The Peripatetic Tradition on the Place of the Conjunction Among

the Parts of Speech (Papers In Poetics)1

Bart A. Mazzetti

1
Being a supplement to my preceeding paper Poetics Chapter 20: The Elements of Language.

1
 CONTENTS

I. The Peripatetic Tradition on the Parts of Speech, with Special Reference to the Name, the
Verb, and the Conjunction.

II. On Hermeneia [‘Interpretation’], Phasis [‘Word’], and Syncategoremata or

Consignificantia [‘Consignifying Words].

III. On the Significative and Consignificative Parts of Speech

2
I. THE PERIPATETIC TRADITION ON THE PARTS OF SPEECH, WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE NAME, THE VERB, AND THE CONJUNCTION.

1. The doctrine with respect to the name or noun and the verb.

Cf. Simplicius of Cilicia, Comm. in Arist. Cat. 10, 24-25 (In: Michael Chase [trans.], Sim-
plicius. On Aristotle’s Categories 1-4. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, pp. 25-26)
(insertions {between curved braces} by B.A.M.):

Porphyry,142 for his part, both in his [commentary] To Gedalius and in his [commentary] By
Questions and Answers, says that the [25-26] goal (skopos) of the book is about predicates.
These are simple words significant of realities, qua significant, and not qua simple expres-
sions {= lexeis?}. For qua expressions, they have other fields of study, which are dealt with
by Theophrastus in his work on the elements of speech,143 [10,25] as well as by his followers,
who wrote [on such topics as] whether nouns and verbs are the [sole] elements of speech, or
whether articles, conjunctions, and other such things are also – these, too, are parts of
vocabulary (lexis {= ‘language’}), but the parts of speech (logos) are nouns and verbs.144
142
Porphyry fr. 46, 35-6 Smith.
143
en tôi Peri tôn tou logou stoikheiôn. Kalbfleisch assumed this was the title of a lost work
by Theophrastus (c. 370-288 BC), the student and successor of Aristotle, while other school-
ars interpret it as reference to Theophrastus’ elsewhere attested work Peri lexeôs (‘On Ex-
pression’)....
144
cf. Boethius Introductio in syllogismos categoricos, PL 64, 766A-B; In Perihermeneias2,
14.25ff. Meiser; De syllogismo categorico, PL 64, 796Dff.; cited by G. Nuchelmans, Theories
of the Proposition, Amsterdam and London 1973, 124.

N.B. While Simplicius attributes the doctrine at issue here to “Theophrastus...as well as his
followers” rather than to Aristotle, as we shall see, there is much evidence supporting the
view that the Philosopher himself is the source for these distinctions. In particular, a remark
by Boethius, shortly to be cited, attributes to the Poetics essentials of this teaching.1 Like-
wise, passages from Apollonius Dyscolus, Priscian of Caesarea, and Ammonius Hermeias
among others support the same conclusion.

Cf. ibid., p. 27:

Porphyry also adds the remarks of Boethus, which are full of sharp-wittedness (ankhinoia)
and tend in the same direction as what has been said. He too says that with regard to nouns
and verbs, the division takes place in so far as the elements of speech (logos), but [25] ac-
cording to the categories the division takes place in so far as expressions (lexeis) have a
relation (skhesis) to beings, since they are significant of the latter. ‘This,’ he says, ‘is the reason
why conjunctions (sundesmoi), although they are found within the vocabulary (lexis), fall
outside of the categories. For they do not indicate any being, not substance, nor the qualified,
nor anything of the kind’.152 It is thus clear from what has been said that these men do not
define [30] the goal (skopos) as being about mere words (phônai), nor about beings themselves
in so far as they are beings, nor about notions (noêmata) alone.

1
To be sure, he may owe this observation, as well as the doctrine he hands on, to one or more intermediate
texts or authors otherwise unknown to us, be it a commentary or doxographical report, but such a provenance
does not preclude the possibility that its ultimate source was the Philosopher’s books About the Poetic Art.

3
 Instead, because it is a prelude to the study of logic,153 [the Categories] is about simple words
(phônai) and expressions (lexeis); but [it deals with these] qua significant of primary and
simple beings, and not in so far as they decline154 or are transformed in order to accord155 [with
certain words], or undergo such-and-such modifications (pathê) and have such-and-such
forms (ideai),156 all of [35] which <is> the domain of the investigation of expressions qua
expressions. [12,1]
152
B. was apparently replying to the objection that the Cat. is incomplete, because it leaves
out conjunctions and thus does not deal with all lexeis; cf. Athenodorus and Cornutus (below,
18,24-19,1); Lucius, below, 64,18-65,3. [N.B. Boethus is at fault here. Conjunctions, like all
syncategorematic words, come under the category of ‘toward something’ or ‘the relative’
(pros ti) insofar as they indicate the way in which something ‘has itself’ or ‘stands’ toward
something else. What this early Peripatetic should have said was that conjunctions, although
they are found within lexis (= ‘language’, not ‘vocabulary’), fall outside of logos (= ‘speech’)
because they do not signify anything by themselves, but only when conjoined to other words,
as the authorities shortly to be cited attest. (B.A.M.)]
153
cf. above, 1,4-6; 9,9; cf. Ammon. In Cat. 10,9-10.
154
paraskhêmatizontai.
155
suskhêmatizontai. Cf., with Ph. Hoffman, Ammon. In De Interp. 65,7-9; Apollonius
Dyscolus, On Pronouns, 15,24; On Adverbs, 128,25; 131,3.
156
On grammatical pathê and ideai, see above, nn. 128, 130.

Cf: Ammonius Hermeias, Commentary On the Peri Hermeneias (= Ammonius: On Aris-

totle’s On Interpretation 1-8, tr. David Blank, pp. 19-20).

<Distinction of name and verb from simple vocal sounds>

One might think there is a problem as to why, when he treated of simple vocal sounds [phonai]
at length in the book of the Predicaments he here again undertakes to speak about the name
and the verb, each of which is obviously a simple vocal sound. The answer is that a simple
vocal sound, a name, a verb, a thing said [phasis], and a term [horos]50 are the same in subject
[toi hupokeimenôi] and differ only in relation [tei skhesei],51 like [an apple considered as] the
seed and the fruit, or the ascent and the descent.52For when we consider that simple vocal
sounds are significant [sêmantikai] of the things [pragmata] to which they have been assigned
[tisthesthai], this is all we call them, ‘simple vocal sounds’, since we do not in this distinguish
names from verbs. But when we have seen some lack of correspondence [diploe] among these,
and find that some of them are combined with articles and others are not, or also that some
signify a certain time in addition, while others do not, we distinguish them from one another
and call those which are combined with articles and do not consignify time ‘names’, and those
which cannot be combined with articles but are said according to a certain time we call ‘verbs’.
But when, on the other hand, we do not take each of these kinds of vocal sound by and for
itself but rather insofar as it is part of an affirmation and denial, then we call it a ‘thing said’
[phasis], as Aristotle will clearly teach us in what follows [cfr. 16b 26]. And when he examines
vocal sounds insofar as they are used in a syllogism, we call them ‘terms’ [horoi], as will be
said in the proem of the Analytics.53 This is also how Plato spoke in the ninth book of the Laws
[878b]54….
50
These represent the four stages of Porphyry’s semantic theory.... [remainder omitted]
51
The difference in relation (skhesis) is a favorite device of Porphyry and later Neoplatonists
in general.
52
[footnote omitted]
53
An. Post. 1.1, 24b16.
54
Laws 9.878B.

4
Cf. ibid,, pp. 20-22 (tr. slightly rev. B.A.M.):

<Why does Aristotle mention only name and verb?>

[11,1] ‘But why’, one might ask, ‘when what the grammarians call “the parts of speech” [tou
merou logou] are various, does he now teach us only these, the name and the verb?’ “Be-
cause’, we shall say, ‘these alone, without all the others, can make an assertoric sentence,1 as
when we [5] say “man is healthy”. Therefore Aristotle conducts his investigation in this
<book> only about these, which of necessity are used in every assertoric sentence and suffice
to generate the simple assertion.’56
56
cf. Boethius II 14.7-30.

Cf. ibid., p. 67:

One should not be surprised if we do not call the parts of the names and verbs parts of speech
consisting of them, strictly speaking. <...> However, the names and verbs themselves, which
effect not only the pronunciation but also the signification (sêmasia) of speech through their
own combination (sunthesis) and which are the most primitive parts to have semantic force,
are rightly said by us to be [20] ‘first parts of speech’. Hence, Socrates in the Cratylus also
says that the smallest part of speech is the name,223 by which, of course, he means both the
name properly speaking and the verb.
223
cf. Cratylus 385C.

N.B. For an additional witness to the provenance of the foregoing teaching in Plato, cf.
Plutarch, Quaest Plat. Question X (= Moralia 1009 c):2

The Complete Works Volume 3, Essays and
Miscellanies. By Plutarch. Platonic Questions.
(tr. William Watson Goodwin)
[Greek Added by B.A.M.]
Plutarch, Mor. 1009 C—1011 E. (In: Plutarch’s
Moralia In Seventeen
Volumes. XIII Part I 99 C—1032 F.
With an English Translation
by Harold Cherniss.

Platonic Questions X, 1009 ff.

QUESTION X. Question X a

WHY SAID PLATO, THAT SPEECH WAS (1009) 1. What was Plato’s reason for sayingb
COMPOSED OF NOUNS AND VERBS? that speech is a blend of nouns and verbs?
(Plato’s “Sophist,” p. 262 A.)

For he seems to make no other parts of speech For it seems that except for these two Plato dis-
but them. But Homer in a playful humor has missed all the parts of speech whereas Homer in
comprehended them all in one verse:— his exuberance went so far as to pack all [C] to-
gether into a single line, the following:

1
That is, only these produce statement-making, or enunciative, speech; cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri
Herm., Proem, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.): “And so only enunciative speech in which the true or false is found is called
‘interpretation’”. Hence, what Blank calls “the assertoric sentence” I call “enunciative speech”. On the enun-
ciation in the perspective of the logic of the second act, see further below on the meaning of hermeneia.
2
N.B. I give both translations of this text in full below (the appended notes being by Cherniss), but cf. the
remarks of Anneli Luhtala immediately following.

5
 au)toj i)w\v klisi/nde, to\ so\n ge/raj: o)/fr’ eu)= Tentward going myself take the guerdon that well
ei)d$=j. (“Iliad”, i. 185.) you may know it.c

For in it there is pronoun, participle, noun, In this there are in fact a pronoun and a participle
preposition, article, conjunction, adverb, and and noun and verb and preposition
d
and article
verb, and conjunction and adverb,

the particle—“de” being put instead of the for the suffix “ward” has here been put in place
preposition “ei)j”; for klisi/nde, TO THE TENT, of the preposition “to,” the expression “tent-
is said in the same sense as ’Aqh/naze, TO ward” being of the same kind as the expression
“Athensward.”e
ATHENS.
a
This question is translated and discussed by J. J. Hartman in De Avindzon des Heidendoms (Leiden,
1910), ii, pp. 22-30 and translated in part by A. von Mörl in Die Grosse Weltordnung
(Berlin/Wien/Leipzig, 1948), ii, pp. 85-89; it is commented on in detail by O. Göldi, Plutarchs
sprachliche Interessen (Diss. Zürich, 1922), pp. 2-10.
b
Sophist 262 c 2-7; cf. Crat. 425 A 1-5 and 431 B 5-C 1, Theaetetus 206 D 1-5, and [Plato] Epistle
vii, 342 B 6-7 and 343 b 4-5; O. Apelt, Platonis Sophista (Lipsiae, 1897), p. 189. and F. M. Cornford,
Plato’s Theory of Knowledge (London, 1935), pp. 307-308.
c
Iliad i, 185.
d
For these eight parts of speech cf. Dionysius Thrax, Ars Grammatica § 11 (9. 23 1-2 [Uhlig]). As
the Homeric line containing all of them the grammarians cite Iliad xxii, 59 (Scholia in Dionysii
Thracis Artem Grammaticam, p. 58, 13-19 and p. 357, 29-36 [Hilgard]); Eustathius, Commentarii
ad Homeri Iliadem 1256, 60-61; and there the noun is du/sthnon, for the adjective (“noun adjective”
in older grammars [cf. O.E.D. s.v. “noun” 3]) was considered to be a kind of noun, o)/noma e)pi/qeton
(Dionysius Thrax, op. cit., § 12 [p. 33, 1 and pp. 34, 3-35, 2]) with Scholia...., p. 233, 7-33 and p.
553, 11-17....).
e
Cf. Etym. Magnum 761, 30-32 and 809, 8-9 (Gaisford) and further for mo/rion as “prefix” or “suffix”
141, 47-52.

Cf. A. Luhtala, “Imposition of Names in Ancient Grammar and Philosophy” [In: Stephanos
Matthaios, Franco Montanari, Antonios Rengakos (ed.), Ancient Scholarship and Grammar:
Archetypes, Concepts and Contexts. Trends in classics – supplementary volumes, 8. Berlin;
New York: De Gruyter, 2011. pp. 483-484]:

3. The Philosophers’ versus Grammarians’ Parts of Speech

The status of the grammarians’ eight parts of speech as opposed to the philosophers’ two parts
was discussed in several philosophical and grammatical works, starting with the Middle
Platonist Plutarch (46-120 AD). Inspired by the Sophist, he raised the question why Plato
should have recognized only two parts of speech, the noun and the verb, and dismissed all the
other parts of speech, if Homer had included them all in a [483-484] single verse (Quaest.
Plat. [X] 1009c). He drew a distinction between two kinds of words, (1) those which form
significant expressions with one another, and (2) those which signify nothing either by them-
selves nor (sic) in association with one another.1 Such are conjunctions, articles and prep-
ositions. He defends the view that only the noun and verbs are parts of speech, because they
can signify and form a proposition without the other parts. According to him, the other parts
do contribute to speech, but in a different way, just as salt contributes to a dish of food and
water to a barley-cake (1010c).12

1
Cf. the texts of Boethius cited in sec. 3.

6
 12
In accordance with the Sophist, he maintains that the noun and the verb were first invented
in order to signify agents and patients as well action and undergoing action (1009d).

Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm., ii. p. 15 (5-7) (ed. Keil; tr. B.A.M.):

Therefore the parts of speech according to the Dialecticians1 are two, the name [5] and the
verb, since these two alone by themselves when conjoined produce complete speech. But the
other parts they named syncategoremata; that is to say, consignificantia [or ‘co-signifying
words’].2

2. The several considerations of speech and the meaning of “complete speech”.

As we have seen, Simplicius distinguishes the consideration of “simple words sig-

nificant of realities, qua significant” from their consideration “qua simple expressions”.
Likewise, speech considered as complex has a manifold consideration, as Aristotle makes
clear:

Yet every instance of speech is not a proposition; only such are propositions as have in them
either truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is speech, but is neither true nor false. [5] Let us there-
fore dismiss all other types of speech but the proposition, for this last concerns our present
inquiry, whereas the investigation of the others belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or of
poetry.3

The consideration of speech that is neither true nor false, then, is proper to rhetoric and
poetics, whereas the first is proper to the logician strictly so called. St. Thomas Aquinas lays
out these distinctions, together with an additional one, in the following text:

Enunciative speech belongs to the present consideration. The reason for this is that the con-
sideration of this book is ordered directly to demonstrative science, in which the soul of man
is led by an act of reasoning to assent to truth from those things that are proper to the thing;
and so to this end the demonstrator uses nothing except enunciative speech which signifies
things according as truth about them is in the soul. The rhetorician and the poet, on the other
hand, induce assent to what they intend not only through what is proper to the thing but also
through the dispositions of the hearer. Hence, rhetoricians and poets for the most part strive to
move their hearers by arousing certain passions in the them as the Philosopher says in his
Rhetoric (cf. Bk. I, 2, 1356a 2, 1356a 14; Bk. III, 1, 1403b 12). And so the consideration of
the species of speech mentioned, which pertains to the ordination of the hearer toward some-
thing, falls to the consideration of rhetoric or poetics by reason of its sense; but to the con-
sideration of the grammarian as regards a fitting construction of the vocal sounds is con-
sidered in them.4

1
As Priscian goes on to cite the Stoics as holding five parts of speech, the ‘Dialecticians’ cannot include them,
contra Philotheus Boehner, Medieval Logic, excerpted below.
2
Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum dialecticos duae, nomen [5] et verbum, quia hae solae etiam per se
coniunctae plenam faciunt orationem, alias autem partes ‘syncategoremata’, hoc est consignificantia,
appellabant. These being words which signify only when joined to the others, as will be made clear below.
3
Aristotle, De Int. (On Interpretation) I. 4 (17a 2-7) (tr. E. M. Edgehill; slightly rev. B.A.M.).
4
In I Peri Herm., lect. 7, n. 6. (tr. B.A.M.): sed enunciativa oratio praesentis considerationis est. cuius ratio
est, quia consideratio huius libri directe ordinatur ad scientiam demonstrativam, in qua animus hominis per
rationem inducitur ad consentiendum vero ex his quae sunt propria rei; et ideo demonstrator non utitur ad
suum finem nisi enunciativis orationibus, significantibus res secundum quod earum veritas est in anima. sed
rhetor et poeta inducunt ad assentiendum ei quod intendunt, non solum per ea quae sunt propria rei, sed etiam
per dispositiones audientis. unde rhetores et poetae plerumque movere auditores nituntur provocando eos ad

7
We can see, then, that there is also a consideration of speech proper to the grammarian. Now
as is clear from elsewhere in St. Thomas’ commentary, the subject of the grammarian’s con-
sideration is oratio perfecta, ‘perfect speech’, which we call a sentence, being that which
“completes a thought” [perfectae orationis, quae complet sententiam], and “make[s] perfect
sense in the soul of the hearer [(facit) perfectum sensum in animo audientis]” (cf. In I Peri
Herm., lect. 7, n. 4).1 On this matter, consider the following:

Cf. Dionysius Thrax, Techne Grammatike (tr. B.A.M.):

Speech is a composition of words disclosing a thought.2

Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm. ii. 4. 14 (tr. B.A.M.):

Speech is a fitting ordering of words, expressing a complete thought.3

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 7, n. 4 (tr. B.A.M.):

Then when he says But not in every, etc. he shows that through this definition the enunciation
[or ‘statement’] differs from the other speeches [= ‘kinds of speech’]. And indeed in the case
of imperfect speeches it is obvious that they do not signify the true or false since they do not
make perfect sense in the soul of the hearer, [and] it is [also] obvious that they do not perfectly
express the judgement of reason, in which the true and the false consist. Therefore, with these
things having been determined, it must be understood that of perfect speech, which completes
a thought, there are five forms [species], namely, enunciative [= making a statement, signify-
ing the true or false], deprecative [= expressing a prayer], imperative [= issuing a command],
interrogative [= asking a question] and vocative [= addressing a person].4

Cf. also Plato, Crat. 431b (tr. Jowett; slightly rev. B.A.M.):

Speeches are, I conceive, a combination of verbs and nouns.

Cf. Plato, Sophist 262 A (tr. Benjamin Jowett):

aliquas passiones, ut philosophus dicit in sua rhetorica. et ideo consideratio dictarum specierum orationis,
quae pertinet ad ordinationem audientis in aliquid, cadit proprie sub consideratione rhetoricae vel poeticae,
ratione sui significati; ad considerationem autem grammatici, prout consideratur in eis congrua vocum
constructio.
1
Such speech possessing both a subject and a predicate; a subject being that about which we speak, a predi-
cate that which we say of the subject. See further under sec. II further below.
2
logo/j e)sti le/cewj sun/qesij dia/noian dhlou=sa.
3
Oratio est ordinatio dictionum congrua, sententiam perfectam demonstrans. Note how Prisician’s definition
improves on that of Thrax: the whole making up a sentence is more accurately described as an ‘ordering’ than
as a ‘composition’. It is further specified as ‘fitting’, an attribute of the sentence that is the proper concern of
the grammarian; and the thought expressed is described as ‘complete’, which serves to distinguish the sentence
from the phrase.
4
deinde cum dicit: non autem in omnibus etc., ostendit quod per hanc definitionem enunciatio differt ab aliis
orationibus. et quidem de orationibus imperfectis manifestum est quod non significant verum vel falsum, quia
cum non faciant perfectum sensum in animo audientis, manifestum est quod perfecte non exprimunt iudicium
rationis, in quo consistit verum vel falsum. his igitur praetermissis, sciendum est quod perfectae orationis,
quae complet sententiam, quinque sunt species, videlicet enunciativa, deprecativa, imperativa, interrogativa
et vocativa.

8
 Str. That which denotes action we call a verb. [262] Theaet. True. Str. And the other, which is
an articulate mark set on those who do the actions, we call a noun.

Cf. the following, excerpted from an Internet article called “The Greeks”:

Plato (Sophist 262a3ff.) discusses onoma as the deloma, disclosure, of pragma, that which is
dealt with, and the rhema as the deloma of praxis, the disclosure of the ‘dealing with’.
Therefore logos must always be an entwining (symploke) of onoma and rhema, such that
neither a string of nouns alone, nor verbs, can constitute a disclosive sentence.

N.B. I return to this subject below, but before proceeding, it will be helpful to consider two
additional texts which handle several of the issues broached above, beginning with the
following:

Cf. Dexippus, On Aristotle Categories. (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle.) John M.

Dillon (tr.) (London: Duckworth, 1990) Book 1, 32,17, p. 66:

SELEUCUS: They also raise the question as to why he left out conjunctions.115
DEXIPPUS: Because, we say, the employment of them is not a primary but a secondary use
of language, nor are they complete, but incomplete, nor really parts of discourse (lektikê), but
act as symbols (symbolikê); nor do they signify primarily [20], but rather in a subsidiary way,
even as we are accustomed to use marks of punctuation (diplai),116 which in combination with
the text contribute to the signifying of breaks in the thought, but on their own they mean
nothing. So, also, then, conjunctions signify in a subsidiary way, in combination with the other
parts of speech, but they in themselves are not significant on their own, but are like glue.1 [25]
It is for this reason that we do not class them as elements of speech, but, if anything, as parts
of speech. Even if these do signify, they signify only in combination, like, for example, the
syllable ‘ba’,2 and we say that the present subject of discussion is words without combination
which are significant by themselves, and for the primary uses of language, not the secondary
ones.
115
[footnote omitted]
116
Diplai are really marginal marks, used by grammarians and scribes to indicate such things
as a variant reading, a rejected verse, or a change of speaker, but this translation preserves the
sense well enough.

Cf. ‘The Reception of Aristotle’s Categories, c. 80 BC to AD 220’. Thesis submitted for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Greek and Latin Language and Literature (Classics) 30
March 2009. Michael J. Griffin, pp. 300-301:

The ‘Co-Significant’

Dexippus 11,11 and the related passage 32,17 ff. are relevant in exploring the attribution of
Simplicius 64,18-65,13. Dexippus tackles the (evidently Stoic) argument that the Categories
should include conjunctions among other ‘grammatical’ elements by remarking that the
Categories considers only what is significant – and conjunctions are ‘co-significant’ (T2b.2):

1
On this comparison, see the multitude of witnesses assembled below.
2
The reader would do well to keep in mind this comparison of the syllable with the conjunction as agreeing in
being non-significative, as we shall meet it again in excerpts from Boethius and Averroes below.

9
 If we take an element of speech which is non-significant in itself, such as blityri, or if
something is significant by reference to something else, as in the case of so-called ‘pro-
nouns’... or if a term is co-significant (συσσημαντικὸν) with something else, as is the case
with articles and conjunctions (τὰ ἄρθρα καὶ οἱ σύνδεσμοι), in no way would it be proper
to include these among the predicates (ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις). [300-301]

This term ‘co-significant’ (συσσημαντικὸν) is unusual. In our record, it first occurs in

Plotinus’s treatment of the categories (6.1.5,14), where voice is divided into the impact on air
and the movement, one of which signifies as the other ‘co-signifies’. It recurs later in Dexippus
at 32,17, the passage mirroring the text of Simplicius ascribed to ‘Lucius’ above. At 11,11,
under a chapter-heading dedicated to ‘the Stoics’, Dexippus mentions the term briefly during
his defense against the arguments of Athenodorus – presumably an epitome of the arguments
of Porphyry in the Ad Gedalium. At 32,17 we are given much more detail about the reason
why conjunctions are such ‘co-signifiers’ – they specifically co-signify ‘breaks in thought’
(συσσημαίνουσι τὸ ἀπαρτίζον τῆς διανοίας, 32,22), but on their own they mean nothing.1

Doctrinal Summary:

According to the foregoing writers, who are either Peripatetics or witnesses to their tradition,
in addition to their treatment in the Categories, there were several considerations of these
simple parts of speech proper to other sciences; the doctrine of concern to us being that the
name and the verb are to be considered the sole parts of speech because these two alone
produce complete or enunciative speech. Moreover, according to Priscian, the other sorts of
words were known as syncategoreumata or consignificantia, terms the meanings of which
we shall have occasion to explore below. Again, as has been noted above, the latter are
components of speech which do not signify by themselves, but “only in combination with
the other parts of speech”, that is, only when joined to others, namely, the name and verb, a
doctrine to which we next proceed.

1
As may be seen by a careful reading of the passage in question, the author has clearly misunderstood Dexi-
ppus here: “signifying breaks in the thought” being proper to diplai, which are merely comparanda, not sun-
desmoi, the co-signification of which is made perfectly evident by the witnesses we cite next.

10
3. The propria of the conjunction and preposition as conjunctive parts of speech.

Cf. Boethius, Commentarium In Librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias Primae Editionis. Liber

Primus. [Introductio] (ed. Migne, PL 64, tr. B.A.M.):

Wherefore, since among the parts of speech there are certain ones which signify nothing by
themselves, yet do convey a meaning when joined to the others, as do conjunctions or
prepositions, these things we do not call ‘interpretations’.1

Cf. Boethius, In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Sex Editio Secunda, Seu Majora
Commentaria (ed. Migne, PL 64, tr. B.A.M.):

For interpretation is articulate vocal sound signifying by itself. But not every vocal sound is
‘interpretation’; for there are vocal sounds belonging to the rest of the animals which are not
included under the word ‘interpretation’. Neither is every locution interpretation because, as
has been said, there are certain utterances which lack signification and, although they do not
signify anything by themselves, nevertheless when they are joined with the others do signify,
like conjunctions. Interpretation, however, consists solely in articulate vocal sounds signif-
ying by themselves. Wherefore the following conversion of statements holds good, that what-
ever is an interpretation, that signifies, and whatever signifies is named by the word ‘interpre-
tation’. That is why Aristotle in the books he wrote About the Poetic Art also taught that
syllables and conjunctions are parts of language, of which the syllables as syllables signify
nothing at all [cf. Poetics ch. 20, 1456b 20ff.]. But conjunctions in fact can consignify, but
signify nothing by themselves.2 In this book, however, he has established the name and verb
as parts of an interpretation, which, of course, signify by themselves. And nevertheless it
cannot be denied that speech is interpretation which, since it is vocal sound joined from parts
which are significative, does not lack signification. Wherefore not of speech alone, but also of
the name and the verb, and not of locution alone, but also of significative locution, which is
interpretation, are treated by Aristotle in this book, and as the name ‘interpretation’ designates
verbs, names, and significative utterances as well, this book is entitled On Interpretation from
the common name of the things which are treated in this book; that is, interpretation….3

1
Quare cum sint quaedam in orationis partibus quae per se nihil significant, aliis tamen iuncta designant, ut
sunt coniunctiones uel praepositiones, haec interpretationes esse non dicimus. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I
Peri Herm., Proem., n. 3, excerpted below.
2
Needless to say, no such statement concerning conjunctions is to be found in the text of the Poetics which
has come down to us, whereas his preceding remarks, as noted, are witnessed to therein. That is to say, of the
three things he asserts about the constitution of the text, the first two are undeniably true.
3
Interpretatio namque est vox articulata per seipsam signifcans. Quocirca non omnis vox interpretatio est,
sunt enim caeterorum animalium voces, quae interpretationis vocabulo non tenentur. Nec omnis locutio
interpretatio est, idcirco quia (ut dictum est) sunt locutiones quaedam, quae significatione carent et cum per
se quaedam non significent, juncta tamen cum aliis significant, ut conjunctiones. Interpretatio autem in solis
per se significativis et articulatis vocibus permanent (?). Quare convertitur, ut quidquid sit intepretatio, illud
significet. Et quidquid significat, interpretationis vocabulo nuncupetur. Unde etiam ipse quoque Aristoteles in
libris quos de Arte poetica scripsit, locutionis partes esse syllabas et conjunctiones etiam tradit, quarum
syllabae, in eo quod sunt syllabae, nihil omnino significant. Conjunctiones vero consignificare quidem pos-
sunt, per se vero nihil designant. Interpretationis vero partes hoc libro constituit nomen et verbum, quae scilicet
per seipsa significant. Nihilominus quoque orationem interpretationem esse constat, quae et ipsa cum vox sit
et significativis partibus juncta, significatione non caret. Quare quoniam non de oratione sola, sed etiam de
nomine et verbo, nec vero de sola locutione, sed etiam de significativa locutione, quae est interpretatio, in hoc
libro ab Aristotele tractatur, idcirco quoniam verbis atque nominibus, et significativis locutionibus nomen
interpretationis aptatur, a communi nomine eorum de quibus in hoc libro tractatur, id est interpretatione, ipse
quoque de Interpretatione liber inscriptus est….

11
Doctrinal Summary:

According to Boethius, the conjunction and the preposition agree in signifying nothing by
themselves, but only when conjoined to the others, namely, the name and the verb; both
being parts of language, according to the second text, and so are not be reckoned ‘inter-
pretations’, as he understands the term. (Rather, as we have noted above, his contemporary
Priscian holds that they are syncategoreumata or consignificantia.)

4. That as parts of language, connectives are like certain kinds of supports or bonds.

Cf. Boethius, De Syllogismo Categorico. Liber Primus (ed. Migne, PL 64 796C-D; tr.
B.A.M.):

The name and the verb are reckoned to be the two sole parts, for the rest are not parts of speech
but rather supports: for as the bridle or reins of a chariot are not parts, but are in a way certain
‘ligatures”—and, as has been said, supports are not even parts—so conjunctions and
prepositions and other things of this sort are not parts of speech but certain bonds.1

Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm., GL II, 551 18. (In: Anneli Luhtala, Grammar and Philosophy in
Late Antiquity. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2004) p. 132):

Therefore some philosophers regarded the noun and the verb as the sole parts of speech, and
the others as having a supporting and binding function, in the same way in a ship, its parts are
the sides [or planks], the rudder and the sail; wax, tow and nails are not parts but things that
bind and glue the parts together.2

Cf. Scholion on Dionysius Thrax (Grammatici Graeci I, 3, p. 515, 19; tr. B.A.M.):

The Peripatetics believed the parts of speech to be two, the name and the verb; but the rest
they did not say were parts of speech, but were added for the sake of binding and gluing. <The
noun and the verb may be compared to the sides [or planks], the rudder, and the sail of a ship,
whereas the other words are more like the pitch, the tow, and the nails>.3

Cf. Ammonius Hermeias, Commentary on the De Interpretatione (In: Ammonius: On Aris-

totle’s On Interpretation 1-8, tr. David Blank; slightly rev. B.A.M., pp. 21-22):

1
Nomen et uerbum, duae solae partes sunt putandae, caeterae enim non partes sed orationis supplementa
sunt: ut enim quadrigarum frena uel lora non partes sed quaedam quodammodo ligaturae sunt et, ut dictum
est, supplementa non etiam partes, sic coniunctiones et praepositiones et alia huiusmodi non partes orationis
sunt sed quaedam colligamenta. For an elaboration of this comparison, see the text of Plutarch below.
2
Quibusdam philosophis placuit nomen et verbum solas esse partes orationem, cetera vero admincula vel
iuncturas earum, quomodo navium partes sunt tabulae et trabes, cetera autem, id est stuppa et clavi et similia
vincula et conglutinationes partium navis [hoc est tabularum et trabium], non partes navis dicuntur. A more
literal translation of the foregoing Latin reads as follows:

Some philosophers were agreed that the name and the verb were the sole parts of speech, but the rest
their supports or bindings, in the way in which the parts of a ship are planks and beams, but the rest, for
instance, tow (or oakum) and spikes (or nails) and similar bonds and joinings of the parts of a ship [that
is, of the planks and beams], are not called parts of the ship.
3
oi( Peripathtikoi\ du/o me/rh lo/gou e)do/casan ei)=nai, o)/noma kai\ r(h=ma, ta\ de\ a)/lla ou) le/gousin ei)=nai
me/rh lo/gou, a)ll” e(/neken sunde/sewj kai\ ko/llhj paralamba/nesqai. [N.B. For this last sentence, see
Gabriel Nuchelmans’ Theories of the Proposition, excerpted below. (B.A.M.)]

12
 For just as the planks of a ship are properly [25] speaking its parts, while bolts, sail-
cloth1 and pitch are also added to hold them together and for the unity of the whole,64
in the same way in the sentence conjunctions, articles, prepositions, and adverbs
themselves do the work of bolts,[2] but they would not correctly be called parts inas-
much as they cannot be put together and on their own produce a [30] complete speech.
So these are not parts of speech, but they are parts of lexis, of which speech itself also
is a [13,1] part, as has been said in [the books] About the Poetic Art [e)n toi=j Peri\
poihtikh=j ei)/rhtai, ed. Busse].65 And these are useful for the [21-22] specific sorts of
composition (sunthesis) and construction (suntaxis)66 of the parts of speech with one
another, just as a bond (is useful) for adding unity to things bound and glue to things
joined by it.67 [35] But these are not parts of the things bound or glued, and neither are
conjunctions, articles, prepositions or adverbs ‘particles’ (moria) of speech.68
64
This is a common simile, known already to Apollonius Dyscolus in the early second century
as Peripatetic; cf. R. Schneider (ed.) Apolloni Dyscoli Quae Supersunt, Grammatici Graeci II
3 Librorum Apolloni Deperditorum Fragmenta, Leipzig 1910, 31.26ff. = Scholia in Dionysii
Thracis Artem Grammaticam [Sch. Lond.] 515,19ff. Hilgard; Schneider (30) attributes this
discussion to Apollonius’ lost work on the division of the parts of speech (peri merismou). It
was probably used also by Porphyry (Ebbesen, ‘Porphyry’s legacy to logic’, in Aristotle
Transformed, op. cit., 156f.), as it appears here, in Boethius in Int. II 6 Meiser, and elsewhere
as well.
65
Poet. 20, 1456b20; cf. below. [Missing from our Poetics. (B.A.M.)]
66
Sunthesis and suntaxis may be used as synonyms; where they are not, however, the former
refers to the way letters, syllables and words as sounds are used together, while the latter refers
to the combination of the meanings of words to create larger units such as the sentence.
67
For the various bonds and joins used in this paragraph, see Metaph. 8.2, 1042b17f. [N.B.
For this and related texts, see further below. (B.A.M.)]
68
The long discussion of this ‘Peripatetic’ argument in our fragment of Apollonius Dyscolus’
On Division is concerned solely with the question whether name and verb are the only parts
of logos; that all the word-classes together are the ‘parts of lexis’ is never mentioned. The
discussion of Theophrastus’ On the Elements of the Sentence by Simplicius (in Cat. 10,20-
11,2 = fr. 683 Fortenbaugh) makes it clear that Theophrastus did not actually make this
distinction, for the words as expression (lexis) were discussed by him in that work. It seems
likely that the Stoics used the term ‘elements of expression’ (stoikheia lexeôs) to refer to the
letters and ‘elements of the sentence’ to refer to the word-classes (Diogenes Laertius 7.56;
Galen, On the Doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates 8.3). I believe that the distinction made
here by Ammonius cannot be traced back further than Porphyry, whose interest in Stoic logic
may have inspired him to interpret Aristotle’s usage in this way; note that it is with Porphyry’s
book To Gedalius and By Question and Answer that Simplicius introduces the note which cites
Theophrastus. Boethius, who is dependant upon Porphyry, gives a fuller account of the
distinction (II 6.15ff.): like Ammonius, he cites Poet. 20 to the effect that ‘the parts of
expression (locutio = lexis) are syllables or also conjunctions’, neither of which are significant
by themselves, while ‘the parts of the “interpretation” (interpretatio, one might translate
‘speech’) he establishes in this book as name and verb’. He ends with the explanation: ‘hence
in this book Aristotle deals not merely with the sentence (oratio), but also with verb and name,

1
The underlying Greek being linon, ‘flax’, one kind of which is ‘tow’, either of these two words would have
been acceptable translations, whereas ‘sail-cloth’, being a composing part and no bond, is impossible.
2
ώσπερ γαρ της νεώς α'ι μεν σανίδες είσϊ τά κυρίως μέρη, γόμφοι δέ καί λίνον καί πίττα συνδέσεως
αυτών και της τοΰ ολου ενώσεως ένεκα παραλαμβάνονται, τον αυτόν τρόπον κάν τω λόγω σύνδεσμοι
και αρθρα και προθέσεις καϊ αυτά τά επιρρήματα γόμφων τινών χρείαν άποπληροΰσι. [added by B.A.M.]

13
 nor indeed with mere expression (locutio), but actually with significant expressions, which is
speech (interpretatio).’

Cf. Anneli Luhtala, Grammar and Philosophy in Late Antiquity (Amsterdam & Philadel-
phia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2004), pp 136-137

I will now proceed to highlight one more author, who attests to the continuous interest shown
in this topic by philosophers of Late Antiquity, namely, Ammonius. The parts of speech are
described somewhat similarly as by Priscian and the Scholiasts, as will emerge from the
passages quoted below:

Now somebody might say: Seeing that there are more parts of speech as the grammarians
call them, why does he speak to us of only two, onoma and rhema? Because, we shall say,
only these two of them all can form a proposition, for instance: ‘Man thrives’. (…)

Now it is worth knowing that of the often-named eight parts of sentence1 some signify
substances (physeis), or persons or doings or sufferings or a combination of them like noun
and pronoun and verb and participle, which alone suffice to constitute a proposition like
‘Socrates walks’ or ‘I walk’ or ‘The runner walks’ ‘Socrates is running’, the one being used
as subject, the other as predicate, whereas the other parts [136-137] of sentences have no
such signification: they designate a relation or the predicate to the subject, like most of the
adverbs, sc. how the predicate inheres in the subject, or when or where, or how often, either
definitely or indefinitely, in what position to another, more or less, or intensely inheres, or
how we think something is or is not. (…)

With ‘how the predicate inheres’ I mean the adverbs of the intermediate kind (mesotes)
and of quality, like: ‘Socrates disputes well’, ‘Melanthius kicked Ulysses with the foot’.
‘The bees fly in clusters’ and the adverbs which indicate whether the predicate inheres in
those we speak of altogether or not altogether. (…)

Those parts of speech then which signify substances or persons or doings or sufferings or
a combination of person and action or passion Aristotle divides them all into onomata and
rhemata, calling those with indication of time and used as predicates in propositions
rhemata and those without temporal relation and taking the function of subjects onomata,
whereas those not used in either of these functions though they belong to the propositions
in other ways, denoting inherence or non-inherence or when or why or how often a predi-
cate inheres in a subject, or some other mutual relation, he does not call parts of sentence
in the proper sense, for just as the planks are the proper parts of a ship, while nails, flax,
and pitch are used for holding together the parts and for the union of the whole, so the
conjunctions, articles, prepositions and even the adverbs in a sentence have the function of
nails and so they are not rightly called parts of the sentence being not fit to form a complete
sentence if joined to one another alone. These then are not parts of sentence (logos), but
parts of speech (lexis) (…) (tr. Arens 1984: 66-67) [= Arens, Hans, 1984. Aristotle’s Theory
of Language and its Tradition. (= Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science,
III.29). Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.]

Cf ibid., p. 133:

Schneider edited a discussion on this topic among Apollonius’ fragments, which are pre-
served by the Scholiasts.2 The discussion elaborates on the notion of the parts of speech from

1
For ‘sentence’ one should read ‘speech’. Likewise, lexis below should be translated ‘language’.

14
 various viewpoints, and contains many Apollonian themes; yet it cannot be regarded as
genuinely Apollonian.
2
Quare non dubito totam illam egregiam disputationem, quae in scholiis Londinensibus ad
Dion. Thr. 515, 19-521, 37 Hilg. servata est, ut desumptam ex Apollonii de merismo libro,
transcribere (CG II.3, 31, 23-25).

Cf. ibid., pp. 134-136:

The following passage involves elements which are distinctly Peripatetic and cannot there-
fore be ascribed to Apollonius Dyscolus. It is said that the Peripatetic philosophers recog-
nized two parts of speech, the noun and the verb, and claimed that the others are not parts of
speech, but are merely used for the sake of binding and gluing. Moreover, just as a boat can
be made of a single piece of wood, without glue or binding agent, so a sentence can consist of
just a noun and a verb, without words of any other type. But a sentence cannot be formed with
no noun or with no verb, just as, by implication, no boat can consist just of pitch, tow and
nails. Just as there are ships made of one piece of wood only, he argues, similarly there are
sentences which need no binding, e.g. Swkra/thj peripatei=, Swkra/thj u(giai/nei ‘Socrates
is walking’, ‘Socrates flourishes’ (GG I.3, 515, 28-29). There is a certain natural union
between the noun and the verb, it is claimed, comparable to that between form and matter; this
is why they do not need binding.
Form and matter are concepts pertaining to Peripatetic philosophy. In Apollonius’ surviving
works, Peripatetic philosophy is not used.

No doubt even other parts of speech have their own meanings, which are not those of the noun and the
verb, and they never bind together verbs with nouns. For when we say ho anthropos peripatei, the art-
icle is joined to the noun only, not the verb. Similarly in ho anthropos kalos peritpatei ‘well’ pertains
to the verb only, not the [134-135] noun. And those that we call conjunctions do not bind together the
noun and the verb, for nobody says ‘Tryphon and reads’. They bind either two nouns or two verbs:
‘Theon and Tryphon’, ‘I read and write’. For conjunctions combine similar parts by themselves: ‘I, you
and Apollonius’. If even those that we call conjunctions do not bind together the noun and the verb, it
is clear that these parts are not used for the sake of binding, but rather have a meaning of their own,
which is not that of binding and gluing. For the article indicates reference, which is expressed neither
by the noun nor the verb. And the pronoun indicates reference or anaphora, and neither of these func-
tions pertain to the noun or the verb. Saying baino is not the same as saying katabaino or hyperbaino,
for the preposition changes the meaning. Similarly the adverb. When it is said ‘A man is walking’ or
‘A man is walking well’, the meaning changes, for in the latter even quality is expressed by the adverb.
Even conjunctions have the effect of changing meaning. The expression ‘I write’ is complete because
it is an assertion, but the expression ‘And I write’ is a confirmation and is not independent. Neither are
grapho men and grapheis de independent. It has thus been proved that the parts of speech are not used
for the sake of binding, but for such a meaning as is not contained in the noun and the verb.

As for the view that the sentence cannot exist without a noun and a verb, it can be said that some parts
of speech are more venerable than others, as is also the case with man. Man’s body parts are his hands
and feet and brain and heart; he can live without a hand or a leg, but not without the brain and heart,
and therefore a complete sentence cannot occur without a noun and a verb (GG I.3, 516, 28-36). A
further problem is inherent in the following argument: “If those, that are said to be parts of something,
are missing, they cause effects, as is the case with man. When he has lost a leg or a hand, he has suffered
something. Given that the sentence has eight or seven or five parts, how can a complete sentence consist
of two or three or four parts? Therefore they are not parts of a sentence”.

The Scholiast then presents a long digression on the two modes of being deficient (GG I.3,
517, 4ff.), which will not be quoted. He concludes that this is an argument against the
Peripatetics, and it is immediately clear that its orientation is Platonic. Thereafter the Scholiast
discusses the ordering of the parts of speech definitely showing Apollonian influences; but
this is quite an independent elaboration of the Apollonian argument.

15
 The noun and the verb are to be placed before the other parts, since they can form an independent clause
without the others, e.g. ‘Socrates is reading’. It is justified to place them first, as they are nearly the only
parts and the others exist for their sake. That which exists for the sake of something else is secondary.
The noun holds the primary position because it expresses the substance, and the verb accidents, the
substances being prior to accidents. Or because when the noun is refuted, even the verb is refuted. Or
the noun is brought along, while the verb brings along; those that are brought along are prior to those
bringing along. And because the noun makes (a construction) complete, and the verb is made complete;
those that make complete are prior to those that are made complete. [135-136]

Since the participle is nothing more than the noun and the verb, it is placed before (the other five parts
of speech). The article precedes pronouns since articles are used with nouns and pronouns are used
instead of nouns, and that which is used with something precedes that which is used instead of some-
thing, and because the pronoun is not only used instead of the noun, but even instead of the article which
is attached to the noun. The preposition precedes the adverbs, since the preposition is used with the
nouns on its own. The adverbs are joined to verbs in their own right: ‘I write well’. Nouns precede
verbs; it is therefore appropriate that the preposition which is associated with the noun should precede
the verb which is associated with the verb. The conjunction holds the final position, since its function
is to bind together the prior mentioned parts of speech (GG I.3, 515, 19-29).

But the Scholiast proceeds to claim that the function of these parts of speech is not to bind
the noun and the verb, but each part has a meaning of its own, and they do not bind together
nouns and verbs. Thus in ‘The man walks about’ the article ‘the’ bears a relationship to the
noun, but none whatsoever to the verb. Conversely, in ‘the man walks about beautifully’ the
adverb kalôs bears a relationship to the verb but none whatever to the noun and so forth (GG
I.3, 515, 35). The second objection is to the argument that only a noun and a verb are needed
to form a complete sentence. That is so: but similarly a man, for example, may be without
hands or feet but cannot be without a brain or a heart. One does not then say that hands or feet
are not parts of a man. Likewise it does not follow that the other elements are not parts of a
sentence; merely that the noun and the verb are the preeminent parts.1 Again, it appears
unlikely that this discussion is authentically Apollonian, as it explicitly refers to Plato (GG I.3,
517, 10).

Cf. also Apulieus of Madaura. The Peri Hermeneias of Apuleius. sec. IV. [In: David
Londey and Carmen Johanson. The Logic of Apuleius (Brill, 1987, p. 85)]:

IV. A proposition, as Plato says in the Theaetetus, consists of two very special parts of speech,
the noun and the verb,2 e.g. ‘Apuleius argues’, which is either true or false, and so is a
proposition. From this, some men have thought that these two are the only parts of speech
because a complete utterance can be made from these alone – that is, because they express a
meaning very well.3 Indeed, adverbs, pronouns, participles, conjunctions, and other such
things which grammarians list are no more parts of speech than ornamented curved stems are
parts of ships or hair of men; or at least they are fit to be classed in the general structure of
speech like nails, pitch and glue.4

1
On this matter, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 6, n. 6 (tr. Jean T. Oesterle): “Now, since what
is properly called a part of a whole is that which contributes immediately to the formation of the whole, and
not that which is a part of a part, “some parts” should be understood as the parts from which speech is
immediately formed, i.e., the name and verb, and not as parts of the name or verb, which are syllables or
letters.” But neither should their various bindings and joinings be considered parts, properly speaking.
2
More literally, the statement reads, “Moreover, as Plato says in the Theatetus, a proposition minimally
(paucissimus) consists of a noun [or name] and a verb”. See the Latin given below.
3
That is to say, a name composed with a verb sufficiently comprehends a thought.
4
Ceterum propositio, ut ait in Theateto Plato, duabus paucissimus orationis partibus constat, nomine et verbo,
ut: ‘Apuleius disserit’, quod aut verum aut falsam est et ideo propositio est. Unde quidam rati sunt has duas

16
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., Proem, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

Or it may be said that only the name and the verb are [the] principal parts of speech. For under
names are comprehended pronouns, which, although they do not name a nature, nevertheless
determine a person, and therefore are put in place of names. But under the verb, the participle,
because it consignifies time, although it have an agreement with the name. But the others are
more bonds of the parts of speech, signifying the relationship [habitudo] of one thing to
another, than parts of speech [themselves], just as spikes [or nails] and other things of this
kind are not parts of a ship, but ‘conjunctions’ of the parts of a ship.1

On the various “bonds” and “gluings” mentioned in the foregoing texts, cf. Ineke Sluiter,
Parapleromatic Lucubrations, from footnote 30, p. 242:2

The more general usage of δεσμός and κόλλα in Aristotle3 also points in this direction. Δεσμός
and κόλλα are two of the means by which unity is achieved, e.g. Ar. Met. Ζ 2, 1042bl6ff.
(συνθέσει , κράσει , δεσμος, κόλλη, γόμφω); Met. Ι 1, 1052a24 όσα κόλλη ή γόμφη ή
συνδέσμος. Interestingly, these metaphors are picked up and applied to all the lesser parts of
speech by Ammonius In Ar. int., CAG IV 5.12.25ff.: ώσπερ γαρ της νεώς α'ι μεν σανίδες
είσϊ τά κυρίως μέρη, γόμφοι δέ καί λίνον καί πίττα συνδέσεως αυτών και της τοΰ ολου
ενώσεως ένεκα παραλαμβάνονται, τον αυτόν τρόπον κάν τω λόγω σύνδεσμοι και αρθρα
και προθέσεις καϊ αυτά τά επιρρήματα γόμφων τινών χρείαν άποπληροΰσι;4 cf. 13.3ff.
Obviously, in none of these cases does the application of the metaphor envisage the
parapleromatics.

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. VIII. 2 (1042b 15-19) (tr. H. G. Apostle):

But many differences appear to exist. For example, some things are spoken of as being
combinations of matters, as in the case of things formed by fusion, such as honey-water, others
as being bound together, such as a bundle, others as being glued together, such as a book,
others as being nailed together, such as a casket, others in more than one of the ways….

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. X. 1 (1052a 15—1052b 2) (tr. H. G. Apostle):

[15] That “one” is used in many senses has been stated previously in our account of the various
meanings of terms.1 Although “one” has many meanings, things which are called “one”
primarily and essentially, but not accidentally, can be summarized under four heads.

solas orationis esse partes, quod ex his soli fieri possit perfecta oratio, id est, quod abunde sententiam
comprehendant. Adverbia autem et pronomina et participia et coniunctiones et id genus cetera, quae
grammaticii numerant, non magis partes orationis quam navium aplustria et hominum pilos aut certe in
universa compage orationis vice clavorum et picis et glutinis deputanda. (excerpt from Apuleius’ Liber Peri
ermeneias) More literally: “or at least they are as a whole assigned the role of conjoining [the parts] of speech
like nails, pitch, and glue [conjoin the parts of a ship]”.
1
vel potest dici quod sola nomina et verba sunt principales orationis partes. sub nominibus enim compre-
henduntur pronomina, quae, etsi non nominant naturam, personam tamen determinant, et ideo loco nominum
ponuntur: sub verbo vero participium, quod consignificat tempus: quamvis et cum nomine convenientiam
habeat. alia vero sunt magis colligationes partium orationis, significantes habitudinem unius ad aliam, quam
orationis partes; sicut clavi et alia huiusmodi non sunt partes navis, sed partium navis coniunctiones.
2
(https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/retrieve/4156/347_017.pdf+parapleromatic&hl=en [11/11/05])
3
Desmos, ‘bond’, ‘fetter’; kolla, ‘glue’. I give next the passages Sluiter cites from Aristotle.
4
Cf. Ammonius Hermeias supra: “For just as the planks of a ship are properly speaking its parts, while bolts,
[tow], and pitch are also added to hold them together and for the unity of the whole, in the same way in speech
conjunctions, articles, prepositions, and adverbs themselves do the work of bolts....”

17
 (1) Things are one if they are continuous, either simply2, or in the [20] highest degree by
nature, and not by contact or by being bound together, and of these, those whose motion is
more indivisible and more simple are one to a higher degree and are prior….3
1
1015b16—1017a6.
2
That is, just continuous, without any restrictions or regardless of the cause.
3
1016a5-17.

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., XIV. 5 (1092a 22-28) (ed. & tr. W. D. Ross):

Those who say that existing things come from elements and that the first of existing things are
the numbers, should have first distinguished the senses in which one thing comes from another,
and then said in which sense number comes from its first principles. By intermixture? But (1)
not everything is capable of intermixture, and [25] (2) that which is produced by it is different
from its elements, and on this view the one will not remain separate or a distinct entity; but
they want it to be so. By juxtaposition, like a syllable? But then (1) the elements must have
position; and (2) he who thinks of number will be able to think of the unity and the plurality
apart; number then will be this—a unit and plurality, or the one and the unequal.

Doctrinal Summary:

Unlike the name and the verb, which, being conjoined, by themselves produce complete
speech, conjunctions (along with prepositions, or the conjunctive parts of speech generally)
are more like bonds of the parts of speech than parts themselves; the former being like the
composing parts of a ship, its planks and beams, etc.; the latter, as with pitch, tow, and nails,
their bindings or gluings. One may therefore distinguish the proper parts of speech—being
those which immediately enter into its constitution—from the rest—conjunctions,
prepositions, articles and the like. In sum, just as one could not construct a ship out of pitch
and tow and wax, or nails and bolts and the like, so neither can one produce speech out
conjunctions, prepositions, articles, or adverbs.

5. An overview of the foregoing witnesses.

Cf. Gabriel Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of
the Bearers of Truth and Falsity (North-Holland: Amsterdam and London, 1973), sec. 6.2.5,
pp. 96-97:

It is evident that the importance assigned to the noun and the verb as the indispensable
ingredients of a self-sufficient utterance that can be true or false has certain consequences for
the treatment of the other elements of speech. It seems that the Peripatetics took the most
radical attitude and refused to admit other parts of speech (merē tou logou) than nouns and
verbs. In his commentary on the De interpretatione (ed. Busse p. 12, 29) Ammonius says that
it would be wrong to call conjunctions, articles, pronouns, and adverbs parts of speech,
because no combination of these elements alone can yield a perfect utterance. This is con-
firmed by the Scholia on Dionysius Thrax (ed. Hilgard p. 515, 19), where we read that the
Peripatetics recognized only two parts of speech, the noun and the verb. The other words are
not parts of speech but are used only as a means of binding the actual parts together, as a kind
of glue. The noun and the verb may be compared to the sides, the rudder, and the sail of a ship,
whereas the other words are more like the pitch, the tow, and the nails.

Others took a less extreme course: they admitted the other kinds of words as parts of speech
but drew a borderline between the nouns and verbs, which are necessary components of a

18
 complete statement-making utterance, and the rest. Nouns and verbs are the parts of speech in
the most proper and genuine sense, being as it were the body and soul of the utterance
(Anecdota Graeca, ed. I. Bekker II, p. 881, 2; cf. also Scholia on Dionysius Thrax, ed. Hilgard
p. 216, 13). Apollonius Dyscolus (De adverbiis, ed. Schneider p. 121, 5) says that the noun
and the verb are the most important (thematikōtera) parts of speech and that the other parts
only serve to make them function in a ready way. Elsewhere (De syntaxi, ed. Uhlig p. 28, 6)
he calls the noun and the verb the most vital (empsychotata) parts of speech; if the speaker
does not make them known, he will cause the hearer to ask questions about them. One of the
criteria for drawing a distinction between two groups of parts of speech, then, is the
contribution they make to the completeness of an utterance. Another criterion is reminiscent
of what Aristotle (De int. 16 b 20) says about the difference between the copula and other
verbs. As we saw in 3.2.2, verbs by themselves do not yet signify something is the case or not,
but most of them have a meaning on their own in the sense that the speaker arrests his thought
and the hearer pauses. The copula, on the other hand, is nothing by itself, but it additionally
signifies some synthesis, which cannot be thought of without the components. This criterion
– whether or not the word is accompanied by a thought which is relatively distinct and self-
sufficient – is also applied by Plutarch (Platonicae quaestiones 1010a), [96-97] as we already
noted in 4.1.4. The verbs ‘beats’ and ‘is beaten’ and the nouns ‘Socrates’ and ‘Pythagoras’
make us think of something; but if such words as men, gar, peri are pronounced in isolation,
they are not associated with any distinct thought or either a pragma or a sōma. Unless they are
uttered in combination with nouns and verbs, they are like empty noises; by themselves they
signify nothing. In the same vein is the remark made by Apollonius Dyscolus (De syntaxi, ed.
Uhlig p. 27, 10) that a conjunction does not signify in an independent way, just as binding
material is useless if there are no objects which it binds together.1 In De syntaxi (ed. Uhlig p.
13, 1) he draws a parallel between words and sounds. Just as we can distinguish between
vowels (which by themselves form a sound) and consonants (which cannot form a sound
without a vowel), so we can distinguish between, on the one hand, verbs, nouns, pronouns,
and some adverbs (for instance, ‘Very well’) and, on the other hand, prepositions, articles, and
conjunctions, which are more like consonants in so far as they have no meaning on their own
but signify only together with the other parts of speech (syssēmainein, a term which is also
used of conjunctions in De coniunctionibus, ed. Schneider p. 222, 12).2

As the completeness of an utterance is determined by the completeness of the thought ex-

pressed by it, it is not surprising that the two criteria lead to much the same result: nouns and
verbs are the essential components of a complete utterance because they contribute those parts
of the complete thought which can also be conceived in isolation.

Cf. ibid., sec. 8.1.1, pp. 123-124:

Boethius identifies the simple interpretationes with verbs and nouns – among which he
includes also participles, pronouns, adverbs, and some interjections – and contrasts them with
conjunctions and prepositions, which by themselves do not signify anything but design-nate
something only in combination with other words and are, therefore, not interpretationes.
While the [123-124] grammarians distinguish eight parts of speech (orationis partes), the
philosophers consider the parts of speech only those expressions which have a full signi-
fication (quidquid plenam significationem tenet), namely the verb and the noun, with which

1
Cf. ed. Householder, p. 27, cited above: “28. After all the parts that have been listed we take the conjunction,
which conjoins, and cannot convey any meaning by itself without the substance of these words, just as physical
bonds are no use if there are no physical objects [to connect]”. Note how this explanation agrees both with
what Aristotle says about the copula, as well as with the Peripatetic tradition on conjunctions as being bonds
of the parts of speech. (B.A.M.)
2
For this text, and the corresponding passage in Priscian, see below.

19
 participles, adverbs, pronouns, and conventional interjections may be aligned. Conjunctions
and prepositions, on the other hand, are not parts of speech for philosophers but merely means
of holding the actual parts together, comparable to a chariot’s reins and strips of leather (In P.
herm. (II) p. 14, 28; Intr. 766 A-C; De syll. cat. 796 D). The copula est or non est is said to
signify or designate the quality of a statement, just as the words omnis, nullus, and quidam
signify the quantity (Intr. 769 A-B). As the signs of quality and of quantity are distinguished
from the termini, which are the nouns and the verbs serving as subjects and predicates, their
signification must be of the same kind as the signification of conjunctions and prepositions:
they signify only in combination with interpretationes. Boethius does not yet have a technical
term for all those words which are not interpretationes. That such a technical term already
existed is shown by a remark of his contemporary Priscian (Institutiones grammaticae, ed.
Hertz I, p. 54, 5): according to the dialecticians there are only two parts of speech, the noun
and the verb, since they alone make a combination of words complete even if it consists of
nothing else; the other parts they called synkatēgoremata, that is, consignificantia. That the
dialecticians cannot be the Stoics is clear from the next line, in which Priscian says that
according to the Stoics there are five parts of speech.

As to the meaning of the Greek term synkatēgoremata, it is advisable, I think, to follow

Priscian’s explanation, namely that it literally means things which co-signify. There is good
evidence that katēgorein was used in the sense of indicating, revealing, signifying, and katē-
gorema in the sense of indication or sign. It is therefore plausible to assume that synkatē-
gorein could be a synonym of such verbs as prossēmainein (Cf. 3.2.2)2 and syssēmainein (Cf.
6.2.5). It is from this passage in Priscian’s grammar that the technical terms syncategorema
and consignificans, which often occur in medieval writings, originate.[1]
2
In his translation of De interpretatione Boethius uses the verb consignificare to render
prossēmainein.

6. The foregoing doctrine according to Priscian.

Cf. Priscian, Inst. gram. GL II 549-551. (In: Anneli Luhtala, Grammar and Philosophy in
Late Antiquity. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2004), pp. 132-
133]:

Nec solum participium non ab alique propria vi,
sed ab affinitate nominis et verbi nominatum est,
sed aliae quoque quinque partes orationis non a
sua vi, sed ab adiunctione, quam habent ad
nomen vel verbum, vocabulum acceperunt:
Not only the participle but even the other five
parts of speech are named according to their con-
nection with the noun and the verb rather than on
account of some property of their own.

pronomen enim dicitur quod pro nomine ponitur, For the pronoun is so named because it is used
et adverbium, quod verbo adiungitur, et instead of a noun, and the adverb because it is
praepositio, quae tam nomini quam verbo joined to the verb; and the preposition, as it is
praeponitur, et coniunctio, quae coniungit ea, et joined to both nouns and verbs; and the con-
interiectio, quae his interiacet. junction, since it joins these two parts, and the
interjection, because it lies between them.
Unde est dicendum, quod, si non sit nomen et Therefore, it must be said, that without the noun
verbum, nec alia pars orationis constare poterit. and the verb, no other part would exist.

Itaque quibusdam philosophis placuit nomen et Therefore some philosophers regarded the noun
verbum solas esse partes orationis, cetera vero and the verb as the sole parts of speech, and the

[1]
On the meanings of the terms Nuchelmans considers, see further below.

20
admincula vel iuncturas earum, quomodo
navium partes sunt tabulae et trabes, cetera
autem, id est stuppa et clavi et similia vincula et
conglutinationes partium navis (hoc est tabu-
larum et trabium), non partes navis dicuntur.
others as having a supporting and binding func-
tion, in the same way in a ship, its parts are the
sides, the rudder and the sail; wax, tow and nails
are not parts but things that bind and glue the
parts together.

sed est obiciendum ad hoc, quod cera et stuppa
non ex eadem constat materia, ex qua tabulae et
trabes, coniunctiones autem et praepositiones et
similia ex eadem sunt materia, ex qua et nomen
et verbum constat, hoc est literis et syllabis et
accentibus et intellectu.
But to this it must be objected that wax, tow and
nails are not made of the same material as the
sides, rudder and the sail; but conjunctions and
prepositions and their like are made of the same
material, as even the noun and the verb, that is of
letters, syllables, accents and meaning.

itaque etiam per se prolatae, quod partes sunt
orationis, ostendunt. quid enim est aliud pars
orationis nisi vox indicans mentis conceptum, id
est cogitationem? quaecumque igitur vox liter-
ata profertur significans aliquid, iure pars orati-
onis est dicenda.
Therefore, even when pronounced as such, they
prove to be parts of speech. [For what is a part of
speech unless a vocal expression which signifies
a mental concept, namely a thought? Whatever is
expressed by means of a literate vocal form,
which signifies something, is a part of speech.]

quod si non essent partes, numquam loco earum Were they not parts of speech, nouns could not
nomina ponerentur, cum loco cerae vel stuppae be used instead of them, whereas pitch and tow
in navi tabula fungi non potest; cannot replace the sides of a ship.

invenimus enim loco adverbii nomen, ut una,
multum, falso, qua, et pronomen similiter: eo,
illo, et loco coniunctionis tam nomen quam
pronomen: quare, ideo, et adverbium loco
nominis, ut «mane novum» et «sponte sua» et
euge tuum et belle et cras alterum.
For the noun is used instead of the adverb, e.g.,
‘una’, ‘multum’, ‘falso’, ‘qua’; and so can the
pronoun: ‘eo’, ‘illo’; both the noun and the
pronoun can be used instead of the conjunction
(‘quare’, ‘ideo’), and the adverb instead of the
noun, e.g., ‘mane novum’ and ‘sponte sua’ and
‘euge tuum’ and ‘belle et cras alterum’.

sed si, quia compaginem videntur praestare
nomini et verbo, non sunt partes orationis
dicendae, ergo nec partes corporis debemus
accipere nervos, quia ligant membra et articulos,
quod penitus videtur absurdum.
For if they are not to be called parts of speech
because they seem to bind the noun and the verb,
neither must sinews be regarded as parts of a
body, because they join together limbs and joints,
what [read which] seems totally absurd.

multo melius igitur, qui principales et egregias It is therefore much preferable to say that the
partes nomen dicunt et verbum, alias autem his noun and the verb are the principal and most
nominis et verbi, eminent parts, the others being adjuncts.

nihil mirum, cum inueniuntur quaedam
nominationes etiam ex abnegatione nascentes, ut
neutrum genus, quod nec masculinum est nec
femininum, et infinitum verbum, quod personam
non habet.
It is no wonder that the participle should receive
its name from the noun and the verb, since even
some names derive from a negation, e.g. neuter
gender, which is neither masculine nor femin-
ine, and infinite verb, which lacks person.

participium est igitur pars orationis, quae pro
verbo accipitur, ex quo et derivatur naturaliter,
genus et casum habens ad similitudinem nominis
et accidentia verbo absque discretione
personarum et modorum.
[Therefore the participle is a part of speech which
is taken in place of the verb, from which it
naturally derives, having gender and case sim-
ilar to the noun and accidents to the verb with-

21
 out distinction of persons and moods. (tr.
B.A.M)]

6. Note on the foregoing.

The reader will note that the objections raised against the doctrinal point at issue in
the foregoing passage are exceedingly weak and quite easily disposed of. With respect to the
first objection, to claim that, inasmuch as they are “made of the same stuff”, conjunctions
and the like are therefore the same kind of thing as the name and the verb is like claiming
that a table is the same kind of thing as the chairs surrounding it because they happen to be
made of the same kind of wood; it being the form of a thing rather than its matter which
gives it its species. As for the second objection, were one so-called ‘part of speech’ to be
used as another, it would no longer taken as that part of speech. Conversely, just as a pair of
pliers would not become a hammer if someone were to manage to use them to drive in a nail,
so neither would a noun become a conjunction were someone to find a way to use it to
conjoin the other parts of speech, supposing such a thing even possible.

22
7. The copulative conjunction according to Averroes.

Cf. Averroes (Ibn Rushd), Averrois Expositio Poeticae interprete Hermanno Alemanno,
textum receptum revisit L. M.-P (ap. Aristoteles Latinus XXXIII, editio altera, De Arte
Poetica. Translatio Gullelmi De Moerbeka. Ed. Laurentius Minio-Paluello), p. 66. [eng. tr.
B.A.M.]:

DIXIT. Copulatio est vox composita non
significativa separatim, ut est ‘et’, ‘deinde’,
‘atque’, et universaliter dictiones consignifica-
tive, que sunt tamquam ligamenta partium
orationis ad se invicem;
HE SAID. A copulative is a composite vocal
sound not significative separately, as is ‘and’,
‘then’, ‘and also’, and in general consignifi-
cative words, which are like ‘bonds’ of the parts
of speech with one another;

et hec autem in principio sermonis, ut ‘quo- and these, however, [are placed] at the begin-
niam’, ‘quidem’; ning of speech, such as ‘seeing that’, ‘indeed’ [or
‘now’];

et dictiones conditionales que significant con- and conditional words which signify continu-
tinuationem, ut ‘si’, ‘quando’ et consimiles. ation, such as ‘if’, ‘when’, and the like.

DIXIT. Disiunctio vero est etiam vox com- HE SAID. But a disjunctive is also a com-
posita non significativa separatim disiunctiva posite vocal sound not significative separately
dictionis a dictione, ut ‘aut’, ‘vel’,* ‘sive’, et that disjoins a word from a word, such as ‘either’
consimiles; or ‘or’, and the like;

et dictiones exceptive, ut ‘preter’, ‘preterquam’, and exceptive words, such as ‘except’, ‘except
et consimiles; for’, and the like;

et adversative ut ‘sed’, ‘verum’, ‘verumtamen’, and adversative [words], such as ‘but’, ‘how-
et consimiles. ever’, ‘but indeed’, and the like.

Et iste aut ponuntur in principio orationis aut in And these are placed either at the beginning of
fine [B 236] aut in medio. speech, or at the end, or in the middle.

Et intendimus hic per sermonem nostrum “vox
non significativa separatim” voces simplices que,
quando coniunguntur aliis, consignificant ut
dictiones sincathegoreumatice, non voces
simplices ut sunt littere;
And by our remark “vocal sound not signi-
ficative separately” here we mean simple vocal
sounds which when conjoined to others con-
signify as syncategorematic words, not simple
vocal sounds like letters [or elements] ,

quoniam voces significative separatim com-
posite ex vocibus pluribus aut tribus aut quator
aut amplius secundum [L 33] figures composi-
tionum sillibicarum, sunt nomen et verbum.
seeing as how vocal sounds significative separ-
ately composed from many vocal sounds,
whether three or four or more according to the
[various] arrangements of the composition of
syllables, are the name and the verb.

* N.B. Minio-Paluello is wrong to treat vel as an example; rather it must be taken formally as joining
the other two words in the example, as is the case with the Preminger translation (for which see
elsewhere) and the corresponding passage as translated by Butterworth. See my separate discussion.

8. Note on Averroes’ text.

23
 The reader will note here that the text of Averroes’ explanation requires revision, as
it makes no sense as it stands. Taken generally, the sense of his remarks is clear: those simple
vocal sounds which do not signify something by themselves are said to “consignify as
syncategorematic words”; such vocal sounds being called ‘simple’ in a sense different from
that of ‘letters’. To understand this last observation, it must be borne in mind that the ‘letter’
or elementum is distinguished from the syllable inasmuch as the former is indivisible,
whereas the latter, being composed of two or more ‘letters’, is composite.1 But a similar
distinction is made with respect to a vocal sound significative by itself, it being either simple,
like ’black’ or ‘bird’, or composite, like ‘blackbird’.2 Now if we emend the text in the light
of these distinctions, we can arrive at the following (intelligible) reading:

seeing as how vocal sounds significative separately, <being either simple, or> composed
from many vocal sounds, whether <two or> three or four or more according to the [various]
arrangements of the composition of the syllables, are the name and the verb.

That is to say, those vocal sounds which are significative separately are the name and the
verb, and these are either simple or are composed from many vocal sounds, whether two or
three or four or however many, etc. Still, it must be pointed out that, as explained elsewhere,
even syncategorematic words, though called simple here, can be composite, as Averroes’
own (Arabic) examples show.3 But a further emendation regarding the mention of ‘letters’
in the preceding member is called for by Averroes’ reference to “the composition of the
syllables” in the present clause, as well as by the role played by the syllable in the definition
of speech, as at De Int. I. 4 16b 30.4 In light of these considerations, I read “the <syllables
and> letters (i.e. elements) <composing names>”.
Moreover, as we have seen from our discussion on the forms of ‘name’, there is a
reason why Aristotle would have drawn a distinction between syllables and conjunctions on
the one hand, and the name and the verb on the other, seeing as how the former agree in not
signifying something by themselves, whereas the latter do. But then he would have had to
have noted the difference between them in this regard, inasmuch as the former, as parts of
compound names, signify in a certain respect, whereas the latter only con-signify—that is,
when conjoined to the others, as our witnesses attest, Averroes’ statement, however, still
appears incomplete, but may be perfected by supplementing it with the relevant parts of other
witnesses cited above, as we shall endeavor to show in our separate reconstruction of the
definition of the conjunction.

8. Note on the provenance of the foregoing doctrines:

As we have seen, with regard to the doctrine under discussion, namely, that the name
and the verb were considered to be the two sole parts of speech, David Blank, the translator
of Ammonius Hermeias, states:

1
Cf. Aristotle, Poet. 20 (1456b 22-25; 34-35)
2
And note that this difference of being either simple or composed is addressed by Aristotle in his various
accounts of the ‘double’ name (for which, see elsewhere in this paper).
3
And why is he calling them simple when he has just defined them as composite?
4
And cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri. Herm., lect. 6, n. 6 (tr. B.A.M.): “But because that is properly called
a part of some whole which immediately enters into the constitution of the whole, but not the part of a part;
therefore, this must be understood about the parts from which speech is immediately constituted, namely, from
the name and the verb, but not about the parts of the name or the verb, which are syllables or ‘letters’”.

24
 I believe that the distinction made here by Ammonius cannot be traced back further than
Porphyry, whose interest in Stoic logic may have inspired him to interpret Aristotle’s usage in
this way....

Now inasmuch as it is inextricably bound up with other teachings that are undeniably those
of the Philosopher himself, one is left to wonder what sort of evidence Blank would require
in order to accept Aristotle as its ultimate source. As the reader will have observed, essential
components of this complexus are directly attributed to the Poetics by Boethius, Ammonius,
and Averroes; the last reporting essentials of the same doctrine in the text of the Poetics he
was commenting upon. Those witnesses who do not mention Aristotle, but are in evident
agreement with them, such as Apollonius Dyscolus, the Scholiast, and Priscian, it is
reasonable to believe must ultimately derive from the same source.1 Consequently, I see no
reason to resort to a work of Porphyry, or of any similar predecessor, whether influenced by
the Stoics or otherwise, to account for the provenance of this teaching. Now in light of the
fact that our versions of Aristotle’s book or books About the Poetic Art are incomplete, it is
not unreasonable to presume Aristotle and the Poetics to be their fons et origo. Indeed, unless
one discover some manifest incompatibility with the Philosopher’s assured teaching, the
most reasonable course is to treat these witnesses as preserving otherwise lost portions of
the text. Of course, the reader may agree with this view of things without taking my
reconstructions as definitive; but then, as this sort of undertaking could never be more than
provisional, I make no such claim on their behalf.

9. Some additional texts supplementing the foregoing.

Cf. Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics. Translation by Charles E. But-

terworth, from the Arabic MSS, p. 118”

81. He said: the conjunction is a compound sound that has no meaning when taken by itself….
In general, they are the letters binding one part of discourse to another....

Cf. “The Middle Commentary of Averroes of Cordova on the Poetics of Aristotle”.

Translated by Alex Preminger, O.B. Hardison, & Kevin Kerrane, p. 373:

Aristotle says: A conjunction is a composite sound that does not mean anything by itself, ...and
in general words of like meaning that are like the cords tying the parts of the statement
together….

Cf. Averroes (Ibn Rushd), Averrois Expositio Poeticae [sc. Aristotelis], ed. Minio-Paluello,
p. 66 (tr. B.A.M.):

HE SAID. A copulative is a composite vocal sound not significative separately, ...and in

general consignificative words, which are like ‘bonds’ of the parts of speech with one
another....2

1
And I know of no route by which Latin authors such as Boethius and Priscian could have reached an Islamic
philosopher like Ibn Rushd, for which reason the simplest hypothesis to account for their evident agreement is
a common source: but two of these three witnesses explicitly cite the Poetics for their doctrine.
2
Dixit. Copulatio est vox composita non significativa separatim, ut est ‘et’, ‘deinde’, ‘atque’, …et univer-
saliter dictiones consignificative, que sunt tamquam ligamenta partium orationis ad se invicem....

25
Cf. Apollonius Dyscolus, On Syntax (= The Syntax or Peri Suntaxeōs [De Constructione] of
Apollonius Dyscolus, translated, and with commentary by Fred W. Householder), Bk. I, n.
28, p. 28:

After all the parts that have been listed we take the conjunction, which conjoins, and cannot
convey any meaning by itself without the substance of these words, just as physical bonds are
no use if there are no physical objects [to connect].

Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm., xvi. 10-11 (pp. 114-115) (ed. Hertz, tr. B.A.M.):

For they always consignify—that is, they signify when conjoined to the others—but by
themselves they do not.1

On the parts of speech in general, cf. Boethius, Introductio ad Syllogismos Categoricos, init.
(ed. Migne, PL 64, 766 A-B; tr. B.A.M.):

Restat igitur ut de oratione dicamus sed prius
uidetur esse monstrandum utrumne nomen et
uerbum sola in partibus orationis ponantur, an ut
grammatici uolunt et reliquae orationis partibus
debeant aggregari.
Accordingly it remains for us to speak about
speech, but first it seems that whether the noun
and the verb alone are [to be] placed among the
parts of speech must be shown, or whether, as the
grammarians wish, the remaining parts of speech
ought to be included.

Grammatici enim considerantes uocum figuras, For grammarians, considering the (various) ar-
octo orationis partes annumerant. rangements of words, enumerate eight parts of
speech.

[766B] Philosophi uero, quorum omnis de
nomine uerboque tractatus in significatione est
constituta, duas tantum orationis partes esse
docuerunt, quidquid plenam significationem
tenet, siquidem sine tempore significat, nomen
uocantes, uerbum uero si cum tempore:
[766B] But philosophers, all of whom have
treated the noun and the verb as being establ-
ished in signification, have taught that there are
only two parts of speech, calling whatever has a
complete signification a ‘noun’ if it signifies
without time, but a ‘verb’ if (it signifies) with
time:

atque ideo aduerbia quidem atque pronomina
nominibus iungunt, sine tempore enim quiddam
constitutum definitumque significant, nec inter-
est quod flecti casibus nequeunt, non est hoc
nominum proprium ut casibus inflectantur.
and so accordingly they join adverbs and pro-
nouns to nouns, for some of them [being so]
constituted and defined signify without time,
which are not inflected for case; for this is not
unique to the noun, that they be inflected for
cases.

Sunt enim nomina quae a grammaticis
*monoptota* nominantur, participium uero quia
temporis significationem trahit, etsi casibus
effertur, uerbo tamen recte coniungitur.
For there are nouns which are named monoptota
by grammarians, but the participle because it
draws to itself the signification of time, even if it
is put forward with cases, is nevertheless rightly
conjoined to the verb.

1
eae etenim semper consignificant, id est coniunctae aliis significant, per se autem non. Cp. Boethius’ remarks
just cited to the effect that “conjunctions in fact can consignify, but signify nothing by themselves” unless
“joined to the others”; statements manifestly bearing witness to a common tradition of doctrine.

26
 Interiectiones autem siquidem, naturaliter But interjections in fact signify naturally, [and
significent, nec uerbo, nec nomini copulandae so] are to be coupled neither to the noun nor the
sunt; verb.

uerbi enim ac nominis definitiones non habent
esse [766C] naturalia sed ad ponentis placitum
constituta, atque ideo nec in orationis partibus
numerabuntur.
For the definitions of the verb and the noun need
not be natural but are established at the pleasure
of the one imposing the name, and so accordingly
they [interjections] are not to be numbered
among the parts of speech.1

For more a particular observation relevant to the foregoing, cf. Boethius, Introductio ad
Syllogismos Categoricos (ed. Migne, PL 64, 762 D ff.; tr. B.A.M.):

...uelut quod nomen designatiua uox dicitur. ...just as a name is called a ‘designative vocal
sound’.

Sunt enim uoces quae nihil designant, ut For there are vocal sounds which designate
syllabae, nomen uero designatiua uox est, nothing, like syllables, but the name is a design-
quoniam nomen designat id semper cuius nomen native vocal sound since a name always design-
est. nates that of which it is the name.

<...> <...>

Quae uero ipsa, quidem nulla propria signifi-
catione nituntur, cum aliis uero iunctae design-
nant, ut coniunctiones atque praepositiones, illae
ne partes quidem orationis esse dicendae sunt;
oratio enim ex significatiuis partibus iuncta est.
But those which themselves depend on no signi-
fication of their own, but designate when joined
to the others, like conjunctions and prepositions,
are not in fact to be called ‘parts of speech’; for
speech is joined from significative parts.

Quocirca recte nomen ac uerbum solae orationis For which reason the name and verb are rightly
partes esse dicuntur. said to be the parts of speech.

Cf. Boethius, Commentarium In Librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias Secundae Editionis,

Liber Primus [Introductio] (ed. Migne, PL 64; tr. B.A.M.):

Quamquam duae propriae partes orationis esse Therefore two things are to be called the proper
dicendae sint, nomen scilicet atque uerbum. parts of speech, namely, the name and the verb.

Haec enim per sese utraque significant, coniunc- For these two signify by themselves; but con-
tiones autem uel praepositiones nihil omnino nisi junctions or prepositions signify nothing at all
cum aliis iunctae designant.... unless they are joined to the others....

1
If the Latin text is correct, I confess I do not understand the point being made here.

27
10. The Peripatetic tradition on the conjunctive parts of speech in relation to the name and
the verb: a compendium of texts.

(1) A copulative is a [simple or] composite vocal (2) After all the parts that have been listed we
sound not significative separately, 1 as is ‘and’, take the conjunction, which conjoins, and can-
‘then’, ‘and also’, not convey any meaning by itself without the
substance of these words,

and in general consignificative words, which are just as physical bonds are no use if there are no
like ‘bonds’ of the parts of speech with one physical objects [to connect]. (Apollonius Dys-
another.... (Averroes) colus)

(3) But conjunctions in fact can consignify, but (4) For they always consignify—that is, they
signify nothing by themselves. (Boethius) signify when conjoined to the others—but by
themselves they do not. (Priscian)

(5) Therefore two things are to be called the

proper parts of speech, namely, the name and
the verb. For these two signify by themselves;
but conjunctions or prepositions signify no-
thing at all unless they are joined to the
others.... (Boethius)
[cf. Poet. ch 20, where Aristotle’s definition of
the name makes it clear that, unlike the syllables
some of them are composed of, as with Theo-
doron, it signifies by itself]

(6) Therefore the parts of speech according to (7) ‘But why’, one might ask, ‘when what the
the Dialecticians are two, the name [5] and the grammarians call “the parts of speech” (tou
verb, merou logou) are various, does he now teach us
only these, the name and the verb?’

since these two alone by themselves when con- ‘Because’, we shall say, ‘these alone, without all
joined produce complete speech. the others, can produce enunciative speech, as
when we [5] say “man is healthy”’. (Ammonius
Hermeias)
But the other parts they named syncategore-
mata; that is to say, consignificantia [or ‘co- [On these technical terms, cf. (9) infra]
signifying words’]. (Priscian)

(8) Wherefore, since among the parts of speech
there are certain ones which signify nothing by
themselves, yet do convey a meaning when
joined to the others, as do conjunctions or
prepositions, these things we do not call ‘inter-
pretations’ (Boethius)
(9) And by our remark “vocal sound not signi-
ficative separately” here we mean simple vocal
sounds which, when conjoined to the others
consignify as syncategorematic words, not
simple vocal sounds like the letters [read the
syllables and letters (or elements)] composing
names],

seeing as how vocal sounds significative separ-

ately composed from many vocal sounds,
whether <two or> three or four or more accord-
[cf. Poet. ch. 21 (1457a 32-1457b 36) on names ing to the [various] arrangements of the compo-
which are ‘single’ or ‘double’, etc.] sition of the syllables, are the name and the verb.
(Averroes)

1
Rather, as is stated in (4), (5), (8), and (9), it signifies only when conjoined to the others.

28
(10) For there are vocal sounds which designate [cf. De Int. I. 4 (16b 30) where Aristotle ex-plains
nothing, like [elements and] syllables, but the that one syllable of a simple name (like ‘apple’
name is a designative vocal sound since a name in English) does not signify anything.]
always designates that of which it is the name.

<...>

But those which themselves depend on no sig- [cf. 5 supra]

nification of their own, but designate when
joined to the others, like conjunctions and pre-
positions, are not in fact to be called ‘parts of (11) For neither alone nor joined one with an-
speech’; other do they signify anything. (Plutarch)

for speech is joined from significative parts. For

which reason the name and verb are rightly said
to be the parts of speech. (Boethius)

(12) That is why Aristotle in the books he wrote
About the Poetic Art also taught that syllables
and conjunctions are parts of language, of
which the syllables as syllables signify nothing
at all. (Boethius)
(13) So these are not parts of speech, but they
are parts of language, of which speech itself
also is a [13,1] part, as has been said in [the
books] About the Poetic Art [e)n toi=j Peri\
poihtikh=j ei)/rhtai]. (Ammonius Hermeias)

(14) …And these are useful for the specific sorts (15) (cf. 1 supra) After all the parts that have
of composition (sunthesis) and construction been listed we take the conjunction, which con-
(suntaxis) of the parts of speech with one joins, and cannot convey any meaning by itself
another, without the substance of these words,

just as a bond (is useful) for adding unity to
things bound and glue to things joined by it.
But these are not parts of the things bound or
glued, and neither are conjunctions, articles,
prepositions or adverbs ‘particles’ (moria) of
speech (Ammonius Hermeias)
just as physical bonds are no use if there are no
physical objects [to connect]. (Apollonius
Dyscolus)
[On things bound and glued, cf. the following
excerpts.]

(16) Therefore some philosophers regarded the (17) The Peripatetics believed the parts of
noun and the verb as the sole parts of speech, speech to be two, the name and the verb; but the
and the others as having a supporting and rest they did not say were parts of speech, but
binding function, were added for the sake of binding and gluing.

in the same way in a ship, its parts are the sides, [The noun and the verb may be compared to the
the rudder and the sail; wax, tow and nails are sides, the rudder, and the sail of a ship, whereas
not parts but things that bind and glue the parts the other words are more like the pitch, the tow,
together. (Priscian) and the nails]. (Scholion to Dionysius Thrax)

(18) The name and the verb are reckoned to be [cf. 16 supra]
the two sole parts, for the rest are not parts of
speech but rather supports: for as the bridle or
reins of a chariot are not parts but are in a way
certain ‘ligatures’—and, as has been said, [cf. 1 and 2 supra]
supports are not even parts—

29
 so conjunctions and prepositions and other [cf. 17 supra]
things of this sort are not parts of speech but
certain bonds. (Boethius)

(19) Moreover, just as a boat can be made of a (20) (cf. 13 supra) For just as the planks [or
single piece of wood, without glue or binding sides] of a ship are properly [25] speaking its
agent, so a sentence can consist of just a noun parts, while bolts [or nails], [tow], and pitch are
and a verb, without words of any other type. But also added to hold them together and for the unity
a sentence cannot be formed with no noun or of the whole, …
with no verb, just as, by implication, no boat can
consist just of pitch, tow and nails. Just as there [cp. Aristotle’s example of “Cleon walks.” (Poet.
are ships made of one piece of wood only, he 20, 1457a 26)]
argues, similarly there are sentences which need
no binding, e.g. Swkra/thj peripatei=,
Swkra/thj u(giai/nei ‘Socrates is walking’,
‘Socrates flourishes’ (GG I.3, 515, 28-29).

There is a certain natural union between the noun [On this relation, which is that of substance and
and the verb, it is claimed, comparable to that accident, cf. Peter of Spain, Syncategoreumata,
between form and matter; this is why they do not cap. 1, excerpted below.]
need binding. (fragment of Apollonius Dysco-
lus, On Division, summarized by Anneli Luhtala) …in the same way in the speech conjunctions,
112 articles, prepositions, and adverbs themselves
do the work of bolts, but they would not cor-
(21) (cf. 16 supra) ...since these two alone by rectly be called parts inasmuch as they cannot
themselves when conjoined produce complete be put together and on their own produce a
speech. (Priscian) [30] complete speech.1 (Ammonius Hermeias)

Sources:

(1) Averroes (Ibn Rushd), Averrois Expositio Poeticae interprete Hermanno Alemanno,
textum receptum revisit L. M.-P (ap. Aristoteles Latinus XXXIII, editio altera, De Arte
Poetica. Translatio Gullelmi De Moerbeka. Ed. Laurentius Minio-Paluello), p. 66. [Eng. tr.
B.A.M.]

(2) Apollonius Dyscolus, On Syntax (= The Syntax or Peri Suntaxeōs [De Constructione] of
Apollonius Dyscolus, translated, and with commentary by Fred W. Householder), Bk. I, n.
28, p. 28

(3) Boethius, Introductio ad Syllogismos Categoricos, init. (ed. Migne, PL 64, 766 A-B; tr.
B.A.M.)

(4) Priscian, Inst. gramm., xvi. 10-11 (pp. 114-115) (ed. Hertz, tr. B.A.M.)

(5) Boethius, Commentarium In Librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias Secundae Editionis,

Liber Primus [Introductio] (ed. Migne, PL 64; tr. B.A.M.)

1
“ From this, some men have thought that these two are the only parts of speech because a complete utterance
can be made from these alone….” (Apulieus of Madaura. The Peri Hermeneias of Apuleius. sec. IV. [In: David
Londey and Carmen Johanson. The Logic of Apuleius [Brill, 1987, p. 85])

30
(6) Priscian, Inst. gramm., ii. p. 15 (5-7) (ed. Keil; tr. B.A.M.)

(7) Ammonius Hermeias, Commentary On the Peri Hermeneias (= Ammonius: On

Aristotle’s On Interpretation 1-8, tr. David Blank, p. 20) (slightly rev. B.A.M.)

(8) Boethius, Commentarium In Librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias Primae Editionis. Liber

Primus. [Introductio] (ed. Migne, PL 64, tr. B.A.M.)

(9) Averroes, op.cit.

(10) Boethius, Introductio, op.cit.

(11) Plutarch, Platonic Questions X (tr. William Watson Goodwin)

(12) Boethius, In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Sex Editio Secunda, Seu
Majora Commentaria (ed. Migne, PL 64, tr. B.A.M.)

(13) Ammonius Hermeias, op.cit., pp. 21-22

(14) Ammonius Hermeias, op.cit., p. 21

(15) Apollonius Dyscolus, op.cit.

(16) Priscian, Inst. gramm., FL II 551, 18 (In: Anneli Luhtala, Grammar and Philosophy in
Late Antiquity. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2004), p. 132

(17) Scholion on Dionysius Thrax (Grammatici Graeci I 3, p. 515, 19; tr. B.A.M.)

(18) Boethius, De Syllogismo Categorico. Liber Primus (ed. Migne, PL 64 796C-D; tr.
B.A.M.)

(19) Apollonius Dyscolous. On Division (summary of fragment) (In: Anneli Luhtala,

Grammar and Philosophy in Late Antiquity. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins
Publishing Co., 2004), p. 134

(20) Ammonius Hermeias, op.cit., p. 22

(21) Priscian, Inst. gramm., ii. p. 15 (5-7) (ed. Keil; tr. B.A.M.)

31
11. Supplement: The Poetics as a source of the foregoing doctrines.

It is convenient here to review the doctrines directly attributed to the Poetics by three of our
witnesses:

(1) Ammonius:

(a) the comparison with the parts of a ship: that connectives are like bonds:

“For just as the planks of a ship are properly [25] speaking its parts, while bolts, [tow] and
pitch are also added to hold them together and for the unity of the whole,

in the same way in the sentence conjunctions, articles, prepositions, and adverbs themselves
do the work of bolts,

(b) the nature of proper parts:

but they would not correctly be called parts inasmuch as they cannot be put together and on
their own produce a [30] complete speech.

(c) the distinction between parts of language and parts of speech:

So these are not parts of speech, but they are parts of lexis [= ‘language’], of which speech
itself also is a [13,1] part, as has been said in [the books] About the Poetic Art [e)n toi=j Peri\
poihtikh=j ei)/rhtai, ed. Busse].”

What is directly attributed to the Poetics:

That “these”, namely, conjunctions, articles, prepositions, and adverbs, “are not parts of
speech, but they are parts of language, of which speech itself is a part”.

Note that our texts do not make any such statement, nor is there any mention of prepositions
and adverbs at all. Still, inasmuch as speech is put down as an element of language, that
much is attested. We must consider, then, the possibility that the text once included the other
doctrines besides this, namely, the comparison of the connective parts with the bindings of
a ship, and the claim about proper parts.

(2) Boethius:

(a) the agreement between syllables and conjunctions as parts of language:

“That is why Aristotle in the books he wrote About the Poetic Art also taught that syllables and
conjunctions are parts of language,

(b) that syllables do not signify:

of which the syllables as syllables signify nothing at all [cf. Poetics ch. 20, 1456b 20ff.].

(c) the definition of the conjunction:

32
But conjunctions in fact can consignify, but signify nothing by themselves.1 In this book, however,
he has established the name and verb as parts of an interpretation, which, of course, signify by
themselves.”

What is directly attributed to the Poetics:

As we noted above, the first two doctrines are found in the Poetics, but not the definition of
the conjunction. But, as I have endeavored to show in my paper on Poetics, Chapter 20, of
which this is a supplement, the proposed definition fits the account that Aristotle gives of
the parts of lexis.

(3) Averroes:

(a) that the definition of the conjunction includes the note of being “not significative by
itself”:

“HE SAID. A copulative is a [simple or] composite vocal sound not significative separately,
as is ‘and’, ‘then’, ‘and also’,

(b) that they are of the sort called ‘consigificative’ and have the character of being
“bonds of the parts of speech with one another”:

and in general consignificative words, which are like ‘bonds’ of the parts of speech with one
another…”

(c) that words which ‘consignify’ are also ‘sycategorematic’ and that they are to be
distinguished from the letters or ‘elements’ [and syllables] which agree with them in
being “not significative separately”:

“And by our remark “vocal sound not significative separately” here we mean simple vocal
sounds which, when conjoined to the others consignify as syncategorematic words, not
simple vocal sounds like the letters [read the syllables and letters (or elements)] composing
names],

seeing as how vocal sounds significative separately composed from many vocal sounds,
whether <two or> three or four or more according to the [various] arrangements of the
composition of the syllables, are the name and the verb.”

What is directly attributed to the Poetics:

Since the text is a commentary, we must recognize that everything it asserts must have
belonged to the text upon which Averroes was commenting.

1
Needless to say, no such statement concerning conjunctions is to be found in the text of the Poetics which
has come down to us, whereas his preceding remarks, as noted, are witnessed to therein. That is to say, of the
three things he asserts about the constitution of the text, the first two are undeniably true.

33
II. ON HERMENEIA [‘INTERPRETATION’], PHASIS [‘WORD’], AND SYNCATE-
GOREMATA OR CONSIGNIFICANTIA [‘CONSIGNIFYING WORDS].

1. On hermeneia or ‘interpretation’ in relation to the foregoing doctrine.

Cf. Boethius, Commentarium In Librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias Primae Editionis. Liber

Primus. [Introductio] (ed. Migne, PL 64, tr. B.A.M.):

Wherefore, since among the parts of speech1 there are certain ones which signify nothing by
themselves, yet do convey a meaning when joined to the others, as do conjunctions or
prepositions, these things we do not call ‘interpretations’.2

Cf. Boethius, In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Sex Editio Secunda, Seu Majora
Commentaria (ed. Migne, PL 64, tr. B.A.M.):

For interpretation is articulate vocal sound signifying by itself. But not every vocal sound is
‘interpretation’; for there are vocal sounds belonging to the rest of the animals which are not
included under the word ‘interpretation’. Neither is every locution interpretation because, as
has been said, there are certain utterances which lack signification and, although they do not
signify anything by themselves, nevertheless when they are joined with the others do signify,
like conjunctions. Interpretation, however, consists solely in articulate vocal sounds signify-
ing by themselves. Wherefore the following conversion of statements holds good, that
whatever is an interpretation, that signifies, and whatever signifies is named by the word
‘interpretation’. That is why Aristotle in the books he wrote about the poetic art also taught
that syllables and conjunctions are parts of language [cf. Poetics ch. 20, 1456b 20ff.], of which
the syllables as syllables signify nothing at all. But conjunctions in fact can consignify, but
signify nothing by themselves.3 In this book, however, he has established the name and verb
as parts of an interpretation, which, of course, signify by themselves. And nevertheless it
cannot be denied that speech is interpretation which, since it is vocal sound joined from parts
which are significative, does not lack signification. Wherefore not of speech alone, but also of
the name and the verb, and not of locution alone, but also of significative locution, which is
interpretation, are treated by Aristotle in this book, and as the name ‘interpretation’ designates
verbs, names, and significative utterances as well, this book is entitled On Interpretation from
the common name of the things which are treated in this book; that is, interpretation….4

1
Notice how Boethius speaks of “parts of speech” rather than of “language” in this earlier commentary.
2
Quare cum sint quaedam in orationis partibus quae per se nihil significant, aliis tamen iuncta designant, ut
sunt coniunctiones uel praepositiones, haec interpretationes esse non dicimus.
3
Notice that while the non-significative character of syllables is treated in the text of the Poetics as it has
reached us, no such statement concerning conjuctions is to be found there, having beeng lost, with much else,
from the work, as I argue at length here and elsewhere.
4
Interpretatio namque est vox articulata per seipsam signifcans. Quocirca non omnis vox interpretatio est, sunt enim
caeterorum animalium voces, quae interpretationis vocabulo non tenentur. Nec omnis locutio interpretatio est, idcirco
quia (ut dictum est) sunt locutiones quaedam, quae significatione carent et cum per se quaedam non significent, juncta
tamen cum aliis significant, ut conjunctiones. Interpretatio autem in solis per se significativis et articulatis vocibus
permanent (?). Quare convertitur, ut quidquid sit intepretatio, illud significet. Et quidquid significat, interpretationis
vocabulo nuncupetur. Unde etiam ipse quoque Aristoteles in libris quos de Arte poetica scripsit, locutionis partes esse
syllabas et conjunctiones etiam tradit, quarum syllabae, in eo quod sunt syllabae, nihil omnino significant. Conjunctiones
vero consignificare quidem possunt, per se vero nihil designant. Interpretationis vero partes hoc libro constituit nomen et
verbum, quae scilicet per seipsa significant. Nihilominus quoque orationem interpretationem esse constat, quae et ipsa
cum vox sit et significativis partibus juncta, significatione non caret. Quare quoniam non de oratione sola, sed etiam de
nomine et verbo, nec vero de sola locutione, sed etiam de significativa locutione, quae est interpretatio, in hoc libro ab
Aristotele tractatur, idcirco quoniam verbis atque nominibus, et significativis locutionibus nomen interpretationis aptatur,
a communi nomine eorum de quibus in hoc libro tractatur, id est interpretatione, ipse quoque de Interpretatione liber
inscriptus est….

34
Cf. Boethius, Commentarium In Librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias Primae Editionis. Liber
Primus. [Introductio] (ed. Migne, PL 64, tr. B.A.M.):

But the intention of the work we have before us must be briefly explained: for in Greek the
book is entitled PERHERMENEIAS, which in Latin means “On Interpretation”. What “in-
terpretation” is must therefore be cleared up a little.

‘Interpretation’ is significative vocal sound signifying something by itself. For whether it be

a name, which signifies by itself, as is ‘man’—or whether a verb, as is ‘[I] run’—or whether
what the grammarians call the participle [, as is ‘running’]—or whether it is a pronoun [, as is
‘I’]—or whether [it is] speech conjoined from these, as is ‘Man runs’—or whether in any other
way either a name or a verb or speech conjoined from these might signify something by itself,
it is named interpretation. Wherefore, since among the parts of speech1 there are certain ones
which signify nothing by themselves, yet do convey a meaning when joined to the others, as
do conjunctions or prepositions, these things we do not call ‘interpretations’. For interpretation
is either simple, like the name and verb, or complex, like speech conjoined and coupled from
these, or should signify by itself, if it is simple, or being conjoined from these [words] which
signify by themselves, if it is composed. Wherefore ‘interpretation’ is vocal sound signifying
something by itself. But since verbs and names are interpretations, so also every [instance of]
speech joined from things signifying predicaments by themselves is named ‘interpretation’,2
and there are many interpretations, among which are those speeches in which the true and the
false may be found, that is, the enunciative, which is to be treated in this book: for that reason
Aristotle entitled the book under the common and comprehensive name.3

2. Note.

The reader will not be surprised to learn that I consider the substance of the fore-
going reports to derive from Aristotle himself; the doctrine they preserve consisting for the
most part in an orderly presentation of observations the Philosopher makes elsewhere.4 Now
inasmuch as the last thing it determines, namely, that ‘interpretation’ is articulate vocal
sound signifying by itself, is the first thing presupposed by the account of signification in the
Peri Hermeneias, it seems to me not unlikely that the doctrine contained in the foregoing
passages originated as a proem to that work.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect., n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.).:

1
Notice how Boethius speaks of “parts of speech” rather than of “language” in this earlier commentary.
2
That is, the sort of terms logicians call categorematic are here called ‘interpretations’.
3
Et prius quae sit huius operis intentio breuiter demonstrandum est. Inscribitur etenim liber Graece
PERIHERMENEIAS quod Latine “De interpretatione” significat. Quid ergo sit interpretatio paucis absoluam.
Interpretatio est uox significatiua per se ipsam aliquid significans. Siue enim nomen sit, quod per se significat,
ut est “homo”; siue uerbum, ut est “curro”; siue quod grammatici participium uocant, siue pronomen est, siue
ex his iuncta oratio, ut est “Homo currit”, siue quolibet alio modo uel nomen uel uerbum uel ex his oratio
iuncta per se aliquid significet, interpretatio nominatur. Quare cum sint quaedam in orationis partibus quae
per se nihil significant, aliis tamen iuncta designant, ut sunt coniunctiones uel praepositiones, haec
interpretationes esse non dicimus. Interpretatio enim siue simplex est, ut nomen et uerbum, siue composita, ut
ex his iuncta copulataque oratio, uel per se ipsam significare debet, si simplex est, uel ex his quae per se
significant iuncta esse, si composita est. Quare interpretatio est uox aliquid per se ipsam significans. Sed
quoniam uerba nominaque interpretationes /33/ sunt, oratio quoque omnis quae ex significantibus per se
praedicamentis iungitur interpretatio nuncupatur, et sunt plurimae interpretationes, inter quas illa quoque est
oratio, in qua uerum falsumue inueniri potest, id est enuntiatiua, de qua hoc libro tractandum est: idcirco
igitur Aristoteles de communi nomine et continenti libro titulum scripsit.
4
I mean the entire prooemia to these commentaries, not just the parts excerpted above.

35
 This book, therefore, which we have before our hands, is called ‘Peri Hermeneias’, as if to
say, On Interpretation. But, according to Boethius, ‘interpretation’ means significative vocal
sound’ [or ‘sound of voice’] which signifies something by itself,1 whether complex or
incomplex. And so conjunctions and prepositions and other things of this sort are not called
‘interpretations’, because they do not signify something by themselves....2

Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm., xvi. 10-11 (pp. 114-115) (ed. Hertz, tr. B.A.M.):

For they always consignify—that is, they signify when conjoined to the others—but by
themselves they do not.3

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect., n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.). (cont.):

...Likewise vocal sounds signifying naturally, not intentionally, or with an imagination of

signifying something, as are the vocal sounds of brute animals, also cannot be called inter-
pretations. For one who interprets intends to explain something. And therefore only names
[i.e. substantive nouns and adjectives] and verbs and instances of speech are called inter-
pretations, which are determined about in this book. But even so, the name and the verb appear
to be principles of an interpretation, rather than interpretations [themselves]. For he is seen to
interpret who explains something to be true or false. And so only enunciative speech in which
the true and false is found is called ‘interpretation’.

But the rest of speeches, as the optative [= expressing a wish] and the imperative [= expres-
sing a command], are ordered to expressing an affection [or feeling], rather than to inter-
preting what is held in the understanding. Therefore this book is entitled On Interpretation, as
if to say, About Enunciative Speech in which the true and the false are found. For it does not
treat of the name and the verb here except insofar as they are parts of an enunciation. For it is
proper to each of the sciences to treat of the parts of its subject, precisely as its passions [or
properties]. Therefore, the part of philosophy to which this book belongs is clear, and its
necessity, and the order it holds among the other books of logic.4

1
N.B. In the second edition of his commentary on the De Interpretatione, Boethius actually defines
interpretation as vox articulata per seipsam significans, “articulate vocal sound signifying by itself”.
2
dicitur ergo liber iste, qui prae manibus habetur, perihermeneias, quasi de interpretatione. dicitur autem
interpretatio, secundum boethium, vox significativa, quae per se aliquid significat, sive sit complexa sive
incomplexa. unde coniunctiones et praepositiones et alia huiusmodi non dicuntur interpretationes, quia non
per se aliquid significant.
3
eae etenim semper consignificant, id est coniunctae aliis significant, per se autem non. Cp. Boethius’ remarks
just cited to the effect that “conjunctions in fact can consignify, but signify nothing by themselves” unless
“joined to the others”; statements manifestly bearing witness to a common tradition of doctrine.
4
similiter etiam voces significantes naturaliter, non ex proposito aut cum imaginatione aliquid significandi,
sicut sunt voces brutorum animalium, interpretationes dici non possunt. qui enim interpretatur aliquid
exponere intendit. et ideo sola nomina et verba et orationes dicuntur interpretationes, de quibus in hoc libro
determinatur. sed tamen nomen et verbum magis interpretationis principia esse videntur, quam interpre-
tationes. ille enim interpretari videtur, qui exponit aliquid esse verum vel falsum. et ideo sola oratio
enunciativa, in qua verum vel falsum invenitur, interpretatio vocatur. caeterae vero orationes, ut optativa et
imperativa, magis ordinantur ad exprimendum affectum, quam ad interpretandum id quod in intellectu
habetur. intitulatur ergo liber iste de interpretatione, ac si dicetur de enunciativa oratione: in qua verum vel
falsum invenitur. non autem hic agitur de nomine et verbo, nisi in quantum sunt partes enunciationis. est enim
proprium uniuscuiusque scientiae partes subiecti tradere, sicut et passiones. patet igitur ad quam partem
philosophiae pertineat liber iste, et quae sit necessitas istius, et quem ordinem teneat inter logicae libros.

36
Cf. Henri DuLac, “The Peri Hermeneias. Its Place in Logic and its Order”. Laval théolo-
gique et philosophique 5, number 2 (November 1949) (pp. 161-169), pp. 161-162:

Both the Greek and Latin forms of the title of this treatise mean “on interpretation.” Since an
interpreter explains something as true or false, an interpretation is enunciative speech 3 in
which truth or falsity
3
“Speech” seems to be the best English equivalent of oratio. A parallel can be found in
grammar in which partes orationis is translated “parts of speech”….

can be found.1 The enunciation, then, is the principal subject of the Peri Hermeneias, and the
noun and verb are treated in it only as they are parts of the enunciation.
1
St. Thomas, In I Peri Herm,, lect 1, n. 3. Thus interpretatio is the equivalent of enunciatio.
For St. Albert, interpretatio has a wider meaning than enunciatio: he takes it to include every
way of explaining something, either as a part, e.g., the noun and the verb, or as a whole, e.g.,
the different kinds of perfect orationes. (St. Albert, Perihermeneias. I. Tr. I, cap.i, ed.
BORGNET) [Opera Omnia, Paris: Vives, 1890]. I, p. 374 a.) But St. Thomas says the noun
and the verb are rather principles of an interpretation than interpretations themselves, and the
other orationes, such as the optative and the imperative, are rather expressions of affections
than interpretations of what is in the intellect.

[N.B. Note how this report reveals Albert to be following Boethius here—and consequently,
in my view—Aristotle (B.A.M.)]

3. On the derivation of the name hermeneia from Hermes.

Cf. Plato, Cratylus 407 E—408 A (tr. B. Jowett):

SOCRATES: I should imagine that the name [408a] Hermes has to do with speech, and
signifies that he is the interpreter (e(rmhneu/j), or messenger, or thief, or liar, or bargainer; all
that sort of thing has a great deal to do with language.

Cf. The Suda, s.v. “Hermes” (Adler no. epsilon, 3037 [excerpt]) (tr. Jennifer Benedict, The
Suda On Line; italics added by B.A.M.):

Hermes: This is what they call a son of Zeus and Maia, which is, of mind and sense. For the
word is engendered from mind and sense. On account of this they also make him winged, as
if to be swift. For nothing is swifter than a word. And [that is why] Homer [says] ‘winged
words’.1

Cf. Aristotle, Soph. Ref., ch. 4 (166b 11-15): parallel translation:

(tr. A. Pickard-Cambridge) (tr. E. S. Forster)

1
(Ermh=n: tou=ton ui(o\n Dio\j le/gousi kai\ Mai/aj, oi(=on tou= nou= kai\ th=j fronh/sewj. e)k nou= ga\r kai\
fronh/sewj o( lo/goj genna=tai. dia\ tou=to kai\ pterwto\n au)to\n poiou=sin, w(j taxu/n: ou)de\n ga\r lo/gou
taxu/teron. kai\ (/Omhroj, e)/pea ptero/enta. N.B. As the Suda explains, Hermes is the offspring of mind (nous)
understood as Zeus, and sense (phronesis), understood as Maia, and hence he is understood as ‘the word’ (ho
logos); with respect to which meaning of phronesis, note that LSJ gives ‘sense’ as its third meaning, and
references Isocrates 14.61: “if we may assume that the dead yonder possess any perception of what takes place
here.... (ei)/ tij a)/ra toi=j e)kei= f. peri\ tw=n e)nqa/de gignome/nwn)”.

37
 Others [sc. fallacies] come about owing to the
form of expression used, when what is really
different is expressed [e((rmhneu/htai] in the same
form, e.g. a masculine thing by a feminine
termination, or a feminine thing by a masculine,
or a neuter by either a masculine or a feminine;
Refutations which depend upon the form of
expression occur when what is not the same is
expressed [e((rmhneu/htai] in the same form, for
example, when the masculine is expressed by the
feminine or vice versa, or the neuter by the
masculine or feminine;

or, again, when a quality is expressed by a ter-
mination proper to quantity or vice versa, or what
is active by a passive word, or a state by an active
word, and so forth with the other divisions
previously laid down.
or again when a quality is expressed by a quan-
tity or vice versa, or the active by a passive, or a
state by the active, and so forth according to the
distinctions previously made.

For it is possible to use an expression to denote For it is possible for something which is not of
[ti t$= le/cei shmai/nein] what does not belong the nature of an action to signify by the language
to the class of actions at all as though it did so used [ti t$= le/cei shmai/nein] something which
belong. is of the nature of an action;

Thus (e.g.) ‘flourishing’ is a word which in the
form of its expression is like ‘cutting’ or
‘building’: yet the one denotes a certain
quality—i.e. a certain condition—while the other
denotes a certain action. In the same manner also
in the other instances.
for example, to ‘flourish’ is a form of expression
like to ‘cut’ or to ‘build’: yet the former denotes
a quality and a certain disposition, the latter an
action. So too with the other possible examples.1

Note. The foregoing text implies that ‘to signify by the language’ produces hermeneia or
‘expression’; that is to say, to signify by a ‘locution’ produces an ‘interpretation’. On this
point, consider the implication of the following passage:

The second and narrower sense of hermeneia is in fact the one that Aristotle privileges
throughout his work: articulated linguistic self-expression and communication. In On Soph-
istical Refutations 4, 166 b 11, 15, Aristotle describes hermeneia as ti tei lexei semainein: to
indicate or express something in speech, lexis (the Latin locutio), for which Aristotle uses
equally the word dialektos (Latin articulatio).2

While the foregoing account is quite informative, it can be improved by noting that
‘speech’ is not the most apt translation of lexis here; rather, as the Latin indicates, ‘lo-cution’
is a more accurate rendering; but even better is ‘language’. Hence, ‘to interpret’, or ‘to
produce an interpretation’, is to indicate or express something by a ‘locution’, or rather, by
one’s ‘language’—that is, by articulate vocal sound; but this when the vocal sounds are
significative by themselves, as we have seen.
When supplemented as I have done, note how this definition harmonizes with that
given by Boethius in the second edition of his commentary on the Peri Hermeneias: vox
articulata per seipsam signifcans. In light of his definition of locutio as vox articulata,
interpretatio may also be defined as locutio per seipsam signifcans.

1
Note the ‘forms of expression’ mentioned here: terminations of words indicating either quantity or quality,
those indicating gender, either masculine, feminine, or neuter, and those indicating a quality as opposed to an
action.
2
Thomas Sheehan, “Hermeneia and Apophansis: The Early Heidegger on Aristotle” [In: Franco Volpi et al.,
Heidegger et idée de la phénoménologie, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1988, pp. 67-80, p. 74].

38
 ‘To interpret’, then, is to signify something by one’s language—that is, by articulate
vocal sound signifying something by itself. Now an ‘interpretation’ is something signified
by one’s language; but an interpretation may signify either a simple or a composed un-
derstanding, the kind of vocal sound signifying the former being called a ‘word’, as St.
Thomas Aquinas states, a point which will also be clear from the following:

Cf. Ammonius Hermeias, Commentary on the Peri Hermeneias (= Ammonius: On Aris-

totle’s On Interpretation 1-8, tr. David L. Blank, p. 14).

This kind of speech, the assertoric [i.e. the enunciative], Aristotle deems worthy to call
‘interpretation’, since it interprets the soul’s knowledge.24
24
Boethius II 6.4 defines ‘interpretation’ in the same way as ‘logos’, i.e. as ‘articulate voice
significant by itself’. In his discussion of the intention, he reports (II 10.4ff.) that Aspasius and
Alexander said that Int. was about oratio (= logos or ‘sentence, discourse’), for if to pronounce
something in a sentence is to ‘interpret’, the book On Interpretation must be about the
sentence. Boethius objects that ‘interpretation’ refers to the sentence, name, and verb equally.
Alexander then added that the title of the book was not complete, since it did not state which
kind of sentence it was about and should have specified the philosophical or dialectical
sentence, which can express truth or falsity (II 10.14ff.). Porphyry weighed in against this
addition (II 11.9-11), saying that it amounted more to inventing than explaining the meaning
of the word.

Cf. David L. Blank, excerpt from note 68, p. 140: Ammonius Hermeias, Commentary on the
De Interpretatione (In: Ammonius: On Aristotle’s On Interpretation 1-8, tr. David Blank;
slightly rev. B.A.M.):

Boethius, who is dependant upon Porphyry, gives a fuller account of the distinction (II 6.15ff.):
like Ammonius, he cites Poet. 20 to the effect that ‘the parts of expression (locutio = lexis) are
syllables or also conjunctions’, neither of which are significant by themselves, while ‘the parts
of the “interpretation” (interpretatio, one might translate ‘speech’) he establishes in this book
as name and verb’. He ends with the explanation: ‘hence in this book Aristotle deals not merely
with the sentence (oratio), but also with verb and name, nor indeed with mere expression
(locutio), but actually with significant expressions, which is speech (interpretatio).’

Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm., ii. p. 15 (5) (ed. Keil; tr. B.A.M.):

Therefore the parts of speech according to the Dialecticians are two, the name [5] and the verb,
since these two alone by themselves when conjoined produce complete speech. But the other
parts they named syncategoremata; that is to say, consignificantia [or ‘co-signifying words’].1

4. Definitions.

1
Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum dialecticos duae, nomen [5] et verbum, quia hae solae etiam per se
coniunctae plenam faciunt orationem, alias autem partes ‘syncategoremata’, hoc est consignificantia,
appellabant. That is to say, the parts of speech which are not interpretationes are consignificantia.

39
 HERMENEIA (INTERPRETATIO, ‘INTERPRETATION’). (1) Commonly speak-
ing, “‘interpretation’ is “something signified by one’s language”1 (Aristotle, Soph. Ref., 4,
166b 13, tr. B.A.M.), in which case ‘to interpret’ or ‘to produce an interpretation’, is to
indicate or express something by ‘locution’—that is, by articulate vocal sound; or again, (2)
it is “articulate vocal sound signifying by itself”2 (Boethius, Commentary on the Peri
Hermeneias, edit. sec., PL 64, tr. B.A.M.); that is to say, it is (3) “significative vocal sound
which signifies something by itself, whether complex or incomplex”3 (St. Thomas Aquinas,
In I Peri Herm., Proem, n. 3, tr. B.A.M.), and hence even a word [= verbum], being an
‘incomplex’ vocal sound, may be called an ‘interpretation’;4 but strictly speaking, in the
logic of the second act, (4) “only enunciative speech, in which the true or the false is found,
is called ‘interpretation’”5 (St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., Proem, n. 3, tr. B.A.M.).

5. Note on hermeneia as meaning ‘word’.

Recalling here that among the Greeks the messenger of the gods was Hermes, from
whose name they spoke of a hermeneus, a ‘messenger’ or ‘interpreter’ (cf. Liddell-Scott-
Jones), consider the implication of the following observation:

And as the outward word announces by means of a sign what is in the mind, the Greeks
have called it angelus intelligentiae, the messenger of the intelligence. (St. Albert the
Great, commentary on the Peri Hermeneias, tract. I, cap. II)

Now in the Summa Theologiae (cf. Ia, q. 34, art. 1. c.), St. Thomas Aquinas uses the same
locutio exemplaris (quoted from St. John Damascene, De Fide. I, 10): “…verbum est
angelus, idest, nuntius, intelligentiae…”, “A word is the ‘angel’—that is, the messenger, of
the intelligence”. But if a word can be such, so much the more can speech, in agreement with
which Ammonius Hermeias tells us, “This kind of speech, the assertoric [= ‘enunciative’],
Aristotle deems worthy to call ‘interpretation’ [= hermeneia], since it interprets the soul’s
knowledge”. And note the relationship between the following terms: nuntius and hermeneus
(both meaning ‘messenger’; cp. angelus), and phasis, which means ‘tidings’, or what is
announced by a messenger. Cf. Acts 21:31:

ζητούντων τε αὐτὸν ἀποκτεῖναι ἀνέβη φάσις τῷ χιλιάρχῳ τῆς σπείρης ὅτι ὅλη
συγχύννεται Ἰερουσαλήμ

quaerentibus autem eum occidere nuntiatum est tribuno cohortis quia tota confunditur
Hierusalem. (Vulgate)

And as they were seeking to kill him, tidings came up to the chief captain of the band,
that all Jerusalem was in confusion. (RSV)

But in English we can use the word ‘word’ in the same sense:

1
ti t$= le/cei shmai/nein.
2
Interpretatio namque est vox articulata per seipsam signifcans.
3
vox significativa, quae per se aliquid significat, sive sit complexa sive incomplexa.
4
See further below on the twofold signification of vocal sound.
5
et ideo sola oratio enunciativa, in qua verum vel falsum invenitur, interpretatio vocatur. In this sense, ‘in-
terpretation’ is opposed to words that are ‘syncategorematic’—which is to say, ‘consignificative’.

40
“The messenger brought tidings of victory.”
“The messenger brought word of victory.”

Hence, ‘word’ may be taken for ‘tidings’. (And recall here that Aristotle uses phasis of the
name and the verb insofar as they are parts of an enunciation.)
We may suppose, then, that from originally meaning the utterance of a ‘messenger’
or ‘tidings’, the name has been carried over to mean word1 insofar as it ‘announces’ what is
‘held’ within the intelligence. But from thence it would have been moved to the statement
which, inasmuch as it ‘interprets the soul’s knowledge’, is understood as enunciative speech,
being that in which the true and the false is found, and thus is ‘interpretation’ par excellence,
as St. Thomas Aquinas explains.

6. Supplement: On dictio as meaning ‘word’.

Cf. Boethius, In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Sex Editio Secunda, Seu Majora
Commentaria (Latin ed. Migne, PL 64; tr. B.A.M.):

So when our breath so has itself that if it is struck and formed in such a way that the tongue
strikes it, it is voice [or ‘vocal sound’]. For if the tongue so strikes it that the voice comes forth
in a certain finite and distinct sound, it becomes ‘locution’ [or ‘an utterance’], which is called
le/xij in Greek. For locution is articulate vocal sound; for we do not call this word le/xij a
dictio [‘word’], because we translate fa/sij by dictio, but le/xij by locutio.2

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II De Anima, lect. 18, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

[A]nd so, in the book of the Predicaments [cf. Cat., ch. 6, 4b 20)] the speech which is brought
forth in the voice is placed in the species of discrete quantity. For speech is distinguished by
words [per dictiones], and a word by syllables; and this happens on account of diverse
percussions of the air by the soul.3

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri. Herm., lect. 6, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

But because there is a twofold signification of vocal sound, one which is referred to a
composed intellect, another which is referred to a simple intellect, the first signification
belongs to speech, but the second does not belong to speech, but to a part of speech. And so
he adds, as a word [or ‘thing said’, dictio (= phasis)], not as an affirmation [kataphasis]—as
if to say, a part of speech is significant, just as a ‘word’ [dictio] signifies, for example, as the
name and the verb, not as an affirmation, which is composed from a name and a verb.4

1
Lat. dictio, on the meaning of which, see the following section.
2
Quare quoniam flatus noster ita sese habet, ut si ita percutiatur atque formetur, ut eum lingua percutiat, vox
sit. Si enim lingua ita percutiat, ut terminato quodam et circumscriptio sono vox exeat, locutio fit quae Graece
dicitur le/xij. Locutio enim est articulata vox, neque enim hunc sermonem, id est le/xin, dictionem dicemus,
idcirco quid fa/sin dictionem interpretamur, le/xin, locutionem.
3
manifestum est enim, quod humana locutio non est continua; unde et in libro praedicamentorum, oratio, quae
in voce profertur ponitur species quantitatis discretae. distinguitur enim oratio per dictiones, et dictio per
syllabas; et hoc accidit propter diversas percussiones aeris ab anima.
4
sed quia duplex est significatio vocis, una quae refertur ad intellectum compositum, alia quae refertur ad
intellectum simplicem; prima significatio competit orationi, secunda non competit orationi, sed parti orationis.
unde subdit: ut dictio, non ut affirmatio. quasi dicat: pars orationis est significativa, sicut dictio significat,
puta ut nomen et verbum, non sicut affirmatio, quae componitur ex nomine et verbo.

41
N.B. In the foregoing text, St. Thomas gives the name dictio (which I have translated as
‘word’) to Aristotle’s phasis, occurring in the definition of speech (= logos or oratio), which
word he explains as meaning a vocal sound which (in effect) signifies a simple un-
derstanding, and hence which belongs to a part of speech (as opposed to one which signi-
fies a composed understanding which is signified not by a part of speech, but simply by
‘speech’). In sum, a word (= dictio = phasis) here is understood as a vocal sound signifying
a simple understanding and hence a part of speech, being exemplified by the name and the
verb. But it must be recognized that this definition can be further specified as follows: A
‘word’ is an articulate vocal sound that by itself signifies a simple understanding (the sig-
nification in question being understood to belong to a part of speech rather than to speech
itself).
In support of the foregoing qualifications, note that it is clear from a consideration of
‘voice’ that the kind entering into a word is articulate. But, as exemplified by the name or
noun and the verb, it is also clear that those articulate vocal sounds called phasis (or rather
phaseis) are those which by themselves signify a simple understanding. That is, in the first
place and primarily, those articulate vocal sounds which signify a simple understanding per
se (which are the name or noun and the verb), are those which he (as well as other Latins,
such as Boethius), looking to Aristotle’s word phasis, call dictiones. Secondarily, however,
we may say that even those vocal sounds which do not by themselves signify a simple
understanding, but which, rather, are consignificant (of the kind elsewhere called
syncategorematic), which signify only when conjoined to the name or verb, are also, in this
later acceptation, considered to be dictiones or words. That is, in later usage (as is implied
by St. Thomas’ remark on the Categories quoted above), the word dictiones is given to vocal
sounds both significant and consignificant, as in English we use the word ‘word’ for this
purpose. Hence to the account given by St. Thomas, quoted above, where in we added the
further specifications ‘articulate’ and ‘by itself’ to arrive at the definition given above, in
light of the use of the word as also encompassing those vocal sounds which do not signify
something by themselves, but only when conjoined to the others, we must note that dictio is
used in an extended sense when said of them, on which point see further below.

7. A definition of ‘word’ implicit in Aristotle.

In the foregoing discussion, we have arrived at a definition of ‘word’ based on cer-

tain remarks found in St. Thomas’ commentary on the Peri Hermeneias. One may, how-
ever, also define ‘word’ in Aristotle by taking what is common to his definitions of onoma
and rhema. According to him, the former is defined as “a vocal sound significative by human
agreement, without time, no part of which is significative separately”, the latter, as a vocal
sound signifying with time, “and a sign of something said of something else” (De Int., 16a
19; 16b 5), it being proper to “substance considered in itself” to be signified by a noun or a
pronoun (as St. Thomas Aquinas notes, In I Peri. Herm., lect. 4, n. 7), whereas “the verb
signifies action or passion” (ibid., lect. 5, n. 5). Hence a word is

• a vocal sound
• significative by human agreement
• no part of which is significative separately
8. Some additional texts.

Cf. “Terms for ‘Word’ in Roman Grammar”. Malcolm D. Hyman, Harvard University.

42
 When we come to the late antique artes grammaticae, we find that some terminological de-
velopments have taken place. Two stand out in particular. First, the term dictio for ‘word’ has
gained in popularity. Second, pars orationis is used not only to mean ‘word class’ but also
‘(single) word token’. We know from Quintilian that earlier authors used dictio for ‘word’,
but we don’t know who they were. [7] (Remmius Palaemon always lurks in the shadows.)
We might suppose that the shift was motivated by a desire to avoid the ambiguity of verbum
(‘word’ or ‘verb’), vocabulum (‘word’ or ‘common noun’ or ‘nominal’), and vox (‘word’ or
‘spoken sound’). But if this was the motivation, the shift wasn’t very helpful, since, as
Cominianus (apud Charisium) notes, dictio is also ambiguous:

barbarismus est dictio vitiosa. haec autem definitio et generalis est et specialis. sed quoniam dictio et
contexta oratio et una pars eius intellegitur, consuetudo hunc tantum barbarismum appellat qui fit in
una parte orationis. (349.18–23 Barwick)

Barbarism is a defective locution. This definition, however, is both general and specific. But since
“locution” (dictio) means both ‘connected speech’ and ‘a single part of connected speech’, it’s cus-
tomary to use the term barbarism only in the case of a single part (i.e. a word, pars orationis).

Why then dictio? For one thing, it suggests the influence of Greek grammar: the term corres-
ponds morpheme-by-morpheme to Greek λέξις (Holtz 1981: 139; Matthews 2002: 267–8).19
We must admit, however, that it’s not a very good equivalent for λέξις: for one thing, its
natural-language equivalents (‘act of speaking’, ‘utterance’, ‘speech’) get in the way (as we’ve
just seen Cominianus note).20 Also, when Roman grammarians use dictio for ‘(meaningful)
word’, they are fundamentally at odds with the Stoics, for whom λέξις was a ‘possible (but
not necessarily meaningful) sound sequence’ (Collinge 1986: 12).
19 Cf. Dineen (1985: 158).
20 Cf. Menge (1977: §209).

References.

Collinge, N. (1986): “Greek (and Some Roman) Preferences in Language Categories”, in: T.
Bynon/F. Palmer (Edd.), Studies in the History of Western Linguistics (In Honour of R.H.
Robins), Cambridge, 11–21.
Dineen, F.P. (1985): “On Stoic Grammatical Theory”, in: Historiographia Linguistica, 12,
149–64.
Dixon, R./Aikhenvald, A.Y. (Edd.) (2002b): Word: A Cross-Linguistic Typology, Cambridge.
Holtz, L. (1981): Donat et la tradition de l’enseignement grammatical: étude sur l’Ars Donati
e e
et sa diffusion (IV –IX ) et édition critique, Paris.
Matthews, P. (2002): “What Can We Conclude?”, in: Dixon/Aikhenvald (2002b), 266–81.
th
Menge, H. (1977): Lateinische Synonymik, 6 ed., Heidelberg.

In sum, according to Cominianus, dictio has a twofold meaning:

“by dictio is understood both ‘connected speech’ and one part of it” (tr. B.A.M.)1

1 dictio et contexta oratio et una pars eius intellegitur.

43
9. Examples of the corresponding twofold usage in the case of lexis:

(a) As meaning a single word:

Cf. Dionysius Thrax, Techne Grammatike, 86.3f. (ed. Ineke Sluiter; tr. B.A.M.):

Σύνδεσμός έστι λέξις συνδέουσα διάνοιαν Α conjunction is a word binding together the
μετά τάξεως) και το της ερμηνείας κεχηνός thought and setting it in order, as well as filling
δηλοΰσα. (v.l. πληρούσα) up the gaps in the expression.

(b) As meaning ‘connected speech’:

Aristotle, Rhet., III. 9 (1409a 37) (tr. W. Rhys Roberts):

By a period [periodos] I mean a portion of speech [lexis] that has in itself a beginning and an
end, being at the same time not too big to be taken in at a glance.

10. A problem with Cominianus’s formulation.

In the foregoing definition, Cominianus includes the word oratio as meaning

‘speech’, the Greek equivalent of which is logos, a procedure that is reasonable insofar as
dictio is understood to be significative vocal sound. But in the usage of the logician rather
than the grammarian the definition is problematic insofar as dictio is taken to be equivalent
to lexis; for logos (the equivalent of oratio) is itself defined as lexis semantike, ‘significative
lexis’; but lexis is ‘articulate vocal sound’. Hence, since (for the logician) logos is a kind of
lexis, one must not define lexis to be a kind of logos. One must, therefore, define dictio by a
word other than oratio/logos. Convenient for this purpose is the word ‘utterance’, inasmuch
as ‘utterance’ is often used to mean articulate vocal sound. Let us say, then, that dictio is
“connected utterance” as well as “one part of it”. In accordance with this understanding, one
could reword the translation of Aristotle’s definition of the period as follows:

By a period [periodos] I mean a connected utterance [lexis] that has in itself a beginning and
an end, being at the same time not too big to be taken in at a glance.

Compare also the translations in the following excerpt:

Stoic discourse also worked to further objectify literary language and texts as objects of
knowledge and interpretation. In Stoic grammatike a poem has two aspects: lexis (connected
verbal expression) and logos (discourse, significant lexis).1

11. Definitions:

PERIODOS (PERIOD). According to Aristotle, “a connected utterance [lexis] that

has in itself a beginning and an end, being at the same time not too big to be taken in at a
glance” (Rhet,, III. 9, 1409a 37 [tr. W. Rhys Roberts; rev. B.A.M.]).

1
Martine Irvine, The Making of Textual Culture: Grammatica and Literary Theory, 350-1100, (Cambridge
Studies in Medieval Literature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 34.

44
 DICTIO (DICTION). commonly speaking, (1) “…by dictio is understood both
‘connected speech’ and one part of it”1 (Cominianus); and hence properly speaking, one part
of connected speech (idem).

1 dictio et contexta oratio et una pars eius intellegitur.

45
12. The dialectician’s definitions of verbum and dictio:

Cf. Augustine of Hippo (S. Aurelii Augustini), De Dialectica Liber, § V (tr. J. Marchand;1
rev. B.A.M.):

Verbum est uniuscuiusque rei signum, quod ab A word is the sign of anything which can be un-
audiente possit intellegi, a loquente prolatum. derstood by the hearer when pronounced by the
speaker.

Res est quidquid vel sentitur vel intellegitur vel A thing is whatever is sensed, or understood, or
latet. hidden.

Signum est quod et se ipsum sensui et praeter se A sign is something which presents itself to the
aliquid animo ostendit. senses and something besides itself to the mind.

Loqui est articulata voce signum dare. To speak is to give a sign in articulate voice.

Articulatam autem dico quae conpraehendi I call that ‘articulate’ which is capable of being
litteris potest. comprised in letters.

Haec omnia quae definita sunt, utrum recte
definita sint et utrum hactenus verba definitionis
aliis definitionibus persequenda fuerint, ille
indicabit locus, quo definiendi disciplina
tractatur.
Now all these [terms] which have been defined,
whether they be rightly defined and whether up
till now the words of the definition are to be
followed by other definitions, he will indicate in
the place where the discipline of defining is
treated.

Nunc quod instat accipe intentus. Now take what is coming attentively.

Omne verbum sonat. Cum enim est in scripto, Every word sounds. Therefore, when it is written
non verbum sed verbi signum est; it is not a word, but the sign of a word.

quippe inspectis a legente litteris occurrit animo, When they are seen by the reader, the letters oc-
quid voce prorumpat. cur to the mind, which breaks out in the voice.

Quid enim aliud litterae scriptae quam se ipsas For what else do written letters do but present
oculis et praeter se voces animo ostendunt, themselves to the eyes and beyond themselves
vocal sounds to the mind?

et paulo ante diximus signum esse quod se ip- And we said a little earlier that a sign was some-
sum sensui et praeter se aliquid animo ostendit. thing that presented itself to the senses and
something besides itself to the mind.

Quae legimus igitur non verba sunt sed signa What we read, therefore, are not the words but
verborum. the signs of words.

Sed ut, ipsa littera cum sit pars minima vocis But also, since a letter itself is the least part of
articulatae, abutimur tamen hoc vocabulo, ut articulate voice, we misuse this designation when
appellemus litteram etiam cum scriptam vide- we name ‘letter’ even what we see written,
mus, quamvis omnino tacita sit although it is in every way silent,

1
(http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/jod/texts/dialecticatrans.html [12/18/08])

46
 neque ulla pars vocis sed signum partis vocis nor is it a part of vocal sound, but appears as a
appareat. sign of a part of vocal sound

Ita etiam verbum appellatur cum scriptum est, Likewise, we also name something written a
quamvis verbi signum, id est signum signify- word, although it is a sign of a word, that is, (even
cantis vocis, eluceat. though it) appears as the sign of significant vocal
sound.

Ergo ut coeperam dicere omne verbum sonat. Thus, as we had just begun to say, every word
sounds.

Sed quod sonat nihil ad dialecticam. De sono
enim verbi agitur, cum quaeritur vel animad-
vertitur, quanta vocalium vel dispositione
leniatur vel concursione dehiscat,
But what sounds has nothing to do with dia-
lectic.1 For the sound of a word is treated when
we seek to learn or pay heed to how vowels are
softened in their disposition, or how they lose
hiatus when they come together,

item consonantium vel interpositione nodetur vel
congestione asperetur et quot vel qualibus
syllabis constet, ubi poeticus rhythmus accen-
tusque a grammaticis solarum aurium tractantur
negotia.
likewise, how consonants cluster by interpose-
ition, or are made harsh by clustering, and how
many or what kind of syllables it consists of,
where poetic rhythm and accent, a matter for the
ears of the grammarian alone, are treated.

Et tamen cum de his disputatur, praeter dialec- But when there is dispute concerning these
ticam non est. Haec enim scientia disputandi est. things, that is not beyond dialectic. For it is the
science of disputing.2

Sed cum verba sint rerum, quando de ipsis But although words are of things, [nevertheless]
obtinent, verborum autem, quibus de his dispu- when they hold about themselves, there is dis-
tatur. pute about these things, but [I mean] of the words
[themselves].3

Nam cum de verbis loqui nisi verbis nequeamus
et cum loquimur nonnisi de aliquibus rebus lo-
quamur, occurrit animo ita esse verba signa
rerum, ut res esse non desinant.
Since we cannot speak of words unless with
words, and when we speak we necessarily speak
about certain things, these words that occur to the
mind are signs of things, but things are not what
they end in.4

Cum ergo verbum ore procedit, si propter se
procedit id est ut de ipso verbo aliquid quaeratur
aut disputetur, res est utique disputationi quaes-
tionique subiecta, sed ipsa res 'verbum' vocatur.
For when a word goes out of the mouth, if it goes
out on account of itself, that is, for example,
when it disputes or asks something about itself, it
is a thing undoubtedly subject to disputation and
question, and then the thing is called a word.

But all [that part] of a word which is not sensed

by the ears but by the mind and is held enclosed

1
On the contrary, the way in which a word is pronounced must be treated in the consideration of fallacies.
2
For further specifications relevant to this matter, see the first chapter of St. Thomas’ De Fallaciis.
3
I.e. they have material supposition.
4
I.e. when we speak about words, since they are signs of things, then signs of things ‘occur’ to the mind–yet
the things they signify are not what the mind rests in, rather it is the words themselves as subject for a dispute.

47
Quidquid autem ex verbo non aures sed animus in the mind is called a ‘sayable’ [cp. the Stoic
sentit et ipso animo tenetur inclusum, 'dicibile' lekton].
vocatur.

Cum vero verbum procedit non propter se sed But when a word goes out not for its own sake,
propter aliud aliquid significandum, 'dictio' but for the sake of signifying something about
vocatur. another thing, it is called a dictio.

Res autem ipsa, quae iam verbum non est neque
verbi in mente conceptio, sive habeat verbum
quo significari possit, sive non habeat, nihil aliud
quam 'res' vocatur proprio iam nomine.
That thing which is neither a word nor a con-
ception of a word in the mind, whether it has a
word with which it may be signified or not, is
called by its proper name nothing other than
‘thing’.

Haec ergo quattuor distincta teneantur, 'verbum We then have four distinct things: ‘word’, ‘say-
dicibile dictio res'. able’, dictio, ‘thing’.

Quod dixi 'verbum' et verbum est et 'verbum' What I have called ‘word’ is both a word and
significat. signifies ‘word’.

Quod dixi 'dicibile' verbum est, nec tamen What I have called a ‘sayable’ is a word, but it
'verbum', sed quod in verbo intellegitur et animo does not signify ‘word’, but that which is
continetur, significat. understood in the word and contained in the
mind.

Quod dixi 'dictionem' verbum est, sed quod iam What I have called a dictio is a word, but it
illa duo simul id est et ipsum verbum et quod fit signifies in fact those two at once, that is, the
in animo per verbum significat. word itself, and what comes about in the mind
through the word.

Quod dixi 'rem', verbum est, quod praeter illa tria When I say ‘thing’ it is a word which signifies
quae dicta sunt quidquid restat significat. that which is left over after those three which
have just been mentioned.

Sed exemplis haec inlustranda esse perspicio. Let us see if we can illustrate this by examples:
Fac igitur a quoquam grammatico puerum Let a boy be questioned by a schoolteacher in this
interrogatum hoc modo: manner:

"'arma' quae pars orationis est?" “What part of speech is ‘arma/ (arms)’?”

Quod dictum est 'arma', propter se dictum est, id ‘arma’ is here said concerning itself (for its own
est verbum propter ipsum verbum. sake), i.e. is a word concerning a word.

Cetera vero, quod ait 'quae pars orationis', non The other parts, however, when he says ‘What
propter se, sed propter verbum, quod 'arma' dic- part of speech ...’ are either felt in the mind or
tum est, vel animo sensa vel voce prolata sunt. pronounced by the voice, not for their own sake,
but for the sake of ‘arma’.

Sed cum animo sensa sunt, ante vocem dicibilia But since they were felt in the mind, ‘dicibilia’
erunt; cum autem propter id quod dixi proruper- [sayables] came before voice; when they break
unt in vocem, dictiones factae sunt. out in voice concerning what I said, then they are
‘dictiones’ [things said].

48
Ipsum vero 'arma' quod hic verbum est, cum a
Vergilio pronuntiatum est, dictio fuit; non enim
propter se prolatum est, sed ut eo significarentur
vel bella quae gessit Aeneas vel scutum et cetera
arma quae Vulcanus heroi fabricatus est.
‘arma’ itself, since it is a word, when it was
pronounced by Virgil, became a ‘dictio’, for it
was not pronounced for its own sake, but that it
might signify either the wars which Aeneas car-
ried on, or the shield, or other arms which Vul-
can made for the hero.

Ipsa vero bella vel arma, quae gesta aut ingestata These very wars or arms which were carried on
sunt ab Aenea— or worn by Aeneas—

ipsa inquam quae cum gererentur adque essent
videbantur, quaeque si nunc adessent vel digito
monstrare possemus aut tangere, quae etiamsi
non cogitentur non eo tamen fit ut non fuerint—
ipsa ergo per se nec verba sunt nec dicibilia nec
dictiones, sed res quae iam proprio nomine 'res'
vocantur.
the same, I say, which were either carried on or
existed, if they were now present could either be
pointed out or touched with the finger, if they
were not thought nor made for him, they are
neither words nor `dicibilia' nor ‘dictiones’, but
things which are properly called ‘res’ [thing] by
name.

Tractandum est igitur nobis in hac parte dia- We must thus in this part of dialectic treat words,
lecticae de 'verbis', de 'dicibilibus', 'dictionibus', ‘dicibilia’, ‘dictiones’, things.
de 'rebus'.

In quibus omnibus cum partim verba signifi- In all these things, where words are partly sig-
centur partim non verba, nihil est tamen, de quo nified and partly things which are not words,
non verbis disputare necesse sit. there is nothing concerning which it is not ne-
cessary to dispute using words.

Itaque de his primo disputetur per quae de ceter- Thus, we must first discuss these, since it is
is disputare conceditur. conceded that we must dispute concerning the
others by use of them.

49
13. Definitions.

VERBUM. 1. A word is the sign of anything which can be understood by the hearer
when pronounced by the speaker. 2. Every word sounds [sonat]. 3. What I have called ‘word’
is both a word and signifies ‘word’.

DICTIO. 1. But when a word goes out [i.e. is uttered] not for its own sake, but for
the sake of signifying something about another thing, it is called a dictio [i.e. a ‘thing said’,
or word that has been spoken; an expression]. 2. What I have called a dictio is a word, but it
signifies in fact those two at once, that is, the word itself, and what comes about in the mind
through the word [i.e. it embraces both verbum and dicibile].

N.B. It is clear from the foregoing definitions that for St. Augustine a dictio is a verbum
prolatum—that is, it is a ‘word’ which has been ‘pronounced’ or uttered—not for its own
sake (as when I say “’Man’ is a word”, for instance), but in order to signify—that is, a
‘spoken word’, or perhaps ‘something said’, in order to convey a meaning.

DICIBILE. 1. That part of a word which is not sensed by the ears but by the mind
and is held enclosed in the mind is called a sayable [cp. the Stoic lekton].1 2. A ‘sayable’ is
a word, but it does not signify ‘word’, but that which is understood in the word and con-
tained in the mind. 3. ‘Sayables’ are first ‘felt in the mind’ and so ‘come before the voice’.

RES. A thing is whatever is sensed [or felt] or understood or hidden [e.g. when it is
not understood by the hearer (?); when it is not expressed by a sayable (?)].

SIGNUM. A sign is something which presents itself to the senses and something
besides itself to the mind.

LOQUI. To speak is to give a sign in articulate voice.

ARTICULATA. I call that articulate which is capable of being comprised in letters.

LITERA. The least part of articulate voice [e.g. an elementary vocal sound, not the
written sign of this, though both are called ‘letter’].

1
Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Adv math. 8.11ff.; LCL 2:245, 247, frag. 166 von Arnim SVF2 (tr. Long & Sedley):

(1) There was another disagreement among philosophers [concerning the true]: some took the sphere
of what is true and false to be ‘the signification’, others ‘utterance’, and others ‘the process that con-
stitutes thought’. (2) The Stoics defended the first opinion, saying that three things are linked together,
‘the signification’ [pragma], ‘the signifier’ [phone], and ‘the name-bearer’ [tunchanon]. The signifier
is an utterance, for instance ‘Dion’; the signification is the actual state of affairs revealed by an utter-
ance, and which we apprehend as it subsists in accordance with our thought, whereas it is not under-
stood by those whose language is different although they hear the utterance; the name-bearer is the
external object, for instance, Dion himself. (3) Of these, two are bodies – the utterance and the name-
bearer; but one incorporeal – the state of affairs signified and sayable [lekton], which is true or false.

50
14. The definition of ‘word’ in St. Augustine compared with Aristotle on the verb:

Augustine Aristotle

A word is the sign of anything which can be un- But in themselves, said by themselves, verbs are
derstood by a hearer when [it is] pronounced by names and signify something; for the one who
a speaker. speaks1 [20] establishes the understanding [sc. of
the hearer] and he who hears [sc. what is said]
rests [sc. in what is said].

In sum:

(a) name (cf. De Int. I. 2):

“A name, therefore, is a vocal sound significative by convention without time, no part of

which is significative separately....” (it being proper to a name to signify something as
existing per se, as St. Thomas explains in his commentary)

(b) verb as a kind of name (cf. De Int. I. 3):

“But in themselves, said by themselves, verbs are names and signify something; for the one
who speaks establishes the understanding [sc. of the hearer] and he who hears [sc. what is
said] rests [sc. in what is said].”

a verb (rhema; verbum)

when spoken by itself is a name and hence (an instance of speaking; a speaker)
when heard by another (something heard by a hearer so as to be understood)
signifies something (a pragma or res)

c. verb and name in common (cf. De Dialectica V):

“A word [verbum] is the sign of anything which can be understood by a hearer when (it is)
pronounced by a speaker.”

a word (verbum)
when spoken by someone (an instance of speaking; a speaker)
and understood by another (something heard by a hearer so as to be understood)
signifies something (a pragma or res)

15. The elements common to the foregoing accounts:

a vocal sound which

when spoken by one person and heard by another
is significative of something
and so is understood (first by the one, and then by the other)

1
That is, the one who utters a verb by itself ‘says something’; in the present case, he utters a name.

51
 Note the continuity exhibited by the foregoing definitions: First, Aristotle defines
onoma, the nomen or ‘name’, then, having defined rhema, the verbum or ‘verb’, in distinc-
tion from the name,1 he points out that, looked at in a certain way, even verbs are names.
But the definition of verbum handed on by St. Augustine follows immediately upon Aris-
totle’s account of the communia of onoma and rhema: that is to say, inasmuch as “in them-
selves, said by themselves, verbs are names and signify something; for the one who speaks
establishes the understanding [sc. of the hearer] and he who hears [sc. what is said] rests [sc.
in what is said],” names and verbs are seen to agree in St. Augustine’s definition of verbum
or ‘word’; it being true to say of either one that it is “the sign of anything which can be
understood by a hearer when (it is) pronounced by a speaker”. Of course, many accounts of
speaking will agree in the foregoing principles, but the continuity of the preceding defi-
nitions strongly suggests to me that they derive from a common source.

1
That is, as a vocal sound significative with time, which is always the sign of something said of something
else.

52
16. On the nature of a ‘word’ according to St. Augustine.

Cf. St. Augustine of Hippo, cited in the Catena Aurea on John 1, by St. Thomas Aquinas (tr.
J. H. Newman et. al.):

1a. In the beginning was the Word.

AUG. As our knowledge differs from God’s, so does our word, which arises from our
knowledge, differ from that Word of God, which is born of the Father’s essence; we might
say, from the Father’s knowledge, the Father’s wisdom, or, more correctly, the Father Who is
Knowledge, the Father Who is Wisdom. The Word of God then, the Only-Begotten Son of the
Father, is in all things like and equal to the Father; being altogether what the Father is, yet not
the Father; because the one is the Son, the other the Father. And thereby He knows all things
which the Father knows; yet His knowledge is from the Father, even as is His being: for
knowing and being are the same with Him; and so as the Father’s being is not from the Son,
so neither is His knowing. Wherefore the Father begat the Word equal to Himself in all things
as uttering forth Himself. For had there been more or less in His Word than in Himself, He
would not have uttered Himself fully and perfectly. With respect however to our own inner
word, which we find, in whatever sense, to be like the Word, let us not object to see how very
unlike it is also. A word is a formation of our mind going to take place, but not yet made, and
something in our mind which we toss to and fro in a slippery circuitous way, as one thing and
another is discovered, or occurs to our thoughts. When this, which we toss to and fro, has
reached the subject of our knowledge, and been formed therefrom, when it has assumed the
most exact likeness to it, and the conception has quite answered to the thing; then we have a
true word. Who may not see how great the difference is here from that Word of God, which
exists in the Form of God in such wise, that It could not have been first going to be formed,
and afterwards formed, nor can ever have been unformed, being a Form absolute, and
absolutely equal to Him from Whom It is. Wherefore; in speaking of the Word of God here
nothing is said about thought in God; lest we should think there was any thing revolving in
God, which might first receive form in order to be a Word, and afterwards lose it, and be
canted round and round again in an unformed state.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Super Evangelium Johannis (= Commentary on the Gospel of St.
John I, cap. 1, lect. 1, nn. 23-29, tr. James A. Weisheipl & Fabian R. Larcher, pp. ?-34):

LECTURE I

1 In the beginning was the Word;

and the Word was with God;
and the Word was God.
2 He was in the beginning with God.

23 John the Evangelist, as already indicated, makes it his principal object to show the divinity
of the Incarnate Word. Accordingly, his Gospel is divided into two parts. In the first he states
the divinity of Christ; in the second he shows it by the things Christ did in the flesh (2:1). In
regard to the first, he does two things. First he shows the divinity of Christ; secondly he sets
forth the manner in which Christ’s divinity is made known to us (1:14). Concerning the first
he does two things. First he treats of the divinity of Christ; secondly of the incarnation of the
Word of God (1:6).

Because there are two items to be considered in each thing, namely, its existence and its
operation or power, first he treats the existence of the Word as to his divine nature; secondly

53
of his power or operation (1:3). In regard to the first he does four things. First he shows when
the Word was: In the beginning was the Word; secondly where he was: and the Word was
with God; thirdly what he was: and the Word was God; fourthly, in what way he was: He
was in the beginning with God. The first two pertain to the inquiry “whether something
exists”; the second two pertain to the inquiry “what something is.”

24 With respect to the first of these four we must examine the meaning of the statement, In
the beginning was the Word. And here three things present themselves for careful study
according to the three parts of this statement. First it is necessary to investigate the name Word;
secondly the phrase in the beginning; thirdly the meaning of the Word was in the beginning.

25 To understand the name Word we should note that according to the Philosopher [On
Interpretation 16a3] vocal sounds are signs of the affections that exist in our soul. It is
customary in Scripture for the things signified to be themselves called by the names of their
signs, as in the statement, “And the rock was Christ” (1 Cor 10:4). It is fitting that what is
within our soul, and which is signified by our external word, be called a “word.” But whether
the name “word” belongs first to the exterior vocal sound or to the conception in our mind, is
not our concern at present. However, it is obvious that what is signified by the vocal sound, as
existing interiorly in the soul, exists prior to the vocal expression inasmuch as it is its actual
cause. Therefore if we wish to grasp the meaning of the interior word, we must first look at
the meaning of that which is exteriorly expressed in words.

Now there are three things in our intellect: the intellectual power itself, the species of the thing
understood (and this species is its form, being to the intellect what the species of a color is to
the eye), and thirdly the very activity of the intellect, which is to understand. But none of these
is what is signified by the exterior vocal word: for the name “stone” does not signify the
substance of the intellect because this is not what the one naming intends; nor does it signify
the species, which is that by which the intellect understands, since this also is not the intention
of the one naming; nor does it signify the act itself of understanding since to understand is not
an action proceeding to the exterior from the one understanding, but an action remaining
within. Therefore, that is properly called an interior word which the one understanding forms
when understanding.

Now the intellect forms two things, according to its two operations. According to its operation
which is called “the understanding of indivisibles,” it forms a definition; while according to
its operation by which it unites and separates, it forms an enunciation or something of that
sort. Hence, what is thus formed and expressed by the operation of the intellect, whether by
defining or enunciating, is what the exterior vocal sound signifies. So the Philosopher says
that the notion (ratio) which a name signifies is a definition. Hence, what is thus expressed,
i.e., formed in the soul, is called an interior word. Consequently it is compared to the intellect,
not as that by which the intellect understands, but as that in which it understands, because it is
in what is thus expressed and formed that it sees the nature of the thing understood. Thus we
have the meaning of the name “word.”

Secondly, from what has been said we are able to understand that a word is always something
that proceeds from an intellect existing in act; and furthermore, that a word is always a notion
(ratio) and likeness of the thing understood. So if the one understanding and the thing
understood are the same, then the word is a notion and likeness of the intellect from which it
proceeds. On the other hand, if the one understanding is other than the thing understood, then
the word is not a likeness and notion of the one understanding but of the thing understood, as
the conception which one has of a stone is a likeness of only the stone. But when the intellect
understands itself, its word is a likeness and notion of the intellect. And so Augustine (On the

54
 Trinity IX, 5) sees a likeness of the Trinity in the Soul insofar as the mind understands itself,
but not insofar as it understands other things.

It is clear then that it is necessary to have a word in any intellectual nature, for it is of the very
nature of understanding that the intellect in understanding should form something. Now what
is formed is called a word, and so it follows that in every being which understands there must
be a word.

However, intellectual natures are of three kinds: human, angelic and divine; and so there are
three kinds of words. The human word, about which it is said in the Psalm (13:1): “The fool
said in his heart, ‘There is no God.’ “ The angelic word, about which it is said in Zechariah
(1:9), and in many places in Sacred Scripture, “And the angel said to me.” The third is the
divine word, of which Genesis (1:3) says, “And God said, ‘Let there be light.’ “ So when the
Evangelist says, In the beginning was the Word, we cannot understand this as a human or
angelic word, because both these words have been made since man and angel have a cause
and principle of their

It is also clear that since in every nature that which issues forth and has a likeness to the nature
from which it issues is called a son, and since this Word issues forth in a likeness and identity
to the nature from which it issues, it is suitably and appropriately called a “Son,” and its
production is called a generation.

So now the first point is clear, the meaning of the term Word.

17. Supplement on verbum, ratio, and logos.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., q. 34, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

The most manifest and common way that ‘word’ [verbum] is said with respect to us is that
which is brought forth [profertur] in the voice, which, in fact, proceeds from within us with
respect to two things found in the exterior word, namely, the vocal sound [or ‘sound of voice’]
itself, and the signification of the voice. For the vocal sound signifies the concept of the
intellect, according to the Philosopher (cf. De Int. I. 1, 16a 5), and, again, the vocal sound
proceeds from the imagination, as is said in the De Anima (cf. II. 8, 420b 31 ff.). Therefore,
the exterior vocal sound is called a ‘word’ from this, that it signifies the interior concept of the
mind. Thus, then, first and principally the interior concept of the mind is called a ‘word’, but
secondly, the vocal sound itself that signifies the interior concept; but thirdly, the very
imagination of the vocal sound is called a ‘word’.

And these three ways Damascene lays down in the first book (ch. xiii), saying that a ‘word’ is
called the natural motion of the intellect, according to which it moves and understands and
thinks, just as light and splendor, with respect to the first; and further, a word is what is not
brought forth by a word, but is pronounced in the heart, with respect to the third; and further
a word is also the ‘angel’—that is, the messenger—of the intelligence, with respect to the
second; but in a fourth way that is called a ‘word’ figuratively which is signified or effected
by a word, as we are wont to say, this is the word I have spoken to you, or (this is the word)
which the king has commanded, when some deed which is signified by ‘word’ has been
pointed out either by simply announcing it or even commanding it.1

1 manifestius autem et communius in nobis dicitur verbum quod voce profertur. quod quidem ab interiori
procedit quantum ad duo quae in verbo exteriori inveniuntur, scilicet vox ipsa, et significatio vocis. vox enim
significat intellectus conceptum, secundum philosophum, in libro i periherm., et iterum vox ex imaginatione
procedit, ut in libro de anima dicitur. vox autem quae non est significativa, verbum dici non potest. ex hoc ergo

55
Cf. Theon of Smyrna, Expositio Rerum Mathematicarum ad Legendum Platoneum Utilium,
Book II: Musica (Gr. ed. Hiller, pp. 72-73; tr. R. & D. Lawlor, pp. 47-48; rev. B.A.M.):

What logo/j means.

XVII. According to the Peripatetics, logo/j is said in many ways [lo/goj de\ kata\ me\n tou\j
peripathtixou\j le/getai pollaxw=j]. The vocal sound which the moderns call prophor-
ikos [= ‘uttered’], and the endiathetos, the reasoning within the mind without the utterance of
the voice, are both designated in this way, and so is proportion, and it is in this sense that one
thing is said to ‘have a ratio’ to another thing. It also has the meaning of the explanation of the
elements of the universe: the recognition of things which honor and are honored, and it is in
this sense that we say: taking account of something, or not taking account of it (word of honor).
The calculation of bankers is also called logo/j, as is the discourse of Demosthenes and Lysias
in their written works (speech); the definition of things which explains their essence (reason),
since it is to this that it applies; the syllogism and induction; the tales of Lybius, and fables.
The name logo/j is also given to the fable, to the tale, and to the proverb. The ratio of form is
also called this as well as the seminal ratio and many others. But according to Plato, the word
logo/j is used with four different meanings: for thought without utterance; for discourse
proceeding from thought and expressed by the voice; for the explanation of the elements of
the universe; and for the ratio of proportion. It is this ratio that we propose now to seek.

Cf. Dominicus Gundisalvus, De Scientiis, Chapter 2, sec. 2: Concerning Logical Sciences

(tr. John Longeway):1

But the interpretation of logic is taken from its highest intention. For logic is said from “logos”,
according to three meanings (intentiones): “Logos” in Greek is interpreted as “ratio” in Latin.
But one sort of “ratio” is external with utterance, by which what is in the soul is interpreted
through language. And another sort is “ratio” fixed in the soul, which is called a conception
of the mind, which linguistic expressions [= ‘vocal sounds’ (B.A.M.)] signify. Hence, there
is, on the one hand, a “ratio” signifying, and on the other, a “ratio” that is signified. The third
sort is a power created in man, by which one discriminates good and bad, and grasps the arts
and sciences. And this is in every man, but in infants and some adults, it is weak, not being
strong enough to perfect its actions, just as the foot of an infant is too weak for walking, and
a small fire for burning a great mass of wood, and so it is even in those who are drunk or
possessed by demons.

Therefore, since this science gives rules concerning external speech (logos), and concerning
internal speech, by which it is certified in each of these the presence of the third “logos”, which
is in man from the Creator, and directs him to a comprehension of what is more correct, for

dicitur verbum vox exterior, quia significat interiorem mentis conceptum. sic igitur primo et principaliter
interior mentis conceptus verbum dicitur, secundario vero, ipsa vox interioris conceptus significativa, tertio
vero, ipsa imaginatio vocis verbum dicitur. et hos tres modos verbi ponit damascenus, in i libro, cap. xiii,
dicens quod verbum dicitur naturalis intellectus motus, secundum quem movetur et intelligit et cogitat, velut
lux et splendor, quantum ad primum, rursus verbum est quod non verbo profertur, sed in corde pronuntiatur,
quantum ad tertium,. rursus etiam verbum est angelus, idest nuntius, intelligentiae, quantum ad secundum.
dicitur autem figurative quarto modo verbum, id quod verbo significatur vel efficitur, sicut consuevimus dicere,
hoc est verbum quod dixi tibi, vel quod mandavit rex, demonstrato aliquo facto quod verbo significatum est vel
simpliciter enuntiantis, vel etiam imperantis.
1
In his footnote 5, Longeway notes that this portion of Gundisalvus’ work is taken from Al-Farabi’s De ortu
scientiarum. (B.A.M.)

56
 this reason it is called logic, a name derived from “logos” in accord with these three ways <of
interpreting that term>.

Now although many sciences that give rules concerning external speech, for instance, the
grammatical science, might be called by the name of logic; still, this one, which directs us to
what is necessary in every manner of speech (logos), is more worthy of this name.

18. On subject and predicate in relation to name and verb.

Cf. The Origins and Development of the Classical Word Class System:1

§ I. The Origins of the Classical Word Classes

In discussing the history of the canonical parts of speech, it is customary to begin with Plato.
He has been credited with being the first person to divide logos, sentence, into two compon-
ents: onoma, nominal part or noun and rhema, verbal part or verb (Forbes 1933:109). This
binary division has been claimed to correspond to the distinction between nouns and verbs.
However, one must understand that the correspondence between the terms is far from com-
plete for the reasons that follow.
In his work Sophist (261E-262A), Plato defines onoma as “an articulate mark set on those
who do the actions” and rhema as “that which denotes action.” Under this definition, the words
onoma and rhema are most likely to mean what we now call subject and predicate re-
spectively. It is clear that the distinction Plato drew here is built on semantic rather than
grammatical grounds. For the conception of onoma and rhema, Plato thought of them as ob-
ligatory constituents of a sentence. This was made clear in his dialogue (262A), which reads
“Now a succession of onomata only can never form a sentence; neither can a succession of
rhemata without onomata.” Robins (1966:7) seems to best represent this idea by the first
phrase structure rule of early generative grammar: “logos, S onoma, NP + rhema, VP.”

Cf. Historical Prelude:2

Plato and Aristotle

The history of linguistic categorization in Europe begins with Plato who considered some
language-related philosophical questions in some of his dialogues, most notably Cratylus.2

Although the principal issue taken up in Cratylus concerns the correctness of names (to put it
simply, why a dog is called a dog and not a cat), some attention is devoted to analyzing a
sentence into two major components – the nominal one (onoma) and the verbal one (rheme):
“... sentences are, I conceive, a
2
Cratylus and the philosophical issues raised in it have been subject to various, widely divergent inte
rpretations (see A.O. Palmer 1989, Baxter 1992 and references cited there).

2 Historical prelude

combination of verbs and nouns” (Cratylus 431b). Thus, Plato approached the problem of
‘noun-verb’ distinction very much like Pānini, also in terms of ‘subject’ versus ‘predicate’.
Since Plato’s focus was purely syntactic (i.e. on sentential analysis), Platonic ‘nouns’ (ono-

1
(http://www.saehaneng.com/data/papers/nka_journal_2004_46_2_12_hwangkyuhong.htm [2/5/06]).
2
(http://www.lotpublications.nl/publish/articles/001178/bookpart.pdf [2/5/6]).

57
 mata) and ‘verbs’ (rhemata) do not exactly correspond to nouns and verbs as these are con-
ceived nowadays and are more likely to be identified with modern NPs and VPs.

Cf. Ammonius Hermeias, Commentary on the De Interpretatione (= Ammonius: On Aris-

totle’s On Interpretation 1-8, tr. David Blank, p. 17):

But some propositions consist of only two simple vocal sounds intertwined, one subjected
[hupokeimenê] and the other predicated [katêgouremenê] – as when I say ‘Socrates walks’;
for here the vocal sound ‘Socrates’ is called the ‘subject-term’ [hupokeimenos horos] and
‘walks’ is predicated, because in every predicative speech one part is that about which the
speech is, and the other part is that which is said about that thing; the part about which the
speech is, here ‘Socrates’, is called a ‘subject’ because it accepts the predications [made] of it,
in this case ‘walks’, [which is] predicated insofar as it is addressed and said of the former.

Cf. Ammonius Hermeias, ibid, , p. 23:

<Only name and verb are properly called ‘parts of a sentence’>

This is why he says that the assertoric sentence [= ‘enunciative speech’] is always com-
posed of and breaks up into a name and a verb, believing as he does that these alone are
properly called ‘parts of [speech]’. ‘Be’ and ‘not be’ [20] belong, on this view, to the things
predicated immediately of some things, in which case they become as much parts of the
propositions as the subjects are, as in ‘Socrates exists’, ‘Socrates does not exist’; but
sometimes they belong to the vocal sounds used additionally in the propositions with a third
added predication or in modal propositions, which are said to be added to the parts of the
proposition or to be divided or to undergo something of this sort, as we shall learn in [25] the
proem of the Analytics.1 Thus the part of the affirmation must always be either a name or a
verb, but the verb is not always a part of the proposition, namely when it is not immediately
predicated of the subject as having to signify an activity or a passion or simply the existence
or non-existence of the subject.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 5, n. 8 (tr. B.A.M.):

n. 8. Then when he says And it is always (an indication), etc., he explains the other part. Where it
should be noted that since the subject of an enunciation is signified as (that) in which something
inheres, since the verb signifies an action in the manner of an action <or a passion in the manner of
a passion in the case of passive verbs…”>,2

to whose account it belongs that it inhere, it is always put on the part of the predicate, but
never on the part of the subject, unless it be taken with the force of a name, as has been said.
Therefore the verb is always said to be an indication of those things which are said of another:
both because the verb always signifies that which is predicated; as well as because in every

1
N.B. On the presence of the copula as constituting a proposition tertii adiacentis, cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas,
In II Peri Herm., lect. 2, nn. 2-4.
2
Cf. In I Peri Herm., lect. 4, n. 7 (tr. B.A.M.):

In another way, that which is measured by time can be considered insofar as it is of this sort. And
because that which is first and principally measured by time is motion, in which action and passion
consist, therefore the verb which signifies action or passion signifies with time. (alio modo, potest
considerari id, quod tempore mensuratur, in quantum huiusmodi: et quia id quod primo et principaliter
tempore mensuratur est motus, in quo consistit actio et passio, ideo verbum quod significat actionem
vel passionem, significat cum tempore.)

58
 predication there must be a verb, by reason of the fact that it implies composition, by means
of which a predicate is composed with a subject.1

Cf. Plutarch, Quaest. Plat. X (= Moralia 1009 c—1011 e): parallel translations:

The Complete Works Volume 3, Essays and Plutarch, Mor. 1009 C—1011 E. (In: Plutarch’s
Miscellanies. By Plutarch. Platonic Questions. Moralia In Seventeen
[Greek Added by B.A.M.] Volumes. XIII Part I 99 C—1032 F.
With an English Translation
by Harold Cherniss.

Platonic Questions X, 1009

QUESTION X. Question X

<...> <...>

What then shall we say for Plato? What, then, is to be said on behalf of Plato?

Is it that at first the ancients called that [prw=toj
lo/gwj], or <primary> speech, which once was
called protasis and now is called axiom or pro-
position,—which as soon as a man speaks, he
speaks either true or false?
...[I]s it that the ancients styled “primary [105-
106] speech” what then was called a pronounce-
ment and now is called a proposition, that in the
enunciation of which a truth or falsehood is first
expressed?

This consists of a noun and verb, which logici- And this consists of a noun and a verb, the former
ans call the subject and predicate. of which the dialecticians call subject and [D] the
latter predicate.

Cf. J. T. Nesfield, Manual of English Grammar and Composition (New York, 1939), Part
I.—Parsing and Analysis. Chapter I. Analysis in Outline, p. 1:

1. Sentence.—When one person says something to another, or puts what he says into writing,
he uses a combination of words which is called a sentence: —

Fire Burns.

Here “fire” is the thing talked about. The word “fire,” though it names the thing, does not
make a sentence. It is a name, and nothing more. It is only be adding such a word as “burns”
to the word “fire,” that is, by saying what the thing (fire) does, that we can make a sentence.

Definition—A sentence is a combination of words, in which something is said about

something else.
Note.—That which is “said” may be a statement, a question, a desire or an exclamation,—whatever,
in fact, can be expressed by a Finite verb (on the meaning of Finite verb see sec. 5)…. 2

1
deinde cum dicit: et est semper etc.,exponit aliam particulam. ubi notandum est quod quia subiectum enun-
ciationis significatur ut cui inhaeret aliquid, cum verbum significet actionem per modum actionis, de cuius
ratione est ut inhaereat, semper ponitur ex parte praedicati, nunquam autem ex parte subiecti, nisi sumatur in
vi nominis, ut dictum est. dicitur ergo verbum semper esse nota eorum quae dicuntur de altero: tum quia
verbum semper significat id, quod praedicatur; tum quia in omni praedicatione oportet esse verbum, eo quod
verbum importat compositionem, qua praedicatum componitur subiecto.
2
“Any part of a verb that can be used for saying something about something else (in any of the four senses
shown in § 1) is called Finite.”

59
Cf. ibid., pp. 1-2:

2. Subject and Predicate.—Every sentence, when it is expressed in full, consists of two parts,
a Subject and a Predicate. [1-2]
In a very short sentence like “fire burns,” the word “fire” (which is called a Noun) expres-
ses the whole of the Subject, and the word “burns” (which is called a Finite Verb) expresses
the whole of the Predicate. <…>

Definitions—The Subject of a sentence is a word or words denoting what we speak about.

The Predicate is a word or words by which we say something about the thing denoted by the
Subject.
Note 1.—In grammar the Subject is not “what we speak,” but “the word or words denoting what we
speak about.” Grammar deals exclusively with words, and this fact has to be recognised in all the defin-
itions.
Note 2.—Such a sentence as “Go!” is elliptical. Here the Subject “thou” or “you” is understood. Still
more elliptical is a sentence in which the Subject and the Finite verb are both understood:

Companion, hence!—SHAKESPEARE

To express this sentence in full, we have to say—

Companion, go thou hence!

Cf. Plain English (Right Words):1

A simple definition of a sentence is: a set of words that expresses a complete thought and
contains a subject and a predicate. Let’s look at this. The subject is the person or thing per-
forming the action that the sentence is talking about. Everything else in the sentence is the
predicate. The predicate must include a verb – the word that describes the action. It may also
include an object – a person or thing that is being acted upon – and any other phrases. The
shortest sentences are all verb; for example, Help! or Duck! In these one-word sentences, the
subject (and the object, if there is one) is understood; if the sentence Help were written in full,
it would read You help me. Usually, however, all the elements in the sentence are expressed:
I love you madly consists of subject, verb, object and ‘other (adverbial) phrase’.
Finally, the sentence must contain a complete thought. This is best demonstrated by con-
sidering an incomplete sentence: Although the car crashed through a barrier. This has a sub-
ject, “car”, a verb, “crashed” and a predicate, “crashed through a barrier”. If you left “al-
though” out, it would be a sentence. But “although” signals that the writer has more to say;
the thought, and therefore the sentence, isn’t finished. Incompleteness is one of the two most
common faults in sentence construction.

Cf. R. H. Robins, “Noun and Verb in Universal Grammar” (In: Diversions of Bloomsbury:
Selected Writings on Linguistics. Amsterdam, 1970, p. 291) (First Published in: Language
28 [1952] 289-298):

But a minimum of common grammatical structure, the universal existence or applicability

of nominal and verbal categories, is asserted, or tacitly assumed, by almost all. Meillet and
Sapir rejected the traditional apparatus of grammar as having no claim to universal validity.
But Meillet declared11 that the categories of noun and verb are common to the grammar of all

1
(www.zednet.lv/~avenija/bussines/new/Right%20Words%20newsletter%20articles.Htm [4/4/06])

60
 known languages and constitute a necessary minimum for any grammatical structure; [1] and
Sapir wrote:12 ‘There must be something to talk about and something must be said about this
subject of discourse... No language wholly fails to distinguish noun and verb, though in
particular cases the nature of the distinction may be an elusive one. It is different with the other
parts of speech. No one of these is imperatively required for the life of language’.
These statements clearly retain logical criteria in their definition and establishment of the
nominal and verbal classes, despite the objections (of which the authors were well aware) to
the employment of nonlinguistic and especially philosophical categories to linguistic analysis.
The assertion of Sapir, making the distinction of noun and verb rest on that between subject
and predicate (which was criticized by Ogden and Richards13) is particularly significant
coming from him, since at the time of writing he had already analyzed a language that might
seem to invalidate his statement.
In Nootka14 he found only one form-class of major word-stems (word-stems other than
particles); but he divided the syntactic function, or syntactic meaning, of the suffixed particles
into two classes, which he named ‘predicative’ (verbal) and ‘non-predicative’. There is only
one form-class of major word-stems; but these stems can be nominalized or verbalized, and
the two grammatical categories are thereby still introduced, though at a slightly different level
of analysis.15
It seems reasonable, therefore, to begin the consideration of universality in grammatical
structure by examining this asserted universality of the nominal and verbal categories. The
claims for at least this irreducible minimum of common structure are made by those who are
well aware how incomplete is our knowledge of the languages of the human race.
Hjelmslev, in holding to the view that linguistics is an inductive science, admits that we are
a long way from a complete enumeration and analysis of the grammatical systems to be found
in the world, but considers that, nevertheless, we have sufficient evidence to frame inductive
hypotheses on grammatical structure in general.16
11
A. Meillet, Linguistique historique et linguistique générale 1.175 (Paris, 1926).
12
Sapir, Language 126.
13
C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning8 260 (London, 1946).
14
Edward Sapir and Morris Swadesh, Nootka Texts 235-43 (Philadelphia, 1939).
15
Cf. the suggestion of B. L. Whorf, Lg. 21.9 (1945), that in ‘Nitinat and the other Wakashan langu-
ages’ the terms noun and verb are meaningless, because ‘the power of making predications or
declarative sentences and of taking on such moduli as voice, aspect, and tense, may be a property of
every major word’.
16
Hjelmslev, Principles 39-42, 256.

Cf. R. H. Robins, ibid., pp. 295-296):

In the article by Burt and Ethel Aginsky referred to at the outset, the universal elements of
grammar are given as segments, morphemes, and significant sequences of morphemes.40
These, and some other terms employed in grammatical analysis—word (minimal free form),
suffix, prefix, juncture, aggluti- [295-296]
40
Word 4.168.72 (1948). [= Burt W. and Ethel G. Aginsky, Word 4.168-72 (1948)]

1
Cp. Marcus Berquist, (incomplete) paper on speculative grammar, Part I. On the Art and the Science of
Grammar, p. 4. “Nor is it true that the study of grammar is simply a study of the conventional and customary,
which is singular and contingent rather than universal and necessary, and thus not the object of any art. This
view has some plausibility, for there is Latin grammar, English grammar, French grammar, and so forth, and
one might well wonder whether there is any grammar to learn beyond these particular grammars. However, it
cannot withstand a more exact examination. For within the various languages, certain forms are universally
present, such as the noun and the verb, and it does not seem there could be a language at all, still less an
adequate language, without them”. (emphasis added)

61
 nation, inflection, and so on—can be claimed by us as universally applicable, because, for us,
all language consists of events in one dimension, time. In employing such terms we are doing
no more than segmenting the unidimensional stream of speech into various meaningful pieces
more or less independent; we are not attributing to the language itself or to its component
parts any categories of meaning, however, abstract, that are found in the semantics of our own
language. These categories are, therefore, of an altogether different order from word-classes
(nouns, verbs, and the rest) and the secondary categories associated with them.
Are we then able to say that there are any universal categories in grammar other than purely
segmental ones? Or must we, in strictly adhering to the principles of descriptive linguistics,
say that nouns and verbs in the widely diverse languages of the world have nothing necessarily
in common save the name, and that the assumption of a universal semantic content is but a
relic of the uncritical ethnocentric theories of the past? Against such a negative answer must
be set the fact that grammatical analysis in terms of a basic distinction between nominal and
verbal categories succeeds in new fields, and stands critical examination in the older areas of
language study where so much else of traditional grammar has had to be abandoned. There is
the additional fact that, when two formally differentiated word-classes are established in any
language as the basis of its grammatical system, a large proportion, at least, of the words in
those two classes can be translated into the nouns and verbs, respectively, or nominal and
verbal phrases, of the analyst’s language, to the satisfaction of a bilingual informant or of
someone competent in the two languages concerned.

18. The foundational doctrine according to Plato.

Cf. Plato, Sophist 261d—263a (tr. B. Jowett):

Str. Then, now, let us speak of names, as before we were speaking of ideas and letters; for that
is the direction in which the answer may be expected.

Theaet. And what is the question at issue about names?

Str. The question at issue is whether all names may be connected with one another, or none,
or only some of them.

Theaet. Clearly the last is true.

Str. I understand you to say that words which have a meaning when in sequence may be
connected, [e] but that words which have no meaning when in sequence cannot be connected?

Theaet. What are you saying?

Str. What I thought that you intended when you gave your assent; for there are two sorts of
intimation of being which are given by the voice.

Theaet. What are they?

Str. One of them is called nouns, and the other verbs.

Theaet. Describe them.

Str. That which denotes action we call a verb. [262]

Theaet. True.

62
Str. And the other, which is an articulate mark set on those who do the actions, we call a noun.
Theaet. Quite true.

Str. A succession of nouns only is not a sentence any more than of verbs without nouns.

Theaet. I do not understand you.

Str. I see that when you gave your assent you had something else [b] in your mind. But what
I intended to say was, that a mere succession of nouns or of verbs is not discourse.

Theaet. What do you mean?

Str. I mean that words like “walks,” “runs,” “sleeps,” or any other words which denote action,
however many of them you string together, do not make discourse.

Theaet. How can they?

Str. Or, again, when you say “lion,” “stag,” “horse,” or any other words which denote agents—
neither in this way of stringing words together do you attain to discourse; for there is [c] no
expression of action or inaction, or of the existence or non-existence indicated by the sounds,
until verbs are mingled with nouns; then the words fit, and the smallest combination of them
forms language, and is the simplest and least form of discourse.

Theaet. Again I ask, What do you mean?

Str. When any one says “A man learns,” should you not call this the simplest and least of
sentences?

Theaet. Yes. [d]

Str. Yes, for he now arrives at the point of giving an intimation about something which is, or
is becoming, or has become, or will be. And he not only names, but he does something, by
connecting verbs with nouns; and therefore we say that he discourses, and to this connection
of words [e] we give the name of discourse.

Theaet. True.

Str. And as there are some things which fit one another, and other things which do not fit, so
there are some vocal signs which do, and others which do not, combine and form discourse.

Theaet. Quite true.

Str. There is another small matter.

Theaet. What is it?

Str. A sentence must and cannot help having a subject.

Theaet. True.

Str. And must be of a certain quality.

Theaet. Certainly.

63
Str. And now let us mind what we are about.

Theaet. We must do so.

Str. I will repeat a sentence to you in which a thing and an action are combined, by the help of
a noun and a verb; and you shall tell me of whom the sentence speaks.

Theaet. I will, to the best my power.

Str. [263] “Theaetetus sits”—not a very long sentence.

Theaet. Not very.

Str. Of whom does the sentence speak, and who is the subject that is what you have to tell.

Theaet. Of me; I am the subject.

Str. Or this sentence, again—

Theaet. What sentence?

Str. “Theaetetus, with whom I am now speaking, is flying.”

Theaet. That also is a sentence which will be admitted by every one to speak of me, and to
apply to me.

Str. [b] We agreed that every sentence must necessarily have a certain quality.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And what is the quality of each of these two sentences?

Theaet. The one, as I imagine, is false, and the other true.

Str. The true says what is true about you?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And the false says what is other than true?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And therefore speaks of things which are not as if they were?

Theaet. True.

Str. And say that things are real of you which are not; for, as we were saying, in regard to each
thing or person, there is much that is and much that is not.

Theaet. Quite true.

Str. [c] The second of the two sentences which related to you was first of all an example of
the shortest form consistent with our definition.

64
Theaet. Yes, this was implied in recent admission.

Str. And, in the second place, it related to a subject?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Who must be you, and can be nobody else?

Theaet. Unquestionably.

Str. And it would be no sentence at all if there were no subject, for, as we proved, a sentence
which has no subject is impossible.

Theaet. Quite true.

Str. When other, then, is asserted of you as the same, and not-being as being, [d] such a
combination of nouns and verbs is really and truly false discourse.

Theaet. Most true.

Str. And therefore thought, opinion, and imagination are now proved to exist in our minds
both as true and false.

Theaet. How so?

Str. You will know better if you first gain a knowledge of what they are, and in what they
severally differ [e] from one another.

Theaet. Give me the knowledge which you would wish me to gain.

Str. Are not thought and speech the same, with this exception, that what is called thought is
the unuttered conversation of the soul with herself?

Theaet. Quite true.

Str. But the stream of thought which flows through the lips and is audible is called speech?

Theaet. True.

Str. And we know that there exists in speech...

Theaet. What exists?

Str. Affirmation.

Theaet. Yes, we know it. [264]

Str. When the affirmation or denial takes place in silence and in the mind only, have you any
other name by which to call it but opinion?

Theaet. There can be no other name.

65
 Str. And when opinion is presented, not simply, but in some form of sense, would you not call
it imagination?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And seeing that language is true and false, and that thought is the conversation of the soul
with herself, and opinion is the end of thinking, and imagination or phantasy is the union [b]
of sense and opinion, the inference is that some of them, since they are akin to language,
should have an element of falsehood as well as of truth?

Theaet. Certainly.

Cf. Keith Allan, “Aristotle’s Footprints in the Linguist’s Garden”, note 2, p. 5:

In Sophist 261e—63 Plato identified two phonic signs for the essence of things: onoma and
rhema. The rhema denotes an action; those who do the actions are signified by onomata (262a,
c). Any combination [= sumploke] of onoma and rhema produces a logos (262c). Every logos
is ‘of something’ (tinos); i.e. it has a subject or topic named in the onoma. Moreover it is about
something which is, or is becoming, or has become, or will be (262d).

20. Plato’s Sophist on speech in sum.

The question is asked: Can all names fit together, or none, or only some of them? It
will be answered: only some names, namely, the noun and the verb, can be fitted together.
What Socrates means is this: only those combinations which express a complete thought and
make perfect sense in the soul of the hearer are allowed to have meaning. Aristotle, on the
other hand, allows that the name and the verb and their congeners are significative
separately, but the two positions are complementary, as we explain elsewhere. Some words
which have meaning when in sequence or succession may be fitted together, but words which
have no meaning when in sequence cannot be fitted together. There are two sorts of
intimations [unveilings] of being given by the voice, one of them being called onomata
(names or nouns), the other rhemata (verbs). Note that each of these is both a sound of voice
and a sign—that is, a significant vocal sound or a vocal sound having meaning. The verb is
the unveiling of action; the noun or name is a sign of voice placed on those who do the
actions. Neither a succession of nouns nor one of verbs is logos (‘speech’ or ‘discourse’).1
There is no expression of action or inaction or of existence or non-existence until verbs are
intertwined [sumploke] with nouns.2 The result of such ‘intertwining’ forms speech and is
the smallest and least form of discourse. E.g. “A man learns.” Every sentence has a subject,
which is what it is about. Again, every sentence has a quality with respect to its ‘truth value’:
for instance (in the case of enunciative speech), it is either true or false.

21. The principal divisions of lexis.

Parts of language which are also parts of speech:

• the name and the verb

1
For a similar observation on conjunctions and prepositions, see Plutarch’s Platonic Questions X below.
2
Cp. Aristotle, Cat. chaps. 2 and 4 on sumploke.

66
Parts of language which are not also parts of speech (= moria or ‘particles’ of language):

• the conjunction, the article, the preposition, and the adverb

22. The principal division of significative vocal sounds in sum.

Those which signify when conjoined to the others, syncategoremata or consignificantia:

• the conjunction and the preposition (and the article and the adverb)

Those which signify by themselves, which are called ‘interpretations’:

• the name and the verb

• enunciative speech1

1
The reader will recall here that Boethius includes the other species of perfect speech under ‘interpretation’ as
well, in this wide understanding being followed St. Albert the Great; but both following Aristotle, according
to the opinion I have expressed above.

67
Appendix: The complete text of Plutarch, Quaest. Plat. Question X (= Moralia 1009 c—
1011 e): parallel translations.

The Complete Works Volume 3, Essays and
Miscellanies. By Plutarch. Platonic Questions.
(tr. William Watson Goodwin)
[Greek Added by B.A.M.]
Plutarch, Mor. 1009 C—1011 E. (In: Plutarch’s
Moralia In Seventeen
Volumes. XIII Part I 99 C—1032 F.
With an English Translation
by Harold Cherniss.

Platonic Questions X, 1009 ff.

QUESTION X. Question X a

WHY SAID PLATO, THAT SPEECH WAS (1009) 1. What was Plato’s reason for sayingb
COMPOSED OF NOUNS AND VERBS? that speech is a blend of nouns and verbs?
(Plato’s “Sophist,” p. 262 A.)

For he seems to make no other parts of speech For it seems that except for these two Plato
but them. But Homer in a playful humor has dismissed all the parts of speech whereas Homer
comprehended them all in one verse:— in his exuberance went so far as to pack all [C]
together into a single line, the following:

Tentward going myself take the guerdon that well

you may know it.c
au)toj i)w\v klisi/nde, to\ so\n ge/raj: o)/fr’ eu)= [au)toj i)w\v klisi/nde, to\ so\n ge/raj: o)/fr’ eu)=
ei)d$=j. (“Iliad”, i. 185.) ei)d$=j.]

For in it there is pronoun, participle, noun, In this there are in fact a pronoun and a participle
preposition, article, conjunction, adverb, and and noun and verb and preposition and article
verb, the particle—“de” being put instead of the and conjunction and adverb,d for the suffix
preposition “ei)j”; for klisi/nde, TO THE TENT, “ward” has here been put in place of the pre-
position “to,” the expression “tentward” being of
is said in the same sense as ’Aqh/naze, TO
the same kind as the expression “Athensward.”e
ATHENS.
a
This question is translated and discussed by J. J. Hartman in De Avindzon des Heidendoms (Leiden,
1910), ii, pp. 22-30 and translated in part by A. von Mörl in Die Grosse Weltordnung
(Berlin/Wien/Leipzig, 1948), ii, pp. 85-89; it is commented on in detail by O. Göldi, Plutarchs
sprachliche Interessen (Diss. Zürich, 1922), pp. 2-10.
b
Sophist 262 c 2-7; cf. Crat. 425 A 1-5 and 431 B 5-C 1, Theaetetus 206 D 1-5, and [Plato] Epistle
vii, 342 B 6-7 and 343 b 4-5; O. Apelt, Platonis Sophista (Lipsiae, 1897), p. 189. and F. M. Cornford,
Plato’s Theory of Knowledge (London, 1935), pp. 307-308.
c
Iliad i, 185.
d
For these eight parts of speech cf. Dionysius Thrax, Ars Grammatica § 11 (9. 23 1-2 [Uhlig]). As
the Homeric line containing all of them the grammarians cite Iliad xxii, 59 (Scholia in Dionysii
Thracis Artem Grammaticam, p. 58, 13-19 and p. 357, 29-36 [Hilgard]); Eustathius, Commentarii
ad Homeri Iliadem 1256, 60-61; and there the noun is du/sthnon, for the adjective (“noun adjective”
in older grammars [cf. O.E.D. s.v. “noun” 3]) was considered to be a kind of noun, o)/noma e)pi/qeton
(Dionysius Thrax, op. cit., § 12 [p. 33, 1 and pp. 34, 3-35, 2]) with Scholia...., p. 233, 7-33 and p.
553, 11-17....).
e
Cf. Etym. Magnum 761, 30-32 and 809, 8-9 (Gaisford) and further for mo/rion as “prefix” or “suffix”
141, 47-52.

68
 What then shall we say for Plato? Is it that at first
the ancients called that prw=toj lo/gwj, or
<primary> speech, which once was called pro-
tasis and now is called axiom or proposition,—
which as soon as a man speaks, he speaks either
true or false?
What, then, is to be said on behalf of Plato? Orf
is it that the ancients styled “primary [105-106]
speech”a what then was called a pronouncement
and now is called a proposition,b that in the enun-
ciation of which a truth or falsehood is first
expressed?c

This consists of a noun and verb, which logi- And this consists of a noun and a verb, the former
cians call the subject and predicate. of which the dialecticians call subject and [D] the
latter predicate.d

For when we hear this said, “Socrates For upon hearing “Socrates philosophizes” and
philosphizeth” or “Socrates is changed” [tre/re- again “Socrates flies” [pe/tetai] we should say
tai], requiring nothing more, we say the one is without requiring anything else besides that the
true, the other false. former is true speech and the latter false.e

For very likely in the beginning men wanted Moreover, it is likely that men first felt the need
speech and articulate voice, to enable them to of speech and articulate soundf in desiring to
express clearly at once the passions and the designate and make quite clear to one another
patients, the actions and the agents. actions and their agents and patients and what
they undergo.
f
See 1003 A and 1008 E supra and note c on De Comm. Not. 1075 F infra.
a
Plato, Sophist 262 C 6-7 (tw=n lo/gwn o( prw=to/j kai\ smikro/tatoj) and 9-10 (lo/gwn . . .
e)la/xisto/n te kai\ prw=ton); cf. Ammonius, De Interpretatione, p. 67, 20-30 and pp. 78, 29-79, 9.
b
Cf. [Apuleius], Peri\ e(rmenei/aj i (pp. 176, 15-177, 2 [Thomas]); Galen Institutio Logica i, 5 (with
J. Mau’s note ad loc., Galen, Einführung in die Logik [Berlin, 1960], pp. 3-4); and Proclus, In
Primum Euclidis El. Lib., pp. 193, 18-194, 4 (Friedlin). For pro/tasij used in the general sense of
“proposition” cf. Albinus, Epitome vi, 1 and 3 (p. 29, 1-4 and 19-20 [Louis] = p. 158, 4-7 and 21-22
[Hermann] and Aristotle himself (Anal. Prior., 24 a 16-17 with Alexander, Anal. Prior., p. 44, 16-
23); and for a)xi/oma as the Stoic term for this cf. besides the passage of Proclus just cited Ammonius,
De Interpretatione, p. 2, 26 and Mates, Stoic Logic, pp. 27-33 and p. 132, s.v. a)xi/oma.
c
Plato, Sophist 262 E 8-9 and 263 A 11-B 3; cf. [Apuleius], Peri\ e(rmenei/aj iv (pp. 178, 1-7
[Thomas]) and Ammonius, De Interpretatione, p. 18, 2-22 and pp. 26, 31-27, 4. It was express Stoic
doctrine that every proposition is either true or false (cf. Mates, Stoic Logic, pp. 28-29).
d
Cf. [Apuleius], Peri\ e(rmenei/aj i (pp. 178, 12-15 [Thomas]); Martianus Capella, iv, 393; and
Mates, Stoic Logic, pp. 16-17 with notes 34-41 and p. 25 with notes 79-81. Notice the difference
between Diogenes Laertius, vii, 58, and Plutarch’s statement (Mates, p. 16, n. 34); and with ptw=sij
as used by Plutarch here cf. besides Sextus, Adv. Math. xi, 29 (Mates, p. 17, n. 40) Clement of
Alexandria, Stromata VIII, ix, 26, 4-5, cited by Pearson (Fragments, p. 75) in connexion with
Stobaeus, Ecl. i, 12, 3 (p. 137, 3-6 [Wachsmuth]) = S.V.F. i, p. 19, 24-26. oi( dialektikoi/ in the
present passage as in 1011 A and 1011 D infra are the Stoics (cf. Aulus Gellius, XVI, viii, 1 and 8;
Sextus, Pyrrh. Hyp. ii., 146 and 247 and Adv. Math. viii, 93; Cicero, Acad. Prior. ii, 97; and see note
d on De Stoic. Repug. 1045 F infra).
e
Plato, Sophist 263 A 8-B 3.
f
i.e. lo/goj in the sense of speech. Cf. De Sollertia Animalium 973 A (proforikou= lo/gou kai\ fqnh=j
e)na/rqrou) with S.V.F. ii, p. 43, 18-20 (t%= profprik%= lo/g%= e)na/rqrouj fwna/j [but in S.V.F. iii,
p. 215, 35-36 h( shmai/nousa e)/narqroj fwnh/, with which cf. S.V.F. ii, frag. 143]); and De An.
Proc. in Timaeo 1026 A (lo/goj de\ le/cij e)n fwn$= shmnatink$= dianoi/aj).

Now, since actions and affections are adequately Since, then, with the verb we do make adequately
expressed by verbs, and they that act and are clear [107-108] acts and what is undergone and

69
 affected by nouns, as he says, these seem to with the noun the agents and patients, as Plato
signify. has said himself,a it seemed that these signify,

And one may say, the rest signify not. For
instance, the groans and shrieks of stage players,
and even their smiles and silence, make their
discourse more emphatic. But they have no
absolute power to signify anything, as a noun and
verb have, but only an ascititious power to vary
speech;
whereas one might say that the rest like the
groans and [E] shouts of actors do not signify;
and, by heaven, suddenly falling silent with a
smile often makes speech more expressive and
yet has not the force requisite for signifying as do
the verb and the noun but a certain supple-
mentary force embellishing speech

just as they vary letters who mark spirits and in the way that the letters are embellished by
quantities upon letters, these being the accidents those who make independent ones of their
and differences of letters. breathings and aspirates and in some cases of
their long and short quantities,b although these
are rather modifications and incidental charac-
teristics and variations of letters,c

This the ancients have made manifest, whom as the ancients showed by adequately expressing
sixteen letters sufficed to speak and write themselves in actually writing with sixteen
anything. letters.d
a
Sophist 262 A 3-7, B 6, and B 10-c 1; but Plato here speaks only of pra/ceij and pra/ttontej as
signified by verbs and nouns. For Plutarch’s substitution of pra/gmata for pra/ceij cf. Scholia in
Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, p. 215, 28-30 (Hilgard); Apollonius Dyscolus, De
Constructione i, 130 and iii, 58 (p. 108, 11-14 and pp. 323, 9-324, 9 [Uhlig]).
b
ta\ pneu/mata are the two “breathings,” dasu\ kai\ yilo/n (cf. Dionysius Thrax, Ars Grammatica,
Suppl. i, p. 107, 4 [Uhlig] and for the argument that such marks are letters cf. Scholia in Dionysii
Thracis Artem Grammaticam, pp. 187, 26-188, 21 and p. 496, 11-13 [Hilgard]); but ta\j dasu/thtaj
refers to the aspirates q, f, x (cf. Dionysius Thrax, Ars Grammatica § 6, p. 12, 5 [Uhlig]; Sextus,
Adv. Math. i, 103; Priscian, Inst. Grammatica i, 24-25 = i, p. 19, 3-8 [Hertz] and e)kta/seij te kai\
sustola\j e)ni/wn to the distinction of h from e and of w from o (cf. Sextus, Adv. Math. i, 115).
c
cf. Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, p. 496, 19-14 (Hilgard).
d
Cf. Plutarch, Quaestio Conviv. 738 F; Demetrius of Phaleron, frag. 196 (Wehrli); Varro, De
Antiquitate Litterarum, frag. 2 (Funaioli, Grammaticae Romanae Fragmenta i, p. 184; cf. pp. 2 and
120 for L. Cincius, frag. 1 and Cn. Gellius, frag. 1; Pliny, N.H. vii, 192; Tacitus, Ann. xi, 14; Scholia
in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, pp. 34, 27-35, 13 and pp. 184, 7-12 and 185, 3-7 (Hilgard).

Besides, we must not fail to observe, that Plato 2. In the second place, take care lest we fail to
says that speech is composed OF these, not BY heed what Plato has said, that speech is a blend
these; nor must we find fault with Plato for of [109-110] these, not that it is blended by
omitting conjunctions, prepositions, and the rest,
means of them, and lest then like one who, when
any more than we should criticise a man who the medicine is said to be a mixture of wax and
should say such a medicine is composed of wax galbanum, carps at the omission of the fire and
and galbanum, because fire and utensils are the receptacle, without which it could not have
omitted, without which it cannot be produced. been mixed, we too similarly object that Plato
For speech is not composed of these; disregarded conjunctions and prepositions and
the like,
yet by their means, and not without them, speech for it is not of these that speech is naturally
must be composed. blended but, if at all, by means of them and
[1010] not without them.

70
 As, if a man says BEATS or IS BEATEN, and For it is not the case that as one by uttering
adds Socrates and Pythagoras to the same, he “strikes” or “is struck” and again “Socrates” or
gives us something to conceive and understand. “Pythagoras” has provided something to
conceive and have in mind somehow[;]

But if a man pronounce INDEED <me/n> or FOR
<ga/r> or ABOUT <peri/> and no more, none
can conceive any notion of a body or matter; and
unless such words as these be uttered with verbs
and nouns, they are but empty noise and
chattering.
so, when “indeed” or “for” or “about” has been
pronounced by itself, it is possible to get some
conception of an act or an objecta ; but, unless
these are expressions about those other words
and in association with them, they resemble
senseless sounds and noises.

For neither alone nor joined one with another do The reason is that they naturally signify nothing
they signify anything. either by themselves or in association with one
another;

And join and confound together conjunctions, but, however we may combine or mix together
articles, and prepositions, supposing you would conjunctions and articles and prepositions in
make something of them; yet you will be taken trying to make of them a single thing in com-
to babble, and not to speak sense. mon, it will seem that we are babbling gib- [111-
112] berish [B] rather than speaking a language.
a
The phrase, sw=ma h)\ pra=gma shmai=non, occurs in the definition of o)/noma given by Dionysius
Thrax, Ars Grammatica § 23 (p. 24, 3-4 [Uhlig]). Since Plutarch has just given both verbs and nouns
as counter-examples, however, pra/gmatoj here is probably meant in the sense of ta\ pra/gmata in
1009 D supra (page 108, note a); cf. also Dionysius Hal., De Comp. Verb. xii, 69-70 (p 46, 21 f.
[Usener-Radermacher]), %)= shmai/nei ti sw=ma h)\ pra=gma, where the preceding ou)/te 0)/noma ou)/te
r(h=ma (ibid. p. 46, 18) indicates that pra/gma means “act” and not “thing.” The use of sw=ma for
“object” generally reflects the Stoic doctrine that all agents and patients—and so all entities—are
sw/mata (see notes f and g on De Comm. Not. 1073 E infra and cf. Apollonius Dyscolus, De
Constructione i, 16 = p. 18, 5-8 [Uhlig]).

But when there is a verb in construction with a When a verb is combined with a noun, however,
noun, the result is speech and sense. the result is straightaway language and speech.a

Therefore some do with justice make only these Wherefore it is reasonable that some people
two parts of speech; and perhaps Homer is consider these alone to be parts of speechb ; and
willing to declare himself of this mind, when he this perhaps is what Homer wants to make clear
says so often, each time he says

e)/poj t’ e)/fat’ e)/k t’ o)no/mzen: gave word to the thought and announced it,c

For by e)/poj he usually means a verb, as in these for it was his custom to call the verb “word,” as
verses. in these lines:

w)= gu/nai, h)= ma/la tou=to e)/poj qumalge\j e)/eipej Verily, woman, a heart-breaking word is this thou
kai\] has spokend
and, and

kai=re, pa/ter w)= zei=ne, e)/poj d’ ei)/per ti
le/lektai deino/n,
a)/far to\ fe/roien a)narpa/casai a)/ellai.
(“Odyssey,” xxiii. 183; viii. 408.)
Joy to thee, reverend guest; if offensive words have
been spoken,
May they be gone forthwith swept up and away by a
whirlwind.e

71
 For neither conjunction, article, nor preposition For what is offensive and heart-breaking to speak
could be said to be [deino/n] (TERRIBLE) or is not a conjunction or an article or a preposition
[qumalge\j] (SOUL GRIEVING), but only a but a verb expressive of a shameful [C] action or
verb signifying a base action or a foolish passion of some improper experience.
of the mind.
a
Plato, Sophist 262 C 4-7 and D 2-6.
b
Cf. [Apuleius], Peri\ e(rmenei/aj iv (pp. 178, 4-7 [Thomas]); Apollonius Dyscolus, De
Constructione i, 30 (p. 28, 6-9 [Uhlig] with Priscian, Inst. Grammatica xvii, 22 = ii, pp. 121, 21-122,
1 [Hertz]); and Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, pp. 515, 19-517, 32 (Hilgard),
where the doctrine is ascribed to the Peripatetics and some of the supporting arguments are answered
(cf. Priscian, op.cit. ii, 15 and xi, 6-7 = i, p. 54, 5-7 and pp. 551, 17-522, 14 [Hertz]). An elaborate
defense of the doctrine, in many particulars like Plutarch’s, is given by Ammonius (De Interpre-
tatione, pp. 11, 1-15, 13), who with explicit reference to the Cratylus and the Sophist asserts that
Plato anticipated Aristotle in holding it (De Interpretatione, p. 40, 26-30; p. 48, 30-32; p. 60, 1-3 and
17-23). Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1404 b 26-27 [= “Language is composed of names and verbs.” (tr.
B.A.M.)]; Theophrastus and Boethus of Sidon in Simplicius, Categ., p. 10, 24-27 and p. 11, 23-25;
and Adrastus in Theon Smyrnaeus, p. 10, 7-9 (Hiller).
c
Iliad vi, 253 and 406; vii, 108; and passim.
d
Odyssey xxiii,.183.
e
Odyssey viii, 408-409.

Therefore, when we would praise or dispraise
poets or writers, we are wont to say, such a man
uses Attic nouns and good verbs, or else common
nouns and verbs;
This is also why we customarily praise or censure
writers of poetry and prose in [113-114] terms
like these, “the nouns employed by so-and-so are
‘Attic’ and the verbs are ‘elegant’” or again
“pedestrian,”a

but none can say that Thucydides or Euripides whereas it would not be said by anyone that in
used Attic or common articles. the language of Euripides or Thucydides “ped-
estrian” or again “elegant and Attic articles” are
used.

What then? May some say, do the rest of the parts 3. “What then?” —one might say— “Do these
conduce nothing to speech? words contribute nothing to speech?”

I answer, They conduce, as salt does to victuals; I should say that they do make a contribution to
or water to barley cakes. it just as salt does to a dish of food and water to
a barley-cake.

And Euenus calls fire the best sauce. Evenus even said that fire is the best of sauces.b

Though sometimes there is neither occasion for Nevertheless, we do not say either that water is a
fire to boil, nor for salt to season our food, which part of barley-cake or wheat-bread or that fire or
we have always occasion for. salt is a part of greens or victuals, although we do
always require fire and salt,

Nor has speech always occasion for articles. whereas speech unlike this often has no need of
those [D] additional words.

I think I may say this of the Latin tongue, which So it is, it seems to me, with the speech of the
is now the universal language; for it has taken Romans, which now is used by nearly all men,
away all prepositions, saving a few, nor does it for it has eliminated all prepositions except for a

72
 use any articles, but its nouns are (as it were) fewc [115-116] and of the words called articles
without skirts and borders. admits none at alla but employs nouns without
tassels, as it were.
a
In such expressions o)/noma (and the same could be said for r(h=ma) is used in a different sense, i.e.
ro\ koinw=j e)pi\ pa=n me/roj lo/gou diatei=non (cf. Simplicius, Categ., p. 25, 14-17; Scholia in Dionysii
Thracis Artem Grammaticam, pp. 522, 21-28 [Hilgard]).
b
Evenus, frag. 10 (Bergk, Poetae Lyr. Graec. ii4, p. 271; Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus i, p. 476). The
remark is ascribed to Evenus in Quomodo Adulator ab Amico Internoscatur 50 A and in Quaest.
Conviv. 697 C-D but to Prodicus in De Tuenda Sanitate 126 D.
c
According to Hartman (De Plutarcho, p. 583) this is an erroneous generalization from those Latin
expressions of relations of place in which no preposition is used; according to H. J. Rose (The Roman
Questions of Plutarch [Oxford, 1924], p. 198 ad lxvii [208 A]) it is rather an exaggeration suggested
by the contemporary fondness for archaic and poetical constructions which omitted the prepositions
of Ciceronian grammar; and both these observations may be partial explanations of Plutarch’s “odd
statement,” but it should be remembered also that many Latin “prepositions” were regarded by the
Greeks as not being prepositions at all (Priscian, Inst. Grammatica xiv, 9-10 and 23 = ii, pp. 28, 19-
29, 11 and pp. 36, 20-37, 6 [Hertz])....
a
Cf. Quintilian, Inst. Orat. i, 4, 19; Priscian, Inst. Grammatica ii, 16 and xvii, 27 (i. p. 54, 13-16 and
ii, p. 124, 16-18 [Hertz]).

Nor is it any wonder, since Homer, who in fine-
ness of epic surpasses all men, has put articles
only to a few nouns, like handles to cans, or
crests to helmets. Therefore these verses are re-
markable wherein the articles are suppressed.—
This is not surprising either, since Homer too,
who excelled in marshalling words,b attaches
articles to few of his nouns, as it were crests to
helmets or handles to goblets that do not require
themc; and that is the very reason why critical
marksd have been put at the verses in which he
does so, for example:

Ai)/anti de\ ma/lista dai/froni qumo\n o)/rine t%= Wrathful fury he chiefly excited in fiery Ajax,
Telamwnia/d$\ (“Iliad,” xiv. 459.) The Telamonian one,e

and, and
poi/een, o)/fra to\ lh=toj u(pekrofugw\n a)le/oito Built it to let him elude and evade the notorious
(Ibid. xx. 147.) monster f

and some few besides. But in a thousand others, and a few others besides. In the rest, however,
the omission of the articles hinders neither countless [E] as they are, though an article is not
perspicuity nor elegance of phrase. present, the expression suffers nothing in clarity
or beauty. [117-118]
b
Cf. Democritus, frag. B 21 (D.-K.) and Pausanius, ix, 30, 4 and 12. The phrase ko/smon e)pe/wn
occurs in a line of Solon’s quoted by Plutarch himself (Solon viii, 2 [82 C]); cf. also Parmenides,
frag. B 8, 52 (D.-K.) and Philetas of Cos, frag. 8 (Diehl, Anth. Lyr. Graec. ii, p. 211) = 10 (Powell,
Collectanea Alexandrina, p. 92).
c
There were e)kpw/mata of countless kinds (Clement of Alexandria, Paedegogus II, iii, 35, 2), many
without handles (Athenaeus, xi, 783 a, 478 b, and 481 d).
d
Cf. Aristotle, Soph. Elench. 177 b 6 (ka)kaei= . . . para/sma poiou=ntai).
e
Iliad xiv, 459-460. Leaf (The Iliad ii2, p. 97ad 458-459) calls the use of t%= in 460 “hardly Homeric.”
Cf. in general Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem ed. Dindorf i, p. 70, 10-11 ad B 1 and p. 339, 14-
15 ad K 1 (e)/sti ga\r o( poihth\j paraleiptiko\j tw=n a)/rqrwn).

73
f
Iliad xx, 147. For the use of the article here, cf. Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem ed. Dindorf ii,
p. 199, 19-20; Leaf (The Iliad ii2, p. 359) calls it very rare in Homer and says that “instances such as
this are confined to late passages in the Iliad.”

Now neither an animal nor an instrument nor 4. Moreover, it is not natural for any living being
arms nor anything else is more fine, efficacious, or instrument or weapon or any other existing
or pleasanter, for the loss of a part. thing to become more beautiful or more effective
or more pleasant by the removal or loss of a part
that belongs to ita ;

Yet speech, by taking away conjunctions, often but frequently when conjunctions have been
becomes more persuasive, as here:— eliminated speech has a force more emotional
and stirring,b as in a case like this:

One rear’d a dagger at a captive’s breast;
One held a living foe, that freshly bled
With new-made wounds, another dragg’d a
dead.
(Ibid. xviii. 536.)
One just wounded alive in her clutches, another
unwounded,
Dead already another she dragged by the feet
through the turmoil c

And this of Demosthenes:— and this by Demosthenes:

“A bully in an assault may do much which his
victim cannot even report to another person,—by
his attitude, his look, his voice,— when he
insults, when he attacks as an enemy, when he
smites with his fist, when he strikes a blow on the
face.
“He who strikes one might do many things, some
of which his victim could not even [F] report to
another, by his posture, by his look, by his tone
of voice, when insultingly, when in hostility,
when with the fist, when with a slap in the face;

These rouse a man; these make a man beside these are the things that stir up, that drive to
himself who is unused to such foul abuse.” distraction men unused to contemptuous treat-
ment.”d
a
Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, pp. 516, 37-517, 4 (Hilgard).
b
Cf. [Plutarch], De Vita Homeri 40 (vii, pp. 355, 20-356, 5 [Bernardakis]); for Plutarch, Caesar 1,
3-4 (731 F) cf. R. Jeuckens, Plutarch von Charonea und die Rhetorik (Strassburg, 1908), pp. 162-
163, pp. 162-163.
c
Iliad xviii, 536-537 = [Hesiod], Scutum 157-158 (cf. F. Solmsen, Hermes, xciii [1965], pp. 1-6).
d
Demosthenes, Oratio xxi, 72. The passage is quoted and analysed by “Longinus” (De Sublimitate
xx-xxi) for the combination of several figures, asyndeton included; cf. also Tiberius Rhteor, Peri\
sxhma/twn 40 (Rhetores Graeci iii, p. 78, 1-4 [Spengel]).

And again:— And again:

“Not so with Midias; but from the very day, he “Not Meidias, however; but from this day forth
talks, he abuses, he shouts. Is there an election of he talks, reviles, shouts. Is someone to be elec-
magistrates? ted?

Midias the Anagyrrasian is nominated. He is the Meidias of [1011] Anagyrus is a candidate. He

advocate of Plutarchus; he knows state secrets; represents the interests [119-120] of Plutarch,a
the city cannot contain him.” (“Demosthenes knows the secrets of state, is too big for the city.”b
against Midias,” p. 537, 25, and p. 578, 29.)

74
 Therefore the figure asyndeton, whereby This is just the reason why the figure of asyn-
conjunctions are omitted, is highly commended deton is very highly esteemed by the writers of
by writers of rhetoric. rhetorical manuals,

But such as keep overstrict to the law, and and those who abide too strictly by the rules and
(according to custom) omit not a conjunction, leave out no conjunction of the ordinary language
rhetoricians blame for using a dull, flat, tedious they censure for making their style dull and une-
style, without any variety in it. motional and wearisome from lack of variety.c

And inasmuch as logicians mightily want con- That the dialecticians have special need of conj-
junctions for the joining together their axioms, unctions for the connexions and combinations of
propositions,d

as much as charioteers want yokes, and Ulysses as charioteers have of yokes and as Odysseus <in
wanted withs to tie Cyclop’s sheep; this shows the cave> of Cyclops had of withes for binding
they are not parts of speech, but a conjunctive the sheep togethere <...>, this shows not that the
instrument thereof, as the word conjunction conjunction is a part of speech f but that it is a
imports. kind of instrument for [B] conjoining, just as its
name indicates,
a
Plutarch, the tyrant of Eretria (Cf. Plutarch, Phocion xii-xiii 747 [A-E] ; Demosthenes, Oratorio v,
5 [with scholion ad loc.] and xxi, 110).
b
Demosthenes, Oratorio xxi, 200. Part of this passage is quoted for ayndeton by [Aristides], Libri
Rhetorici i, 28 (pp. 13, 23-14, 1 [W. Schmid]).
c
Cf. Demetrius, De Elocutione 193-194 and 268-269; “Longinus,” De Sublimitate xxi; Tiberius
Rhetor, Peri\ sxhma/twn 40 (Rhetores Graeci iii, p. 78, 11-15 [Spengel]); [Cicero], Ad Herennium
iv, 41. For ai( te/xnai = “rhetorical manuals” cf. Isocrates, Adv. Sophistas 19 (ta\j kaloume/nas
te//xnaj) with the scholion ad loc.
d
The dialecticians are the Stoics (see note d on page 107 supra). The propositions in question are
the conditional (sunhme/non), the conjunctive (sumplegme/non), and the disjunctive (diezeugme/non);
and the su/ndesmoi required for these are respectively o(sunaptiko/j (ei)), o( sumplektiko/j (kai/),
and o( diazeuktiko/j (h)/toi or h)/): cf. Diogenes Laertius, vii, 71-72 (S.V.F. ii, frag 207); Galen,
Institutio Logica iii, 3-4 and iv, 4-6 (pp. 8, 13-9, 8 and pp. 10, 13-11, 12 [Kalbfleisch] = S.V.F. ii,
frags. 208 and 217); and Plutarch, De E 386 F—387 A, De Sollertia Animalium 969 A-B, and De
An. Proc. in Timaeo 1026 B-C.
e
Cf. Odyssey ix, 427 and Euripides, Cyclops 225.
f
As the Stoics held it to be: cf. Diogenes Laertius vii, 57-58 (S.V.F. ii, frag. 147 and iii, p. 214, 1-2);
S.V.F. ii, frag. 148; Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, p. 356, 13-15 and p. 517, 33-
34 with p. 519, 26-32 [Hilgard]. Posidonius wrote against those who said that conjunctions ou)
dhlou=si me/n ti au)to/ de\ mo/non th\n fra/sin sunde/smoi (Apollonius Dyscolus, De Conjunctionibus,
p. 214, 4-8 [Schneider]).

Nor do conjunctions join all, but only such as are that [121-122] is for holding together not all
not spoken simply; statements but those that are non-simple,a

unless you will make a cord part of the burthen,
glue a part of a book, or distribution of money
part of the government. For Demades says, that
money which is given to the people out of the
exchequer for public shows is the glue of a
democracy.
—unless one also maintains that the strap is part
of the load and the glue part of a book b and the
dole, by heaven, part of the government, as
Demades said when he called the festival-grants
the glue of the democracy.c

75
 Now what conjunction does so of several What kind of conjunction, moreover, by com-
propositions make one, by fitting and joining bining and connectingd makes of many a propo-
them together, as marble joins iron that is incited sition so thoroughly one as the marble makes the
with it in the fire? iron that is smelted with it in the fire?

Yet the marble neither is nor is said to be part of
the iron; although in this case the substances
compose the mixture and are melted together, so
as to make a common substance from several and
to be mutually affected.
The marble, however, is not and is not said to be
a part of the iron; and yet things of this kind make
something common out of a multiplicitye by
permeating the objects that are being blended and
by being fused [C] with them.f

a
That is even for the Stoics the conjunction holds together only a molecular proposition, this
consisting of two or more atomic (simple) propositions, each of which itself consists of a subject and
a predicate not connected by any conjunction: cf. Sextus, Adv. Math. viii, 93-95 and 108-109 (S.V.F.
ii, p. 66, 28-37 and pp. 70, 36-72, 2) with Mates, Stoic Logic, pp. 95-96; and Diogenes Laertius, vii,
68-69 and 71-72 (S.V.F. ii, frags. 203-207).
b
Cf. Apuleius, Peri\ e(rmhnei/aj iv (p. 178, 7-11 [Thomas]); Ammonius, De Interpretatione, pp. 12,
25-13, 6 and p. 67, 15-19 and p. 73, 19-22; Simplicius, Categ., p. 64, 23-25; Scholia in Dionysii
Thracis Artem Grammaticam, p. 515, 19-29 (Hilgard).
c
Demades, frag. 13 (Baiter-Sauppe, Oratores Attici ii, p. 315 B 38-42) = xxxvi (De Falco, Demade
Oratore2, p. 31).
d
See note d on 1011 A supra.
e
Cf. 1010 A supra: e(/n ti peirw/menoi koino\n e)c au)tw=n poiei=n.
f
The marble is not fused with the iron, as Plutarch apparently believed it is, but supplies the limestone
which unites with the non-ferrous minerals of the ore (the “gangue”) and with the ash of the fuel to
form the “cinder” or “slag.” It may be such a flux to which reference is made by [Aristotle], De
Mirabilibus Auscultationibus 833 b 24-28 and by Theophrastus, De Lapidibus 9 (cf. Hans Blümner,
Technologie und Terminologie der Gewerbe und Künste bei Griechen und Römern iv [Leipzig,
1887], pp. 219-220; A. W. Persson, Eisen und Eisenbereitung in Altester Zeit [Lund, 1934], pp. 15-
17; E. R. Caley and J. F. C. Richards, Theophrastus on Stones [Columbus, 1956], p. 77); but in no
ancient text, so far as I know, is an explanation of the process offered, although the purpose of the
flux used in refining gold is mentioned (cf. Agatharchides in Photius, Bibliotheca, cod. 250, p. 448,
19-30 [Bekker]); Pliny, N.H. xxxiii, 60; H. Blümner, op.cit, pp. 131-135). It is to a different stage in
the working of the iron that Plutarch refers in Quaest. Conviv. 660 C and De Primo Frigido 954 A-
B; cf. also H. D. P. Lee on Aristotle, Meteorologica 383 a 32-b 7 (L.C.L., pp. 324-329). [N.B. As I
explain below, Cherniss’ translation gives rise to a manifest contradiction in Plutarch’s argument,
whereas Goodwin’s translation makes perfect sense. (B.A.M.)]

But there be some who think that conjunctions do
not make anything one, but that this kind of
speech is merely an enumeration, as when magi-
strates or days are reckoned in order.
As to conjunctions, however, there are people
who believe [123-124] that they do not make
anything one but that language is an enumeration
like that of annual magistrates <or> of days listed
one after another.a

Moreover, as to the other parts of speech, a
pronoun is manifestly a sort of noun; not only
because it has cases, but because some pronouns,
when they are used of objects already defined, by
their mere utterance give the most distinct desig-
nation of them. Nor do I know whether he that
says SOCRATES or he that says THIS ONE does
more by name declare the person.
5. Now, of the rest the pronoun is patently a kind
of noun, not only as it shares the cases of the
noun but also by reason of the fact that some
pronouns,b being expressions of definite refer-
ence, make an indication fully decisive as soon
as they are spoken; and I do not know that a
speaker uttering “Socrates” has by calling a name

76
 more clearly indicated a person than has one
saying “this man.”c

The thing we call a participle, being a mixture of 6. And as for what is called the participle, since
a verb and noun is nothing of itself, as are not the it is a mixture of verb and noun,d it does not exist
common names of male and female qualities (i.e, of itself,e to be sure, as the nouns of common
adjectives), but in construction it is put with feminine and masculine gender [D] do not eitherf
others, in regard of tenses belonging to verbs, in ; but it is ranked with those parts of speech, since
regard of cases to nouns. through its tenses it borders on the verbs and
through its cases on the nouns.
a
Cf. the sceptical argument that a statement or proposition cannot exist, because the expressions,
which must be its constituent parts, do not coexist but are at most successive (Sextus, Adv. Math. i,
132-138 with Pyrrh. Hyp. ii, 108 and Adv. Math. viii, 81-84, 132, and 136).
b
i.e. demonstratives (cf. Apollonius Dyscolus, De Pronomine, pp. 9, 17-10, 7 and p. 10, 18-26
[Schneider]; Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, pp. 77, 25-78, 6 with p. 86, 7-13 and
p. 86, 7-13 and p. 260, 21-24 [Hilgard]).
c
Cf. Sextus, Adv. Math. viii, 96-97 (S.V.F. ii, frag. 205 [pp. 66, 38-67, 9]): according to the Stoics
Swkra/thj ka/qhtai is intermediate between the indefinite ti\j ka/qhtai and the definite ou(=toj
ka/qhtai.
d
Cf. Dionysius Thrax, Ars Grammatica § 15 (p. 60, 2-4 [Uhlig]); Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem
Grammaticam, pp. 255, 25-256, 7 Hilgard); Ammonius, De Interpretatione, p. 15, 2-4.
e
Cf. Priscian, Inst. Grammatica xi, 2, (i, p. 549, 3-6 [Hertz]: “ideo autem participium separatim non
tradebant [scil. Stoici] partem orationis. . .”) and ii, 16 (i, p. 54, 9-10 [Hertz]); Scholia in Dionysii
Thracis Artem Grammaticam, p. 518, 17-22 (Hilgard).
f
Cf. Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, pp. 218, 18-219, 15 and especially pp. 525,
32-526, 11 (Hilgard); R. Schneider, Apollonii Dyscoli Quae Supersunt i, 2 (Commentarium . . . in
Apollonii Scripta Minora), pp. 24-25.

Logicians call them a)ntana/klastouj, (i.e., Terms of this kind, moreover, are [125-126]
REFLECTED),—as fronw=n comes from called reciprocals by the dialecticiansa on the
fronimou, <and> sw/frronw=n <comes> from ground that they have the force of nouns, that is
swfrono/j,—having the force both of nouns and of appellatives,b as for example the reflecting
appellatives. instead of reflective and the abstaining instead of
abstinent man.c
a
Cf. Priscian, Inst. Grammatica xi, 1 (i, pp. 548, 14-549, 1 [Hertz]): “sic igitur supra dicti philosophi
[scil. Stoici] etiam participiam aiebant appellationem esse reciprocam, id est a)ntana/klaston
proshgori/an, hoc modo: legens est lector et lector legens, cursor est currens et currens cursor,
amator est amans et amans amator, vel nomen verbale vel modum verbi casualem.”
b
The correction, kai\ proshgori/an, is required because the Stoics had restricted o)/noma to proper
nouns and had made a separate part of speech called proshgori/a to cover common nouns and noun
adjectives (Diogenes Laertius, vii, 57-58 [S.V.F. ii, frag. 147 and iii, p. 213, 27-31]), which the
grammarians, however, continued to call o)no/mata or treated as a sub-class of o)n/ oma (Dionysius
Thrax, Ars Grammatica, p. 23, 2-3 and pp. 33, 6-34, 2 [Uhlig] with Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem
Grammaticam, pp. 214, 17-215, 3 and p. 356, 7-23 and pp. 517, 33-518, 16 [Hilgard]).
c
The Stoics, for whom the sage alone is fro/nimoj and sw/frwn and alone fronei= and swfronei=,
could hold that o( fronw=n must always be o( fro/nimoj and o( swfronw=n o( sw/fwv and even that o(
fro/nimoj is always o( fronw=n, since the sage’s exercise of virtue is continual and unremitting (S.V.F.
i, frags. 216 [p. 52, 25-33] and 569; iii, p. 149, 16-18). Nevertheless, they did distinguish between o(
fro/nimoj and o( fronw=n (S.V.F. iii, p. 64, 3-5; cf. iii, frag. 244); and the same distinction between the

77
appellative and the participle is implied in Chrysippus in S.V.F. iii, frag. 243 (De Stoic. Repug. 1046
F—1047 A infra).

And prepositions are like to the crests of a 7. The prepositions, for their part, can be likened
helmet, or footstools and pedestals, which (one to capitals and pedestals and bases as being not
may rather say) do belong to words than are speech but rather appurtenances of speech.
words themselves.

See whether they rather be not pieces and scraps Consider to that they resemble bits and pieces of
of words, as they that are in haste write but wordsd like the fragmentary letters and dashes
dashes and points for letters. used by those who write in haste.

For it is plain that “e)mbh=nai” and “e)kbh=nai” For “incoming” and “outgoing” are plainly
are abbreviations of the whole words “e)nto\j contractions of [E] “coming within” and “going
bh=nai” and “e)kto\j bh=nai”. without,”

As undoubtedly for haste and brevity’s sake, “foregoing” of “going before,” and “under-
instead of “progene/sqai” and “pro/teron setting” of “setting underneath,” just as it is, of
gene/sqai” men first said “kaqi/zein” and “ka/tw course, by quickening and abridging the expres-
i(/zein”.
sion that for “pelting with [127-128] stones” and
“breaking into houses” men say “stoning” and
“housebreaking.”
d
o)no/mata here must have been meant in this general sense, since Plutarch proceeds to represent the
prepositions in composition as fragments of adverbs and not of what he calls nouns. Varro also
appears to have taken the prepositions, which he called “praeverbia,” to be adverbs (frag. 267, 4-7
[Funaioli, Grammaticae Romanae Fragementa i. p. 286]).

Therefore every one of these is of some use in 8. Consequently, while each of these renders
speech; but nothing is a part or element of speech some service to speech, none is a part of speech,
(as has been said) except a noun and a verb, that is a constituent element of it,a except, as has
been said,b the verb and the noun,

which make the first juncture allowing of truth or for these produce the first combination admitting
falsehood, of truth and falsity,

which some call a proposition or protasis, others that combination which has been styled pronoun-
an axiom, and which Plato called speech. cement by some and proposition by others but by
Plato speech.*
a
Cf. Ammonius, De Interpretatione, p. 12, 27-30 and for the stoixei=on added by Plutarch in
explanation of me/roj ibid., p. 64, 26-27 and S.V.F. ii, frag. 148 (p. 45, 9-11) with Scholia in Dionysii
Thracis Artem Grammaticam, p. 356, 1-4 and pp. 514, 35-515, 12 (Hilgard).
b
See 1009 C supra. Of the six “parts of speech” besides the noun and verb which had there been
listed as present in Iliad i, 185 Plutarch has accounted for all except the adverb (e)pi/rrhma).
With his neglect of this cf. what is said of the Stoics, ta\ e)pirrh/mata ou)/te lo/gou ou)/te a)rqmou=
h)ci/wsan, parafua/di kai\ e)pifulli/di au)ta\ pareika/santej (Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem
Grammaticam, p. 356, 15-16 and p. 520, 16-18 [Hilgard]), for whose treatment of the adverb cf. M.
Pohlenz, Kleine Schriften i (Hildesheim, 1958), p. 55.

* Or protos logos, “first (or ‘primary’) speech” according to the ancients, as Plutarch stated at the
outset (cf. sec. 1), but which Aristotle in the Peri Hermeneias called apophantikos logos, or simply
apophansis, ‘statement’ or ‘enunciation’ (Lat. enunciatio). (B.A.M.)

78
1. Note on the comparison of the work of the conjunction with the role of marble (or rather,
limestone) in the smelting of iron.

As I have noted above, as it is quite clear that Plutarch is denying that the ‘marble’
is fused with the iron, Cherniss’ translation leads to a manifest contradiction. An acceptable
meaning can be arrived at simply by inserting a ‘not’ in the appropriate place so that the text
reads: the marble is NOT fused with the iron: rather, it achieves its purpose of making the
iron more one by causing the impurities mixed with it to be separated out of it; the surplus
running off it being known as ‘slag’, as he himself saw, and as the following accounts make
clear:

(a) Iron and Steel Industry (from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 19th ed.):

PRODUCTION PROCESS > How Iron Is Made > Flux and slag.

The limestone in the furnace fluxes, or purifies, the iron. It helps some of the impurities in ore
and coke to fuse, or melt. The limestone then combines with some of the melted impurities to
form slag. The flux begins to melt below the halfway point in the furnace. Since the slag is
lighter than iron, it floats on top of the melted iron, which is from four to five feet (1.2 to 1.5
meters) …

(b) flux (from an Internet article):

flux: a substance that helps fuse together or separate metals; in an iron furnace limestone is
used as flux to separate pure iron from impurities in iron.

(c) What is Slag?1

Slag is a product of the steel making process. Once scorned as a useless byproduct, it is now
accepted and, often, preferred and specified as it is known to be a valuable material with many
and varied uses.

Blast Furnace Slag is formed when iron ore or iron pellets, coke and a flux (either limestone
or dolomite) are melted together in a blast furnace. When the metallurgical smelting process
is complete, the lime in the flux has been chemically combined with the aluminates and
silicates of the ore and coke ash to form a non-metallic product called blast furnace slag.
During the period of cooling and hardening from its molten state, BF slag can be cooled in
several ways to form any of several types of BF slag products.

Steel Furnace Slag is produced in a (BOF) Basic Oxygen Furnace or an (EAF) Electric Arc
Furnace. Hot iron (BOF) and/or scrap metal (EAF) are the primary metals to make steel in
each process. Lime is injected to act a fluxing agent. The lime combines with the silicates,
aluminum oxides, magnesium oxides, manganese oxides and ferrites to form steel furnace
slag, commonly called steel slag. Slag is poured from the furnace in a molten state. After
cooling from its molten state, steel slag is processed to remove all free metallics and sized into
products.

In sum: iron ore before smelting is impure insofar as foreign bodies are mixed with it; after
the process, however, it is (relatively) pure, and therefore more one. The employment of a

1
(http://www.nationalslagassoc.org/Slag_Information.html [2/21/06])

79
flux, such as limestone, causes the pure parts of the ore to fuse, in the process separating off
any impurities (the ‘gangue’), which subsequently ‘bond’ with the flux, resulting in the
‘slag’. The whole force of Plutarch’s comparison, then, comes down to this: supposing his
reader to be familiar with the foregoing process (!), he argues that, just as no one would
suppose the marble—or, more precisely, the limestone in it—to be part of the smelted ore
which it causes to become one, much less would one suppose the conjunction to be part of
the things conjoined by it.

N.B. I give next the principal witnesses to what is manifestly an additional passage pre-
served from Aristotle on the connective parts of speech.

80
III. ON THE SIGNIFICATIVE AND CONSIGNIFICATIVE PARTS OF SPEECH.

1. The analogy between the elements and the words of language.

Apollonius Dyscolus, On Syntax i. 12 (In: The Priscian, Inst. gramm., xvi. 10-11
Syntax or Peri Suntaxeōs (De Constructione) of (pp. 114-115) (ed. Hertz, tr. B.A.M.).
Apollonius Dyscolus, translated, and
with commentary by Fred W.
Householder, pp. 22-23).

12. (III) (h) Furthermore, just as (1) some
phonemes are vowels, which are [9] complete
sounds even in isolation, and others consonants,
whose pronunciation is not possible without
vowels, so also (2) one can consider words of two
kinds. Some words are, like vowels, inde-
pendently speakable, e.g. verbs, nouns, pro-
nouns, adverbs, when they can be applied to
actions in the situational context, as when we
shout kallista (“very well”—i.e. “bravo”) at per-
formers who are doing something just right, or
hupiōs (“soundly”) or kalos (“well”).1
Further, just as among the elements, some are
vowels, which complete a vocal sound by them-
selves, but others consonants, which are unable
to complete a vocal sound without vowels, so
also in words we advert to the fact that certain
ones, like vowels, can be spoken by themselves,
as is especially the case with imperative verbs
and nouns or pronouns often with vocatives or
adverbs, which are applied to antecedent actions
or speeches, as when we cry “Good! Right! Well
said!” to those who do or say something at the
right moment.

Other words resemble consonants, and just as
they require vowels, so these require the pre-
sence of some of the aforesaid parts of speech;
this is the case with prepositions, articles and
conjunctions.
But there are other words which, like conson-
ants, cannot be uttered to complete the sense
without the help of the other parts of speech
(which imitate vowels in this), like prepositions
or conjunctions.

These words always co-signify; For they always consignify—that is, they signi-
fy when conjoined to the others—but by them-
selves they do not.

for instance, we say di’Apollōniou (“by Apol-
[22-23] lonios”)2 with the genitive, implying that
Apollonios was aware, but di’Apollōnion
(“because of Apollonios”) with the accusative,
implying that he was to blame.
And so their signification varies with the force of
the things conjoined by them, as in signifies one
thing when joined to the accusative, and some-
thing else when [joined] to the ablative, as in
urbem and in urbe, and ad locum and in loco.

1
Cf. Plato. Sophist (253 a) (tr. B. Jowett):

STRANGER: This communion of some with some may be illustrated by the case of letters; for some
letters do not fit each other, while others do. THEAETETUS: Of course. STRANGER: And the vowels,
especially, are a sort of bond which pervades all the other letters, so that without a vowel one consonant
cannot be joined to another. THEAETETUS: True. STRANGER: But does every one know what letters
will unite with what? Or is art required in order to do so? THEAETETUS: Art is re-quired.
STRANGER: What art? THEAETETUS: The art of grammar. (emphasis added)
2
On the occurrence of the name ‘Apollonios’ here, cf. C.H.M. Versteegh, Greek Elements in Arabic Lingu-
istic Thinking (Leiden: Brill, 1977), pp. 39-40: “It is a well-known fact that the analysis of paradigms is very
important for the history of Greek and Latin linguistics, not only because in giving examples grammarians
tended to use their own names or those of their teachers, but also because the recurrent use of the same ex-
amples often helps to establish links between different groups of grammarians”. And note that Versteegh goes
on to cite Apollonius’ use of his teacher’s name, ‘Tryphon’.

81
 Conjunctions, too, may vary in force according But copulative and disjunctive conjunctions are
to their position in the sentence or the context, recognizably different from the other parts of
since ētoi is understood conjunctively, (sum- speech, which are made one by them,
plektikos)2 in Iliad 1.68:

1.11 ētoi ho g’hōs eipōn kat’ar’hezeto as ‘vel, aut’ [‘or, or’] are not only disjunctive, but
(“He said this and sat down.”) also are found copulative, such as Terence in the
Eunuch:

Here ētoi is taken as equivalent to men, as is vel rex sempter maximas

shown by the immediately following context, Mihi | [gratias] agebat quiquid feceram;
where de appears: aliis non item,

toisi d’anestē for “and the king”.1

(“Then Kalchas stood up.”)

Elsewhere ētoi is disjunctive (diazeuktikos):

1.12 ētoi neos estin ē palaios

(“He is either young or old.”)

The case is similar for articles; when conjoined

with nouns they have their normal [10] force, but
when they have no noun with them, they become
a sort of pronoun, as will be explained in detail
later [ch. 28], where we will also show the
reason, since other parts of speech, too, may
behave the same—e.g. very often nouns may be
heard used adverbially.

1
Praeterea, quemadmodum elementorum alia sunt vocalia, quae per se voce perficiunt, alia consonantia, quae
sine vocalibus perficere vo- [10] cem nequent, sic etiam in dictionibus animadvertimus quasdam ad
similitudinem vocalium per se esse dicendas, ut in verbis maxime imperativis vel nominibus vel pronominibus
saepe vocativis vel adverbiis, quae adiciuntur antecedentibus actionibus vel orationibus, cum clamamus ‘bene,
recte, diserte’ ad illos, quo oportune aliquid agunt vel dicunt. aliae vero dictio- [15] nes sunt, quae ad
similitudinem consonantium sine adiumento aliarum partium orationis, quae imitantur in hoc vocales, proferri
ad perfectionem sensus non possunt, ut praepositiones vel coniunctiones. eae etenim semper consignificant, id
est coniunctae aliis significant, per se autem non.
coniunctiones quoque copulativae et disiunctivae esse dinoscuntur ab aliis partibus orationis, quae eis
sociantur, ut ‘vel, aut’ non solum disiunctivae, sed etiam copulativae reperiuntur, ut Terentius in eunucho:
[114-115]

vel rex sempter maximas

Mihi | [gratias] agebat quiquid feceram;
aliis non item,

pro ‘et rex’.

Note that Apollonius’ Greek, to which Priscian is manifestly indebted, is not accessible to me. But for the Latin
grammarian’s relation to his Greek predecessor, cf. Inst. gramm. 12.13 [= G.L. 2.584.20, 14.1 [= G.L. 3.24.7]:
maxime Apollonii, cuius auctoritatem in omnibus sequendem putavi.

82
2. Apollonius and Priscian on the consignificative parts of speech.

Notice that what is being distinguished here are words which when spoken signify
something by themselves, and those which do not, as opposed to the more familiar distinc-
tion between words which signify by themselves without further qualification and those
which do not; examples of the former being particular kinds of adverbs, whereas examples
of the latter are the name and the verb. As both Apollonius and Priscian make clear, the
completion of the meaning of such expressions as ‘Right!’ or ‘Well done!’ (as occurring in
their respective languages) depends on their context: utterances like this are understood in
reference to something previously stated (and so are elliptical); whereas the name and the
verb are said to signify by themselves because, as one may gather from Aristotle on the verb,
“the one who speaks establishes the understanding [sc. of the hearer] and he who hears [sc.
what is said] rests [sc. in what is said]”. (De Int. I. 3 16b 19-20, tr. B.A.M.); hence they
determine the first operation of the intellect with respect to some nature, and so bring the
understanding to rest (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 5, n. 17). Further, both
authors go on to illustrate the nature of consignification as it belongs to the dependently-
speakable words, taking (prepositions and) conjunctions as the example. But there is this
difference between their respective accounts: whereas Priscian is in agreement with Apol-
lonius when he points out that “their signification varies with the force of the things con-
joined by them”—that is, according to differences in the words to which they are con-
joined—Apollonius alone adds that differences in the meaning of consignifying words arise
from “their position in the sentence and their context”. Also to be noted is that Priscian
supplies a full definition of what it means to ‘consignify’, whereas Apollonius supplies only
the name. This is surprising, as one would have expected a similar definition to occur in the
corresponding place in Apollonius, suggesting that it has been lost from the text.
With respect to the analogy as found in Priscian, compare the following from the 13th
century logician Nicholas of Paris, from his work Syncategoremata:

But, on the other hand, Priscian says in the Minor (XVIII [read XVII] 10, p. 114.9-20) that
some words behave like consonants and others like vowels. For just as vowels make an utter-
ance on their own, so some words signify on their own; and just as consonants do not make
an utterance on their own, so some words do not signify on their own – e.g., conjunctions, pre-
positions, and adverbs.
Again, nothing that takes on signification from things adjoined to it signifies anything on
its own, but syncategorematic words are of that sort; therefore, etc. (132)1

In explaining what is meant by syncategorematic words, the medieval scholastic

argues according to the following proportion: As the vowel is to the consonant, so is the
categorematic word to the syncategorematic; for in the case of vocal sounds, the vowel
“makes an utterance” or sound on its own; while the latter does so only when joined with
the former; whereas in the case of words, the categorematic signifies by itself, while the
latter does so only when conjoined to the former. Now in the text just cited, Nicholas draws
upon an account given by the 5th century grammarian Priscian of Caesarea; but Priscian, in
turn, is employing a distinction between the sounding of vowels and consonants that is first
met with—indeed, which beyond all doubt comes from—Aristotle’s Poetics, ch. 20, at the
beginning (for which text, see my paper to which this is a supplement). Now as the former

1
Nicholas of Paris, Syncategoremata (Selections). (In: The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philo-
sophical Texts: Volume 1, Logic and the Philosophy of Language. Edited by Norman Kretzmann, Eleonore
Stump, p. 180).

83
part of the proportion comes from Aristotle, it seems more likely than not that the latter part
derives from the Philosopher as well. Whatever the case may be, the doctrine may be
summed up as follows: Some words signify by themselves and some do not. Those words
which do not signify by themselves are nevertheless said to con-signify—that is, they signify
when conjoined to the words which do signify by themselves, as is the case with prepositions
and conjunctions.

84
3. The doctrine concerning significative and consignificative words.

Taking into consideration several of our other sources cited above, the doctrinal
content of the foregoing witnesses may be summed up as follows: In resemblance to vowels,
which complete a sound by themselves, there are certain words which signify by themselves;
but, like consonants, which cannot complete such a sound, there are some that do not. But
those words which do not signify by themselves are nevertheless said to con-signify—that
is, they signify when conjoined to the words which do signify by themselves, as is the case
with conjunctions and prepositions. Further, according to Averroes, the text of the Poetics
upon which he was commenting included remarks about the consignification of the
connective parts of speech being, so to speak, bonds of the others, leading him to explain
that, “…by our remark “vocal sound not significative separately” here, we mean...vocal
sounds which, when conjoined to the others, consignify as syncategorematic words, not...
vocal sounds like the [syllables and] letters [composing names] (cf. text rev. & tr. B.A.M.);”
it being the case, as Boethius explains, that “…syllables and conjunctions are parts of
language, of which the syllables as syllables signify nothing at all. But conjunctions in fact
can consignify, but signify nothing by themselves;”1 so that, as a consequence, “among the
parts of [language] there are certain ones which signify nothing by themselves, yet do convey
a meaning when joined to the others, as do conjunctions or prepositions,” but that “these
things we do not call ‘interpretations’”; rather, with Priscian and Averroes, we call them
‘syncategorematic” or “consignificative” words. One may therefore conclude with a high
degree of probability that such doctrines (among which must be included the complexus of
witness comparing conjuctions to bonds and joining and nails and the like) once belonged
to a version of the Poetics more complete than that which has reached us via the manuscript
tradition.

4. On the distinction between significative and consignificative words.

In addition to the witnesses already cited, it will be helpful here to consider the fol-
lowing, early 13th century, account of the foregoing distinction:2

Of words, some are significative, others consignificative. A significative word is one which in
itself and without the addition of another signifying word signifies something, as this word
‘man’. A consignificative one is one which not through itself, but together with another
adjoined signifying word, signifies something, such as prepositions and conjunctions, and
similarly the verb ‘is’ according as it only implies composition: for as such it is infinite
[infinitum, i.e. ‘indefinite’] and it has to be made finite [finiri] through those things which it
composes. It should be understood, however, that the foregoing division of words is the same
as this one: of words, some are categorematic, others syncategorematic. Categorematic is the
same as signifying, and syncategorematic is the same as consignifying. And it is called syncate-
gorematic from ‘syn’, which is, together with, and ‘categorematic’, which is signifying; hence
‘syncategorematic’ as if significative-with [consignificativa].3

1
Cf. Boethius, In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Sex Editio Secunda, Seu Majora Commentaria
(ed. Migne, PL 64, tr. B.A.M.).
2
On Significant Words: A Selection from The Monacensis Dialectic. A translation of the first third of section
VI of Dialectica Monacensis (Draft by Calvin Normore, and Terry Parsons with suggestions by Steve Barney;
slightly rev. B.A.M.) (Lat. ed. de Rijk, added by B.A.M.). The work is dated ca. 1200.
3
Dictionum alia significativa, alia consignificativa. Dictio signi- [f. 115vb] ficativa est que per se et sine
adiunctione alterius dictione significantis aliquid significat, ut hec dictio ‘homo’. Consignificativa est illa que
non [5] per se sed cum alia dictione significante adiuncta aliquid significat, ut sunt prepositiones et

85
Note here that, while the foregoing account is quite informative for our purposes, it must be
recognized that, contrary to what the author of this work claims, it is not true that the
‘consignificative’ is the same as the ‘syncategorematic’, since, as we have seen, the verb
consignifies “time”, but is also categorematic in a sense.1 Nor does the word ‘categorematic’
mean ‘signifying’, but rather ‘signifying something by itself’, as may be inferred from the
following remarks of Simplicius:

Insofar as an expression is significant, however, it is defined in accordance with the genera of

beings. An expression (lexis) is called a ‘category’ as applied (agoureuomenê) to a reality,149
whereas the reality (pragma) is called a predicate (katêgourêma {better translated as
catagoreme (B.A.M.)}).[2]

Now, a category is either a reality taken together with the expression which signifies it, or the
[5] signifying expression, in so far as it is significant; in either case, the category has something
to do with realities (pragmata) as well.
149
cf. Porph. In Cat. 56,8-9. The entire following passage on the constitution of the table of
categories (Simplicius 11,2-22), absent from Porphyry’s smaller commentary but paralleled
in Boethius (In Cat. col. 160b12-161a12), probably derives from Porphyry’s lost commentary
ad Gedalium; cf. Stan Ebbesen 1987, 303. kata + agoureuô is obviously an attempt at an
etymological explanation of the verb katêgoreuein, ‘to predicate’.3

Now in this passage distinctions are drawn between katêgoria,4 katêgourêma, and pragma:
the first being the name of one of the (ten) highest genera of beings; the second, of a mem-
ber of a katêgoria used as a predicate’, and the third the thing signified by such a name. To
take an instance, substance is a category, man is a member of it, and hence a thing, and let
Socrates be something of which man may be predicated. Now when one says “Socrates is a
man, and hence a substance”, the word ‘man’, being predicated of Socrates, is clearly a
‘catagoreme’, understood as a member of a category used as a predicate.

coniunctiones et similiter hoc verbum ‘est’ secundum quod solam compositionem importat: sic enim infinitum
est et finiri habet per ea que componit. Sciendum tamen quod predicta diviso dictionis eadem est cum [10]
hac: dictionum alia categoreumatica, alia sincategoreumatica. Categoreumatica idem est quod significans;
syncategoreumatica idem esst quod consignificans. Et dicitur sincategoreumatica a ‘sin’, quod est con, et
‘categoreumatica’, quod est significans; inde sincategoreumatica quasi consignificativa.
1
What our author should have noted is that ‘consignificative’ is said in more than one way, inasmuch as there
is a meaning of that term belonging to categorematic words as well, as we have seen in the case of the verb.
Still, it is the case nowadays that logicians speak solely of the name as being categorematic, since it is subjected
in predications, as we shall go on to explain below.
2
One would have expected this last statement to be continued along the following lines: “...whereas the reality
(pragma) is called a predicate” because it is ‘said of’ something else as subject. That is to say, something is
called a kategoria or ‘said-of’ (= predicatum) because it is ‘said of’ another thing.
3
Simplicius of Cilicia, Comm. in Arist. Cat. 11, 2-6 (= Michael Chase [trans.], Simplicius. On Aristotle’s
Categories 1-4. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, p. 26).
4
It is convenient to note here that, with respect to its original imposition, katêgoria meant “accusation,” being
something ‘said of’ another, as in a court of law, as Greek commentators such as Porphyry explain. Cf. Duane
H. Berquist, Prologue to the Categories, n. 4:
“Now if you look up the word kathgoria in a Greek dictionary, you'll find that the first meaning of kathgoria
is that of accusation in the courtroom. It is the opposite of what is called apologia, like the apologia in the
Apology of Socrates, where he’s giving his defense in the courtroom. ‘Category’ is not from defense, but from
accusation…. You can see why it would be named from accusation rather than defense: if I am bringing charges
against you in court, I’m going to accuse you of robbing the bank, or murdering somebody, or whatever. I’m going
to say something about you…. So that is a starting point: ‘said of’”.

86
 Now in accordance with Simplicius’ observations, one may presume that the word
katêgourêma was first given to a vocal sound which is predicated of some subject, and so
would have been applied solely to the verb, and thence to any word which serves as a
‘predicate’, such as ‘pale’ or ‘just’. But as used by Simplicius, the word is said of every
category, and so has been extended to the ‘name’ or noun in general. But this extension
would have occurred only insofar as the name or noun has some fundamental agreement
with the verb. What is that agreement? As is clear from Boethius’ definition of interpre-
tatio, both noun and verb agree in being an articulate vocal sound signifying something by
itself. One may therefore suppose that in this way the word acquired the general meaning of
catagoreme.1

Hence, a ‘categorematic’ word is one which has the character of signifying some-
thing by itself, and so is understood indifferently of the noun or the verb, for which reason
it is used without regard to whether it is subjected or predicated in a statement-making
speech, and so would not be accurately translated as ‘predicate’ in this sense, 2 for which
reason I use ‘categoreme’.3

1
On this last point, compare the following dictionary definitions:

(a) James Mark Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology:

Categorematic (Words, &c.) [Gr. ]: Ger. kategorematisch; Fr. catégorématique; Ital.
categorematico. Such words as may by themselves form the expression of one term, subject or predi-
cate, of a proposition. All others, e.g. prepositions, conjunctions, adverbs, are called Syncategorematic.
The term  appears occasionally in Aristotle as equivalent to predicate. This meaning was
definitely assigned to it by the Stoics, who, distinguishing noun and verb as the essential parts of a pro-
position, gave a foundation for the grammatical distinction of categorematic from syncategorematic.
That distinction was taken over from the Latin grammarians (e.g. Priscian), and begins to appear in
logic in the tract de Generibus et Speciebus, often assigned to Abelard. Literature: PRANTL, Gesch. d.
Logik, ii. 148, 191, 256, 266. (R.A.)

(b) Catagoreme (from The Free Dictionary): 1 a categorematic expression; a term capable of standing
alone as the subject or predicate of a logical proposition; “names are called categoremes”.
2
And cf. Boethius’ Commentary (ed. Prim.), quoted above: “But since verbs and names are interpretations, so
also every speech joined from things signifying predicaments by themselves is named ‘interpretation’”.
3
Still, as noted above, in contemporary usage categoreme is typically restricted to the subject of a statement.

87
5. Supplement: A comparable distinction in the perspective of a contemporary gram-marian.

Cf. Classification of Signs/Morphology: Day One by Edward Vajda:1

Content words denote entities, actions, or qualities that can be experienced or imagined: sun,
red, man, day. Nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs of manner (-ly) are content words.

Function words are the linguistic glue that links parts of a phrase or sentence together. They
have little or no concrete meaning outside their grammatical function in the sentence. Function
words include articles, conjunctions, prepositions, verbal particles: the, a, if, and, or, to, be-
cause. The other function word categories are a bit more like content words: prepositions, pro-
nouns, and adverbs of place and time: here, there, then, now, above/below, after, vs. besides,
to.

Function words can more easily be defined by explaining how they are used in sentences;
content words can more easily be defined by reference to the world.

N.B. It would appear that the distinction between ‘content’ words and ‘function’ words is
common to contemporary linguistics, as is clear from our investigation of the meanings of
morpheme, root, stem, and the like.

1
(http://pandora.cii.wwu.edu/vajda/ling201/test1materials/morphology.htm [2/8/06])

88
6. Supplement: Syncategorematic terms as the concern of the logician.

Cf. Philotheus Boehner, Medieval Logic: An Outline of its Development from 1250 to c.
1400. Part II. Important Contributions of Scholastic Logic. Ch. I: The Syncategoramata as
Logical Constants, pp. 19-24 [N.B. I have moved the endnotes to the body of text.]:

We have already mentioned in our general survey that quite a number of tracts on the
syncategoremata were written in the Middle Ages. This fact, and their appearance as special
tracts or chapters in the scholastic compendia of logic, proves that the scholastics were not
unaware of their significance. In fact, we intend to show that a careful analysis of such terms
is a sure sign of a deeper consciousness of the formality of logic. The reason for this is that
the term “syncategorematic” refers to certain terms which are [19-20] necessary for logical
discourse and without which logic could not start.

Since we are in the dark as to the first independent treatment of these “logical” terms, we
shall, for convenience’ sake, take for a starting-point the Syncategoremata of William
Shyreswood.21 However, we know a little more about the origin of the term “syn-
categoremata”, for there is a strong tradition that the term goes back to the Stoics. Priscian
informs us that the Dialecticians accepted only two parts of a sentence, namely, the noun and
the verb, since, if they are joined, they constitute a complete sentence. They called the other
parts of a sentence the “syncategoremata”, that is, the co-signifying words.22 The Dialect-
icians, however, were not simply logicians, but Stoics as well, as Priscian himself suggests.1
The identification of the Stoics with the Dialecticians is certainly more in agreement with the
ancient usage of the term, at least so far as logic is concerned. 23 To all intents and purposes,
therefore, we here have a definite link existing between scholastic and Stoic logic in that they
make use of the same term in the same meaning.

The meaning of the term “syncategorema” in scholastic logic can be classified in two ways.
Both will serve our purpose equally well, for both reveal the characteristic function of a
syncategorema, and both are offered by scholastics. The one presupposes the theory of
supposition, while the other refers to the formal character of the science.24
21
As to tracts on the Syncategoremata and other earlier tracts prior to Peter of Spain, see M.
Grabmann, “Bearbeitungen und Auslegungen der Aristotelischen Logick der Zeit von Peter
Abaelard bis Petrus Hispanus”, in Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, n. 5, Berlin, 1937.
22
Cf. the quotation from Priscian in O’Donnell’s edition (op.cit., footnote 11 [= Reginald
O’Donnell, C.S.B., “The Syncategoremata of William of Sherwood”, in Mediaeval Studies,
vol. 3, 1941, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, pp. 46-93.]), p. 47. The editor is not
convinced, however, that the “Stoics are meant. There seems no reason to believe it does not
mean a dialectician as opposed to a grammarian even though Priscian goes on to speak of the
Stoics” (loc.cit.).
23
There is a highly commendable unpretentious little book written by M.I. Bochenski, O.P.,
Elementae Logicae Graecae, Romae, 1937, which in the index identifies the “Dialectici” with
the “Stoici”. [N.B. Bochenski to the contrary notwithstanding, dialetici here, as Gabriel

1
Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm., ii. 15. 5-7 (ed. Keil; tr. B.A.M.): Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum dialecticos
duae, nomen [5] et verbum, quia hae solae etiam per se coniunctae plenam faciunt orationem, alias autem
partes ‘syncategoremata’, hoc est consignificantia, appellabant. “Therefore the parts of speech according to
the Dialecticians are two, the noun [5] and the verb, since these two alone by themselves when conjoined
produce full [or ‘complete’] speech. But the other parts they named syncategoremata; that is, consignificantia”.
(B.A.M.)

89
Nuchelmans notes (cf. Theories of the Proposition, p. 124) excludes the Stoics, who are
introduced in the next line as holding five parts of speech. (B.A.M.)]
24
[footnote omitted]

As we approach the characterization of a syncategorema from the viewpoint of supposition,

we must remember that the scholastics used a definite language, Latin, with its own peculiar
grammatical structure. In this language a sentence is formed through the combination of a
noun with a verb or its equivalent. Sentences which are either true or false are called
propositions. In addition to the noun and the verb, other expressions or words are found in
propos- [20-21] tions, and further modifications of the noun and verb are also encountered.
Some of these modifications of nouns and verbs have no influence on the truth or falsity of
the proposition, and as far as logic or philosophy is concerned, they are irrelevant, being of
interest only to the grammarian or rhetorician. On the other hand, some have a definite
influence on the truth or falsity of a proposition, since, through their addition or omission, a
proposition which was true may become false, or vice versa. For example, the addition of the
word “no”, or the modification of the nominative case to the genitive case, and the like,
changes or may change the quality of the proposition. Among the words, or modifications of
words, which have such effects on propositions in which they occur are the following,
according to Ockham: Nouns, verbs, conjunctions, prepositions and adverbs. He further adds
the common accidents of nouns, such as case and number, and finally, the common accidents
of verbs, such as mood, person, tense and number.25
25
Cf. Ockham, Summae Logicae, pars 1, c. 3, and Quodlibeta, v, q. 8; ed. Argentina. Cf. also
our article: “Ockham’s Theory of Signification”, in Franciscan Studies, 6 (1946), pp. 152 s.
[N.B. On the meaning of ‘modification’, cf. the discussion of Ammonius below. (B.A.M.)]

All these words have a meaning connected with them, since they are spoken signs to which
a distinct mental sign or thought corresponds in the understanding. Without further enlarging
on the relation between the mental sign or thought and the spoken word, let us simply admit
with the Scholastics that our language has spoken or written terms which, through their
association with mental terms, have meanings precisely through this association. Thus, for
instance, the terms “man”, “red”, “not”, “if-then” and the like have a meaning which can be
explained by a definition. However, not all of these terms have an object which is thereby
signified. In other words, some of these terms have objects signified by them, and they stand
for their objects or significates in the proposition if they functions either as subject or pre-
dicate of the proposition without entering into any other union with any other term. On the
other hand, there are terms which do not have objects [21-22] signified by them. They lack at
least a definite significate, and since they have no definite significate, they cannot be subject
or predicate of a proposition if they are not used in combination with another term, whether
this term be composed or not, or whether it be a proposition or not. Admittedly, they
sometimes do appear as subject in a proposition, as any word might, but then they only re-
present themselves and should be, according to a device of modern logician, set off with
quotation marks, as, for instance, in this proposition, “Every is a syncategorema”. It is clear
that no object is signified by “Every” in this proposition. However, when the term “Every” is
combined with another term which signifies objects, “Every” modifies or determines the other
term as regards the number of its significates.

This, then, is the general nature of syncategorematic terms: They are determinations of other
terms or propositions, having no signification when taken alone, but exercising their
signification only as co-predicates, which is the literal translation of syncategorema. There is,
therefore, a dependence of signification and supposition in a syncategorematic term, not,
however, a dependence in its meaning, if by “meaning” the sense of a term is understood.

90
Since they depend in their signification upon another term which has signification or signifies
by itself, they are, if taken in their (dependent) significative function, incapable of becoming
subject or predicate of a proposition.
This distinction is clearly brought out by the scholastics and is particularly emphasized in
the following passage from the Logic of Albert of Saxony:

A categorematic term is a term which, taken in its significative function, can be subject or
predicate, or part of the subject or part of the distributed predicate, in a categorematical
proposition. “Man”, “animal”, “stone”, for instance, are such terms. They are called cate-
gorematic terms because they have a restricted and [22-23] fixed signification. A syncate-
gorematic term, on the other hand, is a term which, when taken in its significative function,
cannot be subject or predicate, or even part of the subject or part of the distributed predicate,
in a categorematical proposition. Such are, for instance, the following terms: “Every”,
“none”, “some”, etc., which are called signs either of universality or of particularity. So,
too, negations, as, for instance, the negation “not”, the conjunctions, as “and”, the disjunc-
tions, as “or”, and the exclusive and exceptive prepositions, as, for instance, “except”,
“only”, and the like; all these are also syncate-gorematic terms. To further exemplify syn-
categorematic terms, let us consider the following proposition: “Every man is running”.
“Man” is the subject, “Every” is neither subject nor predicate, nor is it part of either subject
or predicate. Rather, it is a modification of the subject and signifies the manner of
supposition in the subject itself. If “every” were part of the subject itself, then the following
propositions would not have the same subject: Every man is running, and, Some man is not
running. Consequently, these propositions would not be contradictory, which is a gross
falsity.

In defining a syncategorematic term, we have designedly inserted the phrase “taken in its
significative function” as applying to these terms, for if such terms as “every”, “none”, etc.,
are taken materially, they do function as subject or predicates of propositions. For instance,
consider these propositions: “Every” is a sign of universality; “And” is a copulative con-
junction; “No” is an adverb. In these propositions the aforementioned expressions or terms
are not taken in their significative function since they do not act in the capacity for which
they were instituted. Thus, in the proposition, “Every” is a sign of universality, “Every” is
no more a distributive term than “no” is a negation in the proposition, “No” is an adverb.

By way of summary, then, we might say that the syncategorematic terms have meaning and
signification, but their signification is dependent on a categorematic term [23-24] which is
modified or “disposed” by the syncategorematic term. These terms, then, exercise signi-
fication only conjointly with a categorematic term. As Albert of Saxony put it27: “syncate-
gorematic terms do not signify a thing or an object but the mode of a thing, whether this thing
be a subject, a predicate, a proposition, or a number of propositions, and in this sense, these
terms have a significable complexe”.28

We should like to mention here, without going into further details, that the scholastics have
offered a system or a division of the syncategorematic terms accordingly as they are either
dispositions or modes of other terms. Burleigh, for instance, distinguishes the following
classes: (1) those which are modifications of the subject; (2) those which are modifications of
the predicate; (3) modifications of the composition of the subject and a predicate, that is, of
one, or even of several, propositions.29
From previous explanation, then, it follows that syncategorematic terms are not included in
the basic terms of our object language. Rather, they are additions made to the terms of the
object language. Yet, they are of such importance that, without them, logical discourse would
be impossible. Hence, they are real, logical terms and, though we could dispense with some
of them even in logic, many of them are essential.

91
 26
Perutilis Logica, tract. 1, c. 3, fol. 2vb. Albert goes on to discuss the equivocation of certain
terms which can be used either as pure syncategorematic terms or as categorematic terms,
containing a syncategorematic term. For instance, the Latin word “aliquis”, taken alone and
as subject, is not a purely categorematic term, though it functions as such. The proposition:
Aliquis currit, is to be translated: Some-one is running, which immediately brings out the
categorematic content.
27
Tertia conclusio: Syncategorema non significat aliquam rem quae sit substantia vel accidens,
sed bene significat modum rei, quo ab aliis vocatur significabile compelexe. Patet hoc: nam
praedicatum verificari de quolibet contento sub subiecto vel removeri a quolibet contento sub
subiecto non est aliqua res quae sit substantia vel accidens, sed bene est modus rei et dispositio,
puta subiecti vel praedicati. Et sic syncategorema bene significat aliquid, prout li aliquid non
solum significat existentiam rei, se etiam modum rei et caetera. Quaestiones super
Perihermenias, edited in the Expositio Aurea of Ockham, ed. Bologna, 1496.
28
On the problem of the “significabile complexe” cf. Hubert Élie, Le Complex Significabile,
Paris, Vrin. Élie gives an interpretation different from that of Albert of Saxony.
29
Cf. Burleus minor of the Los Angeles MS. Univ. 6, first part. Albert of Saxony in his
Sophismata follows a similar division of the Syncategoremata.

Cf. ibid, , pp. 16-18.

In testimony of this quite general conviction of the scholastics, we cite an interesting passage
found at the beginning of an anonymous little work probably composed during the 15th
century. The work, entitled Copulata tractatum parvorum logicalium, affords a welcome
opportunity to summarize our previous exposition. The unknown author asks whether
Aristotle has dealt with logic in a sufficient manner, in view of the fact that he did not compose
tracts on what we have referred to as the “new elements”. He answers:

First it is to be stated that he (Aristotle) sufficiently completed Logic inasmuch as the being
of Logic is concerned. Nevertheless, a few small tracts can be added which serve for the
well-being of Logic itself and for its completion.1

Secondly, it must be said that although Aristotle did not invent this Logic which is being
treated here in itself and in the proper form of these tracts, he discovered, nevertheless, all
these tracts in their principles, for he discovered certain principles from which these tracts
are further developed and composed. Therefore, it is said of him that he discovered them
in a certain way. From this it follows that the Philosopher is to be thanked more than Peter
of Spain, because the former discovered the principles which are difficult to detect.

<…>

The tract on the Syncategoremata is derived from the second book of the Perihermenias
where Aristotle teaches how to multiply propositions in reference to finite and infinite
terms; but the negation is one of the syncategorema.

N.B. A contemporary view of the basis in Aristotle for the distinction between categore-
matic and syncategorematic words is found in the following summary by Gabriel Nuchel-
mans:

1
On ‘being’ versus ‘well-being’ here, cf. Aristotle, De An. II. 8 (420b 16-22). (B.A.M.)

92
Cf. Gabriel Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of
the Bearers of Truth and Falsity (North-Holland: Amsterdam and London, 1973), p. 29:

De. int. 16 b 201 is also interesting because it is in these lines that we find the first trace of a
distinction that later came to be known as the distinction between categorematic and syn-
categorematic words. Although verbs by themselves do not yet signify whether something is
the case or not and therefore do not possess the degree of completeness and independence
which is characteristic of the units of the legein-level, it is still true that most of them have a
meaning of their own in the sense that both the speaker and the hearer, in pronouncing or
hearing the word, will have a definite thought in their minds, a thought that has some kind of
self-sufficiency. The copula ‘is’, on the contrary, is not accompanied by any such distinct and
relatively self-sufficient thought; it only adds a certain nuance to the meaning of the words to
which it is joined. For this additional way of signifying Aristotle uses the word prossēmainein.
This word also occurs in De int. 20 a 13,2 in connection with ‘every’ and ‘no’. These words
additionally signify nothing other than that the affirmation or negation is about the name taken
universally. Thus we have here the beginning of a trichotomy: expressions signifying that
something is the case; verbs and nouns, which do not yet signify that something is the case but
have some meaning on their own; and words like ‘is’, ‘ever’, ‘no’, which do not signify
(sēmainein) in either of those ways but only contribute to the meaning of other words.

In view of the indebtedness of the Scholastic tradition on Aristotle’s work On Interpre-

tation, and in furtherance of our investigation, let us proceed to consider more closely the
Philosopher’s teaching of the consignification of the verb and related matters.

1
Cf. Aristotle, Peri Herm., I. 3 (16b 19-25): “Verbs in and by themselves are substantival and have signify-
cance, for he who uses such expressions arrests the hearer’s mind, and fixes [20] his attention; but they do not,
as they stand, express any judgement, either positive or negative. For neither are ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ and the
participle ‘being’ significant of any fact, unless something is added; for they do not themselves indicate
anything, but imply a copulation, of which we cannot form a conception apart from the [25] things coupled”
(tr. E. M. Edghill).
2
“Thus the adjectives ‘every’ and ‘no’ have no additional significance except that the subject, whether in a
positive or in a negative sentence, is distributed” (ibid.).

93
7. On the consignification of the verb.

Cf. Aristotle, De Int. I. 3 (16b 5-25) (tr. E. M. Edghill):

A verb is that which, in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion of time. No
part of it has any independent meaning, and it is a sign of something said of something else. I
will explain what I mean by saying that it carries with it the notion of time. ‘Health’ is a noun,
but ‘is healthy’ is a verb; for besides its proper meaning it indicates the present existence of
the state in question. Moreover, a verb is always a sign of something said of something [10]
else, i.e. of something either predicable of [a subject”] or present in some other thing. Such
expressions as ‘is not-healthy’, ‘is not, ill’, I do not describe as verbs; for though they carry
the additional note of time, and always form a predicate, there is no speci-fied name for this
variety; but let them be called indefinite verbs, since they apply equally [15] well to that which
exists and to that which does not. Similarly ‘he was healthy’, ‘he will be healthy’, are not
verbs, but tenses of a verb; the difference lies in the fact that the verb indicates present time,
while the tenses of the verb indicate those times which lie outside the present.

Verbs in and by themselves are substantival and have significance, for he who uses such
expressions arrests the hearer’s mind, and fixes [20] his attention; but they do not, as they
stand, express any judgement, either positive or negative. For neither are ‘to be’ and ‘not to
be’ and the participle ‘being’ significant of any fact, unless something is added; for they do
not themselves indicate anything, but imply a copulation, of which we cannot form a con-
ception apart from the [25] things coupled.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 5, nn. 8-9 (on 16b 8-11) (= Aristotle: On In-
terpretation. Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan. Translated from the Latin with an
Introduction by Jean T. Oesterle. Milwaukee, 1962, pp. 47-48):

8. Then he says, Moreover, a verb is always a sign of something that belongs to something,
i.e. of something present in a subject.60 Here he explains the last part of the definition of the
verb. It should be noted first that the subject of an enunciation signifies as that in which
something inheres. Hence, when the verb signifies action through the mode of action (the
nature of which is to inhere) it is always posited on the part of the predicate and never on the
part of the subject—unless it is taken with the force of a name, as was said. The verb, there-
fore, is always said to be a sign of something said of another, and this not only because the
verb always signifies that which is predicated but also because there must be a verb in every
predication, for the verb introduces the composition by which the predicate is united to the
subject.

9. The last phrase of this portion of the text presents a difficulty, namely, “of something
belonging to [i.e., of] a subject or in a subject.”61 For it seems that something is said of a subject
when it is predicated essentially, as in “Man is an animal”; but in a subject, when it is an
accident that is predicated of a subject, as in “Man is white.” But if verbs signify action or
passion (which are accidents), it follows that they always signify what is in a subject. It is
useless, therefore, to say “belonging to [i.e., of] a subject or in a subject.” In answer to this
Boethius says that both pertain to the same thing, for an accident is predicated of a subject and
is also in a subject.62
Aristotle, however, uses a disjunction, which seems to indicate that he means something
different by each. Therefore it could be said in reply to this that when Aristotle says the verb
is always a sign of those things that are predicated of another 63 it is not to be understood as
though the things signified by verbs are predicated. For predications seem to [47-48]

94
 60
The Oxford Greek text of this sentence reads: “. . . kai\ a)ei\ tw=n u(parxo/ntwn shmei=o/n e)stin, oi(=on
tw=n kaq’ u(pokeime/nou.” The Leonine Greek text (and several other Greek manuscripts) reads: “. . .
kai\ a)ei\ tw=n u(parxo/ntwn shmei=o/n e)stin, oi(=on tw=n kaq’ u(pokeime/nou, h)/ e)n u(pokeime/nou.” St.
Thomas comments on the text as having the phrase “said [i.e. belonging to] a subject or in a subject”
(n. 9; italics added).
61
See note 60 for this variation in the text.
62
Boethius, Comment in librum Aristotelis Peri\ e(rmhneia/j, I. De verbo, p. 314.
63
“...predicated of another” is not in the Greek text, as can be noted in the quotation of the text
in note 60, but it is implied in “of something that belongs to something” and is in the definition
of the verb (16b 5) in the sense that “said of something else” could be translated as “predicated
of another.”

pertain more properly to composition; therefore, the verbs themselves are what are predicated,
rather than signify predicates.64 The verb, then is always a sign that something is predicated
because all predication is made through the verb by reason of the composition introduced,
whether what is being predicated is predicated essentially or accidentally.

64
For a further discussion of this point see p. 24, n. b of the Leonine edition of the Peri Her-
meneias, where the distinction is made between the predicate as formal and material

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 5, nn. 8-9 (tr. B.A.M.):

n. 8. Then when he says And it is always (an indication), etc., he explains the other part. Where
it should be noted that since the subject of an enunciation is signified as (that) in which
something inheres, since the verb signifies an action in the manner of an action, <or a passion
in the manner of a passion in the case of passive verbs,>1 to whose account it belongs that it
inhere, it is always put on the part of the predicate, but never on the part of the subject, unless
it be taken with the force of a name, as has been said. Therefore the verb is always said to be
an indication of those things which are said of another: both because the verb always signifies
that which is predicated; as well as because in every predication there must be a verb, by
reason of the fact that it implies composition, by means of which a predicate is composed with
a subject.2

n. 9. But what is added appears to present a difficulty: that (it is said) of those things which
are of a subject or in a subject. For it seems something is said as of a subject, which is
predicated essentially, as “Man is an animal”; but in a subject, as an accident is predicated of
a subject, as “(a) Man is white”.

1
As noted above, the words added are required by the sense; for it is not true to speak of every verb as if it
were active, inasmuch as some are passive. Cf. In I Peri Herm., lect. 4, n. 7 (tr. B.A.M.):

In another way, that which is measured by time can be considered insofar as it is of this sort. And because that
which is first and principally measured by time is motion, in which action and passion consist, therefore the verb
which signifies action or passion signi-fies with time. (alio modo, potest considerari id, quod tempore mens-uratur,
in quantum huiusmodi: et quia id quod primo et principaliter tempore mensuratur est motus, in quo consistit actio
et passio, ideo verbum quod significat actionem vel passionem, significat cum tempore.)

2deinde cum dicit: et est semper etc., exponit aliam particulam. ubi notandum est quod quia subiectum enun-
ciationis significatur ut cui inhaeret aliquid, cum verbum significet actionem per modum actionis, de cuius
ratione est ut inhaereat, semper ponitur ex parte praedicati, nunquam autem ex parte subiecti, nisi sumatur in
vi nominis, ut dictum est. dicitur ergo verbum semper esse nota eorum quae dicuntur de altero: tum quia
verbum semper significat id, quod praedicatur; tum quia in omni praedicatione oportet esse verbum, eo quod
verbum importat compositionem, qua praedicatum componitur subiecto.

95
 If, therefore, verbs signify action or passion, which are accidents, it follows that they always
signify those things which are said as (being) in a subject. Therefore saying “in a subject or of
a subject” is pointless. In answer to this Boethius says that both pertain to the same thing. For
an accident is both predicated of a subject, and it is in a subject. But because Aristotle employs
a disjunction, something else seems to be signified by each. And so it can be said that when
Aristotle says that verbs are always indications of those things which are predicated of another,
it is not to be so understood as if the significata of the verbs were predicated, for the reason
that since predication would appear to pertain more properly to composition, the verbs
themselves are the things which are predicated, rather than signify things predicated.
Accordingly it is to be understood that a verb is always a sign that something is predicated,
since every predication comes about through a verb by reason of the composition implied,
whether something be predicated essentially or accidentally.1

8. The explanation of St. Thomas in sum.

According to St. Thomas Aquinas, “when Aristotle says the verb is always an in-
dication [nota] of those things that are predicated of another”, this is not to be understood as
if it were the significata of verbs which are predicated, but rather the verbs themselves, for
which reason they do not “signify things predicated”; rather, they indicate that something is
predicated. What verbs signify, it must be added, is the thing upon which they are ‘placed’
or ‘imposed’ (when, that is, such a thing has come to be understood), and this is their
‘signification’ or ‘meaning’. Verbs are always said to be signs of something said of another
thing by reason of the composition implied in their meaning, inasmuch as it is by virtue of
the verb that the predicate is composed with the subject. But, as St. Thomas explains a little
further down in his commentary (cf. In I Peri Herm., lect. 5, n. 22, tr. Jean T. Oesterle),
“when we wish to signify that any form or act is actually in some subject we signify it
through the verb ‘is,’ either absolutely or relatively; absolutely, according to present time,
relatively, according to other times; and for this reason the verb ‘is’ signifies composition,
not principally, but consequently”. Likewise the expression ‘is healthy’ principally signifies
‘health’, but ex consequenti it signifies composition. Hence, not only is ‘composition’
implied in every verb, but the verb is also always a sign that something is in a subject as a
form or act.

9. In sum:

ex. “Socrates is healthy.”

What is predicated is a verb (namely, ‘is healthy’).

What is subjected is a noun (namely, ‘Socrates’).
1
sed dubium videtur quod subditur: ut eorum quae de subiecto vel in subiecto sunt. videtur enim aliquid dici
ut de subiecto, quod essentialiter praedicatur; ut, homo est animal; in subiecto autem, sicut accidens de
subiecto praedicatur; ut, homo est albus. si ergo verba significant actionem vel passionem, quae sunt
accidentia, consequens est ut semper significent ea, quae dicuntur ut in subiecto. frustra igitur dicitur in
subiecto vel de subiecto. et ad hoc dicit boethius quod utrumque ad idem pertinet. accidens enim et de subiecto
praedicatur, et in subiecto est. sed quia aristoteles disiunctione utitur, videtur aliud per utrumque significare.
et ideo potest dici quod cum aristoteles dicit quod, verbum semper est nota eorum, quae de altero praedicantur,
non est sic intelligendum, quasi significata verborum sint quae praedicantur, quia cum praedicatio videatur
magis proprie ad compositionem pertinere, ipsa verba sunt quae praedicantur, magis quam significent
praedicata. est ergo intelligendum quod verbum semper est signum quod aliqua praedicentur, quia omnis
praedicatio fit per verbum ratione compositionis importatae, sive praedicetur aliquid essentialiter sive
accidentaliter.

96
 According to the text before St. Thomas: “But what is added appears to present a
difficulty: that (it is said) of those things which are of a subject or in a subject. For it seems
something is said as of a subject, which is predicated essentially, as “Man is an animal”; but
in a subject, as an accident is predicated of a subject, as “(a) Man is white”. <...> But because
Aristotle employs a disjunction, something else seems to be signified by each.”

The solution of the difficulty: A verb is always an indication of something that is

(said, or predicated) of a subject: this is ‘composition’; or in a subject: this is ‘that any form
or act is actually in some subject’—that is, the verb is always a sign that ‘any form or act is
actually in some subject’. Hence a verb is always two things: (1) a sign of something of a
subject—that is, belonging to it, namely, ‘composition’, and (2) a sign of the inherence of a
form in a subject.

To sum up:

a. What is indicated by a verb:

(1) that something is said or predicated of a subject

(2) that something is in a subject

b. What is signified by the verb ‘is’ (which is signified either principally or consequently):

(1) what is signified principally: ‘that any form or act is actually in some subject’ (for
which reason it is said that a verb is always a sign of something in a subject)
(2) what is signified consequently: ‘composition’ (for which reason it is said that a verb
is always a sign of something belonging to a subject)

c. What is signified by the verb ‘is healthy’:

(1) principally: ‘health’ (as actually in some subject)

(2) consequently: ‘composition’

And note that what is ‘signified consequently’ is the consignification of the verb—that is,
‘what it consignifies’.

10. Aristotle’s statements in sum:

• “...and it is a sign of something said of something else.”

• “Moreover, a verb is always a sign of something said of something [10] else, i.e. of
something either predicable of [read “of a subject”] or present in some other thing.”

• “For neither are ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ and the participle ‘being’ significant of any
fact, unless something is added; for they do not themselves indicate anything, but
imply a copulation, of which we cannot form a conception apart from the [25] things
coupled.”

97
11. Supplement: Aristotle’s account of the verb insofar as it couples in comparison with the
coupling function of the conjunction.

Cf. Aristotle, De Int. I. 3 (16b 19-26) (tr. B.A.M.):

But in themselves, said by themselves, verbs are names and signify something; for the one
who speaks1 [20] establishes the understanding [sc. of the hearer] and he who hears [sc. what
is said] rests [sc. in what is said]. But whether it is or is not (the case), it does not yet signify;2
for neither is ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’3 a sign of [the present existence of] a thing (nor if you say
simply4 ‘that which is’). [By] itself, in fact, it is nothing;5 it consignifies, [25] however, a
certain composition, which cannot be understood without the things composed.

N.B. The reader will note the close correspondence between Aristotle’s description
of the verbal copula and the description found in the work of Apollonius Dyscolus: for just
as the composition implied by the verb insofar as it couples a predicate with a subject can-
not be understood without the extremes of that composition, so neither can the conjunction
‘convey any meaning’ without the things conjoined by it.6
As for the consignification of the verb insofar as it involves the copulatio of com-
position, St. Thomas Aquinas explains it as follows:7

And so Porphyry explained in another way that this “being” [ens] itself does not signify the
nature of a thing as the name “man” or “wise” do, but only designates a certain conjunction,
and this is why he [Aristotle] adds, it consignifies a certain composition, which cannot be
understood without the things composing it. [51-52] This explanation does not seem to be
consistent with the text either, for if “being” itself does not signify a thing, but only a
conjunction, it, like prepositions and conjunctions, is neither a name nor a verb.
Therefore this should be explained in another way, as Ammonius explains it. He says
“being itself is nothing” means that it does not signify truth or falsity. And he assigns the
reason for this when he says it consignifies, however, a certain composition. Nor is consigni-
fies taken here, as he states, as when it is said that the verb consignifies time; but it “con-
signifies”, i.e. it signifies with another; that is to say, adjoined to another it signifies com-
position, which cannot be understood without the extremes of the composition.8

1
That is, the one who utters a verb by itself ‘says something’; in the present case, a name.
2
That is, when a verb is uttered by itself, it does not yet signify whether the action or passion it signifies is “the
case” or not; for this, the saying of something of something is required: e.g., to say “walks” does not yet signify
that anyone walks; for this, one must form an enunciation such as “Socrates walks” or “A man walks”, or
something of the sort.
3
Rather than the participles ‘being’ and ‘not-being’, one would have expected “‘is’ or ‘is not’” to be repeated
here, as the occurrence of the latter would make the argument more unified.
4
That is, ‘by itself’ or ‘without intertwining’.
5
For this statement to be intelligible, ‘nothing’ here must mean something like “not the sign of the existence
of a thing”. But a better reading would be ‘By itself the verb does not signify that something is so”.
6
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 21, q. 2, art. 1, c.): “And so since the verb by reason of composition
conjoins the predicate to the subject, and relates to both....” (unde cum verbum ratione compositionis conjungat
praedicatum subjecto, et ad utrumque se habeat, [congrue possunt ista adverbia tam ad subjectum quam ad
praedicatum adjungi...]), it resembles the conjunction; ‘composition’ itself being a habitudo common to the
verb, the preeminent form of which is the copula ‘is’, and the conjunction, the preeminent form of which is the
copulative conjunction ‘and’. See also the texts cited further below.
7
St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri., lect. 5, n. 19 (on 16b 19-23) (= Aristotle: On Interpretation. Commentary by
St. Thomas and Cajetan. Translated from the Latin with an Introduction by Jean T. Oesterle. Milwaukee, 1962,
pp. 49-53) (tr. rev. B.A.M.).
8
unde porphyrius aliter exposuit quod hoc ipsum ens non significat naturam alicuius rei, sicut hoc nomen
homo vel sapiens, sed solum designat quamdam coniunctionem; unde subdit quod consignificat quamdam

98
 But to return to our text: Since, as Nicholas of Paris explains, “nothing that takes on
signification from things adjoined to it signifies anything on its own”, it follows that, with
respect to conjunctions, “...their signification varies with the force of the things conjoined
by them...”, as Apollonius Dyscolus relates; for which reason, like verbal copulatives, they
cannot be understood apart from the things they conjoin. Of course, as St. Thomas Aquinas
makes clear, it is the composition consignified by the verb which cannot be understood
without the extremes of that composition; it being the case that, unlike the conjunction, every
verb does signify something, namely, to be in act, and hence the inherence of an act in some
subject, as St. Thomas Aquinas explains:1

20. Therefore in order to understand what Aristotle is saying we should note that he has just
said that the verb does not signify that a thing exists or does not exist [rem esse vel non esse];
nor does “being” [ens] signify that a thing exists or does not exist. This is what he means when
he says, it is nothing, i.e., it does not signify that a thing exists. This is indeed most clearly
seen in saying “being” [ens], because being is nothing other than that which is. And thus we
see that it signifies both a thing, when I say “that which,” and existence [esse] when I say “is”
[est]. If the word “being” [ens] as signifying a thing having existence were to signify existence
[esse] principally, without a doubt it would signify that a thing exists. But the word “being”
[ens] does not principally signify the composition that is implied in saying “is” [est]; rather, it
signifies with composition inasmuch as it signifies the thing having existence. Such signifying
with composition is not sufficient for truth or falsity; for the composition in which truth and
falsity consists cannot be understood unless it connects the extremes of a composition.2

21. If in place of what Aristotle says we say nor would “to be” itself [nec ipsum esse], as it is
in our texts, the meaning is clearer.70 For Aristotle proves through the verb “is” [est] that no
verb signifies that a thing exists or does not exist, since “is” said by itself does not signify that
a thing exists, although it signifies existence. And because to be itself seems to be a kind of
composition, so also the verb “is” [est], which signifies to be, can seem to signify the
composition in which there is truth or falsity. To exclude this Aristotle adds that the
composition which the verb “is” signifies cannot be understood without the compos- [52-53]

70
The Greek to/ o)\n is closer to this reading.

compositionem, quam sine compositis non est intelligere. sed neque hoc convenienter videtur dici: quia si non
significaret aliquam rem, sed solum coniunctionem, non esset neque nomen, neque verbum, sicut nec
praepositiones aut coniunctiones. et ideo aliter exponendum est, sicut ammonius exponit, quod ipsum ens nihil
est, idest non significat verum vel falsum. et rationem huius assignat, cum subdit: consignificat autem
quamdam compositionem. nec accipitur hic, ut ipse dicit, consignificat, sicut cum dicebatur quod verbum
consignificat tempus, sed consignificat, idest cum alio significat, scilicet alii adiunctum compositionem
significat, quae non potest intelligi sine extremis compositionis.
1
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri., lect. 5, nn. 20-22 (on 16b 19-23) (tr. Jean T. Oesterle slightly rev. B.A.M.).
2
et ideo ut magis sequamur verba aristotelis considerandum est quod ipse dixerat quod verbum non significat
rem esse vel non esse, sed nec ipsum ens significat rem esse vel non esse. et hoc est quod dicit, nihil est, idest
non significat aliquid esse. etenim hoc maxime videbatur de hoc quod dico ens: quia ens nihil est aliud quam
quod est. et sic videtur et rem significare, per hoc quod dico quod et esse, per hoc quod dico est. et si quidem
haec dictio ens significaret esse principaliter, sicut significat rem quae habet esse, procul dubio significaret
aliquid esse. sed ipsam compositionem, quae importatur in hoc quod dico est, non principaliter significat, sed
consignificat eam in quantum significat rem habentem esse. unde talis consignificatio compositionis non
sufficit ad veritatem vel falsitatem: quia compositio, in qua consistit veritas et falsitas, non potest intelligi, nisi
secundum quod innectit extrema compositionis. Note here that, in a passage cited above, Gabriel Nuchelmans
is in error when he states that the copula agrees with the conjunction in not signifying anything.

99
 ing things. The reason for this is that an understanding of the composition which “is” signi-
fies depends on the extremes, and unless they are added, understanding of the composition is
not complete and hence cannot be true or false.

22. Therefore he says that the verb “is” signifies with composition; for it does not signify
composition principally but consequently. It primarily signifies that which is perceived in the
mode of actuality absolutely; for “is” said simply, signifies to be in act, and therefore signifies
in the mode of a verb. However, the actuality which the verb “is” principally signifies is the
actuality of every form commonly, whether substantial or accidental. Hence, when we wish to
signify that any form or act is actually in some subject we signify it through the verb “is,”
either absolutely or relatively; absolutely, according to present time, relatively, according to
other times; and for this reason the verb “is” signifies composition, not principally, but
consequently.1

Hence there is only a partial agreement between the verb and the conjunction; the former
signifying something by itself or separately—what St. Thomas calls its principal signify-
cation—the latter not by itself but only when conjoined to the others; the conjunction not
involving the difference between what is signified principaliter et consequenter.

1
si vero dicatur, nec ipsum esse, ut libri nostri habent, planior est sensus. quod enim nullum verbum significat
rem esse vel non esse, probat per hoc verbum est, quod secundum se dictum, non significat aliquid esse, licet
significet esse. et quia hoc ipsum esse videtur compositio quaedam, et ita hoc verbum est, quod significat esse,
potest videri significare compositionem, in qua sit verum vel falsum; ad hoc excludendum subdit quod illa
compositio, quam significat hoc verbum est, non potest intelligi sine componentibus: quia dependet eius
intellectus ab extremis, quae si non apponantur, non est perfectus intellectus compositionis, ut possit in ea esse
verum, vel falsum. ideo autem dicit quod hoc verbum est consignificat compositionem, quia non eam
principaliter significat, sed ex consequenti; significat enim primo illud quod cadit in intellectu per modum
actualitatis absolute: nam est, simpliciter dictum, significat in actu esse; et ideo significat per modum verbi.
quia vero actualitas, quam principaliter significat hoc verbum est, est communiter actualitas omnis formae,
vel actus substantialis vel accidentalis, inde est quod cum volumus significare quamcumque formam vel actum
actualiter inesse alicui subiecto, significamus illud per hoc verbum est, vel simpliciter vel secundum quid:
simpliciter quidem secundum praesens tempus; secundum quid autem secundum alia tempora. et ideo ex
consequenti hoc verbum est significat compositionem.

100
12. Supplement: The composition of the copula according to Peter of Spain.

Cf. Peter of Spain, Syncategoreumata. First Critical Edition with an Introduction & Indexes
by L. M. di Rijk. With an English Translation by Joke Spruyt, Tractatus Primus. Chapter I,
nn. 25-26, pp. 63-64:

25 There is also a problem in which way that composition should be understood of which
Aristotle says11 it cannot be understood without the things that are combined. And the answer
should be that the composition of the act with the substance is understood through the
extremes. For the act by itself inheres in its subject just as any other accident by itself inheres
in the subject it resides in. And it is not through some other intermediate, for in that case we
would have an infinite regress, as has been said before regarding the quality of the noun.
Therefore the composition of an act with a substance occurs by means of the inclination of
this act towards the substance itself as towards its subject. And since the inclination of
11
De interpr. 3, 16b24-5.

the one towards the other can only be understood via that which is inclined and via that toward
which it is inclined, hence the composition of an act towards its substance, which is
consignified by the verb, cannot be understood without the extremes. Therefore Aristotle
says12 that ‘is’ (est) consignifies a certain composition that cannot be understood without the
things combined, since it can only be understood through that which is inclined and through
that towards which it is inclined. Indeed, when that which is inclined and that towards which
it is inclined has been taken away, the inclination of a verb, which is in fact that of its act to-
wards the substance, is nothing. And so a composition without its extremes is nothing. And
since everything is understood in virtue of that which grants being to it, therefore because the
extremes grant being to the composition, the composition should be understood through the
extremes, as has been said.
12
Ibid.

26 Note also that this composition as regards its true being is in a thing and cannot be separ-
ated from it, whereas in a verb, this composition is as in a sign, just as health as regards its
true being is in an animal as its subject, but in urine as its sign. Note again that the com-
position exists through the inclination the act has towards a substance, insofar as the act is an
accident of the substance, and it precedes the other inclination through which the act is <said>
of something else, as has been said before.

101
13. Supplement: On the distributive terms ‘every’ and ‘no’.

Cf. Aristotle, De Int., I. 10 (20a 13) (tr. Jean T. Oesterle; slightly rev. B.A.M.):

The ‘every’ and ‘no’, then, additionally signify nothing other than that they affirm or deny
about the name (taken) universally.

Cf. also the following from Oesterle (= Aristotle: On Interpretation. Commentary by St.
Thomas and Cajetan. Translated from the Latin with an Introduction by Jean T. Oesterle.
Milwaukee 1962, n. 35, p. 149):

The Greek reads: “...w(/ste to\ pa=j h)/ mhdei/j ou)de\n a)/llo prosshmai/nei h)/ o(/ti kaqo/lon tou=
o)no/matoj kata/fhsin h)/ a)po/fhsin”; “the ‘every’ and the ‘no,’ then, only signify nothing
other than that they affirm or deny universally of a name”). In the present translation this is
rendered as, ‘The ‘every’ and the ‘no,’ then, only signify that the affirmation or negation is of
a name universally.’

Cf. also Cardinal Cajetan’s commentary, ibid. p. 149:

15. Two things should be noted here: first, that Aristotle does not say “every” and “no” sig-
nify universally, but that the universal is taken universally; secondly, that he adds, that they
affirm or deny of man.35 The [20a13] reason for the first is that the distributive sign does not
signify the mode of universality or of particularity absolutely, but the mode applied to a dis-
tributed term. When I say, “every man” the “every” denotes that universality is applied to the
term “man.” Hence, when Aristotle says “every” signifies that a universal is taken uni-
versally, by the “that” he conveys the application in actual exercise of the universality de-
noted by the “every”, just as in I Posteriorum in the definition of “to know,” namely, To know
scientifically is to know a thing through its cause and that this is its cause, he signifies by the
word “that” the application of the cause.36
35
[Quoted above. Note that the wording is a paraphrase, not a lemma (B.A.M.).]
36
Post. Anal. I, 2, 71b 10.

The reason for the second is to imply the difference between categorematic and syncate-
gorematic terms. The former apply what is signified to the terms absolutely; the latter apply
what they signify in relation to the predicates. For example, in “white man” the “white” de-
nominates man in himself apart from any regard to something to be added; but in “every man”
although “every” distributes “man,” the distribution does not confirm the intellect unless it is
understood in relation to some predicate. A sign of this is that when we say “Every man runs”
we do not intend to distribute “man” in its whole universality absolutely, but only in relation
to “running.” When we say “White man runs,” on the other hand, we designate man in himself
as “white” and not in relation to “running.”

On the foregoing matters, cf. Gabriel Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, p. 29, ex-
cerpted above:

De. int. 16 b 20 is also interesting because it is in these lines that we find the first trace of a
distinction that later came to be known as the distinction between categorematic and syn-
categorematic words.

Although verbs by themselves do not yet signify whether something is the case or not and
therefore do not possess the degree of completeness and independence which is characteristic

102
 of the units of the legein-level, it is still true that most of them have a meaning of their own in
the sense that both the speaker and the hearer, in pronouncing or hearing the word, will have
a definite thought in their minds, a thought that has some kind of self-sufficiency. The copula
‘is’, on the contrary, is not accompanied by any such distinct and relatively self-sufficient
thought; it only adds a certain nuance to the meaning of the words to which it is joined. For
this additional way of signifying Aristotle uses the word pros-sēmainein. This word also
occurs in De int. 20 a 13, in connection with ‘every’ and ‘no’. These words additionally signify
nothing other than that the affirmation or negation is about the name taken universally.

Thus we have here the beginning of a trichotomy: expressions signifying that something is the
case; verbs and nouns, which do not yet signify that something is the case but have some
meaning on their own; and words like ‘is’, ‘ever’, ‘no’, which do not signify (sēmainein) in
either of those ways but only contribute to the meaning of other words.

14. Comparison of versions:

(1) tr. B.A.M. based on Oesterle and Nuchelmans: “The ‘every’ and ‘no’, then, additionally
signify nothing other than that they affirm or deny about the name (taken) universally”.

(2) tr. Jean T. Oesterle: “the ‘every’ and the ‘no,’ then, only signify nothing other than that
they affirm or deny universally of a name”.

(3) paraphrase by Gabriel Nuchelmans: “This word [sc. prossēmainein] also occurs in De int.
20 a 13, in connection with ‘every’ and ‘no’. These words additionally signify nothing other
than that the affirmation or negation is about the name taken universally”.

15. What the names ‘every’ and ‘no’ consignify according to Aristotle.

As Aristotle explains (De Int., I. 10, 20a 13), the names ‘every’ and ‘no’ as occurring
in such statements as “Every man is white” and “No man is white” prossēmainein, or
‘additionally signify”, an affirmation or denial with respect to the name to which they are
attached “taken universally”; that is to say, the name to which they are attached is “taken
universally” with respect to what they affirm or deny about it; and this is their ‘con-
signification’.

To this explanation should be compared the following from St. Thomas Aquinas (In I Peri
Herm., lect. 6, n. 3, tr. B.A.M.):

But second, he puts down that in which speech differs from the name [or ‘noun’] and the verb,
when he says, some parts of which are significative separately. For he said above that a part
of a name does not signify something separate by itself, but only that it [i.e. such a name] is
conjoined from two parts. But he significantly does not say: whose part when separated is
significative of something, but of which some part is significative, on account of negations and
other syncategorematic terms, which in and of themselves do not signify something absolute,
but only the relationship of one thing to another.1

1
secundo autem ponit id, in quo oratio differt a nomine et verbo, cum dicit: cuius partium aliquid signifi-
cativum est separatim. supra enim dictum est quod pars nominis non significat aliquid per se separatum, sed
solum quod est coniunctum ex duabus partibus. signanter autem non dicit: cuius pars est significativa aliquid
separata, sed cuius aliquid partium est significativum, propter negationes et alia syncategoremata, quae
secundum se non significant aliquid absolutum, sed solum habitudinem unius ad alterum.

103
According to St. Thomas, “negations and other syncategorematic terms” do not signify
something “when separated”—which is to say, “in and of themselves they do not signify
something absolute, but only the relationship of one thing to another”. But, as we have seen
from the account laid out above, such a habitudo or ‘relationship’ is explained by saying that
the name to which they are attached is “taken universally” with respect to what they affirm
or deny about it, as I have worded it, which is to say they signify “in relation to the
predicates”, as Cajetan puts it; whereas categorematic terms signify absolutely.

16. Supplement: Résumé on the way in which the copula and the verb are said to consignify.

With respect to the consignification of the copula and the verb at issue earlier in Aris-
totle’s discussion, St. Thomas explains them in a text we have met with above:

And so Porphyry explained in another way that this “being” [ens] itself does not signify the
nature of a thing as the name “man” or “wise” do, but only designates a certain conjunction,
and this is why he [Aristotle] adds, it consignifies a certain composition, which cannot be
understood without the things composing it. [end of page 51]
This explanation does not seem to be consistent with the text either, for if “being” itself does
not signify a thing, but only a conjunction, it, like prepositions and conjunctions, is neither a
name nor a verb.
Therefore this should be explained in another way, as Ammonius explains it. He says “being
itself is nothing” means that it does not signify truth or falsity. And he assigns the reason for
this when he says, it consignifies, however, a certain composition. Nor is consignifies taken
here, as he states, as when it is said that the verb consignifies time; but it “consignifies”, i.e. it
signifies with another; that is to say, adjoined to another it signifies composition, which cannot
be understood without the extremes of the composition.1

According to St. Thomas, when Aristotle says of the verb that “it consignifies a
certain composition, which cannot be understood without the things composing it”, this
means that it “signifies with another; that is to say, adjoined to another it signifies compos-
ition, which cannot be understood without the extremes of the composition”, differing in this
from the case of ‘time’, where ‘consignifies’ means ‘to signify in addition to’ or ‘to
additionally signify’ time. In this way, then, as noted above, the verb agrees with the con-
junction as described by Apollonius Dyscolus (ed. Householder, n. 28, p. 27):

After all the parts that have been listed we take the conjunction, which conjoins, and cannot
convey any meaning by itself without the substance of these words, just as physical bonds are
no use if there are no physical objects [to connect].

1
unde porphyrius aliter exposuit quod hoc ipsum ens non significat naturam alicuius rei, sicut hoc nomen
homo vel sapiens, sed solum designat quamdam coniunctionem; unde subdit quod consignificat quamdam
compositionem, quam sine compositis non est intelligere. sed neque hoc convenienter videtur dici: quia si non
significaret aliquam rem, sed solum coniunctionem, non esset neque nomen, neque verbum, sicut nec
praepositiones aut coniunctiones. et ideo aliter exponendum est, sicut ammonius exponit, quod ipsum ens nihil
est, idest non significat verum vel falsum. et rationem huius assignat, cum subdit: consignificat autem
quamdam compositionem. nec accipitur hic, ut ipse dicit, consignificat, sicut cum dicebatur quod verbum
consignificat tempus, sed consignificat, idest cum alio significat, scilicet alii adiunctum compositionem
significat, quae non potest intelligi sine extremis compositionis. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri., lect. 5, n. 19
(on 16b 19-23) (= Aristotle: On Interpretation. Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan. Translated from the
Latin with an Introduction by Jean T. Oesterle. Milwaukee 1962, pp. 49-53) (tr. rev. B.A.M.).

104
17. Consignification in sum:

(1) Of the verb in general: it “signifies with time” (Aristotle, De Int., I. 3, 16b 6). (That is,
the verb not only signifies some thing or nature, as ‘is healthy’ signifies ‘health’, but it also
or in addition signifies ‘time’, most properly, the present.)

(2) Of verb in general as well as the copula:

(a) the copula: it “signifies with another; that is to say, adjoined to another it signifies
composition, which cannot be understood without the extremes of the composition”
(St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri., lect. 5, n. 19).

(b) the verb in general: “And so since the verb by reason of composition conjoins the
predicate to the subject, and relates to both....” (St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist.
21, q. 2, art. 1, c.). (On this formulation, see further below. And note here that
‘composition’ is also a habitudo.)

(3) Of negations and other syncategorematic terms (e.g. ‘no’ and ‘every’ and the like): “The
‘every’ and ‘no’, then, additionally signify nothing other than that they affirm or deny about
the name (taken) universally” (Aristotle, De Int. I. 10, 20a 13). (That is to say, they signify
“in relation to the predicates” and hence are pros ti or ‘toward something’.)

The verb, then, agrees with the distribuative terms “every” and “no” in signifying addition-
ally, which is to consignify; but the copula agrees with the conjunction in the way in which
it “signifies with another,“ as we have just explained.

18. The consignification of the conjunction in sum.

On the basis of the foregoing accounts, one could explain the consignification of the
conjunction as follows: Like the copula, it “signifies with another; that is to say, adjoined to
another it signifies composition, which cannot be understood without the extremes of the
composition”, which is to say that, like “negations and other syncategorematic terms” it
signifies “in relation” to something, namely, other words (as when I say “Plato and Socrates
were philosophers”); or phrases, which are certain combinations of words (as when I say
“The good man and the bad man differ”); or clauses (as when I say “I love you and you love
me”) all of which are extremes conjoined by it. On this point, compare the following
definition from Priscian, Inst. gramm. xvi. 1, p. 93 (2-3) (ed. Hertz, tr. B.A.M.):

A conjunction is an indeclinable part of speech conjunctive of the other parts of speech, which
(conjunction of the parts) it consignifies, displaying a force or an order.1

1
The Latin (ed. Hertz) reads: Coniunctio est pars orationis indeclinabilis, coniunctiva aliarum partium
orationis, quibus consignificat, vim vel orderem demonstrans. Note that Peter of Spain’s text, which I give
next, omits the words quibus consignificat. On Priscian’s understanding of the conjunction, cf. also Inst.
gramm. (6.11) [II:21] (tr. B.A.M.):
It is proper to the conjunction to conjoin diverse nouns, or whatever chance words [there may happen
to be], whether diverse verbs or adverbs, for instance “Terence and Cicero’…. (Proprium est coni-
unctionis diversa nomina vel quascumque dictiones casuales vel diversa verba vel adverbia coniungere,
ut ‘et Terentius et Cicero’, ....).

105
That is, the conjunction not only conjoins the other parts of speech, it also consignifies
their conjunction. (And note here that I take quibus as referring to the conjunction of the
parts, and not to the parts themselves, since to say the former is true, but the latter false,
as is clear from what Priscian says elsewhere about consignification.)1

N.B. For a scholastic logician’s account of Priscian’s understanding of the conjunction,

cf. Peter of Spain, Syncategoreumata. First Critical Edition with an Introduction &
Indexes by L. M. di Rijk. With an English Translation by Joke Spruyt, p. 199:

Now the word ‘if’ signifies cause or causality. Therefore it signifies antecedence and not
consecution. Furthermore, it may be argued that it signifies consecution on account of the
definition of ‘conjunction’ given by Priscian:1 “A conjunction is an indeclinable part of speech
that conjoins other parts of speech and displays a force or an order”. Priscian explains2 this as
follows: conjunctions that signify a force are the ones that signify certain things to be
simultaneous (e.g. ‘Aeneas was pious and brave’), and those conjunctions signify an order that
display a consequence of certain states of affairs (e.g. ‘If he is walking, he is moving’). Now
the word ‘if’ and the like signify an order. Therefore they signify consequences or states of
affairs or a consecution. Hence they do not signify antecedence.
1
Inst. gramm. XVI 1, p. 93(2-3), ed. Hertz.
2
Ibid., p. 93(4-6).

Cf. Peter of Spain, Tractatus Syncategorematum (ap. Peter of Spain, Tractatus Syncate-
gorematum and Selected Anonymous Treatises. Translated by Joseph P. Mullaley, Ph.D, pp.
77-78):

The conjunction “or” (vel) is one which does not signify a comparison according to the prior
and the posterior but only a comparison of simultaneously existing things by disjoining any
two things with respect to some third, so that the conjunction “is” posits the disjuncts to exist
simultaneously and it is indifferently related to each. But it does not posit that with respect to
which the disjunction exists, as simultaneously existing in them. Hence, when Sortes or Plato
is running, Sortes and Plato are posited simultaneously as mutually existing; nevertheless they
are not posited simultaneously as running. One ought to understand the statement of Boethius15
in this way when he says that the disjunctive conjunction means this because it does not allow
those things which it conjoins to exist simultaneously. It is the same in the case of the
definition of Priscian16 when he says disjunctive conjunctions are those which, although they
conjoin words, nevertheless disjoin meanings. Indeed, they signify that one thing is, but that
the other is not. Thus it is clear that the disjunctive con- [77-78] junction signifies that things
exist simultaneously but it disjoins them with respect to a third.
15
De Syllogismo Hypothetico (PL 64, 834 CD).
16
Inst. Gram., xvi, 7, 17-18.

Cf. Boethius, De Hypotheticis Syllogismus, Liber 3. (tr. B.A.M.):

1
Cf. Inst. gramm., xvi. 10-11: “For they always consignify—that is, they signify when conjoined to the
others—but by themselves they do not”.

106
 For when we say Either a is or b is or [when] we vary the same propositions in some other
way, the disjunctive conjunction which is put down cannot permit them to exist at the same
time.1

Cf. Priscian, Inst. Gram., xvi, 7, 17-18 (tr. B.A.M.):

Disjunctives are those which, although they conjoin words, nevertheless disjoin meanings, and
they signify that one thing exists but another does not, such as ‘ve, vel, aut’ [= ‘or’].2

N.B. Inasmuch as ‘to conjoin’ is to make one thing out of two or more things (or simply “out
of more than one thing”), it follows that a disjunctive is that which makes two or more things
out of at least one thing. But, as Priscian states, it does this by disjoining the meanings while
conjoining the words. Hence, to take Peter of Spain’s example, when I say “Either Socrates
or Plato is running”, Socrates and Plato are posited as existing at the same time, but not as
running at the same time. “Thus,” says Peter, “it is clear that the disjunctive conjunction
signifies that things exist simultaneously but it disjoins them with respect to a third”, the
‘third’ being the predicate “is running”, being that with respect to which the disjunction
“Either Socrates or Plato” is posited. It is instructive here to compare Cajetan’s explanation
of the determiner ‘every’ given above. In both cases, the ‘relativity’ of a syncategorematic
word is evident, since it must be taken with reference to something else in order to be
understood. Note further that in the foregoing discussion, ‘simultaneous existence’ applies
to the two principal species of coordinating conjunctions, namely, the conjunctive or
copulative, and the disjunctive. Those, on the other hand, which ‘display’ an ‘order’ in their
meaning—that is, a before and after in the form of a ‘consequence’ or ‘following after’ (Gr.
akolouthia)—are the subordinating conjunctions, which Priscian treats next. Also on these
matters cf. the following: Peter of Spain, op.cit., pp. 80-81:

Having spoken of the disjunctive conjunction “or” (vel), we now treat of the copulative
conjunction “and” which is called copulative not because it signifies a connection but because
it signifies a comparison which exists simultaneously or according to simultaneity. And the
connection follows from simultaneity just as exclusion naturally follows from my expression
“not with another.” Hence when I say: “Sortes and Plato are white,” the conjunction “and”
affirms their simultaneity and oneness in whiteness. And on that account it unites them in
whiteness. It does not however indicate simultaneity in time, because this would be false:
“Adam and Noah were two men,” because they did not exist at the same time; but nevertheless
one correctly asserts: “He ran yesterday and he is running today and he will run tomorrow,”
yet these acts of running do not exist at the same time. But primarily and essentially it affirms
the simultaneity of many subjects in one accident insofar as it enjoys being or of many
accidents in one subject, for example, “Sortes and Plato are white” and “Sortes is seated and
he also is arguing.”
Hence it must be noted that “a unit” [= “something one”] is spoken of in many ways, for one
kind of thing is a unit consisting of matter and form, as man is a composite of body and soul;
in another way there is a unit by continuity, for example, a line, a surface, time and any
continuum; in a third way there is a unit by grafting, for example, in the case of a tree a unit
follows from the grafting of a branch of one tree and the trunk of another tree; in a fourth way
by contiguity, as it exists where there are two bodies between which there is no intermediate,

1
Cum enim dicimus: Aut a est aut b est, aut easdem propositiones quolibet modo alio uariamus, id et coniunctio
quae disiunctiua ponitur sentit simul eas esse non posse.
2
Disiunctivae sunt, quae quamvis dictiones coniungunt, sensum tamen [7] disiunctum et alteram quidem rem
esse, alteram vero non esse significant, ut ‘ve, vel, aut’.

107
 for example, a finger is contiguous to a finger because there is nothing in between; in a fifth
way by a collection, for example, from flesh and bone a third unit comes into existence which
is neither wholly flesh nor wholly bone, as are the nerves and cartilages; in a sixth way by
addition, for example, a multitude of stones. And in this last way the conjunction “and”
produces unity but not in the other aforementioned ways. Thus the copulated term is one by
addition. But this union though absolute, the conjunction “and” diversifies, because at times
it is opposed to unity, for example, “Man is a body and a soul,” and the copulate whole
produces a unit by the unity of the individual. Therefore it can be subject to a verb which is
singular in number, for example, “A rational soul and flesh constitute one man.” Sometimes
it is held copulatively in the proper sense and then only does it conjoin diverse objects which
enjoy difference among themselves but agreement with respect to something else. Because the
conjunction “and” refers equally to each of the extremes, for this reason, whenever it is placed
in front of one of the extremes, it is necessary that it be repeated and placed before the other
extreme in order that [80-81] it may be related equally to each, and that it not be related more
to that before which it is placed. The copulate whole then produces a unit by addition and
posits a multitude absolutely. Then alone is it subject to a verb of plural number, for example,
“Sortes and Plato are running.
Further, note that although the copulative “and” ought to connect different things, it never-
theless does not connect anything whatever, because it does not join an adjective to a
substantive, nor vice versa, for example, “A white man is running,” because of the fact that,
of itself, it affirms a certain conjoining or association of something or other with some kind of
a thing. Hence it is equally related to each. And so the cause of every copulative conjunction,
except an enclitic, is its equal reference to each of the extremes. Therefore, primarily and
essentially the conjunction “and” conjoins two substances to one act or two acts to one
substance, as, for example, “Sortes and Plato are white” or “The man is reading and also
arguing.” Hence, although this conjunction “and” more properly conjoins different subjects
and different things which are signified as similarly conditioned, for example, “A man and a
horse are running,” it can, nevertheless, conjoin different subjects with a unified signification,
for example, “A man and a man are running,” because in the case of general terms the plural
repeats the singular. But one correctly says: “Men are,” therefore one correctly says “A man
and a man are.” Moreover such are the subjects as are permitted by their predicates. But when
one affirms: “A man and a man are running,” the predicate requires that the term “man” be
held for different men. But if it is held for different men, one correctly says: “A man and a
man are running.

19. On the nature of conjunction.

As is clear from a text of St. Thomas cited above (sec. 13; cf. In I Sent., dist. 21, q.
2, art. 1, c.), composition involves a kind of ‘conjoining’ or ‘conjunction’; but this is a form
of ‘union’ and hence a relation, as may be gathered from the following texts:

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Sent., dist. 4, q. 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

I reply that it must be said to the first question, that conjunction imports a kind of uniting [or
‘making one’, adunatio], and so wherever there is a ‘making one’ of certain things there must
be a certain conjunction.1

Cf. also In III Sent., dist. 5, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

1
Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod conjunctio adunationem quamdam importat; unde
ubicumque est adunatio aliquorum, ibi est aliqua conjunctio.

108
 I reply that it must be said to the first question that union is a certain relation....Now ‘unition’
[or ‘uniting] is a certain action or passion by [means of] which one thing is in some way
effected [or ‘produced’] out of many things; and this action follows upon such a relation which
is union.1

Cf. also Priscian, Inst. gramm., xvi. 10-11 (pp. 114-115) (ed. Hertz, tr. B.A.M.):

But copulative and disjunctive conjunctions are recognizably different from the other parts of
speech, which are made one by them, as ‘vel, aut’ [‘or, or’] are not only disjunctive, but also
are found copulative....2

Cf. also Aristotle, Rhet., III. 12 (1413b 32—1414a 6) (tr. Theodore Buckley):

...[F]or the connective [or ‘conjunction’, = sundesmos] makes many one; so that if it be taken
away, it is evident that on the contrary one will be many.3

Hence, insofar as conjunction makes many things one, it is a species of relation.4 For a
helpful account of the primary division of conjunctions, cf. the following witnesses:

Cf. “Universal Grammar”. Encyclopedia Britannica (1st. ed, 1771), Of Conjunctions:

A conjunction is “a part of speech void of signification itself, but so formed as to help

signification, by making two or more significant sentences to be one significant sentence.”
As, therefore, it is the essence of a conjunction to connect sentences; at the same time that they
do this, they must either “connect” their meaning or “not.” For example, let us take these two
sentences, “Rome was enslaved,” — “Caesar was ambitions,” and connect them together by
the conjunction BECAUSE; “Rome was enslaved, BECAUSE Caesar was ambitious.” Here
the meaning, as well as the sentences, appear to be connected. But if I say, “manners must be
reformed, OR liberty will be lost;” here the conjunction OR, though it join the sentences, yet,
as to their respective meanings, is a perfect disjunctive.And thus it appears, that though all
conjunctions conjoin sentences, yet, with respect to the sense, some are conjunctive, others
are disjunctive.

Cf. also Gould Brown, The Grammar of English Grammars (1851):

1
Respondeo dicendum, ad primam quaestionem, quod unio relatio quaedam est.... Unitio autem est quaedam
actio vel passio qua ex multis efficitur aliquo modo unum; et hanc actionem sequitur ista relatio quae est unio.
2
coniunctiones quoque copulativae et disiunctivae esse dinoscuntur ab aliis partibus orationis, quae eis
sociantur, ut ‘vel, aut’ non solum disiunctivae, sed etiam copulativae reperiuntur....
3
o( ga\r su/ndesmoj e(\n poiei= ta\ polla/, w(/ste e)a\n e)caireqh=?, dh=lon o(/ti tou)nanti/on e)/stai to\ e(\n polla/. e)/xei ou)=n
au)/chsin. Cf. also Poet. ch. 20 (1457a 4-5) (ed. R. Kassel; tr. B.A.M.): “Or else [a conjunction is] a non-significant vocal
sound which [5] out of more than one significant vocal sound is naturally apt to produce [or ‘effect’, or ‘make’] one
significant vocal sound”; (h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ e)k pleio/nwn me\n [5] fwnw=n mia=j shmantikw=n de\ poiei=n pe/fuken mi/an
shmantikh\n fwnh/n). As I have argued elsewhere, I take this portion of Aristotle’s text, although missing its examples, to
refer to every species of conjunction.
4
It may also be added that, as Aristotle makes clear in his various accounts of what it is to be one (for which,
see elsewhere), things that are one by conjunction must be distinguished from those that are one by signi-fying
one thing, as is the case with (real) definitions. In the latter instance, the parts stand to one another as potency
to act inasmuch as the last differentia determines what comes before it, as ‘with reason’ determines ‘animal’
in the definition of ‘man’, such members being reached by a per se division of the genus. Where, on the other
hand, the parts stand to one another just as it happens, as is the case with an accidental definition (an example
of which is the definition of ‘angler’ arrived at in Plato’s Sophist), no such unity exists. Similarly, a thing one
by conjunction differs from a composition wherein the parts are mutually adapted and hence articulated, as is
the case with a harmony of sounds, or speech disposed in members.

109
A Conjunction is a word used to connect words or sentences in construction, and to show the
dependence of the terms so connected: as, “Thou and he are happy, because you are good.”—
Murray. Conjunctions are divided into two general classes, copulative and disjunctive; and a
few of each class are particularly distinguished from the rest, as being corresponsive. A
copulative conjunction is a conjunction that denotes an addition, a cause, a consequence, or a
supposition: as, “He and I shall not dispute; for, if he has any choice, I shall readily grant it.”
A disjunctive conjunction is a conjunction that denotes opposition of meaning: as, “Though
he were dead, yet shall he live.”—St. John's Gospel....The corresponsive conjunctions are
those which are used in pairs, so that one refers or answers to the other: as, “John came neither
eating nor drinking.”—Matt., xi, 18.

110
20. Supplement: St. Thomas Aquinas’ explanation ofAristotle on the nature of the verb.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri., lect. 5, nn. 15-22 (on 16b 19-23) (= Aristotle: On Inter-
pretation. Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan. Translated from the Latin with an
Introduction by Jean T. Oesterle. Milwaukee 1962, pp. 49-53) (tr. slightly rev. B.A.M.):

LB1 LC-5N.15

deinde cum dicit: ipsa itaque etc., ostendit con- 15. He points out the conformity between verbs
venientiam verborum ad nomina. et circa hoc duo and names where [16b19] he says, Verbs in
facit: primo, proponit quod intendit; secundo, themselves, said alone, are names. He proposes
manifestat propositum; this first and then manifests it.

ibi: et significant aliquid etc.. dicit ergo primo, He says then, first, that verbs said by themselves
quod ipsa verba secundum se dicta sunt nomina: are names.

quod a quibusdam exponitur de verbis quae
sumuntur in vi nominis, ut dictum est, sive sint
infinitivi modi; ut cum dico, currere est moveri,
sive sint alterius modi; ut cum dico, curro est
verbum.
Some have taken this to mean the verbs that are
taken with the force [49-50] of names, either verbs
of the infinitive mode, as in “To run is to be
moving,” or verbs of another mode, as in
“Matures is a verb.”

sed haec non videtur esse intentio aristotelis, quia
ad hanc intentionem non respondent sequentia. et
ideo aliter dicendum est quod nomen hic sumitur,
prout communiter significat quamlibet dictionem
impositam ad significandum aliquam rem.
But this does not seem to be what Aristotle
means, for it does not correspond to what he says
next. Therefore “name” must be taken in another
way here, i.e. as it commonly signifies any word
whatsoever that is imposed to signify a thing.

et quia etiam ipsum agere vel pati est quaedam Now, since to act or to be acted upon is also a
res, inde est quod et ipsa verba in quantum certain thing, verbs themselves as they name, i.e.,
nominant, idest significant agere vel pati, sub as they signify to act or to be acted upon, are
nominibus comprehenduntur communiter comprehended under names taken commonly.
acceptis.

nomen autem, prout a verbo distinguitur,
significat rem sub determinato modo, prout
scilicet potest intelligi ut per se existens. unde
nomina possunt subiici et praedicari.
The name as distinguished from the verb signi-
fies the thing under a determinate mode, i.e. ac-
cording as the thing can be understood as existing
per se. This is the reason names can be subjected
and predicated.

LB1 LC-5N.16

deinde cum dicit: et significant aliquid etc.,
probat propositum. et primo, per hoc quod verba
significant aliquid, sicut et nomina; secundo, per
hoc quod non significant verum vel falsum, sicut
nec nomina; ibi: sed si est, aut non est etc..
[16b20] 16. He proves the point he has just made
when he says and signifies something, etc., first
by showing that, like names, they do not signify
truth or falsity when he says, for the verb is not a
sign of the being or nonbeing of a thing.

dicit ergo primo quod in tantum dictum est quod
verba sunt nomina, in quantum significant
aliquid. et hoc probat, quia supra dictum est quod
voces significativae significant intellectus.
He says first that verbs have been said to be
names only inasmuch as they signify a [16b22]
thing. Then he proves this: it has already been
said that significant vocal sound signifies
thought; hence it is proper to significant vocal

111
unde proprium vocis significativae est quod sound to produce something understood in the
generet aliquem intellectum in animo audientis. mind of the one who hears it.

et ideo ad ostendendum quod verbum sit vox
significativa, assumit quod ille, qui dicit verbum,
constituit intellectum in animo audientis. et ad
hoc manifestandum inducit quod ille, qui audit,
quiescit.
To show, then, that a verb is significant vocal
sound he assumes that the one who utters a verb
brings about understanding in the mind of the one
who hears it. The evidence he introduces for this
is that the mind of the one who hears it is set at
rest.

LB1 LC-5N.17

sed hoc videtur esse falsum: quia sola oratio
perfecta facit quiescere intellectum, non autem
nomen, neque verbum si per se dicatur. si enim
dicam, homo, suspensus est animus audientis,
quid de eo dicere velim; si autem dico, currit,
suspensus est eius animus de quo dicam.
17. But what Aristotle says here seems to be
false, for it is only perfect speech that makes the
intellect rest. The name or the verb said by
themselves, do not do this. For example, if I say
“man,” the mind of the hearer is left in suspense
as to what I wish to say about man; and if I say
“runs,” the hearer’s mind is left in suspense as to
whom I am speaking of.

sed dicendum est quod cum duplex sit intel-
lectus operatio, ut supra habitum est, ille qui dicit
nomen vel verbum secundum se, constituit
intellectum quantum ad primam operationem,
quae est simplex conceptio alicuius,
It should be said in answer to this objection that
the operation of the intellect is twofold, as was
said above, and therefore the one who utters a
name or a verb by itself, determines the intellect
with respect to the first operation, which is the
simple conception of something.

et secundum hoc, quiescit audiens, qui in sus- It is in relation to this that the one hearing, whose
penso erat antequam nomen vel verbum profer- mind was undetermined before the name or the
retur et eius prolatio terminaretur; verb was being uttered and its utterance termin-
ated, is set at rest.

non autem constituit intellectum quantum ad
secundam operationem, quae est intellectus
componentis et dividentis, ipsum verbum vel
nomen per se dictum: nec quantum ad hoc facit
quiescere audientem.
LB1 LC-5N.18
Neither the name nor the verb said by itself,
however, determines the intellect in respect to the
second operation, which is the operation of the
intellect composing and dividing; nor do the verb
and the name said alone set the hearer’s mind at
rest in respect to this operation. [50-52]

et ideo statim subdit: sed si est, aut non est,
nondum significat, idest nondum significat
aliquid per modum compositionis et divisionis,
aut veri vel falsi. et hoc est secundum, quod
probare intendit.
18. Aristotle therefore immediately adds, but
they do not yet signify [16b21] whether a thing is
or is not, i.e., they do not yet signify something
by way of composition and division, or by way
of truth or falsity.

probat autem consequenter per illa verba, quae
maxime videntur significare veritatem vel falsi-
tatem, scilicet ipsum verbum quod est esse, et
verbum infinitum quod est non esse; quorum
neutrum per se dictum est significativum very-
tatis vel falsitatis in re; unde multo minus alia.
This is the second thing he intends to prove,68 and
he proves it by the verbs that especially seem to
signify truth or falsity, namely the verb to be and
the infinite verb to non-be, neither of which, said
by itself, signifies real truth or falsity; much less
so any other verbs.

112
vel potest intelligi hoc generaliter dici de
omnibus verbis. quia enim dixerat quod verbum
non significat si est res vel non est, hoc
consequenter manifestat, quia nullum verbum est
significativum esse rei vel non esse, idest quod
res sit vel non sit.
This could also be understood in a more general
way, i.e., that here he is speaking of all verbs; for
he says that the verb does not signify whether a
thing is or is not; he manifests this further,
therefore, by saying that no verb is significative
of a thing’s being or non-being, i.e. that a thing
is or is not.

quamvis enim omne verbum finitum implicet
esse, quia currere est currentem esse, et omne
verbum infinitum implicet non esse, quia non
currere est non currentem esse; tamen nullum
verbum significat hoc totum, scilicet rem esse vel
non esse.
For although every finite verb implies being, for
“to run” is “to be running,” and every infinite
verb implies non-being, for “to non-run” is “to be
non-running,” nevertheless no verb signifies the
whole, i.e., a thing is or a thing is not.

LB1 LC-5N.19

et hoc consequenter probat per id, de quo magis 19. He proves this point from something in which
videtur cum subdit: it will be clearer when he adds,

nec si hoc ipsum est purum dixeris, ipsum Nor would it be a sign of the being or nonbeing
quidem nihil est. of a [19b23] thing if you were to say “is” alone,69
for it is nothing.

ubi notandum est quod in graeco habetur: neque It should be noted that the Greek text has the
si ens ipsum nudum dixeris, ipsum quidem nihil word “being” in place of “is” here.
est.

ad probandum enim quod verba non significant
rem esse vel non esse, assumpsit id quod est fons
et origo ipsius esse, scilicet ipsum ens, de quo
dicit quod nihil est (ut alexander exponit),
In order to prove that verbs do not signify that a
thing is or is not, he takes the source and origin
of to be [esse], i.e. being [ens] itself, of which he
says, for it is nothing. Alexander explains this
passage in the following way:

quia ens aequivoce dicitur de decem praedica-
mentis; omne autem aequivocum per se positum
nihil significat, nisi aliquid addatur quod deter-
minet eius significationem; unde nec ipsum est
per se dictum significat quod est vel non est.
Aristotle says being itself is nothing because
“being” [ens] is said equivocally of the ten pre-
dicaments; now an equivocal name used by it-
self signifies nothing unless something is added
to determine its signification; hence, “is” [est]
said by itself does not signify what is or what is
not.

sed haec expositio non videtur conveniens, tum But this explanation is not appropriate for this
quia ens non dicitur proprie aequivoce, sed text. In the first place “being” is not, strictly
secundum prius et posterius; speaking, said equivocally but according to the
prior and the posterior.

unde simpliciter dictum intelligitur de eo, quod
per prius dicitur: tum etiam, quia dictio
aequivoca non nihil significat, sed multa
significat; et quandoque hoc, quandoque illud per
ipsam accipitur: tum etiam, quia talis expositio
non multum facit ad intentionem praesentem.
Consequently, said absolutely, it is understood of
that of which it is said primarily. Secondly, an
equivocal word does not signify nothing, but
many things, sometimes being taken for one,
sometimes for another. Thirdly, such an explan-
ation does not have much application here.

113
unde porphyrius aliter exposuit quod hoc ipsum
ens non significat naturam alicuius rei, sicut hoc
nomen homo vel sapiens, sed solum designat
quamdam coniunctionem; unde subdit quod
consignificat quamdam compositionem, quam
sine compositis non est intelligere.
sed neque hoc convenienter videtur dici: quia si
non significaret aliquam rem, sed solum coni-
unctionem, non esset neque nomen, neque ver-
bum, sicut nec praepositiones aut coniunctiones.
et ideo aliter exponendum est, sicut ammonius
exponit, quod ipsum ens nihil est, idest non
significat verum vel falsum. et rationem huius
assignat, cum subdit: consignificat autem quam-
dam compositionem.
nec accipitur hic, ut ipse dicit, consignificat, sicut
cum dicebatur quod verbum consignificat
tempus, sed consignificat, idest cum alio
significat, scilicet alii adiunctum compositionem
significat, quae non potest intelligi sine extremis
compositionis.
sed quia hoc commune est omnibus nominibus et
verbis, non videtur haec expositio esse secundum
intentionem aristotelis, qui assumpsit ipsum ens
quasi quoddam speciale.
LB1 LC-5N.20
et ideo ut magis sequamur verba aristotelis
considerandum est quod ipse dixerat quod
verbum non significat rem esse vel non esse, sed
nec ipsum ens significat rem esse vel non esse.
et hoc est quod dicit, nihil est, idest non significat
aliquid esse. etenim hoc maxime videbatur de
hoc quod dico ens: quia ens nihil est aliud quam
quod est.
114
And so Porphyry explains in another way that
this “being” [ens] itself does not signify the
nature of a thing as the name “man” or “wise” do,
but only designates a certain conjunction and this
is why he [Aristotle] adds, it signifies with a
composition, which cannot be conceived apart
from the things composing it. [51-52]
68
Cf. n. 16 of St. Thomas’s Commentary for this di-
vision.
69
The Greek text has to/ o)\n here; the Latin, est.
This explanation does not seem to be consistent
with the text either, for if “being” itself does not
signify a thing, but only a conjunction, it, like
prepositions and conjunctions, is neither a name
nor a verb.
Therefore this should be explained in another
way, as Ammonius explains it. He says “being
itself is nothing” means that it does not signify
truth or falsity. And he assigns the reason for this
when he says, it consignifies, however, a certain
composition.
Nor is consignifies taken here, as he states, as
when it is said that the verb consignifies time; but
it “consignifies”, i.e. it signifies with another,
that is to say, adjoined to another it signifies
composition, which cannot be understood with-
out the extremes of the composition.
But this explanation does not seem to be in
accordance with the intention of Aristotle, for it
is common to all names and verbs not to signify
truth or falsity, whereas Aristotle takes “being”
here as though it were something special.
20. Therefore in order to understand what
Aristotle is saying we should note that he has just
said that the verb does not signify that a thing
exists or does not exist [rem esse vel non esse];
nor does “being” [ens] signify that a thing exists
or does not exist.
This is what he means when he says, it is no-
thing, i.e., it does not signify that a thing exists.
This is indeed most clearly seen in saying “be-
ing” [ens], because being is nothing other than
that which is.
et sic videtur et rem significare, per hoc quod
dico quod et esse, per hoc quod dico est. et si
quidem haec dictio ens significaret esse
principaliter, sicut significat rem quae habet esse,
procul dubio significaret aliquid esse.
And thus we see that it signifies both a thing,
when I say “that which,” and existence [esse]
when I say “is” [est]. If the word “being” [ens] as
signifying a thing having existence were to
signify existence [esse] principally, without a
doubt it would signify that a thing exists.

sed ipsam compositionem, quae importatur in
hoc quod dico est, non principaliter significat,
sed consignificat eam in quantum significat rem
habentem esse.
But the word “being” [ens] does not principally
signify the composition that is implied in saying
“is” [est]; rather, it signifies with composition
inasmuch as it signifies the thing having exis-
tence.

unde talis consignificatio compositionis non
sufficit ad veritatem vel falsitatem: quia
compositio, in qua consistit veritas et falsitas,
non potest intelligi, nisi secundum quod innectit
extrema compositionis.
Such signifying with composition is not suffice-
ent for truth or falsity; for the composition in
which truth and falsity consists cannot be under-
stood unless it connects the extremes of a com-
position.

LB1 LC-5N.21

si vero dicatur, nec ipsum esse, ut libri nostri
habent, planior est sensus. quod enim nullum
verbum significat rem esse vel non esse, probat
per hoc verbum est, quod secundum se dictum,
non significat aliquid esse, licet significet esse.
21. If in place of what Aristotle says we say nor
would “to be” itself [nec ipsum esse], as it is in
our texts, the meaning is clearer.70 For Aristotle
proves through the verb “is” [est] that no verb
signifies that a thing exists or does not exist,
since “is” said by itself does not signify that a
thing exists, although it signifies existence.

et quia hoc ipsum esse videtur compositio And because to be itself seems to be a kind of
quaedam, et ita hoc verbum est, quod significat composition, so also the verb “is” [est], which
esse, potest videri significare compositionem, in signifies to be, can seem to signify the com-
qua sit verum vel falsum; position in which there is truth or falsity.

ad hoc excludendum subdit quod illa compos- To exclude this Aristotle adds that the composi-
itio, quam significat hoc verbum est, non potest tion which the verb “is” signifies cannot be
intelligi sine componentibus: understood without the compos- [52-53]
70
The Greek to/ o)\n is closer to this reading.

ing things.

quia dependet eius intellectus ab extremis, quae
si non apponantur, non est perfectus intellectus
compositionis, ut possit in ea esse verum, vel
falsum.
The reason for this is that an understanding of the
composition which “is” signifies depends on the
extremes, and unless they are added, under-
standing of the composition is not complete and
hence cannot be true or false.

LB1 LC-5N.22

ideo autem dicit quod hoc verbum est 22. Therefore he says that the verb “is” signifies
consignificat compositionem, quia non eam with composition; for it does not signify com-
principaliter significat, sed ex consequenti; position principally but consequently.

115
significat enim primo illud quod cadit in It primarily signifies that which is perceived in
intellectu per modum actualitatis absolute: nam the mode of actuality absolutely; for “is” said
est, simpliciter dictum, significat in actu esse; et simply, signifies to be in act, and therefore
ideo significat per modum verbi. signifies in the mode of a verb.

quia vero actualitas, quam principaliter signify- However, the actuality which the verb “is”
cat hoc verbum est, est communiter actualitas principally signifies is the actuality of every form
omnis formae, vel actus substantialis vel acci- commonly, whether substantial or accidental.
dentalis,

inde est quod cum volumus significare
quamcumque formam vel actum actualiter inesse
alicui subiecto, significamus illud per hoc
verbum est, vel simpliciter vel secundum quid:
simpliciter quidem secundum praesens tempus;
secundum quid autem secundum alia tempora. et
ideo ex consequenti hoc verbum est significat
compositionem.
Hence, when we wish to signify that any form or
act is actually in some subject we signify it
through the verb “is,” either absolutely or rela-
tively; absolutely, according to present time,
relatively, according to other times; and for this
reason the verb “is” signifies composition, not
principally, but consequently.

116
21. On the several considerations of speech.

Cf. Simplicius of Cilicia, Comm. in Arist. Cat. 10, 24-25 (In: Michael Chase [trans.], Sim-
plicius. On Aristotle’s Categories 1-4. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, pp. 25-26)
(insertions {between curved braces} by B.A.M.):

[for this passage, see Part I, sec. 1 supra]

Cf. ibid., p. 27:

[idem]

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., Proem, nn. 2-3 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB1 LC-1N.-2

si quis autem quaerat, cum in libro praedica-
mentorum de simplicibus dictum sit, quae fuit
necessitas ut hic rursum de nomine et verbo
determinaretur; ad hoc dicendum quod simpli-
cium dictionum triplex potest esse consideratio.
But if one were to ask, since in the book of the
Predicaments he had spoken about simple words,
why it was necessary that here, besides, the name
and the verb were determined about; to this it
must said that there can be a threefold consider-
ation of simple words.

una quidem, secundum quod absolute signi- One, according as they signify absolutely a sim-
ficant simplices intellectus, et sic earum consi- ple understanding, and in this way their consi-
deratio pertinet ad librum praedicamentorum. deration pertains to the book of the Predica-
ments.

alio modo, secundum rationem, prout sunt partes In another way, according to the notion they have
enunciationis; et sic determinatur de eis in hoc as parts of an enunciation; and thus they are de-
libro; termined about in this book.

et ideo traduntur sub ratione nominis et verbi: de
quorum ratione est quod significent aliquid cum
tempore vel sine tempore, et alia huiusmodi,
quae pertinent ad rationem dictionum, secundum
quod constituunt enunciationem.
And so they are treated under the ratio of the
name and the verb, to whose notion it belongs
that they signify something with time or without
it, and other things of this kind, which belong to
the notion of words, according as they constitute
an enunciation.

tertio modo, considerantur secundum quod ex eis In a third way, they are considered according as
constituitur ordo syllogisticus, et sic from them a syllogistic order is constituted, and
determinatur de eis sub ratione terminorum in thus they are determined about under the charac-
libro priorum. ter of terms in the Prior Analytics.

LB1 LC-1N.-3

potest iterum dubitari quare, praetermissis aliis Again, one might wonder why, having consi-
orationis partibus, de solo nomine et verbo dered earlier the other parts of speech he deter-
determinet. mines only about the name and the verb.

ad quod dicendum est quod, quia de simplici To this it must be said that, because he intends to
enunciatione determinare intendit, sufficit ut determine about the simple enunciation, it

117
solas illas partes enunciationis pertractet, ex suffices that only those parts of the enunciation
quibus ex necessitate simplex oratio constat. be treated out of which of necessity simple
speech consists.

potest autem ex solo nomine et verbo simplex Now a simple enunciation can be made solely
enunciatio fieri, non autem ex aliis orationis from the name and verb, but not from the other
partibus sine his; parts of speech without these.

et ideo sufficiens ei fuit de his duabus deter- And therefore it suffices for him to determine
minare. about these two things.

vel potest dici quod sola nomina et verba sunt Or it may be said that only the name and the verb
principales orationis partes. are [the] principal parts of speech.

sub nominibus enim comprehenduntur prono- For under names are comprehended pronouns,
mina, quae, etsi non nominant naturam, person- which, although they do not name a nature,
am tamen determinant, et ideo loco nominum nevertheless, determine a person, and therefore
ponuntur: are put in place of names.

sub verbo vero participium, quod consignificat But under the verb, the participle, because it con-
tempus: quamvis et cum nomine convenientiam signifies time, although it have an agreement
habeat. with the noun.

alia vero sunt magis colligationes partium
orationis, significantes habitudinem unius ad
aliam, quam orationis partes; sicut clavi et alia
huiusmodi non sunt partes navis, sed partium
navis coniunctiones.
But the others are more bonds of the parts of
speech, signifying the relationship of one thing to
another, than parts of speech [themselves]; just
as spikes [or nails] and other things of this kind
are not parts of a ship, but ‘conjunctions’ of the
parts of a ship.

118
22. The several considerations of speech in sum.

As we have seen, Simplicius distinguishes the consideration of “simple words sig-

nificant of realities, qua significant” from their consideration “qua simple expressions”.1
Likewise, complex speech has a twofold consideration, as Aristotle explains:

Yet every instance of speech is not a proposition; only such are propositions as have in them
either truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is speech, but is neither true nor false. [5] Let us therefore
dismiss all other types of speech but the proposition, for this last concerns our present inquiry,
whereas the investigation of the others belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or of poetry.2

In the second case, the consideration is proper to rhetoric and poetic, whereas the first is
proper to the logician strictly so called. St. Thomas lays out these distinctions, together with
an additional one, in the following text:

Enunciative speech belongs to the present consideration. The reason for this is that the con-
sideration of this book is ordered directly to demonstrative science, in which the soul of man
is led by an act of reasoning to assent to truth from those things that are proper to the thing;
and so to this end the demonstrator uses nothing except enunciative speech which signifies
things according as truth about them is in the soul. The rhetorician and the poet, on the other
hand, induce assent to what they intend not only through what is proper to the thing, but also
through the dispositions of the hearer. Hence, rhetoricians and poets for the most part strive to
move their hearers by arousing certain passions in the them as the Philosopher says in his
Rhetoric [cf. Bk. I, 2, 1356a 2, 1356a 14; Bk. III, 1, 1403b 12]. And so the consideration of
the species of speech mentioned, which pertains to the ordination of the hearer toward
something, falls to the consideration of rhetoric or poetics by reason of its sense; but to the
consideration of the grammarian as regards a fitting construction of the vocal sounds is con-
sidered in them.3

We see, then, that in this perspective there is also a consideration of speech proper to the
grammarian. Now as is clear from elsewhere in St. Thomas’ commentary, the subject of the
grammarian’s consideration is oratio perfecta, ‘perfect speech’, which we call a sentence,
being that which “completes a thought” [perfectae orationis, quae complet sententiam], and
“make[s] perfect sense in the soul of the hearer [(facit) perfectum sensum in animo
audientis]” (cf. In I Peri Herm., lect. 7, n. 4).4

1
Simplicius of Cilicia, Comm. in Arist. Cat. 10, 24-25 (In: Michael Chase [trans.], Simplicius. On Aristotle’s
Categories 1-4. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, pp. 25-26).
2
Aristotle, De Int. (On Interpretation) I. 4 (17a 2-7) (tr. E. M. Edghill; slightly rev. B.A.M.).
3
In I Peri Herm., lect. 7, n. 6. (tr. B.A.M.): sed enunciativa oratio praesentis considerationis est. cuius ratio
est, quia consideratio huius libri directe ordinatur ad scientiam demonstrativam, in qua animus hominis per
rationem inducitur ad consentiendum vero ex his quae sunt propria rei; et ideo demonstrator non utitur ad
suum finem nisi enunciativis orationibus, significantibus res secundum quod earum veritas est in anima. sed
rhetor et poeta inducunt ad assentiendum ei quod intendunt, non solum per ea quae sunt propria rei, sed etiam
per dispositiones audientis. unde rhetores et poetae plerumque movere auditores nituntur provocando eos ad
aliquas passiones, ut philosophus dicit in sua rhetorica. et ideo consideratio dictarum specierum orationis,
quae pertinet ad ordinationem audientis in aliquid, cadit proprie sub consideratione rhetoricae vel poeticae,
ratione sui significati; ad considerationem autem grammatici, prout consideratur in eis congrua vocum
constructio.
4
Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm. ii. 4. 14 (tr. B.A.M.): Oratio est ordinatio dictionum congrua, sententiam perfectam
demonstrans; “Speech is a fitting ordering of words, expressing a complete thought”. Note that in the foregoing
definition, sententiam means ‘thought’, whereas the imposition of the name ‘sentence’ as we understand it is
of later origin. See my separate discussion.

119
 Seeing, then, that there are several considerations of speech, to which does the in-
vestigation of categorematic and syncategorematic words properly pertain? As we have seen,
Simplicius, writing in the 6th cent. A.D., had occasion to advert to this distinction in his
commentary on the Categories, wherein he informs us that

qua expressions, they have other fields of study, which are dealt with by Theophrastus in his
work on the elements of speech, [10,25] as well as by his followers, who wrote [on such topics
as] whether nouns and verbs are the [sole] elements of speech, or whether articles,
conjunctions, and other such things are also – these, too, are parts of vocabulary (lexis {=
‘language’}), but the parts of speech (logos) are nouns and verbs.1

Then, quoting Porphyry’s citation of Boethus of Sidon (2nd cent. B.C.),2 he adds:

...[B]ut [{the Categories} deals with these] qua significant of primary and simple beings, and
not in so far as they decline or are transformed in order to accord [with certain words], or
undergo such-and-such modifications (pathê) and have such-and-such forms (ideai), all of
[35] which <is> the domain of the investigation of expressions qua expressions.3

That is to say, lexis or ‘language’ and its parts, considered as lexis, or as such,4 have a con-
sideration of their own, a position we observe him to have taken from the much earlier writer
Boethus of Sidon by way of Porphyry, it being ultimately traced back to “Theophrastus and
his followers”. But, as we have also seen, a place where the consideration of this division of
words has a place is Aristotle’s work Peri Hermeneias, or On Interpretation—that is, “on
interpretative speech”, the latter term being understood as speech in which the true or false
is found—which is to say, the enunciation (or ‘proposition’, or ‘statement’, as the word is
also translated), inasmuch as one is there concerned with that particular form of perfect or
‘complete’ speech, and so requires a distinction to be made between words sufficient for
producing it and those which are not. In fact, as we have seen, there are three forms of
consignification discussed in Aristotle’s work: (1) that of the verb, since it additionally
signifies time (De Int. I. 3, 16b 6); (2) that of the copula, since it signifies with another (cf.
St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri., lect. 5, n. 19), and (3) that of negations and other syncategor-
ematic terms, i.e. determiners like ‘every’ and ‘no’, since they “additionally signify nothing
other than that they affirm or deny about the name (taken) universally” (De Int. 5. 10, 20a
13). On the other hand, the reconstruction of Aristotle’s definition of the conjunction that
has been lost from the Poetics (for which, see my preceding paper) demonstrates decisively
that the foregoing distinction was introduced by the Philosopher in that work, a conclusion
the present paper has endeavored to establish beyond all doubt.

1
Simplicius of Cilicia, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
2
Not to be confused with the later philosopher, Boethius (‘The Last of the Romans’), quoted further below.
3
ibid., p. 27
4
Lexis being understood as articulate vocal sound, whereas logos is such sound insofar as it signifies something
by itself, and hence is a part of it.

120
23. The principal doctrines investigated in this paper in sum.

(1) That, since these two alone by themselves when conjoined produce complete
speech, the name and the verb are reputed to be the sole parts of speech, but the rest, being
as it were their supports, or joints, or bonds, are parts of language rather than speech. (Bo-
ethius, Priscian, et alia) Hence, although “what the grammarians call ‘the parts of speech’
(tou merou logou) are various” (Ammonius), in the De Interpretatione Aristotle teaches only
these, the name and the verb, the reason being that “these alone, without all the others, can
produce enunciative speech, as when we say ‘man [flourishes]’”.1

(2) That the sole parts of speech signify by themselves, but the conjunction, the pre-
position, and the like only when conjoined to the others; the former being called ‘interpre-
tations’ (Boethius), the latter, syncategoreumata, that is, consignificantia, or ‘co-signifying
words’ (Priscian): ‘interpretation’ being understood as articulate vocal sound signifying by
itself; the other kind, as such sound not signifying by itself, but only when conjoined to the
others (Boethius).

(3) “And by our remark ‘vocal sound not significative [by itself]’ here [is under-
stood]...vocal sounds which, when conjoined to the others consignify as syncategorematic
words, not...vocal sounds like the [syllables and] letters [composing names], seeing as how
vocal sounds significative separately, <being either simple, or> composed from many vocal
sounds, whether <two or> three or four or more according to the [various] arrangements of
the composition of the syllables, are the name and the verb’” (Averroes); and these are parts
of speech, which signify by themselves, whereas “syllables and conjunctions are parts of
language, of which the syllables as syllables signify nothing at all. But conjunctions in fact
can consignify, but signify nothing by themselves.” (Boethius)

(4) Hence, we see that syllables agree with conjunctions in not signifying anything
by themselves, but that, whereas the former, occurring as parts of compound names, may be
said to signify, they do not do so as parts of such a name, while the latter only signify when
conjoined to the others. (composite doctrine)

(5) Accordingly, “[o]f words, some are significative, others consignificative. A sig-
nificative word is one which in itself and without the addition of another signifying word
signifies something, as this word ‘man’. A consignificative one is one which not through
itself, but together with another adjoined signifying word, signifies something, such as pre-
positions and conjunctions, and similarly the verb ‘is’ according as it only implies compos-
ition: for as such it is infinite [infinitum, i.e. ‘indefinite’] and it has to be made finite [finiri]
through those things which it composes”. (Anon., On Significant Words)

(6) But with respect to their function in speech, “the noun and the verb may be com-
pared to the sides, the rudder, and the sail of a ship, whereas the other words are more like
the pitch, the tow, and the nails”. (Scholion on Dionysius Thrax) “[I]n the same way in a
ship, its parts are the sides, the rudder and the sail; wax, tow and nails are not parts but things
that bind and glue the parts together.” (Priscian)

1
As with Luhtala’s translation, I have had to change Blank’s “is healthy” to “flourishes” here, since the
presence of the copula “is” constitutes a proposition tertii adiacentis, as Ammonius explains above.

121
 Hence,” just as the planks [or sides] of a ship are properly speaking its parts, while
bolts [or nails], [tow] and pitch are also added to hold them together and for the unity of the
whole, in the same way in speech conjunctions, articles, prepositions, and adverbs them-
selves do the work of bolts, but they would not correctly be called parts inasmuch as they
cannot be put together and on their own produce complete speech. So these are not parts of
speech, but they are parts of lexis, of which speech itself also is a part, as has been said in
[the books] About the Poetic Art [e)n toi=j Peri\ poihtikh=j ei)/rhtai, ed. Busse]. And these
are useful for the specific sorts of composition (sunthesis) and construction (suntaxis) of the
parts of speech with one another, just as a bond (is useful) for adding unity to things bound
and glue to things joined by it. But these are not parts of the things bound or glued, and
neither are conjunctions, articles, prepositions or adverbs ‘particles’ (moria) of speech.”
(Ammonius Hermias)

(7) For “[i]t is said that the Peripatetic philosophers recognized two parts of speech,
the noun and the verb, and claimed that the others are not parts of speech, but are merely
used for the sake of binding and gluing. Moreover, just as a boat can be made of a single
piece of wood, without glue or binding agent, so [speech] can consist of just a noun and a
verb, without words of any other type. But [speech] cannot be formed with no noun or with
no verb, just as, by implication, no boat can consist just of pitch, tow and nails. Just as there
are ships made of one piece of wood only, [the Scholiast] argues, similarly there are
[speeches] which need no binding, e.g. Swkra/thj peripatei=, Swkra/thj u(giai/nei
‘Socrates [walks]’, ‘Socrates flourishes’ (GG I.3, 515, 28-29). There is a certain natural
union between the noun and the verb, it is claimed, comparable to that between form and
matter; this is why they do not need binding”. (Scholion to Apollonius Dyscolus) Hence,
whereas the name and the verb may be considered the principal parts of speech, “the others
are more bonds of the parts of speech, signifying the relationship of one thing to another,
than parts of speech [themselves], just as spikes [or nails] and other things of this kind are
not parts of a ship, but ‘conjunctions’ of the parts of a ship”. (St. Thomas Aquinas)

(8) Moreover, there are some words which, when spoken, signify something by
themselves, whereas others do not (as opposed to the more familiar distinction between
words which signify by themselves without further qualification and those which do not;
examples of the former being particular kinds of adverbs, whereas examples of the latter are
the name and the verb). For (as both Apollonius and Priscian make clear), the completion of
the meaning of such expressions as ‘Right!’ or ‘Well done!’ (as occurring in their respective
languages) depends on their context: utterances like this are understood in reference to
something previously stated (and hence are elliptical); whereas the name and the verb are
said to signify by themselves, as one may gather from Aristotle on the verb, “for the one
who speaks establishes the understanding [sc. of the hearer] and he who hears [sc. what is
said] rests [sc. in what is said]” (De Int. I. 4 16b 19-20, tr. B.A.M.); hence they determine
the first operation of the intellect with respect to some nature, and so bring the understanding
to rest. Accordingly, as the vowel is to the consonant, so is the categorematic word to the
syncategorematic; for in the case of vocal sounds, the vowel “makes an utterance” or sound
on its own, while the latter does so only when joined with the former; whereas in the case of
words, the categorematic signifies by itself, while the syncategorematic does so only when
conjoined to the former; the categorematic words being the name or noun and the verb; the
syncategorematic being the conjunction, the preposition, and the article, and the like.

122
 (9) And finally, let us conclude by remarking that conjunctions cannot be under-
stood without the substance of the words they conjoin (Apollonius Dyscolus), according to
which their signification varies, as some are found conjunctive, but others, disjunctive.
(Priscian)

(c) 2013; 2024 Bart A. Mazzetti

See also:

Poetics Chapter 20: The Elements of Language (Papers In Poetics 9)

‘Sundesmos and Arthron’: Aristotle on the Connective Parts of Speech (Papers In Poetics
11)

123