Mondano vs.

Silvosa Facts: Mosende filed a complaint against Mondano, mayor of the municipality of Mainit, province of Surigao with the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee accusing him of (1) rape committed on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other than the conjugal dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the complaint to the respondent provincial governor for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. On 10 April the petitioner appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to his summons and was served with a copy of the complaint filed by the provincial governor with provincial board. On the same day, the provincial governor issued AO 8 suspending the petitioner from office. Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges preferred against the petitioner over his objection. The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the respondents from further proceeding with the hearing of the administrative case against him and for a declaration that the order of suspension issued by the respondent provincial governor is illegal and without legal effect. On 4 May 1954 the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was issued after filing and approval of a bond for P500. Issue: WON the provincial governor may issue an order of suspension. Held/Ratio: YES. But not in this case. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for the reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, Article VII, of the Constitution. If "general supervision over all local governments" is to be construed as the same power granted to the Department Head in section 79 (c) of

the Revised Administrative Code, then there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of control and that of supervision. In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such is the import of the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code and 37 of Act No. 4007. The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question." 3 Section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of . . . municipalities . . .. If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by section 10 (1), Article VII, of the Constitution. Hebron vs. Reyes Facts: In the general elections held in 1951, petitioner Bernardo Hebron, a member of the Liberal Party, and respondent Eulalio D. Reyes, of the Nacionalista Party, were elected mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, of said municipality, for a term of four (4) years, beginning from January 1, 1952, on which date they presumably assumed the aforementioned offices. Petitioner discharged the duties and functions of mayor continuously until May 22 or 24, 1954, when he received communication that the President has decided to assume directly the investigation to the administrative charges against him for alleged oppression, grave abuse of authority and serious misconduct in office, and has designated the Provincial Fiscal of that province as Special Investigator of the said charges. Hebron was also suspended from office. Thereupon, Reyes acted as mayor of Carmona and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite investigated the charges. After

holding hearings in connection with said charges, the provincial fiscal submitted his report thereon on July 15, 1954. Since then the matter has been pending in the Office of the President for decision. Inasmuch as the same did not appear to be forthcoming, and the term of petitioner, who remained suspended, was about to expire, on May 13, 1955, he instituted the present action for quo warranto, upon the ground that respondent was illegally holding the Office of Mayor of Carmona, and had unlawfully refused and still refused to surrender said office to petitioner, who claimed to be entitled thereto. Respondent and the Solicitor General, who was allowed to intervene, filed their respective answers admitting substantially the main allegations of fact in petitioner's complaint, but denying the alleged illegality of petitioner's suspension and alleging that respondent was holding the office of the mayor in compliance with a valid and lawful order of the President. Owing to the nature and importance of the issue thus raised, Dean Vicente G. Sinco of the College of Law, University of the Philippines, and Professor Enrique M. Fernando, were allowed to intervene as amici curiae. At the hearing of this case, the parties, as well as the Solicitor General and said amici curiae, appeared and argued extensively. Subsequently, they filed their respective memoranda, and, on September 2, 1955, the case became submitted for decision. The case could not be disposed of, however, before the close of said year, because the members of this Court could not, within the unexpired portion thereof, reach an agreement on the decision thereon. Issue: WON a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may be removed or suspended directly by the President of the Philippines, regardless of the procedure set forth in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code. Held/Ratio: NO. Under the present law, the procedure prescribed in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, for the suspension and removal of the municipal officials therein referred to, is mandatory; that, in the absence of a clear and explicit provision to the contrary, relative particularly to municipal corporations and none has been cited to us said procedure is exclusive; that the executive department of the national government, in the exercise of its general supervision over local governments, may conduct investigations with a view to determining whether municipal officials are guilty of acts or omissions warranting the administrative action referred to in said sections, as a means only to ascertain whether the provincial governor and the provincial board should take such action; that the Executive may take appropriate measures to compel the provincial governor and the provincial board to take said action, if the same is warranted, and they failed to do so.

Ganzon vs. Kayanan Facts: Rosales lodged a verified complaint against Ganzon for taking advantage of his public position. On September 13, 1956, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, designated Kayanan to conduct the investigation of said complaint pursuant to the provisions of Section 64(c) of the RAC granting Kayanan all the powers given to an investigating officer by Sections 71 and 580 of the same Code. On September 18, 1956, respondent served a copy of the complaint on petitioner and set the investigation of the charges on September 20, 1956. Petitioner, having filed a motion for postponement, respondent definitely set the investigation for September 25 and 26, 1956. On September 24, 1956, Ganzon instituted in the CFI an action for prohibition with preliminary injunction questioning the authority of the President to order his investigation and praying that respondent be enjoined to suspend and desist from proceeding with the investigation and that, pending decision of the case on the merits, a preliminary injunction be issued against respondent. On September 26, 1956, the lower court declined to issue the writ and instead set the case for hearing on the merits on September 28, 1956. At the hearing, both parties agreed to admit all the facts set forth in the pleadings and submitted the case for decision. And on October 2, 1956, the lower court rendered decision dismissing the petition. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner took the present appeal. Issue: WON the President of the Philippines has the power and authority under our Constitution and the laws at present in force in this jurisdiction to investigate the mayor of a city and, if found guilty, to take disciplinary action against him as the evidence and law may warrant. Held/Ratio: YES. Iloilo charter does not contain any provision as regards the procedure by which he may be removed. Nevertheless, as this Court has once said, "the rights, duties, and privileges of municipal officers (including city officials) do not have to be embodied in the charter, but may be regulated by provisions of general application specially if these are incorporated in the same code of which the city organic law forms a part". The code herein referred to is the Revised Administrative Code. The charter does not say that he shall hold office at the pleasure of the President unlike similar provisions appearing in other city charters. The idea is to give the mayor a definite tenure of office not dependent upon the pleasure of the President. If this were the case, he could be separated from the service regardless of the cause or motive. But when he was given a

definite tenure, the implication is that he can only be removed for cause. An inferential authority to remove at pleasure can not be deduced, since the existence of a defined term, ipso facto, negatives such an inference, and implies a contrary presumption, i.e. that the incumbent shall hold office to the end of his term subject to removal for cause.' The President may remove any official in the government service "conformably to law" and to declare vacant the office held by the removed official. And to this end, the President may order "an investigation of any action or the conduct of any person in the Government service, and in connection therewith to designate the official committee, or person by whom such investigation shall be conducted." Note that the provision refers to any official in the government service, which must necessarily include the mayor of a chartered city. It cannot therefore be disputed that in the particular case under consideration the President is vested with the authority to order the investigation of petitioner when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, and such being the case, petitioner cannot now contend that the designation of respondent as the official to investigate him in connection with the charges lodged against him by Rosales has been done without the authority of law. This of course is upon the premise that the charges involved in the investigation refer to those for which petitioner may be suspended or removed under the law, a question which we will take up later in this decision.

Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals Facts: A series of administrative complaints, ten in number, were filed before the Department of Local Government against petitioner Mayor Rodolfo T. Ganzon by various city officials sometime in 1988 on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, etc. Finding probable grounds, the respondent Secretary of the Department of Local Government Luis T. Santos issued successive suspensions. The petitioner then instituted an action for prohibition against the secretary in the RTC of Iloilo City where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. He also instituted actions for prohibition before the Court of Appeals but were both dismissed. Thus, this petition for review with the argument that the respondent Secretary is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials as the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President to exercise said power. Issue: WON the President, acting thru the Secretary of Local Government, has the power to suspend, remove, or both, local officials.

Held/Ratio: YES. It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the Constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its rightor the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanction against local officials.

Taule vs. Santos Facts: On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) convened in Virac, Catanduanes with six members in attendance for the purpose of holding the election of its officers. Present were petitioner Ruperto Taule of San Miguel, Allan Aquino of Viga, Vicente Avila of Virac, Fidel Jacob of Panganiban, Leo Sales of Caramoran and Manuel Torres of Baras. The Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants was composed of Provincial Government Operation Officer (PGOO) Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as Chairman with Provincial Treasurer Luis A. Manlapaz, Jr. and Provincial Election Supervisor Arnold Soquerata as members. When the group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five (5) of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked out. The election nevertheless proceeded. On June 19, 1989, respondent Leandro I. Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes, sent a letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government, protesting the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. In compliance with the order of respondent Secretary, petitioner Ruperto Taule as President of the FABC, filed his comment on the letter-protest of respondent Governor denying the alleged irregularities and denouncing said respondent Governor for meddling or intervening in the election of FABC officers which is a purely non-partisan affair and at the same time requesting for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes. On August 4, 1989, respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of August 4, 1989 but it was denied by respondent Secretary in his resolution of September 5, 1989. In the petition for certiorari before Us, petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions of respondent Secretary dated August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 for being null and void. Issues:

1) WON the Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils. 2) WON the Governor has the legal personality to file an election protest. Held/Ratio: 1) NO. It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of quasi- judicial powers. 19 The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves. Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their determinations. There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay. Although the Department is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by local government units of such issuances. To monitor means "to watch, observe or check. This is compatible with the power of supervision of the Secretary over local governments which as earlier discussed is limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Even the Local Government Code which grants the Secretary power to issue implementing circulars, rules and regulations is silent as to how these issuances should be enforced. Since the respondent Secretary exercises only supervision and not control over local governments, it is truly doubtful if he could enforce compliance with the DLG Circular. Any doubt therefore as to the power of the Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government. 2) YES. The Court finds that respondent Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of the sangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the said sanggunian and the presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan and the kabataang barangay provincial federation. The governor acts as the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan. As presiding officer of the sagguniang panlalawigan, the respondent governor has an interest in the election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If the president of the FABC assumes his presidency under questionable circumstances and is allowed to sit in the sangguniang panlalawigan the official actions of the sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Hence, respondent governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC.

Carpio vs. Executive Secretary Facts: Republic Act No. 6975 was enacted. Carpio assails said RAs constitutionality. But in an en banc resolution dated December 27, 1990, the SC simply required the public respondents to file their Comment, without however giving due course to the petition and the prayer therein. Hence, the Act took effect after fifteen days following its publication, or on January 1, 1991. Issue: WON RA 6975 emasculated the National Police Commission by limiting its power "to administrative control" over the Philippine National Police (PNP), thus, "control" remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the National Police Commission and the PNP were placed. Held/Ratio: NO. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices to lay at rest petitioner's contention on the matter. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members. Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized Department of Interior and Local Government is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, 24 the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government. Such organizational set-up does not detract from the mandate of the Constitution that the national police force shall be administered and controlled by a national police commission as at any rate, and in fact, the Act in question adequately provides for administration and control at the commission level. By vesting in the local executives the power to choose the officers in question, the Act supposedly went beyond the bounds of the Constitution's intent. Not so. The principle of constitutional construction is that every presumption should be indulged in favor of constitutionality and the court in considering the validity of the statute in question should give it such reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within the fundamental law.

Drilon vs. Lim Facts: Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. The court cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter, while the second is the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions is accordance with law. Issues: 1) WON Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional. 2) WON the Secretary of Justice can exercise control, rather than supervision, over the local government. Held/Ratio: 1) NO. The judgment of the lower court is reversed in so far as its declaration that Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional but affirmed the said lower courts finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. Regarding the issue on the non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court carefully examined every exhibit and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does

not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. 2) NO. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. 2) An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision. Bito-Onon vs. Fernandez Facts: Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Tacras, Narra, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Narra, Palawan. The private respondent, Elegio Quejano, Jr. on the other hand, is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both Onon and Quejano were candidates for the position of Executive Vice-President in the August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial Chapter of the province of Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winning candidate in the said election prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the Board of Election Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him on August 25, 1997. Quejano filed a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City (RTC). On April 26, 1999, Onon filed a motion to dismiss the Petition for Review raising the issue of jurisdiction. Onon claimed that the RTC had no jurisdiction to review the decisions rendered by the BES in any post proclamation electoral protest in connection with the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election of officers and directors. In his motion to dismiss, Onon claimed that the Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election issued by the DILG on August 11, 1997 in its Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, providing for review of decisions or resolutions of the BES by the regular courts of law is an ultra vires act and is void for being issued without or in

excess of jurisdiction, as its issuance is not a mere act of supervision but rather an exercise of control over the Liga's internal organization. On June 22, 1999, the RTC denied Onon's motion to dismiss. In its order, the RTC ratiocinated that the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government is vested with the power "to establish and prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision of local government units and the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units."3 The RTC added that DILG Circular No. 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant to his rule-making power as provided for under Section 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the Administrative Code.4 Consequently, the RTC ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petition for review filed by Quejada. Motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was denied prompting the petitioner to file the present petition. Issue: WON the questioned provision in the MC was issued by the DILG secretary in excess of his authority. Held/Ratio: YES. The resolution of the present controversy requires an examination of the questioned provision of Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 and the Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the 1997 General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay Officers and Directors (Guidelines). The memorandum circular reads, insofar as pertinent, as follows: "Any post-proclamation protest must be filed with the BES within twenty-four (24) hours from the closing of the election. The BES shall decide the same within fortyeight (48) hours from receipt thereof. The decision of the BES shall be final and immediately executory without prejudice to the filing of a Petition for Review with the regular courts of law." The Guidelines provides that the BES shall have the following among its duties: "To resolve any post-proclamation electoral protest which must be submitted in writing to this Board within twenty-four (24) hours from the close of election; provided said Board shall render its decision within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt hereof; and provided further that the decision must be submitted to the National Liga Headquarters within twenty-four (24) hours from the said decision. The decision of the Board of Election Supervisors in this respect shall be subject to review by the National Liga Board the decision of which shall be final and executory." Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant to the power of general supervision of the President over all local government units which was delegated to the DILG Secretary by virtue of Administrative Order No. 267 dated February 18, 1992.13 The President's power of general supervision over local government units is conferred upon him by the Constitution.14 The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law."15 This is distinguished from the

power of control or "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter." The Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG insofar as it authorizes the filing a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in a post proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality. We agree with both the petitioner and the Solicitor General that in authorizing the filing of the petition for review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts, the DILG Secretary in effect amended and modified the Guidelines promulgated by the National Liga Board and adopted by the Liga which provides that the decision of the BES shall be subject to review by the National Liga Board. The amendment of the Guidelines is more than an exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President does not have over the Liga.

National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes Facts: On 11 June 1997, Rayos, Punong Barangay of Barangay 52, District II, Zone 5, District II, Caloocan City, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages before the RTC of Caloocan, alleging that David, Punong Barangay of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Caloocan City and then president of the Liga Chapter of Caloocan City and of the Liga ng mga Barangay National Chapter, committed certain irregularities in the notice, venue and conduct of the proposed synchronized Liga ng mga Barangay elections in 1997. On 13 June 1997, the Executive Judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), effective for seventy-two (72) hours, enjoining the holding of the general membership and election meeting of Liga Chapter of Caloocan City on 14 June 1975. However, the TRO was allegedly not properly served on herein petitioner David, and so the election for the officers of the Liga-Caloocan was held as scheduled. Petitioner David was proclaimed President of the Liga-Caloocan, and thereafter took his oath and assumed the position of ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan. On 17 July 1997, respondent Rayos filed a second petition, this time for quo warranto, mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages, against David, Nancy Quimpo, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City, and Secretary Barbers.7 Rayos alleged that he was elected President of the Liga Caloocan Chapter in the elections held on 14 June 1997 by the members of the Caloocan Chapter pursuant to their Resolution/Petition No. 001-97.8 On 18 July 1997, the presiding judge granted the TRO, enjoining therein respondents David, Quimpo and Secretary Barbers from proceeding with the synchronized elections for the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters of the

Liga scheduled on 19 July 1997, but only for the purpose of maintaining the status quo and effective for a period not exceeding seventy-two (72) hours. Eventually, on 18 July 1997, at petitioner Davids instance, Special Civil Action (SCA) No. C-512 pending before Branch 126 was consolidated with SCA No. C-508 pending before Branch 124. Before the consolidation of the cases, on 25 July 1997, the DILG through respondent Secretary Barbers, filed in SCA No. C-512 an Urgent Motion, invoking the Presidents power of general supervision over all local government units and seeking that the DILG pursuant to its delegated power of general supervision, be appointed as the Interim Caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new set of National Liga Officers shall have been duly elected and assumed office. Issue: WON the Liga ng mga Barangay is subject to DILG supervision. Held/Ratio: YES. However, in this case, the actions of the DILG are void. Even before the respondent Judge designated the DILG as interim caretaker of the Liga, on 28 July 1997, it issued Memorandum Circular No. 97-176, directing local government officials not to recognize David as the National Liga President and his pronouncements relating to the affairs of the Liga. Not only was the action premature, it even smacked of superciliousness and injudiciousness. The DILG is the topmost government agency which maintains coordination with, and exercises supervision over local government units and its multi-level leagues. As such, it should be forthright, circumspect and supportive in its dealings with the Ligas especially the Liga ng mga Barangay. The indispensable role played by the latter in the development of the barangays and the promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants thereof deserve no less than the full support and respect of the other agencies of government. As the Court held in the case of San Juan vs. Civil Service Commission, our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are based. When the respondent judge eventually appointed the DILG as interim caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, she effectively removed the management from the National Liga Board and vested control of the Liga on the DILG. Even a cursory glance at the DILGs prayer for appointment as interim caretaker of the Liga "to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new set of National Liga officers shall have been duly elected and assumed office" reveals that what the DILG wanted was to take control over the Liga. With his Department already appointed as interim caretaker of the Liga, Secretary Barbers nullified the results of the Liga elections and promulgated DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 dated 11 August 1997, where he laid down the supplemental guidelines for the 1997

synchronized elections of the provincial and metropolitan chapters and for the election of the national chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay; scheduled dates for the new provincial, metropolitan and national chapter elections; and appointed respondent Rayos as president of Liga-Caloocan Chapter. These acts of the DILG went beyond the sphere of general supervision and constituted direct interference with the political affairs, not only of the Liga, but more importantly, of the barangay as an institution.

Batangas vs. Romulo Facts: The Province of Batangas, represented by Governor Mandanas, filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to declare as unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000 and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos (P5,000,000,000.00) of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the release thereof. Issue: WON the provisos in the GAAS of 1999-2001 relating to the LGSEF, as well as the Oversight Committees Resolutions issued pursuant thereto are unconstitutional and void. Held/Ratio: YES. The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions violate the constitutional precept on local autonomy. Section 4 of AO 372 orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation in the country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means something held back or withheld, often temporarily. Hence, the temporary nature of the retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited. The just share of the LGUs is incorporated as the IRA in the appropriations law or GAA enacted by Congress annually. Under the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, a portion of the IRA in the amount of five billion pesos was earmarked for the LGSEF, and these provisos imposed the condition that such amount shall be released to the local government units subject to the implementing rules and

regulations, including such mechanisms and guidelines for the equitable allocations and distribution of said fund among local government units subject to the guidelines that may be prescribed by the Oversight Committee on Devolution. Pursuant thereto, the Oversight Committee, through the assailed OCD resolutions, apportioned the five billion pesos LGSEF. Significantly, the LGSEF could not be released to the LGUs without the Oversight Committees prior approval. Further, with respect to the portion of the LGSEF allocated for various projects of the LGUs (P1 billion for 1999; P1.5 billion for 2000 and P2 billion for 2001), the Oversight Committee, through the assailed OCD resolutions, laid down guidelines and mechanisms that the LGUs had to comply with before they could avail of funds from this portion of the LGSEF. The guidelines required (a) the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding based on the criteria laid down by the Oversight Committee; (b) the LGUs to submit their project proposals to the DILG for appraisal; (c) the project proposals that passed the appraisal of the DILG to be submitted to the Oversight Committee for review, evaluation and approval. It was only upon approval thereof that the Oversight Committee would direct the DBM to release the funds for the projects. This is constitutionally impermissible. Section 285 then specifies how the IRA shall be allocated among the LGUs. However, this percentage sharing is not followed with respect to the five billion pesos LGSEF as the assailed OCD resolutions, implementing the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, provided for a different sharing scheme. For example, for 1999, P2 billion of the LGSEF was allocated as follows: Provinces 40%; Cities 20%; Municipalities 40%.[39] For 2000, P3.5 billion of the LGSEF was allocated in this manner: Provinces 26%; Cities 23%; Municipalities 35%; Barangays 26%.[40] For 2001, P3 billion of the LGSEF was allocated, thus: Provinces 25%; Cities 25%; Municipalities 35%; Barangays 15%. The respondents argue that this modification is allowed since the Constitution does not specify that the just share of the LGUs shall only be determined by the Local Government Code of 1991. That it is within the power of Congress to enact other laws, including the GAAs, to increase or decrease the just share of the LGUs. This contention is untenable. The Local Government Code of 1991 is a substantive law. And while it is conceded that Congress may amend any of the provisions therein, it may not do so through appropriations laws or GAAs. Any amendment to the Local Government Code of 1991 should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law, because Congress cannot include in a general appropriation bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.