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The last half century exactly covers the period of independence of Pakistan and the life
span of our sovereign experience. We got independence from the British in 1947, and set
up a two wing state of Pakistan - an arrangement which was to play an important part in
providing us a catalyst, a direction and diplomatic orientation to structure a relationship
with China. Later we saw the separation of the Eastern wing through a long series of
political follies. We fought three wars with India. We entered intoinnumerable security
pacts and formal as well as less than formal arrangements with countries within the zone
(like Iran and Turkey), beyond the seven seas with USA. This meandering quest for
security has been very well recognised by strategic experts and well documented by
many scholars. Looking back over the history of our pacts and security arrangements we
see the landscape littered with disappointments, shattered expectations, broken promises,
and solemn pledges not worth the paper they were written on. There is one notable
exception though, and that is the quality of Pakistan's relationship with China. This is the
story of a relationship in which, once it started in right earnest, there is nothing but
smooth and steady progress all the way.

In the very early stages of our diplomacy, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, the firvt Prime Minister
of Pakistan, took three steps which had profoun 1 effect on the eNolution of our
diplomatic orientation, and conseqiu ntly our place upon the ever-changing shape of the
post WW2 power structure. These three steps were in the form of one visit he did not
make, oncpatra he did undertake, and in a gesture of splendid courage and "prophetic"
vision, one act of recognition he accorded to a government.

Liaquat Ali Khan received an invitation from Moscow, but he never went there. From this
many scholars as well as plebeians in this country conclude that he forced upon USSR an
irreversible separation of paths; that the path chosen by Pakistan led to many points of
collision with that powerful neighbour. But one point is clear. Had Liaquat Ali Khan gone
to Moscow and as a logical corollary of that joined the Soviet bloc, Pakistan would
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have been without a dependable friend like China. The second decision of Liaquat AH
Khan relates to the recognition accorded to the People Republic of China on 20 January
1950.

His third decision is linked with the first, is that he decided to visit Washington in May
1950. It coincided with the time when fighting broke out in Korea and the UN Security
Council had passed its contentious resolution to military intervene in Korea. It took
Liaquat Ali Khan several months of oscillation, pcrplexion and indecision before he
discovered the middle path. Barely two years after his death, and in continuation of the
path explored and chartered by Liaquat Ali Khan, the Government of Pakistan decided to
enter into a multiplicity of bilateral and multilateral security agreements and pacts,
motivated by its desire to obtain economic and military assistance from the USA, and
also from a genuine ideological impose to protect itself from the expanding tide of
communism. One of the pacts, SEATO, was clearly designed to contain China and
prevent spread of communism in South East Asia. As expected this arrangement caused
considerable discomfort and questioning in Beijing.

We many identify three principal determinants of China's Foreign Policy. First is its own
painful experience of having been a victim of colonial occupation and exploitation during
the whole of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century. Second, sensing the emerging threat
of hegemonism from all around its periphery, the People Republic of China vehemently
rejected and stubbornly opposed hegemonism from any quarter and in all its form. Third,
in the world of today, China is the only country with the longest surviving civilisation in
the history of mankind. It drank deeply from the fountainhead of the teachings of Buddha
and Confucius, and showed a remarkable ability to absorb newer thinking without losing
its basic structure of values and its distinctive colour of creativity, patience and wisdom.
Thus, China out of genuine convictions decided to play a determined but not aggressive,
helpful but never hegemonic role in international politics, with full adherence to the
principles of sovereign equality and mutual respect for individual national value system,
this character of the Chinese -.policy has been a most refreshing experience for Pakistan
hemmed in between an ideologically aggressive and imperialistic Soviet Union in the
north, hegemonically ambitious India in the east, and culturally demanding allies from
the West.

Despite its close linkage with US policies, Pakistan made a decision of great wisdom, in
that in spite of immense temptation and earnest urging from the Western allies, Pakistan
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troops to Korea and Laos. The dominant constraint in this policy decision was respect for
Chinese sensitivities ad recognition of Chinese security compulsions in Korea and Laos.
This message was not lost on the Chinese whose tone towards Pakistan's presence in
SEATO gradually changed from harsh suspicion to benign interpretation. At one stage,
China is said to have condoled if not fully approved Pakistan's presence n the SEATO
forum as a moderating influence against any overtly hostile or adventurous actions of the
Alliance.

However, in the late 50s, Pakistan's strategic perception took a queer and as yet
unexplained somersault. Encouraged by the conclusion of the Indus Basin negotiations in
1959, and having been carried away by the international rhetoric of applause generated
on that occasion, Ayub Khan made a preposterously flawed strategic appreciation, and an
equally ludicrous proposal. On 9 November
1959 he said: "The Subcontinent will be vulnerable to attack within five years. Chinese
occupation of Tibet and road construction activities in Afghanistan pose a serious threat
from the north. It is a threat that cannot be overlook by wishful thinking." In an
hyperbolic mood, he assigned himself the responsibility of the security of the entire
Subcontinent! Three months later he reiterated this thesis, and proposed "joint defence" to
India, only to receive a laconic rebuff from Nehru: "Against whom?"

However, it must also be said to his credit that he lost no time in rediscovery of his proper
orientation and strategic interests. In March 1961. Ayub Khan personally highlighted
before China the need to demarcate boundary between China and Pakistan. Despite initial
hesitation from China, Ayub continued to follow this proposal with vigour and
persistence. In the background of the fact that SinoIndian border dispute was then
emerging as an immediate catalyst of deteriorating India-China relations, Ayub Khan's
unilateral initiative thoughtfully and gracefully put Pakistan-China bilateral relations on a
new and firm foundation of mutual trust and confidence. The Boundary Agreement with
China was signed on 2 March 1963.

India's China War of 1962 brought about a whole new power game into South Asia.
Hitherto muted Soviet-Chinese split sprang loudly into open when the Soviet Union
openly stepped in with full politico-military support of India. Similarly and
simultaneously, USA, UK and France rushed in with every military hardware they
thought India needed in its so-called hour of extreme peril. Nehru saw no contradiction or
inconvenience in this hodgc podge of simultaneous security relations with two opposing

ideological and military blocs. Without any hesitation, he jettisoned the principles of non-
alignment in so far as these related to China.

Pakistan was utterly surprised, even appalled, over the indecent haste and monumental
scale with which the Western bloc mounted the aid and support operation which had scant
relationship with the quantum and nature of actual threat. The threat was nonreal, and the
problem was of India's own making, through a quaint and fortuitous combination of
ignorance and arrogance. This sudden shift of sympathy in favour of India shattered the
entire edifice of security Pakistan had so carefully and assiduously built over the
preceding ten years.
During the Sino-India border conflict of 1962 Pakistan had to suffer and withstand
enormous pressure mounted by our Western Allies to support India and condemn China.
This was one of those occasion when Pakistan accustomed to oblige refused to oblige.
This was a correct calculation.

And there comes the 1965 War. Without going into many details of the Chinese role in
this War, two points must be recorded for the purpose of this study. Firstly, it can be said
with a reasonable degree of confidence that one reason for India to leave inactivated the
Eastern Front, despite known vulnerability of Pakistan's military capability there,
was the close proximity of East Pakistan with the NEFA sector. The Indian were careful
not 10 start any military activity in this sensitive location so soon after their last debacle.
Two, the Chinese factor started coming into play our Western Allies panicked. On
September 19, 1965 the British High Commissioner called on President Ayub, and
warned the president that if the Chinese plunged into the conflict: "the game would then
by played by others, including the nuclear powers .... The nuclear powers would take over
.... A drastic move .... might enlarge the conflict in such a way that there will be no
Kashmir to fight for, nor Pakistan, nor for that matter United Kingdom or any other
country." After an earlier unpleasant experience of a Soviet threat of nuclear
extermination in 1961, this was the second time Pakistan received such brash and brute
threat of nuclear extinction. For Pakistan it was the "unkindest cut of them all", coming
from our closest allies. With the West estrangement was complete. On the other hand, by
her actions during and after the 1965 War, China succeeded to add a new dimension to
sanitised and structured plane of inter-governmental relations into the hearts and thoughts
of the people of Pakistan.

From 1965 to 1980, is a period of intense co-operation in a wide range of activities out of
which, rather erroneously, the ^o-128

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operation in defence procurement and production stands out as the hallmark of our co-
operation. In fact the benefits of economics and development assistance received from
China are no less significant, The Chinese contribution in the economic sector should be
fulh recognised, and so should be case with the backward flow ol assistance from
Pakistan which stand least documented, bui eloquently and generously recognised
by the Chinese themselves For a long time Pakistan was the only window through which
Chins could see the West, and could have access to a range of new an< emerging as well
enormously powerful and expensive technologies o the West. In this particular case the
nexus between Pakistan am China was that of hand and glove. Pakistan was in possession
o technologies but lacked the will, or skill or capability to produce. 0 the other side,
China had perfected reverse engineering into fabulous and awe-inspiring art. This
synergetic relationship was t result in something like instantaneous blossoming of flowers
in tli spring.

Until the end of the 80s' all the Chinese military hardwai assistance to Pakistan came in
the form of free aid until end of tl Eighties, and several studies are available which have
tried monetise the quantum of this assistance. We have not seen ai attempt at
monetisation of the reverse flow of technologies fro Pakistan. We should be glad it has
not been done. How do you put price tag on sincerity, steadfastness and friendship, or
on dependable factor of security? Thank God that both the Chine and Pakistanis do not
belong to that category of people 'who kn< the price of everything and value of nothing'.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created a new set challenges for Pakistan and China,
Pakistan developed a articulated its own response to the Soviet inteuvention and invasi
within twelve hours of its happening, and Pakistan did not cons anyone before
formulating its response, the Chinese fully endor; it, adopted it* and made it a corner
stone of their dealings with vis-a-vis USSR. The Chinese contribution in rolling back the
So^ invasion is no less significant or critical than of any other suppor of the Afghan cause
and Jihad.