G.R. Nos.

L-25994 and L-26004 to L-26046 August 31, 1966 BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, petitioner, vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, acting through JUDGE JOSUE L. CADIAO, Associate Commissioner, and EASTERN TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, INC., respondents. Domingo E. de Lara and Associates for petitioner. Manuel O. Chan for respondents. BENGZON, J.P., J.: Sometime in 1953 an agreement of lease was entered into by Eastern Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. and Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. The former leased to the latter, for a period of five years, its lines and equipment authorized for operation in the eastern portion of the Province of Quezon under various certificates of public convenience granted to it by the Public Service Commission. The lease was approved by the Public Service Commission. On June 30, 1958, the parties to the 1953 lease agreement it having expired executed a new lease contract providing for another period of five years. This contract was also approved by the Public Service Commission on August 11, 1958. Subsequently, on March 11, 1963, the parties executed a renewal contract, providing for a lease of five years duration under the same conditions as the last agreement and covering, in addition, some newly-acquired lines of the lessor. The Public Service Commission likewise approved said lease on August 1, 1963. On August 27, 1964, Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc., the lessee, merged with Batangas Transportation Co., Inc., forming a new corporation named Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. Another lease contract was therefore executed, on March 26, 1965, between Eastern Tayabas Bus Co., Inc., as the lessor, and the aforesaid new corporation as the lessee, with the same terms and conditions as the lease of June 30, 1958, for a period of five years starting from March 11, 1963. The Public Service Commission, on July 22, 1965, approved the abovementioned lease agreement, stating, among the conditions of said approval, "that this lease agreement shall be valid for a period of FIVE (5) YEARS beginning from March 11, 1963." About eight months after the approval of said lease by the Public Service Commission, on March 11, 1966, Eastern Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. sent a letter to Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc., stating: Dear Sirs: Pursuant to paragraph 7, of our lease agreement of June 30, 1958, as renewed, this is a formal notice on your goodselves that we are terminating the aforesaid agreement upon the expiration of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof. The decision to terminate the lease agreement is the result of a lengthy and careful deliberation not only by the Board of Directors of this Company but by its stockholders as well in various meetings held for that purpose. May I extend to you our appreciation for the cordial relationship that we have had during the long period of our association. And on March 15, 1966, without awaiting the end of said sixty-day period, Eastern Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. presented an application before the Public Service Commission docketed therein as Cases Nos. 66-1942 to 66-1985, inclusive. Said application stated that the lease agreement would terminate at the expiration of the sixty-day notice of termination; that pursuant to the lease agreement, all lines and additional trips acquired by Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. (now Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc.) in its name in the territory of Eastern Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. shall belong to the latter at the termination of the lease; that it is financially capable of operating with its own trucks and equipment said lines and additional trips. The applicant prayed that the certificates of public convenience issued thereover in the name of Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. be modified or changed so as to be considered issued and granted to Eastern Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. On March 21, 1966, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. wrote Eastern Tayabas Bus Co., Inc., in reply to the socalled letter of notice of termination, thus: Gentlemen: We refer you to your letter dated March 11, 1966 terminating our lease agreement of June 30, 1958. A review of the pertinent documents on the subject and the surrounding facts and circumstances revealed to us that the clause in the agreement of June 30, 1958 ceding to you all new lines and additional trips acquired by our predecessors into your territory has been surreptitiously inserted and, in any event, is unsupported by adequate and valuable consideration. Moreover, we dispute the applicability of Par. 7 relating to the sending of 60-day notice for a number of reasons including the fact that there are pending unsatisfied and unliquidated obligations incident to our operations. Our lawyers have advised us that our agreement may be annulled in a proper action in court and, consequently, the application of Par. 17 regarding arbitration may be dispensed with. However, to the end that our dispute may be settled amicably, we suggest, without intending to waive the ground for annulment of our agreement, that our differences be submitted to arbitration. As you have furnished a copy of your notice to the Public Service Commission, we are also sending a copy hereof to it with the request that the status quo as of March 10, 1966 be maintained, pending resolution of our controversy. We look forward to hearing from you soon. On April 15, 1966, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. opposed the afore-cited application in the Public Service Commission, and subsequently, it filed a motion to dismiss said application for lack of jurisdiction. Said motion to dismiss was denied by the Public service Commission on April 28, 1966, through Associate Commissioner Josue L. Cadiao. And thereupon, on May 3, 1966, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Case SP-600), among others insisting on compliance with the arbitration clause of the lease agreements; disputing Eastern Tayabas Bus Co., Inc.'s interpretation of Paragraph 7 of the lease on termination by sixty-day notice; seeking annulment of the lease, of its lines and additional trips by Eastern Tayabas Bus Co., Inc.,

on the ground that it was fraudulently inserted in the contract and is without consideration; and seeking the determination and liquidation of alleged indebtedness of the Eastern Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. under the lease agreement. On the next day, May 4, 1966, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc., filed a motion in the Public Service Commission to stay the proceedings therein in view of the suit in court aforementioned. The Public Service Commission, however, denied said motion and scheduled for May 6, 1966 reception of evidence on the application. As a result, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. filed herein on May 6, 1966 this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, relating to the forty-four cases in the Public Service Commission involved in the application in question. This Court granted it due course and issued on May 11, 1966 a temporary restraining order enjoining the Public Service Commission from continuing with the proceedings in its Cases Nos. 66-1942 to 66-1985. After the answer was filed on May 16, 1966, this petition was heard and submitted for decision on May 18, 1966. Respondents on June 29, 1966 moved to lift the temporary restraining order. Petitioner, upon order of this Court, filed an answer to said motion.1wph1.t The sole issue in these forty-four cases before Us has to do with the jurisdiction or competence of the Public Service Commission to proceed hearing the application in dispute. The Public Service Commission is not a judicial tribunal. Its functions are limited and administrative in nature. It has only such jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by statute. (Filipino Bus Co. v. Philippine Railway, 57 Phil. 860). And so it cannot pass upon questions that are within the exclusive province of the ordinary courts of justice, like the validity of a contract (Hoc Lian Ho Dry Goods Club vs. Meralco, 63 Phil. 804; Dardag vs. Public Service Commission, L-11940, July 25, 1958). The application pending before the Public Service Commission raises as the sole issue whether herein respondent Eastern Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. has the right under the contract to terminate the lease contract by giving a sixty-day written notice of termination. Said respondent contends that it has such right because paragraph 7 of the contract provides: 7. ... Each party to this contract shall have the option of terminating the lease at any time upon sixty (60) days notice given in writing to the other party. On the other hand, the petitioner maintains that said right of termination cannot be availed of by respondent Eastern Tayabas Bus Co., Inc., in view of standing and unliquidated claims of the petitioner against said respondent for various alleged obligations of the latter under the lease agreement, such as claims for the share of respondent Eastern Tayabas Bus Co., Inc., in the liabilities of petitioner Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc., for damages to third persons on account of accidents in the operation of its units; for claims under the Workmen's Compensation Law, separation pay, etc. And, said petitioner invoked the arbitration clause of the lease agreement, paragraph 17, to the effect that; 17. The LESSOR and the LESSEE agree to submit any controversy or dispute regarding the interpretation, enforcement, or any other issue connected with this contract to arbitration. For this purpose, within ten (10) days after being duly required to do so by the other party, the LESSOR and the LESSEE shall each nominate one arbitrator to constitute jointly a board of arbitration. The members of the board shall render their opinion within thirty (30) days after submission of the controversy to them, and the LESSOR and the LESSEE agree to be bound with finality by the said opinion if the arbitrators are in agreement, or to the extent that they are in agreement. ... From the above, it can be seen that the dispute in question pertains to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, and not of the Public Service Commission. It involves the interpretation or proper construction of some provisions of a lease contract which had already been previously approved by the Public Service Commission. In Garcia v. Bonifacio, 55 O.G. 6014, this Court observed that where the sale of a franchise is not yet approved by the Public Service Commission, the parties asserting rights to said franchise by virtue of said alleged sale must go to the Public Service Commission and there, in seeking approval of the sale, thresh out their respective claims to the franchise. In such a case, the Public Service Commission would be acting within its power, for it would be exercising its jurisdiction to approve the sale of the franchise, a power conferred by Section 20(g) of the Public Service Act. SEC. 20. Acts requiring the approval of the Commission. Subject to established limitations and exceptions and saving provisions to the contrary, it shall be unlawful for any public service, or for the owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the approval and authorization of the Commission previously had xxx xxx xxx g. To sell, alienate, mortgage, encumber or lease its property, franchises, certificates, privileges, or rights, or any part thereof; or merge or consolidate its property, franchises, privileges or rights, or any part thereof, with those of any other public service. The approval herein required shall be given, after notice to the public and after hearing the persons interested at a public hearing, if it be shown that there are just and reasonable grounds for making the mortgage or encumbrance, for liabilities of more than one year maturity, or the sale, alienation, lease, merger, or consolidation to be approved, and that the same are not detrimental to the public interest, and in case of a sale, the date on which the same is to be consummated shall be fixed in the order of approval: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the transaction from being negotiated or completed before its approval or to prevent the sale, alienation, or lease by any public service of any its property in the ordinary course of its business. The situation is different herein where, as stated, the Public Service Commission had already granted its approval to the lease agreement in question, but during the effectivity of said lease agreement, a dispute arises between the parties as to its proper interpretation. Said dispute no longer calls for the exercise of the Public Service Commission's approval of the agreement. It follows that the Public Service Commission is not the body empowered to pass upon and resolve the rights and claims of the parties arising from or regarding the same agreement, since the resolution of the dispute thereon would no longer be a necessary incident in the exercise of the power to approve the agreement.

Accordingly, for the respondent Public Service Commission to act upon the application in question and resolve the dispute of the parties as to the terms of the lease agreement, would amount to exercising the functions of a purely judicial tribunal, an act it cannot do. Furthermore, said dispute whether the lease could be terminated by sixtyday notice in writing; whether arbitration must first be resorted to; whether there are standing claims of the lessee against the lessor that should first be liquidated concerns the private aspect of the lease agreement the private rights of the parties in their relation to each other as lessor and lessee. It is established that the Public Service Commission has no control over a public utility in its private aspect (City of Manila v. Meralco, 36 Phil. 89). The dispute of the parties in the application filed in the Public Service Commission has to do with their private rights and claims vis-a-vis each other and does not involve the public interest or the public aspect of the utility. The same therefore must be threshed out in the ordinary courts, not in the Public Service Commission. Wherefore, respondent Public Service commission is hereby declared without jurisdiction to continue with Cases Nos. 66-1942 to 66-1985, until final judgment or order is rendered by the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Civil Case No. SP-600, and, until such time, the restraining order herein issued shall remain effective. No costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-46853 MANILA TRADING and SUPPLY CO., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE FRANCISCO ZULUETA, JOSE G. GENEROSO, and LEOPOLDO ROVIRA, Judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, and PHILIPPINE LABOR UNION, respondents. Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner. Manabat and Fajardo for respondent Philippine Labor Union. Laurel, J.: This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations promulgated On August 8, 1929, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration of its previous order directing the reinstatement of laborer Filomeno Ramollo. On July 7, 1938, the Secretary of Labor apprised the Court of Industrial Relations of a labor dispute existing between the petitioner company and its employees who were members of the Philippine Labor Union which was forthwith docketed as case No. 49 and entitled, Philippine Labor Union vs. Manila Trading and Supply Co. A preliminary hearing was held after which, on August 6, 1938 the respondent court entered an order requiring the company, inter alia not to dismiss any of its employees and laborers except for good cause and with its permission. Subsequently, on June 30, 1939, one of the gatekeepers of the petitioners, Filomeno Ramollo, was suspended for a breach of duty. The breach consisted in that as gatekeeper of the petitioner he permitted, contrary to instructions, one of the customers to pass thru the exit gate without paying for the work done on the car. Before this, it is also alleged that he refused to work in the setting up department of the company when ordered by his superior. The Philippine Labor Union submitted a petition in case No. 49 requesting the reinstatement of the suspended laborer, to which an answer was filed by the company. In its order of July 28, 1939, the respondent court found that the laborer was guilty of the breach imputed to him, but, deciding that his suspension from June 30 to July 28, 1939 was a sufficient punishment, ordered his immediate reinstatement. The petitioner moved for reconsiderations, but the respondent Court of Industrial Relations, sitting en banc, denied the motion. Hence, this petition for certiorari. The whole controversy is centered around the right if the Court of Industrial Relations to order the readmission of a laborer who, it is admitted, had been found derelict in the performance of his duties towards his employer. We concede that the right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employees, is subject to regulation by the State basically as we should expend beyond economic orthodoxy, we hold that an employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards his employer, and whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his interest. The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. There may, of course, be cases where the suspension or dismissal of an employee is whimsical or unjustified or otherwise illegal scrutinized carefully and the proper authorities will go to the core of the controversy and not close their eyes to the real situation. This is not however the case here. The writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted, and the order of the Court of Industrial Relations appealed from, reverse without pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered. G.R. No. L-44077 September 30, 1978 ELIODORA C. VDA. DE CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. THE COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE ARMY, respondent. Cornelio R. Besinga for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General for respondent. GUERRERO, J.: This is a petition for mandamus filed to compel the response lent Commanding General of the Philippine Army to pay petitioner the full death compensation benefits awarded to her and her children in the decision dated October

5, 1971 by Acting Referee Claro Q. Riego de Dios of the Workmen's Compensation Unit Labor Regional Office No. 4, Manila, in WC Case No. R04-13114, entitled Eliodora C. Vda. de Corpuz, et al., vs. Republic of the Philippines (Philippine Army)". The facts of the case are simple and uncontroverted. Fro the service-connected death of T/Sgt. Cornelio Corpuz, the wife. petitioner herein. and her children were. awarded the amount of P6,000.00 plus burial expenses in the amount of P200.00. This ,award became final and executory and the Solicitor General indorsed the same to respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army for payment. However, instead of implementing the full award, the office of said respondent prepared General Voucher No. W-7023 in the amount of only P2.950.00, deducting from the total award the amounts of P3,000.00 representing the gratuity paid to petitioner under Republic Act No. 610, otherwise known as the Armed Forces Death Gratuity and Disability Pension Act of 1951 and P250-00 for burial expenses under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, or a total of P3,250.00 apparently on the ground that the benefits received under RA 610 was under Section 699 of the Revised Administratived Code with respect to the burial expense and the Workmen's Compensation Act are mutually exclusive. Notwithstanding the vehement protest of petitioner against said deductions, respondent refused to make full payment. Petitioner then sought the aid of the Office of the President of the Republic of the Philippines, which rendered a decision on May 6, 1972, denominated as OP Decision No. 19, S. 1972, thru Acting Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora. The decision noted therein that "the payment of gratuity to the claimant under Republic Act No. 610 was not brought to the attention of the hearing officer; hence it was not considered in the decision of this case which became final for failure of the Government to appeal the same within the prescribed period," 1 and ruled in the dispositive portion as follows: Premises considered, this Office holds that the deduction in question is without legal justification. Accordingly, payment of the entire amount awarded as death compensation to the heirs of the late T/Sgt. Cornelio Corpuz is hereby authorized, subject to availability of funds and the usual auditing requirements. 2 Despite this definitive ruling, respondent Commanding General, thru Major Maraan Y. Calapis Army Adjutant, insisted in his 1st Indorsement dated July 5, 1972 that "the deduction from the award is in order and therefore the basic request of the claimants for full payment should be denied. 3 Respondent explained that the Philippine Army has a cause of action against claimants for reimbursement of the sum of P3,250.00 already given to them under RA 610 and Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code to avoid double compensation. On account of this firm posture adopted by said respondent, Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora reiterated that the deduction in question cannot be legally sustained in a decision dated March 9, 1973 denominated as OP Decision No. 168, S. of 1973. While agreeing that the Philippine Army has a cause of action against herein claimants for reimbursement of the amount of P3,250.00, the Secretary, however, said that the recovery thereof should be pursued through the proper legal remedy, not by way of deducting the same from the Workmen's Compensation Award. He further emphasized "that the instant claim was granted for the reason that, albeit the simultaneous payment of gratuity under the Workmen's Compensation Act and Republic Act No. 610 is not allowed, (his) Office or any office under the Executive Department is powerless to review or alter a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, much more after the same has become final and executory". 4 The dispositive portion of the aforesaid decision states: For all the foregoing, this Office reiterates that the deduction in question cannot be legally sustained and hereby directs the payment of the entire amount awarded as death compensation to herein claimants, subject to availability of funds and the usual auditing requirements. 5 But this second directive failed to above respondent t release the balance of the award prompting petitioner to file instant petition for mandamus. For respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army to insist on deducting from a final and executory award under the Workmen's Compensation Act the sums paid to petitioner under Republic Act No. 610 and Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code is, indeed, an unlawful act of excluding petitioner from the use and enjoyment of a right to which the latter is entitled under the law. A final and executory award entities petitioner to its enforcement according to its letter. It is not susceptible of any change or alteration by the officer charged with its implementation as the latter's duty on the matter constitutes only a ministerial act that does not call for the exercise of discretion. The adamant refusal of respondent to enforce the award completely is also an unlawful neglect to perform an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from his office. Consequently, mandamus is a proper remedy. Clearly, there is no other plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law than the issuance of this writ especially in this case where petitioner had sought the help of the office of the Chief Executive of the land which consistently ruled in her favor but failed to convince respondent to effect the full payment of the award. A case on all fours with the present case is that of Antonio Falcon vs. Ismael Mathay, Sr., etc., L-30303, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 765, where this Court granted the writ of mandamus prayed for to compel the Auditor General to pass in audit and approve for payment a final award of the Workmen's Compensation Commission against the Republic of the Philippines. In disposing of the case, this Court ruled: The denial of the coed deduction by the Workmen's Compensation Commission having become final, the respondent Auditor General has no alternative but to approve the payment of the Commission's award. For him to insist on reducing the compensation payable thereunder by insisting that the indemnity paid under Republic Act No. 610 should be subtracted from it amounts to review by him of the Commission('s) final award, and no such review is authorized by law or jurisprudence. The decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission are exclusively appealable to the Supreme Court, yet, even the latter is powerless to alter the award that have become final, so long as they are made within the Commission's jurisdiction, which is not questioned in this case. Respondent, thru the Solicitor General, views this petition for mandamus as a mode for the issuance of "an extraordinary judicial writ to coerce a double payment of benefits, a payment not allowed and, in fact, excluded by the very statutes upon which entitlement is based." 6 Then, he concludes "that mandamus is not only improper but

it also should not be used to amend the law, reverse existing court decisions, and create an unfair advantage for one beneficiary not enjoyed by countless others, ..." 7 The provisions of the statutes referred to above are Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended and Section 9 of the Republic Act No. 610, as amended, herein quoted as follows: Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kins against the employer under the Civil Code and other law, because of said injury. 8 (emphasis supplied) Sec. 9. Repeal or modification of laws. Except as hereinafter provided, any gratuity or pension revived under the pro. visions of this Act shall be in addition to any retirement pay payable under existing laws. Provided, That no person who has received the death or disability benefits under Republic Act Numbered Five Hundred seventy-three shall be entitled to the benefits of this Act No payment shall hereafter be made to the beneficiaries of deceased officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine Constabulary under the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Thirty or any other law granting similar benefits to officers and employees generally, of the national, provincial or municipal government. ... 9 In support of his stand, respondent cites the case of Republic of the Philippines (Philippine Air Force) vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission and Erlinda L Doyon No. L-30320, March 29,1972; 44 SCRA 191, where this Court ruled: It will thus be seen that Republic Act No. 610 bars payment under other laws; so does the Workmen's Compensation Act. Hence, if one is paid under Republic Act No. 610, he may not again be paid under the Workmen's Compensation Act, unless as in the case at bar, what was received under the first law is less than what can be received under the Workmen's Compensation Act, in which event, considering that both laws are social legislations designed to provide a system whereby dependents are awarded benefits to prevent them from being destitute and a charge upon society, the difference in amount may still be ordered paid by the Workmen's Compensation Commission in a proper case brought to it. We find this line of reasoning of respondent completely devoid of merit as it conveniently evades the material fact brought to light by petitioner that the award has become final and executory. The finality of the award not having been denied or disputed, the case is closed against respondent in view of the ruling in Falcon vs. Mathay (supra), a case squarely in point. By reason also of the finality of the award, the doctrine enunciated in. Republic vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission and Doyon (supra) is not applicable. An excerpt from the factual backdrop of the said case is pertinent, and We quote: Both the Philippine Air Force and the Office of the Solicitor General wrote the Commission that they were not controverting the widow's claim, the death of Cpl. Doyon being in their opinion compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. They request however, that the sum of P3,000.00 already paid under Republic Act No 610 be deduct from whatever award would be given to the widow; that there be no adjudication for burial expenses, payment thereof having already been made. While the payment, therefore, of gratuity under Republic Act No. 610 and the burial expense benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code were properly and timely raised in the aforesaid case of Doyon, such facts were not brought to the attention of the hearing officer in the instant case thereby resulting iii the rendition of an award which became final and executory as the Solicitor General did not interpose an appeal. Moreover, barely two months after the promulgation of the decision in Republic vs. Workmen's Compensation and Doyon the validity of the doctrine therein laid was put in issue in the case of Republic of the Philippines (Philippine Constabulary) vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission and Flora A. Vda de Sanchez, No. L-34352, May 31, 1972; 45 SCRA 358 where this Court took note of the "well-reasoned observation" of the Workmen's Compensation Commission in its decision holding tht the amount received by the claimants under R.A. No. 610 should not be charged against the compensation due under Act No. 3428, as amended, to wit: ... The death benefits given under R.A. 610 is given in recognition of the Added risks peculiar to Armed Forces personnel as our guardian of our national security; while the benefits granted under Act No. 3428, as amended, as part substitute for lost earnings of the workmen who are victims of work-connected accidents, siickness or death. In other words, while the origin of the employer's obligation emanated from only one reason, namely, the employee's injury, illness or death, the former law is given as a gratuity in appreciaiton of said employee's past services, while the latter law is a social legislation which has for its purpose the amelioration of service connected injuries or illnesses of the victims and their dependent sin case of death so that they will not become a social outcast. While this Court ruled in the aforesaid Anchez case that the P3,000.00 previously received by respondentsclaimants under Republic Act 610 should be deducted from the total award made to them under the Compensation Law, it did so "if only from the standpoint of adhering to precedent" 10 and on the consideration "that , unlike previous laws of similar nature, Republic Act 610 does not appear to be expressly intended to grant the benefits therein provided for 'in recognition of the added risks peculiar to Armed Forces personnel as our guardian of our national security' and all such though implies." 11 Petitioner herein now prays for a re-examinaiton of the aforeseaid doctrine claiming tht there is no express provision in the law relative to the exclusiveness of R.A. 610 vis-a-vis the VWC and neither is there any provisin in the Workmen's Compensation Act that expressly benefits under R.A. 610 and Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code. She further asserts that while it is true that R.A. makes no express mention aobut its concept and purpose as a gratuity benefit, the legislative intent prompting the passage of R, A. 610 in 1951 was to give higher benefits to military men "in recognition of or commensurate with the hazards attendant to military service." This particular intent, she states, can be deduced from the explanatory note to House Bill No. 1516, the parent bill of R.A. 610. And from the deliberations of Senate Bill No. 252, parent Bill of R.A. 5859 which amended R. A. 610 by increasing the gratuity from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00, it can allegedly be seen that the purpose of such amendment

is based on the increased cost of living, medical care and attention and not on The basis of merely equalizing said benefit with that granted in the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended. However, inasmuch as this is a suit for mandamus, We find Chat this is not the proper time for the re-examination of the present doctrine. The right of petitioner to the enforcement of the whole award under the Workmen's Compensation Act is clear, well- defined and certain as the said award has become final and executory and it is elementary that once a judgment has become final and executory, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution. 12 Any opinion expressed by this Court upon the validity of the doctrine wished to be reexamined would, therefore, be not necessary to the Decision of this case and would merely constitute an obiter dictum. 13 Moreover, a discussion thereof would, in effect, put in issue the validity of the final and executory award of Acting Referee Claro Q. Riego de Dios something which may not be done in a suit for mandamus as the validity of a final judgment cannot be assailed collaterally unless the ground of attack is lack of jurisdiction or irregularity in their entry apparent on the face of the record or because it is vitiated by fraud. 14 WHEREFORE, the writ of mandamus prayed for is hereby granted ordering respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army to pay petitioner the sum of P3,250.00 unlawfully deducted from her award of P6,200.00 under the Workmen's Compensation Act. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-56833 July 20, 1982 RAMON V. MERANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE EDUARDO C. TUTAAN, Branch V, Court of First Instance of Quezon City; SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, ANTONIO TRIA TIRONA, Labor Arbiter, and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents. Pacifico B. Advincula for petitioner. Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Offices for private respondents. AQUINO, J.: The National Labor Relations Commission in a decision dated November 9, 1979 ordered San Miguel Corporation to reinstate Ramon V. Merano to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other rights and benefits to which he is entitled under existing laws and with backwages from December 16, 1977 up to his reinstatement (Case No. 13799-T). This Court in its resolution of April 30, 1980 dismissed the petition of San Miguel Corporation for the review of that decision (G. R. No. 52157). Hence, it became final and executory. Pursuant to that decision, Merano was paid P53,949.16 as monetary award up to August 31, 1980 but he was not reinstated. San Miguel Corporation opposed the reinstatement due to his supervening physical unfitness and asked that it be allowed to pay Merano separation pay in lieu of reinstatement (pp. 124-125, Rollo). The NLRC in its en banc resolution of June 11, 1981 ruled that because Merano could no longer be reinstated due to his illness, he should be paid his additional backwages from September 1 to November 19, 1980, the date of the medical evaluation made by the Chief of the National Orthopedic Hospital, and separation pay up to that date at the rate of one month's salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six months being considered as one year (pp. 128-129, Rollo). Even before the issuance of that NLRC resolution of June 11, 1981, or on February 10, 1981, Merano filed in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City a special civil action of mandamus against San Miguel Corporation and the Labor Arbiter who functioned as the execution arm of the NLRC. Merano prayed that the respondents be ordered to execute solidarily the judgment of the NLRC and, on failure to do so, San Miguel Corporation should be required to pay him the sum of P616,560 as his "expected income until he reaches the age of 60 years" plus his unpaid back salaries, to deposit in court his monthly salary, to pay P35,000 as moral and exemplary damages and P30,000 as attorney's fees and to defray the expenses for his surgical operation. After receiving the comments of the respondents, the learned trial judge, Hon. Eduardo C. Tutaan, in his order of April 20, 1981, dismissed Merano's petition on the ground that he had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case which falls within the competent of the NLRC. That order of dismissal was appealed by Merano to this Court in this petition for review under Republic Act No. 5440 which he filed on June 2, 1981. The appeal was given due course. The NLRC was impleaded as a respondent. We hold that respondent judge did not err in dismissing Merano's petition for mandamus on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The Court of First Instance is not the proper tribunal to pass upon Merano's complaint against the failure of the Labor Arbiter to enforce the NLRC's decision to reinstate him to his former position of sales staff assistant. His remedy against the refusal or inaction of the Labor Arbiter, who is in charge of executing the awards of the NLRC, is to call the NLRC's attention to the alleged nonfeasance and not to file a mandamus action in the Court of First Instance which has no jurisdiction to interfere with the execution of a final judgment of the NLRC. That labor tribunal has the same rank and is in the same category as the Court of First Instance. (See Ambrocio vs. Salvador, L-47651, December 11, 1978, 87 SCRA 217; Nation Multi Service Labor Union vs. Agcaoili, L-39741, May 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 274.)

Articles 217 and 223 of the Labor Code indicate that the NLRC has jurisdiction to review the decisions, awards and orders of the labor Arbiter. It is elementary that mandamus does not lie if the petitioner has another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As already noted, the NLRC on June 11, 1981, acting on the Labor Arbiter's report that Merano could not be reinstated because of the supervening fact that he was suffering from aseptic necrosis of the hip, held that he should not be reinstated and should be given separation pay in addition to his back salaries. Another supervening fact is that on November 11, 1981 Merano and San Miguel Corporation executed a notarized agreement whereby, in consideration of certain additional payments, Merano released San Miguel Corporation from any further liability and manifested that the instant appeal should be dismissed because he was no longer interested in his claim for reinstatement and damages (pp. 199-204, Rollo). However, Merano's counsel said that he was not bound by that agreement. He prayed that this case be decided. Merano in his comment dated June 28, 1982 asked that this case be decided notwithstanding that settlement. Whether that settlement should terminate the case between Merano and San Miguel Corporation is a point which is not decided in this case. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The order of dismissal issued by respondent Judge is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

JOSE CLAVANO, INC. v. HLURB and SPS. TENAZAS 2002 / Bellosillo / Enforcement of agency action > Writ of execution, mandamus Except in the case of judgments which are void ab initio or null per se for lack of jurisdiction which can be questioned at any time, once a decision becomes final, even the court which has rendered it can no longer alter or modify it, except to correct clerical errors or mistakes. Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation and would set to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality. FACTS Clavano sold a house and lot in Cebu to Sps. Tenazas, who paid 50% o f the purchase price. Alleging the spouses default, Clavano refused to accept their subsequent payments and instead sued them for rescission of the contract and forfeiture of all prior payments made. This was however dismissed.The spouses filed a specific performance complaint with the HLURB Cebu Regional Office against Clavano tocompel it to honor the contract. They asked for judgment compelling Clavano to accept their payment and to execute a Deedof Absolute Sale in their favor, plus damages. The HLURB Regional Office ruled in favor of the spouses, and this wasupheld by the HLURB in its Decision, and the Office of the President. The petitions of Clavano in the CA and the SC werenot given merit due to its failure to comply with rules on civil procedure.When the HLURB Decision lapsed into finality, the HLURB Regional Office issued a Writ of Execution. Eventually,the spouses complained via a motion to the HLURB, alleging that there were defects in the housing unit, that the Deed of Absolute Sale was unnotarized, and that the TCT was still in Clavanos name. They also asked Clavano to pay the corresponding expenses re: notarization fees and taxes, among others. HLURB granted this motion via an Order.Clavano contests this, saying that the HLURB Order amended the final HLURB Decision which, according toClavano, has been fully executed. Clavano also pointed out that in the contract, it was agreed upon that the spouses will bethe ones to answer for the expenses involved in the transfer of title. HLURB, in another Order , denied Clavanos motion for reconsideration. The CA upheld the HLURB Orders, and so the Sheriff demanded from Clavano the reimbursements soughtby the spouses. ISSUE & HOLDING WON HLURB can rightfully order Clavano to pay said expenses. NO , since this is not part of the HLURB Decision RATIO Since the HLURB Decision has become final, the agency is left with no other authority but to enforce the decisions dispositive portion, which it can no longer amend, modify, or alter in a manner affecting the merits of the judgment .Clavano is correct in availing of the remedy of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Execution must conform to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part of the decision; consequently,where the order of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the order haspro-tanto no validity. Subsequent HLURB orders requiring Clavano to pay for the expenses incurred do not fall within theambit of the HLURB Decision. The Orders cannot be considered part of the decision which must be executed againstClavano. The obligation to pay for such expenses is unconnected with and distinct from the obligations to execute anddeliver the deed of absolute sale and the certificate of title.The HLURB or the CA cannot order Clavano at this late stage to reimburse the charges and fees relative to thetransfer of title when the spouses did not allege this obligation nor pray for this relief and did not attempt to provethis cause of action

. Sps. Tenaza only sought the enforcement of the mutually binding contract to sell so that they couldfinally own the house and lot but did not ask for the transfer of the title at Clavanos expense. Likewise, the assailed Orders do not involve supervening events where the court a quo is allowed to admitevidence of new facts and circumstances and thereafter to suspend execution of the judgment and grant relief as may bewarranted which may or may not result in its modification. The responsibility for the expenses for registering and titling thesubject house and lot - a matter pre-dating the filing of the complaint with the HLURB, and in fact, written in the contract tosell - does not qualify as a supervening event. The foregoing matters , in addition to alleging them in the complaint, should have also been heard during thetrial on the merits before the HLURB where the parties could have proved their respective claims. However, believing thatthe assailed rulings were merely part of the execution of the HLURB Decision, the HLURB instead precipitately resolved theissue in favor of the spouses without notice and hearing. Since the Orders are a wide departure from and a material amplification of the final and at least executoryHLURB Decision, they are pro tanto void and absolutely unenforceable for any purpose. After the decision hasbecome final and executory, it can no longer be amended or corrected except for clerical errors or mistakes .Under the circumstances, SC has no authority to unsettle the final and perhaps satisfactorily executedHLURB Decision . The general power of courts to amend their judgments or orders to make them conformable to justicecannot be invoked to correct an oversight or error as a judicial error may not be considered as a mere ambiguity, curablewithout a proper proceeding filed before the judgment had become final. The spouses are barred from raising the issue either in the instant case or in another action. Under Sec. 47,Rule 39, a final and executory judgment is conclusive upon any matter that could have been raised in relation thereto. Petition for certiorari GRANTED.

G.R. No. L-1871 November 18, 1949 ICE & COLD STORAGE INDUSTRIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. JOSE M. VALERO and JOSE SAMSON, respondents. Basilio Francisco for appellant. Evaristo R. Sandoval for respondent-appellee Jose M. Valero. Recardo LL. Rosal for appellee Jose Samson. OZAETA, J.: In a decision rendered on November 6, 1947, the Public Service Commission granted to the respondent Jose M. Valero a provisional or emergency certificate of public convenience to install and operate an ice plant of 10-ton daily capacity in the municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and to sell ice in said municipality and in the cities of Manila and Quezon; and to the respondent Jose Samson, a similar certificate of public convenience to install and operate an ice plant of 11-ton daily capacity in the municipality and in the municipalities of San Juan, Makati, Pasig Cainta, Taytay, and Antipolo as well as in Manila and Rizal City. Both certificate were to expire on December 31, 1948, without prejudice to extending them in due time upon petition of the parties if they so desired. The petitioner, Ice & Cold Storage Industries of the Philippines, Inc., which holds a prewar certificate of public convenience to operate an ice plant in the City of Manila and sell ice in said city as well as in various municipalities of the Provinces of Rizal, Cavite, and Bulacan, and whose opposition to the applications of Valero and Samson was overruled by the Commission, has brought the case to this Court to review and reverse said decision, contending (1) that it is not reasonably supported by the reasonable opportunity to resume and reestablish completely its service, interrupted by the war, before granting the applications of the respondents. I. Under its first assignment of error the petitioner-appellant contends that public necessity and convenience do not required the service proposed by the respondents; that the petitioner has been giving and rendering a sufficient and efficient service in the sale of its ice to the inhabitants of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and neighboring municipalities; that there is no necessity for the proposed operation of ice plants in Mandaluyong and, even if such necessity existed, only one applicant was sufficient to properly serve the needs of said municipality; and that the proposed operation of the ice plants by the respondents would only cause ruinous and destructive competitions with the established business of the petitioner. Petitioner-appellant asserts that "there is no conclusive evidence on the record to reasonably support the decision of the Honorable Public Service Commission in granting to the respondent authority to operate and maintain their ice plants in Mandaluyong, Rizal." After considering the evidence adduced by both parties, the Commission arrived at the conclusion (a) that public interest and convenience required the establishment and operation of the ice plants proposed by the applicants because up to date there was no authorized ice-plant operator in the municipality of Mandaluyong, where the applicants proposed to establish their plants; (b) that said applicants had machineries and equipment ready for

immediate installation as described in their respective applications; and (c) that both applicants are financially able to maintain and rendered the service proposed by them. Section 35 of Commonwealth Act no. 146 vests the Supreme Court with jurisdiction "to review any order, ruling, or decision of the Commission and to modify or set aside such order, ruling, or decision when it clearly appears that there was no evidence before the Commission to support reasonably such order, ruling, or decision, or that the same is contrary to law, or that it was without the jurisdiction of the Commission." The Commission's findings of fact are conclusive upon this Court. We are not authorized to weigh the conflicting evidence and substitute our conclusion for that of the Commission. (Javellana vs. La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., 63 Phil., 621; Philippine Shipowners' Association vs. Public Utility Commissioner, 43 Phil., 328; Ynchausti Steamship Co. vs. Public Utility Commissioner, 44 Phil., 363; San Miguel Brewery vs. Lapid, 53 Phil., 539.) We are authorized to modify or set aside a decision of the public Service Commission only "when it clearly appears that there was no evidence before the Commission to support reasonably" such decision; and upon the record before us it cannot be said that there was clearly no evidence before the Commission to support reasonably its decision. Petitioner-appellant cites no proof in support of its contention that the operation of ice plants by the respondentsappellees would cause ruinous competition may prosper, it must be shown that the opponent "would be deprived of fair profits on the capital invested in its business. The mere possibility of reduction in the earnings of a business is not sufficient to prove ruinous competition. it must be shown that the business would not have sufficient gains to pay a fair rate of interest on its capital investment." (Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co., 66 Phil., 36, 6 L. J. 1117.) Mere allegations by the oppositor that its business would be ruined by the establishment of the ice plants proposed by the appellants "are not sufficient to warrant this court to revoke the order of the Public Service Commission." (Teodora Santos Vda. de Pilares vs. Consuelo Arranze, G. R. No. 45462, July 28, 1938. II. Upon the contention that the decision of the Public Service Commission is contrary to law, and particularly that the Commission erred in not first giving the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to resume and re-establish completely its service, interrupted by the last war, before granting the applications of the respondents, we find, on the contrary, that said decision is supported by a long line of decisions of this Court on the same subject. In San Miguel Brewery vs. Lapid, supra, this Court said: Although we can conceive that the San Miguel Brewery is able to supply ice for the consumption of the whole Province of Cavite, the fact, however, is that said company does not really operate in that province under a certificate issued by the Public Service Commission. Said establishment operates its ice factory in the City of Manila and sells its ice in the Province of Cavite through its agents. Said agents or dealers in ice are not subject to the rules which the Commission may prescribe as to the price for which they sell this article to the consumers, and naturally they have to fix a higher price in view of the waste of the ice from the time it is taken from the factory and the cost of transportation, expenses which, in the last analysis, the consumers has to pay. In San Miguel Brewery vs. Espiritu, 60 Phil., 745, 752, we held: The fact that one or several ice plants established in another municipality or municipalities are authorized to sell ice in another municipality where no ice plant exist, does not prevent the authorization to establish an ice plant in the later municipality when the public convenience and necessity so demanded. (See also Angel T. Limjoco vs. San Miguel Brewery, G. R. No. 47299, Dec. 21, 1940, 40 O. G. 10th Supp., 135;1 Fortunato F. Halili vs. Ice and Cold Storage Industries of the Philippines, Inc., G. R. Nos. L-336 and L-343, January 25, 1947, 44 O. G. 1151.)2 In re Quirino G. Gregorio, 44 O. G. 1216,3 it was held: Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that, as a result of the destruction of the various ice plants in Manila and its environs during the war and the use by the United States Army of what was left of the ice and cold storage, there was an acute shortage of ice on the advent of liberation. The Public Service Commission did not abuse its authority when, to ease this situation, applicants who had facilities for making ice were certificates of public convenience good up to December 31, 1948, and applications of those who had not were dismissed. In Joaquin Ma. Joson vs. Ildefonso Santos, G. R. No. L-455, 45 O. G. 1740, 1743,4 we said: . . . Both reason and equity approve the issuance of the temporary license. In these days of reconstruction and rehabilitation there is a crying need to establish public services destroyed by the war. As always, the people's convenience and welfare should be of paramount importance. It is not in keeping with this view for prewar operators to adopt a dog-in-the-manger policy, opposing the rendition by others of these services which they cannot actually and immediately perform. The decision of the Public Service Commission, being reasonably supported by the evidence and not being contrary to law, is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. Moran, C.J., Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.

CASE DIGEST 0006: ON JURISDICTION OF HLURB (ROMULO R. PERALTA VS. HON. E DE LEON HON. RAUL E. DE LEON ET AL., G.R. NO. 187978, 24 NOVEMBER 2010) Filed under: LEGAL DIGESTS Leave a comment December 6, 2010

ROMULO R. PERALTA VS. HON. E DE LEON HON. RAUL E. DE LEON ET AL. (G.R. NO. 187978, 24 NOVEMBER 2010) THIS CASE IS ABOUT THE JURISDICTION OF HLURB. READ THE FULL TEXT OF THE DECISION IN jabbulao.com under the category RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS. DOCTRINE: ALL CASES INVOLVING QUESTIONS ABOUT SUBDIVISIONS AND CONDOMINIUMS ARE WITHIN THE JUDRISDICTION OF HLURB. DIGEST: FACTS: ABC AND DEVELOPER XYZ COMPANY ENTERED INTO CONTRACT TO SELL. ABC FAILED TO PAY FULL AMORTIZATION PAYMENT. XYZ FILED CASE AT HLURB AGAINST ABC. XYZ WON THE CASE. HLURB ORDERED CANCELLATION OF CONTRACT TO SELL, FORFEITURE OF AMORTIZATION PAYMENT, FORCLOSURE OF ABCS CONDO UNITS AND GARNISHMENT OF HIS BANK DEPOSITS. ABC FILED A CIVIL CASE AT RTC FOR ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. ISSUE: DOES RTC HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE TO RESTRAIN ENFORCEMENT OF HLURB DECITION. RULING: RTC HAS NO JURISDICTION. ALL CASES INVOLVING QUESTIONS ON SUBDIVISIONS AND CONDOMINIUMS ARE UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF HLURB. THE PROVISIONS OF P.D. NO. 957 WERE INTENDED TO ENCOMPASS ALL QUESTIONS REGARDING SUBDIVISIONS AND CONDOMINIUMS. Said the Supreme Court: PEREZ, J.: XXXX We affirm the Court of Appeals. Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. Presidential Decree No. 1344, Empowering the National Housing Authority to Issue Writ of Execution in the Enforcement of its Decision under Presidential Decree No. 957, clarifies and spells out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of jurisdiction to the HLURB in the following specific terms: Sec 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature. A. Unsound real estate business practices; B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, broker or salesman.[1][14] It is noteworthy that the HLURB in HLURB Case No. REM-091699-10646, rendered a decision against petitioner ordering him to pay CSDI the unpaid amount due from his purchase of a condominium unit or in the alternative, the rescission of contract with forfeiture of payments made by petitioner. A writ of execution was issued against petitioner and his appeal was dismissed by the Office of the President. Petitioner no longer assailed this dismissal, thus the same became final and executory. Unable to obtain relief before the Office of the President, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 07-0141 before the RTC of Paraaque City. As adverted to earlier, the RTC concluded that the jurisdiction over petitioners complaint falls on the HLURB. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is a settled rule that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and decide cases is determined by the nature of the cause of action, the subject matter or property involved and the parties.[2][15] In Civil Case No. 07-0141, petitioner prayed for the issuance of temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to restrain respondent CSDI from cancelling the Contract to Sell, forfeiting the amortization payment, foreclosing petitioners condominium units, and garnishing his bank deposits. Specifically, petitioner asked that the RTC, Branch 258: 1. Immediately upon receipt of this petition, a temporary restraining Order be issued and/or a Preliminary Injunction, pending the determination of the merits of the case, by way of restraining defendants from forfeiting the amortization payments, foreclosure of plaintiffs condominium unit, its break opening, and garnishment of plaintiffs bank deposits at Bank of Philippine Islands, Forbes Park branch, Makati City. 2. To order the final and permanent injunction. 3. And to order defendant-developer to pay plaintiff the actual damages of his hospitalization amounting to Php 60,000.00 including the interest until fully paid, caused by the unlawful and damaging acts of defendants as above shown;

4. To order defendant developer to pay P300,000.00 as moral damages to plaintiff; 5. Another payment of P300,000.00 as exemplary damages to plaintiff; 6. To pay Attorneys fees of P50,000.00 and costs of suit; 7. Ordering defendants to adhere to the License to Sell and all its strict compliance thereto imposed on defendant developer.[3][16] We have to agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the petitioner is with the HLURB.

G.R. NO. 96298, MAY 14, 1991 Renato M. Lapinid, petitioner Vs. Civil Service Commission, Philippine Ports Authority and Juanito Junsay, respondents Cruz, J. FACTS Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to the position of Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal on October 1, 1988. This appointment was protested on December 15, 1988, by private respondent Juanito Junsay, who reiterated his earlier representations with the Appeals Board of the PPA on May 9, 1988, for a review of the decision of the Placement Committee dated May 3, 1988. He contended that he should be designated terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view of his preferential right thereto. On June 26, 1989, complaining that the PPA had not acted on his protest, Junsay went to the Civil Service Commission and challenged Lapinid's appointment on the same grounds he had earlier raised before the PPA. In a resolution dated February 14, 1990, the Commission disposed as follows: After a careful review of the records of the case, the Commission finds the appeal meritorious. Foregoing premises considered, it is directed that Appellants Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be appointed as Terminal Supervisor (SG 18) vice protestees Renato Lapinid and Antonio Dulfo respectively who may be considered for appointment to any position commensurate and suitable to their qualifications, and that the Commission be notified within ten (10) days of the implementation hereof. Upon learning of the said resolution, Lapinid, who claimed he had not been informed of the appeal and had not been heard thereon, filed a motion for reconsideration on March 19, 1990. This was denied on May 25, 1990. The Philippine Ports Authority also filed its own motion for reconsideration on June 19, 1990, which was denied on August 17, 1990. A second motion for reconsideration filed on September 14, 1990, based on the re-appreciation of Lapinid's rating from 75% to 84%, was also denied on October 19, 1990. When the petitioner came to this Court on December 13, 1990, we resolved to require Comments from the respondents and in the meantime issued a temporary restraining order. The Solicitor General took a stand against the CSC, which, at his suggestion, was allowed to file its own Comment. The petitioner filed a Reply. The private respondent's Comment was dispensed with when it was not filed within the prescribed period. ISSUE/S Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter? RULING In Luego v.CSC this court declared appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. The CSC acknowledged that both the petitioner and the private respondent were qualified for the position in controversy. That recognition alone rendered it functus officio in the case and prevented it from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the petitioner's appointment. To be sure, it had no authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor. Only recently, in Gaspar v. Court of Appeals, this Court said: The only function of the CSC in cases of this nature, according toLuego, is to review the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law, and when it finds the appointee to be qualified and all other legal requirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has no choice but to attest to the appointment. Luego finally points out that the recognition by the Commission that both the appointee and the protestant are qualified for the position in controversy renders it functus officio in the case and prevents it from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the former's appointment; it has no authority to revoke the appointment simply because it considers another employee to be better qualified for that would constitute an encroachment on the discretion vested in the appointing authority.

The determination of who among several candidates for a vacant position has the best qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of the Department Head or appointing authority and not in the CSC. The CSC cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Head of Office in this regard. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the respondent Civil Service Commission dated February 14, 1990, May 25, 1990, August 17, 1990, and October 19, 1990, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order dated December 13, 1990, is made PERMANENT.

MENELIETO A. OLANDA, petitioner, vs. LEONARDO G. BUGAYONG, PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY, MICHAEL DUMANGENG, PMMA BOARD OF INVESTIGATION, ALFREDO JOSON, LAURO DEL ROSARIO, AURORA BORROMEO, EMMANUEL SANTOS, MARLOWE REYES, TOMAS AQUINO, NORMELITA YANEZA and PEDRO DULAY, respondents. DECISION CARPIO-MORALES, J.: The present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the June 8, 19991[1] and November 12, 19992[2] orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales, Branch 70, in Sp. Civil Action No. RTC-28-I, a petition3[3] for quo warranto, mandamus, and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and damages. The antecedents of the case are as follows: On March 17, 1998, twelve officers and employees of the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA) including petitioner, then Dean of the College of Marine Engineering and former PMMA Complex Project Officer, filed a verified complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against respondent Leonardo G. Bugayong (Bugayong), President of the PMMA, charging him with violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for entering into a grossly disadvantageous contract with the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) on behalf of PMMA. On March 22, 1998, petitioner was interviewed live on DZRH by radio anchorman Fernan Enverga regarding the above-said complaint, prompting respondent Bugayong to require petitioner, by Memorandum4[4] of March 25, 1998, to explain under oath within 72 hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for misusing classified information. In the meantime, respondent Pedro S. Dulay, Jr. (Dulay), chief security officer of the PMMA, by a March 26, 1998 letter5[5] addressed to respondent Bugayong, stated that he heard the radio interview of petitioner and that in discussing publicly without any clearance from respondent Bugayong the Memorandum of Agreement between PMMA and PNCC, petitioner violated the PMMA Faculty Handbook and other civil service rules. Respondent Dulay accordingly requested that a board of investigators be created to look into the matter. By special order6[6] of March 27, 1998, respondent Bugayong relieved petitioner as Dean of the College of Marine Engineering and designated him as acting executive assistant in the Graduate School Program at Pamantasan ng Makati. The order at the same time directed petitioner to turn over all documents, properties and records related to his duties as Dean to respondent Engr. Michael Dumangeng who was appointed by respondent Bugayong as Acting Dean. On even date, petitioner returned respondent Bugayongs March 25, 1998 Memorandum, arguing that it was not properly addressed to him, his middle initial being incorrect.7[7] Respondent Bugayong thus sent a Memorandum8[8] of March 27, 1998 to petitioner similar to that of March 25, 1998, this time putting the correct middle initial of petitioner. Responding to respondent Bugayongs March 27, 1998 Memorandum, petitioner argued that his radio interview did not warrant disciplinary action as the complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman was a public document and involved public interest and he was merely exercising his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.9[9] By an April 1, 1998 Memorandum, respondent Bugayong found petitioners explanation unsatisfactory and not under oath as required by his Memorandum of March 27, 1998.10[10] He thus created a board,11[11] by Special Order12[12] of April 6, 1998, to investigate the allegations of respondent Dulay in his March 26, 1998 letter. Sustaining the findings of the board, respondent Bugayong, by decision13[13] of August 21, 1998, suspended petitioner for three months for violation of the PMMA Faculty Handbook and the civil service rules.

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Petitioner thereupon filed before the RTC of Iba, Zambales on October 27, 1998 a petition against herein respondents for quo warranto, mandamus, and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and damages, claiming that there was no valid cause to deprive him of his position as Dean and that respondent Dumangeng was usurping his position. Branch 70 of the RTC of Iba, Zambales, by Order of June 8, 1999, dismissed petitioners petition, on motion of respondents, in this wise, quoted verbatim:14[14] After considering both motions, the Court finds the grounds relied upon by the respondents, especially that the plaintiff has not exhausted all administrative remedies, the complaint not having alleged the fact of such exhaustion, the same may be dismissed for lack of cause of action. (Underscoring supplied) Petitioners motion for reconsideration15[15] of the June 8, 1999 order of the trial court having been denied, the present petition was filed, petitioner assigning to the trial court the following errors:16[16] I. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE AND MANIFEST ERROR IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONERS ALLEGED FAILURE TO EXHAUST ALL HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. II. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A PATENT AND GRIEVOUS ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION DESPITE THE FILING BY OTHER RESPONDENTS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE ANSWERS. As a rule, this Court reviews only the specific issues or errors raised by the parties. However, even if not raised, an error in jurisdiction may be taken up.17[17] The PMMA was created pursuant to Republic Act No. 3680, AN ACT CONVERTING THE PRESENT PHILIPPINE NAUTICAL SCHOOL INTO THE PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY, CONFERRING THE DEGREES OF BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN MARINE TRANSPORTATION, MAJOR IN NAVIGATION AND SEAMANSHIP, AND BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN MARINE TRANSPORTATION, MAJOR IN STEAM ENGINE AND ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING, PROVIDING FOR A MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY BOARD, DEFINTNG THE BOARDS RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES as amended. It is a government institution,18[18] hence, falling under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission:19[19] The test to determine whether a corporation is government-owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and are compulsory members of the Government Service Insurance System. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Disciplinary cases and cases involving personnel actions affecting employees in the civil service including appointment through certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion and separation are within the exclusive jurisdiction of Civil Service Commission20[20] which is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service. In Corsiga v. Defensor,21[21] this Court held: The Civil Service Commission has jurisdiction over all employees of Government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. As such, it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service. The National Irrigation Administration, created under Presidential Decree No. 1702, is a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter. Thus, being an employee of the NIA, private respondent is covered by the Civil Service Commission. Section 13 Rule VII of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (the Adm. Code of 1987) provides how appeal can be taken from a decision of a department or agency head. It states that such decision shall be brought to the Merit System Protection Board (now the CSC En Banc per CSC Resolution No. 93-2387 dated June 29, 1993). It is the intent of the Civil Service Law, in requiring the establishment of a grievance procedure in Rule XII, Section 6 of the same rules, that decisions of lower level officials be appealed to the agency head, then to the Civil Service Commission. Decisions of the Civil Service Commission, in turn, may be elevated to the Court of Appeals. Under this set up, the trial court does not have jurisdiction over personnel actions and, thus, committed an error in taking jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 22462. The trial court should have dismissed the case on motion of petitioner and let private respondent question RMO No. 52 before the NIA Administrator, and then the Civil Service Commission. As held in Mantala vs. Salvador, cases involving personnel actions, reassignment included, affecting civil service employees, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted) It was thus error for the trial court, which does not have jurisdiction, to, in the first, place take cognizance of the petition of petitioner assailing his relief as Dean and his designation to another position. This leaves it unnecessary to dwell on the issues herein raised by petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is, upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court, hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.

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Angeles vs. Gaite Facts 1. Petitioner was given custody of her grand niece, Maria Mercedes Vistan, to take care and provide for as she grew up. Petitioner became attached to such child and took care of her as her own. Petitioner also gave the same attention to the half-brother of the grand niece. The latter would seek petitioners financial support ranging from daily subsistence to hospitalization expenses. 2. After one incident wherein the half-brother of the grand niece, Michael Vistan, failed to do an important task, the petitioner and the Michael Vistan had a falling out. Since no more support was given to the latter, he took his half-sister away. He brought her to different provinces while asked the help of certain individuals to mislead the petitioner and the police. 3. The police was able to apprehend Michael Vistan through a dragnet operation. 4. The petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She likewise filed a complaint for Libel against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and Maria Mercedes. 5. The Investigating prosecutor issued a resolution to continue with the filing of the case. This was however denied by the provincial prosecutor who also issued a decision to dismiss the case. Petitioner filed a petition for review with USEC. Teehankee but was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with SEC Perez and was also denied 6. She tried appealing to the Office of the President but was dismissed by such on the ground of Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death 7. Petitioner went to the CA which sustained the dismissal 8. Petitioner contends that such Memo Circular was unconstitutional since t diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power. Issue W/N Memorandum Circular No. 58 is unconstitutional since it diminishes the power of the President? Ruling NO, it does not diminish the power of the President The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been established in our jurisdiction. Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."The CA cannot be deemed to have committed any error in upholding the Office of the President's reliance on the Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted and applied the law as it should be. Memorandum Circular No. 58, promulgated by the Office of the President on June 30, 1993 reads:

In the interest of the speedy administration of justice, the guidelines enunciated in Memorandum Circular No. 1266 (4 November 1983) on the review by the Office of the President of resolutions/orders/decisions issued by the Secretary of Justice concerning preliminary investigations of criminal cases are reiterated and clarified. No appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death x x x. Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President, as set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, it shall be dismissed outright x x x. It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits of his power to review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite the disposition of cases. Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to the extent of rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses the former may commit in the exercise of his discretion is purely speculative to say the least. Petitioner cannot second- guess the President's power and the President's own judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy administration of justice, especially that such delegation is upon a cabinet secretary his own alter ego. BUT THERE ARE LIMITATIONS: Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear that There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (par. 3, sec. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem). These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental law. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import. In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the Secretary of Justice dealing with the preliminary investigation of cases cannot be considered as falling within the same exceptional class which cannot be delegated. Besides, the President has not fully abdicated his power of control as Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher. Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose upon the President the task of reviewing all preliminary investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly hamper the other important duties of the President by having to scrutinize each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the latters expertise in said matter. The Constitutional interpretation of the petitioner would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government.