washington insisting upon respect for

35

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CHAPTER

APPEASEMENT

I .

"PEAC E

FO R

TWO

TRIUMPHANT

OU R

TIME "

N E W YEAR'S DAY of 1939 dawned like other days in the mid- Pacific at the international date-line. Hour after hour, time-zone b y time-zone, over the turning face of the eastward-rolling planet, the year to come crowded the old year into the past. In the South Seas, in Eastern Asia, belatedly and by stages far across the great Eurasian land-mass, people tumbled sleepily out of a billion beds—some with the first light, some before break of day, others more fortunate long after dawn, each to his daily tasks. Some twelve hours later, as sunrise drove night westward, other hundreds of millions in Europe and Africa rolled out of other beds. Six hours after they had breakfasted still more millions be- stirred themselves throughout the Americas, amid mid-winter cold in the broad Northland and in mid-summer heat in the nar- row Southland. They rose to recover from hangovers, to enjoy the last day of the holiday season, to greet again the beginning of another cycle of the earth's slow journey around the sun.

In all this there was nothing noteworthy. This had happened each dawn over much of the earth for a million days and would doubtless happen again for a million days to come. The private lives of the two billion earth-dwellers were doubtless little differ- ent during this New Year's Day from what they had been on others. Public events were in few lands sufficiently remarkable to warrant headlines in the holiday newspapers. Socialists in Ne w Zealand were still celebrating an election victory. In Tokio diplo- mats pondered, but not too seriously, over a vigorous note re- ceived the day before from Washington insisting upon respect for

35

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Appeasement

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the Open Door and for American rights in China. Japanese troops clashed with guerrillas in Mongolia. On the fourth day of the Ne w Year, Premier Prince Konoye resigned under the pressure of the militarists who insisted not only on a free hand in China but on control over corporation funds and dividends at home. He was replaced by Baron Kichiro Hiranuma who had fewer scruples about bending the necks of Japanese capitalists to the yoke of the army oligarchy. In Chungking on January i Chiang Kai-shek's police arrested some hundreds of followers of Wang Ching-wei who had sent a message from his refuge in Indo-China urging peace with Japan. For this he was expelled from the Kuomintang and deprived of all his posts.

T o the North and West stretched the slovenly vastness of Rus- sia. In Moscow Emelyan Yaroslavsky, head of the atheist society,

admonished Russian children in the columns of Bezbozhnik not to obey priests or religious parents. Red Star, organ of the Red Army, informed its readers that the British ruling classes had betrayed China, Ethiopia, Spain, Austria and Czechoslovakia. "Each time the Fascist beast has opened its bloody maw a new victim was thrown in. Such feeding of animals seeking prey in all directions is called 'pacification.' World Fascism is sharpening swords and

sabres against us, but we are

ing forces of a united front of workers of the whole With us is the wise, perspicacious fearless, unhesitating and genial marshal of Communism, the Great Stalin." In Poland, Wladyslaw Sikorski, General and Ex-Premier, averred that "localization of any war in Eastern Europe would be quite impossible." T o the South, in Bucharest, Premier Miron Cristea and his ministers for the first time greeted King Carol in court with the Fascist salute, and promised in an address to purge Jews from businesses and professions—in order to "preserve Rumania for the Rumanians."

Daybreak in Germany brought floods of words in praise of the Great Hitler and of the victories of the past year. In a symposium in the ZiDolf Uhr Blatt Gobbels declared: "National Socialism's attitude toward Jewry brooks no compromise." A. S. Lees, a leader of the British Fascist League, contended that Churchill, Eden, Duff-Cooper and Greenwood were all tools of the Jews who "devote all their energies to making Britain believe that war is inevitable." Horace Greeley Hjalmar Schacht did not know that twenty days later he would be relieved by the Fiihrer of his duties

Wit h us are the grow-

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"Peace for Our Time"

37

as President of the Reichsbank in favor of Walter Funk, who had already succeeded him a year before as Minister of Economics. Or if he knew, he said nothing. In Prague hope and optimism were expressed by Premier Rudolf Beran. His threats to call in the Nazis if Benes accepted Soviet aid against the Reich had precipitated surrender to the Anglo-French ultimatum of September. He was confident of cordial relations with the victors of Munich.

In Rome preparations were under way for the coming visit of Chamberlain and Halifax. But French Ambassador Andre Fran- 9ois-Poncet was troubled. He had come to the Italian capital from Berhn to promote "understanding" with the gift of French recog- nition of Italian title to Ethiopia. On November 30, however, the Italian deputies and their friends in the gallery had greeted him with cries of "Tunis! Nice! Savoy! Corsica! Jibuti!" On New Year's Day he made a speech at the Embassy to members of the French colony:

France will defend her possessions, her patrimony and the material and moral heritage left by the sacrifices of preceding The Munich spirit seeks to bring nearer to each other the two axes re-

gardless of differences in regime, to complete the improvement of Franco- German relations with an improvement of Franco-Italian relations, to

I have brought here with unre-

served good will and with sincere esteem for the great achievements of present-day Italy a desire and a hope to solve the difficulties and stamp

out the quarrels dividing France and Italy so as to restore between them that collaboration and harmony that should in any case be an adequate expression of their natural affinities. Although circumstances have not up to now permitted these hopes to materialize, we shall not in any way

abandon the task we

build peace, to halt the arms

have begun. W e shall persevere.

In the Ambassador's own capital politics took no holiday. Pre- mier Edouard Daladier battled in the Chamber, after a disorderly all-night session, with the men of the Left who had been his former allies in the Popular Front. Five times he posed the question of confidence on budget items. Five times he was victorious by a margin of over 100 votes supplied b y the Center and Extreme Right. Daladier's own Radical Socialists for the first time split completely with their erstwhile Socialist and Communist allies. They voted as a unit with the Right. Daladier missed the 10.15 train for Toulon. But he departed at noon, leaving Paul Reynaud to secure approval of the budget. In this the diminutive Finance

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Appeasement

Triumphant

Minister was successful in the course of the afternoon. The Cham- ber adjourned until January lo. Daladier sailed from the Mediter- ranean naval base that night for a journey to Corsica and Tunisia, symbolizing defiance of Italian demands. South of the Pyrenees war-bled Spain enjoyed a brief lull. With the greatest concentra- tion of engines of war since 1918, Franco's forces were slowly pushing toward Borjas Blancas and Artesa, which they entered on January 4. Daladier was officially unconcerned. He had agreed with Chamberlain that Franco's victory would contribute to the "appeasement" of Italy.

In London the day was quiet. The annual New Year's honors list conferred upon Sir James Jeans, physicist, and Lord Chatfield, Admiral of the fleet, the "Order of Aierit," and granted baronies to Sir Maurice Hankey, Cecil Harmsworth, Sir Laurence Philipps and Sir Frederick Arthur Greer. Th e diplomats who had helped to engineer the surrender of Czechoslovakia to Hitler were not forgotten: to Basil Newton, British Minister in Prague, went a knighthood of the Order of St. Michael and St. George; to Sir Nevile Henderson and Sir Alexander Cadogan, Grand Crosses of St. Michael and St. George; to Frank Ashton-Gwatkin and Wil- liam Strang, titles of Companions of the Order of the Bath. Most of the British public still believed that Chamberlain had averted war in September and laid the bases for enduring peace with the Reich. On his Christmas card the Prime Minister had proudly pic- tured his Munich-bound plane. Only a few sharp minds saw through this sham.^ Others accepted at face value the piece of paper signed at Munich on September 30 by Chamberlain and Hit- ler, and waved so cheerily by the Prime Minister as he alighted from his plane at Heston Airport. It pledged "consultation" and reiterated "the desire of our two peoples never to go to war

1 T o take but one example, Professor R. G. Collingwood, distinguished philos-

opher and historian, wrote in his Autobiography (Oxford University Press, 1939) pp. 165-6: "The betrayal of Czechoslovakia was only a third case of the same policy by which the 'National' government had betrayed Abyssinia and Spain; and I was less interested in the fact itself than in the methods by which it

was accomplished: the carefully engineered war-scare in the country at large, officially launched by the simultaneous issue of gas-masks and of the prime minister's emotional broadcast, two days before his flight to Munich, and the carefully staged hysterical scene in parliament on the following night. These things were in the established tradition of Fascist dictatorial methods; except that whereas the Italian and German dictators sway mobs by appeal to the thirst for glory and national aggrandizement, the English prime minister did it by playing on sheer, stark terror. H e gained his point."

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"Peace for Our

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39

again." ^ From the balcony of 10 Downing Street Chamberlain had told the applauding crowds: "My good friends, this is the second time in our history that there has come back from Germany to Downing Street peace with honor. I believe it is peace for our time."

Yet the turn of the year brought doubts. The Nazi pogrom of November had shocked Britain. On December 19 Chamberlain had defended Munich once more before Commons as the only

alternative to war (with Germany, Italy, Japan and Rebel Spain!)

he

. that they are prepared to make their contribution to peace." N o new hope emerged from the early January visit to the Reich of Sir Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England—to sponsor the baptism of the grandchild of his bosom friend, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht. The flight of investors from the pound to the dollar indicated lack of confidence . , .

These things seemed of small moment to the great Megalopolis of Transatlantis to which the gold flowed across the sea. The Broadway theatrical season was at its height. Among the offerings were "Kiss the Boys Good-bye," "The Primrose Path," "What a Life," and "Outward Bound." Washington, always provincial in comparison to Manhattan, had no theatre to which to escape. The shadows of Berlin and Lima hung heavy over officialdom. The irrepressible Harold Ickes had denounced Henry Ford and Colo- nel Lindbergh for accepting Nazi decorations and denounced the Nazi Jew-baiters as "unlettered, benighted and bestial." Chilly Sumner Welles had coldly rebuffed German protests. Roosevelt had dined with Ickes to show approval. The American press ap- plauded. After the November pogrom, Ambassader Hugh Wilson had been called home to "report." He was not to return. Washing- ton warned Berlin. Washington warned Tokio. At Lima on

Decembe r 27 th e 107

votin g delegates of th e 21 American Repub -

lics signed n o resolutions and declarations, including a Declara- tion of American Principles and a sonorous manifesto of solidarity ("The Declaration of Lima") pledging "consultation" in the face of any danger to the "peace, security, or territorial integrity" of any American Republic. On New Year's Day, John W . White of the Neiv York Times reported from Chile that agents of the Bena-

.

and received

said

sadly of

a thumping vote of his Nazi friends: "I

confidence, 340 t o 143. But

am

still waiting for a sign .

1 Text in Europe on the Eve, p. 446.

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Appeasement

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vides dictatorship in Peru had surrounded the conference with an atmosphere of "censorship, intimidation and spying." But Washington made light of his charges. On January 4 the Chief Executive addressed the Congress in ringing words which called for action, for new resolve, for revision of "neutrality" legisla- tion:

A war which threatened to envelop the world in flames has been

averted, but it has become increasingly clear that peace is not assured.

All about us rage undeclared wars—military and economic. All about us

grow more deadly armaments—military and economic. All about us are

threats of new aggression—military and economic. Storms from abroad

directly challenge three institutions indispensable to Americans, now as

always. The first is religion. It is the source of the other two—democracy

and international good faith

There comes a time in the affairs of men when they must prepare to

defend not their homes alone but the tenets of faith and humanity on

which their churches, their governments, and their very civilization are

founded. The defense of religion, of democracy, and of good faith among

nations is all the same fight. T o save one we must now make up our minds

to save all

The mere fact that we rightly decline to intervene with arms to pre-

vent acts of aggression does not mean that we must act as if there were

no aggression at all. Words may be futile, but war is not the only means

of commanding a decent respect for the opinions of mankind. There are

many methods short of war, but stronger and more effective than mere

words, of bringing home to aggressor governments the aggregate senti-

ments of our own people. At the very least, we can and should avoid any

action, or any lack of action, which will encourage, assist, or build up an

aggressor. W e have learned that when we deliberately try to legislate

neutrality, our neutrality laws may operate unevenly and unfairly—may

actually give aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim. Th e instinct

of self-preservation should warn us that we ought not to let that happen

any more

Events abroad have made it increasingly clear to the American people

that dangers within are less to be feared than dangers from without

Once I prophesied that this generation of Americans had a rendezvous

with destiny. That prophesy comes true. T o us much

expected. This generation will "nobly save or meanly lose the last best

hope of earth

which if followed the world will forever applaud and God must forever

bless."

is given; more is

The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just—a way

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Spain t January i8, i^s9

4^

But the way was not to be followed. Congress would not heed. Money for arms? Yes. Action to entangle America in international efforts to halt aggression? No. If Britain and France would not or could not act, why should America act? Later, when Britain and France acted, America would still not act, save within the limits of the President's phrase "short of war"—three words which be- came a fatal fetish for Congress and the masses. In January, how- ever, Britain was Chamberlain and France was Daladier. Hence no action.

2.

TH E

SPANISH

t JANUAR Y

REPUBLIC

i8 ,

1939

The violent death of Republican Spain during the early months of the New Year, after two and a half years of heroic struggle against the forces of international Fascism, constituted the last great victory of "appeasement." This death was willed by the dominant personalities in the British and French Governments. It is tempting to linger over the tale in its entirety: the plotting of the generals in the Spring of 1936 in co-operation with German and Italian agents; the rebellion in Morocco in mid-July of the first year of blood; the flight of Franco in a British plane to take com- mand of the Rebel forces; ^ the heartbreaking initiative of Leon Blum in proposing that all the Powers deprive the Spanish Repub- licans of weapons for their defense: the futile rage of his followers in the People's Front, shouting "Planes for Spain!" but quite un- able to move the Quai d'Orsay and Downing Street from their course; the cosmic farce of the "Non-intervention" Committee and the subsequent co-operation of the United States in cutting off

1 The plane was a private one chartered ostensibly for tourist purposes. The British Government was presumably unaware of the fact that British territory was in effect made a base of revolutionary operations against a friendly State and that British subjects, in violation of British statutes, were parties to a con- spiracy to overthrow the Spanish Republic. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Britain was here guilty of violating the rights of Spain under international law by virtue of failure to observe "due diligence" to prevent such acts from taking place. The responsible persons were never indicted or punished by British authorities. They were rewarded by Franco in June, 1939: Major Hugh B. C. Pollard was made Hidalgo of the Imperial Order of Red Arrows; his daughter Diana and her friend, Dorothy Watson, received medals of the same order. The pilot, Mr. C. W . H. Bebb, had been honored earlier with the Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Red Arrows.

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Spain t January i8, i^s9

4^

But the way was not to be followed. Congress would not heed. Money for arms? Yes. Action to entangle America in international efforts to halt aggression? No. If Britain and France would not or could not act, why should America act? Later, when Britain and France acted, America would still not act, save within the limits of the President's phrase "short of war"—three words which be- came a fatal fetish for Congress and the masses. In January, how- ever, Britain was Chamberlain and France was Daladier. Hence no action.

2.

TH E

SPANISH

t JANUAR Y

REPUBLIC

i8 ,

1939

The violent death of Republican Spain during the early months of the New Year, after two and a half years of heroic struggle against the forces of international Fascism, constituted the last great victory of "appeasement." This death was willed by the dominant personalities in the British and French Governments. It is tempting to linger over the tale in its entirety: the plotting of the generals in the Spring of 1936 in co-operation with German and Italian agents; the rebellion in Morocco in mid-July of the first year of blood; the flight of Franco in a British plane to take com- mand of the Rebel forces; ^ the heartbreaking initiative of Leon Blum in proposing that all the Powers deprive the Spanish Repub- licans of weapons for their defense: the futile rage of his followers in the People's Front, shouting "Planes for Spain!" but quite un- able to move the Quai d'Orsay and Downing Street from their course; the cosmic farce of the "Non-intervention" Committee and the subsequent co-operation of the United States in cutting off

1 The plane was a private one chartered ostensibly for tourist purposes. The British Government was presumably unaware of the fact that British territory was in effect made a base of revolutionary operations against a friendly State and that British subjects, in violation of British statutes, were parties to a con- spiracy to overthrow the Spanish Republic. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Britain was here guilty of violating the rights of Spain under international law by virtue of failure to observe "due diligence" to prevent such acts from taking place. The responsible persons were never indicted or punished by British authorities. They were rewarded by Franco in June, 1939: Major Hugh B. C. Pollard was made Hidalgo of the Imperial Order of Red Arrows; his daughter Diana and her friend, Dorothy Watson, received medals of the same order. The pilot, Mr. C. W . H. Bebb, had been honored earlier with the Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Red Arrows.

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arms to the Madrid regime; the German and Italian invasions; ^ the attack upon Madrid in October 1936 by Mola's four columns, con- fident that Fascist sympathizers within, comprising the original "Fifth Column," would dehver the capital into their hands; the I ith hour arrival of Russian aid; the sacrifices of the Spanish masses in resisting year after year the siege of their citadel and in fighting stubbornly an unequal war in which they were doomed to defeat by the policies of Britain, France and the United States; the sickening subterfuges of the diplomats; the impassioned resist- ance of the Loyalist troops fighting barehanded against German and Italian machines. But these things have elsewhere been told. Only the close of the tragedy need here be recounted.

All the elements of Europe's tragedy and the world's tragedy were here in miniature and in the exact proportions in which they were compounded in the larger drama. Nobles, bankers and priests supported military adventurers against workers, peasants and the lesser bourgeoisie. They feared that an irreverent parliamentary democracy, speaking for the masses, would reduce or destroy the prerogatives of those with land, money and sanctity. The forces of democracy awakened too late to their peril. Once awake, they fought with far greater vigor than democrats elsewhere, since free- dom was for them a new experience which they cherished, rather than an old and empty word whose meaning they had forgotten. Rome and Berlin at once intervened to insure Rebel victory for reasons of Realpolitik. Their motives had little to do with ideology or economics, but much to do with the desire of the Caesars to complete the encirclement of France and to challenge Anglo- French power in the middle sea.

London at once intervened to further the Axis design. Fearful Paris, frightened by British threats of desertion, led the way. Anglo-French nobles, bankers and priests deemed the cause of Spanish nobles, bankers and priests more sacred than the national

interests of their country. Anglo-French politicians were not more

far-sighted than

priests and politicians, save the servile bondsmen of the Caesars, would be brought to utter ruin by these decisions was too much

those they represented.

Tha t all nobles, bankers,

1 Ciano and Goring revealed in May, 1939, that German and Italian troops, some of them disguised as tourists, went to Spain to aid Franco's revolt at the outset of the rebellion and that these forces had been prepared for action long before th e proclamation of revol t in Morocc o on Jul y 16, 1936. Cf. NY T 5.31 and 6.1.39.

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for any of the participants to foresee. Doubting electorates were readily silenced by solemn affirmations that Franco loved Britain and France; that the Loyalists were Bolsheviks, atheists, cutthroats and scoundrels; and that in any case the sacrifice of Spain was the price of "peace." Moscow intervened in a vain hope of saving France's southern frontier from Fascist control and of stirring London and Paris to action in their own defense. From first to last the story conformed in motive and plot to the stories of China, Ethiopia, Austria and Czechoslovakia. It foreshadowed a greater and grimmer story to come.^

The last act opened two days before Christmas 1938 with the launching of Franco's offensive against Catalonia. The Caudillo and his Nazi and Fascist aides knew that the Loyalist forces, since their Ebro counter-offensive of July, were short of guns and planes in the face of overwhelming Rebel superiority. They desired, moreover, to score new successes before Chamberlain should reach Rome. In the face of stubborn resistance, German planes and artil- lery and ItaUan tanks and infantry pushed forward on both flanks of the Catalonian line. A Loyalist counter-offensive gained some headway in Estremadura, but failed to deflect the Rebels from their major operation.

Under these circumstances, Chamberlain and Halifax, accom-

1 The tale is nowhere better told than in Freedom's Battle (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1940) by J. Alvarez Del Vayo, Foreign Minister of the Republic. N.B. p. xvii: "The foreign policy of the Republic was at no time linked with that of the Soviet Union, and the assistance and support which the latter gave during the Spanish War was not aimed at achieving a political solidarity between the two countries, but was born of the Soviet Union's desire to prevent a hostile force, able to render the French-Russian Pact practically valueless as a safe- guard for the Soviet Union, from massing on France's third frontier." P. 47:

"Non-Intervention became one of the greatest farces of our time. The long and brilliant repertoire of Italian comedy has no better spectacle to offer than this, where the debatable quaUties of Lord Plymouth as stage manager served as a foil to the dexterity and abandonment of the actors. The most intelligent review of the comedy was given in Stampa on July 20, 1937, in a single phrase—a model of simplicity and of honest and impartial dramatic criticism: 'While the diplo- mats play for time, the legionaries cut the Gordian knot with their swords.' It was only when with the fall of Barcelona they felt assured of certain victory that the totaUtarian states gave up all pretence and jeered at the childishness and passivity of the Western democracies. Now began the third stage of interven- tion, a stage of sarcasm and caustic irony and ridicule directed against the simple souls in London and Paris. A note published in the official Informazione Diplo- matica stated: 'Italy replied t o the first call of Franco on July 27, 1936: our first casualties date from this time.' All the Italian press echoed the Popolo d'ltalia:

'W e have intervened from the first moment to the last.' " P. 59: "An examination

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panied by Cadogan, prepared for their Roman holiday. Under urgent pressure from the French leaders, who feared a Tory- Fascist bargain at French expense, the British travellers stopped for tea in Paris on January lo. Bonnet expressed confidence that his guests understood the French position. In imitation of the American example, he announced that 45,000 tons of wheat would be made available to Barcelona. By January 24 only 1,700 tons had left for Spain. Sefior Pascua, Spanish Ambassador in Paris, com- mented bitterly that the wheat was "tied up with red tape." The Republic could yet be saved, not by wheat but by weapons. All arms, however, were denied to it. As his British visitors arrived, the Duce's legionnaires aided Franco's troops to capture Falser and Montblanch. On January 15 Tarragona fell.

His Majesty's Ministers conferred in Rome with Mussolini, Ciano and Pius XI, January 11-14, 1939. Mussolini's formula was "peace with justice." Chamberlain's formula was "peace by the method of negotiation." The communique of January 12 de- clared: "No new commitment, arrangement or agreement has been asked for or entered into by either Government." The visi- tors had "learned" the ItaUan viewpoint—which the Fascist press had shrieked to the world for two months. The Earl of Perth, who

of the graph of so-called exports to Germany and Italy over the past two years will show how the saviours of Spain, in the midst of their ideological preoccupa- tions, took advantage of the splendid opportunity offered them to feed their war industries, in preparation for the extension of their civilizing influence to other nations. In 1938 Germany imported from Spain 1,000,000 tons of iron ore, against 310,000 tons in 1937; 25,563 tons of copper against 7,309 in 1937; 13,167 tons of zinc where none had been imported in the preceding year. Italy also managed to provide herself—although in much smaller proportions—with some of the raw materials (principally wool) which she needed, and she now has free access to the quicksilver which she was unable to obtain by her repeated attacks on Almaden." P. 62: "According to the official statistics for the whole of the Spanish War—pubhshed in the Italian press in June 1939—there were 86420 air raids on loyalist Spain, compared with 3,979 during the Ethiopian War; 5,318 bombardment s i n wester n Europ e compare d wit h 872 i n east Africa; 11,584 ton s of explosives hurled on the Spanish people, compared with 1,500 tons on the Abyssinian Negroes. During a considerable period of the war the rebels had some 600 t o 650 first-line planes permanently at their disposal. Thi s assumes th e dispatch of thousands of machines to Spain from Germany and Italy."

The most detailed and fully-documented account of "non-intervention" is Norman Padelford's International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil Strife (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1939). Professor Padelford's scholarly work suffers, however, from the author's delusion that "non-intervention" repre- sented a triumph of "international co-operation" and prevented the spread of war.

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was scheduled to retire in April as British Ambassador to Italy, had presumably conveyed this viewpoint to London long before. As Chamberlain returned empty-handed to London, Mussolini's newspapers raged against France and indicated that all issues must wait upon Franco's final victory. Czaky visited Berlin and an- nounced Hungary's adherence to the Anti-Comintern. Britain and France belatedly followed the United States in protesting Japan's closing of the Open Door. Fascist forces moved against Barcelona.

Toward the end there were scurryings of diplomats and last hopes that Anglo-French folly might still be redeemed. On Jan- uary 14 Daladier, who had returned in triumph five days previ- ously, was visited by Blum and by Sir Eric Phipps, the British Am- bassador. Th e Socialist author of the original "non-intervention" scheme apparently pleaded for last-minute aid to Barcelona. H e received some encouragement in his belated repentance from the

Radical Socialist Premier. But Sir Eric expressed different hopes. According to a Havas communique that night: "After seeing Mr. Chamberlain the British Ambassador gave M. Daladier an account

Minister's impressions of his Rome visit. H e empha-

sized particularly the repeated assurances that Signor Mussolini gave Mr. Chamberlain of his intention to withdraw the Italian forces now in Spain, in the Balearics, and in other Spanish terri- tories after the final victory of General Franco." ^

On January 15 Bonnet met Halifax at Geneva. The Loyalist Foreign Minister, Alvarez del Vayo, also came, since the League Council was to examine the report of the International Commis- sion set up to supervise the withdrawal of foreign combatants from RepubUcan Spain—a measure which the Loyalists had voluntarily agreed to in the vain hope that Britain and France would then take action to force the withdrawal of the vastly superior German and Italian forces fighting with the Rebels. Burgos (and Rome and Berlin) insisted that foreign troops could only be withdrawn in return for Allied recognition of the belligerency of the Rebels, a step which would enable them to blockade Loyalist ports without Anglo-French objection. Chamberlain had insisted that belligerent rights could be granted only in return for full acceptance of the complex 80-page "formula" of July 5, 1938. Franco had rejected

of the Prime

1 France and Munich p. 415.

(Harper & Bros., New York, 1939) by Alexander Werth.

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the plan. Chamberlain, Halifax and Bonnet were content to do nothing more.

Their problem of silencing domestic opposition to the final sacrifice of the Spanish Republic on the Fascist altar was not too difficult. Some new voices, to be sure, were now raised on behalf of a change of course. Del Vayo, who went from Geneva to Paris in an effort to beg, buy or borrow arms to hold the Catalonian front, found many generals, politicians and journalists who were formerly pro-Franco, including Henri de Kerillis, now convinced that a Rebel victory would be a catastrophe. At a Radical-Socialist congress on January 15 Bonnet's name was booed. Senator Ber- thod was cheered when he warned that French security was in danger from Italian intervention in Spain. Daladier said nothing on the issue. Bonnet hastened back from Geneva on the following day and joined Laval, Flan din and other Munichmen in silencing all such nonsense. H e brought new assurances of Mussolini's assur- ances to Chamberlain. Flandin's pro-Franco speech in the Cham- ber on January 17 was cheered by half the house. H e argued that France must abide by "non-intervention" even if others broke their promise. This was the way of peace. This was the way of hu- manity, since any other course would prolong bloodshed. This was the way to win the friendship of Franco. He countered Blum's counter-arguments: "If you thought that Italian interven- tion in Spain could damage France's vital interests, why did you tolerate it for two years? Wh y are you choosing this moment for putting an end to non-intervention—the very moment when we have been solemnly warned that French intervention would lead to a general war?" ^ Th e French Right press shouted approval. Bonnet indicated that there would be no change in French policy unless British policy changed.

Chamberlain had no intention of changing British poUcy. "Britain firm for inaction," asserted the headlines. The Nazi Diplo- matische-Korrespondenz affirmed Germany's support of Mus- solini's warning that any aid to Barcelona would be deemed "sabotage" of non-intervention and would give Rome a free hand. While the 35,000 ton battleship Richelieu was launched at Brest (destined for ignominious ruin eighteen months later without hav-

1 Cf. Werth , op. cit., pp. 4i6f.

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ingfireda shot in defense of France), Ciano departed for Belgrade on January 17 to woo Milan Stoyadinovich, pro-Axis premier of France's erstwhile ally, and to bind Italy, Jugoslavia and Hungary into an anti-French bloc. Italian war veterans returned their French medals. Said // Tevere: "We spit in the face of the Third Republic, which patiently is wiping its face with sheets of its newspapers." All of this was as Chamberlain would have it, for it rendered easier his task of holding Paris to the line of Mediter- ranean appeasement. In this area he had assigned to Spain the rolp imposed upon Czechoslovakia in Central Europe and upon China in Eastern Asia. The House of Commons was not scheduled to re-convene until January 31. Scattered demonstrations, speeches and editorials for a change of course did not affect the Prime Minister's imperturba- bility. On January 18 he announced his decision in the form of a reply to a letter from Laborite Clement Attlee, Leader of His Majesty's Loyal Opposition. Attlee's letter asserted:

The gravity of the situation in Spain compels me to request the im- mediate summoning of Parliament. In view of the fact that while the Spanish Government dismissed from its service all foreign combatants Italian and German troops and munitions are still being employed to carry out openly the avowed intention of the Italian Government to secure by every possible means a victory for Franco, it is obvious that the policy of non-intervention now has become a means of insuring that the Spanish Government shall be unable to provide for its defense against aggression by a foreign Power.

It appears to me that it is inimical to the honor and interests of this country that it should continue to deny to the Spanish Government the right freely to purchase the arms and supplies necessary for its defense.

Impartial inquiries made in behalf of the British Government proved there was wanton slaughter of women and children through indiscriminate bombing of non-military objectives.

The British Government expressed its concern at the plight of the civilian inhabitants and the hundreds of thousands of refugees in the territory of the Spanish Republic and its willingness to give assistance on humanitarian grounds.

There is grave danger of famine at the present time and it is in my view necessary to concert measures of relief in cooperation with other countries.

For all these reasons it is, in my opinion, imperative that Parliament should be called together as soon as possible.

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Chamberlain replied:

I have given careful consideration to your request which is apparently

based on your view that the time has come when the policy of non-

intervention should be reversed and all embargo on the supply of arms

and ammunition to the Spanish Government removed.

In the opinion of His Majesty's Government such a course would in-

evitably lead to an extension of the conflict with consequences which

cannot be accurately foreseen but which would undoubtedly be very

grave.

H. M. Government are not, as at present advised, prepared to adopt

such a course and in these circumstances they see no advantage in antici-

pating the date on which Parliament is due to meet in less than a fort-

The Government will continue to watch the situation in Spain as it

develops and if in their view the circumstances should demand alteration

in the date they will not hesitate to recommend to Mr. Speaker to call the

House together at short notice.

The French Cabinet announced an identical decision on the same day. The French frontier would remain closed to the ship- ment of any mihtary supplies to the Loyalists. The now pointless debate in the Chamber went on. Socialists warned of peril from an alliance of Fascist Spain with Fascist Italy. M. Montigny, col- league of M. Caillaux and spokesman for Bonnet, argued that Italian hostility and the results of Munich left France with no further possibility of a large European policy. But France was defensively invincible behind the Maginot Line. (Cf. Paul Rey- naud, February, 1938: "No line of fortifications can hold out in- definitely against an indefinite accumulation of guns and tanks.") France should therefore run no risks. It should seek an understand- ing with Rome. Kerillis warned that such policies would only serve to leave France alone in Europe "with no ally save a soldier- less England." The Cabinet should have supported Czechoslovakia and should now rebuild its alliances with Poland, Jugoslavia, Ru- mania and the U.S.S.R. Bonnet deferred replying until January 26—after Barcelona had fallen. H e then defended appeasement and accused the Communists of wanting France to "intervene every- where, in China, in Spain, in Central Europe." The weak Daladier spoke glumly of "the hard and heavy task that lies ahead," but de- clared that France would surrender "not a single acre of our ter- ritory, and not a single one of our rights."

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The verdict of January 18 was the death warrant of the Spanish Republic. Del Vayo, empty-handed and heavy-hearted, left Paris for Barcelona on the 24th. He never arrived. On January 26 Bar- celona fell to the Rebels. Victory celebrations were ordered

throughout Italy. Mussolini addressed a cheering throng outside the Palazzo Venezia: "Our enemies are biting the dust!" Th e

crowd shouted back "W e

Loyalist Ministers fled to Figueras amid the human wreckage of their shattered armies. Del Vayo saw the last remnants of the Re- publican forces pass the frontiers into France on February 9. "It was heartbreaking to watch that procession of men who had been defeated merely because the means of defending the country and the cause which they loved so passionately had been withheld from them."^

On February 2 in the cellars of Figueras Castle the members of the Cortes had supported Premier Juan Negrin's decision to con- tinue the hopeless fight. By February 10, however, all of Catalonia was lost. Th e Cabinet next met in the Spanish Consulate in Tou- louse. Negrin and Del Vayo flew back to the unconquered central zone—to Alicante and then to Madrid, still defying its besiegers. They held out for peace terms whereby Franco would pledge himself to free Spain from foreign domination, to hold a plebiscite to determine the form of government, to grant clemency to Loy- alist sympathizers. But they had no means of enforcing their de- sires. At the end they clung only to the last condition. Even this was to be yielded. President Manuel Azafia, favoring uncondi- tional surrender, had refused to return from France despite the pleas of Del Vayo who flew back to Paris on a peace mission. On February 28 Azafia resigned his office.

The death agony of Madrid epitomized what had happened the year before in Vienna and Prague and what was to happen the next year in Paris, Tours and Bordeaux. On February 6, while still in France, the Negrin Cabinet sued for "an honorable peace" through British Charge Stevenson and French Ambassador Jules Henri. Loyalist Ambassadors Azcarte in London and Pascua in Paris sought to utilize the services of Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay to obtain peace from the Rebels on the basis of no reprisals. But their communications to Negrin in Madrid, and those of Del Vayo as well, were intercepted by certain Loyalist

want Corsica! W e

want Tunisia!" The

1 Freedom's Battle, p. 283.

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army leaders, headed by Col. Sigismundo Casado, who had plans of their own. Back in Madrid on February 27, Del Vayo was hope- ful of prolonging resistance—not as a means to victory, of which there could no longer be hope, but as a means of securing clemency from the victors. But Casado took the view that Franco would never consent to deal with the Negrin Cabinet. H e insisted that only a new regime, headed by himself, could secure peace at once on favorable terms. H e alleged falsely that Negrin was turning over the command of the army to the Communists.^ T o save Spain from Communism and to make a deal with the foe, Casado and his followers were certain that they must assume power and oust those who favored continued resistance. Fifteen months later a comparable drama was to be played in France with Reynaud and Mandel on the one hand, and Petain, Weygand and Laval on the other, playing comparable roles.

In the name of anti-Communism, Casado, now a "General," or- ganized rebelhon. On March 5 the artillerymen in Cartagena, crying "Long live Franco," repudiated Negrin's authority and forced the Republican fleet to put out to sea, never to return. It was later interned in Bizerte. This uprising was suppressed in a few hours. But the Cabinet, in session in Negrin's residence near Alicante, learned that evening that Casado had seized control of Madrid. With no means of opposing the coup, Negrin made a last appeal to preserve unity and settle all differences by discussion.^ N o reply arrived. When the news came at 2.30 a.m. that the Casado forces had taken Alicante, Negrin, Del Vayo and other members of the Cabinet took a plane for France. Casado's "Na- tional Defense Council" was headed by General Jose Miaja, who

1 Luis Araquistain, former Ambassador in Paris and friend of tlie fiery Socialist Largo Caballero, who was Negrin's predecessor as Republican Premier in 1936-37, charged subsequently that Negrin was from the beginning a tool of Moscow and that Stalin had demanded Caballero's removal and Negrin's appointment. The letters from Stalin to Caballero which he published, however, dated December 21, 1936 and February 4, 1937, revealed the Soviet Dictator in a different role. He urged that the Soviet Ambassador, Marcel Rosenberg, and Soviet military experts be restricted to a purely advisory capacity and that Caballero's social radicalism be moderated in the interest of conciliating the peasantry and the small bourgeoisie. (Cf. text of letters and Araquistain's articles, NY T 5.21 and 6.4.39) Moscow supported Negrin because he was a liberal democrat, free of all taint of Communism or extreme Socialist sympathy. There was no Soviet military intervention in Spain until October 1936. Fascist intervention began in July with the connivance of the British and French Governments.

2 Text in Del Vayo, op. cit., pp. 316-17.

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at once declared in a broadcast: "W e will fight to the last drop of blood unless we are assured of Spanish independence and the ex- pulsion of the foreigner." Since the new junta was obviously headed for unconditional surrender, whatever Miaja's wishes may have been, it encountered opposition. On March 8 the Cuatro Cemines, a Communist stronghold in Madrid, rose in re- volt. The mutineers were joined by others who opposed capit- ulation. For a week Miaja's troops fought the rebellion against the rebellion while the real Rebels looked on. The revolt was sup- pressed with great loss of life.

At the end, Burgos would grant no terms save unconditional surrender. Hunger, disease and despair left the Loyalists with no alternative. By the end of the month Miaja and his staff had fled by plane to Algiers. Casado made good his escape with British help. The "Fifth Column" of Franco sympathizers in Madrid, long in hiding, took over the ruined capital amid shouts of "Arriba Espana! Viva Franco!" Of the Loyalist leaders, only the old and infirm Minister of the Interior, Julien Besteiro, remained to make the official transfer of authority to the victors. H e was arrested for his pains and sentenced to 30 years in prison, where he died 18 months later. On March 2 8 Madrid surrendered. Within twenty- four hours the ten remaining provincial capitals in Loyalist hands capitulated: Valencia, Murcia, Alicante, Cuenca, Almeria, Jaen, Ciudad Real, Guadalajara, Cartagena and Albacete. At 2.20 p.m. March 29 Burgos broadcast: "The war has ended! Total victory is Franco's!"

The ensuing triumph of reaction was ferocious and complete. Th e firing squad and the altar sanctified a fearful vengeance on all those who were active in the Loyalist cause. The priesthood came again into its own, with the vast wealth of the Jesuits restored to them, although the Vatican's hopes of a new Concordat were frustrated by Franco's desire to approve ecclesiastical appoint- ments. The feudal nobility recovered its estates, punished the peasantry for its insolence and reduced it to semi-serfdom. The magnates of money crushed Spanish labor into sub-proletarian helplessness. Th e Falangists dominated the new regime through Franco's brother-in-law, Ramon Serrano Sufler, Minister of the Interior. German and ItaUan troops finally returned home in June, leaving large quantities of military equipment behind as gifts or as payment for Spanish ores. Suiier, Ciano, Mussolini, and

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Victor Emmanuel reviewed the victorious crusaders in Naples and in Rome. The German "Condor Legion" was similarly hon- ored by Hitler. Wit h all need for reserve now past, the Nazi and Fascist press boasted of the vast scope of Axis intervention from the beginning. Even Portugal, according to the Lisbon journals, had furnished 10,000 men to the Rebels. Franco had concluded a cultural pact with Germany on January 24. On March 9 General Wilhelm Faupel, first Nazi Ambassador to Burgos and head of the Ibero- Amerikanische Institut for the dissemination of Nazi doctrines throughout the Hispanic world, declared that victory in Spain would aid Fascist efforts to save Latin-America from the United States. On April 8 Berlin and Burgos announced that the new Spain had signed the anti-Comintern pact on March 27. Spanish democracy was dead. Spain had been "saved from Bolshevism."

Chamberlain and Daladier responded to these events in their customary fashion. The Anglo-French press of the Right rejoiced in Fascist victory and "Red" defeat. Almost half a million Loyalist refugees were permitted to flee into France, where they were wel- comed in a fashion which condemned most of them to appalling misery. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay hoped for a Franco amnesty in order that the fugitives might be repatriated. But Franco would grant nothing. Daladier and Bonnet, Chamberlain and Halifax, moved to extend prompt diplomatic recognition to the Caudillo. By favors and friendship they hoped fatuously that they might win the good will of Fascist Spain. On February 9 the British cruiser Devonshire had obligingly conveyed Count de San Luis, Rebel Governor of Majorca, to the Loyalist-held island of Minorca whose surrender to Franco was neatly effected with British aid. This action, in the British view, cleverly prevented an Itahan occupation of Port Mahon. Franco would need money. Franco could be "bought" by British and French loans

Long before the end of LoyaHst resistance, London and Paris acted to make Franco's victory complete and to obtain "assur- ances" and "guarantees." The aged Senator Leon Berard, admirer of Franco and friend of Laval, was named French agent to Burgos, to which he made two visits in mid-February. H e sought to lay down two conditions for full recognition: an amnesty and a pledge of neutrality. Franco was uninterested and unavailable. Foreign Minister Jordana was non-committal. In the "settlement"

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which Berard negotiated, France got nothing. But Franco was promised so much in the way of Spanish arms, gold and other property in France that Daladier refused to divulge the terms. Like Chamberlain, he had decided to recognize Franco uncondition- ally because, as he told the Chamber on February 24, he did not desire France's third frontier to be "hostile."

On February 27 the British and French Cabinets granted de jure recognition. This action, like the arms embargo against the Re- public at the beginning of the conflict, constituted unlawful inter- vention. London and Paris thus belatedly followed Rome and Ber- lin (November 18, 1936) in intervening openly on the Fascist side by recognizing the Rebels as the government of Spain. The French Chamber approved on February 24, 323 t o 261. Fou r days later Commons followed suit, 344 to 137, amid opposition shouts of "Shame!" and "Betrayal!" Anthony Eden, co-author with Blum of "non-intervention," supported Chamberlain. The latter declared that "certain assurances" had been received from Bur- gos, but he decUned to reveal them. Bonnet told the Chamber on March i that Franco had already demanded the withdrawal of Italian "volunteers" and had promised amnesty and "Spanish independence." Burgos and Rome failed to confirm his words.^

Franco designated the Duke of Berwick and Alba as his Am- bassador in London, and received in return Sir Maurice Peterson, one of the authors of the Hoare-Laval plan of 1935. On March 2 Paris appointed 83-year-old Marshal Henri Philippe Petain as

1 Daladier opened his speech to the Chamber on February 24 with the words:

"I want to say flatly that my intention is to recommend to the Cabinet recogni- tion of Generalissimo Franco." In London two days later policemen and firemen kept anti-Franco demonstrators from Downing Street. Chamberlain's statement in Commons, February 27, declared: "H . M. Government have noted with satisfaction the public statements of General Franco concerning the determina- tion of himself and his Government to secure the traditional independence of Spain and to take proceedings only in the case of those against whom criminal

charges are laid." The lost Labor motion of censure asserted "that in the opinion

decision of H . M. Government to grant unconditional recogni-

tion to the Spanish Insurgent forces dependent upon foreign intervention consti- tutes a deliberate affront to the legitimate government of a friendly Power, is a gross breach of international traditions and marks a further stage in a policy which is steadily destroying in all the democratic countries confidence in the good faith of Britain." Attlee accused the Prime Minister of deceiving the House, of

of this House the

"selling out" the Spanish Republic and "consummating the treachery by recog- nizing a rebel, puppet government." Attlee went on: "The Government's sham of nonintervention was really devised to prevent the Spanish Government from exercising its rights under international law. The British Government connived at

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French Ambassador to Franco, who reciprocated by sending to Paris the obscure pro-German mayor of Bilbao, Jose Lequerica.

Petain, clerical reactionary, quasi-Fascist and venerable octoge- narian, was a national hero in France by virtue of his command of the defense of Verdun in 1916. He had come out of retirement to serve as Minister of Wa r in the Doumergue Cabinet of 1934.

H e was a warm friend of

peatedly during the Munich crisis. The Nazi press greeted his new appointment with approval. Franco had been a student in the Paris Military School in 1926 when Petain was an instructor there. Like Maginot, he was an old friend of the Caudillo. Yet he was held up at the frontier at San Sebastian for a week. It soon appeared that Burgos, not Paris, was now laying down conditions: the Spanish fleet at Bizerte must be delivered up before Petain could be re- ceived. The fleet was delivered. Petain was received. In Washing- ton the Roosevelt Administration, which for twenty-six months had denied arms to the Spanish Republicans, lifted the embargo and recognized Franco on April i. Having together aided the Axis to strangle Spanish democracy, the western democracies sought to embrace Spanish Fascism. The reply was a kick in the face.

Daladier who sought his advice re-

"Foreign anti-Fascism," declared II Duce in Rome on January 22, "is truly incurably, stupendously ignorant of Italian things - all of which does not disturb us in the least. After all it is better not to be too well known, for surprise will then have its full effect. Our enemies are too stupid to be dangerous."

the starving of women and children, the bombing of open towns and the slaying of men, women and children. Now this scrambling with indecent haste to try to make friends with Franco. This is not in the interests of democracy or of the safety of the British Empire. The Government is thinking all the time of the

interests of British capitalists. What does it mean to the Government if Gibraltar

There was a time when

this country was universally known as the friend of liberty and the freedom of

peoples and as the enemy of tyrants. It is now being regarded more and more

as a nation that will acquiesce in any form of tyranny and always stand in favor

of the

whole world that anyone who is out to use force will always have a friend in the British Prime Minister." In reply Chamberlain denied that the Republican Government could any longer be regarded as the legal government of Spain and averred that recognition was essential for humanitarian reasons and for preservation of British influence. Liberal leader Sir Archibald Sinclair rejoined:

an announcement to the

is in danger if we get the Rio Tinto dividends?

The present action is

"The British Government's policy has strengthened the dictatorships, weakened the democracies and betrayed one after another the countries that trusted us, and its epitaph will be 'We have eaten dirt in vain.'"

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3. UKRAINIA N

DREA M

The modus operandi of appeasement, so admirably illustrated in the case of Spain, can scarcely be a subject of debate among those famiUar with Anglo-French policy toward Germany, Italy and Japa n from 193 3 t o 1939. Th e motives and assumptions of th e appeasers, however, will doubtless continue to be debated for years. Diplomatic documents seldom tell all regarding the logical processes, to say nothing of the psychological and pathological processes, through which decisions are formulated. Public utter- ances and memoirs, designed to justify what has been done or left undone, are even less illuminating. The mystery of why the polit- ical leaders of France and Britain granted to Berlin (and to Rome and Tokio) the means of consummating the destruction of France and Britain is not one to be solved by any single clue or any simple formula. Part of the answer must be sought in the admiration felt in British and French "society" for the alleged purposes of the Fascist Caesars.^ Part of the answer lies in the conviction of many people in the democracies that appeasement was the surest road to peace and a morally necessary measure to rectify the "injustices" of Versailles. Part of it lies in the paralysis of mind and will which afflicts leaders and masses aUke in epochs of decadence.

Apart from these subjective factors, however, the searcher after causes must look for light within the context of Realpolitik. Diplo- mats are habitually moved to action by regard for national inter- ests and by guesses as to the purposes of those with whom they play the diplomatic game. Even in democracies, where their free-

^ Thu s Winston Churchill, writing on

December 30, 1938, wrote (Step by

Step, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1939, p. 274): "The bulk of the Conserva- tives admire General Franco; all the forces of the Left are ardent for the Repub- lic. The difference between the Duchess of AthoU and the Scottish Tories in the Perth by-election began about Spain. The dominant element in those parts regarded her vehement sympathy for the Spanish Government as proof that she was almost ready to carry Bolshevism into Britain, to confiscate their property, pollute their churches and, if necessary, cut their throats. Nothing has strength- ened the Prime Minister's hold upon well-to-do society more remarkably than the behef that he is friendly to General Franco and the Nationalist cause in Spain. But these sentiments on either side may be pushed beyond the bounds of British interest. It would seem that today the British Empire would run far less risk from the victory of the Spanish Government than from that of General Franco." Cf. also Europe on the Eve, pp. 332-46.

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3. UKRAINIA N

DREA M

The modus operandi of appeasement, so admirably illustrated in the case of Spain, can scarcely be a subject of debate among those famiUar with Anglo-French policy toward Germany, Italy and Japa n from 193 3 t o 1939. Th e motives and assumptions of th e appeasers, however, will doubtless continue to be debated for years. Diplomatic documents seldom tell all regarding the logical processes, to say nothing of the psychological and pathological processes, through which decisions are formulated. Public utter- ances and memoirs, designed to justify what has been done or left undone, are even less illuminating. The mystery of why the polit- ical leaders of France and Britain granted to Berlin (and to Rome and Tokio) the means of consummating the destruction of France and Britain is not one to be solved by any single clue or any simple formula. Part of the answer must be sought in the admiration felt in British and French "society" for the alleged purposes of the Fascist Caesars.^ Part of the answer lies in the conviction of many people in the democracies that appeasement was the surest road to peace and a morally necessary measure to rectify the "injustices" of Versailles. Part of it lies in the paralysis of mind and will which afflicts leaders and masses aUke in epochs of decadence.

Apart from these subjective factors, however, the searcher after causes must look for light within the context of Realpolitik. Diplo- mats are habitually moved to action by regard for national inter- ests and by guesses as to the purposes of those with whom they play the diplomatic game. Even in democracies, where their free-

^ Thu s Winston Churchill, writing on

December 30, 1938, wrote (Step by

Step, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1939, p. 274): "The bulk of the Conserva- tives admire General Franco; all the forces of the Left are ardent for the Repub- lic. The difference between the Duchess of AthoU and the Scottish Tories in the Perth by-election began about Spain. The dominant element in those parts regarded her vehement sympathy for the Spanish Government as proof that she was almost ready to carry Bolshevism into Britain, to confiscate their property, pollute their churches and, if necessary, cut their throats. Nothing has strength- ened the Prime Minister's hold upon well-to-do society more remarkably than the behef that he is friendly to General Franco and the Nationalist cause in Spain. But these sentiments on either side may be pushed beyond the bounds of British interest. It would seem that today the British Empire would run far less risk from the victory of the Spanish Government than from that of General Franco." Cf. also Europe on the Eve, pp. 332-46.

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dom of action is limited and their opportunities to devise and exe- cute far-sighted schemes are few, their conduct is shaped by the nature of the contest in which the Great Powers and their satel- lites are engaged. What assumptions regarding contemporary- power politics lay behind the course so long pursued in London and Paris? It would be easy to reply: "None"—and to contend that the appeasers exhibited such extremes of blindness and naivete as to justify the conclusion that in their relations with the Caesars they were no longer playing the game of power at all. They played not checkers, but "give-away." Perhaps until the end they were unaware that they were players or that any game was going on. This explanation is unflattering but plausible.

Against it stands much evidence that those who determined Anglo-French pohcy toward the Fascist States during the years of retreat were moved less by ignorance and by lack of calculation than by a set of apparently far-sighted assumptions, reinforced by hopes, fears and prejudices, which might have proved correct (and therefore safe as guides to action) but which in fact proved wrong. Insofar as such assumptions were the raison d^etre of ap- peasement, they envisaged the future not in terms of an irrecon- cilable conflict between the Western democracies and the Fascist signatories of the anti-Comintern accord, but in terms of an in- evitable clash between Fascist totalitarianism and Communist totalitarianism. This indeed was the constant boast of Berlin (and of Tokio and Rome) and the equally constant fear of Moscow.^ T h e demagogues of the Third Reich, like the warlords of Japan, never tired of denouncing the Soviet Union as their inveterate foe and intended victim. In Realpolitik it is always a sound axiom that a quarrel between two Powers is beneficial to any third Power which fears both—provided that neither upsets the balance by destroying the other and both do not settle their quarrel by com- bining against their common enemy. In the triad of power rela- tionships during the 1930's, the contestants were the U.S.S.R., the Fascist Triplice and the Western Democracies. The leaders of the latter were not ignorant of the axiom, however feeble their grasp of the provisos may have been. A German-Russian clash in Europe, a Russian-Japanese clash in Asia, would not be disadvantageous to the interests of Britain,

1 Cf. Europe on the Eve, pp . 239-62.

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France and the United States if it could he localized. This is not to say that London and Paris "wanted" such a clash or sought to promote it. Sufficient unto the day are the hopes thereof. This is only to say that such an eventuality would not have been un- welcome to those who made Anglo-French decisions, and that this hope explains much which is otherwise inexplicable. From the Tory point of view the conditions of the eventuality were obvi- ous: Tokio must not be thwarted by America on the Asiatic mainland; Berhn must not be thwarted by France in Eastern Eu- rope; Rome's ambitions were more troublesome, since they could be realized only at French expense, but Italy was weak and could be cajoled into "cooperation" by concessions in Ethiopia, the Near East and Spain. The prerequisite of locaUzation was equally obvious: the disintegration of the French alliance system in the East and the immobilization of France behind the Maginot Line, the Alps and the Pyrenees. Hence the willingness of Cham- berlain and his confreres to acquiesce in Axis control of Spain, Austria and Czechoslovakia. Munich was the climax of appease- ment. The fall of the Czech bastion was the last step needed to free Hitler's hands for the Drang nach Osten, for it meant the ruin of the French bloc and of the Paris-Prague-Moscow alliance, and in- sured French acquiescence in further Nazi moves toward the East. Th e more specific hopes, which received full expression in the Munich accords, were hopes that Hitler, and his mentor in Eastern pohcy, Alfred Rosenberg, would now proceed toward the reali- zation of their long-publicized program for "liberating" the Ukraine and converting it into a German satrapy after the design of the peace of Brest-Litovsk of 1918. Th e Ukraine ("frontier- land") was inhabited by "Little Russians," having a common lan- guage and culture and spreading over the fertile plains between the North Caucasus and the Western Carpathians. Some 35,000,- 000 of them lived within the frontiers of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet RepubUc, second largest state of the Soviet Union. Another 5,000,000 or more dwelt in Poland on lands wrested from the Soviets by Pilsudski's armies in 1920. Almost a million lived in Bessarabia, wrested from the Soviets by Rumania in 1918. Some 400,000 lived in the eastern sub-Carpathian region of Czecho- slovakia under the name of "Ruthenians." Th e Nazi dream thus involved the partition of Czechoslovakia, Poland and perhaps

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Rumania, and a struggle to free the great majority of the Ukrain- ians from Moscow's rule.^ If Chamberlain, HaUfax and Hender- son, along with Daladier and Bonnet, cherished the hope that this development would be the natural aftermath of Munich, their hope at the time was by no means absurd.^ In fact sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, now rechristened "Carpatho- Ukraine" in the Nazi press, became after Munich the center of Nazi sohcitude and the hope of all Ukrainian "Nationalists" everywhere who looked to Hitler to help them achieve "inde- pendence." On October 8, 1938, Carpatho-Ukraine became an "autonomous" unit in truncated Czecho-Slovakia, with Bohemia- Moravia and Slovakia as the other two constituents. On October 27 Mgr. Augustin Volosin was named Premier of this primitive region in a cabinet including Julian Revay, his pro-German assist-

ant. H e at once suppressed all political parties in favor of a single totahtarian entity, the "National Ukrainian Union," with a militia of some 12,000 called the "Carpathian Sitch." While Volosin oc- casionally doubted whether his State was large enough to under- take the liberation of the Polish and Soviet Ukraine (its total pop- ulation was 552,000 of which four-fifths were Ukrainians), he declared on November 15: "The world already recognizes the

Ukrainian nation and its

Representatives of Germany and other states promise moral and material support." * Ukrainian propaganda was broadcast from

Vienna. The Sitch was trained by German officers. Whe n War-

efforts to build up a Ukrainian State

1 Cf. Alfred Rosenberg, Der Zukunftsiveg einer deutschen Aussenpolitik, 1927;

W . Kubjjowytsch, Die Verteilung der Bevolkerung in der Ukraine, 1934; and

John W . Wheeler-Bennett, The

2 In Failure of a Mission (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1940) Sir Nevile

Henderson makes no mention of this hope, though he acknowledges his admira-

Forgotten Peace (Morrow, New York, 1939).

tio

n for dictatorships "u p t o a point " (p . 11) and reveals th e extent t o whic h

he

was impressed by Nazi denunciations of Russia. He was perhaps unconsciously

influenced by his own anti-Slav prejudices (cf. his effort to explain "German sadism" by a bad admixture of "Slav blood," pp. 23-4) and he was of course, like most British diplomats and aristocrats, bitterly anti-Bolshevik. Cf. p. 259: "I always believed that Moscow's chief aim was to embroil Germany and the Western Powers in a common ruin and emerge as the tertius gaudens of the conflict between them. This was, up to August, similarly the professed view of all Germans from Hitler downward who commented on our Russian negotia-

tions." This view, while correct enough "up to a point," is less revealing as a judgment of Stalin's policy than as a projection in inverted form of Chamber- lain's policy.

3 Cf. Paul B. Taylor, Germany's Expansion in Eastern Europe, Foreign Policy

Association Report, May 15, 1939.

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saw and Moscow protested, Prague intimated that the Ukrainian Nationalist campaign was being conducted from Berlin.^ The German capital had for years been the Mecca of most Ukrainian Nationalist leaders as well of Russian Monarchist emigres. As early as 1933 Rosenberg had encouraged the latter to establish a short-lived "Russian National Socialist" organization in Berlin to work for the overthrow of the Soviets with German aid. Ukrainian Hetman Skoropadsky and Cossack Herman Popov left the German capital for Carpatho-Ukraine early in January. Grand Duke Vladimir, Pretender to the Romanov throne, had visited Berlin in mid-December and had doubtless wondered whether Nazi promotion of Ukrainian Nationalism could be

1 Cf. Bulletin of the Ukrainian Press Service, 51 East 42 Street, Ne w York City. Roman Lapica, Director, denied before the Dies Committee on October 20, 1939 that his organization was disseminating Nazi propaganda in the United States. (Bulletin No . 40) He and V. S. Dushnyk, Editor of The Trident ("One Independent Sovereign Ukrainian State!"), submitted a 133-page affidavit to the Committee on November 29, 1939 denying similar charges brought by Emil Revyuk, President of the United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States. The Bulletin and The Trident, however, though filled with denunciations of the U.S.S.R. and Poland, expressed few doubts as to the wisdom of accepting German support until the "betrayal" of March 1939. In the June, 1940, issue of The Trident, pp. 37-8, Mykola Sciborsky probably stated the relationship accurately when he wrote: "The Ukrainians hoped the anti-Comintern bloc would turn against their greatest enemy, Soviet Russia. They regarded the bloc favorably not because the sponsor was Germany but because the consolidation of Europe against Russia coincided with the interests of the Ukrainian people, and because the destruction of Bolshevism was one of the basic aims of Ukrainian nationalism. Had this anti-Russian front been initiated, not by Germany, Italy and Japan, but by England, France and the United States, Ukrainian nationalists would have supported these countries, since they were then and are now ready to fight Moscow to the end despite the fact that it is now a 'friend' of Berlin. But it is self-evident that Moscow's agents would hide before the world the fact that the policy of the Ukrainian nationalists was to serve only the Ukrainian

people. Th e second reason

behind the Bolshevik campaign has already been

mentioned—the creation of Carpatho-Ukraine. Due to international develop- ments, the solution of the Carpatho-Ukrainian problem was almost entirely in German hands. It is clear that the Ukrainians had to consider this situation and they decided to profit by it for their own interests. W e are firmly convinced that had they been in their place, French, English and American leaders would have done the same. But the necessity of having German support did not mean that the Ukrainians were or are Germanophile. T o become convinced of this one needs only to read the Ukrainian nationalist press of that time." It is inter- esting to note that a year previously, in The Trident for June 1939, V. S. Dushnyk expressed the opinion that the Ukrainian Nationalist cause would best be served by a war between Germany and Russia in which Germany would defeat Russia, with Britain and France neutral, and later be attacked and de- feated by the Western Powers who should pledge themselves to Ukrainian inde- pendence. Cf. The Hour, Jul y 27, August 10 and September 14, 1940.

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reconciled with his own hopes of Nazi support for a Russian counter-revolution. On December 20, 1938, General Anton Denikin, emigre White leader, asserted in Paris that Germany was plotting to conquer the Ukraine and Transcaucasia. H e said that he and other White generals had obtained the whole plan from Hitler himself several years previously. "Whoever may aid Russia's enemies," he added in denunciation of White officers who were accepting Nazi gold, "cannot call themselves patriots no matter what ideological excuses they may make for taking money to fight their own people. Nazis are not the only ones. The Japanese too have been successful to our shame in buy-

ing so-called White Russians to aid them against our Fatherland"

Volosin de-

clared: "The creation of a great Ukraine will be realized in the near future. I believe Ukrainians of the whole world will be able to return to a liberated fatherland, to their brothers who are now so brutally suppressed by Poland and Soviet Russia."

Since the integrity of both Poland and the U.S.S.R. was menaced by these ambitions, it might have been expected that Warsaw and Moscow would attempt counter-measures in com- mon. But the Polish Government, which had shared in the parti- tion of Czechoslovakia and staunchly opposed all Soviet efforts to rescue Prague from its enemies, remained firm in its refusal to accept Soviet collaboration even in its own defense. Following conversations in Moscow between Litvinov and Ambassador Grzybowski, the two governments issued a joint statement of November 26, 1938, re-affirming existing treaties (including the non-aggression pact of July 25, 1932 which had been prolonged to December 31,1945), favoring an increase in Polish-Soviet trade and recognizing the necessity of regulating frontier incidents. They made no mention of the Ukrainian question (P 160,161). O n February 19, 1939, a new Soviet-Polish commercial agreement was announced (P 162). Less than a month later Carpatho- Ukraine was liquidated by Berlin, but Poland's peril from the Reich was rendered more rather than less acute. Warsaw, how- ever, still declined to consider any mutual assistance pact with Moscow. Following Potemkin's visit of May 10, Foreign Minister Beck declared: "The Soviets recognize that the Polish Govern- ment will not conclude any accord with one of its great neighbors against the other and understand the advantages which accrue to

(NY T 12.21.38). In his Christmas message Premier

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them from this attitude. M. Potemkin has declared similarly that in case of a Polish-German armed conflict, the Soviets will adopt toward us 'a benevolent attitude' " (P 163).

Meanwhile German pressure on Poland took the form of veiled threats to stir up revolt in the Polish Ukraine. But if Warsaw would accept German demands regarding Danzig and the Cor- ridor and agree to "a common attitude toward Russia within the framework of the anti-Comintern pact," then Berlin would guar- antee the German-Polish frontiers and extend the German-Polish non-aggression pact for 2 5 years (Ribbentrop to Beck at Berchtes- gaden, October 24, 1938, P 44) . Beck refused. Ribbentrop then suggested that if Warsaw would assent, Berhn might accept Polish demands for Hungarian annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine. These demands were inspired by the correct conviction that such annexation would eifectively destroy the Ukrainian Nationalist nucleus and by the doubtful assumption that a common Polish- Hungarian frontier would constitute an effective barrier to the Drang nach Osten. Beck declined to bargain.

By the arbitral award of November 2, 1938, handed down by Ciano and Ribbentrop in Vienna, the Axis permitted Hungary to annex a generous slice of southern Slovakia (10,307 sq. kilometers with a population of 854,000) and a strip of Ruthenia (1,523 sq. km. with a population of 173,000), including the former provin- cial capital of Ungvar. Th e remainder of Ruthenia (Carpatho- Ukraine, 11,094 sq. km. and 552,000 people with its capital at Chust) consisted of the relatively barren uplands and was scarcely promising as the Piedmont of Hitler's Great Ukrainian dream. Berlin continued to groom the Volosin regime for this role, how- ever, to the alarm of Warsaw and to the disgust of Budapest, which desired to annex the entire area. The Fiihrer told Beck at Berchtesgaden on January 5 that Germany and Poland had com- mon interests: "For Germany, Russia, whether Tsarist or Bol- shevist, was always dangerous. Bolshevist Russia was perhaps worse, given Communist propaganda. On the other hand. Tsarist Russia was militarily more dangerous and more imperialistic. It was for these reasons that a strong Poland was purely and simply a necessity for Germany. Here the Chancellor observed that each Polish division, engaged against Russia, released a corresponding German division. The Chancellor said next that he was interested in the Ukraine from an economic point of view, but that he had

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no interest of a political order" (P 48). "Against Moscow, against 'Russia,' and not merely against Bolshevism, the Fiihrer showed the same hostility as in days gone by" (F 37). Danzig, however, remained the stumbling block in the way of any German-Polish collaboration against Moscow.

On the fifth anniversary of the signature of the pact of January

dined in Warsaw by Beck. Th e Nazi

26, 1934,

Ribbentrop was

Foreign Minister spoke soothing words. "At the audience with Marshal Smigly-Rydz, Ribbentrop spoke of Russia, whose en- feeblement he confirmed. He likewise asserted that the course of the U.S.S.R. was always unpredictable and that one could never know what it would be tomorrow" (P 51). Beck declared a week later that Ribbentrop had understood the Polish attitude toward Russia and the impossibility of Poland adhering to the anti- Comintern pact (P 53). The discussions over Danzig and the Cor- ridor, however, made no progress. This dispute was soon to oc- cupy the center of the diplomatic stage. In conjunction with the events of the Ides of March, it placed the whole question of Anglo- French policy toward the Reich and the U.S.S.R. in a new set- ting.

Between the peace of Munich and the fall of Prague, Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay continued to act on the assumptions already suggested. Henderson acquiesced in the prompt liquida- tion of the Four-Power International Commission set up at Munich to define the new German-Czech frontier. He had "made up his mind before the first meeting began that, with a view to the future, the best hope of Czecho-Slovakia lay in direct negotiation, where possible, with Germany, and that plebiscites which could only lead to trouble should be avoided at all costs. I did my best to ensure both these objectives. I saw Goring and secured an assur- ance from him that Germany would not be unconciliatory if the Czech Government frankly sought co-operation with, rather than antagonism to, Germany" ( H 174-5). Berhn demanded accept- ance without a plebiscite of its maximum territorial claims as out- lined in the Godesberg memorandum which Chamberlain had made the basis of the "war scare" of September. Berlin also insisted on defining the 50% German majority provision regarding addi- tional territories on the basis of the language line drawn on Austrian maps of 1910. Tw o of the five members of the Commis- sion were instructed by their governments to accept these de-

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mands as presented by the German member, Count Ernst von Weizsacker. They were Italian Ambassador Bernardo Attolico and the French Ambassador Andre Fran9ois-Poncet. The Czech member, Dr. Mastny, objected and looked to Henderson, the British member, for support. But Henderson accepted the de- mands "without prior reference to His Majesty's Government because I hoped thereby to avoid plebiscites and to pin the Germans down to a line of their own choosing, which they would find it difficult afterward to modify again to their renewed ad- vantage" ( H 174-5). H e later threatened to resign when the Germans further increased their demands. "The German Govern- ment thereupon abandoned their pretension at the time, but only to secure their object, or at least part of it, by direct negotiations with the Czechs"—which Henderson and Frangois-Poncet had favored from the beginning despite the plain language ( F 12) of the Munich accord providing for a settlement through the Com- mission.

On the principle that diplomats, like neurotics, are often most concerned with the things they talk about least, it may not be without significance that Henderson's published dispatches and his memoirs make no mention of the Ukraine. Anglo-French pol- icy at Munich and immediately thereafter is intelligible as a de- liberate sacrifice of Czech interests in order to give Hitler an open road for expansion toward the steppes of Little Russia. Henderson left for England in mid-October "thoroughly disheartened" and full of misgivings, so he wrote later, "as to Hitler's good faith and the honesty of his intentions toward the Czechs" ( H 176). H e remained in England until mid-February, convalescing from a surgical operation which discommoded him rather more than the dissection of Czechoslovakia. In the interim. Western opinion was shocked anew by the pogrom of November, and Downing Street was perturbed by another development which Henderson does not mention.

On December 30, 1938, it became known that British Ad- miralty officials were in Berlin to discuss Germany's demand for submarine tonnage equal to Britain's. The Anglo-German naval accord of June 18, 1935, often praised b y Chamberlain, had granted the Reich a submarine fleet 45 % as large as Britain's, with the option of building up to 100% of British tonnage. This option Wilhelmstrasse now proposed to exercise, though Germany al-

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ready had 6; submarines (of smaller tonnage) to Britain's 51. Amid deep secrecy, it was rumored that the Reich also desired to construct additional cruisers and to avail itself of the escalator clause of the 1937 naval agreement in order to build battleships of 40,000 tons with 18-inch guns. Here, as always, the "Soviet menace" was cited as justification. N o concrete result of the Ber- lin discussions was announced. These moves were not conclu- sively indicative of a Nazi decision to challenge British sea power. But since Chamberlain's quest for appeasement required ever new concessions, Hitler saw no reason for not charging all the traffic would bear.

Despite these inauspicious developments, the British leaders were imperturbable. If Hitler had a free hand in the East they were convinced that all Western questions could be compromised through adroit appeals for cooperation, implemented by eco- nomic and financial concessions. Early in January Montagu Nor - man returned Hjalmar Schacht's visit of December. Dienst cms Deutschland, an official Nazi news agency, asserted that the two financiers would discuss trade and Jews. Germany must increase its exports. The Nazi inquisitors were quite willing to permit racial refugees to take part of their money with them into exile if the money were ear-marked to pay for German imports into the countries of refuge. George Rublee, American director of the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee, also went to Berlin to discuss possibilities. On January 27 eighteen eminent Britons, in- cluding Montagu Norman, the Earl of Derby, Sir Arthur Edding- ton. Sir Josiah Stamp and John Masefield, all acting with the approval of Lord Halifax, addressed a public appeal to the leaders and people of the Reich "to use those great gifts by which they have for centuries enriched our common heritage in all fields of human knowledge and activity and to join with us in a supreme effort to lay the spectre of war and enmity between nations and, in the spirit of free and willing cooperation by which alone can their needs and ours be satisfied, to build with us a better future so that we may not only preserve civilization but hand it down to our children enhanced by our experience."

More tangible inducements were also offered. Leading British industrialists were preparing to visit the Reich to discuss trade arrangements with leading German industrialists. Before Hen- derson left London plans had been made for the President of the

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Board of Trade, Oliver Stanley, and the Secretary of the Over- seas Trade Department, Robert Hudson, to visit Berlin in a "private" capacity, ostensibly to attend a banquet of the indus- trialists, but actually to pave the way for an economic and politi- cal rapprochement ( H 191-2). Ribbentrop and Goring expressed approval. Henderson was therefor optimistic on his return, de- spite Nazi resentment over British rearmament and Hudson's scheduled journey to Moscow. Henderson felt that British rear- mament, along with Fascist victory in Spain, would deter Hitler from any move against the West. Goring was re-assuring. "He may have been fooling me, but I doubt it" ( H 195). Yet he was uncertain. "I would give much to know what was at the back of Hitler's mind during those fateful six months after Munich when he stood at the parting of the ways" ( H 207).

Georges Bonnet and Edouard Daladier acted as if they felt certain of the ultimate direction of Nazi imperialism. Immedi- ately after Munich Bonnet instructed Ambassador de Lacroix in

Prague to convey to Foreign Minister Krofta his "profound sym- pathy," "personal friendship" and "admiration" for "the strength of character and the incomparable self-control shown by all Czechoslovak leaders, whose clear-sightedness has done so much

to protect their country from the horrors of war

nity and the self-abnegation shown by the entire Czechoslovak nation afford proof of its reserves of strength and vitality, the best safeguard of her historical patrimony and her proud and free destiny" (F 14). Like Chamberlain, Bonnet sought to demon- strate that the Munich accord—a "settlement concluded under the guarantee of the Four Powers, the execution of which is essen- tially under the control and even in many cases subject to the decision of an international commission"—was a vast improve-

ment over the Godesberg memorandum, which "resembled in many respects a veritable armistice convention concluded after victorious military operations on the part of Germany" (F 15). In the sequel the Commission came to nothing, and Bonnet approved of concessions to the Reich wider even than those con- templated in the Godesberg plan.

Frangois-Poncet scarcely shared his chief's optimism. H e opined on October 4 that the Nazi radicals were already "scan- ning the horizon in search of new demands to formulate, new battles to fight, new prizes to conquer." The German press, he

The dig-

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reported, was praising Daladier and quoting Goring: "With a man like M. Daladier, politics becomes a practical proposition." In the Ambassador's judgment "the Munich Conference should

The Western Democracies should

eliminate all causes of internal weakness, they should fill up as quickly as possible any gaps in their armaments, and they should give to the outside world tangible proof of industry, cohesion and strength. This is the price we must be prepared to pay if Europe is not to undergo again, after a respite of uncertain duration, crises similar to the last one just settled at the Munich conference after threatening for several days to degenerate into general pan- demonium" (F 16).

Frangois-Poncet, transferred to Rome, took his leave of Hitler on October i8, 1938, in the Fiihrer's fantastic eagle's nest, high in the Bavarian Alps above Berchtesgaden. The two men dis- cussed the possibility of a peace declaration comparable to the Anglo-German declaration of September 30. "W e may be cer- tain," reported the Ambassador to Bonnet, "that the Fiihrer re- mains true to his wish to disintegrate the Franco-British bloc, and to stabilize peace in the West, so as to have a free hand in the East. Wha t plans may be revolving already in his mind? Is it Poland, Russia, the Baltic States, which, in his thought, will be called upon to pay the cost? Does he himself even know? Be that as it may. Hitler is one of those men with whom one must never relax one's utmost vigilance, and whom one can only trust with reservations. Personally, I do not draw the conclusion that we should not listen to his suggestions" (F 18). Bonnet was delighted. Goring and Ribbentrop approved. But delays followed. They were due to the assassination of a German Charge in Paris, to the pogrom in the Reich, to the French general strike of November 30. They were also due apparently to Polish fears that such an accord would spell the end of the Paris-Warsaw alliance.

The gentlemen in Warsaw showed little appreciation of the fact that the partition of France's other ally, in which they had so eagerly taken part, rendered their own position hopeless. Bonnet assured the Polish Ambassador on November 22 that the proposed agreement "reserving in principle the relations of the contracting parties with third countries, and consequently those of France with Poland, does not in any way interfere with France's commitments toward the latter country" (F 22). The

serve us as a warning

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Soviet Ambassador, Jacob Suritz, was given similar assurances. "He made no particular observations," noted Bonnet. The next evening, however, he telephoned for the text of the agreement. Bonnet replied that it was secret, but he outlined the essential points. Suritz called again on November 26. When asked for comment by Bonnet, he replied that "he had received no commu- nication from his government and that, moreover, the agreement

in its present form could not be modified. I drew his attention to the fact that before putting the agreement before the Council of Ministers, I had informed him of its general outlines. M. Suritz did not insist" (F 27). The terms of the declaration had been sub- mitted to London on the 24th and had been warmly welcomed. Meanwhile on November 23 the new French Ambassador, Robert Coulondre, who had formerly served in Moscow, pre- sented his credentials to Hitler. By the end of the month all arrangements had been completed. Ribbentrop came to Paris.

Otto Abetz, chief of the Nazi espionage

H e was accompanied by

and bribery services in France. Bonnet greeted him warmly. With great delicacy, he refrained from inviting Georges Mandel and Jean Zay, the two Jewish Ministers, to the Cabinet dinner in Ribbentrop's honor. On December 6, 1938, the two Foreign Ministers signed a solemn declaration:

(1) The French Government and the German Government fully share the conviction that pacific and neighborly relations between France and Germany constitute one of the essential elements of the consolidation of the situation in Europe and of the preservation of general peace. Con- sequently both Governments will endeavor with all their might to assure the development of the relations between their countries in this direction.

(2) Both Governments agree that no question of a territorial nature remains in suspense between their countries and solemnly recognize as permanent the frontier between their countries as it is actually drawn.

(3) Both Governments are resolved, without prejudice to their special relations with third Powers, to remain in contact on all questions of importance to both their countries and to have recourse to mutual con- sultation in case any complications arising out of these questions should threaten to lead to international difficulties.

In witness whereof the Representatives of the two Governments have signed the present Declaration, which comes into force immediately

(F

28).

This declaration deserves to be regarded as the

tombstone

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which the French and German Foreign Ministers erected over the grave of France's alliances in Eastern Europe, already buried at Munich. Its only possible meaning in Realpolitik was that France, as well as Britain, was prepared to accept German assur- ances of respect for the status quo in the West in return for a free

hand in the East. The declaration, to be sure, did not expressly state this as its purpose. Bonnet took pains to insist, not to Ribben- trop but to his colleagues and to the French public, that French relations with Jugoslavia, Rumania, Poland and the U.S.S.R. were unaffected. His contention deceived no one, least of all him- self. The phrase in the declaration admitting of this interpretation was "sous reserve de leurs relations particulieres avec des Puis- sances tierces." Th e joint communique pubhshed at the time of signature used the words "tout en reservant les relations particu- lieres avec les Puissances tierces" (F 29). Bonnet made no men-

tion of this reservation in

his own address limited himself on this point to the phrase "tenant compte de la base solide que constitue Vamitie qui les lie a d^autres £tats." He referred to Italy, and understood that Bonnet referred to Britain.

In subsequent communications Bonnet asserted that he had warned Ribbentrop against speculating on Anglo-French disunity and expressed hopes for an improvement of Anglo-German rela- tions. N o comparable warning or hope was voiced with respect to relations with Warsaw, Belgrade, Bucharest and Moscow (F 30, 31). Ribbentrop shared Bonnet's hope for an improvement of French-Italian relations. "It is the struggle against Bolshevism," wrote Bonnet on December 14, "which is essentially at the basis of the common German-Italian political conception and, with- out saying so formally, Ribbentrop perhaps wished to give us to understand that there is no other objective to be attributed to it. In regard to Spain, it is again the struggle against Bolshevism which alone has inspired the German effort from the beginning. These considerations incidentally led the Foreign Minister of the Reich to raise the question of French policy toward the U.S.S.R., without however laying any particular stress upon it and only with a view to informing himself of the position. This policy appeared to him to be a survival of the encirclement policy of Versailles. I had to remind him that the Franco-Russian pact was not originally meant to remain only bilateral, that it had

his address to Ribbentrop. Th e latter in

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been and still was conceived as an element of collective agree-

ment, in which Germany and other Powers had been invited to

participate, and that it was the fault neither of France nor of the

U.S.S.R., if it had actually developed into an apparently purely

Franco-Soviet

exchange of observations was necessary in order to leave no doubt

as to the implications of the international agreement of Munich,

if executed both in the letter and the spirit. Th e Minister for

Wit h regard to Czechoslovakia, an

Foreign Affairs is to re-examine, as soon as he returns to Berlin,

the question of the setting up of the international guarantee, the

principle of which was asserted by Germany in protocol No . i "

Bonnet probably desired "re-examination" of an issue which

was for all practical purposes closed only as a face-saving device

to conceal the true purport of Munich and of the declaration of

December 6. Coulondre reported from Berlin on December 15,

in what is perhaps the most illuminating single dispatch in the

French Yellow Book of 1939:

The will for expansion in the East, as a matter of fact, seems to me as undeniable on the part of the Third Reich, as its disposition to put aside— at least for the present—any idea of conquest in the West; the one is a corollary of the other. Th e first half of Herr Hitler's programme—the integration of the Deutschtum into the Reich—has been carried out more or less completely; now the hour of the "Lebensraum" has come. Th e insistence with which it has been explained to me that Germany has no claims in the direction of France would have been enough to enlighten me. But I received even more explicit information; all those with whom I held conversations, with the exception of Herr Hitler, spoke to me, in different ways, and always with intentional vagueness, of the necessity for German expansion in Eastern Europe; Herr von Ribbentrop spoke of "the creation of zones of influence in the East and South-East"; Field- Marshal Goring, of "an essentially economic penetration in the South- East." I have not personally received very definite confidential information on this subject; but it appears that little by little one can see the outlines of a great German enterprise emerge from what is still nebulous. T o secure mastery over Central Europe by reducing Czechoslovakia and Hungary to a state of vassalage and then to create a Greater Ukraine under German control—this is what essentially appears to be the leading idea now accepted by the Nazi leaders, and doubtless by Herr Hitler

With regard to the Ukraine, it has been talked about by the whole staff

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of the National-Socialist Party for the past ten days. Dr. Rosenberg's Centre of Studies, Dr. Gobbels's Services and the "Ost-Europa" organ- ization under the former Minister, Herr Curtius, as well as the Intelligence Service of the German Army, are working on the question. It looks as if the ways and means had not yet been decided upon, but the aim appears to be well defined: to create a Greater Ukraine, which would become Germany's granary. In order to achieve this, Rumania must be subdued, Poland won over, and Soviet Russia dispossessed; German dynamism is not to be stopped by any of these obstacles, and in military circles, they already talk of the advance to the Caucasus and to Baku.

It is unlikely that Herr Hitler will attempt to achieve his plans con- cerning the Ukraine by direct military action. It would be contrary to the principles he has professed at different times, and according to which the regime wants neither an ideological war nor the annexation of hetero- geneous populations. It seems, moreover, that he has not yet decided on the means of action. Among those who approach him, a political opera- tion is thought of which would repeat, on a larger scale, that of the Sudetens: propaganda in Poland, in Rumania and in Soviet Russia in favor of Ukrainian independence; support eventually given by diplomatic pressure and by the action of armed bands; Ruthenia would be the focus of the movement. Thus by a curious turn of Fate, Czechoslovakia, which had been established as a bulwark to stem the German drive, now serves

the Reich as a battering-ram to demolish the gates to the

Nazi leaders use the method of Descartes, taking up each question in turn; above all, their appetites, whetted both by their needs and by their ambi- tions, drive them towards the East, towards the "glorious adventure" and the great achievement of the regime, which they are eager to undertake In order to sustain and reinforce this preparatory war economy, there

Th e

is need of a granary, of mines, and of labor; the Ukraine is at the door of

the

will see in a Ukrainian adventure an opportunity to divert the attention of his people from the internal difficulties now increasing in a dangerous manner (F33).

It is quite possible that, among other advantages. Hitler

These were the expectations entertained by the French Am-

bassador in Berlin and by Bonnet regarding Nazi intentions at

the turn of the year.

and the Right press of France, which sent correspondents to

Chust and published feature articles on the forthcoming Nazi

conquest of the Ukraine. Th e nature of these expectations was

known in Berlin which had much of the Right press in its pay.

Th e Nazi leaders lost no opportunity to encourage Paris and

London to act upon these assumptions. Their nature was known

The y were fully shared by Laval, Flandin

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in Moscow. On December 20 Bonnet was reported to have told the U.S.S.R. that it could rely upon French military aid against the Reich only in case of a German invasion and not in the event of a German-inspired insurrection in the Ukraine. Warsaw was apprehensive. The French Left charged that Bonnet and Dala- dier had abandoned all of France's allies in order to give Hitler a free hand against Russia. For domestic reasons Bonnet was obliged to deny this—and to the degree to which he became doubtful of the correctness of his own assumptions, he began to wish that his denials had substance. Ribbentrop at least drew the correct con- clusions from Bonnet's policy. The latter's subsequent insistence that these conclusions were incorrect is unconvincing. In the Paris conversations the German Foreign Minister, according to his own account, told Bonnet that the Reich regarded Eastern Europe as its own sphere of interest and looked upon the French alliances with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia as "atavisms." On July 13, 1939, he wrote a personal letter to Bonnet (who had by then long since shifted his position) declaring:

As to your remark about the reservation recorded in Article 3 of the Franco-German declaration concerning the special relations of France and of Germany with regard to third Powers, it is unquestionably not correct to say that this reservation implies a recognition of France's special relations with Poland. In the conversations which took place in Berlin and Paris at the time of the preliminary negotiations on the subject of the declaration, and on the occasion of the signature, it was on the contrary perfectly clear that the reservation referred to the special relations of friendship of France towards Great Britain and of Germany towards Italy. W e were in agreement, in particular, at the time of our conversations in Paris on December 6, 1938, in considering that respect for vital recipro- cal interests must be the prior condition and the principle of the future development of good Franco-German relations. On that occasion, I ex- pressly pointed out that Eastern Europe constituted a sphere of German interests, and, contrary to what is stated in your note, you then stressed on your part, that, in France's attitude with regard to the problems of Eastern Europe, a radical change had taken place since the Munich con- ference (F 163).

In his reply July 21, Bonnet said: "There is one point which I am anxious to make absolutely clear. At no moment either before or after the declaration of December 6 has it been possible for the German Government to think that France had decided to disin-

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terest itself in the East of Europe" (F i68).

to January 1939: in his address of the 26th Bonnet

asserted that all of France's engagements in the East, especially the French-Polish and French-Soviet alliances, remained fully in force and would be appUed if necessary. This struck Ribbentrop, then in Warsaw, as peculiar. French Ambassador Leon Noel reported to Bonnet that he had called upon Ribbentrop and "was

able to put matters in their true light, thanks to the telegram of the Havas agency and to the conversation which I had last week

On the question of the Soviets, as

he gave me to understand that he always dreaded their influence on our foreign policy, I rephed that our Government's attitude, as well as the situation at home and the state of public opinion in France, should be enough to prevent Germany's interpreting our relations with Soviet Russia in a way that would misrepresent

their nature" ( F 38, 39). There is no published record of the conversation cited. The reference to the Havas telegram is obscure.

Ribbentrop was not satisfied. H e ordered Count Johannes von Welzceck, German Ambassador in Paris, to protest. Bonnet ap- parently assured him that the objectionable passages in his speech "were for internal consumption only and of no importance what- ever to France's real poKcy." According to Welzceck, Bonnet had submitted the speech to him for approval in advance of its delivery. "M. Bonnet read aloud several passages from his speech, declaring some were meant for internal consumption and at the same time mentioning France's absolute adherence to her present policy on Eastern Europe." In spite of this, the German protest followed, expressing displeasure over France's apparent inten- tion to "widen her friendships in Eastern and Central Europe, thus creating the impression in Poland and Czecho-Slovakia that she was taking up again an encirclement policy directed against the Reich." Bonnet replied, according to Welzceck: "It should be possible to maintain old friendships and develop them, eco- nomically and culturally, without conflicting with the Reich, which enjoys a most favorable position in any case, thanks to its geographic location." Welzceck's report continued:

with Your

T o return

M. Bonnet said that in foreign political debates before the Chamber things were often said that obviously were only meant for internal con- sumption and did not have any further importance. If the French Foreign

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Minister braves the storm of the opposition to put through what he con- siders personally to be justified German demands on the Sudetenland and subsequently in his own mind draws the consequences of a changed situa- tion in Central Europe, then one cannot well demand that he abdicate all along the line before the Chamber. "If I did so," said M. Bonnet, "then the war-mongers would gain the upper hand." ^

In an interview with Coulondre on February 6 Ribbentrop again complained over Bonnet's language. " 'One might gather

the impression,' he remarked, 'that France has not renounced the

policy which brought about the last crisis.'

that France had no intention of giving up either her friendships or her interests in any part of the continent; as a great European Power she would make her presence felt in Europe. Nothing however in her attitude could give rise to suspicion on the part of

the Reich" (F 46). Ribbentrop's own account of this conversa- tion differs from the version in the French Yellow Book. H e "declared sharply that M. Bonnet has previously affirmed his dis- interest in Eastern questions and that, therefore, deviation from this line would not be advisable." Coulondre replied: "It is difK- cult for France to renounce Eastern Europe while making con- cessions in the Mediterranean. However, she will undertake no pohcy in Eastern Europe that would disturb Germany" (NY T

I answered him

1.17.40).

By this time the hopes of the Western Munichmen for a Nazi drive toward the Ukraine were already wavering. Yet so much had been staked on this gamble, so much had been sacrificed, so much had been forever lost that it was all but impossible to execute a volte-face and seek a new orientation. Th e means were no longer at hand to rebuild the aUiance system that had been shattered or to revert to the diplomacy of Louis Barthou. T o enjoy the cake which one has given away to others is more diffi- cult than to eat one's cake and have it too. Bonnet and Daladier, like Halifax and Chamberlain, drifted along in fumbling befud- dlement, hoping against hope that their original hopes might yet be realized.

The initiative lay with the victor of Munich. Whether he should move East or West was now for him alone to determine. H e bided his time, studied the map, conferred with his advisers

iNY T 1.1740, quoting documents issued by the German foreign office.

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and wrestled with his soul. H e dehvered one of his more notable

orations on January 30, 1939.

Th e day was the sixth anniversary of his appointment as

Chancellor. Th e place was the gayly beflagged KroU Opera in

Berlin. Th e audience was the new Reichstag of Great Germany,

855 strong, including Austrian and Sudeten delegates—and be -

yond the walls, all Germans listening attentively to their ow n

radios—and beyond Germany, milHons of other auditors all over

Europe and the Americas listening in fear to the voice of the

Master. Hitler spoke for two hours and a quarter:

When , six years ago this evening, tens of thousands of National Socialist fighters marched through the Brandenburg Gate to the light of their torches to express to me, who had just been appointed Chancellor of the Reich, their feeling of overwhelming joy and their vows as faithful fol- lowers, countless anxious eyes all over Germany and in Berlin gazed upon the beginning of'a development, the end of which still seemed unknown

and

Th e rescue of Europe began at one end of the

Continent with Mussolini and Fascism. National Socialism continued this rescue in another part of Europe and at the present moment we are witnessing in still a third country the same drama of a brave triumph over the Jewish international attempt to destroy European

After reviewing once more the years of struggle for victory,

and reiterating the Nazi version of Anschluss and Munich, he

paid ironical respects to democratic statesmen and journalists who

criticized the Third Reich and desired its ruin. Th e democracies,

with incomparably greater resources, had all failed to solve their

economic problems. The Third Reich had succeeded.

It is a matter of absolute indifference to us in Germany what form of

government other nations have.

At the most, it is a matter of indifference to us whether National Social-

ism—which is our copyright, just as Fascism is the Italian one—is exported

or not. W e are not in the least interested in this ourselves! W e see no

advantage in making shipments of National Socialism as an idea, nor do

we feel that we have any occasion to make war on other people because

they are democrats.

The assertion that National Socialism in Germany will soon attack

North or South America, Australia, China, or even Th e Netherlands, be-

cause different systems of government are in control in these places, is on

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the same plane as the statement that we intend to follow it up with an immediate occupation of the full

If certain methods of our economic policy appear injurious to the rest

of the world, it should recognize that a hatred on the part of the former

victor States, which was irrational and purposeless from an economic point of view, was chiefly responsible for making these efforts

W e must export in order to buy foodstuffs, and secondly, we must

export still more to cover raw materials.

And if foreign statesmen threaten with I-don't-know-what economic counter-measures, I can only say that in such a case a trade war of despair would begin, which would be an easy one for us. Easier than for the saturated other nations because the motive for our economic battle would be a very simple one, namely: the German people either live—meaning export—or

The theft of the German colonies was morally an injustice. Eco- nomically it was utter insanity! The political motives advanced were so mean that one is tempted merely to call them

Either the wealth of the world is divided by force, in which case this division will be corrected from time to time by force, or else the division is based on the ground of equity and therefore, also, of common sense, in which case equity and common sense must also really serve the cause of justice and ultimately of

W e can only serve the cause of peace if it is quite clearly understood

that a war of rival ideologies, waged against the Italy of today, will, once it is launched, and regardless of its motives, call Germany to the side of her Now, when we defend ourselves against such apostles of war as Duff Cooper, Eden, Churchill or Ickes, this is represented as interference with

the sacred rights of the democracies. According to the conception of these gentlemen, they have the right to attack other people and their leaderships, but nobody has the right to take umbrage against

Our relations with the United States are suffering from a campaign of defamation carried on to serve obvious political and financial interests which, under the pretense that Germany threatens American indepen- dence, are endeavoring to mobilize the hatred of an entire continent against the European States that are nationally governed.

W e all believe, however, that this does not reflect the will of the

millions of American citizens who, despite all that is said to the contrary by the gigantic Jewish capitalistic propaganda through press, radio and

films, cannot fail to realize that there is not one word of truth in all these assertions. Germany wishes to live in peace and on friendly terms with all coun-

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tries, including America. Germany refrains from any intervention in American affairs and likewise decisively repudiates any American inter- vention in German affairs. The question, for instance, whether Germany maintains economic rela- tions and does business with the countries of South and Central America concerns nobody but them and ourselves. Germany, anyway, is a great and sovereign country and is not subject to the supervision of American politicians.

Quite apart from that, however, I feel that all States today have so many domestic problems to solve that it would be a piece of good fortune for the nations if responsible statesmen would confine their atten- tion to their own If international financial Jewry within and without Europe should suc- ceed in throwing the nations into another world war the result will be not the bolshevization of the earth and therewith a victory for Jewry,

but the extermination of the Jewish race in

,

This address was widely hailed in the Western press as "mod- erate" and "conciliatory." Democratic demoralization had al- ready reached a point at which any speech by Hitler which did not make new territorial demands or threaten immediate war was greeted with joy as a vindication of appeasement and an assur- ance of peace and prosperity for all the world. Stocks recovered in London and New York. The Neiu York Times wondered at the new demand for colonies. The London Times deplored anti- Semitism, but declared that if Hitler desired peace, "if the eco- nomic and social welfare of the German people is henceforth the sole preoccupation of the German Government, much may be possible tomorrow that is beyond possibility in a time of obscure and growing tension." Chamberlain in Commons on the follow- ing day said: "Wha t we want to see is not only words which indicate a desire for peace, but before we can enter upon the

final settlement we shall want to see concrete evidence in a will- ingness, let us say, to enter into arrangements, if not for disarma-

I know

that this country will not be unsympathetic, and we shall be ready to make our contribution to the general appeasement of Europe."

Th e most significant portions of the January 30 address were the portions left unspoken. For the first time in an address of such length the Fiihrer did not denounce Soviet Russia. For the

ment, at any rate for a limitation of

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first time he defined Lebensraum in terms of Africa rather than in terms of Eastern Europe. He said nothing of the Drang nach Osten. H e said nothing of the Ukraine. Hitler had charted his course for 1939: Uquidation of France's remaining "alHes" east of the Reich, up to but not beyond the Soviet frontiers, and then the war against the West. The Ukrainian dream was dead.

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APPEASEMENT

THREE

BETRAYED

I. BLACKSHIRT BLACKMAIL

^'DowN WITH WAR! Down with imperialism! Down with bloody adventures in Africa!" The agitator denounced King and coun- try. He did more than talk. His socialism and pacifism were in- spired by a will to deeds. At Forli in Romagna he and his best friend, Pietro Nenni, helped to organize their followers for resist- ance to the war of conquest already under way in the South. A mob seized the railroad station, tore up the tracks, stopped a troop train. Cavalry arrived. Martial law was proclaimed. The agitator and his friend were arrested, tried, sentenced to jail. His martyrdom made him a hero. Upon his release five months later he became editor of Avanti, official organ of the Socialist party of Italy. The year was 1911.

Three years later he denounced war once more, this time more vehemently as befitted a greater war. Italy must remain neutral. Th e proletariat must revolt in all countries to overthrow the bloody capitalist exploiters and imperialists. The agitator was not Lenin, though he was later to learn from Lenin. Before the learning came the transformation. The instrument thereof was Socialist Jules Guesde, Minister of the Interior in the French Wa r Cabinet. Unlike the Itahan agitator, he was a patriot first and a Socialist second. He had money to buy up newspapers in neutral countries. He sent his secretary, Charles Dumas, to Italy. Dumas had 50,000 francs and an offer of 10,000 a month. He discovered that the editor of Avanti had his price.

The agitator switched sides and became an ardent advocate of military intervention on the side of France. H e founded a new

78

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THREE

BETRAYED

I. BLACKSHIRT BLACKMAIL

^'DowN WITH WAR! Down with imperialism! Down with bloody adventures in Africa!" The agitator denounced King and coun- try. He did more than talk. His socialism and pacifism were in- spired by a will to deeds. At Forli in Romagna he and his best friend, Pietro Nenni, helped to organize their followers for resist- ance to the war of conquest already under way in the South. A mob seized the railroad station, tore up the tracks, stopped a troop train. Cavalry arrived. Martial law was proclaimed. The agitator and his friend were arrested, tried, sentenced to jail. His martyrdom made him a hero. Upon his release five months later he became editor of Avanti, official organ of the Socialist party of Italy. The year was 1911.

Three years later he denounced war once more, this time more vehemently as befitted a greater war. Italy must remain neutral. Th e proletariat must revolt in all countries to overthrow the bloody capitalist exploiters and imperialists. The agitator was not Lenin, though he was later to learn from Lenin. Before the learning came the transformation. The instrument thereof was Socialist Jules Guesde, Minister of the Interior in the French Wa r Cabinet. Unlike the Itahan agitator, he was a patriot first and a Socialist second. He had money to buy up newspapers in neutral countries. He sent his secretary, Charles Dumas, to Italy. Dumas had 50,000 francs and an offer of 10,000 a month. He discovered that the editor of Avanti had his price.

The agitator switched sides and became an ardent advocate of military intervention on the side of France. H e founded a new

78

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paper: II Popolo (Tltalia. His comrades accused him of accepting bribes and expelled him from the editorship and from the Party. Nenni took over Avanti. Eight years later its headquarters in Milan were burned down by the friends of his former friend. Nenni's arrest was ordered. He fled to France and continued his work for socialism. Fifteen years later, in March 1937, the fol- lowers of the agitator, on vacation in Spain, found themselves near Guadalajara on the road to Madrid. Their hosts inconsid- erately showered them with propaganda pamphlets and then with bombs. Th e survivors sought safety in flight. The pam- phlets were written by Nenni, head of the propaganda depart- ment of the International Brigade. The agitator was Benito Mus- solini.^

Unlike parliamentary democrats who often compromise all their principles for the sake of the principle of compromise, the first of the new Caesars adhered uncompromisingly to one prin- ciple—that of exploiting the weak, casting his lot with the strong and selling himself to the highest bidder among those stronger than he. This is the way of the weak and of the newly-arrived. It is pleasant and profitable for those who are uninhibited by senti- ment. If it has been a principle also of Italian foreign policy since the achievement of unification, this results from the circumstances that foreign policy is unsentimental and that Italy is weak and newly-arrived.

In 1933-34 Mussolini perceived that Hitler was as yet feeble and that France and Britain were still strong. H e therefore col- laborated with the Western Powers and helped save Austria from Hitler's first assault. In 1935-36 he discovered that Hitler was becoming strong and that France and Britain were being steadily weakened by their own leaders. He therefore sold to Pierre Laval the pledge of an alliance against the Reich in return for Laval's acquiescence in the murder of Ethiopia. When Ethiopia was done to death with Laval's connivance, II Duce joined Hitler in alliance against France, sacrificing Austria in the bargain. The German- Austrian accord of July 11, 1936, which paved the road to Aus- tria's grave, also paved the way to the Ciano-Ribbentrop bargain of October 25.^ Th e "Axis" was herewith established. Its mem- bers took their first step together in according simultaneous

1 Cf. "Mussolini

vs. His Past" b y George Seldes, Ken, April 21,1938.

- Europe on the Eve, pp. 24if.

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recognition to Franco on November i8. Signature of the Ger- man-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement followed on Novem- ber 25, 1936. Italy adhered on November 6, 1937. Hungary and Manchukuo also signed on February 24, 1939. Fascist Spain did likewise on March 27. The three Fascist Great Powers, each with its satelHte, had formed a bloc. Its slogan was "Anti-Bolshevism."

This slogan deceived only the democratic statesmen and the magnates of sanctity and property in the West whom it was intended to deceive. II Duce was not deceived. It was he who had first discovered what magic could be worked with this

slogan. In its name he had assumed Caesar's mantle. For some of the mighty in Berlin and Tokio this slogan was deemed a useful fagade for imperialistic designs against Russia. The hopes of 1918, when German troops held the Ukraine and the Caucasus and Japanese troops poured into Eastern Siberia, were not for- gotten. Mussolini and Ciano had no such designs and no such hopes. Italy was separated from Russia by three seas and six countries. Italy could neither wage war on Russia nor hope for

the least advantage from war on Russia

democracies," holding most of Africa and both exits from the middle sea, were the only Great Powers at whose expense II Duce could hope to realize imperial dreams. Against these Powers he strove to turn the Axis and the Triplice. In this he succeeded.

Many factors moved the Fiihrer to abandon or defer his Ukrainian adventure. By no means least among them was Musso- lini. The Fascist jackal could not alone challenge France and Britain. But with the aid of the Nazi lion he could nurture another Fascist jackal in Spain to worry the flank of the Anglo-French bull. The creature was castrated, but still too formidable for the lesser beasts of prey. But if the Nazi lion could be persuaded that the Russian bear was tough and that the steer in the West was tender, then the steer could be brought down, with ample bits of the carcass for the jackals to feed upon after the lion was sated. Munich was the signal for the jackal to move. The prey in the West was in full flight and must not be permitted to rest. Th e lion, looking hungrily toward the East, must be induced to look hungrily toward the West. Hence II Duce's support of Magyar claims on Carpatho-Ukraine and his efforts to promote a settle- ment of all Eastern problems.

The barking began with Frangois-Poncet's reception in the

by others. Th e "pluto-

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Italian Chamber on November 30, 1938. Rioting broke out in Tunis on December 8. Tw o days later Gayda demanded Italian participation in the management of the Suez Canal. He warned Paris of the fate of Prague and intimated that French Somaliland and the Addis-Jibuti railway must pass into Fascist hands. Ciano hinted at war. On December 22 it was revealed that Rome had informed Paris on December 17 that it no longer regarded the Laval-Mussolini accord of 1935 as binding. Ratifications had never been exchanged. Far from giving up the railway shares and the real estate ceded to Italy by Laval's catastrophic pact, Rome pressed for new cessions in fresh fulfillment of the promises of the Treaty of London of 1915. Gayda declared that if France proved stubborn "Italy is ready to accept the offensive on any front and with any means." Verbal threats were accompanied by troop movements from Ethiopia toward French Somaliland, though any intention of invasion was disclaimed. It was hinted that Rome might be satisfied with "independence" for Tunis, participation in the Suez Canal, and a free port at Jibuti.

The Fascist clamor for partition of the French colonial empire was based upon the realistic supposition that France, even with British support, could never dare to resist the military might of the Rome-Berlin axis. Only with American and Soviet support could London and Paris meet the Fascist Triplice on equal terms. At a Socialist Congress on December 26 Blum advocated such a Four-Power Bloc against Fascism. His supporters approved, but his words were idle. Munich had ended any such prospects, at least for the near future. Should Germany move eastward, the Soviet Union could hope to offer effective resistance, even with- out allies. But should the Axis move westward, France and Brit- ain would be beaten unless powerful allies went to their aid. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay were thus under an in- creasingly desperate necessity either to join forces with Moscow or to push the Fascist powers into an assault on the Soviet Union at all costs. Th e first objective they were unwilling to contem- plate. Ho w to achieve the second?

The salvation of the West through a German war against Russia was attainable only by convincing Hitler that his path of least resistance lay to the East and by convincing his allies that they stood to gain something from such an enterprise. The first condition could scarcely be realized as long as the Soviet Union

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remained armed to the teeth and Britain and France were without allies, hopelessly outarmed by the greater Reich which they had helped to create, and governed by Chamberlains and Daladiers. Th e second condition also offered difficulties. T o achieve it, Japan must be stopped from expansion southward and deflected toward Outer Mongolia and Siberia. And since Italy could gain nothing by the anti-Soviet crusade, Mussolini must be paid in other coin to give his blessing.

This double problem dominated Tor y diplomacy at the turn of the year. On December 6, 1938, Lord Plymouth announced that the Cabinet was contemplating the extension of export credits to China. He warned Japan of the "incalculable conse- quences" of closing the Open Door. Downing Street, having already hailed the Anglo-American trade agreement of Novem- ber 17 as a symbol of solidarity, expressed approval of reiterated American championship of the Open Door; blessed the $25,- 000,000 credit to China through the Export-Import Bank, an- nounced on December 15 in Washington; and looked to the United States to keep Japan within bounds. These gestures of belated and feeble aid to China were of doubtful efficacy. Tokio indicated that it regarded the Nine-Power Pact as dead and that the "new order" in East Asia would comprise a bloc of Japan, Manchukuo and China in which the privileges of the Western Powers would be curtailed or terminated. Hiranuma's assumption of the Premiership signified renewed determination to crush Chinese resistance, but it did not necessarily foreshadow any pro- gram of war against the Soviet Union. Whatever the West might do, Japan's path of least resistance lay southward. In the event that France and Britain should be driven to the wall in Europe by the Caesars, Tokio would strike at their Oriental possessions.

to comprehend the problem

of "appeasing" Mussolini. Daladier referred on December 5 to "the firm resolve of all Frenchmen to assure, by all the means in their power, the absolute integrity of the territory over which the French flag floats." On December 14 Bonnet told the Depu- ties: "There cannot be the slightest equivocation. France will never consent to giving up an inch of territory to Italy, and any attempt to realize such a claim can only lead to an armed conflict." O n December 19 he reiterated this defiance and coupled it with

T o London's distress, Paris failed

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references to Nice, Savoy, Corsica, Tunis, and Somaliland and t o British support of France against aggression. Three months previ- ously he had denied that France could count on Britain. Four months previously he had made similar brave pledges in defense of Prague. Small military and naval reinforcements were sent to Jibuti where a few hundred troops faced 250,000 Italian and colonial soldiers in the neighboring territories of East Africa.

Ciano's note of December 17 was answered on December 16 with an acknowledgment and an expression of willingness to re- dress "grievances" and to exchange ratifications of the accord which Rome had just repudiated. But no French territory would be ceded and Rome's suggestion of "arbitration" in Munich fashion, with Hitler and Chamberlain as participants, was re- jected. On January 9 Daladier returned to Paris from a tour of Corsica, Tunisia, and Algeria which the Fascist press denounced as a "provocation." H e made new promises: "I shall maintain France. I shall maintain the French colonial empire."

The pathetic gyrations of the French politicians in the face of Fascist threats were of a piece with Laval's folly of 1935. Th e bargain which Laval had made with U Duce on January 7 of that year was sealed with a pledge to stand aside while Caesar attempted the conquest of Ethiopia. Laval's repeated denials that he had given such a pledge do not alter the fact, which is docu- mented by the Maffey Commission Report to the British Foreign Office.^ In the sequel Laval had done his best, in cooperation with Sir Samuel Hoare, to carry out his pledge. Public and par- liamentary pressures, alas, required a pretense of sanctions to restrain the aggressor. But II Duce understood and II Duce con- quered his empire. No w he was displaying base ingratitude.

Bonnet in his speech to the Chamber on December 19 made no mention of the Italian notification of two days before. On the 29th, after the news had leaked out, he was accused in the Cham- ber of having deliberately concealed the fact. His critics argued that France was now free to alter the status of Italians in Tunisia, to demand the return of the 2,500 railway shares, to take back the territories which had been ceded. But Bonnet preferred a differ- ent course. The small strip of Somaliland coast was indeed reoc- cupied in mid-February. For the rest. Bonnet chose "watchful

1 Cf. Europe on the Eve, pp . 167-8,173-4,

559"6i.

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waiting." In his address to the Deputies on December 29 he said

he had not learned of the Italian action until after his address of

the 19th. Even if he had, he could not have mentioned it since it

had not been discussed b y the Cabinet. Whe n asked whether the

Italian note had been delivered on the 17th, he repUed: "I neither

deny nor confirm it." "I am sorry to say," retorted Communist

Deputy Peri, "that M. Bonnet's denials are no longer of any use

to anybody." ^

No t until March 29 did the Quai d'Orsay publish the corres-

pondence of December and then only to refute Mussolini's pub -

lic hints that precise Italian demands had been formulated on

December 17. Ciano had written to the French Ambassador:

Mr. Ambassador: In our conversation of the second instant Your Excel- lency expressed the desire of the French Government to know whether the Italian Government considers as still effective the Franco-Italian ac- cords of January 7, 1935, and whether these accords in its opinion can still serve as a basis for Franco-Italian relations.

I replied to Your Excellency that the question was one of too great importance for me to give a definite answer offhand and required more extensive study. I now have the honor to inform you as follows in confirmation of what I was able then to tell you personally. The Franco-Italian accords of January 7, 1935, are composed, as Your Excellency knows, of a treaty relative to the settlement of reciprocal interests in Africa and of a series of acts that are closely connected with it. Article VII of the treaty provides that it will be ratified and subordinates its going into effect to an exchange of ratifications. Now this exchange has never taken place. The constitutional procedures preparatory to ratification were indeed begun immediately after the sig- nature but were never carried out. Negotiations for the stipulation of the special convention concerning Tunisia were never even commenced and that convention, according to Article I of the treaty, should have become effective on the same date as the treaty itself. The Franco-Italian treaty for the settlement of reciprocal interests in Africa has therefore never been completed.

Over and above these observations of a juridical nature must also be taken into account that the treaty as well as the accompanying acts were concluded on the basis of very definite assumptions and that these assump- tions never received any partial confirmation.

As you know, the 1935 accords, in return for the settlement of a whole

1 Cf. France and Munich, by Alexander Werth, pp. 399-406.

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series of questions, aimed at developing friendship between Italy and France and instituting relations of confident collaboration between the two nations.

Italy notably agreed by 1935 to important sacrifices both as concerns the rights of the Italians in Tunisia and as concerns the rights she held from the Treaty of London in 1915, in recognition of the equitable under- standing and attitude in conformity that France was to show for Italy's needs for expansion in East Africa.

Now the attitude adopted by France when Italy b y the action of the Negus was forced to solve definitively the problem of its relations with Ethiopia and also thereafter was certainly not in accordance with the above intention. It was precisely the opposite. It is sufficient to refer, without need to discuss them further, to the different phases of the events that have transpired since 1935.

The accords of January 7, 1935, as Your Excellency was able to note in our conversation of the second instant, have never been executed and thus are emptied of their content and can evidently not be considered as being in effect today. They have in fact been superseded historically by events.

As a whole they were related to a general situation that has been rapidly outdated by the events that followed the application of sanctions. Further, the creation of the empire has established new rights and new interests of fundamental importance.

Under these conditions and even in the interests of their improvement, Franco-Italian relations cannot have for a basis at the present time the accords of 1935, and especially if it is desired to improve them it is evi- dent that these relations ought to be examined again in common accord by the two Governments (NYT 3.30.39).

Th e nature of the "intentions" and the "very definite assump-

tions" referred to is not in doubt. Th e balance of the formula was

familiar: you have granted our demands in return for our prom-

ises in other fields; once the demands are realized, however, "new

rights and new interests" are created; these invalidate our earlier

promises; conditions have changed. So sorry. With identical logic

the Japanese Foreign Office had repeatedly demonstrated that

"changed conditions" had rendered the Nine-Power Pact of 1922

"inappHcable." (The changes were a result of Japanese military

violence in disregard of the pact and of other treaty obligations.)

Here was the diplomatic equivalent of the proverbial strategy of

the murderer who, having killed both his parents, pleaded for

mercy on the ground that he was an orphan.

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Frangois-Poncet's long reply, which was doubtless drawn up by Bonnet, was a plaintive plea for good faith:

My government feels that it must set forth the following facts:

First, the accords of January 7, 1935, which set the basis for the settle- ment of all outstanding differences between France and Italy and which had the object of assuring the development of their friendly relations were approved with only nine dissenting votes by the French Parliament on March 23 and 26,1935. If ratifications could not be exchanged as a result of the adjournment of the establishing of the Tunisian convention that was to precede that exchange, France cannot be held responsible for evaluating the circum- stances that led Italy to desire that adjournment. Moreover, even before their ratification these accords, solely advantage- ous to Italy, were started to be put in operation by France since, anticipat- ing one of their provisions, the French Government arranged the transfer from the French group of the company holding the concession of the Addis Ababa-Jibuti railway of a parcel of 2,500 shares into the hands of an Italian group. Even on the part of the Italian representatives in the negotiations that took place in Paris in 1937 for revision of the economic settlements pro- viding for East Africa, the Rome accords were considered sufficiently established to be frequently invoked as a basic reference. Recently, again on May 12, 1938, considering with the French Charge d'Affaires the program of negotiations submitted on April 22, 1938, by the Italian Government, Your Excellency, while making a formal reservation, raised no objection to the principle of the application of the African ac- cords of January 7, 1935, which was augmented in Points 9, 10 and 11 of that program. Your Excellency even specified with regard to the Tunisian convention that the Chigi Palace contemplated no substantial change in the text pro- posed by the French Government, which text M. Blondel [Jules Blondel, then the French Charge d'Affaires] pointed out, had been extracted from the 1935 accords. No political consideration in the mind of the Italian Government therefore opposed the maintenance of these accords at that time.

Second, no political action of the French Government ever has been since invoked to justify the attitude displayed by the Royal Government. The French Government, on the contrary, has taken every step that has been represented to it as being in the nature of facilitating the improve- ment of relations between the two countries.

O n May 12, 1938, the French Government adopted at Geneva

a position

of principle that aimed to secure for it freedom of action to recognize

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Italian sovereignty in Ethiopia. A few months later, on October 12, it accredited an ambassador to His Majesty the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia. Third, as to the previous attitude of France with regard to the Ethiopian affair, the Italian Government never has been ignorant of the general lines of French policy and the international obligations they included. They were always loyally reported to the Italian Government at the proper moment by the head of the French Government, M. Laval, who was then directing French foreign policy. And the Italian Government knows in what spirit that policy was con- ducted by the French Government. Premier Mussolini was several times good enough to express to the French Ambassador during the course of the Geneva procedures his appreciation of the moderating influence of France and of the constant efforts of the French delegation to reconcile as much as possible respect for the obligations of the pact with the safe- guarding of Franco-Italian friendship.

The French Government desires to recall these facts to Your Excel-

lency in acknowledging the receipt of your communication (NYT

3-30.39)-

Thus: Laval had betrayed Ethiopia and the Covenant. Laval had kept his bargain in good faith. His successors had done like- wise. Ethiopia was Italian. The League was dead. Mussolini had expressed gratitude. And now, now—to repudiate the deal and to make new demands—was this honorable? Was this just? The grim comedy of these complaints was not lost upon a lonely exile in England. This was what he had predicted. His name was Haile Selassie.

was willing to make new

But Bonnet continued to hope. H e

concessions—not perhaps because the wits were right in saying that he was in the pay of every European government except the French, but because he was a convinced and incurable advocate of appeasement, wherever it led. He was quite prepared to grant new favors to Rome if the Grand Design of the Munichmen could thereby be restored to some semblance of its pristine beauty. But Daladier was doubtful. Parliament was dubious. The public was anxious. He must proceed circumspectly. His public formula was that no Italian territorial demands could be met, but as for "non- territorial" demands, much could be done with sufficient good will on both sides.

When the formula produced no results, Bonnet had other de- vices. On February 14 the Socialist group in the Chamber, sup-

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ported by other opposition deputies, demanded that the Foreign

Minister explain reports of "secret negotiations with Germany and Italy." The reports came from the pen of Henri de Kerillis in USpoque. M. de Kerillis was a rara avis: an anti-Munichman

of the

extreme Right. H e was an honest and reputable journalist

whose

reports were

not to be lightly dismissed. H e asserted that

Bonnet, in his ardor for concessions to the Axis, was circumvent- ing his own diplomatic service through the use of secret agents:

in BerUn, Fernand de Brinon; in Rome, Paul Baudouin. Th e former had published in Le Matin in November 1933 a sensa- tional interview with Hitler, bespeaking appeasement and a French-Nazi entente. H e became Vice-President of the Co?mte France-Allemagne, an organization pledged to rapprochement with the Reich. H e was a contributor to the leading financial paper of Paris, VInformation, controlled by a bank with which Bonnet had close connections. In its pages he had denounced the "war-mongers" before Munich had praised "self-determination" after the surrender. Baudouin, who was destined for higher things, was a financier of extreme reactionary and Mimichois

H e had been party to the alleged "bankers' con-

orientation.

spiracy" which had contributed to the fall of the Blum Cabinet in June 1937. H e was now President of the Bank of Indo-China. The Berlin Borsenzeitung had reported on February 6 that Baudouin was in Rome negotiating a settlement of Italy's claims against France through a possible cession of a large area south of Libya, including Tibesti and Lake Chad. According to Kerillis, Ambassador Coulondre, after phoning the Quai d'Orsay, had

issued a denial. Meanwhile it was announced in Jibuti that Italy had dropped its boycott of the French railway and had signed a contract for the shipment of 15,000 tons of freight. When Cou- londre next saw Ribbentrop, the Nazi Foreign Minister expressed

surprise at the Ambassador's denial in view of the fact that M. de Brinon had confirmed the story in person with Bonnet's permis- sion. Coulondre returned to Paris and allegedly told Bonnet on February 10 that such maneuvers were "intolerable" and that he would resign if "such practices are not halted." De Brinon ex- plained that he was convinced that Germany would long be occupied by "the immense job" of organizing Central and East- ern Europe. "European peace will not be exposed to grave risks

If the Berlin-Rome Axis is considered a fact

during

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and the Paris-London Axis another fact that the Germans them- selves recognize, there are serious possibilities for negotiation and peaceful settlement. Briefly, I bring back the conviction that if we have a government, each day more and more stable and more and more realist, which is the case for the Daladier-Bonnet gov- ernment, things should be considerably cleared up during the Spring and Summer, and that at that time we may look to the future with a certain optimism" (NY T 2.15.39).

Bonnet as usual denied the whole story, though the charges were also made by Pertinax in UOrdre and by UHumanite} Nothing came of the accusations, nor of Bonnet's endeavors, if he had indeed done what he was accused of doing. From his point of view, the wretched "war-mongers" were forever making im- possible a sensible settlement with the Axis. From their point of view, he was forever scheming to betray French interests into the hands of Hitler and Mussolini. The two groups checkmated one another in both France and Britain, as did "interventionists" and "isolationists" in the United States. The result was a paralysis of policy which was far more dangerous than a complete surren- der or a firm defiance to the Axis.

Chamberlain and HaHfax, to whom the French leaders con- stantly looked for guidance, were not helpful. They were as anxious as Bonnet to appease Mussolini. But they seemed to con- template the necessity of "sacrifices" by France as well as by Ethiopia and Spain. Ever since the Ciano-Perth accord of April 16, 1938, Londo n had pressed Paris t o arrive at a similar settle- ment with Italy.^ The pressure had increased after Munich. Chamberlain and Hahfax acquiesced anew in Italian intervention in Spain, recognized Italian title to Ethiopia and put the April agreement in force. On November 23-25, 1938, they had come to Paris to urge a similar course on the French Ministers. Daladier and Bonnet needed no urging, but they were perturbed when Chamberlain announced on November 28 that he and Hahfax were going to Rome. At the London Press dinner on December 13 the Prime Minister said that "some will once again be specu- lating upon who is the winner and who the loser in these talks.

1 N o hint of this appears of course in the French Yellow Book, though there is perhaps discernible a certain coolness in the dispatches between Bonnet and Coulondre after mid-February.

2Cf. Europe on the Eve, pp. 349-58 and s6$-yi (text).

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That is not the spirit in which we propose to undertake our jour- I find it difficult to rouse much excitement over differ- ent systems of government, apart from particular actions which may not necessarily be inherent in the system." The anti-French demonstrations in the Italian Chamber had begun two days after the London announcement of the visit. Frangois-Poncet was assured that these outcries were "spontane- ous" and did not represent Italian policy. But Tor y appeasement might well be at French expense. In his references to the French colonies, Chamberlain first declared that Britain had "no specific pledge" to defend them. But at the press dinner, he asserted that "our relations with France are so close as to pass far beyond mere legal obligations, since they are founded on identity of interests." In the House of Commons on December 14 he asserted that the Anglo-Italian agreement to respect the Mediterranean status quo "certainly applies to Tunis." Any attack upon Tunis "would be a matter of grave concern." Here, as in dealing with Prague in the spring. Chamberlain warned against war, but declined to assume any pledge of defense. It was not strange that some Frenchmen feared that Tunis might suffer the fate of Sudeten- land. On December 19 he spoke of Anglo-French relations as "cordial" and expressed gratitude at Bonnet's pledge of Decem- ber 14 to place all the forces of France at Britain's disposal to resist unprovoked attack. But he made no reciprocal pledge cov- ering the French colonies, merely opining that "intentions" were "more significant than actual treaties." Paris wondered anxiously what his intentions were.

French courage was slightly restored by Daladier's Mediter- ranean tour and Chamberlain's pledge in Paris on January 10 not to attempt "mediation" of the French-Italian quarrel. This pledge rendered the Rome discussions largely futile. Their results were summed up by the Italian Foreign Office in the January 15 issue of Informazione Diplomatica:

Nothing sensational transpired since [Anglo-Italian] relations are de- fined in the accords of April 16 tha t wen t into effect November 16. Thes e

accords already have been loyally applied by both

in a most formal manner that the basis of Italian foreign policy is and will

continue to be the Rome-Berlin Axis. As for Spain, II Duce repeated that the last Italian legionnaires would be repatriated when the Reds do like- wise and when Franco receives belligerent rights, which it is simply

Italy stressed

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absurd to refuse any longer. U Duce, however, added that if in the near future there is intervention on a larger scale on the part of governments friendly to Negrin, Italy will resume her liberty of action because she would thus consider the non-intervention policy ended and a failure. As for Italo-French relations, II Duce stated that the Spanish question deeply divided the two countries and only when the war was finished might it be possible to review the situation. In the meantime it is absolutely impossible to speak of arbitration or mediation, four-Power conferences and much less of three-Power ones.

The Spanish Republic died. Rome made new demands, always taking care to leave them vague and therefore elastic. Daladier breathed defiance. London pushed plans for a trade conference with Berlin, though the Reich exhibited little enthusiasm in the absence of colonial concessions. Downing Street made polite queries in Rome as to the reasons for the summoning of Italian reservists and the dispatch of reinforcements to Libya where Marshal Badoglio was inspecting fortifications. Chamberlain told the House of Commons on February 21 that ,£580,000,000 would be spent for defense during a single year. Tw o days later Halifax reaffirmed Anglo-French solidarity and quoted from Mein Kampf to prove that Britain was not decadent.

Meanwhile, amid unconfirmed rumors of border clashes, French army chiefs in North Africa conferred under General August Nogues on the defense of Tunis. Hore-Belisha announced on March 8 that Britain would send nineteen divisions to France in the event of war. But on the following day it was intimated that the Prime Minister was hopeful of the settlement of Italian claims against France without war and of the feasibility of a dis- armament conference by summer. Sir Samuel Hoare echoed the idea on March 10 by suggesting a meeting of five heads of states. Sir Samuel, now Secretary for Home Affairs, was one of the authors of the Anglo-German naval accord of June 18, 1935, and of the Laval-Hoare bargains of September 10 and December 8»

1935. H e was a member of the "Inner Cabinet." He, of all men,

should know what results might be expected from appeasement. Men and women therefore breathed easier when he said on March 10 that there was hope of freeing the people of Europe

from a nightmare that haunts them and from an expenditure upon arma-

ments that beggars

must have meant Hitler, Mussolini and Franco, since he was above sus-

Five men in Europe—three dictators [he

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picion of dealing with Stalin] and the Prime Ministers of England and France—if they worked with singleness of purpose and unity of action might in an incredibly short space of time transform the whole history of the world. These five men, working together in Europe and blest in their efforts by the President of the United States of America, might make themselves eternal benefactors of the human race. Our own Prime Minis- ter has shown his determination to work heart and soul to such an end. I cannot believe that other leaders of Europe will not join him in the high endeavor upon which he is engaged.

On the same day, however, Stalin was deriving no little satis- faction from pronouncing in Moscow the bankruptcy of Anglo- French hopes for a Nazi-Soviet clash. And in Slovakia there was an effort to proclaim "independence" from Prague. Sir Samuel's address was a swan song.

2. CZECHO-SLOVAKI A

f

MARC H

15,

1939

Emil Hacha was not a great leader. His eyes were tired, his hair was thin, his face drooped with age and ill-health. But he was amiable, colorless and therefore "safe." For these qualities, now so necessary after the Great Betrayal, the Chamber and the Senate of the Republic elected him President of Czecho-Slovakia on November 30, 1938. It was fitting that so small a man should hold the office that Thomas Masaryk and Edouard Benes had held before him. The proud and prosperous nation of freemen which they had helped to build was now a mutilated torso, still breathing only by the grace of Hitler. Hacha was a man of 66, of Czech peasant stock—a devout Catholic, a jurist, a member of the Hapsburg Imperial Privy Council, Chief Justice of the Supreme Administrative Court of Czechoslovakia after 1925, a lecturer and writer on administrative law—always aloof from party pol- itics. The important thing was that the Nazi press approved of him.

Following his election, he drove from the Parliament House in Prague to Hradcany Castle, dominating the ancient city. H e was accompanied by General Syrovy, Premier of the central govern- ment; by Mgr. Josef Tiso, Premier of Slovakia; and by M. Julian Revay, Deputy for Mgr. Augustin Volosin, Premier of Carpatho- Ukraine. The State of which he became the head had had, before

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picion of dealing with Stalin] and the Prime Ministers of England and France—if they worked with singleness of purpose and unity of action might in an incredibly short space of time transform the whole history of the world. These five men, working together in Europe and blest in their efforts by the President of the United States of America, might make themselves eternal benefactors of the human race. Our own Prime Minis- ter has shown his determination to work heart and soul to such an end. I cannot believe that other leaders of Europe will not join him in the high endeavor upon which he is engaged.

On the same day, however, Stalin was deriving no little satis- faction from pronouncing in Moscow the bankruptcy of Anglo- French hopes for a Nazi-Soviet clash. And in Slovakia there was an effort to proclaim "independence" from Prague. Sir Samuel's address was a swan song.

2. CZECHO-SLOVAKI A

f

MARC H

15,

1939

Emil Hacha was not a great leader. His eyes were tired, his hair was thin, his face drooped with age and ill-health. But he was amiable, colorless and therefore "safe." For these qualities, now so necessary after the Great Betrayal, the Chamber and the Senate of the Republic elected him President of Czecho-Slovakia on November 30, 1938. It was fitting that so small a man should hold the office that Thomas Masaryk and Edouard Benes had held before him. The proud and prosperous nation of freemen which they had helped to build was now a mutilated torso, still breathing only by the grace of Hitler. Hacha was a man of 66, of Czech peasant stock—a devout Catholic, a jurist, a member of the Hapsburg Imperial Privy Council, Chief Justice of the Supreme Administrative Court of Czechoslovakia after 1925, a lecturer and writer on administrative law—always aloof from party pol- itics. The important thing was that the Nazi press approved of him.

Following his election, he drove from the Parliament House in Prague to Hradcany Castle, dominating the ancient city. H e was accompanied by General Syrovy, Premier of the central govern- ment; by Mgr. Josef Tiso, Premier of Slovakia; and by M. Julian Revay, Deputy for Mgr. Augustin Volosin, Premier of Carpatho- Ukraine. The State of which he became the head had had, before

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Munich, 140,500 sq. km. and 14,729,000 inhabitants by the 1930 census. It now had only 98,900 sq. km. and 9,807,000 inhabitants. Germany had annexed 28,680 sq. km. with 3,653,000 people, Hungary 11,830 with 1,027,000 people, and Poland 1,086 with 241,000 people. Thanks to German-supported pressure for local "autonomy" in the aftermath of the debacle, the new Czecho- slovakia was a federation, with 6,794,000 of its population in Bohemia-Moravia, 2,450,000 in Slovakia, and 552,000 in Carpa- tho-Ukraine. In the reshuffle of posts in the wake of Hacha's election, Tiso and Volosin retained their positions in Bratislava and Chust, while the premiership in the National Cabinet passed to Rudolf Beran, with Frantisek Chvalkovsky remaining Foreign Minister.

The new regime was committed to full collaboration with the Reich. Beran was leader of the ultra-conservative Czech Agrarian party. He it was who had long opposed Benes and urged appease- ment of Hitler. He it was who helped to bring about capitula- tion to the Chamberlain-Daladier ultimatum of September 19. H e it was who organized the new "Party of National Unity" in the name of "authoritarian" democracy. With his bald head, round face, stubby mustache and heavy body, he personified the "prac- tical" bourgeois who preferred submission to resistance so long as Property seemed safe. In a broadcast of December 3 he de- clared:

W e shall quickly consolidate good relations with all our neighbors. While firmly resolved to maintain our independence, we have decided

in the interests of the present and coming generations for open coopera-

tion with our most powerful

vulsions, we shall fight our way successfully through all the difficulties

that confront is determined to live.^

No power in the world can destroy a nation that

Even after the recent con-

These hopes were buttressed by the fact that the Annex to the Munich agreement asserted that Britain and France had accepted the partition of Czechoslovakia "on the basis that they stand by the offer, contained in paragraph six of the Anglo-French pro- posals of the nineteenth September, relating to an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak state against

1 The Central European Observer, Prague, December 16, 1938.

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unprovoked aggression. When the question of the Pohsh and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Ger- many and Italy for their part will give a guarantee to Czecho- slovakia." By early November this "settlement" vi^as achieved through German-Italian arbitration. The "guarantee," however, failed to materialize. Halifax and Bonnet displayed no enthusiasm. Ribbentrop and Ciano displayed less. If words on paper still had meaning, London and Paris were solemnly bound to defend Prague against unprovoked aggression. But Rome and Berlin were not yet parties to the arrangement.

Bonnet raised the question with Ribbentrop in Paris on Decem- ber 6. His German guest was non-committal: the Reich must await developments with respect to minority problems. "The best and most effective guarantee would be the establishment of a friendly relationship between Germany and Czecho-Slovakia." Berlin could never tolerate a reversion to Benes policies which might be encouraged by a four-power guarantee. According to Ribbentrop, Bonnet replied that "France was forced by the pres- sure of events to foresee the possibility of guaranteeing the Czech borders," but he recognized that the new State was within Ger- many's sphere of interest and that a four-power guarantee might be deemed "an onerous remnant of the defunct French-Czech alliance that was of no particular importance." ^ But Ribbentrop, according to Bonnet (F 32), agreed to re-examine the question of the guarantee on his return to Berlin.

When Coulondre asked Baron von Weizsacker on December 22 what had been done in this direction, he replied with a smile:

"Could not this matter be forgotten? Since Germany's predomi- nance in that area is a fact, would not the guarantee of the Reich be sufficient?" (F 35) Th e French Ambassador responded rather weakly that obligations cannot be forgotten. His own Govern- ment had conveniently forgotten all its obligations toward Prague in September and therewith reduced its ally to such help- lessness that no new guarantee could have any meaning. But the very lack of substance rendered it all the more important for the Munichmen to insist upon the form. This the Baron failed to comprehend. "Besides," he added, "it would be for Czecho-Slo- vakia to claim that guarantee. In any case we are in no hurry to

1 NY T 1.17.40,

quoting German documents issued in Berlin, January 16, 1940,

in reply to The French Yellow

Book.

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settle this question, and M. Chvalkovsky is not coming to Berlin until after the holidays." This attitude, thought Coulondre, con- firmed the misgivings felt in Prague.

Downing Street did little to press Berlin for the guarantee. Henderson was uninterested. During his visit to Rome, Chamber- lain apparently questioned Mussolini regarding the conditions under which Italy might consider joining in the guarantee. Bonnet did little until he began to feel alarmed over Berlin's re- luctance. Even this reluctance, however, might be a good omen. The French Charge, M. de Montbas, reported to Bonnet on Janu- ary 5 that "German domination is weighing down Czecho-Slo- vakia more and more heavily. The conclusion of a customs and monetary union to the profit of the Reich might prove at the same time a most advantageous operation and the first stage on the road to the Ukraine" (F 36). On February 4 Bonnet in- structed Coulondre to join Henderson "in a parallel demarche" in soliciting the views of Wilhelmstrasse regarding the guarantee. Three days later M. de Lacroix conferred with Chvalkovsky re-

garding the latter's recent visit to Berlin. Hitler had received the Czech Foreign Minister in a not unfriendly fashion. The Fiihrer and Ribbentrop had both emphasized that the Reich could not guarantee any State which had not eliminated the Jews: "Do not imitate the sentimental and leisurely manner in which we our-

selves treated this

. Germany will seek to form a bloc of anti-Semitic States, as

she would not be able to treat as friends the States in which the Jews, either through their economic activity or through their

high positions, could exercise any kind of influence" (F 45),

Prague was already relieving Jews of public posts in order to oblige Berlin. Hitler was casting about for pretexts. H e insisted also that Germans in Czecho-Slovalda must be free to be active Nazis. The Czech army must be reduced. Both conditions had

already been met

had seen Ribbentrop on February 6 and had been read a lecture denouncing the inability of London and Paris to understand that "our vital interests must be satisfied" and condemning attacks on the Reich by "British and American newspapers, under the pres- sure of Jewish and Bolshevising influences."

This vermin must be destroyed.

? Coulondre reported to Bonnet that he

W e have decided to give our newspapers full liberty to answer back,

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and you will soon see how they do it. In foreign policy our aim is two-

every means, and especially through the

operation of the anti-Comintern pact. (2) T o regain our colonies. On the first point, believe me, the struggle we have started is merciless. Toward the Soviets, we will remain adamant. W e will never come to an

fold: (i ) T o fight Bolshevism by

understanding with Bolshevist

are not prepared to start negotiations. And why should we, as long as in the democracies the opposition parties are stirred up by the mischievous action of Bolshevism and Jewry (F 46).

we

As to the colonies

In the face of this unpromising attitude, Bonnet instructed Coulondre to submit a note verbale on February 8, recalling the Munich annex and Chamberlain's talk with Mussolini. "The French Government, anxious to see all the clauses of the Munich agreement effectively carried out, would appreciate information on the views of the Government of the Reich on the question of the guarantee provided for in said agreement. The French Em- bassy would be grateful to the Reicih Foreign OfEce if it would kindly enable it with all speed to comply with the desire thus expressed by the French Government" (F 47). Ribbentrop pre- pared no reply until February 28. Meanwhile De Lacroix re- ported from Prague on the i8th that Germany had indicated willingness to guarantee the frontiers only on condition of com- plete neutrahzation, adhesion to the anti-Comintern pact, with- drawal from the League of Nations, drastic reduction of military effectives, surrender of part of the Czech gold reserve, sale of raw materials for the now worthless Czecho-Slovak currency in the Sudeten areas, full access to Czech markets for Sudeten indus- tries with which no new Czech industries must be allowed to compete, anti-Semitic legislation fashioned after the Nuremberg decrees, dismissal of all State employees objectionable to Ger- many, and permission for Germans to carry Nazi badges and fly the Nazi flag (F48) .

Ribbentrop's note of February 28, which was not transmitted to Coulondre until March 2, made no specific mention of such conditions. He argued instead that there could be no German guarantee until Prague's other neighbors were willing to accept similar engagements. Ne w conflicts with Hungary and Poland were likely. The Anglo-French guarantee was no safeguard against them. Britain had similar difficulties in Palestine. "An undeniable danger exists that premature guarantees, far from

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