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PEOPLE VS. JUDGE DONATO [198 SCRA 130; G.R. NO.

79269; 5 JUN 1991] Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court once every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that: 1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA) 2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address; 3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity; 4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address; 5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and address were also found to be false; 6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his arrest. This however was denied. Hence the appeal. Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.

Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution. Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the crime of

rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him. Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. CARPIO VS. MAGLALANG [196 SCRA 41; G.R. NO. 78162; 19 APR 1991] Thursday, February 12, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: On January 8, 1987, information for the murder of Mayor Jose Payumo of Dinalupihan Bataan was filed against Escao and ten other unindentified persons by the provincial fiscal in the RTC of Bataan at Balanga. Four days later, the Acting Executive Judge of said court issued an order of arrest against Escao recommending no bail for his provisional liberty. Pat. Cesar Diego who acted on the warrant returned to the court with a certification issued by NBI agent Gonzales, stating therein that accused was still under investigation. Through counsel Rolando T. Cainoy, Escao filed in court an urgent ex-parte motion for his commitment at the provincial jail of Bataan on the ground that he wanted to be where his family and counsel could have easy access to him. He alleged therein that his detention at the NBI headquarters in Manila was irregular and in defiance of the warrant of arrest issued by the court. This was granted. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Director Carpio stating that the NBI needed physical custody of Escao for the identification of the other accused in the case who were still the objects of a manhunt by NBI agents; that in view of the finding of NBI agents that the other accused and suspects in the case were subversive elements or members of the New People's Army, it was for the best interest of Escao that he be detained at the NBI lock-up cell where security measures were adequate; and that the NBI would produce the person of Escao before the court whenever required and every time that there would be a hearing on the case. However another motion was executed by Escao stating that he now wants to be detained in the NBI, alleging that he did not authorize his counsel to execute the first motion. Also, Escao's counsel Rolando T. Cainoy filed an application for bail stating that Escao was arrested by NBI agents on December 7, 1986 without a warrant having been presented to him and that since then he had been detained in the lock-up cell of the NBI; that said agents, also without a warrant, searched his house when he was arrested; that he was subjected to inhuman torture and forced to admit participation in the killing of Mayor Payumo and to implicate other persons, and that during the custodial investigation, he was not represented by counsel. In opposing said application, the public prosecutor averred that the accused was charged with a capital offense for which no bail may be availed of, that the reasons advanced in said application would be overcome by strong and sufficient evidence; and that during the custodial investigation, he was represented by counsel. The court granted the application for bail fixing the same at P30,000, having found no sufficient evidence against accused. Director Carpio was ordered to justify his actions and so as not to be considered in contempt. Issue: Whether or Not the order granting right to bail was proper.

Held: No. The order granting bail had been rendered moot not only by the fact that he had been released from NBI custody, but also because Escao jumped bail and did not appear on the date set for his arraignment. Notwithstanding, the Court resolved the issue of the legality of the order granting bail to Escao. Although the right to bail is principally for the benefit of the accused, in the judicial determination of the availability of said right, the prosecution should be afforded procedural due process. Thus, in the summary proceeding on a motion praying for admission to bail, the prosecution should be given the opportunity to present evidence and, thereafter, the court should spell out at least a resume of the evidence on which its order granting or denying bail is based. Otherwise, the order is defective and voidable. In the case at bar the RTC erred in not summarizing the factual basis of its order granting bail, the court merely stated the number of prosecution witnesses but not their respective testimonies, and concluded that the evidence presented by the prosecution was not "sufficiently strong" to deny bail to Escao.

The facts, however, that Mayor Payumo was killed on August 20, 1986 when the 1973 Constitution allowing the death penalty was still in force and that the application for bail was made on March 5, 1987 during the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution which abolished the death penalty, should not have gotten in the way of resolving the application for bail in accordance with the Constitution and procedural rules. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides that "(a)ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law." As the phrase "capital offenses" has been replaced by the phrase "offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, 25 crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua instead of those punishable by the death penalty, when evidence of guilt is strong, are the exceptions to the rule that the right to bail should be made available to all accused. As the court itself acknowledged in its order of April 2, 1987 that "capital punishment" in Section 4, Rule 114 has been amended to reclusion perpetua, the court should have proceeded accordingly: i.e., resolved the application for bail pursuant to Section 13, Article III of the Constitution. It did not have to invoke the abolition of the death penalty and the lack of legislative enactment restoring it in justifying the grant of bail. All it had to do was to determine whether evidence of guilt is strong in the light of the provision of Section 13, Article III. The RTC has the discretion in the consideration of the strength of the evidence at hand. However, in the exercise of said discretion, the court is controlled by the following: first, the applicable provisions of the Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules which this Court may promulgate; and third, by those principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be part of the laws of the land. 27 The lower court not only failed to properly apply the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the Rules but it also disregarded equity and justice by its failure to take into account the factual milieu surrounding the detention of Escao People Vs. Fortes Case Digest People Vs. Fortes 223 SCRA 619 G.R. No. 90643 June 25, 1993

Facts: Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon, accompanied his 13year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said municipality to report a rape committed against the latter by the accused. Following this, the accused was apprehended and charged. A bond of P25000 was granted for accuseds provisional release. The MCTC found him guilty. An appeal to RTC was filed, the request for the fixing of bond was denied. Now accused assails denial of bail on the ground that the same amounted to an undue denial of his constitutional right to bail. Issue:Whether or Not the accuseds right to bail violated. Held: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA [200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO. 93177; 2 AUG 1991] Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process. In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail. The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release. Issues: (1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process. (2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail. Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of G/SCM)

It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the courtmartial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto. The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.

On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup. Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs. MANOTOC VS. COURT OF APPEALS [142 SCRA 149; G.R. NO. L-62100; 30 MAY 1986] Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel. Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated. Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. Tatad Vs. Sandiganbayan 159 SCRA 70 G.R. Nos. L-72335-39 March 21, 1988

Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused. Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986) FACTS: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.

The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them. Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer. Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution. But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them). Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process. However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused. (2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause. RULING: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process. Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacaang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'. The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and

that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office. More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded. The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice." Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.

Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process. he function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor

minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and honor. PEOPLE VS. DRAMAYO [42 SCRA 60; G.R. L-21325; 29 OCT 1971] Facts: Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the robbery case where he is an accused. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The others were to station themselves nearby. Only Dramayo and Ecubin were convicted in the RTC for murder. Hence the appeal Issue: Whether or not the accuseds criminal liability proved beyond reasonable doubt. Held: Yes. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of innocence. So it must be, according to the Constitution. That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt be shown beyond reasonable doubt. What is required then is moral certainty. "By reasonable doubt is meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certain of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any carnal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof regular to constitute the offense."

The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the two appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution. The principal contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time, there had been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party or parties, responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainty having arisen as to their capability. People Vs. Alcantara 240 SCRA 122 G.R. No. 91283 January 17, 1995 Facts: On July 19, 1988, Venancio Patricio, accompanied by Larry Salvador, drove a ten-wheeler truck a Coca-Cola plant in Antipolo to load cases of softdrinks. They were about to leave the plant at 10:00pm when several men approached them to hitch for a ride. Ascertaining that Salvador knew appellant, Venancio accommodated appellant's request. Appellant had four companions. At Ortigas Ave., one of them poked a gun at Venancio and grabbed the steering wheel. At the North Diversion Road, Venancio and Salvador(helper) were brought down from the vehicle and tied to the fence of the expressway, thereafter they were stabbed and left bleeding to death. Venancio survived but Salvador did not.Appellant was arrested in the vicinity of Otis Street in Pandacan, Manila. A few days later, he was turned over to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group. Sgt. Alberto Awanan brought the appellant to the MCU hospital and was presented to Venancio for identification. Appellant was brought to the Headquarters at Camp Crame where he confessed. Appelants Defense: Denial and alibi. He said that he was just applying to be a driver and stayed there even if he was told that no work was available, to confirm with the truck drivers. While he was applying for CONCEPCION

TRUCKING located across Otis street from the Coca-cola plant. He was arrested. He denied any knowledge of the "hit" on the Coca-cola delivery truck. He remained in the custody of the police for two days and two nights. On the third day of his detention, he was turned over to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group. Appellant was the brought to the MCU hospital. He was made to confront Venancio whom he saw for the first time. CHPG Sgt. Awanan asked Venancio twice if appellant was among those who hijacked the truck he was driving. On both times, Venancio did not respond. Undaunted, Sgt. Awanan, called to a photographer present, forced appellant to stand about a foot from Venancio, and told the latter to just point at the suspect. "Basta ituro mo lang," Sgt. Awanan directed. Venancio obeyed, and pictures of him pointing to the suspect were taken. From the hospital, appellant was brought to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group headquarters at Camp Crame. Without being apprised of his rights nor provided with counsel, he was interrogated and urged to confess his guilt. He balked. At ten o'clock that night, hours after questioning began, appellant's interrogators started boxing him and kicking him. He was also hit on the back with a chair, and electrocuted. Still, he refused to admit to the crime. In the midst of his ordeal, appellant heard someone say, "Tubigan na iyan." He was then blindfolded and brought to another room where he was made to lie down. Water was slowly and continuously poured on his face, over his mouth. Appellant could no longer bear the pain caused by the water treatment. Finally, he confessed to being one of the hijackers. He was led to another room, where he was handcuffed and left until the following day. Later, he was made to sign prepared statements containing his full confession. Alcantara was arraigned under an information charging him and four others (at large) with the crime of robbery with Homicide and Frustrated Homicide. The trial court convicted the accused despite the following inconsistency between Venancios affidavit and testimony: Affidavit 1. mentioned 5 assailants 2. stabbing was preceded by a 3. conference by all assailants 4. claimed to have allowed assailants 5. to hitch a ride because Alcantara 6. was familiar to them Testimony only Alcantara was identified only 3 assailants had a conference failed to identify Alcantara at the hospital and in open court (pointed to another person)

Issue: Whether or not the rights of the accused was violated. Held: YES. The peoples evidence failed to meet the quantum required to overcome the presumption. The second identification which correctly pointed to accused by Venancio should not be credited. There is no reason for him to err as they know each other for 3 years. It was also incorrect to give too much weight to Police Sgt. Awanans testimony as to the previous identification at the hospital. The testimony of Sgt. Awanan was not corroborated by Venancio. The identification procedure was irregular. Due process demands that the identification procedure of criminal suspects must be free from impermissible suggestions as the influence of improper suggestion probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor. Conviction must be based on the strength of the prosecution and not the weakness of the defense. There was blatant violation of the constitutional rights of appellant as an accused. Appellant belongs to the economically deprived in our society. He is nearly illiterate(third

grade education). Our Constitution and our laws strictly ordain their protection following the Magsaysay desideratum that those who have less in life should have more in law. CORPUZ VS. REPUBLIC [194 SCRA 73; G.R. NO. 74259; 14 FEB 1991] Facts: Generoso Corpuz is the Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Viscaya. He was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said office. In this capacity, he received collections, disbursed funds and made bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to government accounts. On April 13, 1981 his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated and a transfer of accountabilities was effected between him and his successor. The Certificate of turnover revealed a shortage of P72,823.00. He was able to pay only P10,159.50. After a final demand letter for the total of P50,596.07 which was not met, a case of malversation was filed against him. Corpuz did not deny such facts but he insists that the shortage was malversed by other persons. He alleged that Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through 1 of 4 separate checks (PNB) issued and encashed such checks while he was of leave. Also, Acting Deputy Provincial Treasurer Bernardo Aluning made to post the amount on his cashbook although he had not received the said amount. He was convicted in Sandiganbayan. Issue: Whether or Not Corpuz is guilty of malversation. Held: It is a subtle way of camouflaging the embezzlement of the money equivalent when 1 of the 4 checks issued and encashed in the same day was entered in the accuseds cash book 3 months after such encashments. Also, Corpuz claim that he was absent when Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through 1 of 4 separate checks (PNB) issued and encashed such checks, was not proven. Post-Audit is not a preliminary requirement to filing a malversation case. The failure of the public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by an authorized officer shall be a prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to personal use. The equipoise rule(balancing test) which is the presumption of innocence is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly balance, in which case the scale of justice should be tilt in favor of the accused. There is no such balance in the case at bar. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his claims. The presumed innocence must yield to the positive finding that he is guilty of malversation. Wherefore his petition is denied. He is guilty as principal of Malversation of Public Funds.