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H A R RY F R A N K F U R T A N D S U F F I CIENCY

1 . I N T RO D U C T I O N

(e.g. Parfit, 1998) and sufficientarians claim that equality is not a moral ideal but simply masks deeper ideals such as that of giving priority to the worseoff, or that of ensuring that everyone has enough, respectively. In this essay, I will discuss Harry Frankfurts attack on egalitarianism (in Ethics 98, 1987; reprinted in Frankfurt, 1997) and contend that Frankfurts arguments do not support the conclusion he is trying to make.

Ever since the French Revolution, egalitarianism has had a wide appeal as a moral ideal, such that most people in our society, even those quite privileged and reluctant to give away any of their resources, find themselves sympathetic to such an ideal. Clearly, very few consider equality as the first principle of justice; even in the famous cry libert, galit, fraternit it takes the second place. Egalitarians such as Cohen (1989:908) insist that their claims for equality are weak (qualified) equalisandum claims 1; Rawls (1972:61ff.39.82) underlines that liberty is lexically prior to the difference principle, which itself allows deviations from the more purist egalitarian ideal. However, the value of equality as a moral ideal has recently come under attack from various sides: libertarians such as Nozick (1974 ch.7) claim that the redistributive policies needed to implement egalitarianism are unjust as they violate personal rights (unless they are completely voluntary); prioritarians

2. THE DOCTRINE OF SUFFICIENCY

Let us clarify a number of points at the outset. It is important to note that Frankfurts objection to egalitarianism is an ethical, not a pragmatic or aesthetic or religious one: what is important from the point of view of morality is not that everyone should have the same but that each should have enough (1997:261). He admits that equality may nevertheless be desirable for a number of reasons (e.g. as the best pragmatic approach to problems of economic distribution), but insists that such reasons cannot be moral ones. Furthermore, he claims that if from a moral point of view, egalitarianism is not a value (it is irrelevant), the very idea that equality is a

A qualified or weak equalisandum claim says that [people] should be as equal as possible in some dimension but subject to whatever limitations need to be imposed in deference to other values: those limitations are not specified by the claim in question Cohen (1989:908).

moral ideal is itself not morally neutral; it creates envy, and moral shallowness in that nobody is interested in determining what is enough. This last point illuminates directly what I find problematic with Frankfurts argument. The word enough, in English, has two different meanings: on one hand it indicates the psychological state of satisfaction (the gratification of a particular desire, and in an extended sense, the gratification of all possible desires), on the other hand it indicates the more objective concept of sufficiency (the adequate meeting of a need, and, in an extended sense, the adequate meeting of all needs). Clearly, Jane may have all her needs met and yet not be satisfied; Claire may be a Tiny Tim, living in dire poverty and yet completely satisfied with what she has. Given that the doctrine of sufficiency is supposed to yield a principle of justice, it is immediately evident that interpreting enough as satisfactory bring up all the offensive and expensive tastes arguments used by resourcists against welfarists 2; interpreting it as sufficient brings up various other problems: how can we determine what is sufficient? Is the distribution of the excess beyond the scope of justice? What

would be just when there is not enough resources to ensure that everyone has enough? Clearly, avoiding such a dodgy term is hardly a sign of moral shallowness.

3 . C O N F U TA T I O N O F E G A L I TA R I A N A R GUMENTS

I consider egalitarianism as the most common sense position at present, hence anyone contesting it should bear the burden of proof. Frankfurt does this to some extent in the second part of the paper, while dedicating the first part in an attempt to counter egalitarian arguments. The last part is dedicated to a clarification regarding what he understands by enough; unfortunately he does not distinguish between sufficiency and satisfaction. The main egalitarian argument that Frankfurt discusses is that regarding diminishing marginal utilities. The core idea behind the principle of diminishing marginal utility is that a dollar is more useful to a person dying of hunger than to a billionaire: as the amount of utility (say, wealth, or money, or pleasure) that a person possesses tends to infinity, the utility s/he gets from an additional dollar tends to zero; the less utility one possesses (the poorer a person is), the more utility one gets from an addition-

Cohen (1989:912ff) offers a good review of the Rawlsian and Dworkinian arguments on the subject.

al dollar. This intuitively seems approximately correct; bearing in mind the problems with the term utility 3, the utility differences between persons with approximately equal wealth 4 and the buying power of the unit (be it 1p, 1 euro, 100 yen). For example, this last problem renders the hypothesis a first-order approximation, since there are phenomena such as saving and overcoming of thresholds that are linked to the buying power of the defined unit, such factors create local kinks on the decaying marginal utility curve but should not affect the best fit curve (i.e. when comparing curves for different persons, at the same value (n) for the persons wealth, person x may get very little marginal utility (because that nth dollar went into saving for a future preference satisfaction) while person y may get a great deal of utility (because with that nth dollar she saved enough to buy something she had been saving for since quite a long time.))

Thus, the principle of marginal utility must be understood as a rough-and-ready concept in political science, not as a Newtonian law. Frankfurts argument, however, targets the local inconsistencies with some obvious counter examples, but does not show that as an approximate rule of thumb, the principle is inconsistent. The main examples invoke thresholds; and at times make use of ambiguities. To take one example, Frankfurt uses a threshold-effect argument to suggest that there are cases where an egalitarian distribution actually minimizes aggregate utility. He gives the example of a distribution of medicine needed for survival (note that here Frankfurt shifts from satisfaction to sufficiency: a hedonic example would not be so convincing): there are x persons, d doses and a treatment consists of n doses; d < x.n. Hence, Frankfurt argues, giving the doses out in an egalitarian fashion, we risk that nobody gets the n doses required for survival and hence all the persons die. This argument is expected to demonstrate the falsity of the principle: where some people have less than enough, no-one should

Interpreting utility as the satisfaction of preferences that can be bought, rather than hedonic enjoyment renders the hypothesis more plausible, since a billionaire may enjoy a 1$ bag of popcorn more than a person dying of hunger his 1$ meal, but usually, that extra dollar doesnt go to satisfy the billionaires first or second preference.

have more than anyone else. But, obviously, all this case demonstrates is that an egalitarian should distribute treatments, not single doses that have no value in themselves. Frankfurt takes the example

The utility difference of an additional dollar given to two people with very slight difference in wealth will not be very significant.
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further, claiming that supposing a little medicine may be toxic, the principle when some people have more than enough, no-one should have less than enough turns out to be false. Again, this merely shows that the doses in themselves have no worth, and further the word enough is being used ambiguously with two different references: when some people have more than enough cure, no-one should have less than enough poison is no egalitarians claim! This demonstrates how easy it is to use the term enough equivocally. To conclude, I do not think that this is the most significant argument in favour of egalitarianism: most contemporary egalitarians are not utilitarians and would not justify their theories by referring to the principle of utility; besides, egalitarianism as a (moral) doctrine developed before classical utilitarianism (Bentham, Mill) and before contemporary economists started introducing into political theory concepts such as that of marginal utility. Frankfurts arguments can at most be used to sustain a claim such as that of Cohen (1989) or Sen (1997), that money is not the right currency of egalitarian justice, but not that the principle of marginal utility, as a rough rule, is flawed.

4 . F R A N K F U RT S E R R O R T H E O RY

In countering the intuition that an egalitarian distribution is fair, and that inequality is unjust, Frankfurt proposes a sort of error theory: what is intuitively morally objectionable is not the fact that some of the individuals in those situations have less money than others but the fact that those with less have too little (p. 268). What is morally important is manifestly not that our society permits a situation in which a substantial minority of Americans have smaller shares than others of resources [ but] rather, that the members of this minority do not earn decent livings (p. 269). Hence, what is morally wrong is poverty, but we tend to assume that what is (also) morally wrong is the inequality which accompanies such poverty. Frankfurt then argues that the link between poverty (not having enough for sufficiency, rather than for satisfaction, here) and inequality is contingent and hence that if poverty is bad, it does not entail that inequality (in itself) is bad. In other words, the injustice is in the absolute measure, not (necessarily) in the relative measure (of well being, resources etc.) A first thing to note is that Frankfurts arguments (that speak of smaller share of resources)

are not directed towards welfare egalitarians. We shall come back to this later. A second observation is the use of the guarding term manifestly. Clearly, egalitarians often use examples of injustice where both poverty and inequality are present; what is most blatantly unjust is the poverty, but the inequality too may be unjust on its own account even if it turns out that it is not necessarily linked to the poverty in the given examples. A third problem is that with absolute measures in such cases: how can we determine what is enough?

procedure both accept, we say this is fair (even though the result is arbitrary). Unless there is a personal attachment to the pearl itself, the most sensible thing would be to sell the pearl and divide the money. Egalitarians can extend such cases to the distribution of resources in our society and argue that intuitively, not only poverty, but also inequality is morally wrong. Frankfurt, however, assumes that showing that there is no necessary link between poverty and inequality is enough to show that inequality is not morally relevant. But this very example shows the problem with the doctrine of sufficiency. Consider a rational dis-

5 . A N E G A L I TA R I A N R E S P O N S E

Some egalitarians, such as Rawls (1972:302ff) use our intuitions regarding equality of opportunity to argue in favour of egalitarianism. Even if two people, John and George, are both well-off (and have what is sufficient), distributing extra resources arbitrarily is unfair unless they accept the terms of such a distribution or unless one takes the good while the other renounces it. Say they together find a precious pearl, and dont know who should get it, so they elect Mr Ross as arbiter to decide who should get it. If Mr Ross decides to give it to John

tribution of resources in a society. For the two understandings of enough, there are possible cases: a) Everyone has enough, and further resources remain to be distributed; b) The resources available are used up, and some people do not have enough; c) Everyone has enough and all the resources are used up. 5

because he has a shorter name, we would say this is unfair. If Mr Ross proposes a fair coin-toss, which

There are two further possibilities: that some people have enough and some have less than enough when (d) all resources have been used up, (e), not all resources have been used up; but these cases reduce to (a), (b), or (c), once a fair redistribution (by sufficientarian standards) is made.

In case (a) sufficiency (as sole principle of justice) would tell us nothing about how to distribute the excess, and according to our intuitions in the pearl example, we do need justice in cases of excess, hence we need a further principle of justice -- and the most obvious would be an egalitarian one! In (b), assuming that enough is not just the bare minimum for survival 6, we still need a principle of justice to decide how to distribute the limited resources (if, say, sufficient were to be two meals a day while people with one meal would still survive would it be just to give two meals to as many people as possible and let the others starve, or would you first give one meal to everyone and then give out the second meal?). Only in (c), then, does the sufficientarian principle seem to suffice. Whether enough is understood as sufficient or as satisfactory, it is highly implausible that (c) could obtain in real life (i.e. all resources are used up and exactly everyone has enough). A sufficientarian may nevertheless object, suggesting, say, that sufficient be so defined so as to mean the amount each person gets in a rational distribution (which concept

we will call q-sufficiency) 7. But q-sufficiency (and likewise q-satisfaction) works out to be a relative concept of enough, it depends on what other people have. In (c), where all resources are distributed with none remaining, if someone gets more than the amount defined as enough under q-sufficiency, then necessarily someone else would get less than enough. If someone gets more than me, then I am getting less than enough; hence I am interested to know what others get: this is precisely what Frankfurt attacks in egalitarianism! In (c), therefore, q-sufficiency is logically equivalent to a sort of resource egalitarianism that, maybe, does not seek to distribute money, but goods such as balanced nutrition, mobility, adequate healthcare etc. (since these are the things that compose what is sufficient) 8. Q-satisfaction (defined, say, as what each one gets in a rational distribution of pleasure 9), similarly collapses into equality of welfare, and one of the worst kind, that is, a nave

7 Say, if we cannot give 2 meals to each person, but only 1.5, we could say that 1.5 meal per day is sufficient. 8 Frankfurt seems to assume (e.g. in his arguments regarding marginal utility) that resource egalitarianism means that everyone gets the same amount of money. But resource egalitarianism can distribute other goods, to attain q-sufficiency. 9

6 Frankfurt (1989:270) himself claims that he does not refer to the bare minimum; rather he understands non-trivial needs to be those that have significant bearing upon the quality of a persons life or upon his readiness to be content with it.

One actually distributes resources, not pleasure, but the value of the resources is measured on the amount of pleasure afforded to the persons who get them, such that in the end, all persons are equally pleased with what they get.

welfarism open to all the objections regarding offensive and expensive tastes. If someone is completely satisfied with little but someone else isnt completely satisfied with plenty, q-(complete)satisfaction would redistribute from the Tiny Tim to the person with expensive tastes, such that both would be maximally (but not completely, in absolute terms) satisfied. If not we get situation (b) where satisfaction is a limited resource and sufficientarianism does not help us decide whether it is just or not that Tiny Tim should be completely satisfied while the person with the expensive tastes should not 10. Again, we note here that q-(complete)satisfaction is a relative measure. The problem of defining enough is not confined to case (c). By medieval standards, most human societies are now in situation (a). By contemporary standards, most are in (b). What can we take as enough? (iv.) (iii.) (ii.) (i.)

6. CONCLUSION

The doctrine of sufficiency is therefore an incomplete principle of justice since it does not tell us: What criteria will be used to define enough; Whether to understand enough as sufficiency or satisfaction; how to govern the distribution of the surplus, if any remains [(a), above]; how to govern the distribution of available welfare or resources, should they be less than enough [(b), above]. Furthermore, in the case of (c) above, Frankfurts arguments do not refute egalitarianism; if anything they support some resource or welfarist form of the doctrine. In a society with limited resources the most plausible way of understanding human societies sufficientarianism seems to collapse into egalitarianism once we try to derive from it complete principles of justice applicable to such a

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I think that the more elaborate welfarist positions, such as Sens (1997) equality of capability, Arnesons (1997) equal opportunity for welfare and Cohens (1989) equal access to advantage have interesting solutions to such problems; certainly Frankfurts (p.272) suggestion that provided all have enough satisfaction, there is no injustice in some having greater amounts of satisfaction (!) is not very helpful.

society.

REFERENCES

Sen, A. 1997. Equality of What?. in Goodin, R. E. and P. Pettit (eds.). Contemporary Political Philosophy

Arneson, R. J. 1997. Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare. in Pojman and Westmoreland, 1997. Cohen, G. A. 1989. On the currency of egalitarian justice. Ethics 99 (July 1989): 906-944. Frankfurt, H. 1997. Equality as a Moral Ideal. In Pojman and Westmoreland. [reprinted from Ethics 98: (1987) pp. 21-43]. Kymlicka, W. 20022. Contemporary political philosophy : an introduction. Oxford University Press. Oxford. xiv+497 pp. Parfit, D. 1998. Equality and Priority. in Mason, A. (ed.). Ideals of Equality. Blackwell. Oxford Malden (Massach.). xi+114pp. Nozick, R. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Blackwell. Oxford. xvi+367pp. Pojman, L. P. and R. Westmoreland (eds.) 1997. Equality: selected readings. Oxford University Press. New York. x+325pp. Rawls, J. 1972. A Theory of Justice. Oxford University Press. Oxford. xvi + 607 pp.

An Anthology. Blackwell. Oxford Malden (Massach.). x+648pp.

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