Mishpatim 5769

Rabbi Ari Kahn

‘Lex Talionis’ : Law and Ethics

While for many people “Torah” is synonymous with “Law”,

until the 21st chapter of Exodus the Torah has remarkably
little discussion of Law. Up to this point, the main focus has
been narrative, with occasional detours to introduce
individual laws. This Parsha’s first three chapters mark a
departure. Biblical narrative is left in abeyance, and a series
of laws is presented, with little or no connection to the
narrative.

One of the most familiar of these laws is often considered

the quintessential expression of “Old Testament” values. In
short, to-the-point language, we are instructed in matters of
conflict that result in physical harm:

:‫(כד) עַיִן תַחַת עַיִן שֵן תַחַת שֵן יָד תַחַת יָד רֶגֶל תַחַת רָגֶל‬:

The accepted translation is “an eye for an eye”. A more

literal, though not very helpful translation, would be “an eye
under an eye”. The word tachat literally means “under”, but
the sentence lacks any decisive meaning when translated
this way. This same word appears several times in the Torah
in other contexts:

‫בראשית פרק ד‬
‫(כה) וַיֵדַע אדָם עוד אֶת אִשְתו וַתֵלֶד בֵן וַתִקְרָא אֶת שְמו שֵת כִי שָת לִי אֱלֹהִים‬
:‫זֶרַע אחֵר תַחַת הֶבֶל כִי הֲרָגו קָיִן‬
And Adam was once again intimate with his wife and
she had a son. And he called his name Shet, ‘for God
has provided me with other offspring tachat Hevel – in
place of Hevel - for he was killed by Kayin. (Bereishit
4:25)

Though the word tachat could be translated literally as

“under” or “for”, neither of these translations works well in
this context. Rather “in place of,” “instead of,” or “as a
replacement for” is clearly the best definition.

Similarly, when Avraham was commanded to bring his son

Yitzchak as an offering, at the last minute the heavens
opened and an angel called out, bidding him to stop. The
text continues,

‫בראשית פרק כב‬

ְ‫(יג) וַיִשָא אבְרָהָם אֶת עֵינָיו וַיַרְא וְהִנֵה איִל אחַר נֶאֱחַז בַסְבַךְ בְקַרְנָיו וַיֵלֶך‬
:‫אבְרָהָם וַיִקַח אֶת הָאיִל וַיַעֲלֵהו לְעֹלָה תַחַת בְנו‬
Avraham lifted his eyes, and behold a ram was
entangled in the brush by the horns, and Avraham went
and took the ram, and offered it as an offering tachat
b’no - in place of his son. (Bereishit 22:13)

Again, the best translation for tachat is ‘in place of,’ and not
“under” or “for”. This slight linguistic nuance offers us an
opportunity to reexamine our understanding of the oft-
quoted phrase, “an eye for an eye”. What has made this
phrase so popular? Is there an ideological, or even perhaps a
theological bias which underlies this translation?1

The connotation of “an eye for an eye” is that the

punishment for removing an eye is that the perpetrator’s
eye will be put out. We should note that normative Jewish
law has never interpreted this pronouncement in this way.
Jewish law is unequivocal: no Jewish court ever sanctioned or
implemented this method of corporal punishment. Taking an
eye from the perpetrator would be an affront to Jewish law,
as practiced both in modern and ancient times. No authentic
Jewish court ever meted out such punishment.2 Jewish law
has always dictated monetary restitution, interpreting the

1
Common Christological bias attempts to contrast the New Testament’s so-called doctrine of love and
kindness, represented by “turning the other cheek”, with “Old” Testament harshness, epitomized by “an eye
for an eye.” This bias is most clear in the “Sermon on the Mount” where the founder of Christianity says:
“It is said of them of old, ‘Love your neighbor and hate your enemy,’ but I say love your neighbor as
yourself”. Of course, the “old” Torah actually states (Vayikra 19:18), “Love your neighbor as yourself,”
without any reference to hating your enemy.
2
See the assertion of the Rambam cited below.
Torah as said having commanded “[the value of an] eye in
place of an eye”.

If the law is so unequivocal, why is the Torah’s wording so

equivocal? Why doesn’t the Torah simply state that if you
knock out an eye, you are required to pay the victim the
value of the eye? This is not an unheard of formulation; there
are numerous examples of monetary compensation in the
Torah. In short, in this verse we are confronted with two
distinct problems: What does this phrase mean? And why
was it written in this particular way, leaving room for
misunderstanding?

Comparing the emerging legal codex of our Parsha with

other authoritative codes of law current in the ancient Near
East, our problem only worsens. The best known of these is
the Code of Hammurabi which mandated lex talionis, literally
prescribing punitive removal of an eye.3

In contrast, Jewish law sees the body as being owned by

God; the individual is merely a caretaker. This idea is
concisely and clearly expressed in a stunning statement by
Rav Sh’neor Zalman of Liadi, in his Shulchan Oruch:

‫דיני נזקי גוף ונפש‬- ‫שולחן ערוך הרב‬

‫ אסור להכות את חבירו אפילו הוא נותן לו רשות להכותו כי אין לאדם רשות על גופו‬- ‫ד‬
‫כלל להכותו ולא לביישו ולא לצערו בשום צער (ב) אפילו במניעת איזה מאכל או משתה‬
It is forbidden to strike one’s fellow, even if he gives
permission to strike him, for a person does not own his
or her body at all [to allow] striking or embarrassment
or to cause pain of any kind, even through denying a
particular food or drink.

Clearly, if the body is owned by God and one is forbidden to

cause pain of any kind – physical or emotional - the very
thought that the Torah would mandate removing an eye as

3
See Hammurabi's Code of Laws, Translated by L. W. King: 196. If a man put out the eye of another man,
his eye shall be put out. 197. If he break another man's bone, his bone shall be broken. 198. If he put out the
eye of a freed man, or break the bone of a freed man, he shall pay one gold mina. 199. If he put out the eye
of a man's slave, or break the bone of a man's slave, he shall pay one-half of its value.
punishment is implausible. Nonetheless, when damage is
incurred, when an individual suffers physical harm at the
hands of another, the damage to the victim’s person or
livelihood carries a price.

The Ibn Ezra,4 citing Rav Saadya Gaon, rejects the principle
of lex talionis on technical grounds: If one person injures
another, impairing but not obliterating their vision, how can
a court implement a fair punishment? Would it be reasonable
to expect a court of law to precisely mete out punishment,
impairing the offender’s vision to the precise degree as the
damage caused to the victim? Rav Saadya points out that
such an interpretation of the Torah is impractical, even
impossible, and must therefore be an incorrect
understanding of the text. Although his objection is technical
and not based on moral concerns or social sensitivities, but
solely on the inexact result of this type of punishment in
cases of partial blindness, Rav Saadya concludes that the
Torah legislated against this behavior in all cases, even when
the victim completely lost vision in the damaged eye.5 The
weakness of the argument is that in cases of absolute
blindness, which ostensibly is the case referred to by the
straightforward reading of the Torah text, exact retribution
could be measured, so why would it then be rejected? 6

4
See Ibn Ezra Shmot 21:24
‫אבן עזרא שמות (הפירוש הארוך) פרק כא פסוק כד‬
‫ איך יתכן שיוכה‬,‫ וסרה שלישית אור עיניו‬,‫ כי אם אדם הכה עין חבירו‬.‫ לא נוכל לפרש זה הפסוק כמשמעו‬,‫)כד( עין אמר רב סעדיה‬
‫ אם לא‬,‫ … והכלל לא נוכל לפרש על דרך מצות התורה פירוש שלם‬.‫ אולי יחשיך אור עינו כלו‬.‫מכה כזאת בלי תוספת ומגרעת‬
‫ והנה יהיה פי' עין תחת עין‬.‫ אין הפרש ביניהם‬,‫ כן קבלנו תורה שבעל פה‬.‫ כי כאשר קבלנו התורה מן האבות‬.‫נסמוך על דברי חז"ל‬
.‫ אם לא יתן כפרו‬,‫ראוי להיותו עינו תחת עינו‬
5
See Rav Yehuda Halevi Kuzari section 3 subsection 46. There was a certain degree of crosspollination of
ideas between Rav Avraham Ibn Ezra and Rav Yehuda Halevi. There was a relationship between the Kuzari
and Ibn Ezra, the precise nature of this relationship is unknown, some theorize that they were blood
relatives, or in-laws.
‫ ס‬- ‫ מאמר שלישי אות לא‬- ‫ספר הכוזרי‬
:‫ האם לא נאמר אצלנו דין ענשים מפרש בתורה עין תחת עין שן תחת שן כאשר יתן מום באדם כן ינתן בו‬:‫)מו( אמר הכוזרי‬
‫ האם לא נאמר בסמוך לזה ומכה נפש בהמה ישלמנה נפש תחת נפש האין זה תשלום כפר אין הכתוב אומר אדם‬:‫)מז( אמר החבר‬
‫שהרג סוסך הרג סוסו כי מה בצע בהרגך את סוסו וכן אדם שקטע ידך קח כפר ידך כי מה בצע בכרתך את ידו אף כי דינים שיש‬
‫בהם משום סתירה לשכל הישר פצע תחת פצע חבורה תחת חבורה וכי איך נוכל לשער זאת יתכן כי האחד מהם ימות מפצעו זה‬
‫והשני לא ימות מפצע דומה לזה ואיך נדאג לדבר כי יהיה הפצע אשר יושם בו דומה בדיוק לפצע אשר שם בחברו כיצד נעור עינו‬
‫של אדם אשר אין לו כי אם עין אחת ככפר לעוור עינו של אדם אשר לו שתי עינים וישאר זה עור בשתי עיניו שעה שהאחר יהיה‬
‫עור רק בעינו האחת והרי התורה אמרה כאשר יתן מום באדם כן ינתן בו אך למה לדבר אתך על הפרטים האלה אחרי אשר הקדמתי‬
:‫לך עד כמה רב הצרך במסרת וכמה נאמנים מקבליה ומה רבה גדלתם והשתדלותם בשמירתה‬
Thus far, we have addressed the verse in question from
several distinct approaches: First, we have examined
linguistic considerations: Do the words of the verse, tachat
‘ayin, actually mean “an eye for an eye”? Second, we have
posed the moral dilemma inherent in this verse, based on
the principle that the human body is the sole property of
God, and at no time or in any way is man allowed to do it
physical harm. Finally, technical considerations come into
the equation, namely the difficulty in implementing fair
punishment across the board and in a variety of cases. Yet
there remains an additional, more practical consideration:
Aside from the barbaric and grotesque elements of removing
a body part of the perpetrator, other than perhaps the most
base motivation of revenge, how would the punishment
indicated by a literal reading of the verse, “an eye for an
eye,” help the victim?7

The Rambam, in his halakhic magnum opus Yad Hachazaka,

puts forth three arguments as to why the verse could not
possibly have been intended to be taken literally.8 His first
argument is based on tradition: The interpretation of this
verse has always been taught from the authoritative Oral
Tradition, namely that one pays money for these types of
damages. His third argument follows along this same line; he
reiterates that this interpretation has its origin at Mount Sinai
and was taught and explained to Moshe, and in turn by
Moshe, in this manner.

6
See above, the response of the Kuzari, as well as the opinion of Rav Ashi, below, for a possible resolution
to this problem: Even in cases of total loss of vision, the “value” of the eye of the victim and that of the
perpetrator is not necessarily equal.
7
See Sanhedrin 58 where Rav Huna had the arm of a particular pugilist amputated, though from the context
it does not see as much punishment as self defense, for the man would not stop his attacks upon others: “R.
Huna had the hand cut off [of one who was accustomed to strike other people].”
8
See Rambam Yad Hachazaka Laws of Khovel U’Mazik, Chapter One, Laws 2,5,6.
‫רמב"ם הלכות חובל ומזיק פרק א‬
‫ שאם קטע יד חבירו או רגלו רואין אותו כאלו הוא עבד נמכר בשוק כמה היה יפה וכמה הוא יפה עתה ומשלם‬,‫ נזק כיצד‬-‫הלכה ב‬
.‫ מפי השמועה למדו שזה שנאמר תחת לשלם ממון הוא‬,'‫ ויקרא כד' כ') 'עין תחת עין‬,‫ שנ' (שמות כ"א כ"ד‬,‫הפחת שהפחית מדמיו‬
‫ שנאמר (משפטים כ"א כ"ה) 'חבורה תחת חבורה' ובפירוש‬,‫ ומנין שזה שנאמר באיברים עין תחת עין וכו' תשלומין הוא‬-‫הלכה ה‬
‫ והוא הדין‬,‫' הא למדת שתחת שנאמר בחבורה תשלומין‬,‫נאמר 'וכי יכה איש את רעהו באבן או באגרוף וגו' רק שבתו יתן ורפא ירפא‬
.‫לתחת הנאמר בעין ובשאר איברים‬
‫ אע"פ שדברים אלו נראים מענין תורה שבכתב כולן מפורשין הן מפי משה מהר סיני וכולן הלכה למעשה הן בידינו וכזה‬-‫הלכה ו‬
.‫ראו אבותינו דנין בבית דינו של יהושע ובבית דינו של שמואל הרמתי ובכל בית דין ובית דין שעמדו מימות משה ועד עכשיו‬
The Rambam’s second argument is more helpful to our
current discussion, for instead of simply focusing on the
words in question, The Rambam considers the broader
context of Parshat Mishpatim, bringing to bear verses in an
earlier section of the Torah that deal with bodily damages:
Our verse, as the Rambam points out, is composed of
several parts, including instructions for other cases of
physical damage: “An eye tachat an eye, a tooth tachat a
tooth, a hand tachat a hand, a leg tachat a leg” –in short, a
list of physical wounds. What we might have forgotten, if not
for the Rambam’s comment, is that the Torah dealt with
wounds a few verses earlier:

‫שמות פרק כא‬

‫(יח) וְכִי יְרִיבֻן אֲנָשִים וְהִכָה אִיש אֶת רֵעֵהו בְאֶבֶן או בְאֶגְרֹף וְלֹא יָמות וְנָפַל‬
‫(יט) אִם יָקום וְהִתְהַלֵךְ בַחוץ עַל מִשְעַנְתו וְנִקָה הַמַכֶה רַק שִבְתו יִתֵן‬:‫לְמִשְכָב‬
‫ ס‬:‫וְרַפֹא יְרַפֵא‬
If men struggle and one man hit his friend with a rock
or a fist, and (the victim) does not die, rather he is
incapacitated. If he gets up (lives) and walks on his
own, the one who struck will be exonerated (of a capital
charge); he will pay only damages of lost wages and
medical expenses.

Here we clearly see that the “price” of damaging one’s

friend is financial, not corporal. The word “tachat” used in
our verse must necessarily be understood within the context
of this adjacent verse, and the idea of financial restitution
begins to seem more than interpretation, more than
apologetics. The contextual argument is quite compelling,
almost unavoidable.

The experienced reader, though, is left somewhat unsettled.

This passage from the Yad Hachazaka gnaws at us because it
is uncharacteristic. The Rambam is wont to state his opinion
without citing any source, without offering supporting
arguments. Why did he feel it necessary in this case to put
forth three distinct arguments? Occasionally, adding
multiple arguments weakens ones’ position; why did the
Rambam feel that in this case, rather than simply stating the
law as is his usual style, he needed to prove the law, and
with multiple proofs?

A Talmudic passage, with which the Rambam was most

certainly familiar, may be the key to this uncharacteristic
style. In his third point, the Rambam states that the non-
literal interpretation of this verse has been universal in the
practice of Jewish law, and every Jewish court from the time
of Moshe has been unanimous in discharging obligations for
physical damage through financial restitution. While he
stated that this has been the opinion followed in practice, he
did not state that this opinion has always enjoyed an
absolute monopoly in halakhic thought. A passage in the
Gemara may indicate that there may have been a dissenting
opinion:

‫א‬/‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת בבא קמא דף פד‬

‫תניא ר"א אומר עין תחת עין ממש ממש סלקא דעתך רבי אליעזר לית ליה ככל הני‬
:‫תנאי … אלא אמר רב אשי לומר שאין שמין אותו בניזק אלא במזיק‬
It was taught: R. Eliezer said: ‘Eye for eye’ should be
understood literally. Literally, you say? Could R. Eliezer
be against all those Tannaim [enumerated] above…? R.
Ashi therefore said: It means to say that the valuation
will be made not of [the eye of] the injured person but
of [that of] the offender. (Talmud Bavli Baba Kamma
84a)

The Talmud records the dissenting opinion of Rabbi Eliezer,

who contends that ‘an eye tachat an eye” is to be
understood literally – but not in the manner we might
expect. The Talmud qualifies and explains his opinion: The
perpetrator indeed pays the value of an eye. The question is,
the value of whose eye? The value of the victim’s eye, or the
value of his own eye? Rabbi Eliezer seems to be telling us
that this man “deserves” to lose his eye, but the Torah
allows him, even requires him, to pay ransom for his own
eye. He is not paying the replacement value of the victim’s
lost eye; he is paying a ransom, the value of his own eye
which should, by all rights, be forfeited.9

The uncharacteristic style of our passage in the Rambam’s

Yad Hachazaka, then, impart a certain hesitation which we
may reconcile with the Rambam’s appreciation of this
dissenting Talmudic opinion. We may gain further insight if
we examine the Rambam’s philosophical magnum opus,
“The Guide for the Perplexed”. Here, the Rambam explains
the concept of punishment in philosophical terms. The one
overarching principle in the Torah’s philosophy of
punishment is that whatever a person does, he deserves to
be punished in an identical way. This should be precise;
crime creates punishment.

‫ חלק ג פרק מא‬- ‫ספר מורה נבוכים‬

‫ אם הזיק בגוף ינזק‬,‫ שיעשה בו כמו שעשה בשוה‬- ‫שם עונש כל חוטא לזולתו בכלל‬
.‫ ואם הזיק בממון ינזק בממונו‬,‫בגופו‬
The punishment of one who sins against his neighbor
consists in the general rule that there shall be done
unto him exactly as he has done: if he injured anyone
physically, he must suffer physically; if he damaged the
property of his neighbor, he shall be punished by
damage to his own property.

There are spiritual rules of the universe; there is an equal

and opposite effect to a person’s actions. There is a Divine
quid pro quo. A spiritually sophisticated individual should
expect Divine retribution for any and all indiscretions. One of
the most basic tenets of Judaism is reward and punishment,
and such should be man’s expectations. We do not do good

9
A similar argument is found in Talmud Bavli Baba Kamma 40a : Since it was the life of the owner of a
beast that has killed someone that should be redeemed, the payment must surely correspond to the value of
the owner’s life, and noot the value of the beast’s victim:
‫א‬/‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת בבא קמא דף מ‬
‫דתניא ונתן פדיון נפשו דמי ניזק ר' ישמעאל בנו של רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה אומר דמי מזיק מאי לאו בהא קמיפלגי דרבנן סברי כופרא‬
‫ממונא הוא ור' ישמעאל בנו של רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה סבר כופרא כפרה‬
For it was taught: [The words] ‘Then he shall give for the ransom of his life’ [indicate] the value [of the
life] of the person killed. But R. Ishmael the son of R. Johanan b. Beroka interprets it to refer to the value
[of the life] of the defendant. Now, is this not the point at issue between them, that the Rabbis consider
kofer (ransom) to constitute a civil liability whereas R. Ishmael the son of R. Johanan b. Beroka holds kofer
to be of the nature of propitiation?”
for the sake of the reward that will follow, rather we believe
that there is reward and punishment for all our actions. To
elucidate this principle, the Rambam cites these very verses
from our Parsha. He then continues:

‫ חלק ג פרק מא‬- ‫ספר מורה נבוכים‬

‫ אין מקילים לו כלל‬,‫ לחוזק חטאתו‬,‫ אמנם ההורג לבד‬.‫ויש לבעל הממון למחול ולהקל‬
‫ ומפני‬."‫ ולארץ לא יכופר לדם אשר שופך בה כי אם בדם שופכו‬,‫ולא ילקח ממנו כופר‬
"‫ "הניחו הורגי‬,‫ ויאמר‬,‫ והוא מדבר ושכלו טוב‬,‫זה אילו חיה הנהרג שעה אחת או ימים‬
‫ בהשוות הקטן לגדול‬,‫ אבל נפש בנפש בהכרח‬,‫ אין שומעים לו‬- "‫הנה מחלתי וסלחתי לו‬
‫ ומי שחיסר‬.‫ שאין בכל חטאות האדם יותר גדול מזה‬- ‫והעבד לבן חורין והחכם לסכל‬
‫ [ולא תטריד רעיונך בהיותנו‬."‫ כן ינתן בו‬,‫איבר יחוסר איבר; "כאשר יתן מום באדם‬
‫ ועם‬.‫ ולא סיבת דברי התלמוד‬,‫ כי הכונה עתה לתת סיבת הפסוקים‬,‫עונשים הנה בממון‬
‫ והמכות אשר אי אפשר‬.]‫ ישמע פנים בפנים‬,‫כל זה יש לי במה שאמר בו התלמוד דעת‬
:"‫ "רק שבתו יתן ורפוא ירפא‬,‫ דינם בתשלומים‬- ‫לעשות כיוצא בם בשוה‬
But the person whose property has been damaged
should be ready to resign his claim totally or partly.
Only to the murderer we must not be lenient because of
the greatness of his crime; and no ransom must be
accepted of him. "And the land cannot be cleansed of
the blood that is shed therein but by the blood of him
that shed it" (Num. xxxi. 33). Hence even if the
murdered person continued to live after the attack for
an hour or for days, was able to speak and possessed
complete consciousness, and if he himself said, "Pardon
my murderer, I have pardoned and forgiven him," he
must not be obeyed. We must take life for life, and
estimate equally the life of a child and that of a grown-
up person, of a slave and of a freeman, of a wise man
and of a fool. For there is no greater sin than this. And
he who mutilated a limb of his neighbor, must himself
lose a limb. "As he has caused a blemish in a man, so
shall it be done to him again" (Lev. xxiv. 20). You must
not raise an objection from our practice of imposing a
fine in such cases. For we have proposed to ourselves
to give here the reason for the precepts mentioned in
the Torah, and not for that which is stated in the
Talmud. I have, however, an explanation for the
interpretation given in the Talmud, but it will be
communicated vivâ voce (in person, face to face).
Injuries that cannot be reproduced exactly in another
 person, are compensated for by payment; "he will pay
only damages of lost wages and medical expenses."
(Shmot 21, 19). (Guide for the Perplexed, Book 3
Chapter 41)

Here we have watershed of Jewish philosophy: The Rambam

makes a remarkable distinction between what is written in
the Torah versus the tradition found in the Talmud; even
when contradictory, both are true. The Rambam makes no
attempt to reconcile the Talmudic tradition with the Biblical
text, explaining that the functions of each are different. In
the Guide to the Perplexed, the Rambam explains Jewish
philosophy, based on the text of the Torah. On the other
hand, when discussing the Law, and the implementation of
legal principles, the Rambam forcibly states that our
authoritative source for financial restitution is the orally
transmitted tradition recorded in the Talmud and universally
upheld in Jewish practice. Only when this distinction is made
by the Rambam are we able to understand why the language
of these Torah verses is less than straightforward, non-legal.
The words of the Torah serve a higher purpose than legal
formulation. They reflect a philosophical cornerstone of
Judaism; while other factors cause the legal implementation
to take a slightly different course, the importance of the
philosophical statement contained in this verse is preserved
by the language used to express it. The words as they
appear in the Torah have a value independent of their
practical interpretation.10 In this instance they teach the
philosophy of the law even when it is not literally
implemented.

10
A similar idea is found in the commentary of the Recanati on Shmot 21:24; however, this source replaces
what the Rambam would call a philosophical understanding, with what the Recanati calls a mystical
understanding.
‫ריקאנטי שמות פרק כא פסוק כד‬
‫ גם‬,‫ כבר ידעת כי זה הפסוק אמרו רבותינו ז"ל ]בבא קמא פ"ג ע"ב[ שאינו כפשוטו אלא לממון‬.[‫)כד( עין תחת עין וגו' ]שם כ"ד‬
‫ י"ב[ וקצותה את‬,‫ וכן ]דברים כ"ה‬,‫ הכוונה בו לממון דבר הניתן מיד ליד‬,‫ כ'[ כאשר יתן מום באדם כן ינתן בו‬,‫פסוק ]ויקרא כ"ד‬
‫ והתשובה‬,‫ ואולי תשאל אחרי שאין הכוונה בו ככתבו למה נכתב כך לתת מקום למינים לרדות‬.‫ וכן ]להלן כ"ט[ בעליו יומת‬,‫כפה‬
‫ אמנם בא לשון הפסוק‬.‫ ופירוש המצוה כפי פשוטה ניתן בתורה שבעל פה ואחריה נלך‬,‫היא מה שאמרו רז"ל שבעים פנים לתורה‬
‫ האמת הוא כפי הקבלה‬,‫ דוגמא לדבר באומרו עין תחת עין‬,‫בענין אחר שיובנו בו הפנים האחרים שלא היו מובנים בלתי הלשון ההוא‬
,‫ אמנם נכתב כך לסוד גדול מאוד‬,‫]ב"ק פ"ג ע"ב[ כי החובל בחבירו חייב בחמשה דברים‬
We might say that while the Rambam does not concur with
the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, he agrees with a certain
sentiment expressed by that earlier authority: A person who
knocks out someone else’s eye deserves to lose his own eye.
Nonetheless, no Jewish court, today or at any time in the
past, has the authority to rule in this manner, for this is not
the law. Jewish courts mete out financial punishments.
According to Rabbi Eliezer’s line of reasoning, a vestige of
the underlying philosophical statement remains when the
perpetrator is forced to pay a sum in lieu of his own eye, an
eye that he should lose. And while the Rambam’s
formulation, quoted above, indicates that the sum paid is the
value of the victim’s eye (and not the perpetrator’s eye, as
per Rabbi Eliezer), the Rambam also indicates that the victim
is asked to compromise, to accept payment in lieu of what
should morally be his – his own eye, restored.

The implication of all this is that we are faced with two levels
of truth. There is a level of truth that exists and is applied in
the Heavenly Court, and this truth is absolute, non-
negotiable and unbending. But this is not the way that God
asks us to bring His truth to Earth. We are instructed to
operate on a different level, a kinder, less exact level, which
replaces “fairness” and absolute justice with practicality.
Although Divine Justice is not always served, this is an
unavoidable byproduct of our very nature, and thus, too, an
aspect of God’s Will.

On the other hand, the moral message can not be lost upon
us: The guilty party deserves punishment. This insight can
help us with a question which is answered with great
difficulty by various commentators: If “An eye for an eye”
means money, why does the Torah not simply write “pay the
value of an eye”? Our answer is now clear: The perpetrator
should see that he deserves precise and parallel punishment
for each and every indiscretion. Moreover, disengagement of
the moral element from the financial restitution should
dissuade the perpetrator from thinking that morally he has
made full amends by paying the fine levied by the court. Had
the Torah not stated the moral culpability of these actions,
we would likely find rampant perversions of the spirit of the
law: for example, a wealthy individual might do a cold
mathematical equation and knock out one or two eyes of his
enemies, relying on the financial restitution he will pay to
effect moral healing. Indeed, the Talmud is familiar with this
sort of attitude:

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת בבא קמא דף לז עמוד א‬

‫ זיל הב ליה פלגא דזוזא; הוה‬:‫ א"ל‬,‫ אתא לקמיה דרב הונא‬,‫חנן בישא תקע ליה לההוא גברא‬
‫ תקע ליה אחרינא‬,‫ לא הוה משתקיל ליה‬,‫ בעי למיתבה ליה מיניה פלגא דזוזא‬,‫ליה זוזא מכא‬
.‫ויהביה נהליה‬
The scoundrel Hanan, having boxed another man's ear,
was brought before R. Huna, who ordered him to go and
pay the plaintiff half a zuz. As [Hanan] had a battered
zuz he desired to pay the plaintiff the half zuz [which
was due] out of it. But as it could not be exchanged, he
slapped him again and gave him [the whole zuz].
(Talmud Bavli Baba Kamma 37a)

Hanan’s cavalier attitude earned him the moniker

“scoundrel”:11 He felt that by paying for a crime he was
exonerated, thus he could premeditatedly strike someone,
knowing that the monetary “solution” was within his reach,
even at his convenience. This was precisely what the Torah
wished to avoid. This is the type of moral equivalence
created by a price–tag that comes with no moral debt
attached. The Rambam’s formulation shows us that this is
not Judaism’s view: While lenience is the reigning principle of
the Jewish court system, there is another system of justice
which operates on the moral level, and we are enjoined by
the words of the verses in Parshat Mishpatim never to forget
the standards of Divine truth that we should use as our
moral compass.

The cynic12 can look at the discrepancy between the written

law and the oral law and claim that the written Torah is
11
Most closely translated as “scoundrel” or “wicked”. For more on Hanan, see Talmud Bavli Baba Kamma
115a, there the Gemara tells that he may have been a scoundrel – but he wasn’t a thief: “But was Hanan the
Wicked not notorious, …? He was only notorious for wickedness, but for theft he was not notorious at all.”
‫‪barbaric, a remnant of the Dark Ages, while the Rabbis were‬‬
‫‪involved in the evolution of a somewhat more sensitive and‬‬
‫‪socially mature Judaism. Our most basic response to the‬‬
‫‪cynic is that he has misread the text: The Torah never says‬‬
‫‪to put out the perpetrator’s eye. The more sophisticated‬‬
‫‪response is that the Written Torah, the Word of God,‬‬
‫‪expresses the Divine perspective, represents a more perfect‬‬
‫‪approach to human existence - an approach of pure values, a‬‬
‫‪philosophy of morality. The Written Torah is not a guide to‬‬
‫‪adjudication; it is a guide to ethics, values, morals and‬‬
‫‪ideals.13 The Oral Law tells how to bring these values into our‬‬
‫‪world, how to adapt Divine considerations to human needs,‬‬
‫‪and how to live by the principles of Divine truth.14‬‬

‫‪While at times we feel a tension between a reading of the‬‬

‫‪text of the Torah and the Rabbinic interpretation, there is a‬‬
‫‪12‬‬
‫‪See Baley Tosfot21:23 who answers the cynics by quoting the Rambam, Also see Yam Shel Shlomo Bava‬‬
‫‪Kamma 8:1.‬‬
‫פירוש בעלי התוספות על שמות פרק כא פסוק כג‬
‫עין תחת עין‪ .‬תשובה למינים האומרים עין עין ממש‪ .‬שהרי כתיב לעיל והכה את רעהו באבן או באגרוף‪ .‬כלומר כל מה‬
‫שאירע ע"י ההכאה ובלבד שלא ימות‪ .‬שבתו יתן ורפא ירפא‪ .‬ואם עין תחת עין ממש‪ .‬כמו כן פצע תחת פצע ממש אם כן‬
‫למה נותן שבת ורפוי‪ .‬והלא כאשר עשה כן יעשה לו‪ .‬אלא ש"מ דר"ל דמי עין‪ .‬מיימו"ן‪:‬‬
‫‪13‬‬
‫‪Regarding two levels of judgment see Shla HaKadosh, Shnie Luchot Habrit Mishpatim, Torah Ohr.‬‬
‫ספר השל"ה הקדוש ‪ -‬ספר שמות ‪ -‬פרשת משפטים תורה אור‬
‫והמשפטים הם קיום כולם‪ .‬ואמרו רבותינו ז"ל (שמו"ר ל‪ ,‬ג)‪ ,‬התורה תחילתה דינין וסופה דינין‪ ,‬תחילתה דינין שם שם לו‬
‫חק ומשפט‪ ,‬וסופה דינין ואלה המשפטים‪ .‬דע כי יש שני מיני דין‪ ,‬יש דין שהוא מדת הדין גמור‪ ,‬ויש דינים שהם משותפים‬
‫במדת הרחמים‪ .‬וכמו שאמרו רבותינו ז"ל (ב"ר יב‪ ,‬טו)‪ ,‬בתחלה עלה במחשבה לברוא העולם במדת הדין‪ ,‬ראה וכו' שיתף‬
‫מדת הרחמים עם מדת הדין‪ .‬וכיצירתו של אדם כך תורתו‪ ,‬כלומר נידון בבית דין שלמטה‪ ,‬לפעמים נדון במדת הדין הגמור‪,‬‬
‫כגון ארבע מיתות בית דין‪ ,‬ויש משותף כמו וגם בעליו יומת פירש"י בידי שמים‪ ,‬ומשותף ברחמים אם כופר יושת עליו וגו'‬
‫שאז נפטר מהמיתה‪ .‬וכמו עין תחת עין‪ ,‬שפירשו רבותינו ז"ל (ב"ק פד‪ ,‬ב) שרצה לומר דמי עינו‪ .‬וכתבו התורה בלשון עין‬
‫תחת עין‪ ,‬להורות שהיה ראוי ליתן עין ממש‪ ,‬אלא שמצד מדת הרחמים באה הקבלה ליפטר בדמי עין‪ .‬וכן מצינו בכלל‬
‫הדינים שבין אדם לחבירו‪ ,‬שמצוה בדיינים להתחיל בפשרה‪ ,‬ולא לירד לעומק הדין‪ .‬והכל כדרך שהקב"ה דן את העולם‪,‬‬
‫לפעמים מדקדק כחוט השערה‪ ,‬כמו שאמרו רבותינו ז"ל (יבמות קכד‪ ,‬ב) וסביביו נסערה מאוד‪ ,‬ולפעמים משתף רחמים‬
‫בדין‪ ,‬כי לולי זה לא היה העולם מתקיים‪ .‬וכן ראוי להיות בבית דין שלמטה ‪ ,‬כי על כן גם הם נקראים אלהים‪ ,‬כמו שאמרו‬
‫רבותינו ז"ל אין אלהים בכל מקום אלא סמוכים‪:‬‬
‫ועל זה מתבאר הפסוק ואלה המשפטים‪ ,‬וכתב רש"י ואלה מוסיף על הראשונים‪ ,‬מה הראשונים מסיני אף אלו מסיני‪ ,‬הלא‬
‫כל דקדוקיה ופרטיה מסיני‪ .‬ויש מפרשים שנתנו מסיני בקולות וברקים כמו י' דברות‪ .‬אבל יש רמז בכאן‪ ,‬רומז למה‬
‫שכתבתי בפרשת בראשית‪ ,‬מתחלה עלה במחשבה לברוא העולם במדת הדין‪ ,‬ראה שאין העולם מתקיים שיתף כו'‪ .‬שחס‬
‫ושלום ראשית המחשבה לא נתבטלה‪ ,‬רק נתקיימה בבני עלייה‪ ,‬שהם הראשונים אשר נשמתם למעלה במקור הנשמות‪,‬‬
‫ועמהם מדקדק הקב"ה כחוט השערה ומדקדק בדין המדוקדק כו'‪ ,‬עיין שם באורך מה שכתבתי‪ .‬ושם בארתי כל הדן דין‬
‫אמת לאמתו נעשה שותף להקב"ה במעשה בראשית עיין שם‪ .‬ועל הראשונים אלו שהם עולים בסוד המחשבה ונדונים בשם‬
‫אלהים שהוא מדת הדין‪ ,‬ובהם נתקיים בראשית‪ ,‬אותם ראשית הם נדונים באלהים כו'‪.‬‬
‫‪14‬‬
‫‪See Yismach Moshe Dvarim 90a‬‬
‫ספר ישמח משה ‪ -‬פרשת דברים דף צ‪/‬א‬
‫והנה מה שנכתב בתורה הוא מן הדין‪ ,‬דכל התורה הוא מפי הגבורה נאמר‪ .‬וידוע דהתורה שבכתב הוא דין‪ ,‬על כן אין ללמוד‬
‫בלילה‪ .‬ושבעל פה הוא רחמים‪ ,‬וכמו שביארתי בסוף פרשת אמור ד"ה בילקוט (סוף איוב [ילקו"ש איוב רמז תתקכ"ז])‪ ,‬את‬
‫מוציא כשבא יסורין על איוב כו' אמר לו הקב"ה כו'‪ .‬ומזה תבין (שמות כא כד) עין תחת עין‪ ,‬ממון (כתובות ל"ב ע"ב)‪ .‬והנה‬
‫פירשתי להפשוטים עין‪ ,‬ר"ל מי שהכה עין‪ ,‬יענש במה שהוא תחת עין‪ ,‬ר"ל במקום עין דהיינו דמי עינו‪ .‬וידוע שאמרו דורשי‬
‫רשימות כי תחת עין‪ ,‬הוא כסף‪ .‬מכל מקום קשה למה לא כתבה התורה בפירוש‪ .‬ולפי מ"ש אתי שפיר‪ ,‬כי שורת הדין הוא‬
‫עין ממש‪ ,‬רק בעל פה מיקל מצד הרחמים‪ ,‬על כן לא נכתב בפירוש והבן‪,‬‬
possibility that we lack the skills and understanding to
properly understand the text. The Vilna Gaon explained that
the tension between the Written and Oral Torah is merely a
product of our superficial efforts to read and understand the
text; deep understanding brings harmony. The Written Torah
and Oral Torah are two parts of a whole; both express Divine
teachings. If at times tension seems to exist, it is caused by
our limited understanding of the mechanisms of the spiritual
and physical universe. A case in point is the very verse we
have been examining. The Gaon illustrates that the written
text, which reads, literally, “An eye under (or, below) an
eye,” and the oral tradition which mandates financial
compensation, are really saying the same thing. The key to
his understanding is the usage of the word tachat – under.
The Hebrew word for eye is ayin, which is spelled ‫ – עין‬ayin,
yud, nun. To unravel this mystery, the Vilna Gaon follows the
words of the Torah with unparalleled precision: He literally
looks “below” ayin, noting that the letters subsequent to
each of the letters of the word ‘ayin spell ‫( כסף‬kesef) –
money! For an eye you pay tachat ayin – under an eye. The
letter under an ayin is peh, the letter under yud is kaf, the
letter under nun is samech. The written words of Torah
include all the information necessary to understand the oral
tradition and legal application.15

Although most of us are not blessed with the skills of the

Vilna Gaon, the day will come when all the tensions will be
resolved and we will be able to clearly grasp the unity of the
Torah as the Word of God. God and His compassion and
Judgment will be manifest. In the words of the prophet
Yesha’ayahu, on that day we will see God “ayin b’ayin” - eye
to eye:

15
Kol Eliyahu Shmot 21:23
‫ספר קול אליהו על שמות פרק כא פסוק כג‬
‫ ויש לומר דבפסוק מרומז שאין עין ממש אלא‬,).‫ קבלו חז"ל דהוא ממון (ב"ק פג‬,)‫ כג‬.‫בפסוק עין תחת עין וגו' (שמות כא‬
,'‫ תחת העין הוא פ‬,‫ אלא לרמז כי האותיות שתחת העי"ן בהא"ב הוא כס"ף‬,‫ממון כי הול"ל עין בעד עין מהו הלשון תחת‬
‫ (שער בת רבים‬.‫ וזהו עין אם לקח עין יתן תחת עין והוא כסף‬,‫ ועולה אותיות כסף‬,'‫ ותחת הנו"ן הוא ס‬,'‫ותחת היו"ד הוא כ‬
:)‫פ' אמור‬
1. Awake, awake; put on your strength, O Zion; put on
your beautiful garments, O Jerusalem, the holy city… 3.
For thus says the Lord, ‘You have sold yourselves for
nothing; and you shall be redeemed without money.’ …
7. How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him
who brings the news, who announces peace; who
brings good news, who announces salvation; who says
to Zion, Your God reigns! 8. The voice of your watchmen
is heard; together shall they sing; for they shall see eye
to eye, when God returns to Zion. (Isaiah 52:1-3,7,8)