LTD - Hiezll Rivera

RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R.
FEU Institute of Law
LTD 2nd Semester 2012-2013
AURORA ALCANTARA-DAUS, vs. Sps. HERMOSO and SOCORRO DE LEON GR No. 149750, June 16, 2003
FACTS: The respondents alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of San Manuel which Hermoso de Leon inherited from his father Marcelino de Leon by virtue of a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition. In the early 1960s, respondents engaged the services of the late Atty. Florencio Juan to take care of the documents of the properties of his parents. Atty. Juan let them sign voluminous documents. After the death of Atty. Juan, some documents surfaced and most revealed that their properties had been conveyed by sale or quitclaim to Hermosos brothers and sisters, to Atty. Juan and his sisters, when in truth and in fact, no such conveyances were ever intended by them. His signature in the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim made in favor of Rodolfo de Leon was forged. They discovered that the land in question was sold by Rodolfo de Leon to Aurora Alcantara. They demanded annulment of the document and reconveyance but defendants refused Aurora Alcantara-Daus that she bought the land in question in good faith and for value. Aurora has been in continuous, public, peaceful, open possession over the same and has been appropriating the produce thereof without objection from anyone. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Rodolfo de Leon over the land in question in favor of petitioner was perfected and binding upon the parties therein? 2. Whether or not the possession of petitioner including her predecessor-ininterest Rodolfo de Leon over the land in question was in good faith? HELD: The contract of sale is consensual because of its perfection by mere consent, upon a meeting of the minds on the offer and the acceptance thereof based on subject matter, price and terms of payment. At this stage, the sellers ownership of the thing sold is not an element in the perfection of the contract of sale. The contract, however, creates an obligation on the part of the seller to transfer ownership and to deliver the subject matter of the contract. It is during the delivery that the law requires the seller to have the right to transfer ownership of the thing sold. In general, a perfected contract of sale cannot be challenged on the ground of the sellers non-ownership of the thing sold at the time of the perfection of the contract. It is well-settled that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or possession. Neither can prescription be allowed against the hereditary successors of the registered owner, because they merely step into the shoes of the decedent and are merely the Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN
RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R. FEU Institute of Law
continuation of the personality of their predecessor in interest. Consequently, since a certificate of registration covers it, the disputed land cannot be acquired by prescription regardless of petitioners good faith.
Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN
GSIS v. SANTIAGO G.R. No. 155206, October 28, 2003

FACTS: Zulueta and Ramos obtained various loans from defendant GSIS for the secured by real estate mortgages over parcels of land. The Zuluetas failed to pay their loans to defendant GSIS and the latter foreclosed the real estate mortgages. Thereafter, the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction by defendant GSIS. Not all lots covered by the mortgaged titles were sold. Ninety-one (91) lots were expressly excluded from the auction since the lots were sufficient to pay for all the mortgage debts. GSIS sold the foreclosed properties to Yorkstown Development Corporation which sale was disapproved by the Office of the President of the Philippines. The sold properties were returned to GSIS. After GSIS had re-acquired the properties sold to Yorkstown Development Corporation, it began disposing the foreclosed lots including the excluded ones. Eduardo Santiago and then plaintiff Antonio Vic Zulueta executed anagreement whereby Zulueta transferred all his rights and interests over the excluded lots. Plaintiff Eduardo Santiagos lawyer, Atty. Wenceslao B. Trinidad, wrote a demand letter to defendant GSIS asking for the return of the eighty-one excluded lots. Zulueta filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for reconveyance of real estate against the GSIS. Spouses Alfeoand Nenita Escasa, Manuel III and Sylvia G. Urbano, and Marciana P. Gonzales and the heirs of Mamerto Gonzales moved to be included as intervenors and filed their respective answers in intervention. Upon the death of Santiago on March 6, 1996, he was substituted by his widow, Rosario Enriquez Vda. De Santiago, as the plaintiff. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not GSISs defend on prescription is tenable. HELD: 1. No. An action for reconveyance of real property based on fraud prescribes in four years from the discovery of fraud; such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance of the certificate of title over the property.
FACTS:
AGUIRRE vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 122249, January 29, 2004
Medrano and his first wife Emilia owned a piece of land. After the death of Emilia, the former married Miguela. When Medrano died, all his heirs agreed that Sixto Medrano, a child of the first marriage, should manage and administer the said property. After Sixto died, his heirs learned that he had executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property in which he falsely stated that he was only heirs of Medrano. Sixto, then living, was able to sell the property to Maria Bacong a portion of the property, and another portion to Tiburcio Balitaan. Maria Bacong later sold the said portion to Rosendo Bacong. Petitioners, all heirs of Medrano who were affected by the sale demanded reconveyance of the portions sold by Sixto but the 3vendees refused. So, petitioners sued them seeking the nullity of the documents and partition. The vendees contended that they acquired the property under the valid deed of sale and petitioners cause of action was bared by laches and prescription. Tiburcio also contended that he is an innocent purchaser for value. ISSUE: Whether there was a valid sale made by a co-owner Sixto without the consent of the other co-owners. HELD: A sale by a co-owner of the whole property as his will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale (Art. 493, NCC).It clearly provides that the sale or other disposition affects only the sellers share, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantors share in the partition of the property owned in common. The respondents failed to show that the Affidavit executed by Sixto to the effect that he is the sole owner of the subject property was known or made known to the other co-heirs of Medrano.
LEONARDO v. MARAVILLA G.R. No. 143369, November 27, 2012

FACTS: Mariano Torres owns a parcel of land. Roxas bought the said land from Mariano Torres but was not able to register the same due to a legal dispute between Mariano and a certain Francisco Fernandez. Mariano eventually won that case. Petitioner now bought the lot from Eusebio Roxas and asked that it be registered under his name. He was not able to do so because the Owners Duplicate Certificate of Title was still in the hands of respondents and that the Register of Deeds made an affidavit that the original copy of could not be retrieved in their office. Petitioner filed an adverse claim. Petitioner claims that he was the lawful owner of said land having purchased it from Roxas and having protected his rights through the annotation of adverse claim. On the other hand, Maravilla countered that the action has been barred by prescription and laches, it being filed only on Sept. 6, 1993, or 21years from the time the right of action has commenced. Petitioner claims that his action is an accion reivindicatoria which prescribes in 30 years. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners action is barred by prescription and laches. HELD: Yes. Petitioners action is actually an action for specific performance. The delivery of a thing constitutes a necessary and indispensable requisite for the purpose of acquiring the ownership of the same by virtue of a contract. Certainly, petitioners action filed on September 6, 1993 is barred by the 10 year prescriptive period from the accrual of his alleged right of action on September 29,1972. In the same vein, said action is barred by laches having allowed 21 years to lapse before enforcing his alleged right.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA G.R. Nos. 103882 & 105276

FACTS: On May 6, 1958, invoking the a forecited provision of RA 1899, the Pasay City Council passed Ordinance No. 121, for the reclamation of Three Hundred (300) hectares of foreshore lands in Pasay City, empowering the City Mayor to award and enter into reclamation contracts, and prescribing terms and conditions therefor. The said Ordinance was amended on April 21, 1959 by Ordinance No. 158, which authorized the Republic Real Estate Corporation ("RREC") to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain terms and conditions. On April 24, 1959, Pasay City and RREC entered into an Agreement for the reclamation of the foreshore lands in Pasay City. On December 19, 1961, the Republic of the Philippines ("Republic") filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Preventive injunction and Mandatory Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 2229-P before the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, (Branch 7, Pasay City). The Answers of RREC and Pasay City, dated March 10 and March 14, 1962, respectively, averred that the subject-matter of said Agreement is within the commerce of man, that the phrase "foreshore lands" within the contemplation of RA 1899 has a broader meaning than the cited definition of the term in the Words and Phrases and in the Webster's Third New International Dictionary and the plans and specifications of the reclamation involved were approved by the authorities concerned. On April 26,1962, Judge Angel H. Mojica of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch 7, Pasay City) issued an Order the dispositive portion of which was to the following effect that to refrain from "further reclaiming or committing acts of dispossession over any area within the Manila Bay or the Manila Bay Beach Resort", until further orders of the court. ISSUE: Whether of not the Pasay City Ordinance No. 121 is valid. HELD: Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, dated May 6, 1958, and Ordinance No. 158, dated April 21, 1959, as well as the Reclamation Agreements entered into by Pasay City and Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) as authorized by said city ordinances, are declared null and void for being ultra vires, and contrary to Rep. Act 1899. Under the aforecited provision of law in point, a notice of lis pendens is necessary when the action is for recovery of possession or ownership of a parcel of land. A torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue of validity of a torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not, may be posed only in an action brought to impugn or annul it.
CALICDAN vs. CEDAA G.R. No. 155080, February 5, 2004

FACTS: Fermina Calicdan executed a deed of donation inter vivos whereby she conveyed the land to Silverio Cendaa, who immediately entered into possession of the land, built a fence around the land and constructed a two-storey residential house sometime in 1949, where he resided until his death in 1998. In 1992, Calicdan, through her legal guardian Guadalupe Castillo, filed a complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages against Cendaa, alleging that the donation was void; that respondent took advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the land; and that she merely tolerated Cendaas possession of the land as well as the construction of his house thereon. In Cendaas answer with Motion to Dismiss, he alleged, by way of affirmative defenses, that the land was donated to him by Calicdan in 1947; and that he had been publicly, peacefully, continuously, and adversely in possession of the land for a period of 45 years. Moreover, he argued that the complaint was barred by prior judgment in the special proceedings for the Inventory of Properties of Incompetent Soledad Calicdan, where the court decreed the exclusion of the land from the inventory of properties of the petitioner. The trial court ruled in favor of Calicdan, while the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the donation inter vivos is valid HELD: Trial court found the donation of the land void because Fermina was not the owner thereof, considering that it was inherited by Sixto from his parents. The land was not part of the conjugal property of the spouses Sixto and Fermina Calicdan, because under the Spanish Civil Code, the law applicable when Sixto died in 1941, the surviving spouse had a right of usufruct only over the estate of the deceased spouse. Cendaa, who derived his rights from Fermina, only acquired the right of usufruct as it was the only right which the latter could convey. After a reviewing the evidence on record, we find that the Court of Appeals ruling that the donation was valid was not supported by convincing proof. Respondent himself admitted during the cross examination that he had no personal knowledge of whether Sixto Calicdan in fact purchased the subject land.
PALOMO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 95608, Jan. 21, 1997
FACTS: William Cameron Forbes issued an Executive Order No. 40 which reserved for provincial park square meters of land situated in Barrio Naga, Municipality of Tiwi, Province of Albay. The Court ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40 in the name of Diego Palomo. Palomo donated these parcels of land to his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death. Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay. Then, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the Tiwi Hot Spring National Park, under the control, management, protection and administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition. The Palomos continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon and introduced improvements . Carmen Vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan from the Bank of the Philippine Islands. ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged original certificate of titles issued pursuant to the order of the Court of First Instance in 1916-1917 and the subsequent TCTs issued in 1953 pursuant to the petition for reconstitution are valid. HELD: The land sought to be registered was in fact and in law, unregisterable since it is a reserved provincial park. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. There is no question that the lots here forming part of the forest zone were not alienable lands of the public domain.
CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002
FACTS: The Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). Public Estates Authority (PEA) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA. Thereafter, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring the lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the Freedom Islands. Afterwards, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Amari, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and Amari entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to Amari. This caused a stir especially when Senator Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain. Frank Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to Amari and from implementing the JVA. Then, under President Estradas admin, PEA and Amari entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chavez claim that the contract is null and void. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the transfer to Amari lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between Amari and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution. 2. Whether or not the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government. HELD: On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution: 1. The hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. 3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to Amari, a private corporation, ownership of hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. 4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. The government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to Amari will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
BARANDA vs. GUSTILLO G.R. No. L-81163, September 26, 1988

FACTS: Baranda and Gustillo claim that they own a parcel of land, Lot No. 4517. The Court, after discovering that private respondents TCT was fraudulently acquired, ordered a writ of possession against them and issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for reconsideration filed by Gustillo. Another group filed a separate civil case against Baranda and applied for lis pendens on the TCT of said lot, which court found out to be privies of the Gustillo tasked to delay the implementation of the final decisions of the Court. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the pendency of the appeal in subsequent civil case with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from canceling the notice of lis pendens in the certificate of titles of petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court. 2. What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul the notice of lis pendens in a Torrens Certificate of Title? HELD: 1. Respondent Judge abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deeds stand. He forgot the par 1 of Sec. 77 of P.D. 1529 which provides: Cancellation of lis pendens, Before the final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the Court after proper showing that it is necessary to protect the rights of those who caused it to be registered. 2. Sec 10 of PD 1529 states that, It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration. If the instrument cannot be registered, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presenter of such denial in writing, stating the ground therefore, and advising him of his rights to appeal by consulta.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 83609, October 26, 1989
FACTS: Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar claimed to the owners in fee simple of Lots 860 and 870. They alleged that they inherited these parcels of land and have been paying taxes thereon. The respondents filed a joint application for registration of title to the aforementioned parcels of land. Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground that the private respondents did not meet the requirements laid down in Commonwealth Act. No. 141, Section 48. The law states that for a citizen residing in lands of public domain to register said lands in his own name, he must: Have applied for the purchase of the land prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the U.S.; Have (either by himself or through his predecessors in interest) been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least 30 years; or be a member of a cultural minority who has been in possession and occupation of lands of public domain suitable to agriculture. The trial court disagreed with this argument, holding that the private respondents that they had filled (b) of CA 141, Sec. 48. Director of Lands elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the land was more valuable as forest land rather than agricultural. As such, it must be recognized as forest land. But the Court of Appeals denied said appeal because there was no proof to the aforementioned claim. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners had fulfilled the requirement for the registry of land within public domain as stated in Commonwealth Act 141, Sec. 48, (b) HELD: No. The Court cited the case of Bureau Forestry v. Court of Appeals, where it was held that the classification or reclassification of public land into alienable mineral or forest land is a prerogative of the Executive Department and not of the courts. The Executive Department reserves the sole right to determine the public or alienable character of the lands in question. CA 141, Sec. 48 (b) applies only to forest land. Director of Lands recognizes the subject lands as public, rather than forest land. As such, the requirement stated in CA 141, Sec. 48 cannot be invoked in the registration of the subject lands. Hence, it cannot be said that they have fulfilled this requirement.
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs. VILLAREAL G.R. No. L-32266, February 27, 1989
FACTS: Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on 25 January 1949, a land consisting of 178,113 sq. m. of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than 40 years. He was opposed by several persons, including the Director of Foresty on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the CFI Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the land in dispute was forestall in nature and not subject to private appropriation? HELD: The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and dismissed the application for registration of title of Villareal, Administrative Code of 1917; Mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of the country. Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared that mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative Code of 1917, which became effective on 1 October 1917, providing in Section 1820 of said code that for the purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character." The legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, remains unamended up to now, provides that mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING CO., INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 88883, January 18, 1991
FACTS: The Fredia Mineral claim of 9 hectares situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet was located sometime between December 25 and 31, 1930 by A.I. Reynolds in accordance with the provisions of Congress Act known as Philippine Bill of 1902 in a so-called Declaration of Location. The Declaration of Location of the mineral claim has been duly recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder sometime January 2, 1931. Fredia mineral claim was sold by A.I. Reynolds to Big Wedge Mining Co., which was the earlier name of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company, Inc. in a Deed of Sale executed November 2, 1931. Ever since, Atok has been in continuous and exclusive ownership and possession of said claim up to present. Atok has paid the realty taxes and occupation fees for the Fredia mineral claim as well as other mineral claims owned by them as declared under Tax Declaration 9535. Liwan Consi owns a lot below the land of Mr. Acay at Tuding Slide, Itogon, Benguet, where he constructed a house thereon in 1964. Said lot is covered by Tax Declaration 9462. When he first constructed his house below the lot of Mr. Acay, he was told that it was not necessary for him to obtain a building permit as it was only a nipa hut and no one prohibited him from entering the land as well as constructing a house thereon. In January 1984, Consi had the house repaired and people came to take pictures and told him that the lot belongs to Atok. However, Consi has been paying taxes on the said land, which his father before him had occupied. Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against Liwan Consi on March 1, 1984. The Municipal Trial Court of Itogon, presided over by Judge Irving rendered a decision on January 29, 1987 dismissing the case against Consi. Atok appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio and Benguet, presided over by Judge Ruben Ayson and on December 5, 1987, the RTC rendered decision stating that the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Itogon is reversed and set aside. Liwan Consi is ordered to vacate the premises of the Fredia Mineral claim at Tuding, Itogon, Benguet immediately, demolish the house, and to restore possession to Atok Big Wedge Mining Company. The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint regarding forcible entry action. There is a chance that the subject property may be classified as alienable agricultural land. At any rate, the mining company may not so readily describe Liwan Consi as a "squatter" he also has possessory rights over the property. Such rights may mature into ownership on the basis of long-term possession under the Public Land Law, thus, both Consi and Atok are of equal legal footing with regards the subject lot. But it was established that the petitioner has been in actual and beneficial possession of the subject lot since before the Second World War in the concept of owner and in good faith. ISSUE:
Whether or not an individual's long term occupation of land of the public domain vests him with such rights over the same as to defeat the rights of the owner of that claim? HELD: Yes. The Court enunciated that the petitioner, Atok, has the exclusive right to the property in question. The court grants the petition. The decision of the RTC is upheld and the decision of CA is reversed and set aside. The record shows that the lot in question was acquired through a Deed of Sale. The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefore upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public and the property of the locator. Atok has been in continuous and exclusive possession since 1931. Consi started only sometime in 1964 when he constructed a house thereon. Atok has, indeed, superior possessory rights than Consi. Atok has the right to sue for ejectment being in actual possession of the land and for the deprivation of his rights.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VDA. DE CASTILLO G.R. No. L-69002 June 30, 1988
FACTS: Modesto Castillo applied for the registration of two parcels of land located in Batangas. Modesto Castillo married to Amanda Lat was declared the true and absolute owner of the land with the improvements. The OCT 0-665 was issued to him by the Register of Deeds at Batangas. By virtue of an instrument, the two parcels of land covered by OCT 0-665 together with two other lots were consolidated and sub-divided into Lots 1-9. After Modestos death, Amanda Lat Vda. De Castillo executed a deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in favor of Florencio Castillo. As a result, Original Certificate of Title No. D-665 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, new transfer cerfificates of title were issued to Florencio Castillo. The Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. 2044 with the lower court for the annulment of the certificates of title issued to Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al., as heirs/successors of Modesto Castillo, and for the reversion of the lands covered thereby (Lots 1 and 2, Psu-119166) to the State. It was alleged that said lands had always formed part of the Taal Lake, washed and inundated by the waters thereof, and being of public ownership, it could not be the subject of registration as private property. They alleged in their answer that the Government's action was already barred by the decision of the registration court; that the action has prescribed; and that the government was estopped from questioning the ownership and possession of appellants. The Court of First Instance of Batangas, presided over by Honorable Benjamin Relova, ruled in favor of the petitioner. The decision orders the Register of Deeds of Batangas to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 0-665 in the name of Modesto Castillo and the subsequent Transfer of Certificates of Title issued over the property in the names of the defendants. Lots Nos. 1 and 2 are declared public lands belonging to the state. The Court of Appeals in a decision reversed and set aside the appealed decision, and dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Land Registration Court involving shore lands constitutes res adjudicata? HELD: Long possession of a land is not available as a defense for this case because the Court has already ruled that mere possession of land does not by itself automatically divest the land of its public character. The Supreme Court held that the decision of then Intermediate Appellate Court is set aside and reversed. The decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas is affirmed and reinstated. Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN
HILARIO vs. CITY OF MANILA GR No. L-19570, April 27, 1967

FACTS: The petitioner was the registered owner of a large tract of land around 49 hectares in area. Upon his death this property was inherited by his son, Jose Hilario, Jr., to whom a new certificate of title was issued. During the lifetime of plaintiffs father, the Hilario estate was bounded on the western side by the San Mateo River.3 To prevent its entry into the land, a bamboo and lumber post dike or ditch was constructed on the northwestern side. This was further fortified by a stonewall built on the northern side. For years, these safeguards served their purpose. However, in 1937, a great and extraordinary flood occurred which inundated the entire place including the neighboring barrios and municipalities. The River destroyed the dike on the northwest, left its original bed and meandered into the Hilario estate, segregating from the rest thereof a lenticular piece of land. The disputed area is on the eastern side of this lenticular strip which now stands between the old riverbed site and the new course. In 1945, the US Army opened a sand and gravel plant within the premises, and started scraping, excavating and extracting soil, gravel and sand from the nearby areas along the River. The operations eventually extended northward into the strip of land. Consequently, a claim for damages was filed with the US War Department by Luis Hidalgo, the then administrator of Dr. Hilarios estate. The US Army paid. In 1947, the plant was turned over to herein defendants-appellants and appellee who took over its operations. On 22 October 22, 1949, plaintiff filed his complaint for injunction and damages against the defendants City Engineer of Manila, District Engineer of Rizal, the Director of Public Works, and Engr. Busuego, the Engineer-in-charge of the plant. HELD: The Supreme Court set aside the decision and orders appealed from, and entered another judgment to the effect that the City of Manila and the Director of Public Works, and his agent and employees, are absolved of liability from extracting materials from subject property (of public domain); and the portion within the strip of land question declared not part of public domain and confirmed as part of Hilarios private property. The excavations and extractions of materials, even from the American period, have been made only on the strip of land west of the River. Under the following-the nature-of-things argument advanced by plaintiff, the River should have moved westward, where the level of the ground had been lowered. But the movement has been in the opposite direction instead. Therefore, it cannot be attributed to defendants operations. Moreover, Hilarios own evidence indicates that the movement eastward was all due to natural causes. The movement eastward of the channel by as much as 31 meters, from 1950 to 1953, was due to two typhoons which caused the erosion of the east bank and the depositing of materials on the west side which increased its level from as much as .93 to 2 meters. Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN
MANECLANG vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. L-66575, September 30, 1986
FACTS: Adriano Maneclang, et.al., petitioners, filed before the then CFI Pangasinan a complaint for quieting of title over a certain fishpond located within 4 parcels of land belonging to them situated in Barrio Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan. On August 15, 1975, the trial court dismissed the complaint upon a finding that the body of water traversing the titled properties is a creek constituting a tributary of the Agno; and held that Resolution 38, ordering an ocular inspection of the Cayangan Creek situated between Barrios Salomague Sur and Salomague Norte, and Resolution 95 authorizing public bidding for the lease of all municipal ferries and fisheries were passed by the members of the Municipal Council of Bugallon, Pangasinan in the exercise of their legislative powers. Maneclang appealed said decision to the IAC, which affirmed the same on 29 April 1983. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari. Before the IAC were able to comment on the petition, the petitioners manifested that for lack of interest on the part of respondent Alfredo Maza, the awardee in the public bidding of the fishpond, as the parties desire to amicably settle the case by submitting to the Court a Compromise Agreement praying that judgment be rendered recognizing the ownership of the petitioners over the land the body of water found within their titled properties. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and set aside the Compromise Agreement and declare the same null and void for being contrary to law and public policy. ISSUE: Whether or not the stipulations mentioned in the Compromise Agreement is null and void. HELD: The stipulations is null and void for being contrary to law and public policy. The stipulations contained in the Compromise Agreement partake of the nature of an adjudication of ownership of the fishpond in dispute, which was originally a creek forming a tributary of the Agno River. A creek, defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a property belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive, and as a public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual and considering further that neither the mere construction of irrigation dikes by the National Irrigation Administration which prevented the water from flowing in and out of the subject fishpond, nor its conversion into a fishpond, alter or change the nature of the creek as a property of the public domain. The Compromise Agreement, thus, is null and void and of no legal effect, the same being contrary to law and public policy.
REPUBLIC vs. REYES G.R. No. L-30263-5 October 3, 1987

FACTS: Urbano Lara and Godofredo Eusebio filed with the Bureau of Lands their Free Patent Applications for the parcels of land, situated in Napindan, Taguig, Rizal. After the favorable recommendation of a representative of the Bureau o Lands, said free patent applications were approved; they were issued to respondents Eusebio and Lara, which patents were transcribed and registered by the Register of Deeds of Rizal. In a subsequent investigation by the Anti-Graft and Corruption Board of the Bureau of Lands, it was discovered that the said lands were actually under water and form part of the Laguna de Bay. Lara and Eusebio executed separate affidavits, admitting that they have not complied with certain requirements of the Public Land Act and expressly agreed to have their patents and certificate of title cancelled. The Anti-Graft and Corruption Board of the Bureau of Lands filed separate complaints against Eusebio, Lara, and the Register of Deeds of Rizal, before the Court of First of Instance of Rizal (Branch II). Summons together with copies of the complaints were served to all defendants. However, notwithstanding the receipt of the summons, Eusebio and Lara failed to file their answers. The CFI of Rizal declared that the defendants were in default. The Register of Deeds addressed letters to respondents, informing them of the said decision and adbising them to surrender their owners duplicate copy of Original Certificates of Titles. Respondents sent a letter that they have long surrendered such to Atty. Javier of the investigating section of the Ani-graft and Corruption of the bureau of Lands. Respondents filed a case at the CFI of Rizal (Branch VI) against the Director of Lands for the annulment of the decision by the CFI of Rizal (Branch II). The CFI of Rizal (Branch VI) declared the judgment of the CFI of Rizal (Branch II) null and void. A motion to admit petition to reopen proceedings was filed by the Director of Lands in the CFI of Rizal (Branch VI); it averred that Eusebio and Lara executed a deed of absolute sale (in consideration for 10K) in favor of respondents Venzuela, Cenidoza, and Orosa at the same time when Eusebio and Lara secured the decision of the CFI of Rizal (Branch II) being final and executory, causing the cancellation of Original Certificates of Titles and the issuance in lieu thereof of Transfer Certificates of Title, in the names of Venzuela, Cenidoza, and Orosa. The court ruled that the petition is not the proper course of action available to the Director of Lands and has consequently lost his personality when he was declared in default, and the Court, its jurisdiction to entertain the aforementioned petition to reopen. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not a decision which has long become final and executed can be annulled on the grounds that the court lacks jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and that the decision was procured through fraud.
RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R. FEU Institute of Law HELD:
There is no question that the Court acquired jurisdiction over Eusebio and Lara as adduced from the evidence that personal service was made on them. Jurisdiction over a person of a defendant is acquired when he actually receives the summons. A judgment whether correct or not becomes final when the plaintiff did not appeal said judgment and courts are without jurisdiction over the case once judgment has become final. Doctrine of non-interference: judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened,modified, or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser shall be cancelled. The disputed area forms part of Laguna de Bay, neither agricultural nor disposable. Any false statement in an application for public land shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the title granted. A certificate of title cannot be used as a shield to perpetuate fraud, and the documents of indefeasibility of torrens title does not apply to free patent secured through fraud.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-45061 November 20, 1989
FACTS: A large tract of agricultural land situated in Barrio Kapok, Orion, Bataan, containing 233.6883 hectares, alleged to have been occupied since 1913 by the grandfather of applicant Arturo Rodriguez, the late Vicente Rodriguez, who, during his lifetime filed Lease Application with the Bureau of Lands, but which application was rejected upon investigation and ascertainment that the land was classified as within the U.S. Military Reservation under Executive Order of the President of the United States of America. Upon the death of Vicente Rodriguez in 1924, possession of the property was taken over by his sons, Victorino Rodriguez and Pablo Rodriguez. Both Victorino and Pablo Rodriguez waived their rights as heirs of the late Vicente Rodriguez over the subject property ceding all their participation, ownership and possession thereon in favor of Arturo Rodriguez, who sold two-thirds undivided portion of the land to Guillermo Reyes and Francisco S. Alcantara. In 1953, the land in question was deemed reverted to the public domain as it was excluded from the US-Philippine Military Bases Agreement. Arturo Rodriguez together with Guillermo Reyes and Francisco S. Alcantara filed a verified petition for registration of their title, alleging that they, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of their application. Thirty-nine (39) persons headed by Rosauro Canaria filed their Opposition to the petition for registration contending, among others, that they have been in actual, peaceful, adverse and continuous possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years and have introduced improvements thereon consisting of fruit-bearing trees; that the applicants have never been in possession of the property; and that applicant Arturo Rodriguez could not have inherited the land from his grandfather, because the children of Vicente Rodriguez are still living The lower court ruled in favor of the applicants confirming their title to the land, Orion Cadastre, Bataan and ordering its registration in the names of said applicants in the following proportion: 2/3 undivided portion to Arturo Rodriguez and 1/3 undivided portion to Guillermo Reyes. The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the lower court on the ground that the land in question had been decreed in 1938 to be part of the public domain by the cadastral court, which had become final thereby constituting a bar to the subsequent application for registration on the principle of res judicata. Applicants-appellees filed a motion for the reconsideration. Court of Appeals thru a division of five and by a vote of four to one reversed its decision and ruled that the prior decision of the cadastral court declaring the lot in question as public land way back in 1930. Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN
ISSUE: Whether or not the land was declared public domain and would, thus, be registrable. HELD: Registrable even though the cadastral court declared the land as public domain. The land in question had been declared public land in a decision rendered by the cadastral court. Factually, however, there is no prior final judgment at all to speak of because in a cadastral proceedings declaring a lot public land is not the final decree contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land Registration Act. Thus, a judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude the same applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public land remains alienable and disposable.
REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-40912 September 30, 1976
FACTS: On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No. 5436) of a 33-hectare situated in barrio Libaron, Municipality of Davao (now Davao City). The property applied for was a portion of what was then known as Lot 522 of the Davao Cadastre. On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through its Davao District Land Officer, accepted sealed bids for the purchase of the subject land. One Irineo Jose bidded for P20.00 per hectare, while a certain Dr. Josc Ebro submitted a bid of P100.50 per hectare The Director of Lands, however, annulled the auction sale for the reason that the sales applicant, Eugenio de Jesus, failed to participate in the bidding for non-service of notice on him of the scheduled bidding. In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on October 4, 1934. Sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the lone bidder. He equalled the bid previously submitted by Dr. Jose Ebro and made a deposit of P221.00 representing 10% of the price of the land at P100.50 per hectare. On November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issued to Eugenio de Jesus an Order of Award. On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that a portion of the land covered by Sales Application No. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes. On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclaimation No. 85 withdrawing Lot No. 1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the same for military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army. On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85 and declared the disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the provisions of the Public land Act for resettlement of the squatters in the Piapi Beach, Davao City. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners appeal is meritorious. HELD: It find petitioner's appeal to be meritorious. Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title. Proclamation No. 350 is free of any legal infirmity. It proceeds from the recognized competence of the president to reserve by executive proclamation alienable lands of the public domain for a specific public use or service. Appellate Court erroneously ruled that Alejandro's father, Eugenio de Jesus, had acquired ownership over the whole 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 because the Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN
Sales Award issued to him on November 23, 1934 by then Director of Lands Simeon Ramos covered the 33 hectares applied for, including the 12.8081 hectares.
LAHORA vs. DAYANGHIRANG G.R. No. L-28565 January 30, 1971

FACTS: Francisco Lahora and Toribia Moralizon file a petition for registration of 9 parcels of land in Davao. Registration of one of the parcels of land identified as lot no. 2228 was opposed by appellee Emilio Dayanghirang who alleged that said lot was already registered in the name of his wife. Director of Lands also filed opposition to the petition arguing that appellants never had sufficient title over such land sought to be registered nor were they been in open, continuous or notorious possession of said lot. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for the original registration of lot no. 2228 is valid? RULING: No. The registration of lot no. 2228 is invalid as the lot has already been registered under the name of oppositors wife. It was not denied by the appellants that said land was a public land grant in favor of oppositors wife, because when the Government grants land to a private individual a patent thereof is recorded and a certificate of title is issued to the grantee then it comes within the land registration act that after 1 year of issuance said title becomes indefeasible, incontrovertible and irrevocable. And as the court ruled in Pamintuan vs. San Agustin that a cadastral court cannot decree a registration over a land which has already been registered in an earlier case, and a second decree for said land is null and void.
LABURADA vs. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY 287 SCRA 33

FACTS: The petitioners were the applicants in an LRC Case for the registration of Lot 3-A, Psd-1372, located in Mandaluyong City. Trial court, acting as a land registration court, rendered its decision disposing thus, Spouses Marciano and Erlinda Laburada, have a registrable title over the parcel of land. The trial court, upon motion of petitioners, issued an order requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA refused. Hence, petitioners filed this action for mandamus. Attached to the LRA's comment on the petition is a report igned by Silverio G. Perez, director of the LRA Department of Registration, which explained public respondent's refusal to issue the said decree. An application for registration of title of a parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of San Felipe Neri, Province of Rizal was filed by Spouses Marciano Laburada and Erlinda Laburada. It was found that it might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration (CLR) Case Nos. 699, 875 and 817. The letter of this Authority was sent to the Register of Deeds, Pasig, Metro Manila, requesting for a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. 355, issued in the name of Compania Agricola de Ultramar. It was found that the technical description of the parcel of land described therein is not readable, that prompted this Authority to send another letter requesting for a certified typewritten copy of OCT No. 355, or in lieu thereof a certified copy of the subsisting certificate of title with complete technical description of the parcel of land involved therein. To date, however, no reply to our letter has as yet been received by this Authority. After verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, it was found that Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O. 7237, is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor. For this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners, it would result in the duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purpose of the Torrens registration system. ISSUE: Whether or not the Land Registration Authority can be compelled to issue the corresponding decree of registration. HELD: No. Petitioners contend that mandamus is available in this case, for the LRA unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the laws specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office. Therefore, petition is hereby dismissed but the case is remanded to the court of origin in Pasig City. Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN
REPUBLIC vs. LAO G.R. No. 150413, July 1, 2003

FACTS: Lao filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City application for registration of a parcel of land. She allegedly acquired the land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria Valenzuela who inherited it from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from Edilberto Perido by transfer. She prayed that the land be registered in her name under Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act) based on her and her predecessor-in-interests open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years. She presented witnesses and evidence constituting of deed of sale, survey plan, the technical description of property and tax declarations in her and her predecessors names. The court approved the application. The petitioner represented by the Solicitor General appealed the decision before the CA which re-affirmed the lower court decision, hence this petition for review before the SC. The petitioner contends that there is no sufficient evidence to warrant the issuance of the title to the respondent as she fails to comply with the required periods and acts of possession mandated by law and her failure to prove that the land is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the respondent sufficiently provided evidence that she meets the qualifications required by lawon the manner of possession (continuous, adverse, notorious, etc..) and the period of time (30 years) necessary to have a bonafide claim of ownership under C.A. 141. 2. Whether or not respondent was able to show that the land subject of her application was disposable and alienable land of the public domain. HELD: The court held that Commonwealth Act 141 requires that before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; in adverse possession over the land for at least 30 years and the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Petitioner was right to contend that the respondent did not prove by incontrovertible evidence that she possessed the property in the manner and time required by law. She further did not present any certification from appropriate government agency to show that the property is re-classified as disposable and alienable land of the public domain. It is incumbent for an applicant of a land registration to provide these incontrovertible evidences to support her Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN
claim for her application. In the absence of these evidences, her application shall fail. Hence the petition was granted and her application was denied.
BERNARDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 111715, June 8, 2000

FACTS: Manuel Silvestre Bernardo, claiming to be the legitimate son and only surviving heir of Tomas Bernardo, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a verified petition for reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12658 that the Register of Deeds of Rizal Province issued in the name of Tomas Bernardo. TCT No. 12658 allegedly covered an area of approximately three hundred thirty-four thousand five hundred eleven (334,511) square meters in Quezon City (previously part of Rizal Province) designated as Lot 802 of the Piedad Estate. Petitioner Manuel Bernardo alleged that since his deceased father died, he had continuously exercised actual ownership and possession over the property embraced in and covered by said title. He asserted that the technical descriptions, boundaries and area of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 12658 are substantially the same as those indicated in the official Technical Descriptions attached to the petition and the officially approved survey plan that he would present at the hearing. He indicated therein the properties adjoining the property covered by TCT No. 12658 as follows: On the N., Lots 724 & 935 (Piedad Estate) owned/claimed by Far Eastern University, Manila; on the E., Lot 933 (Piedad Estate) owned/claimed by San Pedro Estate represented by Engracio San Pedro of 118 Kamias Road, Quezon City; on the S., Lot 706 (Piedad Estate) owned/claimed by San Pedro Estate, supra; and on the NW., Lot 705 (Piedad Estate) owned/claimed by Himlayang Pilipino, Quezon Blvd., Quezon City;. On the strength of the certification allegedly issued by the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal stating that the original copy of TCT No. 12658 was on file and record under Reg. Book T-51 and that he could no longer locate the owners copy of TCT No. 12658, petitioner Manuel Bernardo contended that reconstitution of the same certificate of title was proper and necessary. Otherwise, he could not exercise his legitimate rights as owner of the property. ISSUE: Whether or not, under the Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals may entertain and render a decision on a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a two-pronged purpose: (a) annulment of an Order reconstituting a title, and (b) questioning the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint for nullification of titles covering lots that overlap the area covered by the reconstituted title. HELD: Contrary to the Bernardos contention, the Court of Appeals correctly entertained the petition filed before it by the private respondents. That the Court of Appeals is vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgment and with original but concurrent jurisdiction over a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition is immaterial. What is material is that the issues jointly raised before the Court of Appeals pertain to the jurisdiction of the Pasig and Quezon City RTCs respectively, over the reconstitution proceedings and the denial Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN
of the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. Q-92-12645. As this Court has always stressed, the Rules of Court must be liberally construed.
FRANCISCO vs. CA 97 SCRA 22

FACTS: The Petitioner alleges that she is the absolute owner of the land in dispute covered with an Original Certificate of title of the Register of Deeds; that she is in continuous, adverse, open, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the land since time immemorial; respondents have never been in possession of the land as they claim and that they obtained their Decree of Registration of said land by fraud. Apparently, Diego Francisco, the petitioners father occupied the land in dispute since 1918 and obtained a homestead patent for it. He was able to secure a title in favor of his children petitioner included for the big parcel of land he cultivates and improves and when he died in 1941 the petitioner continued to possess the land in question not embraced in the Transfer of Cert. of Title issued to them in the concept of an owner. The petitioner had the land surveyed from a private surveyor only to find out that there is already a survey plan of the said land in the name of the respondents and that a title was already issued to them. Petitioner did not read the publication in the Official Gazette and the former mayor of Teresa who is the owner of the property across the Santol Creek testified that Diego Francisco was in possession of the land throughout his lifetime and after his death his heirs and not the respondents. By virtue of this continuous, adverse, and open possession of the land in question for forty-seven (47) years now, Fausta Francisco has become the absolute owner of this parcel of land. Respondent contends that the petitioners claim for ownership of the land in question is insufficient in form and substance failing to explain under what color of title she acquires ownership of the land in question, citing that an essential requisite for a valid petition for reopening and review of a decree should be made by a person who is deprived of the land or interest. A mere claim of ownership is not sufficient to avoid a certificate of title obtained under the Land Registration Act. They claim that Toribio Santos, the respondents father owns the land and Alejandro Santos inherited it from him and occupied the land in 1920 and has been in possession thereof for more than 30 years. ISSUE: Who is the true and absolute owner of the land in question. HELD: The court finds it absurd that the respondent claims that they complied with the requisite of serving notice to interested parties on the land in question. It is clear that the petitioner and her brothers and sisters who are the actual occupants of the adjacent lots were not notified of the registration proceeding applied for by the petitioner. It is clear that no notice was sent to the actual owner and possessor of the land in question allowing the respondents to successfully register the land in their name. Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN
AGUILAR vs. CAOAGDAN 105 Phil. 766

FACTS: The registered land in question is the same identical property object of Registration Case No. 494 of this Court, G.L.R.O. Record No. 15951, filed in 1919, wherein the Director of Lands was the principal oppositor claiming the land as part of the public domain. The applicants therein were the spouses Simon Castro y Rufo and Tomasa Aguilar. In 1924, this Court rendered therein a decision declaring the land in question a part of the public domain. However, on appeal by the applicants, our Supreme Court, in 1926, reversed the decision of this lot covered by Plan Psu15730, with the exception of the Canoac Creek, in favor of the applicants. Before she died, however, she sold pendente life the land in question to plaintiff Januario Hermitano, and by virtue of said sale Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10499 was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15763 (Exhibit "C") was issued in favor of Januario Hermitano on April 8, 1953. Sometime before the commencement of this case, the defendants had filed individual free applications with the Bureau of Lands over several lots comprised within Plan Ps-84 (Exhibit "4") covering a big mass of land situated in Mangatarem, Pangasinan. The Bureau of Lands, however, in January to March, 1947, after due investigation and relocation of the registered property in question, ordered the exclusion from the respective free patent applications of the defendants (Exhibits "E", "E-1" to "E-31") of all portions thereof that where included by the Bureau of Lands from the respective free patent applications of the defendants, containing a total area of 419,824 square meters, more or less, are part and parcel of the registered land in question, (Exhibits "D" and "D-1"). In contending that the title to the land in question was procured by the original registered owners in bad faith, the defendants claimed that they were not personally notified of the initial registration proceedings in the aforementioned Registration Case No. 494 and that they were misled and deceived by the pendency of another registration case filed by the applicants before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan over a bigger mass of land which includes the several portions now in dispute. HELD: Moreover, it appears that appellants based their right to the land merely on the applications for homestead patent they filed with the Bureau of Lands which were then under investigation when the registration case was filed in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac wherein the Bureau of Lands was made party respondent. It can therefore be said that appellants were already indirectly represented in the registration case by the Bureau of Lands because their interest in the land can be considered as derivative of the Bureau's claim that it belong to the public domain. But what makes the claim of appellants legally futile is that they are raising the nullity or invalidity of the decree and title of appellees over the property in question after the lapse of more than 30 years, which certainly cannot be done considering the purpose of our Torrens system.
NICOLAS vs. PRE 97 Phil. 766

FACTS: It is the contention of appellant that this action of the trial court was in violation of section 37 of Act No. 496 because, after having dismissed the registration proceeding upon the motion of appellant, the court could no longer continue the hearing without requiring the appellees to file a new application for registration so that they may comply with the law as regards publication as if it were an original application. And the court having failed to follow this procedure, its ulterior proceeding is null and void, upon the theory that the court acted without jurisdiction or in violation of the law. ISSUE: Whether or not the action of the court in authorizing the clerk to receive the evidence of the oppositors cannot be sustained. HELD: The legal contemplation and, strictly speaking, the applicant, as far as his application for registration was concerned, had already lost his standing in court when the oppositors presented their evidence before the Clerk of Court, and for this reason, his assault against the legality of the action of the court in authorizing its Clerk to receive the evidence of the oppositors cannot now be sustained.
LIM vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 112876, June 8, 2000

FACTS: The respondent entered into a contract of lease with petitioner for a period of 3 years that is from 1976 to 1979. After the stipulated term, the respondent refused to vacate the premises. The petitioner filed an ejectment suit against the former in the City Court of Manila. Civil Case No. 051063-CV. The case was terminated by a judicially approved compromise agreement of the parties providing in part: 1. That the term of the lease shall be renewed every three years retroacting from Oct 1979 to Oct 1982. 2. The rent will be automatically increase in 20% everythree years for as long as the defendant needed the premises and can meet and pay the said increases.c.The defendant to give notice of his intent to renew sixty(60) days before the expiration of the term. By reason of the said compromise agreement the leasecontinued from 1979 to 1982; 1982-1985. On April 17, 1985, petitioner advised private respondent that hewould no longer renew the contract effective October, 1985. On August 5, 1985, private respondent informed petitioner inwriting of his intention to renew the contract of lease for anotherterm, commencing November, 1985 to October, 1985. On January 15, 1986, the petitioner again filed another ejectmentsuit at the MTC of Manila in Civil Case No. 114659-CV. On September 24, 1987 said court dismissed the complaint onthe grounda.the lease contract has not expired, being a continuousone the period whereof depended upon the lesseesneed for the premises and his ability to pay rentsb.the compromise agreement constitutes res judicata. On January 28, 1988, CA affirmed the decision of the lower court. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of CA meritorious? HELD: We thus do not see any need to discuss further the allegations and contentions on procedural matters of the petitioners. Suffice it to state that private respondents were not guilty of forum-shopping, which is prohibited by Circular No. 28-91, when they filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The established rule is that for forum-shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, same essential facts and circumstances, and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. In filing the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition, private respondents simply raised the issue of jurisdiction of the lower courts in the actions they took cognizance of. Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN
LTD 2nd Semester 2012-2013 197 SCRA 13
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEE

FACTS: Lee filed before the RTC a registration of a parcel of land in her favor which was opposed by the Director Of Lands on grounds that respondent or her predecessor-in-interest acquired the land under any recognized mode for acquisition of title; they have not been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years prior to the filing of application and the land in dispute is a public domain belonging to Republic of the Philippines. The court rendered judgment in favor of respondents. Upon appeal by RP, it affirmed the lower court decision thus this appeal to the Supreme Court. Republic of the Philippines contends that Lee failed to prove by conclusive evidence that she has ownership of the land by fee simple title and her testimony as to the ownership of her predecessor-in-interest is self serving after claiming that she obtained her Deed of Sale of the property from Laureana Mataban and Sixto Espiritu who obtained their title from the previous owners of the land, Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan. From the time of filing the application of registration, the respondent was in possession of the land for 13 years but she sought to tack her possession on the said land from her predecessor-in-interests who were in possession of the land for 20 years. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is able to provide sufficient and substantial evidence as complying with the requirement of law for confirmation of her ownership of the land in dispute? HELD: It is incumbent upon the respondent to prove that her predecessor-in-interest is the persons of Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan have been in adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful possession in the concept of an owner for 20 years which she failed to provide a clear and convincing evidence to prove. Her bare allegations do not constitute substantial proof. Respondent failed to comply with the requirements of the law to confirm her title on the land applied for registration. Lower court decision was set aside. Underlying Principle, lands not acquired from the government belong to the state as part of public domain.
TURQUESA vs. VALERA G.R. No. 76371, January 20, 2000

FACTS: Valera applied for registration of 2 parcels of land referred to as Lot 1 and Lot 2. She alleged to have bought Lot 1 and declared it in her name for taxation purposes. The opposition of Bureau of Lands was denied for failure to substantiate his claim that the land is part of the public domain. Other petitioners claim that their lands were included in Lot 1 sought to be registered by the respondent. The lower court decided in favor of the respondent and denied petitioners motion for ocular inspection of the land in dispute. Oppositors appealed to CA regarding Lot 1. The trial court reiterated its former judgment to registerthe whole are of Lot 1 to the respondent with its encumbrance to PNB in the amount of P1,000 removed as it was already paid and thus no longer annotated on the title. The oppositors appealed with the argument that their properties were erroneously included in the respondents land registration. CA modified the land registration on lot 1 excluding the landholdings of the oppositors. Respondent filed a suit for a writ of possession over 2 lots occupied by Santiago Partolan and Crispin Baltar which the court denied. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the court decision and granted the motion for writ of possession on the landholdings of Partolan, Baltar and oppositors who did not appeal the decision of the lower court while excluding the landholdings of Segundina and Damasen who proved they have rightful and registrable rights over their claim on a specific portion of land. Thus, the oppositors filed a motion for review. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is entitled for land registration of the entire area of Lot 1 including those owned by the oppositors? HELD: The court held that the burden of proof in land registration is encumbered upon the applicant who must show he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for. Because the land registration proceeding is an in rem proceeding, a default order issued by the court binds the whole world except those appearing in court to file their opposition or pleadings in the registration case. Thus, the oppositors are exempted from the general default order by the court. Respondent should also prove not only the genuineness of her title but also to identify the land in dispute with the boundaries comprising it. The writ of possesion sought by the private respondent against persons who are in actual possession under claim of ownership and their possession of the land raises a disputable presumption of ownership. Therefore, the land areas to be registered to the respondent are limited only to certain areas in the sketch that is annexed to the Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN
Commissioners report as the respondent failed to establish proprietary right over the excluded areas.
REPUBLIC vs. SODSOD G.R. No. 116426, April 12, 2000

FACTS: The Director of Lands filed with the Court of first Instance of Albay, Ligao cadastral proceedings[3] for the coverage under the torrens system of the lands in Oas Cadastre, Oas, Albay. Spouses Gerardo Sodsod and Felicidad Rellores filed an answer to the petition, claiming ownership of Lot No. 10367, Oas Cadastre, consisting of 52,847 square meters, located at Tablon, Oas, Albay, by virtue of their more than thirty (30) years possession including that of their predecessor-ininterest. During the cadastral hearings, the lot was uncontested. The evidence showed that respondent Sodsod and his predecessor-in-interest occupied and possessed the lot in question in the concept of owner, openly, continuously, adversely, notoriously and exclusively since 1929, or for more than thirty (30) years. ISSUE: Whether the respondent and his predecessor-in-interest possessed the land in question for more than thirty years sufficient to vest in him registrable title over the same. HELD: Nonetheless, looking into the facts of this case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that respondent has fully complied with the requirements under Section 48 (b), C.A. No. 141 for confirmation of title over the lot in question. Ipso jure, respondent has acquired private ownership of the land by mere possession and occupation for more than thirty (30) years under claim of ownership. Since 1929 up to the filing of the cadastral case, respondent and his predecessor had been in actual, open, continuous, exclusive, peaceful and notorious possession and occupation of the lot involved in the concept of owners.
LUCENA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-77468, August 31, 1999
FACTS: The petitioners alleged they are the registered owners of a parcel of land located at the barrio of Mag-asawang Tubig, Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. On October 29, 1969, petitioner Eduardo Lucena obtained a loan from the private respondent Rural Bank of Naujan, Inc. in the amount of three-thousand pesos secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on said parcel of land. On October 1, 1970, after the loan had matured, petitioners paid to the Rural Bank of Naujan, Inc., the sum of two-thousand six pesos and ninety centavos (P2,006.90) in partial satisfaction of their debt, thereby leaving a balance of one-thousand pesos (P1,000.00) in its favor. An affidavit of consolidation of ownership was executed by the Rural Bank of Naujan through its manager, private respondent Rogelio P. Pineda. The affidavit of consolidation was subsequently registered by private respondent Reynaldo Mambil in his capacity as acting Register of Deeds on July 8, 1975, under Entry No. 134351. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-41512 in the name of the petitioners was thus cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-68547 of the Registry of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro was then issued in favor of the rural bank also on July 8, 1975. Thereafter, on July 14, 1975, a deed of sale was executed by the rural bank through its manager whereby the subject property was sold to private respondent spouses Marianito Baja and Patricia Araja, resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. T-68547 and the subsequent issuance of TCT No. T-68680 in the name of said respondents. Said deed of sale dated July 14, 1975 was accepted and registered by private respondent Ramon G. Garcia. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not reconveyance and damages is the proper remedy available to petitioners. 2. Whether or not a valid foreclosure sale of the subject property was conducted. HELD: 1. With respect to the first issue, this Court has ruled that failure to comply with statutory requirements as to publication of notice of auction sale constitutes a jurisdictional defect which invalidates the sale. In the case at bar, the affidavit of posting executed by the sheriff states that notices of the public auction sale were posted in three (3) conspicuous public places in the municipality such as (1) the bulletin board of the Municipal Building (2) the Public Market and (3) the Bus Station. There is no indication that notices were posted in the barrio where the subject property lies. Clearly, there was a failure to publish the notices of auction sale as required by law. 2. What Baja should have noticed, if we follow his own chronological estimates, was that the title was still in the petitioners name when he verified the status of the land in question. Hence, at the time the property in question was Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN
being sold to him by the rural bank, possession thereof was with the petitioners, exercised through their tenant Victor Atienza.
HEIRS OF BRUSAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS 313 SCRA 176

FACTS: Petitioners heirs of Juan, Mariano, Tarcela and Josefa Brusas claimed that the property, formerly a public land, was part of the 33 hectare land in the actual physical possession of their grandfather Sixto Brusas who have inherited the same from their great grandfather. On July 1968, Ines Brusas applied and was granted free a patent over lots 1 and 2 of said land. Thus when Mariano and Josefa Brusas filed their sworn statements of landholdings in 1973 they discovered that their properties were already titled in the name of their sister Ines. Which then made siblings Mariano and Josefa Brusas filed a petition for reconveyance of said property. ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of said property? HELD: Ines Brusas is the lawful owner of the property as It is a fundamental principle in land registration that a certificate of title serves as an evidence of incontrovertible title of the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. And the primary purpose of the Torrens System was to quiet the title and to prevent forever the questions of its legality. And a title once registered in the Torrens system can no longer be defeated by actual, open or notorious possession or even by prescription.

LTD - Hiezll Rivera

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RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R.

FEU Institute of Law

LTD 2nd Semester 2012-2013

RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R. FEU Institute of Law

LTD 2nd Semester 2012-2013

Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN

RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R. FEU Institute of Law

LTD 2nd Semester 2012-2013

GSIS v. SANTIAGO G.R. No. 155206, October 28, 2003

Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN

RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R. FEU Institute of Law

LTD 2nd Semester 2012-2013

Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN

RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R. FEU Institute of Law

LTD 2nd Semester 2012-2013

LEONARDO v. MARAVILLA G.R. No. 143369, November 27, 2012

Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN

RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R. FEU Institute of Law

LTD 2nd Semester 2012-2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA G.R. Nos. 103882 & 105276

Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN

RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R. FEU Institute of Law

LTD 2nd Semester 2012-2013

CALICDAN vs. CEDAA G.R. No. 155080, February 5, 2004

Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN

RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R. FEU Institute of Law

LTD 2nd Semester 2012-2013

Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN

RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R. FEU Institute of Law

LTD 2nd Semester 2012-2013

Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN

RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R. FEU Institute of Law

LTD 2nd Semester 2012-2013

Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN

RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R. FEU Institute of Law

LTD 2nd Semester 2012-2013

BARANDA vs. GUSTILLO G.R. No. L-81163, September 26, 1988

Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN

RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R. FEU Institute of Law

LTD 2nd Semester 2012-2013

Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN

RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R. FEU Institute of Law

LTD 2nd Semester 2012-2013

Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN

RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R. FEU Institute of Law

LTD 2nd Semester 2012-2013

Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN

RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R. FEU Institute of Law

LTD 2nd Semester 2012-2013

Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN

RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R. FEU Institute of Law

LTD 2nd Semester 2012-2013

RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R. FEU Institute of Law

LTD 2nd Semester 2012-2013

HILARIO vs. CITY OF MANILA GR No. L-19570, April 27, 1967

RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R. FEU Institute of Law

LTD 2nd Semester 2012-2013

Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN

RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R. FEU Institute of Law

LTD 2nd Semester 2012-2013

REPUBLIC vs. REYES G.R. No. L-30263-5 October 3, 1987

Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN

RIVERA, Hiezll Wynn R. FEU Institute of Law HELD: