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At the recently held Conference on Disarmament (CD) at Geneva, the draft of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was discussed, amended and finalised, though
not approved because of the veto applied by India.

It is quite obvious that the treaty is an instrument of NonProliferation and the United
States intends to maintain its nuclear capability and even resume nuclear tests if required
in its supreme national interest.

The second important point emerging is the fact that the United States does not need
testing of nuclear weapons for the maintenance and even advancement of its nuclear
capabilities any more in view of its Science-based Stockpile Stewardship programme.
The degree of nuclear advancement has probably been attained by other Nuclear
Weapons States (NWS) in view of- the many tests they have carried out to reach the state
of doing away with nuclear field testing. But for the threshold states (India, Pakistan and
Israel atomic field testing programme is essential to derive a credible nuclear capability.

CTBT as such would stop any Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) from acquiring
credible nuclear capability and would as such act in the furtherance of the objective of
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It would freeze the nuclear capabilities of the threshold
states at the present levels and many help, later on, the some degree in roiling it back to
elimination.

CTBT aims at reduction of weapons of mass-destruction.

* Any step in that direction is commendable. But in fairness to NNWS, this exercise must
be further carried out towards total elimination of nuclear arsenals from the whole world.
This aim was spelt out in the permeable to the NPT signed in 1968, but none of the NWS
has showed any intention or desire to work for tha< aim. Otherwise CTBT itself nould
establish the hegemony of the NWS, placing the NNWS into nuclear and missile
servitude rciegat'ng them to the status of second or third class powers adversely affecting
the sovereignty and equality of all states sis enshrined in the UN Charter. ' "

In a world environment wlurre might has proved right in many cases like aggression jo«l
genocide on a massive sci'le in

Bosnia, Chechnya and Kashmir and where no protection is guaranteed by NWS (one of
major drawbacks of NPT), CTBT would adversely affect the NNWS states, in
safeguarding the security and integrity of the country against a neighbour bent on
imposing its will cither by virtue of its nuclear power blackmail or its conventional forces
of much greater size.

It would be recalled that during the Cold War, the USSR had conventional forces in
Europe that were numerically superior. For the countries in West Europe, nuclear
weapons were the equaliser as mentioned in a USI official test, "the threat to use them
was present and was used to compensate for our smaller numbers of conventional forces.
Today, nuclear weapons can still be the equaliser against superior conventional forces."

The NWS, therefore, on this analogy, cannot deny the strategy', logic, suggesting the
deterrent value of nuclear weapons to counter a superior conventionally armed adversary.
Such is the situation of Pakistan vis-a-vis India.

In conventionalised weapons, India has an edge over Pakistan, with its indigenous
defence production capabilities, weapon systems etc. On top of this, India has been
acquiring sophisticated weapons to enhance its offensive potential. India maintains tke
world's fourth largest military, has ambitious plans for a bluewater navy, has a growing
network (ICM) capability and near self-efficiency in conventional weapons.

India did not hesitates to unleash its offensive capabilities against Pakistan in the 1965
and 1971 wars. In 1974 it exploded its nuclear bomb, which resulted in the imperative of
Pakistan attaining a nuclear deterrent capability. If Pakistan signs the CTBT, it accepts the
freezing and capping of its nuclear capability, allowing India to make sophisticated
nuclear weapons and enhance its nuclear capabilities. Unilateral signing of the treaty as
such would be suicidal, placing Pakistan at the mercy of superior conventional forces and
nuclear arsenals of India,

-*;S,\r

Pakistan must not sign the CTBT even if India signs. How can Pakistan abandon its
nuclear deterrent in the face of the high superiority India has in its conventional forces?
There is a manifest logic in Zbigniewd Brezinski's argument that "elimination of nuclear
weapons was a plan to make the world safe for conventional w:arfare."

The proof of the need of nuclear deterrent for Pakistan

,._n; tde itself abundantly manifest in 1987 and 1990, when the Indian

».iov .s of attacking Pakistan were halted in view of the Pakistan's212

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nuclear capabilities. Presently a rudimentary state of nuclear deterrence exists between

New Delhi and Islamabad.
Even if India signs CTBT, Pakistan must not sign, unless there are complementary
measures implemented to safeguard our •national security interests. The establishment of
a stable peaceful regime in the Subcontinent is an important prerequisite for Pakistan
joining India in the signing of the Treaty.

The two essential elements of this would be an arms control agreement between India and
Pakistan to lay down and limit the quantum of armed forces, including the weapons and
delivery systems which while allowing'Pakistan and India sufficient defence capability,
should help to remove fear of threat of one against the other. The second important
clement of such a regime, without which the first cannot be effectively done, is the need
to resolve the major problem of Jammu and Kashmir through a meaningful dialogue and
other means like mediation, etc., suggested in the UN Charter. The resolution of this
dispute is essential to help build a political and psychological climate and thus end the
damaging arms race in the continent. Other Confidence Building Measures (CBM) would
automatically come as corollary to the resolution of this important conflict.

As a prelude to the signing of the CTBT, we, therefore,

advocate a comprehensive approach to arms control, incorporating

measures for arms reduction and resolution of the main dispute of

.Kashmir. These have hindered the building up of trust and confident

^between Pakistan and India. To reiterate, Pakistan's stand with

regard to the signing of CTBT agreement should be guided by its

.national security interests which should be a primary consideration.

Even if India signs the CTBT, Pakistan must not, unless this is

accompanied by a resolution of the Kashmir dispute and requisite

arms control agreement between India and Pakistan to help remove

the danger of aggression by India against Pakistan and to create a

climate of trust and confidence between the two countries.

The main target of the CTJBT is three threshold statesIsrael, India and Pakistan included
in the Entry Into Force (EIF) Clause of the Original Draft CTBT.

As for Israel, the American arsenal is at its disposal as was demonstrated during the 1973
war, when the US supplied the requisite weapons by air to help Israel turn the tables on
Egypt. The US has also been favouring the India. It extended'military aid to India during
the 1962 Indo-Chinese \\i\r without consulting Pakistan and restrained Pakistan from
exerting any pressure on India during

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that war for the settlement of its Kashmir disjjute. Whereas during the 1965 Indo-
Pakistan war, although Pakistan was an ally of the US, "US announced arms embargo
making the Pakistanis painfully aware that their long nourished American equaliser
would not be available in times of a crisis.

Comparatively the great reaction to India's explosion of atomic device in 1974 and
bringing Pakistan under restrictive clauses of Pressler Amendment do not speak of a
balanced approach of the US. In fact as Professor Stephen Cohen, Director of Programme
in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security at the University of Illinois has
states: "In the past the US has supported or at least has looked favourably on it (India's
nuclear explosion) in terms of balancing the Chinese. If that situation was to rise again,
we might wind up again supporting-the Indians," .

The US arms control objectives ia South Asia include:

«*v

(a) Multinational dialogue for the peace, arms control, nuclear non-proliferation and
regional security.

(b) A regional solution resulting in capping nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery
capabilities in the first stage to be followed by roll back and eventual elimination of
nuclear arsenals.

(c) Application of CTBT and agreement to end enrichment of materials used for nuclear
weapons. •

The CTBT as such will be probably followed/complemented by achieving the objectives

of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Fissile Material Cut off Convention.
The first aims at focusing MTCR controls from preventing the development of nuclear
capable delivery systems to vehicles able to deliver any Und of ..weapons -of. mass
destruction. The MTCR control aims to effectively preclude technology for short-range
missiles being sold or given to a Third World country. The US alU'gation of China having
delivered M-ll missiles to Pakistan fails in this category. The cut off convention would
aim to stop any further production of fissile materials for weapons purposes.

If and when the complementary measures are proposed and accepted, would depend upon
the success of bringing in Pakistan and India within the ambit of CTBT.
Pakistan has paid for its acquisition of the nuclear capability

_. in many ways and shall continue to do so for talcing the decision of

rejecting the CTBT, without the establishment of a peaceful regime214

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in the Subcontinent removing the threat of an Indian aggression against it.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto realised the sacrifice we Mill have to make, wen he vowed to have
the nuclear weapons, even if we have to cat grass."

The COAS, General Jehangir Karamat, truly reflected the nation's interests when he
remarked "We will take any decision after much consideration even if India signs CTBT."

Signing CTBT is an issue of great importance and having long-range and grave
consequences. The primary consideration for us is the safeguarding of our national
security. As a sovereign nation, we should not compromise our survival or security for the
sake of a treaty. The UN Charter itself provides for each country to be responsible for its
own-security and national defence. National security overrides all treaties.

The government should after through deliberations and considerations take the nation and
concerned institutions into confidence, while taking a stand on CTBT, particularly in
view of the shifting and bargaining stance of India on CTBT.