CASE DIGEST RIGHT AGAINST CRUEL, DEGRADING or INHUMAN PUNISHMENT

Legarda vs. Valdez, G.R. No. 513, February 25, 1902 People vs. Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472, February 7, 1997 People vs. Mercado, G.R. No. 116239, November 29, 2000

Legarda vs. Valdez, G.R. No. 513, February 25, 1902 WILLARD, J. FACTS: The prosecution in this case is based upon article 458, which assigns a penalty of destierro and a fine of form 625 to 6,250 pesetas. The court finds that it is not ecessary in this case to decide whether the penalty of banishment is lighter or heavier than imprisonment for six months. Even assuming that it is a lighter punishment the court had, as far as this point is concerned, jurisdiction to try this case because it had power to impose a fine of nearly $600. It remains to be considered whether Courts of First Instance have power to impose the penalty of banishment. We do not agree with the counsel for the defendant in his claim that the language of article 56 of Act No. 136 prevents Courts of First Instance from inflicting any punishment except fine or imprisonment. Such a construction would prohibit the infliction of the death penalty. ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty imposed upon the accused constitutes cruel and unusual punishment".

RULING: The Supreme Court held that punishment of this character is not new, for it is found in the Fuero Juzgo (law 12, title 5, book 6; law 13, title 5, book 6). It is not limited to the Spanish law. It has existed in the French, Austrian, Italian, Portuguese, and other codes. It cannot be and is not claimed to be a cruel punishment. It is, however, claimed to be a punishment unusual in the United States, and therefore prohibited in these Islands by the instructions of the President to the Commission. Those instructions use the words cruel and unusual punishment. They were, of course, taken from the Constitution of the United States and originally from the English statute. It is to be observed that the words are cruel and unusual. To be prohibited by this provision the punishment must not only be unusual but it must also be cruel. There is no reason why unusual punishments which were not cruel should have been prohibited. If that had been done it would have been impossible to change the punishments that existed when the Constitution was adopted. A law which changes a penalty so as to make it less severe would be unconstitutional if the new penalty were an unusual one. It would prohibit the introduction in the matter of penalties of new ideas intended to ameliorate the condition of criminals. Such a construction has never been given to this provision. Speaking of the law of New York providing for electrocution the Supreme Court of the United Stated said: The provision in reference to cruel and unusual punishments was taken from the well-known Act of Parliament of 1688, entitled An Act for Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Setting the Succession of the Crown, in which, after rehearsing various grounds of grievance, and among others, that excessive bail hath been required of persons committed in criminal cases, to elude the benefit of the laws made for the liberty of the subjects; and excessive fines have been imposed; and illegal and cruel punishment inflicted it is declared that excessive bail ought not to be required, not excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. (Stat. 1 W. & M., chap. 2.)

People vs. Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472, February 7, 1997 PER CURIAM FACTS: The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death. The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. This was dismissed. On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines (FLAG). A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant. In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659. ISSUE: Whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishments. RULING: The Supreme Court held that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with each other. Because the subject crimes are either so revolting and debasing as to violate the most minimum of the human standards of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications and consequences so destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our socio-political and economic agenda as a developing nation, these crimes must be frustrated, curtailed and altogether eradicated. Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society. It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming upsurge of such crimes", for the same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes."

People vs. Mercado, G.R. No. 116239, November 29, 2000 PER CURIAM FACTS: For automatic review by the court is the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, convicting accused-appellants SPO2 Elpidio Mercado y Hernando and SPO1 Aurelio Acebron y Adora, of the Philippine National Police of Tanay, Rizal, of kidnapping with murder. A Supplemental Brief filed for accused-appellants by collaborating counsel Rene V. Sarmiento with regard to the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 providing for the death penalty for 13 heinous crimes. Accused-appellants argue that Republic Act 7659 violates the 1987 Constitution because 1. There are no compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for the crimes of treason, qualified piracy, qualified bribery, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons, destructive arson, rape, plunder, importation of prohibited drugs, etc. 2. R.A. No.7659 violates the constitutional ban against infliction of cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. 3. R.A. No. 7659 impugns the constitutional right to equality before the law. 4. R.A. No. 7659 repudiates the obligation of the Philippines under international law. 5. Death penalty is not deterrence to the commission of crimes. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No.7659 violates the constitutional ban against infliction of cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. RULING: The Supreme Court held it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director of Prisons, this Court held that punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.' Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law 'cruel, degrading or inhuman'? The Court believes not. For reasons hereafter discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative officials. The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 has already been settled in the Court's 12-3 per curiam Resolution in People vs. Echegaray, wherein the following rulings were made: 1. The death penalty is not a "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment." It is an exercise of the state's power to "secure society against the threatened and actual evil." 2. The offenses for which Republic Act No. 7659 provides the death penalty satisfy "the element of heinousness" by specifying the circumstances which generally qualify a crime to be punishable by death; 3. Republic Act No. 7659 provides both procedural and substantial safeguards to insure its correct application. 4. The Constitution does not require that "a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven" before the death penalty may be prescribed. Congress is authorized under the Constitution to determine when the elements of heinousness and compelling reasons are present, and the Court would exceed its own authority if it questioned the exercise of such discretion.