Aristotle on Improving One's Character Author(s): Gianluca Di Muzio Source: Phronesis, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Aug., 2000), pp.

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Aristotle on Improving One's Character

GLANLUCADI MUZIO

ABSTRACT

Contraryto what most interpretershold, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle is not committed to the view that people of established vicious character could never become good. The present paper proves this result (1) by giving a better reading of 1114 a 12-21, a passage which has traditionallybeen taken to assert that unjustand self-indulgentpeople are doomed to a lifetime of vice; (2) by showhe ing that when Aristotle refers to self-indulgentpeople as "incurable", does not mean that they could never change, but only that they could not change as a result of external influences such as persuasion or punishment;(3) by proving that although Aristotle regards the desires of vicious people as determined by their character,there is room within Aristotelian moral psychology for the possibility that people of corruptcharacterbecome motivated to begin a process of moral reform.

In chapter5 of Book III of the NicomacheanEthics, Aristotle argues that characteris voluntary.He supportsthis conclusion by pointing out that (1) engaging in activities of a certain kind producescorresponding states of character(1114 a 7); and (2) everybodyknows that (1) is true (1114 a 9-10). In Aristotle's view, those who routinely do, say, unjust actions tend to producein themselvesan unjustcharacter. Since they are aware of the long-termeffects their actions will have on their character, then if in the end they acquire a permanentdispositionto act unjustly, Thereis thus a clear they can fairlybe said to have acquiredit voluntarily. sense in which unjustor self-indulgentpeople wish to be unjustor selfindulgent(1114 a 11-12). Then comes a passage in which Aristotleappearsto suggest that those who have acquireda morally corruptcharactercannot change it or act contraryto it:
But if without being ignoranta man does the things which will make him unjust, he will be unjust voluntarily. Yet it does not follow that if he wishes he will cease to be unjust and will be just. For neither does the man who is ill become well on those terms. We may suppose a case in which he is ill voluntarily, through living incontinently and disobeying his doctors. In that case it was then open to him not to be ill, but not now, when he has thrown away his chance, just as when you have let a stone go it is too late to recover it; but yet it was in your power to throw it, since the moving principle was in you. So, too, to the unjust and to the self-indulgent man it was open at the beginning not to become

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men of this kind, and so they are unjust and self-indulgent voluntarily;but now that they have become so it is not possible for them not to be so (1114 a 12-21, trans. Ross). '

In this passage Aristotle compares a man who has made himself unjust with one who has made himself ill. To the two men it was open at the outset to be just and healthy respectively. But now that the one has voluntarily become unjust and the other has voluntarily become ill, they cannot escape the condition they have brought upon themselves through their actions. They are like someone who has voluntarily thrown away a stone and can no longer recover it. The passage, then, appears to seek to establish two propositions: (a) that those who have acquired a bad character cannot subsequently change it, and (b) that people of established bad character can only act in character, since this, once acquired, is a prison from which no one can escape. A passage in the Categories, however, indicates that Aristotle regarded moral reform as possible:
For the bad man, if led into better ways of living and talking, would progress, if only a little, towards being better. And if he once made even a little progress it is clear that he might either change completely or make really great progress. For however slight the progress he made to begin with, he becomes ever more easily changed towards virtue, so that he is likely to make still more progress; and when this keeps happening it brings him over completely into the contrary
state, provided time permits (Categories 13 a 23-31, trans. Ackrill).

Instead of treating the apparent conflict between the two passages as an oddity within the Aristotelian corpus, William Bondeson tried to reconcile them.2 The present paper aims to supplement Bondeson's discusAccepted February 2000 I their commentaryto this passage, Gauthierand Jolif quote from P. Mesnard's In La morale d'Aristote (Alger, 1942, pp. 24-25). Mesnard holds that for Aristotle the on le and vicious cannot"remonter courant", remarks how foreignthe notionof conversion was to the Greek mentality (R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif, eds., L'Ethique a Nicomaque, Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1970, vol. H, pt. 1, pp. 214-215). See also discussionsof the passage in D. Furley,Twostudies in the GreekAtomists,Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1967, p. 190; R. Sorabji,Necessity, Cause, and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle'sTheory,Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress, 1980, p. 232; R. Curren, "The contributionof Nicomachean Ethics iii 5 to Aristotle's theory of responsibility", History of Philosophy Quarterly, 6 (1989), pp. 261-277 (esp. pp. 272-273). 2 W. Bondeson, "Aristotle on responsibility for one's characterand the possibility of of characterchange",Phronesis 19 (1974), pp. 59-65. In his interpretation Aristotle's position in the Nicomachean Ethics, Bondeson focused on 1114 a 9-10. These lines make the point that only a "thoroughlysenseless" person would not know that "it is

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sion.3 By giving a close reading of the passage in the Nicomachean Ethics,

I will bring out certainfeaturesof Aristotle's argumentthat interpreters to have overlooked.It will emergethatAristotlesubscribed only one view, namely, that moralreformis possible, althoughdifficult. First of all, we need to place the Nicomacheanpassage in its proper context. As we have seen, it comes right after 1114 a 11-12, a statement must wish to the effect that those who have acquireda certaincharacter
from the exercise of activities on particularobjects that states of character are produced". In Bondeson's view, Aristotle would not stress that people usually know about the character-formingpower of their actions unless he also thought that characteris changeable. As Bondeson puts it, "If men do know that actions of certain kinds lead to correspondingstates of character,then that knowledge makes them responsible for the states of characterwhich they have acquired. But this is possible only if it is possible to act contrary to an established character.One could imagine a case in which a man knew that the actions he performs will lead to a correspondingstate of character but nevertheless he is unable to act contrary to his existing state of character" (p. 64). Bondeson's point, as I understandit, is that Aristotle is issuing a reminder ("You know that your repeated actions shape your character.So you are responsible for the kind of characteryou eventually acquire").But this type of reminderimplies that those for whom it is issued are free to act as they please, even contraryto their character.One would not warn others by saying: "Watchhow you act" if one thought that people's existing states of characterrob them of any control over their actions. Is Bondeson's argumentconclusive? Only if it can be proved that Aristotle's warning is intendedboth for people of established characterand for people whose character is in course of formation.The former have acquiredstable dispositions througha long process of habituation.Some of them may even be called "fully virtuous" or "fully vicious". The latter are still in the process of shaping their dispositions to act virtuously or viciously. Bondeson clearly thinks that Aristotle is speaking to both sets of people (cf. note 12 on p. 64 of Bondeson's paper and the reference to acting contrary to an established characterin the above quote). But this requiresargument.For given the text, Aristotle may simply be addressing his warning to those who have not yet acquired a set of stable dispositions and thus need to be reminded of the difference their futureactions will make to those dispositions. In other words, Aristotle's warning does not prove anythingper se. If the warning is not also addressedto people of established character,then issuing it is consistent with holding that those who have acquired stable dispositions can no longer act contrary to them. My approach, unlike Bondeson's, does not focus exclusively on 1114 a 9-10. By looking at the whole of 1114 a 12-21, I show directly, and not by implication, that Aristotle does not there assert that character is unchangeable. His point is that character cannot be changed simply by wishing to do so. In my interpretation,then, Aristotle's warning is directed to those who are in the process of forming their character.Aristotle reminds these people that character,although voluntary and changeable, is not changeable at will and easily. I I am also developing and providing textual support for a suggestion that comes in the very last paragraphof F. A. Siegler's paper "Voluntaryand Involuntary",The Monist 52 (1968), pp. 268-287.

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to be as they are. Now Aristotleis careful to preventa possible misunderstanding his position.To say thatthose who have a certaincharacter of wish to be as they are is not to say thatit is by wishingto be a certaintype of personthatone becomes so. To say thatcharacter voluntary, that is and we can controlthe character acquire,is not to say thatwe can acquire we a character will, just by wishing to do so. Put more formally,Aristotle at is committedto the conditional"If a personhas an X-type character, that personwishes to be an X-type person",but he wants to make it clear that this conditionaldoes not entail its converse. The phrasingof 1114 a 13-14 revealspreciselythatAristotleis nipping in the bud a possible misunderstandingof his view: "ovO Eav YE jiTlv i' c KQi gata aLtKOcxv aetat which Ross translates iat1KaLto;", Po)kXEal, "Yetit does not follow that if he wishes he will cease to be unjustand will be just" (emphasissupplied).Aristotle'ssaying that people voluntarily form theirown character wish to have it may encouragesomeone and to take him to be saying that people can change their character just by wishing to do so. This, however, is not the case, Aristotlestresses. The kind of change underdiscussionhere does not happenmerely as a result of wish. It is to illustratethis point that Aristotleintroducesthe comparison with the man who makeshimself ill. Farfrombeing intendedto support the impossibilityof character change for the bad man, the comparison is rather intended to clarify how that change could happen. The wording of 1114 a 14-15 is particularly revealing:"Forneitherdoes the man who is ill become well [by wishing to become well]". This sentence is about a man who undergoes a change and becomes well from ill. Aristotleremindsus thateverybodywould dismissthe suggestionthatthis man became well just by wishing to become well. Now supposethat this to is a personwho became ill voluntarily, adoptinga lifestyle contrary by is his doctors'recommendations 114 a 15-16).This supposition intended (1 to create an analogy with the case of someone who becomes unjust.For Aristotlehas just told us that those who become unjustdo so voluntarily. So if Aristotleintendsfor there to be an analogy between the two men, and the former is a voluntarilyill person who becomes well, the latter must be a voluntarilyunjustpersonwho becomes just. The whole point of the comparisonis to show thatjust as an ill persondoes not become healthysimply by wishing, so an unjustpersondoes not becomejust simthe ply by wishing.Through former,familiarfact, Aristotleseeks to estabof lish the latter, preventinga misunderstanding his view. He does not say, of the unjustman, thathe could neverchange.Rather,he tries to perthe ill suadeus, through analogywith the voluntarily person,thatan unjust

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man could not change simply by wishing to do so, even if thereis a clear sense in which people can controlthe character they have. The simile of the stone, at 1114 a 17-19, supportsAristotle's position with a further analogy.The analogyis betweenthe state of being ill (when one has become ill voluntarily)and the state of being unjustor self-indulgent. The act of throwinga stone serves as a common term of comparison to link these two states. One who is in the state of having become ill voluntarily exactly in the same predicament someonewho has thrown is as a stone. At first, it was open to the individualnot to throw the stone/ become ill. But afterthe throw/onsetof the disease, the individualcannot help being in the situationhe is in (the situationof having thrown the stone/beingill, with all the consequencesthe situationentails).No amount of wishing can alter the individual'spresentpredicament. Aristotleis not assertinganythingstrongerthan this. For it would be odd and uncharitable to interpret comparison the with the throwof the stone as intendedto show that once one has voluntarilycontractedan ailment,one can never recover.This is contraryto fact, and, in addition,the passage was about an ill man who becomes well all along (recall 1114 a 14-14: "Forneither does the man who is ill becomewell on those terms").Whatreasonwould we have, then, to think that when the focus of the analogy shifts to the unjustor self-indulgentman, Aristotlemeans that once one has acquired a corruptcharacter,moral reform is impossible?If this was Aristotle's view, he would alertus to a differencebetweenthe ill and the unjustman, instead of likening them to each other. The concludinglines of the passage cash out the analogyby assertingthat,just as the voluntarily man, ill the unjustman is similarto a man who has throwna stone. Like the latter, who could have avoidedthrowingthe stone (1114 a 18-19), the unjust man could have avoidedbecomingunjust.But now he cannothelp being in the statehe has broughtupon himself. He cannothelp being unjust,and no amountof wishing (thathe had not become unjust,thathe becomejust now, etc.) will help him. Perhapsinterpreters were misled by the very last sentence in the passage: "butnow that [the unjustand the self-indulgentman] have become so it is not possible for them not to be so" (1114 a 21). Taken in isolation, this sentencedoes seem to say that the vicious are doomedto a lifetime of vice. But notice that Aristotlesimply says "it is not possible for them not to be so" ("oV?cTi ETattfli eTvax", emphasis supplied).Lacking furtherindicationfrom the context, this sentence should not be taken to make a claim aboutthe whole of the unjustor incontinent person'sfuture life. For the negatedinfinitive"ti1 &Ivai" exactly parallelsthe earlier"gil

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voasiv" ("not to be ill", said at 1114 a 15-17 to be open to a man when

he is still healthy,and then no longeropen to him once he has made himself ill). In the earliercontext, as we have seen, it would be odd to interpret Aristotleas saying that a man who contracteda disease because of his incontinence will suffer from that disease for the rest of his life. Likewise, lines 19-21, whose "gineJvat" parallelsthe "gi' voieiv" of the earlierpassage,are not plausiblytakento state thatthe unjustand the selfindulgentwill never cease to be unjust and self-indulgent.The passage states only that these people cannot help being unjustand self-indulgent now that they have thrownaway theirchanceof remainingfree from vice (just as the voluntarilyill man cannot help being ill now that he has thrownaway his chance of remaininghealthy). But what exactly is the point of Aristotle'sremark? Am I not attributing to him an entirely trivial statementsuch as "those who have made is themselvesvicious are vicious"?My replyis thatthis statement far from trivialif Aristotleuses it to counterthe two pointsmost likely to be raised in relation to his theory of the voluntarinessof character.(A) A philosophicallysophisticated opponentmay object to Aristotlethat by making character voluntaryhe is in fact assertingthat people can change character at will. But the notion of characteris typically associatedwith permanenceand a certainlack of flexibility. (B) A personinclined towards to vice may use the doctrineof the voluntariness character objectto all of attemptsto convince him to become virtuous.Such a personmay reason that since characteris voluntary, there are no major disadvantagesto becoming vicious. For one can always embracea virtuouslife at a later time by wantingto become virtuous.4 In responseto the reactionsto his doctrineexemplifiedin (A) and (B), Aristotle stresses that asserting the voluntarinessof characterdoes not involve assertingthat character not a firmand lasting dispositionto act is in a certain way. The dispositionis a powerful one, and althoughit is it broughtaboutvoluntarily, is extremelydifficultto get rid of it. The point of Aristotle'sremarkto the effect that people cannothelp being unjustor
4 Joachim seems to have (B) in mind when he writes: "Notice the doctrineof 1114 a 11-21. The acts which form a moral state are willing - we can do or not do them. But we cannot, when we have once formed a moral state, all at once act contraryto it. [...) Characteris formed by a long and gradual growth. It is only the fool who supposes he can pursue his folly with impunity, relying on the miracle of a sudden conversion",H. H. Joachim, The Nicomachean Ethics, Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1955, p. 106.

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self-indulgent once they have voluntarily become so lies precisely in bringing out that although injustice and self-indulgence are voluntary is states, one cannot get rid of them at will. Character not just a matter of wishing. Once it has taken hold of an individual'ssoul, its grip is not an easy one to break.Aristotlewants to make this clear by stressingthat mere wishing is causally ineffectivewhen it comes to changes in moral states,just as it is ineffectivewhen it comes to changes in health. What, then, is effective? In keeping with Aristotle's analogy between injusticeand disease,we can answerthis questionby pointingto the transformational power of repeated and consistent action. Just as one can recover health through engaging in therapy, diet, and exercise over a periodof time, so can one improvea state of character acting in ways by apt to defeat the bad habits one has. After all, as Aristotlehad remarked, everybodyknows that it is throughthe "exerciseof activities on particular objects" (1114 a 9-10) that states of characterare produced. The process of character improvement likely to be very difficultand laboriis ous for an unjustman, whose progresswill constantlybe jeopardizedby the abilityhis bad states of character have to incline him stronglytowards bad actions. But nothingof what Aristotlesays at 1114 a 12-21 implies thatin his view this is an impossibleprocessto complete.Aristotle'sposition in the Nicomacheanpassage, then, is fully compatiblewith the one expressedin the Categories passage, which insists precisely on the timeconsumingnatureof moral reform. One reasonfor resistingthe interpretation have been defendingis that I elsewhere in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle calls the self-indulgent
man "avuaroq" (incorrigible, incurable). At 1150 a 21-22 he points out that

self-indulgentpeople have no regrets,and people with no regretscannot be cured. At 1150 b 29-1151 a 5 he comparesthe self-indulgentand the incontinentman in respectof the possibilityof reform:
The self-indulgent man, as was said, has no regrets; for he stands by his choice; but any incontinent man is subject to regrets. This is why the position is not as it was expressed in the formulationof the problem, but the self-indulgent man is incurable and the incontinent man curable; for wickedness is like a disease such as dropsy or consumption, while incontinence is like epilepsy; the former is a permanent,the latteran intermittent badness. And generally incontinenceand vice are differentin kind; vice is unconscious of itself, incontinence is not (of incontinent men themselves, those who become temporarilybeside themselves are better than those who have the rational principle but do not abide by it, since the latter are defeated by a weaker passion, and do not act without previous deliberation like the others); for the incontinentman is like the people who get drunk quickly and on little wine, i.e. on less than most people (trans. Ross).

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for This passage clearly contains a verdict of incorrigibility the selfindulgent(and perhapsfor the vicious in general).But it is worth asking is whetherincorrigibility to be equatedwith the impossibilityto change. Someone may be incorrigible in the literal sense of in-corrigible,i.e. in imperviousto externalmeans of correction.But being incorrigible this with being able to changeif the processof changehas sense is compatible an internalorigin. Indeed,some of the most meaningfulchanges in people are producedfrom the inside and could not have been broughtabout If throughmere correctionand punishment. we now returnto the passage we in which Aristotlecalls the self-indulgentperson "incorrigible", will has in mind is the literalsense of "incorrigible". be able to see that all he First,we shouldnote that a remarkin the passage ("thepositionis not of as it was expressedin the formulation the problem",1150 b 31) indiearlier.The aporia, cates that Aristotle is solving a difficultyintroduced 2 the end of Chapter of Book VII, consistedin the fact presentedtowards that self-indulgentpeople would seem to be betterthan incontinentpeople. For the formerpursuepleasureby choice and on full convictionthat the unconditional enjoymentof pleasureis the rightcourseto take. A selfindulgentman would thereforeappearto be "easierto cure since he may &tb be persuadedto change his mind" (UXaxt6oepo;tOa ToUaEUOavat av, is 1146 a 33-34). In otherwords, if being self-indulgent a matterof being wrong about pleasure,then one may reform a self-indulgentperson by persuadinghim to change his beliefs. The incontinentman, however, is already persuaded that he should not yield to his wrong impulses. So would be as futile as giving someto attempting reformhim by persuasion one a drinkof water to wash down the water that is choking him (1146 a 35). The puzzle here is that self-indulgence,which is a vice that proceeds from deliberatechoice and calculation,and does not involve regrets of any kind, would seem to be a morally less desperateconditionthan incontinence,despite the fact that the incontinentstruggles against his impulsesand would thus appearto have a betterchance at reform. In Chapter8 of Book VII Aristotlesolves this puzzle by reevaluating people standby theirchoices and what it meansto say that self-indulgent act on convictionthat what they do is the right course to take. The selfindulgentperson'sconvictionis of the sort thatdestroysthe person'sabilrightopinionaboutends (1151 a 15-19). Such a conviction ity to entertain since it stems from a fundamencould not be changedthroughargument, to of tal corruption judgmentabout moral matters.Contrary what stated in the aporia, then, the self-indulgentman is not morallybetteroff than the incontinentman. For his vice makes him imperviousto all attempts

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man who to persuadehim to change his ways. It is ratherthe incontinent to turnsout to be "easilypersuaded changehis mind"(6geaituLtato;,1151 a 14). Aristotle does not elaborateon what exactly this means, but his betweendropsyandconsumption, fromhis comparison view canbe gathered on the one hand, and epilepsy, on the other (1150 b 32-35). Incontinence percondition.The incontinent is like epilepsy in that it is an intermittent son retainsthe ability to reasoncorrectlyabout ends. It is only at certain times that his judgmentbecomes clouded and his knowledgeof the good is overshadowedby passion. The incontinentman, then, is not impervious to persuasion,because when he is not in the grip of passion he is responsive to guidance and can be persuadedto fight more vigorously on againsthis impulses.A vice like self-indulgence, the otherhand,is like a disease that has no periods of spontaneousremission. Persuasion is bound to fail because there are no times when the self-indulgentperson would be receptiveto it. The self-indulgentperson,then, is incurable.But does the progression to of Aristotle'sargumentauthorizeus to attribute him the view that the No; at most self-indulgentpersoncould never cease to be self-indulgent? to we can attribute Aristotlethe view that the self-indulgentpersoncould
not cease to be self-indulgent as a result of persuasion. The aporia yielded

man would be "easierto cure since he the odd resultthat a self-indulgent

may be persuaded to change his mind" (1146 a 33-34, emphasis supplied).

So The "cure" issue is moralreformthroughpersuasion. when Aristotle at later turns the tables on the aporia and shows that it is the incontinent, he and not the self-indulgentman, who is Ev,ueraiEtato, is saying only throughexterthatthe vice of self-indulgence does not admitof correction nal influences.But this leaves open the possibility that moral reformbe attainedthrougha differentprocess,which I shall try to elucidatebelow. Aristotleuses the That in calling the self-indulgentman "incorrigible" in to terrm the limited sense of "unresponsive correction" a sense that leaves open the possibility that the vice of self-indulgencebe overcome fromcorrection can be confirmed from a variety throughmeansdifferent of angles. In a passageI have alreadyreferred (1150 a 21-22), Aristotle to asserts that it is the self-indulgentman's lack of regret that makes him
&viaToq.

Now it is importantto rememberthat Aristotle takes an etymological

is, The approachto the notion of self-indulgence(aicoXacaia). adcoko6Xao; In literally, the man without punishment(ico6aoa;). the EudemianEthics (1230 a 37-b8), Aristotleexplains that this may signify a man who has or not been curedthroughpunishment a man whose natureis impervious It to punishment. is in the lattersense that people are called "a&c6oXkatot"

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when they are hardto cure (6-aiaTot)or altogether incurable through punishment(aviarot natgnav&taKOXcZGaSox, 1230 b 8). So when Aristotledesignatesthe self-indulgent man as "incurable" on accountof his lack of regret(1150 a 21-22) and differentiates betweenthe curable incontinentand the incurableself-indulgent(1150 b 29 ff.), he need not have in mindanythingmorethanthe fact thatself-indulgent people are imperviousto correction.Thus we should be wary of attributing to him the strongerthesis that it is impossibleto cease to be self-indulat gent.5Further, 1121 b 12-13, Aristotlecalls a vice "incurable" the on basis of contingentreasonsand not purelyon accountof its being a vice, as we would expect him to do if he were convincedthat it is altogether impossibleto overcomevicious character states.In this passage,he states that meannessis an incurablevice becauseold age and disabilitiesappear to make people mean. Clearly,meannessis here said to be incurablenot insofar as it is a vice - for otherwisethe referenceto old age and disabilitywould be superfluous but becauseold age cuts shortthe time that could be used to attainreformor the disabilityon which the vice depends cannotbe cured.So Aristotleis comfortable with calling a man "aviaTo;9 even when it is only de facto, but not intrinsicallyimpossiblefor him to be cured of his vice. Aristotle'suse of the term does not per se commit him to the thesis that vice is by natureinsuperable. only commitshim It to the thesis that thereare circumstances underwhich attemptsat reforming an individualare boundto fail. This thesis is consistentwith the possibility of moralreformif this can be attainedthrougha processthatdoes not rely on means such as persuasionor punishment. To begin to explainhow Aristotleunderstands such a process,it is useful to focus on yet anotherpassage in which "aviaxto;" occurs.At 1165 b 13-22, Aristotle takes up the questionof how one should act towardsa friendwho has become bad:
But if one accepts another man as good, and he turns out badly [y?v-tat 5 ioxOp6;] and is seen to do so, must one still love him? Surely it is impossible, since not everything can be loved, but only what is good. What is evil neither can nor should be loved; for it is not one's duty to be a lover of evil, or to become like what is bad; and we have said that like is dear to like. Must the friendship, then, be forthwithbroken off? Or is this not so in all cases, but only when one's friends are incurable in their wickedness [XvtaoTt; KcaTa Tiv AoGipiavJ? If they are capable of being reformed,one should come to the assistance of their charactereven more than of their property,inasmuchas characteris a betterthing
I For another passage in which "aviato;" is clearly used in the sense of "unresponsive to punishment",cf. 1180 a 5-14.

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and bears a closer relation to friendship.But a man who breaks off such a friendship would seem to be doing nothing strange;for it was not to a man of this sort that he was a friend; when his friend has changed, therefore,and he is unable to save him, he gives him up (trans. Ross, slightly modified).6

This passageimplies thatsome of those who become bad are incurable. Now how does one help But it also implies that some can be reformed.7 Aristotle'sansweris comthose friendswhose character degenerated? has What does pressed:we should come to the assistanceof their character. lack the this mean?Given that Aristotlenotoriouslyholds that arguments power to make people good (1179 b 4-31), it is unlikely that he has in course of tryingto persuadethe friendto become mind the argumentative Aristotleseems to have attemptat persuasion, better.Insteadof an abstract in mind the same kind of practicalapproachthat would lead one to help out a friendwho is experiencingfinancialdifficulties.As lines 19-20 suggest, since we take action when a friend's substancesare in trouble,then a fortiori we should take action when a friend's characteris in danger. should thus be con"Comingto the assistance of a friend's character" struedas doing that action or set of actions which, in the circumstances, of would most effectively counterthe degeneration the friend's character and its consequencesin termsof actions.This may involve tryingto limit that the friend'saccess to people or environments exercise a bad influence the of on him. Or it may simply take the for-m approaching friendto show of genuine concernfor him and for the restoration his virtue.The variations are probablyinfinite, since they would be dictatedby the circumstances. But in all or most cases the friendturnedbad will be exposed to the virtuousbehaviourof the rescuing friend, and to his noble concern and readinessto help.
,ov ci; xo 0o; i rrv Ross translates:"If they are capable of being reformed one should rathercome to the assistance of their characteror their property,inasmuch as this is better and more characteristicof friendship".But "gakkov ...fi" clearly introduces a comparison between "zo i10o;"and "rrv oixsiav". The sense of the passage is that just as one should help one's friends in times of financial hardship,so should one come to the rescue of a friend's character,which is so much more precious than wealth. I According to Gauthier and Jolif (L'thique a Nicomaque, vol. II, pt. 2, p. 724), in this passage Aristotle distinguishes between friends who have become vicious and friends who have become incontinent.It is only the latter, Gauthierand Jolif hold, that given that Aristotle regardsas curable. I see no basis in the text for this interpretation, it is clear that the purpose of the whole passage is to discuss options for dealing with a friend who has become goXrIpo';(cf. 1165 b 13-14).
OiKtO'TEpOV".

5' 6 Lines 19-20 read: "CnavOpOoxv 0Xouat ,&A.ov poi

oOiLav, OM() PkXttOV ca1C ptS tk'ta

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Of courseAristotledoes not thinkthatexposureto the virtueof a friend is sufficientto reform a person's character.For clearly there are cases where nothingwill help. When it is impossibleto save a friend, one is justifiedin breakingoff the friendship(1165 b 22). But Aristotle'spoint, I believe, is that in certaincases exposureto virtueand to the noble concern of a friendmay triggera processof moralreformin a personof bad character. This process would take the form describedin the Categories of in passage(improvement character successiveincrements through action). And the Categories passage, too, identifies the first-handexperienceof virtue - or at least the experienceof a way of life betterthan vice - as the point of departure moral reformin those individualswho manage of to escape from vice. The bad man, Aristotlesays, may become betterif he is "led into betterways of living and talking"("ei; FeXtiov; 8tarptpta;
ayo6evo; xait X6yov;", 13 a 23-24). A plausible way of understandingthese

lines is by thinkingof someonewho is exposed to the exampleof people living virtuouslyand thus becomes attracted the life of virtue,exactly to as a person turnedbad may be attractedback to virtue by the virtuous attitudeand concernof a friend. One may object to my overall enterpriseof showing that Aristotle admitsof the possibilityof moralreformon groundsthat it is hardto see how exposureto virtuecould providesufficientmotivationfor the vicious to become virtuous.Actually,given certainfacts aboutAristotelian moral psychology,it is hardto see how anythingcould providethat motivation. Aristotleholds thatvice is unconsciousof itself (1150 b 36). He also holds thata vicious character shapesthe desiresof the individual who possesses it (1129 a 6-10). So if the vicious do not realize that they are vicious and theircharacter determinestheirdesires,what in them could be the source of a desire to change?Wherecould their motivationcome from? To answer this question, we should keep in mind that accordingto Aristotlewicked people experiencea misery that is characteristic vice. of NicomacheanEthics IX 4 draws a sharpcontrastbetween the good person's self-love and the bad person's self-loathing.Wicked men, Aristotle points out, shun themselves and thereforedislike being by themselves. They have no feelings of self-love, since thereis nothinglovable in them. So the life of the bad man is the most wretched(1166 b 13-29). Now in the last few lines of this passage Aristotleremarksthat the spectacleof the bad man's wretchednessshould affect us and serve as an impulse to "strainevery nerve to avoid wickednessand [. ..] endeavourto be good" (1166 b 27-28). But Aristotle clearly believes that such a wretchedness also affects the bad man himself. The bad man is aware of his unhappi-

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ness and is able not only to desire that it cease, but also to take concrete steps to get away from it. As I pointedout above, Aristotlestresses that wicked people actively seek the companyof others.They pursuethis form of distractionin order to avoid the feelings they experience about their past and futureevil deeds (1166 b 13-17). Aristotlealso remarksthat the conditionof wicked people is so unbearable they sometimestake their that own life (1166 b 11-13). So it is clear that accordingto Aristotlewicked people can form the desire that some of their feelings cease, and can also act on it. Such a desire is a "higherorder"one, in the sense that it comes from stepping back and reflectingon the overall quality of one's life. Althoughone of the tenets of Aristotelianmoral psychology is that a bad charactercan only producedesires for bad things, the "higherorder"desire does not proceedfrom an individual'smoralcharacter. quite independently For of their moral character,people can realize - throughmere introspection that certainunpleasantfeelings are presentin them; and this realization, in turn,can serve as a basis for a desire that those feelings cease. Even
wicked people, then, can desire that something change in them. This is

not necessarilya desireto become good, since for Aristotlevice is unconscious of itself, and a bad personmay have no clearrepresentation what of being good amountsto. Rather,it is a generic desire to change so as to reduce or eliminateone's feelings of self-loathing.It is at this stage that exposureto virtue, togetherwith the realizationthat virtuouspeople are immune from feelings of self-loathing,may triggera process of change and inducethe vicious personto experiment with the actionsvirtuouspeople routinelyengage in. Given an adequateamountof time, this process may in some cases lead to the kind of complete moral reform the Categories passage describes. Although a vicious person may start the process for reasons of mere self-interest,it is clear from the Categories passage that accordingto Aristotle making even a little progressat the beginningmay lead to more dramaticchanges in the long run. In other words, by admitting of the possibility of moral reform, Aristotleadmitsthat even a morallycorrupt personcould do good actions
and little by little arrive at doing them in the way in which a good person

does them.This qualification necessarybecause there is a trivial sense is in which any, say, unjustpersoncould do just actions.Reasons of opportunity often promptimmoralpeople to act morally. But an action done underthese circumstances for instance,returninga deposit simply for fear of the consequencesof not doing so - would be just only incidentally (cf. NicomacheanEthics V 8, 1135 b 2-6). Now Aristotle distinguishes

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between actions of the sort a just personwould performand actionsdone in the way a just persondoes them (cf. NicomacheanEthics H 4, 1105 b 5-12). The formermay be performedby an unjust agent who is acting justly only in the incidentalsense, whereas in orderto do the latterit is necessarythat the action be chosen for its own sake. If Aristotleallowed for the possibility of moral reform, he must have thought that even morallycorruptpeople could go beyond doing good for mere reasonsof He opportunity. must have thoughtthat even the unjustcould in principle do just actions for their own sake, and could in time - and after struggling considerably acquirea stable dispositionto act in this way. Seeing that Aristotledoes not regardit as impossiblefor people to act contraryto their charactermay serve to ease a worry some interpreters On of have expressedaboutthe doctrineof the voluntariness character. a reading,in NicomacheanEthics III 5 Aristotledistincertain traditional guishes between two stages in the moral developmentof an individual. of whenevera personacts, he or she could Before the formation character, have taken some other course of action instead. But once a person has type of behaviour acquireda certaincharacter,this dictates a particular If and robs the personof the ability to act otherwise.8 this is Aristotle's theory,however,the actionsof moraladolescentswould oddly seem to be more directlyvoluntarythan those of the morallymature.The actions of would seem to be either the latter,necessitatedas they are by character, or downrightinvoluntary voluntaryonly in a weak, derivativesense (that that has is, merely as a consequenceof their proceedingfrom a character been acquiredthroughvoluntaryactions).9
I For an example of this reading, see D. Furley, Two studies in the Greek Atomists, a pp. 189-190. Of course, even on this interpretation, person's behaviouris not entirely determinedby character.An unjust man retains the option of choosing wine or beer is when he is offered a drink. But the point of the interpretation that an unjust man can only act unjustly in a situation involving a moral choice. I This would be odd in light of the fact that Aristotle's whole treatmentof voluntariness in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics "makes actions explained by the character of the agent paradigmexamples of voluntary action", J. Roberts, "Aristotle on responsibility for action and character",Ancient Philosophy 9 (1989), p. 28. The p. difficulty is pointed out also by Siegler ("Voluntaryand Involuntary", 285) and by Sarah Broadie, who articulates it thus: "The individual who habitually puts himself first will find a way of doing this whichever way he acts, and genuinely self-sacrificing alternativeswould not be live options to him. It may depend on him whether he does precisely this or that, and in respect of detail he may be a contingent cause, but it seems that whatever he now does, it does not depend on him whether he behaves selfcentredly. So, if some action of his mainly strikes us as an instance of selfish behav-

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This difficultyis done away with if one abandonsthe assumptionthat Aristotleviews character necessitatingcertaintypes of action. He ceras tainly views characteras a source of very strong inclinationto act in a certainway. But his not ruling out the possibility of moral reformindicates that he took even the unjustto be still equippedwith the resources for acting well. So having an establishedcharacter does not rob a person of the abilityto act contrary it. Those who see a difficultyin Aristotle's to of doctrineof the voluntariness character take it that an action cannotbe voluntaryif the agent could not have refrainedfrom doing it. It is not at all clear that Aristotleunderstood voluntariness this way.'0But even if in he did, one should not be worriedthat his theory may entail that people of established characteract involuntarily.For in Aristotle's view they retainthe ability to act contraryto their character."
Department of Philosophy University of Virginia

iour, is the action voluntary under that description, and is he to be reproachedfor it or blamed? It would be strange if not, since that would imply that a person of settled characteris a voluntary agent only (if at all) in respect of the ethically insignificant aspects of his action; yet the concept voluntaryis above all relevant to ethics as setting the formalconditionunderwhich an individualbecomes subjectto ethicaljudgment", S. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 160. 10 Furley, for instance, has argued that Aristotle does not frame the notion of voluntarinessin terms of freedom to do otherwise. Cf. Two studies in the Greek Atomists, pp. 215-225. " I would like to thank Dan Devereux for his advice and encouragementthroughout the realization of this project. I also profited from helpful discussions with Tom Brickhouse.