G.R. No.

166470

August 7, 2009

Victoria to appear in court on her behalf when she was in fact unknowingly authorizing her half-sister to sell the said property to the Manila Electric Company for P18,206,400.7 Thereafter, Cecilio asked Lulu to authorize him to lease her 45-hectare property in Montalban, Rizal to Oxford Concrete Aggregates for P58,500 per month so that she could have a car and driver at her disposal. In September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that petitioners had been dissipating her estate. She confided to Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of petitioners Montalban, Rizal home and was receiving a measly daily allowance of P400 for her food and medication. Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt and smelled of urine. She later found out that Lulu was occupying a cramped room lit by a single fluorescent lamp without running water. Since she had not been given a proper toilet, Lulu urinated and defecated in the garden. Due to Lulu's poor hygiene, respondent brought her to several physicians for medical examination. Lulu was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis, rheumatism and diabetes from which she was suffering several complications.8 Thereafter, the San Juan family demanded an inventory and accounting of Lulus estate from petitioners.9However, the demand was ignored. On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for guardianship10 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and managing her estate because she was of weak mind. Subsequently, petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the same. Natividad denied that Marilou Subdivision belonged to Lulu. Since she and her late husband were the registered owners of the said property, it was allegedly part of their conjugal partnership. Cecilio, Teresa and Ma. Victoria, for their part, claimed that the issue of Lulus competency had been settled in 1968 (upon her emancipation) when the court ordered her legal guardian and maternal uncle, Ciriaco San Juan, to deliver the properties for her to manage. They likewise asserted that Lulu was literate and, for that reason, aware of the consequences of executing an SPA. Furthermore, whether or not Cecilio and Ma. Victoria acted within the scope of their respective authorities could not be determined in a guardianship proceeding, such matter being the proper subject of an ordinary civil action.
1

CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-1 and NATIVIDAD CRUZ-HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, vs. JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 169217 CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-SAGUN and TERESA C. HERNANDEZ-VILLA ABRILLE, Petitioners, vs. JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS,2 Respondent.

DECISION CORONA, J.: Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due to complications during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan. On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three children, petitioners Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille. Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan family (conservatively estimated at P50 million in 1997). Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. She was then 10 years old and studying at La Consolacion College. However, due to her "violent personality," Lulu stopped schooling when she reached Grade 5. In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her estate.3 Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her elementary education, Felix continued to exercise actual administration of Lulus properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993, petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's properties. During the period of their informal administration (from 1968 until 1993), Felix and petitioners undertook various "projects" involving Lulus real properties. In 1974, Felix allegedly purchased one of Lulus properties for an undisclosed amount to develop the Marilou Subdivision.4 In 1995, Ma. Victoria informed Lulu that her 11-hectare Montalban, Rizal property5 was under litigation. Thus, Lulu signed a special power of attorney6 (SPA) believing that she was authorizing Ma.

Petitioners also admitted that the property developed into the Marilou Subdivision was among those parcels of land Lulu inherited from the San Juan family. However, because the "sale" between Felix and Lulu had taken place in 1974, questions regarding its legality were already barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, its validity could no longer be impugned, or so they claimed. During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to testify on her genealogy and experiences with the San Juan and Hernandez families. Lulu identified and described her parents, stepmother, half-siblings and maternal relatives. She claimed inheriting tracts of land from the San Juan family. However, these properties were dissipated by the Hernandez family as they lived a "luxurious" lifestyle. When asked to explain this allegation, Lulu said that her stepmother and half-siblings rode in cars while she was made to ride a tricycle. Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulus examinations which revealed the alarming state of her health.11 Not only was Lulu severely afflicted with diabetes mellitus and suffering from its complications,12 she also had an existing artheroselorotic cardiovascular disease (which was aggravated by her obesity). Furthermore, they unanimously opined that in view of Lulus intelligence level (which was below average) and fragile mental state, she would not be able to care for herself and self-administer her medications. In a decision dated September 25, 2001,13 the RTC concluded that, due to her weak physical and mental condition, there was a need to appoint a legal guardian over the person and property of Lulu. Thus, it declared Lulu an incompetent and appointed respondent as guardian over the person and property of Lulu on a P1 million bond. Petitioners moved for reconsideration asserting that the P1 million bond was grossly insufficient to secure LulusP50-million estate against fraudulent loss or dissipation.14 The motion, however, was denied.15 On July 2, 2002, petitioners appealed the September 25, 2001 decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals (CA).16 The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75760. On December 29, 2004, the CA issued a decision affirming the September 25, 2001 decision of the RTC (in the petition for guardianship) in toto.17 It held that respondent presented sufficient evidence to prove that Lulu, because of her illnesses and low educational attainment, needed assistance in taking care of herself and managing her affairs considering the extent of her estate. With regard to the respondents appointment as the legal guardian, the CA found that, since Lulu did not trust petitioners, none of them was qualified to be her legal guardian.1avvphi1 Because guardianship was a trust relationship, the RTC was bound to appoint someone Lulu clearly trusted.

Petitioners now assail the December 29, 2004 decision of the CA in this Court in a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 166470.18 Meanwhile, Lulu moved into 8 R. Santos St., Marikina City (Marikina apartment) and was provided with two housemaids tasked to care for her. Sometime in November 2003, Lulu was abducted from her Marikina apartment. Jovita immediately sought the assistance of the Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER) division of the Philippine National Police. The PACER subsequently discovered that petitioners were keeping Lulu somewhere in Rodriguez, Rizal. Despite their initial hostility to the investigation, Ma. Victoria and Cecilio subsequently contacted the PACER to inform them that Lulu voluntarily left with Natividad because her guardian had allegedly been maltreating her.19 On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus20 in the CA alleging that petitioners abducted Lulu and were holding her captive in an undisclosed location in Rodriguez, Rizal. On April 26, 2005, the CA granted the petition for habeas corpus, ruling that Jovita, as her legal guardian, was entitled to her custody.
21

Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said decision but it was denied in a resolution dated July 12, 2005.22 Aggrieved, they filed this petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 169217. This was consolidated with G.R. No. 166470. The basic issue in petitions of this nature is whether the person is an incompetent who requires the appointment of a judicial guardian over her person and property. Petitioners claim that the opinions of Lulu's attending physicians23 regarding her mental state were inadmissible in evidence as they were not experts in psychiatry. Respondent therefore failed to prove that Lulu's illnesses rendered her an incompetent. She should have been presumed to be of sound mind and/or in full possession of her mental capacity. For this reason, Lulu should be allowed to live with them since under Articles 194 to 196 of the Family Code,24 legitimate brothers and sisters, whether half-blood or full-blood are required to support each other fully. Respondent, on the other hand, reiterated her arguments before the courts a

quo. She disclosed that Lulu had been confined in Recovery.com, a psychosocial
rehabilitation center and convalescent home care facility in Quezon City, since 2004 due to violent and destructive behavior. She also had delusions of being physically and sexually abused by "Boy Negro" and imaginary pets she called "Michael" and "Madonna."25 The November 21, 2005 medical report26 stated
2

Lulu had unspecified mental retardation with psychosis but claimed significant improvements in her behavior. We find the petition to be without merit. Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may give his opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.27 Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that her intelligence level was below average and her mental stage below normal. Their opinions were admissible in evidence. Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary.28 The observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence29 establishing the person's state of mental sanity will suffice.30 Here, the trial judge was given ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally when she testified before the RTC. Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court,31 persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of the evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions of fact. As a general rule, this Court only resolves questions of law in a petition for review. We only take cognizance of questions of fact in exceptional circumstances, none of which is present in this case.32 We thus adopt the factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA.1avvph!1 Similarly, we see no compelling reason to reverse the trial and appellate courts finding as to the propriety of respondent's appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu.33 We therefore affirm her appointment as such. Consequently, respondent is tasked to care for and take full custody of Lulu, and manage her estate as well.34 Inasmuch as respondents appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu was proper, the issuance of a writ ofhabeas corpus in her favor was also in order. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by which the rightful custody of person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.35 Respondent, as the judicial guardian of Lulu, was duty-bound to care for and protect her ward. For her to perform her obligation, respondent must

have custody of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus after she was unduly deprived of the custody of her ward.36 WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DENIED. Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to respondent, Lulus legal guardian, an accurate and faithful accounting of all the properties and funds they unlawfully appropriated for themselves from the estate of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision. If warranted, the proper complaints should also be filed against them for any criminal liability in connection with the dissipation of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandezs estate and her unlawful abduction from the custody of her legal guardian. Treble costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188315 vs.

August 25, 2010

naturally surprised and she asked appellant why the latter did such a thing. Appellant did not answer but told her not to mention the incident to anybody. AAA then saw appellant went back to his bed and touch his private part. AAA immediately went back to sleep. The following day, at around the same time, and while BBB was at work, appellant again touched AAA from her legs up to her breast. AAA tried to resist but appellant threatened that he will kill her and BBB. Two (2) weeks after the incident, AAA was already asleep when she suddenly woke up and saw appellant holding a knife. While pointing the knife at AAAs neck, appellant removed his shorts, as well as AAAs pajamas. He slowly parted AAAs legs and inserted his penis into AAAs vagina. Meanwhile, AAA struggled and hit appellants shoulders. Appellant was able to penetrate her twice before he got out of the house. Two (2) days after, appellant again raped her by inserting his organ into AAAs vagina. AAA recounted that appellant raped her at least three (3) times a week at around the same time until 15 October 2002, when she was 14 years old. After the last rape incident, AAA did not go home after school and instead went to the house of her friend, Marvin.7 On 16 October 2002, Marvin watched television with AAA from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. Afterwards, AAA refused to go home. She told Marvin that appellant would spank her for going home late. Marvin asked AAA if there were other things that appellant might have done to her, aside from spanking. At that point, AAA finally cried and divulged that she has been raped by appellant. Marvin told AAA to file a complaint.8 AAA stayed at her mothers friends house and came back on 18 October 2002. She, together with Marvin, went to Kagawad Ramon Espena to seek assistance. Marvin went with the Barangay Tanod in apprehending appellant, who at that time, was trying to escape.9 PO1 Babor was the duty investigator at the Womens and Children Desk of Makati Police Station on 18 October 2002. She took down the statements of AAA and her friend, Marvin. She then referred AAA to the PNP Crime Laboratory to undergo medico-legal examination.10 P/Sr. Insp. Ortiz confirmed that she conducted the medico-legal examination on AAA. Results of the examination, as indicated in the medico-legal report, show that the "hymen is with presence of deep healed laceration at 1 oclock and shallow healed laceration at 2 oclock positions at the time of examination." Said report concluded that AAA is in a "non-virgin state physically."11 P/Sr. Insp. Ortiz opined that the lacerations could have been caused by any solid object, like the penis inserted at the genitalia.12
4

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA, Accused-Appellant. DECISION PEREZ, J. On appeal is the 29 January 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00726 finding appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape. In 181 Informations, which are similarly worded except for the dates of the commission of the crime and the age of the complainant, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 140, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 to 03-261, appellant was accused of raping AAA,2 allegedly committed as follows: That in or about and sometime during the month of _________, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the adopting father of complainant who was then _________ years of age, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with [AAA] by means of force and intimidation and against the will of the complainant.3 Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated on the following facts: 1. AAA is below fifteen (15) years of age; 2. Appellant is the guardian of AAA; and 3. AAA has been under the care and custody of appellant and his wife since AAA was one and a half years Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The following facts are undisputed: AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB,5 since she was just a few months old.6 BBB is married to appellant, who was working abroad for six (6) years. Appellant came home in 1997 and lived with AAA and BBB. BBB was working as a restaurant supervisor from 4:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. for six (6) days a week. Five (5) witnesses testified for the prosecution. They are the victim herself, Marvin Suello (Marvin), PO1 Evangeline Babor (PO1 Babor), P/Sr Insp. Paul Ed Ortiz (P/Sr Insp. Ortiz), and Maximo Duran (Duran). The prosecutions version of the facts follows In February 1999 at around 9:30 p.m., AAA, then 11 years old, was sleeping inside the house when she felt and saw appellant touch her thighs. AAA could see appellants face as there was a light coming from the altar. AAA was old.4

Duran and another Bantay Bayan member were at the barangay outpost at 2:10 p.m. on 18 October 2002 when they were summoned by Barangay Kagawad Ramon Espena. Acting on the complaint of AAA, they were directed to proceed to the house of appellant to invite him for questioning. Duran saw appellant about to board a jeep. They stopped the jeep and asked appellant to alight therefrom and invited him to the Bantay Bayan outpost. Appellant voluntarily went with them. Appellant was then brought to the police station.13 Only appellant testified in his defense. While appellant admitted that he was a strict father to AAA in that he would scold and spank her whenever the latter would ran away, he denied raping AAA.14 He alleged that AAA has the propensity to make up stories and was even once caught stealing money from her grandmother. Appellant recalled that on 16 October 2002, AAA asked permission to go out to buy a "project." She never came home.15 On 27 August 2004, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 181 counts of rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 to 03-261, finding accused ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-ONE (181) counts of RAPE penalized by RA 8353, Chapter 3, Article 266-A, par. 1(a) in relation to Article 266-B par. 1. Taking into account the minority of [AAA], adopted daughter of the accused, at the time of rape, and the fact the offender is the adoptive father of the minor complainant, accused, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH for each count of rape, and to pay [AAA] the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 150,000.00) for moral damages and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 50,000.00) for exemplary damages for each count of rape.16 The trial court found that force and intimidation attended the commission of the crime of rape through the testimony of the victim, which the trial court deemed "straightforward, consistent and credible." The trial court also established that appellant is the adoptive father of AAA since 1989 and that AAA was then a minor, as proven by the birth certificate, testimonies of witnesses, and admission made by AAA.17 Finally, the trial court dismissed appellants defense of denial as self-serving and which cannot prevail over AAAs positive testimony.18 Upon denial of appellants motion for reconsideration, the case was initially elevated to the Court of Appeals for its review pursuant to People v. Mateo.19 However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case in 23 August 2005 for failure of appellant to file his appellants brief.20 When the case was brought

before us on automatic review, we set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals and remanded it back for appropriate action and disposition on the ground that review by the Court of Appeals of the trial courts judgment imposing the death penalty is automatic and mandatory.21 On 29 January 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that AAA was raped by appellant, but it did so only on two (2) counts. The fallo of the Decision reads: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision is hereby rendered as follows: 1. Accused-appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua in Criminal Cases Nos. 03082 to 03-260, inclusive, is found not guilty on the ground of reasonable doubt and is hereby acquitted; 2. Accused-appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua in Criminal Cases Nos. 03081 and 03-261 is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count without eligibility for parole and to pay the victim AAA (to be identified through the Information in this case), the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count.22 The appellate court found that the guilt of appellant on the first and last incidents of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03-261, respectively, was proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.23 With respect to the other incidents, according to the appellate court, the testimony of AAA was merely based on general allegations that she was raped on the average of three (3) times a week from February 1999 to 15 October 2002. Therefore, the appellate court concluded that her statement is inadequate and insufficient to prove the other charges of rape.24 On 17 February 2009, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court of Appeals Decision. In a Resolution dated 26 October 2009, this Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) both filed their Manifestations stating that they will no longer file any Supplemental Briefs, but instead, they will merely adopt their Appellants and Appellee's Briefs, respectively.25 Appellant harps on the failure of AAA to actively defend herself or resist the alleged assaults. Moreover, considering that the relatives of AAA live only meters away from her and the frequency of the alleged molestation, appellant proffers that it was impossible for them not to notice the abuses. Appellant also questions the appreciation of the circumstances of minority and relationship as
5

basis for the imposition of the death penalty. He contends that an adopting parent is not included within the purview of qualifying relationships under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. Assuming arguendo that an adopting parent may be construed as similar to a parent, appellant argues that the term "adopting parent" must be given a definite and technical meaning in that the process of adoption must first be undertaken and a judicial decree to that matter must have been issued.26 The OSG, on the other hand, avers that the positive and categorical testimony of AAA that appellant sexually abused her, in tandem with the medico-legal report, are more than sufficient to establish appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, appellant failed to impute any ill motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse him of rape.27 The OSG insists that AAAs failure to report promptly the previous incidents of rape does not dent her credibility. Appellants exercise of moral ascendancy over AAA and that fact that she was under physical threat during those times, could have instilled fear on AAA from reporting said incidents.28 The OSG moved for modification of the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole in light of Republic Act No. 9346.29 After an extensive review of the records, we find no cogent reason to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals. Appellant was charged with 181 counts of rape, all of which were committed within the span of three (3) years or from February 1999 until 15 October 2002. We are in full accord with the acquittal of appellant in the 179 counts of rape. Stated otherwise, we agree with appellants conviction for two (2) counts of rape. In rape cases, "the victims credibility becomes the single most important issue. For when a woman says she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed; thus, if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof." 30 Both the trial court and the appellate court found AAAs testimony credible. The RTC considered it "straightforward and consistent on material points," while the Court of Appeals described it as "spontaneous, forthright, clear and free-fromserious contradictions." Well-entrenched is the legal precept that when the "culpability or innocence of an accused hinges on the issue of the credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court, when duly supported by sufficient and convincing evidence, must be accorded the highest respect, even finality, by this Court and are not to be disturbed on appeal."31 We see no reason in this case to depart from the principle. Moreover, we give due deference to the trial courts assessment of

AAAs credibility, having had the opportunity to witnesses firsthand and note her demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination.32 Worthy of reiteration is the doctrine that "when the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. When a girl, especially a minor, says that she has been defiled, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was inflicted on her." 33 Out of the 181 counts of rape charged against appellant, the prosecution was only able to prove two counts. Applying the ruling in People v. Garcia,34 the Court of Appeals correctly declared, thus: As to the other counts of rape (Criminal Cases Nos. 03-082 to 03-260) imputed against accused-appellant, We find him not guilty beyond reasonable doubt as the testimony of AAA was merely based on general allegations that she was raped by the accused-appellant on the average of three (3) times a week from February 1999 to 15 October 2002. AAAs bare statement is evidently inadequate and insufficient to prove the other charges of rape as each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime and that each of them must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On that score alone, the indefinite testimonial evidence that the victim was raped three times a week is decidedly inadequate and grossly insufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant therefore with the required quantum of evidence.35 As regards to the first incident of rape in 1999, AAA recounted how appellant forced her to have sexual intercourse with him, thus: Q: What happened after two (2) weeks? A: I was sleeping when somebody went on top of my head. Q: Tell us about what time was this when this happened, when you said you noticed somebody climbing up your bed? A: 9:30 in the evening. Q: At that time again, where was your [BBB]? A: At work, sir. Q: What happened after you noticed somebody climbing up your bed? A: I woke up and I saw him holding a bread knife. xxxx Q: Did you know who was this person who climbed your bed and who was holding a knife? A: Yes, sir. Q: Who was that person? A: "Papa"
6

Q: When you said "Papa," you are referring to the accused? A: Yes, sir. Q: What happened next? A: "Tinusok nya yong kutsilyo sa leeg ko" and he removed his shorts. Q: At that time, what were you then wearing? A: Pajama, sir. Q: What if any did the accused do to what you were wearing then? A: He undressed me. Q: Which one did he remove? A: My pajama. Q: What about your upper garments? A: He did not remove. Q: After you said the accused remove his shorts and removed your pajama, what happened? A: He slowly parted my legs. Q: And then? A: He inserted his penis into my vagina. Q: What were you doing, were you resisting when he was doing that? A: I was resisting but my strength is no match to him. He was strong. Q: What sort of resistance were you putting up that time? A: "Hinampas ko po siya sa braso." Q: What was his response to your act of hitting his arms? A: "Wag daw po akong papalag at bubutasin nya ang leeg ko ."36 Under Article 266-A(d) of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman who is below 12 years of age. At that time of the commission of the first incident of rape, AAA was only 11 years old, as evidenced by her birth certificate.37 As regards the final incident of rape in 15 October 2002, AAA narrated: Q: You said this happened always, approximately three (3) times a week, until when? A: The last time was in October 15, 2002. Q: This last incident, describe to us where did it happen again? A: In our house. Q: At about what time? A: 9:30 in the evening. Q: Narrate to us how did this incident happen? A: The same. He went to my bed, holding a bread knife, pointing it to me and he removed my shorts and he also undressed himself. Q: Then?

A: And he inserted his sexual organ into my vagina and after the incident, he left the house.38 Since AAA was already 13 years old at the time of the commission of the last incident of rape, the applicable rule is Article 266-A(a) which states that rape is committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation. AAAs testimony that she was defiled by appellant was corroborated by the medical findings of the medico-legal expert. The presence of deep healed and shallow healed laceration only confirms AAAs claim of rape. In both rape incidents, the trial court applied Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code in imposing the penalty of death, which was later modified by the Court of Appeals to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346. Article 266-B provides: The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: "l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; xxxx The Court of Appeals appreciated the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It relied on the established fact that AAA was still a minor when she was raped and on the stipulated fact that appellant is her guardian. One of the instances wherein the crime of rape may be qualified is when the victim is a minor AND the accused is her guardian. At this point, we cannot subscribe to this interpretation and hence, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in considering the qualifying circumstance of relationship. Indeed, it was stipulated during the pre-trial conference that appellant is the guardian of AAA. However, we cannot simply invoke this admission to consider guardianship as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape. "Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase its penalty to death cannot be subject of stipulation. The accused cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the gravity and irreversibility of capital punishment. To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically allege in the information and prove during the trial the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender."39
7

Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who has legal relationship with his ward. The theory that a guardian must be legally appointed was first enunciated in the early case of People v. De la Cruz.40 The issue in said case was whether the aunt of a rape victim could file a criminal complaint on behalf of her niece, when the victims father was still living and residing in the Philippines. The Solicitor-General contended that the aunt was the legal guardian of the victim, thus, was competent to sign the information. The Court rejected this contention and ruled as follow: Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraph 3, is as follows: "Tampoco puede procederse por causa de estupro, rapto, violacion o abusos

It would not be logical to say that the word "guardian" in the third paragraph of Article 344 which is mentioned together with parents and grandparents of the offended party would have a concept different from the "guardian" in the recent amendments of Article 335 where he is also mentioned in the company of parents and ascendants of the victim. In Article 344, the inclusion of the guardian is only to invest him with the power to sign a sworn written complaint to initiate the prosecution of four crimes against chastity, while his inclusion in the enumeration of the offenders in Article 335 is to authorize the imposition of the death penalty on him. With much more reason, therefore, should the restrictive concept announced in De la Cruz, that is, that he be a legal or judicial guardian, be required in the latter article. The Court notes from the transcripts of the proceedings in Congress on this particular point that the formulators were not definitive on the concept of "guardian" as it now appears in the attendant circumstances added to the original provisions of Article 335 of the Code. They took note of the status of a guardian as contemplated in the law on rape but, apparently on pragmatic considerations to be determined by the courts on an ad hoc basis, they agreed to just state "guardian" without the qualification that he should be a legal or judicial guardian.1wphi1 It was assumed, however, that he should at the very least be a de facto guardian. Indeed, they must have been aware of jurisprudence that the guardian envisaged in Article 335 of the Code, even after its amendment by Republic Act No. 4111, would either be a natural guardian, sometimes referred to as a legal or statutory guardian, or a judicial guardian appointed by the court over the person of the ward. They did agree, however, that the additional attendant circumstances introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 should be considered as special qualifying circumstances specifically applicable to the crime of rape and, accordingly, cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances. The obvious ratiocination is that, just like the effect of the attendant circumstances therefore added by Republic Act No. 4111, although the crime is still denominated as rape such circumstances have changed the nature of simple rape by producing a qualified form thereof punishable by the higher penalty of death. xxxx The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations do not obtain in appellant's case or, for that matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or
8

deshonestos, sino en virtud de denuncia de la parte agraviada, o de sus padres, o abuelos o tutor, ni despues de haberse otorgado al ofensor, perdon expreso por dichas partes, segun los casos." Without passing at this time on the
question whether the tutor (legal guardian) may file a complaint in the temporary absence of the parents or grandparents of the offended party, it suffices to say that we cannot accept the view of the Government that an aunt who has the temporary custody of a minor in the absence of her father occupies the position of a tutor (legal guardian). The word "tutor" (guardian) appearing in article 344, supra, must be given the same meaning as in section 551 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that is to say, a guardian legally appointed in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure.41 Garcia was more direct in addressing the issue of when the accused will be considered a "guardian" as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape. In said case, appellant therein raped a 12-year-old girl. The victim was left to the care of appellant, who is the live-in partner of the victims aunt. The issue of whether appellant is considered a guardian in the contemplation of the amendment to the law on rape such that, the victim being a minor, he should be punished with the higher penalty of death for the nine (9) crimes of rape was answered in the negative by the Court. The underlying reason behind its ruling was explained in this discourse: In the law on rape, the role of a guardian is provided for in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, specifically as one who, aside from the offended party, her parents or grandparents, is authorized to file the sworn written complaint to commence the prosecution for that crime. In People vs. De la Cruz, it was held that the guardian referred to in the law is either a legal or judicial guardian as understood in the rules on civil procedure. xxxx

another's property. The fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting sanctions should he betray the trust. In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be considered as the guardian falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by Republic Act No. 7659. He would not fall either in the category of the "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim" in the same enumeration, since his liaison is with respect to the aunt of [AAA]. Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period, we cannot impose the death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7659, since he does not fit into that category.42 People v. De la Cuesta43 adhered to Garcia when it ruled that the mere fact that the mother asked the accused to look after her child while she was away did not constitute the relationship of guardian-ward as contemplated by law.44 Garcia was further applied by analogy in People v. Delantar45 where it was held that the "guardian" envisioned in Section 31(c) of Republic Act No. 7610 is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. In said case, accused was charged for violation of Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 when he pimped an 11 year old child to at least two clients. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish filiation albeit it considered accused as a de facto guardian. However, this was not sufficient to justify the imposition of the higher penalty pursuant to the ruling in Garcia. In addition, the Court construed the term "guardian" in this manner: Further, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated.87 Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator and the victim which will justify the imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is an "ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity." It should be noted that the words with which "guardian" is associated in the provision all denote a legal relationship. From this description we may safely deduce that the guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may be established either by being the wards biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian). Appellant is neither AAAs biological parent nor is he AAAs adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the "guardian" contemplated by law.46

Be that as it may, this qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was not even mentioned in the Informations. What was clearly stated was that appellant was the "adopting father" of AAA, which the prosecution nonetheless failed to establish. For failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant could only be convicted for two (2) counts of simple rape, and not qualified rape. We likewise reduce the Court of Appeals award of civil indemnity from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 and moral damages from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence.47 The award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should be increased to P30,000.00 pursuant to People v.

Guillermo.48 While no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of

rapes, it was established during trial that appellant used a deadly weapon to perpetrate the crime. Hence, the award of exemplary damages is proper. WHEREFORE, the decision dated 29 January 2009 convicting Isidro Flores y Lagua of the crime of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03-261 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in that he is held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of simple rape only and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. He is also ordered, for each count of rape, to pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00. SO ORDERED.

JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA, petitioners,

the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, regarding the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to sell the same (Annex B). Therein, the petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza averred the physical and mental incapacity of her husband, who was then confined for intensive medical care and treatment at the Iloilo Doctors Hospital. She signified to the court her desire to assume sole powers of administration of their conjugal properties. She also alleged that her husbands medical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up, accumulating to several hundred thousands of pesos already. For this, she urgently needed to sell one piece of real property, specifically Lot No. 4291 and its improvements. Thus, she prayed for authorization from the court to sell said property. The following day, June 14, 1991, Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City issued an Order (Annex C) finding the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 to be sufficient in form and substance, and setting the hearing thereof for June 20, 1991. The scheduled hearing of the petition proceeded, attended by therein petitioner Gilda Jardeleza, her counsel, her two children, namely Ernesto Jardeleza, Jr., and Glenda Jardeleza Uy, and Dr. Rolando Padilla, one of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s attending physicians. On that same day, June 20, 1991, Branch 32 of the RTC of Iloilo City rendered its Decision (Annex D), finding that it was convinced that Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, and that the sale of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements thereon was necessary to defray the mounting expenses for treatment and Hospitalization. The said court also made the pronouncement that the petition filed by Gilda L. Jardeleza was pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code, and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings sanctioned under Article 253 of the same Code x x x. The said court then disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, there being factual and legal bases to the petition dated June 13, 1991, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows: 1) declaring Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., petitioners husband, to be incapacitated and unable to participate in the administration of conjugal properties; 2) authorizing petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza to assume sole powers of administration of their conjugal properties; and 3) authorizing aforesaid petitioner to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, situated in Iloilo City and covered by TCT No. 47337 issued in the names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the buildings standing thereof.
10

vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.

DECISION PARDO, J.: The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying reconsideration[2] reversing that of the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo, Branch 32[3] and declaring void the special proceedings instituted therein by petitioners to authorize petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza, in view of the comatose condition of her husband, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., with the approval of the court, to dispose of their conjugal property in favor of co-petitioners, their daughter and son in law, for the ostensible purpose of financial need in the personal, business and medical expenses of her incapacitated husband. The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows: This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein respondent) on the one hand, against his mother Gilda L. Jardeleza, and sister and brother-in-law, the spouses Jose Uy and Glenda Jardeleza (herein petitioners) on the other hand. The controversy came about as a result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s suffering of a stroke on March 25, 1991, which left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties. Said Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the father of herein respondent Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein private respondent Gilda Jardeleza. Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the senior Jardeleza spouses was about to be sold, petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza, on June 6, 1991, filed a petition (Annex A) before the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, Branch 25, where it was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4689, in the matter of the guardianship of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. The petitioner averred therein that the present physical and mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. prevent him from competently administering his properties, and in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the Jardelezas real and personal assets, there was a need for a court-appointed guardian to administer said properties. It was prayed therein that Letters of Guardianship be issued in favor of herein private respondent Gilda Ledesma Jardeleza, wife of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. It was further prayed that in the meantime, no property of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. be negotiated, mortgaged or otherwise alienated to third persons, particularly Lot No. 4291 and all the improvements thereon, located along Bonifacio Drive, Iloilo City, and covered by T.C.T. No. 47337. A few days later, or on June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza herself filed a petition docketed as Special Proceeding NO. 4691, before Branch 32 of

SO ORDERED. On June 24, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the proceedings before Branch 32 in Spec. Proc. Case No. 4691, said petitioner being unaware and not knowing that a decision has already been rendered on the case by public respondent. On July 3, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 and a motion for consolidation of the two cases (Annex F). He propounded the argument that the petition for declaration of incapacity, assumption of sole powers of administration, and authority to sell the conjugal properties was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. As such, it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings set out in Article 253 of the Family Code. It should follow the rules governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court which require procedural due process, particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits. On the other hand, even if Gilda Jardelezas petition can be prosecuted by summary proceedings, there was still a failure to comply with the basic requirements thereof, making the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a defective one. He further alleged that under the New Civil Code, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. had acquired vested rights as a conjugal partner, and that these rights cannot be impaired or prejudiced without his consent. Neither can he be deprived of his share in the conjugal properties through mere summary proceedings. He then restated his position that Spec. Proc. No. 4691 should be consolidated with Spec. Proc. No. 4689 which was filed earlier and pending before Branch 25. Teodoro Jardeleza also questioned the propriety of the sale of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements thereon supposedly to pay the accumulated financial obligations arising from Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s hospitalization. He alleged that the market value of the property would be around Twelve to Fifteen Million Pesos, but that he had been informed that it would be sold for much less. He also pointed out that the building thereon which houses the Jardeleza Clinic is a monument to Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.s industry, labor and service to his fellowmen. Hence, the said property has a lot of sentimental value to his family. Besides, argued Teodoro Jardeleza, then conjugal partnership had other liquid assets to pay off all financial obligations. He mentioned that apart from sufficient cash, Jardeleza, Sr. owned stocks of Iloilo Doctors Hospital which can be off-set against the cost of medical and hospital bills. Furthermore, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. enjoys certain privileges at the said hospital which allows him to pay on installment basis. Moreover, two of Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.s attending

physicians are his own sons who do not charge anything for their professional services. On July 4, 1991, Teodoro Jardeleza filed in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a supplement to his motion for reconsideration (Annex G). He reiterated his contention that summary proceedings was irregularly applied. He also noted that the provisions on summary proceedings found in Chapter 2 of the Family Code comes under the heading on Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife which contemplates of a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Thus, he argued that were one spouse is comatose without motor and mental faculties, the said provisions cannot be made to apply. While the motion for reconsideration was pending, Gilda Jardeleza disposed by absolute sale Lot No. 4291 and all its improvements to her daughter, Ma. Glenda Jardeleza Uy, for Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00), as evidenced by a Deed Absolute Sale dated July 8, 1991 executed between them (p. 111, Rollo). Under date of July 23, 1991, Gilda Jardeleza filed an urgent ex-parte motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale. On August 12, 1991 Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the motion for approval of the deed of sale on the grounds that: (1) the motion was prematurely filed and should be held in abeyance until the final resolution of the petition; (2) the motion does not allege nor prove the justifications for the sale; and (3) the motion does not allege that had Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. been competent, he would have given his consent to the sale. Judge Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto of Branch 32 of the respondent Court, who had penned the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 had in the meantime formally inhibited herself from further acting in this case (Annex I). The case was then reraffled to Branch 28 of the said court. On December 19, 1991, the said court issued an Order (Annex M) denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration and approving respondent Jardelezas motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale. The said court ruled that: After a careful and thorough perusal of the decision, dated June 20, 1991, the Motion for Reconsideration, as well as its supplements filed by oppositor, Teodoro L. Jardeleza, through counsel, and the opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, including its supplements, filed by petitioner, through counsel, this Court is of the opinion and so holds, that her Honor, Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto, Presiding Judge of Branch 32, of this Court, has properly observed the procedure embodied under Article 253, in relation to Article 124, of the Family Code, in rendering her decision dated June 20, 1991.
11

Also, as correctly stated by petitioner, through counsel, that oppositor Teodor L. Jardeleza does not have the personality to oppose the instant petition considering that the property or properties, subject of the petition, belongs to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Ernesto and Gilda Jardeleza, who are both still alive. In view thereof, the Motion for Reconsideration of oppositor Teodoro L. Jardeleza, is hereby denied for lack of merit. Considering the validity of the decision dated June 20, 1991, which among others, authorized Gilda L. Jardeleza to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47337 issued in the names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the building standing thereon, the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Approval of Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 23, 1991, filed by petitioner, through counsel, is hereby granted and the deed of absolute sale, executed and notarized on July 8, 1991, by and between Gilda L. Jardeleza, as vendor, and Ma. Glenda Jardeleza, as vendee, is hereby approved, and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City, is directed to register the sale and issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title to the vendee. SO ORDERED.[4] On December 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing the appealed decision and ordering the trial court to dismiss the special proceedings to approve the deed of sale, which was also declared void.[5] On December 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,[6] however, on March 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the

guardian of the person or estate or both of such incompetent, under Rule 93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, petitioner earlier had filed such a petition for judicial guardianship. Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows: ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a). In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct.[9] In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code may apply to the wife's administration of the conjugal property, the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court.[10] Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
12

motion, finding no cogent and compelling reason to disturb the decision.[7] Hence, this appeal.[8] The issue raised is whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a stroke, a cerebrovascular accident, rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, and could not manage their conjugal partnership property may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of land with its improvements, worth more than twelve million pesos, with the approval of the court in a summary proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own daughter and son-in-law, for the amount of eight million pesos. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., the procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family Code are not applicable. Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to take care of himself and manage the conjugal property due to illness that had rendered him comatose, the proper remedy was the appointment of a judicial

In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted. Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent an opportunity to be heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due process. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court is that a denial of due process suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the government the impress of nullity.[11] A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally.[12] A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard.[13] A void decision may be assailed or impugned at any time either directly or collaterally, by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked. [14] WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 26936, in toto. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 162421 PUNO, C.J.:

August 31, 2007

On December 17, 1985, the Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte issued Original Certificate of Title No. 17035 over the purchased land in the names of respondents-spouses. decision1 of On December 30, 1985, Saturnina and her four (4) children executed an affidavit to the effect that petitioner Nelson would only receive the amount of P176.34 from respondents-spouses when he reaches the age of 21 considering that Saturnina paid Dr. Corrompido P966.66 for the obligation of petitioner Nelsons late father Alberto, i.e., P666.66 for his share in the redemption of the sale with pacto de retro as well as his "vale" ofP300.00. On July 24, 1986, 24-year old petitioner Rito Cabales acknowledged receipt of the sum of P1,143.00 from respondent Jesus Feliano, representing the formers share in the proceeds of the sale of subject property. In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson, then residing in Manila, went back to his fathers hometown in Southern Leyte. That same year, he learned from his uncle, petitioner Rito, of the sale of subject property. In 1993, he signified his intention to redeem the subject land during a barangay conciliation process that he initiated. On January 12, 1995, contending that they could not have sold their respective shares in subject property when they were minors, petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, a complaint for redemption of the subject land plus damages. In their answer, respondents-spouses maintained that petitioners were estopped from claiming any right over subject property considering that (1) petitioner Rito had already received the amount corresponding to his share of the proceeds of the sale of subject property, and (2) that petitioner Nelson failed to consign to the court the total amount of the redemption price necessary for legal redemption. They prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of laches and prescription. No amicable settlement was reached at pre-trial. Trial ensued and on August 11, 2000, the trial court ruled against petitioners. It held that (1) Alberto or, by his death, any of his heirs including petitioner Nelson lost their right to subject land when not one of them repurchased it from Dr. Corrompido; (2) Saturnina was effectively subrogated to the rights and interests of Alberto when she paid for Albertos share as well as his obligation to Dr. Corrompido; and (3) petitioner Rito had no more right to redeem his share to subject property as the sale by Saturnina, his legal guardian pursuant to Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, was perfectly valid; and it was shown that he received his share of the proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, when he was 24 years old.
14

NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES v CA This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the

the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 2003, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68319 entitled "Nelson Cabales and Rito Cabales v. Jesus Feliano and Anunciacion Feliano," which affirmed with modification the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, dated August 11, 2000, in Civil Case No. R2878. The resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February 23, 2004, which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, is likewise herein assailed. The facts as found by the trial court and the appellate court are well established. Rufino Cabales died on July 4, 1966 and left a 5,714-square meter parcel of land located in Brgy. Rizal, Sogod, Southern Leyte, covered by Tax Declaration No. 17270 to his surviving wife Saturnina and children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito. On July 26, 1971, brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold the subject property to Dr. Cayetano Corrompido for P2,000.00, with right to repurchase within eight (8) years. The three (3) siblings divided the proceeds of the sale among themselves, each getting a share of P666.66. The following month or on August 18, 1971, Alberto secured a note ("vale") from Dr. Corrompido in the amount ofP300.00. In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner Nelson. On December 18, 1975, within the eight-year redemption period, Bonifacio and Albino tendered their payment ofP666.66 each to Dr. Corrompido. But Dr. Corrompido only released the document of sale with pacto de retro after Saturnina paid for the share of her deceased son, Alberto, including his "vale" of P300.00. On even date, Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold the subject parcel of land to respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for P8,000.00. The Deed of Sale provided in its last paragraph, thus: It is hereby declared and understood that the amount of TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX PESOS (P2,286.00) corresponding and belonging to the Heirs of Alberto Cabales and to Rito Cabales who are still minors upon the execution of this instrument are held in trust by the VENDEE and to be paid and delivered only to them upon reaching the age of 21.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court. It held that the sale by Saturnina of petitioner Ritos undivided share to the property was unenforceable for lack of authority or legal representation but that the contract was effectively ratified by petitioner Ritos receipt of the proceeds on July 24, 1986. The appellate court also ruled that petitioner Nelson is co-owner to the extent of one-seventh (1/7) of subject property as Saturnina was not subrogated to Albertos rights when she repurchased his share to the property. It further directed petitioner Nelson to pay the estate of the late Saturnina Cabales the amount of P966.66, representing the amount which the latter paid for the obligation of petitioner Nelsons late father Alberto. Finally, however, it denied petitioner Nelsons claim for redemption for his failure to tender or consign in court the redemption money within the period prescribed by law. In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) recognizing petitioner Nelson Cabales as co-owner of subject land but denied him the right of legal redemption, and (2) not recognizing petitioner Rito Cabales as co-owner of subject land with similar right of legal redemption. First, we shall delineate the rights of petitioners to subject land. When Rufino Cabales died intestate, his wife Saturnina and his six (6) children, Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito, survived and succeeded him. Article 996 of the New Civil Code provides that "[i]f a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children." Verily, the seven (7) heirs inherited equally on subject property. Petitioner Rito and Alberto, petitioner Nelsons father, inherited in their own rights and with equal shares as the others. But before partition of subject land was effected, Alberto died. By operation of law, his rights and obligations to one-seventh of subject land were transferred to his legal heirs his wife and his son petitioner Nelson. We shall now discuss the effects of the two (2) sales of subject land to the rights of the parties. The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido by the brothers and coowners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto was valid but only as to their pro-indiviso shares to the land. When Alberto died prior to repurchasing his share, his rights and obligations were transferred to and assumed by his heirs, namely his wife and his son, petitioner Nelson. But the records show that it was Saturnina, Albertos mother, and not his heirs, who repurchased for him. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Saturnina was not subrogated to Albertos or his heirs rights to the property when she repurchased the share.

In Paulmitan v. Court of Appeals,3 we held that a co-owner who redeemed the property in its entirety did not make her the owner of all of it. The property remained in a condition of co-ownership as the redemption did not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.4 But the one who redeemed had the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and until reimbursed, holds a lien upon the subject property for the amount due.5Necessarily, when Saturnina redeemed for Albertos heirs who had then acquired his pro-indiviso share in subject property, it did not vest in her ownership over the pro-indiviso share she redeemed. But she had the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and held a lien upon the property for the amount due until reimbursement. The result is that the heirs of Alberto, i.e., his wife and his son petitioner Nelson, retained ownership over their pro-indiviso share. Upon redemption from Dr. Corrompido, the subject property was resold to respondents-spouses by the co-owners. Petitioners Rito and Nelson were then minors and as indicated in the Deed of Sale, their shares in the proceeds were held in trust by respondents-spouses to be paid and delivered to them upon reaching the age of majority. As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable as correctly held by the Court of Appeals. Articles 320 and 326 of the New Civil Code 6 state that: Art. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. Art. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the childs property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court. In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the mother, is considered legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under his or her parental authority without need of giving a bond in case the amount of the property of the child does not exceed two thousand pesos.7 Corollary to this, Rule 93, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to this case, automatically designates the parent as legal guardian of the child without need of any judicial appointment in case the latters property does not exceed two thousand pesos,8 thus: Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. When the property of the child under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian x x x x9
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Saturnina was clearly petitioner Ritos legal guardian without necessity of court appointment considering that the amount of his property or one-seventh of subject property was P1,143.00, which is less than two thousand pesos. However, Rule 96, Sec. 110 provides that: Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. A guardian appointed shall have the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of his estate, or the management of the estate only, as the case may be. The guardian of the estate of a nonresident shall have the management of all the estate of the ward within the Philippines, and no court other than that in which such guardian was appointed shall have jurisdiction over the guardianship. Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the minors property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial authority.11 Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the latters pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to do so. Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus: Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified: (1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers; xxxx Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of petitioner Rito was unenforceable. However, when he acknowledged receipt of the proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito effectively ratified it. This act of ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him. With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of sale was void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians with judicial authority to alienate or encumber his property. It was his mother who was his legal guardian and, if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his undivided share to the property. She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina and the others sold the subject property in its entirety to respondents-spouses, they only sold and transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares and not that part which pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother. Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership over their undivided share of subject Articles 1088 and 1623 of the New Civil Code are pertinent: Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so property. 12 But may petitioners redeem the subject land from respondents-spouses?

within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners. Clearly, legal redemption may only be exercised by the co-owner or co-owners who did not part with his or their pro-indiviso share in the property held in common. As demonstrated, the sale as to the undivided share of petitioner Rito became valid and binding upon his ratification on July 24, 1986. As a result, he lost his right to redeem subject property. However, as likewise established, the sale as to the undivided share of petitioner Nelson and his mother was not valid such that they were not divested of their ownership thereto. Necessarily, they may redeem the subject property from respondents-spouses. But they must do so within thirty days from notice in writing of the sale by their co-owners vendors. In reckoning this period, we held in Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,13 thus: x x x we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice. Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. x x x x x x x x While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the lawmakers will. In requiring written notice, Article 1088 (and Article 1623 for that matter)14 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to obviate the problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two.1awph!1
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In the instant case, the right of redemption was invoked not days but years after the sale was made in 1978. We are not unmindful of the fact that petitioner Nelson was a minor when the sale was perfected. Nevertheless, the records show that in 1988, petitioner Nelson, then of majority age, was informed of the sale of subject property. Moreover, it was noted by the appellate court that petitioner Nelson was likewise informed thereof in 1993 and he signified his intention to redeem subject property during a barangay conciliation process. But he only filed the complaint for legal redemption and damages on January 12, 1995, certainly more than thirty days from learning about the sale. In the face of the established facts, petitioner Nelson cannot feign ignorance of the sale of subject property in 1978. To require strict proof of written notice of the sale would be to countenance an obvious false claim of lack of knowledge thereof, thus commending the letter of the law over its purpose, i.e., the notification of redemptioners. The Court is satisfied that there was sufficient notice of the sale to petitioner Nelson. The thirty-day redemption period commenced in 1993, after petitioner Nelson sought the barangay conciliation process to redeem his property. By January 12, 1995, when petitioner Nelson filed a complaint for legal redemption and damages, it is clear that the thirty-day period had already expired. As in Alonzo, the Court, after due consideration of the facts of the instant case, hereby interprets the law in a way that will render justice.15 Petitioner Nelson, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, can no longer redeem subject property. But he and his mother remain co-owners thereof with respondents-spouses. Accordingly, title to subject property must include them. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals of October 27, 2003 and February 23, 2004 are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte is ORDERED to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 17035 and to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in the name of respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for the 6/7 portion, and petitioner Nelson Cabales and his mother for the remaining 1/7 portion, pro indiviso. SO ORDERED.

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