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Documente Profesional
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and reference with
(SWAG).
d, To furnfzh certa5n functioning and procedures of thm staff as&Son8 ae explaSned in f&u staff annsxls.
2. Thorough familiarization with this handbook and strict compliance
with the pres.or?b?d p~ocedur?e shouridexpedite the efficient accomplish-
ment of the KMAG miseion and the successful termination of this campaign.
LHD8.X ----
Adviror*s Handbosk Part I -GF Skction I - ORIEYTATIOP qriginal ObJectivea P'unction Pnd.Mission Comnnd Relationship rc\ \. Wssfon, XMAG Off&era Sfxmti8rf-b for Advisor6
I
Z-6 x-3 1 2
3
%
I
4 5
2 2
Section If - ORGAFIZATIOF OF PHn: 3-OR~ATf AWY AM) OF KMAG Organieetion of the Worenn Army 6
7
3-i
3
I
Or@nleation of KMAG Section III - In=& FXAG ?J'LWC!TIGBS, ~Al?JWWERS Imporhnt A*mblatrative Frocehree
J
3'
46
% 9
Internal L3u$ply !%A!? Iaterpret9r Qvvhe Part II - srAp'pl ASWEXW El G-2 G3 G-4
r* ,-
KMAG
10
??l #2
#3 #4 #5 Apps??SiX _____-_
PRrt
I?TDlX
----A D V I -WW?:.+573'~~~ 0 0K - rr-p$_ __._ --_-----w_; _ ._
9
PARAGRAPH
Advieorls Handbook
Part
PAGX
I
I-6
1-3
I -GEVEiUI,
Section I - ORIE?~'l%TIO~
Original Objectives
Function Pnd.Wlsalon
Command Relationship
Niasion, KMAG Officers
Stand8tb for Advisors
Section II'- ORGA~?IZATfOF OF '?Ha: FORTAN ARMYAEDO1pKMAG Organlaetibn of the Xore~a rirmy Organization of KMAG Section III - IN~AL ??UWTIGPS, RMAff !-naIQYARms Import~tit Afiminfatrative Procecbres
Internal Supply
-1
2
3
4
5
1
8
2
2
3-4 6. 7
3
3
.46 a 9 SO 4 .5 5
?!l.!AG
KMAG
**
,_
APP3zwX w.__--_
UNITEDfJTA!t'%SMZLfTAW
AIYVISORP
OF KOR?3
82026 AU
Office of the Chief
APO 301
c/o Postmaster
. San Y'xinciaco,Calif
1 ?4qkch1951
SUBJ9CT: Advieor's Handbook
TO:
a. mini, FMAG>is rsa~an~il~ls to the Commandine: G%firal, ?VSA? for advice to th* ROY Army in organization, afiminiotration, WRining, equipping, and combat onerations; analfor advice to ths vor~an ?ational Police. !
b. Zach United Statsei Army Officer, WAG is rseponeibls to his immediate Unite8 Stats8 Army military aupo!rior and to Chiaf, n"AG.
4,
_
Officersis:
aa To advisethe Koreancounterparts so as to-provide them with the benefits of the militaryexpesiense of the KMAG officers in order to accomplish successfully the overallcombatmission. gathering and reportingagency
b. To functionas an information so that accurateand timelyreports on all phases of the militaryoperation
can be forwarded through UnitedStateschannelsto Chief, -K&G.
3. Standards,for Advisory,
8. In the executionof his advisorymission,the advisorbegins with considerable prestigewhich he must continually endeavorto maintain* ?iith finesseand intelligence many advisors have made recommendations to their counterparts so logic;olLy and
effectively that UnitedStatesmilitary doctrinestands out clearlyin the issuanceand executionof orders
aordialrelationships
by Korean countc:parts.kdviscrs shouldestatkish . with their counter-perts; and
are cautioned to avoid issuesover autharity.
They will insure tile taamwarkfa p:epmatdokl of plans,in checkson exe-
cution of orders,and in cocrdinstion of logistical supportessential to the accomplishment of the opcretional mission. Wenever hot spots occur, and assist in the coordination
they will go there with their coizn+erparts of attacks,defense,and counterattacks; especiallythe air, artillery,
and naval gun fire support.
of his information gathering and rePorti% b. In the performance mission,, the unit field advisoris chargedwith rendering periodicand attention to their accur?.icular flash reportsas prescribed and with pa responsible ts racylandtimelirEss. SeniorFieid Advisorsare directly their kited StatessuperioroffLcers fcrr the accomplishment of the above mission. They alone are responsible that communications are &,%qy~_oZ~, under whichradio Ever closedd_oz~~ They must know the normal procedties trafficis hondisdand rn-~~ give important outgoing mescege sufficiently ciassificetion encodingand transmission, high precedeno?: ,toinsuretimeL!y Accordingly, the signaiperscnneland the communications net must be attuned to meet the exigent-its of the tacticalsituation, t'ne movement.of commandpasts,and the changesin the compositi@l of forces, A backlog of ..-..*_-__ inconning messagesmust be anticipated and,, v:hen necessary, normalproceduresmuat be modifiedand the signalperscnnel plsced on en overtime hasiso SeniorAdvisze must insistthat 31.1 membersof their staffsknow , the capabiLities, and workingr*&es of the communications
lifii-t.sLions teams necessaryfor cif:e L41entexecutionof the timelytransmission
and receipt Of Official messages.
ce SeniorAdvisorswill maintainin their crganizations the
same high standards of discipline requiredin -anyUnitedStates hrmy
ccmaand, In an isoiatedunit such as an advisorygroqp high standards
in performance of duty and in individual conductare of the utmost
importance, SeniorAdvisorswill devote particular attention to the
nalntaln the high moraledisting$&ing
sr13
welfare of the individucll all UnitedStates &my units.
t .,
2
The organization of the Forean Army is shown in &arts #l, 2, and 3, fnclosurnsl With a Department of Vational Defense organized along KS; lines, but also exercising the functions of our Department of the Army, the ZCo1'ean channal of reauonsibility goes directly to the Chief of Staff, voroan Army. Prom the Chisf of Staff the chain of responsibility proceeds directly to Forean Corps Commanders. (There is no intorvcning field Army Commander or headquarters and.,hence, Eeadquartars Porean Army exercises the usual operational functions of the U.S. Field Army Headquartersj. In th? vorean Corns and Divisions Haadauaters, the orcenizationel structure is based unon and closely parallels thr!structurn Of UC& W.&a!%~ayt%on~. The organization of the Division is bpsed uuon U.S. organization but lpcks thn fire newer of the U.S. unit. The principal shortegs in fire power is apparent upon analyzing the Division . Artillery structure:,. Insterad of P Division Artillery of three 105.mm gun batterifisand cnn l%mm Xowitzer battery, the Korean Division has Only one batta'lfon of l!Xmm Artiliery. Also tha Division doss not have within the Infantry rflpiaouts, tqnks, heavy mortars, or r+coilloss wna- hesent plans, how'Vnr, call for an augp:mntPtion pans. in each Division of onn heavy tank company, ons battery of 155mm artillery, and r~coilless weapons at the company'lovsls where arsscribnd in th? U.S, organization-
__ al structure.
7. Ths organization of KMAG is shown in Charts #4, 5, and 6, Inclo-
sure6 #4, 5, and 8, to G-3 Annex #3.
a- Chart #4, mted Stptss M$lfterv A_dv~soryJroup. trz._t_ha_Re=_
-._c._ _-
Public of Korea shows the IWiG tIeedauert_rs orgenizetional structura; par-
ticularly the corrallnting advisory agnncy to Bach vorsan Staff Division.
Chart #5, J!MAG Corps Rnadq_uart;lrs __ _._.__L__J portrays thq JWG zation functioning wtth ROILCorps Headq.uerters.
I-8.
organi-
PA=: b. Personml of all sections within RMAG me paid by a Class A Agent, %i,i use ehould bo made of Rllotments of pay, sinc,e
fRcilitie6 for obtaining monpy orders or US Treasury Check& are not rea-
dily aPRilable to most un?ts ii1the field.
d.
side,
knives
(4) At present w2r souvenirs such as @IX. srr;ords, for mailing by any APO in etc, 9 ltiiii not 'bs~uzr:~ted thtiFilrX-SC Conmaud.
e, PXf?SONAL YZYECTS: Under no circwnstencras will the effects 811 of personnel K3'Aor MIA tr; forvnr30a to i;h* nsxt-of -kXl dixct, for dispoaition through
such effects will be forwardpi!to this heatdquartara proper channels,
-4
9.
The supply of KMAG field personnel is R matter of particular concern to Chief, SNAG, Dispersion of detacments, poor roads, limited transportation facilities, end prolorged periods of bad.weather complicate the problem of logistical support,, To overcome'these obstacles, the internal supply of IlMAGis placed under the Eeadquarters Commandant, of %pply, acting as the exscri;crr with an operating agency, tha Dirnc.;;or for all logistical matters, To facilitate and expedite lo&tic& x@port of field insta!.l.a?icns, thsre Is attached to each Corps Advisory Betachment, a Corps Sn-Ji.7 i._ D~~tschmPntconsisting of one (1) officer and of this section to insure that one (1) enlisted ma3, 3.txs the f-a,ction requisitions are properly and promptly submitted to this headqusr%ers: that supplies are promptly drawn acd dalivt;rnd to using units, and that effective liaison is maintainad with t'heLirnctor of Supply to insure continuing prompt and adequate logistical support of field personnel, Details of this internal supply are prescribed in letter this headquarters, subject: SOP for Internal Supply, KMAG, dated 26 December 1950. 10. Interureter Service WAG -___-_,..~.z _._.
Of the utmost importance to an Advisor is the interpreter. Interpreters will be provided by this IIeadcuarters(AC of S, Gl) 'to newly arrived field advisors prior tc their departure from this Headouarters. Recruited from civilian life, with little military experience, interpreters are entitled to the pay, allowances, and privileges of first lietenants but have no command status, They must meet prescribed physical, educational, and lo,yaltyclearance stand_ards, Interpretars arc entitled to the same consideration given other officers, and mania1 jobs will not be imposed upon them. The supuort of the interpreter is a resnonsibility of the ROY unit whers he is ettached. Advisors are morally resnonsible that their interpreters have the necessary items of clothing and individual eauipment. Reassignments of interureters will be promptly reported to this headquarters (AC of S, Gl) giving name, rank, and serial number of the interpreter, the circumstances of tha reassignment, ana the name and assignment of the losing, or gaining, advisors. 11. Referents.
R. For your reference, five (5) staff annexes are uublishad as Part II, and two (2) KMG Standing Operating Procedures, and.one (1) letter are Published as Part III of this handbook.
I
b, The Advisor's Handhook is supplemnnted by other nublications of this Headquarters,'and it .$s planned to keQi3t)lPJ nresant'Fbd%boks
up tc date by issuance of appropriate KM?G letters, memorandums, and
SOP'S.
-5-
.
-- - -
-c
..---..---
-__,_
-_---
-,
..-.
I-
CAPITOL
DlVl51CI&$ ,. KWIMENT
RE$I MENT
FIRST
D~viS~or\l
--
CAY 1st
THIRD
PlVlS&d_
I. _.
.,:..;
<..^
i.
_.I_
-s.-.-
--.
----
__
. .
. . .
;,
~7 ,
.,.
\,
mattersbetween G*l Kk and EUSAK. b. At Corps and Divisionlevel the mission of the G-l Advisorsis
to advise and assist counterparts in planningand coordinating activities
pertaining to the G-l functions(See par 15, FM 1Ol-5, Staff Organization --- and
Procedure, dated July 1950).
4.
5:
Biscellaneous.
for the administration (records, pay, etc) of Korean a* Arrangements by the Army personnel integrated into the T3 Forcesin Korea are coordinated Army G-l Advisor.
b. The Army G-l Advisoris responsible for the final preparation .and
processing of recommendations for awards and decorations for personnelof KMAG.
El
functionperformed by the G-l Advisor. All other
(This is the only KIVIAG KwrAG personnel mattersare handledby the KMAG Adjutant Generaland Deputy
Chief of Staff).
4 Inclosures: Incl
StGltlsc.cs *
Trans-
R3.E; Procurement, Allocation, Ijriorities, . Replacement Battalion, Processing %pply, pl-'thtlOrI, Rate TableD
fiSC".l?"
#$I. Ap~intment;Assignment, Classification, Transfers, Promotion, Demotion, Reclassification, Discharge, Retirement. CCXSCRIFTION: Conscription, Military Services, RTC Control, NDA Matters. CIV: Frocurement,Appointment, Assignment, Wages,
Norking Conditions, Population.
A.___._
OFFIC2 OF AEBISOR Gl
_.__.____.~___-^-..I
ASSIST.QB AnVISOR
.__l___._
Statistics
--
_..__A-.-
---
A--.--L
Specie.1
-@
Service Reports
ma
/ Reports
?E!?E!u
-i--iCoordination
Graves Registration
---__.A____,
Military Police Reports
Prisoner of ?"lar Data
Stragglers
Military Justice sirmyPrison A ?. 0. L. Civil Assistance
Inclosure Ko 5
I -
. _! .
1.
INCLCjSURE r40 6
_-_
--_
-.._. --.
-----we.
-.
--_
--
_ ___. =
= t
TI _= .-
.-----_.-___...
_,
1,
The G2 functions are ?erfor?odet KEG Corps levels by one officcx"ansiened as Ea2., At divieign ltirels,the G-2 fwctions are executed by L?nofficer asslgod as G2/'G-3, %erc is no officer provided irlthe ICIIIc2 T/O as S-2/S-3 nt r@_mental and bzttzlion le~zels.,Hw:ever, the -5.3
Ctical advisors assQncd to the regimcct? and battalions hzve an nddition~z.1
duty of advising in S-2 functiow (ztthe regimtintnl lc-,-cl RLc 3aGtt::Lion
lcvcls, respectively,
*3. .At Corps 2nd Division lcvcls, the G2 mission rks: a. To advise the Korean G-2 coktcrparts so as to cn;?Xo them
to accomplish their mission, and
zz.thering and roportin.5 qczcy so
b. To act as an irform,?tion that accurate, tincly, and prescribed G-2'rcports on the enemy situation and capabilities may be fonr-rdcd through American channels to Chief E-AC . and all intcrestcd qcncies and sectionsi 4, Dctailcd Instructions
the follo?ting ;Yssion
b, flenL@pe Captured Am~~r Zquipmnt: Rm ty-pe cngturcd cneq~ erluipnont should be immdirtcly rcportcd and held in spccinl custody pendin instructions for its disposition by this Headqumtors. C. Captured Documents: All docur;lcnts collected from enemy -dead and from POYs should be cxmir,ed for tirlelyaildiqyortnnt informtion. Such information should be classifidd secret and, if affectin:; adjment units 2nd higher headqucrters, reported ?iiththe utmost practicable speed. d. lkil:;Tntclli~cnco Plan: A daily Intelligence Plan till
be prepared at division, level. Thjx plan should.contnin detailed in-
structions to the Xorean collection qencies, mong the most important
of which are ground pztrols,, Zffective ground patrolling, difZ_cult to
achieve in any 2.q~~ is psrticul?rly so ir,the Korean I'imqbemuse of its
lack of training aildthe l~k of sypreci4ion by KorOzn comandeys of
the vital nature of ground ~trcll~_n~;, Iknce, the advisor must constant-
ly stress to the Sorcan co~-mFier the importance aY;dnecessit;?of ground
patrolling, must activcY7
t!:eprnpnrctior,of patrol plars and
I) In (. aesiat of det,?iled instructions for pytrols,, and do everything in his power to
assure the actuc?lexecut.lor_ missions.
Advisors nust assure
of pc,";rol that information fron all sources nust be reported to hi$wr he::_dquartcrs
and affected adjacent head?unrtcru with the utmost practicable speed.
e. Intelligence Xstimkc: (372Jd\&ors till keep cor,tirmous-
ly abreast of the ta,~~~~-7---'" 1 eltua-tz.on
will be prcprred to present
and an intelligence estimtO~-of-the-situationat any time
__
~OncO
Speck.1 Report
0800
0900
Spot Report
At
once
At
once
Brief general picture of situqtion with nc~ativo information being reported in absence of positisc i:IPomation. Includes 17h0,tilat, t-rhen, r,%cre,<Ti:d Trhy, qm-
tith an eT.-zlw.ti.on 301 (see pamzraph 8 bclos-r).
portine:
a. 3. c. 8. The numhsr of POWs carryine s&render leaflets,
.
Defueef3movem3nt trenf3.s.
Siv5.l ian nttT_tu~esin areas of proba?le revolt.
WCCL?ACY -.---
Annex # 2
%ction I
-__.._-_-
1.
Functions of YIQG_+_3__S~.cJioz1: _.____.-__ _...._.~ - _ -The furztions of the IDfAG G-3 Cection are: '.
*
r an?
stmsroise tilefunctiom n.qrixinir.6z c. To plan, cocrcI.m;~t;~ to combat oDerPticns, .toinciu?? pre?,mrtion of opsrptiona nlans, orfiers,
directives, renorts, and bx it3finm.
ix
Ftmlyze VPF~ ??-I+ frisnQ tr\ctics with P visw of rlsvp.lomQff"ctive tactical floctrina rlnfi tr?ininp m4hoA.s.
CT.
To
h.
TO net
PS
To enrcisp pensral staff su?ervision of mvchql~g-fcal warfms i. nctivitil>sin the Porem, kmy.
.j .
nnflthe %tiond
Police.
nil renr
k. To cor?r?inpte officer ?USAF.
1. 5-1pssist thl Chief of
n0rtPining to G-3 nctivities.
2 The ROR Inf Division is similar in structup to thq A?ericPn Xvision, al though certnin suny,X>rtiny
units, armor, AAA, Artfl1er.yand Y~vy
MOrt;lrunits, or&%nic to the AmOricRn Division prr?not indud!?& (SW Tnsl 79
#lJ.
I.
units
to sun?ort P 13
4. A coaDl?te orppnization of Army sunr,ortin+? division Army has been &~~elor)~~ enc7 is onPr?,tinE. This Qrpnnizztign in-
cluclss%gr, (29,Sign21, ?idfi tirtillerv, OrfinRficCR,
Yilitary Polics$ Nedical,
CIC and IIIDunits. (SN Incle $3 and #3 to Pprt I).
5. Ths MilitRrg Advisory Group to the Q.prublicof Porea @MAa) has a
total strength of RnBrqximetdy 1,000 officers and men. Both dvisors and
administrative personnel pre inclu?ad in this figure. WAG ngrallels the
orKpnizetion of the Horeen Rrmv with Ac%isors Rssipnsfi(at ~11 1~3~~1s)
ifWJ?2 to Bzttdion in tactical units an8 trrcnmpnrnyin 6nme of ths sF?rvicf?
slenQnts, The structure of Fb??Gorganization is shown in Incls 4, 5, and 6.
S4CTIO" III
_ _~._______.___
TRAI?YI1% _.--__-
ganiser-7 for the pur-noae of trnininp hc?sicenlister!ronlacem~nts, Rnc?the oaricus branch school3 ware 4~eacl under central control Rt th? KoraEn Army Ground.GenFtral School. ?+re officer r,RndiBates were trains8 for Rll arms ana services.
/-
7 To C7?vel0n R higher stanFar of non-cqmmissir,ned oific*r a Lmaders Schoo;'wns orpaniz.?i! an8 began ocq-atir)ne 1 ?brch 1951 with a ca-oacity of
7200. (See Incl +7),
G-3 me
listed ~8 f01lows: a.
3.
To pepere
corn3pt units
tl?r?V,-h ,07.
and-mbise
c. To naintnin clqse coqrfiination with PA G-3 onerations officer, him?\dnthe nsrformance of his i'utiss,
a.
kneral:
All o?erPtiqnal directives, normd.y vrr?nPrd! in the form of en oprations dan, orfisror instructlm, are '?asef? on ?tEAF onerationel fiirect ivas an8 instructions. Owr~tiona officw, KA CWT, is Fri.efe!C? on
all pr0:asd operationid directivss, his conmsnts an?.cmcurrmce, o7?tainclc'
Rnd tmrallel publisatione in K,rs?anend.?nzlish arP r'istributsc?
sbultan
SOUsly to all units concerneii_. with sdbor9inate units e.reenjoined
ACl.visora
to follow this sane arocedure in issuinz instzmctims within units to which
thev tireassi+zned. This drmztice insuree nmimm cmr3imtion an? mutual
un?erstandine between Advisore e.ndthe+Forean chuntnrdts.
h,
memtion
Plans!
7.
B. -
Generd:
--_
The Cox_~andiap General TJ$AV +enenPs uv0n Chief WAG to pravide him with information an* ~fiviceconcerning the tactical enDlo.pent of ROKA uqit;s. One of the most important i'utie.s of the TWB ac?visoris to keep the next hiczh2rKMAG hea?auarters informed of the current C.acticp> situP,tion. Periodic onerations renorta auMi.ttefi hy this h?a&uartsrs b. to ZUSAK, is R consolidfition of evduatefl inforr?Ption rsoeiver' fr9m fielc? Rrbisors in the form of "e~ot" an-3Veriofiic renorts. These reports are submitted.to XWK as the official neriodic onerations report of the Korean Army. c. PerioiCic0nerPtions rqxrts will 3e subnittsrl to this headquarters 3.y Senior Lrlvisorsof all units pssicne+ or nttachefito ?ed.quarters Stanr9inr OneratYoreEn Army for oDoro.tiozlal antrol. ?c?fPrence: TRcticd ing Procefiure,this he&ouRrters, detsP 16 r)ecember lcj50. (Incl +8).
CL Periodic operetlons renorts will Ye su7Tlsmentecl ?y %rief, sBot rsnorts RS necessRry to ~QW=Jthis hepd-0uartars a\reAst 0f the current situation.
4.
Air sunnort for the Korean Army is nroviAe? 357 ?ifth US Air 'force in the same manner RS for US units. In vIp.w of the lc?nguRPe harrier and lack of knowle+e in the tecticnl emnloyment qf Rir suT%rt by the majority of ROK.4Officers, the PMAG Ativisoris G-3 Air tq the unit tr,which he is assign&. As such, he is resg0nsihls for the,locp.tion0f th? f)om?lineen? for requesting air support RR required, %r r)roce?urwsin reauestinc nnr! controlling tactichl air su?bort f?r ?OKA units, eee "@erntiona SOP for 150800 JRn 1951 (1x1 $9)
Tactical Air Sunport", this he&.auRrtsrs, ii.ptg? and letter "Tpctical Air CoorfiinPtor(.Air%rnn), this hendqunrters, &teP.
15 'Fe%1951 (Incl +lO).
Annex #3
W4Ar,
Divisions, 8t? 1 Mar 51 Ltr, XXQG, Assipnmnt of Yield Aciviflors, Chmt Replace:JentSchool System, I(A Ltr, FMAG, Tactiwl Stan$.i~~ Onemtinlz Pmcer'ure, ritil 16 Dee 80
Ttr, KMAG, Omrations SO3 fQr Tmticpl Air Sunnort, Jtd 15 Jnn 51 +lO Ltr, RMAG, Tecticel Air Coordimtor (Air%orne), ?t?
1 lar 51.
Annex #3
-_
1
_~
-.^.-.___-_____._._,
Infantry Division
TD En L
I , . ,
ORGANIZATIONAL C'H~T
KOREANCORPS E-IEADn~J~~RT~$
-HP1
.3 AIDES. I J 6 I CG I -2
,,..:
.
pq-STAFT
6 G3
J.
fJ
c1
1T-------
I,-8
I
3
t
:I_ 1 3 PM SEC
.
I 4 QMC SEC
1
-11
10
,a1
Ir
ORD SEC
1 c
SIG SEC
4
SPS szc
Inclclgure #2
:
_ ____..
9
y--
-* ~
ORG4NIZBTIONAL CH;RT
- I* KORINN AREY
26
t
DND
C&i?
ORG-:NIZATION,u, CHLfi'f
UNITEDSTATESYILIT:&Y,",DyISGRY
GROUP TO THE RX'UBLICOF ~&a:,
LEGmD:
Denotesdual functions
Inclosure #f!+
c/a SRn
RqtBftr':0" ~'ORQ
??etnpstsr
TO:
Senior Advimr 1.
3ach Cor'm
visory
A.
5. c.
a.
::
CT.
h.
. 1. 3.
Ir -.
1. m. n. 0. n. 9. r. 8.
7 The Si,anL ArLvisnr'e orimrry miSsion is to nPviSs the SimsI. Officer oh-the Corn3 on d-I_nni-.ters ?ertPininr to Sip301 corvnuni.c-~ti0n. Twr,
Yiel3 Communication ITI!Oio p.renssiznai!to pssiSt the Cnr~s 3ig:nal Aiivieor,
tr,?rovirIecommunicative fw 4. The rac?iqteens ;ra c"ttachaJ vimry ,:nrs~.rm@l nnP will nqrm-ol1.v m~r&te under thm Pimct mntml Signal Arlvism.
Ihs ad-
of the
5. The orzmization end n~licy outliner?in nrecedinfr vr"rngrsvhs will be considered stanflare extent under exce-tionei circtistances. It m%y '5ernodifiefi in certain cases At the r?iscratio,n of the Senior Corns Ail-
visor. These exceptional circumstnnces inc1uir.e:
h,.
C.
However such adjustments ehouli! he cansirtrred tnmnorRrg measures tq meet the requirements qf the tacticnl situntion. The orgRnizati5n p.8outlined. is considereir PdequEte t? flccomvlishthe Came Mvisory mission.
.-
-UiiL
,,
ORQANIZATION CHART
KMAG CORPS HEt4~UART"rJzs
f--l
c-L--
KMAG
HQ COTYDT
1-I
ADVISOR
-.
, TACP: Mr*r-
?+?EDICAL
. 7 -F-LI --c---e : RAD.TEXM 1 1 I --e--c-c--h
I
a-e-w-* I
I
l RADTFm
I I -- r-iL_
.'
,
't
I TRANS
I
SUPPLY
t
Incl*sure
.
.;_ J
. . . .
.i:
a,
e. f. E* h. .
1.
C.
3.
~ISTTZWTION
______-
1 -1 -3 -110 20 20 -12 -3 -2 -Chief of Staff
e9 Staff Section
ea C0rtx1
ea Di&l.sion
Tncr
Signal
FA
O-3 Pile
AG File
Incl:
Orpnimtior Chart
I!XAGDivision lieadmarters
ORGANIZ~'ffON CHART
KMAG DIVISfON HEXQUX3TERS
#--4dvi3r
Gl -G4 Advisor
REF'LACEMENT &
SCHOOLSYSTEJ4
KORE:W ARMY
C/FIN
i I
Inclosure #7
WIT%
1.
General.
2. Iiaison.
Senior Advisors of Sor?s, Divisions PEA separate com*at units
a. of regim@ntal size oberatine C'irnetly undbr this headquertars-will rerpest
counternarts to furnish at least one liaison officer @oraan) to 3% Head-
quarters.
h. .
units
as requir-d,
7 . *
Command Fasts.
3nolokire #8
..a
..
*r-
:. ;NCL~SSIFIED
teletype, telephone (using tsleohone cotie)or messenger. ?legatiVeremrts will 3e au3mittefl. For format anP coatents see inclo%r+%, 1. An overly to cover locatiorbof su3or*i~ste 3n4ta frownto an5 incluflina 3Rttalions nnfl This overly will 3e separate compa&"les w?il he ~rfqa7xi.ee of 2200 ilpiiy, forwarded by first i3Vail&ls cou-rier. 3. situation. 6. XntPlliebnc~__~_e~orts __.~~_ _*
fntnlliesn~e Ibx,rts of mp.jorsu~orr?inats euhmittefi hy Ssn-ior A&ieox AS t'ollowa: Report -- a.
h. spot %TOT tE
Period9.c opqationb ?X?pOitB will. 1f? su~alemnnt4 ?g khf, Sp+ tc~ keep this he&+artfrs ahred, of the currant
Intelligence Summary
Pairs;,TeietpP, Tela~hone
BY CCMFAKD OF BRIG~IDI73
":I J.
W. MAR?
j Mrjor, AGC
AdjutantGenerid
c?lc:hr~3
i.3
2.
Operatio;l:; ?la*;te~::
_..--___.. Outline FQ:!oparations which are in the planning stam only.
3.
0Perati.os7.s Cs&xcif:
(2200 repkt
c.
only).
Ccn?at efficiency c~atessed as Txcellent, Good, Fair or Poor
(2200 repod;tonlyj.
Inclustire .#8
P -------_..__
!,tNCUlSSlFlED
c/o Postmaster
San Zbncisco, Celif 150806 Jan 1951
03?Fw
-_c
A1
IOV
sop
T'orTflcticelAir Su3Tort
~-----____-...-__--L-~__1. IYirdose, - TO provi.de WAG Personnel with ROK tactice units the
standard procEFi!ure for reaues~<.n~ ta:,
1;icei eir support end to 7xovid.eassist-
pnce in proper util,isRtianqf ?.tt,~c.h~~,ir
Air Control -Perti?s (TACP).
%cZiceI.
_-
7
C.
Requestin~..Proce~~e.-
Inclosure 69
5,
Txtrsct if 5th .hirForce SOD for Tecticd Air Control "firtie is
infomE$ion Rnirprlrt~ncs.
attache& for
Ehm MATTIE
071 'inf
Cil1ef of %aff
(.'lSt; IJt
h%
Inclosure #9
2
- UNCLASSIFIED '
UKJTED .!%'ATES
i!ti.ITARY ADW%RY
GROUP TO IRE
REPUBLICCF KC!FGA
TO:
See Mstribution
Procedure Nunber55-26,
1. Reference is mada to *sandingOperating Headquarters 5th bir Force, dated 26 Jacuary1551, attachedas inclosure
nunberl.
2. Reference SOP is forwarded for your informatigl and guidancein
conduct of future operations.
BY CCMMAXDCF BRIGADIER GENZRALFARRELkt
_*Lxi~k&v c
1st Lt. -+iGC
Actg d*djutant General
Inclosure #!LO
CLASSIFIED
'
OPRRATIOKS
NO.
HQFIFTRUIR FCRCZ
APO 970
26 January1951
55-26:)
1; loss - To prescribethe functions, duties and procedures of Tattical dir Cmznators (Airbarns).
bmne)
AFT Coordinator (Airborne) 5: &nctions_- The functionsof a Tactics1 controlling and coordinating close supportstrikesgenerally include: a0 Receivingand evaluating target locations for air strikesfrun the ground controllers. b, Searching for targetsof opportunity, to includespecified route
and area reconnaissance, and directing tsctica1afrcraf%on such targets.
co Advising the TXP and/orDivisionALO of all observed losations, inrrtsllat?.ons, and disposltfons,
moveactivity,. positions, ooncentraY_ons, ments of the enemy io his area of responsibility.
strikesto Reportingthe resultsof controlled Division ",io.
the
TACP end/orthe
-~ ~
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
wmmunicetione.
QFFICIAL:
15 - ea Ftr ?g
1;; -$&L TAC Eq
20 - 5AF (Operations)
..-._
2. General- The TacticalAir ControlParty is an operations ccmbatteam engaged in close supFt of ground that by use of voice radio aontrolsaircraft forces who are in contactwith the enemy. Each team is attacheddirectlyto a Corps,Division,or regimentand acccmpanies that unit ciherever it goes. This
assignment may be changedby the nir LiaisonOfficerwho has oprational con+
fro1 of the TACP, when tactical requirements so dictate.
3. Graanization - The commander 0; the TACP is the Forward Air Controller (FAC) td10 tdii be a pilot who has had ccmbatexperience in close supportin this theater, Each team will be organized as follows:
PERSONAL
EGDIPMENT
One (1) ForwardAir Controller (FAC) Two (2) VRC-1 Radio Jeepswith Om (1) SCR-522and 0~ (1) SCR-191each. Ons (1) Radio Mechanic (648) or(V54) One (1) spare 93-522.
One (1) Radio Operator(766) ~4: (776) One (1) Remote systemfor SCR-522.
carrierjeep.
one (1) personnel Portable VHF radio.
One (1) AN/TRC-7, 4. Tour of Duty - The ForwardAir Controller is furnishedon a rotational basis by an activecombatwing and dusinghis period of duty in the fieldhe .. will be on TDY cr DS to the TAC Squadron. MormaXQ, but not alnays,he will be relievedby a pilot from his ol*vn group and squadronto his parent organiza-
tion. Airmen orew membersare selectedfrom a TACP pool of men who are perma-
nentlyassigned to the detachment, and axe rotatedwith the FAC,
SCTION II
SOP for Tactical hir ControlParties
5. Dutieq- 'Ibe TACP in the field will be under the operational control
In his area of responsibility the FAC will
of the Army Air LiaisonQE'ficer. maintaincognizance of tarpts and their priorityss dets.rmined by
the Mvi-
sion or Corps Advise or his representative.
- .TheFAC will determinathe extent of damage dona 6. &3snonsibilitv by our aircraftand maintaina retard in the daily log. This inform&b Radio QP will also be reportedto the Air LhaisonOfficerby High Frequency telephone. He will maintaina journalof daily events to include: call signs of flightsworki& end times in the area; resultsof attacks;failure mmements of the T&P; pertinent remarks. The journal of ccmununicetions; Headquarters, FifthAir will be forwarded by him to the Directorof Liaison, Force on Wednesdays. a site to operatethe M@RC-1 Tactic& Procedure -..-
- a, In selecting consideration muzs given to the limitations of the equipment. The VHF in so far as pracradios operateon the %.na of sightnprincipletherefore, tical they shouldbe iocatedvhere there is least obstruction fran terrain featuresin crderthat transmissions betxeenaircraftand controller may obon the
high frequency band rmg3. The SC-191 opertites. tain maximumposs.2'itlc and is not serfons3.y
haRpred by terrainfeatures, howver it has very low-
out and awhip an+&nnais mer!.yalaays nscessary to obtainrange. One further
precaution; Do not operaba the transmitter unlessthe engine generator is
operating, as the tram' ,,a.nltter draws high wattage and will discharge a fully chargedbatteryin a few seconds.
7.
must keep a current to oprate the controller b. When be ia F;"opared list of targetsmarked on his map and continually evaluatethem in orderto advise as to their suitabiiity with reference to the weaponsthat he will have plan in his mind just how he will describeeach available. He must constantly target and how he will directhis aircraftaga3.nst it so that when his planes is made, report in statingtheir armament load, and the final targetselection his dirkctions will be prompt and as brief as claritywill permit. He should anticipate the arrivalof his scheduled flightsand be monitoring the "'reparting" frequency. Monitorjng the reportingfreqlancy is very important in arder that the flightleadermay obtairprompt inattuctions.&hen the controller is in on the spare Working a flight,he sh0Ql.d hove his radio operator listening equipment, if available, or on the AE/TRC-7,in order that he can inform the The, controller can switah controller tien a flight calls in far 'instzucti0as. frequencies munentarily to give a "standby:' or directthe flightback to the next higher controller.Even when there are no targetsit is impcrtant to m@nitor the "reporting" net in order to be able to redirectaircraftprcanptly. c* After the targethas been described it will be initially located
by referenceto UIM Grid Coordinates. As the aircraft begin their attack,he
must carefully scrutinize the final approach, giving continuous directions
with referenceto prominent landmarks and if it ap.pzars that the wrong target
in
some will be structk, he must call off the attack? It may be n3cessar-y cases to requiree dry run, and in many cases the mosquitoaircraft must be called upon to assistin findingthe target or to point the way, Army Liaison type aircraft(L-5) (L-17)will not be used for controlling our planesexcept under very exceptional conditicns and when such cases do occur,the circunstanceswill be reportedto the ALO who will make a report to this headquarters. The ForwardAir Controller must be an AI? pilot thoroughly familicrwith our aircraft. The liaisonpiiots are not adapt in ovr procedures, are not familiar with cunacnications problems, and in their enthusiasm have been known to s. call aircraftaww from a vital targefto attack a less lucrativeone selected by the liaisonobserver. Homver, their rcdiced adviceis valuable to the army and is used extensively by them in targetselection. The army when requested,will assistin markingtargetsby smoke,and friendlytroopsby panela.
d. The reasons for being prctnptand con&iSe are apparent when it is realized that the f3.ghter, particularly a jet is,Limited in ehdurence. He has only a short time to stay in the area before it becomes necessary to return to his base. If he begins to run lov on fuel his w@k becomes hasty and haphaThen, to, wasting time over zard with resulting inaccuracy against the emmy. the target is inefficient use of the aircraft, adds extra, tiring time to the Pilots flying, and keeps him unnecessarily long circling at low altitude where he is a cripple for light flfikand hostile fighters. Xhen it is necessary to have aircraft circle to keep the enemy pinned, that type of mission will heve been requested instead of close support. Our present VW-l's are equipped with the SCR-522 radio which permits 4 radio channels only for voice canmunications. This is an additional reason fcr stressing brevity and clear instructions. No unnecessary chatter should take place, such as long congratulstory
or abusive messages or inquiries about the boys back in the group.
Ccmmunice&ions - Communications frequencies will be established by 8. ^--.-
FAF COI, ---Fr
will also establish call signs, voice and 071,for each army
The CdL unit, these tail signs to be assumed by the TACP assigned.
9. Mainten.a_nc? - ab
The condition of automotive and radioequipment determines whether a TACP can operate. The automotive equinment must be well
maintained (the jeep engine provides power for the radio) and ready to move
immediately when the Command Post moves. Field maintenance ~5.11be difficult
and many hours must be spent on it. Ercrusted mud must be removed and vehicles
washed to allow lubrication and inspection for defects. The army regiments
or divisions, although not required to do so, will assist on maintenance and
repair and will supply such parts as tires, spark plugs, and batteries, but
for the most part, needed supplies must be procured thru the Air Liaison Offi-
cer.
b. Operative radio equipment is vital. Mechanics must be thoroughly
qualified to install the radios, align frequencies, change tubes, trace circuits, and ma& other minor repairs. He must have a frequency meter and other tools for performing these functions as the frequencies will nearly always go out of alignment after driving the AN/VRC-1 even for a short distance* Driving the jeep over roqh terrain may also cause internal damage. It is therefore exceedingly important that the equiument be moved only when it is mandatory to move it and never purely for personal. conveniences. A small stock of spares should be kept on hand and when new sets are required, the sir Liaison Officer will arrange to have this equipment brought by an L-5. 10. Summary - The responsibilities of the TAG3 cannot be over-stressed, The success of one mission may result in the winning of important objectives; its failure mayresult in the loss of important positions and in the unnecessary loss of many lives. Constant vigilance, patience, endurance, initiative and courage are necessary to insure the successof our mission in close support.
1.
Functions of YFAG G-4 Section, The functions of tha KMAG G-4 Section are:
To nlan, coordinate, and sunarvise the logistical supuort d. measures end operations necesserv to implement the flow of sunnlies and equinment to the using sgencp in a timely and efficient manner.
e. TO assist the Chief of Tteff in the coordinetion of functions perteining to lo&stics. To plan and sunervise the logistical training of his own SWf. tion and, in coordinction bli.tF G-3, such training within WAG.
To assist and sunervise salvae: 9 and.
reclamation onerfltions, eb and to encourage the recovery of ceFturefi enemy materiel.
The G-4 functions are narformed et,YMAG Sorns 1~~1s ?y one officer assigned as G-4. At division levels, the F-4 functions ere ex?cutnd 5y an officer assizned as G-l/G-4. There is no officer nrovided in th,? KMAG T/O as S-l/S-4 Pt reeimentel levsls; However, the tectice!. advisors asSipnd to the Peftb&its anO 'batt&~ibiS--+&Q&?~TI srjd5t*6n& &ity+jf $6=?-. rezimental level anA bttelion levels, res?ec~is~ng-fn~SS4~Flt~~~~ Bt-3Ghe tively. 3. ?4ission.
At Corps and Division lbvels, thm r-4 mission is:
a. To advise the Korean G-4 countnmarts so as to nrqvirb them
with t?-tE! benefit of the military eqerieqce of the WAG
G-4.
4.
ywio?.ic
To advise, coor?ir*ix, RIX?suT)ervise, in coord$wtion with G* Technical Services pnc!G-.71$?7iF3rs,"-3 ~~i~i_q~nsnt of loeistlcal suwort
units, inclufiing of
~!~i2iitr~ptiw r,rZsrs,
She fir~ftin::
5.
(6)
(7)
3.
(1)
qf the snnmy can+ R rI_irect bearing tha aaunt of vour 8. Bossible chznges
(?I
(3)
(41
(5)
References.
Administrative ?tanding_ Onoratincr ?( Lstter, WAG, Subject: Procedure, currently being revised, Ordnance Section, PA ____ b. 1s t r a. t lve s~~n_r?ln~__~~_r_~~~~_~_~~~Adm in -.-._I _._. ceil.ure dtd.26 Aug 1950. c. Lsttsr, PEAG, Subject: Mnintsnanoe and.?vacuat_ion of Or+
nance Materiel, dtd 17 Se? 1950,
d. Current Latter, YVAG, Subject: Ammunition Surly, QOFA, dtd 7 Fab 19s. e, Letter, TNQLG, Subject: b%inted~nce and Sunply Disciqline -With Relation to Ordnance Materiel .-.._L__ _-_-A __.___9 dtd 27 Feb 1951. f; Letter, YMAG, Subject: Ammunition Used --._____-_----.__-'for Stina.1 _
?urnosos
PDVISORrS
1.
S.?ction Are:
3.
To
agency.
9.
siFtT_al troops
2.
2nd a6
The Gpnior Advisor, Signel is Sknal Officer of PI'IAG the 6TlQCiP1 str?ffof the fiiaf, WAG, is fesTonsi.ble for +he
of $hs KMAG 6iz&d mission,
a. a mem??erof
RCCOE!771iSh?9nt
The Siznel Officer util_izpsthe oreanizwtion shown in the %. PMAG Sign=11Communiantions &qctionpl Chart (Incl, -#l)end %he ?XXS FZaaio Nets Chart (Incl 92) to flischar~e his r~sr)onsibilities~
?. CORPS A?rDDIVIS'iOF AEf11304.S. At dvi~ory heaflqu~rtsra of Cor'96 t -I_ _-___-_-.. ._ --_ _-. -____.._1-_'
Rnd Divisiona the Si?nal &+vi~or; in nfiiiition to
his Puties as Signal Advisor, his the ac?Pitiond ijutyof Simal Officer on thq stnff of the Senior These &tins aret A&isor.
h.
P . . Every effort will be exerted to mainbin communice.tione twenty-four hours a dey. DurinP the movemant qf d.ivisirjn command no&$ continuous onerstion mry 5~ im9rncticehl e Secr?use0nl.y9ne redio set (SC?1%) iS iSSUei! to thm Pivfsbn siirnpldetachment. The radio set shquld 1e moved to predesignet?d_ nointa on 19nc moves in order to 0Den u? tsnnor~rflg.
b. When the commnd nest moves, ind.icpte the general desired-location of the future comaand post pnd request the Sienel Advisor's recommendctions on conmunicrticns. Adeoueto edvence notice to the Signal Advisor Prior tc the move will im>rovF! signal communications during movements.. The Senior Advisor will notify the Chief 73jA.G of the neriod af time the station will ?IPoff the Rir. c. ?k+?nnrncticable com!unicetions should ha in operation in the
new commend post ?fore the commend pour, fiisrlaces. This will ?e accom-
plished by the ltjumn nethod'f where two rbdib sets sre assigned to the unib.
n. All Messiahs should F,ccleared, or relnyed to the new com-
mend post, before P station is closer! dmwn for P move to a new looetion.
pn out.33ing messeee is not cleared ?romntly
5. WZSSAG?!DXI,i+P:If -(maximum delay four hours) the writer will >e notifie* %y the communicn-
tions center. When traffic cqnfrsstiQn occurs the senior advisor will con-
sult with his signal officer tr,nscsrtein thl status of nrecedence of mess-
eges. Failure tq do this mny result in traffic, which the senior edvisor
ureently desires ta be trensmitted, Seine held u? by nssn~~es of higher,
prec(?dence,incoming and outgolag.
S;. XTSSAGE WLAYS %smnle.
- - &gsF_sJ?..nd to
3ne or several
msy b 9 e.ttri%utei! P %. Cous9s: Messege ae1FLys of the following CPUSPS.
(1) -0vercl~ssific~tionin the category of qrscedence,.
(2) The limitation qf the &20? cinher device,
4R.) The limitntbn innessd. )?yminimti onoretion nersonnql, tacet)ler with the iknl ,jcbassignments (rzAi(3 onerrtor snd cry-W3 clerk).
(3)
Annex 95'
The necessrrily prescrl\ed signnl standing oneratin resyect to messe,?esof qua.1 ing l3rscedure: Tmt, precedence clessificetion, the station zt the higher headausrtsrs trnnsmits its messace 3efore the lower hePdauRrt_rs transmits. 2
e : Recently m b. ~xa.ml imnortmt nessaEe sipped at a division a'Sout2300 hm& WPS not trmemitted by 0830 hmrw ths follo%ina day. Check disclosed. thRt seven incminc ~OSSRBW., of between 700 an+ 800 code eroum , were received from t'hnhiphmr hsad.c+prtcrF during the period; that only'onp of the two o~e:r-ziors (crgato men) was en ilutg;that the mm on duty imnedfately be,gn decinherbg the inconing mess~ge5 after their receint (such nction was nropr 'b+c;nase of their cfnssificetion); Chat these messages Secausi:of their length were not~dscinhm~?? >y 0830 hours of "the following d~v" nca~;io:leci. awve; That tklewriter was not notified. -
c mention&
in m~agrznki 5, above - of this de-
in accardznce with the ru';~? lay; ani!that the irr,portant oubgoing .m?ssag~ had not besn comletaly
en-
ciphered F)t0830 hours of "the folllowing dq"_~enfionnd r?ovs.
2 Incls:
Annex #5 3 -
FUidCTIObJAL CHKRT
-_..--
- ..--.-.--
. - _. _
-1
f
i
ra.de..e_
_WI_-_._L
w.... _, -_.-..
I
KXAG
h,-.-__.,.J
Fh0tL.o
Corimunications
O.ffi32r
--l'fL--m. .4
_ --
1 AdminTstration
r------Y
Operst.dm
_-_I
L ----_...-.-
Note a.
a.
BrlTTAT:IO,d AbVI=RS
AIR-GXWND LIAISON
Note
a, -
Radio te,amsfrom the KMflGsignal section are assi.g;ied at KMAG Headquarters and lower echelons to FncLlde division headquarters, Teams at Corps include red-Looperators, crypt0 perscL.;lel.and, whei:the
a radio repairrrtll
powerman.
and availability of personnel _oermi.ts, Teams at division level are usually limited to one radio operator
who also performs crypt0 functions.
Incl #2
RTWIC
OF PCR7A
c/o ?cslx?!.sster
San Franciscor Salif
1950 20 Decsm7?fi?
he conilitionp unbar which fieliiar%isc!ry p~sonn~l of this croup 1. ,m serve are varid, anr!tRctica1 conditions make In ~ornasitu3tionsl irist;,ncqs it relatively sir2nlrfcr ths Director of ';CLn,niJr to satisfy r?llrnauirEm?nts
of th? fiel? a$_visory ?~~~~:c~i~~?ts, In
otl;+r~ituati~7ns, rtistances, lack of
communications, anfit'??<~,rctS. it f92sih19 %t 8ifficul.t cgi situation rn~\kn to
supply fioIF installal;l~ns, Ddc?r stdi oth.lrcircumstances, pistances or the tactical sitwtiqn mkt-! it innrssihle f(\rthe Dirnc$bQrof Surj-dytq furnish logistical sunport, In this ca.sn,snpcial firranp::nnts nust % l&e for the sup?ly of fielr! afivisory&tacbe~ts,, Genlr&ly thpss ~etac~lnonts will ?e attache? to US units for lod.s*.icalSU~GT~, 7!';:lnn such arrsngeaents are
necessary, separate instructions trillhi: issud '?ythis headquarters.
G3RRAL : I? generpLl,l, the Birnctor of Sun?;-' will requisition, mceive, star- 7,) an+ issue 011 classps qf su-031 ins
to all. nmm%rs or units of thq group. It is the resnonsi?ility offthe seniQr advisor of each field a?visorg
detachment to insure th.?following:
3 -,.
That there is no misuse, waste, or 8ccumulPtion of axcess su~01ips 3. in his detachment. c. That informal rocors?s of ~11 non-exoFnflnFle property in his de-
tackTent nre m&ibtained.
7. .
COPPS
SUPPLY
STCTIOV:
1 1, ieut
1 set l/cl
-- Sur3ly %TCO
(1) gJF)TLYO?IC73:
The COFX Su~nly Officer is resnqnsi?le for the proper oneratiQn of the Car-Jssupqly section. Ye will assist the senior,advisor on all m&tars prtaining
&pen?
ix #1
t0 SUpply of US nersonnel, Ve is resnonsFle that informal recorfis qf all non-emendable property in the Cerps are maintainer'. UP will con?ly with procetires an? scheduals as outline? 5y his sunplying apency.
(2) SUPPLY VCO: The S?~ply 'JCO'willefiitan? consolidate requests from Soms units and nersonnel, HP will receive, store, anclissue su3131ips, maintain recor?s, and uerform additional duties as mRy ?a required,
T",o '?rsicunit for su~Jy numosss is tha division advisory a. Petachment. PPers3nnql assiznsr! or attache3 tn divisions will requisition weekly on the r?ivision advisory ilrtadhmsnt CusUlv O"ficnr or "X0, T:?sDivi.
Officer or XC0 will su%~it &.e co>y of his requisition to the Cor?s Sunnly
Officer (or appropriate sunply azency, in the case qf divisions not attached
to a ROR Corps), retaining one copy for his own use in issuinir items when
received..
-b The Crrns %Dply ; fficer will nranare his requisition for the personnelLLssigned_ or attached to the Corbs Advisory Detechment in the manner d.escri?ed a3ove. Iipwill then consolidate that requisition with those sutmjtted hy the Suuply Officers of the attached Division Advisory Detachments. The final consolidation will he submitted to the aeency sunnlyinz ths Corps as a formal requisition. Ore copy of the requisition will \e retained hy the Corps Supply Officer for his use in making issue of sunulies received,
a, Units based on an agency other than IWAG for supply will comply
with schedules and nrocec'uresas diractnd hy the sunuortinc agency.
3.
for supply:
(1) Requests will 30 consolidated weQkly ky Corps, Se-aarate
Division, Senarate ?eEimnnts, Pnd other senarata units anfi
forwardad, ATT??: Director of Supuly, so as to reach this
headquarters on or Yefore Tussr?ay. Sunnlies will Ye ready
for issUe at the Director of Supnly warehouse on Friday of
the same week.
Appendix #l'
2
._.
A---
b.
c_
days.
nnir icihr:cztts
OT?ICIAL:
TO:
.
Field Advisors
Chief
Appendix #2
BE an American Advisor with units of the Korean Army your mission is to provide your Forean officers with the Benefits of your Fast military experience. This requiremnnt ?ooe not apply to tact ical operations clone. It anFlies to all phases of military operations such as loeistics, n~rsonnel, trainin?, medical sunnort, &Tend., is
your mission is to act as an information Eath=rine acrenrgso that accurate, timely reports on all phases of the military oDeration can 3e forwarder'. through Anerican channels to the Chief I;TtAG. From this informption accurate reports can be prepared and submitted to the Army Commander. h order to perform these twq functions, you must have an und-erstandinc of the type of people wtth whom you are wTrkinc. YOU must realize fhat the Korean Army is a new army, +;hs'; there is ngt an old esta?lishsc? system. YOU must also rmalize t,kLqt the P;:rnansare very much aware of their inexperience and are 19oki;lgfor eood advice. Remamher thqt yc;uare not dealing with a group of unin:elligsnt pecpls, On the contrary thny are ex?,remely
intelligent and easily 2~c3-1l*ze 33 difference hetweox ~0~3. ; ,4vice, iq?i:ferent advice, .and ?a(! ad7,i,ce, Tha manner in which you prov+de advice 5r, ycur unit officers is er::r6SI_y important. If you give ad-vice in an inc?ifferent , lackadaisical macn:+T:, thy wili z.ccept it ad such and react to it in the same manner. Therefcrt it can he sair?t:latyour first .joh, is to stuay YOUr officers, learn to l;nderstandthem, and iend every effort to ecta?lish You should consider the a spirit of mutual trust, res;)pct, and cooneration. lack of experience and training of your >ersonnel a challange rather than an 03stacle. YOU must approach the securing of accurate information in much the same manner as giving advice. You must attempt to develop, a willingness on the The alternative to part of your officers to Sring Mxmation to vou. dig it out yourself - is uncertain and far too s?_ow. You will find it eood
practice to require cerbin resorts each;mornin< or each week denendinc on the su?jact and the sitwtion. An S-1 revert each morxing shcwing the
strengths of each unit, and. the number of casualties is invalu&le. Information on ?attle casualties can ??e utilized in various wa.ys. First of all it provides a check on the efficiency of your unit in com3a.t. From this report you may note that B Comrany h.assuffered serious casualties in an
action the previous day. Take thisinformption to tha S-3 an8 determine just what took place. Check with the commadrler concerned tr,find out the circumstances. Often in this way you spcure information that you miaht otherwise have overlooked, Corrective action can then ?e taken immediately that may prevent future difficulties, A second use of the S-1 report is to determine the number of non-?attlc cr.sualti?s. When these are excess?ve, yuu can often make apnroprinte recommendations to the medical officer or unit officers to eliminate the CPUS~ of these losses, $xamQle: l?if teen
men are listed as non-battle casualties. Check with the r+Wmental aifl. station and determine the reason. It may 36 dysentery, frost%ite, or any in th$s OEG~, let us say frostF\ite was the of a number of other reasons, cause. Immediately Sring this to the attention of the riletocn lead.ers. Have them conduct foot inspection twice daily, have them suqerviae the changing of socks, have them nrovide means of drying the mens socks and shoes. Recommend qeriodic massaging of the feet using the hudiry system. and check the front line nlatcons to 8.etarmine Finally go forward yourseif what is being done. YQU may find thet the casualties are not due to faulty This conilit ion can %cF? hroucrhtto the atequipment 5ut due to lack of it.
tention of S-4. Necessary action can at least he started to eliminate the shortage. The most im%rtant thing is to show interest and to 8.0something
constructive.
Appendix # 2 1
There ?re other types of reports thnt you should receive periodically;
They will assist you in pilvisinm unit officers properly. They will eid
you in rendorine eccurete r"?crts to hich@r heedauertsrs. They include
the following:
Ammunitix Status Be3oyt_: This is P necessitv! In order to pre-
Qent the stockpiling of rmmuniti3n fPr beyond co&at renuirsments you must
al~~ev~ >e up to fiTto on whzt is on hand. You must nlweys rnmem?er thn capacity of your tr9,nsnortPtion end keep ycur supnly of emmunition at p.
level that cm 11e hnndled.. %cess ive 0uTJlies usunllv must ?e f?estroyed or R?andoned.
_%~_g~s_of Weapons Re;iort: Ym must r~lweysshow much concern Rhout
tb_f? loss of weP?Dons. ?ecq>;meilr! some svstem whereby
the weapons of cc7suel-
ties ;Iresnlv~grer'
remover? ;~nd tr,F,safe star,?EG place for reissue ct :!later
dnte. Constrntly work on mezne of controlling the loss of wee7)ons. You
will find this one of ycur CreRtest prohlsms.
S-4 Qport:
This ra?ort ,qtlcrst once n we+ should shr)~shr?rtrees
_-_I_of clothing and equi-i:ren.t..
%t9?,lish T.qstr9 of checking all reauisitions
for resupply of food, clothin:, PCL, equ_Lzent, etc. In t%is wpy YT.Ikeep
aSreast of the supply situation pnc'eliminate wcste pnP ~ov9rClrPwing.
Oper::tions_~_~~__I_n_t~~l_l_~~ence__~sn?rt 5: V-U cpn
best secure this type of informatinn thraueh "~son;l o?serv~tirn .onPky persone.1cnntsct Judith the S-2 and S-X. Q'tlow whet information vvouwent! T~'rc" 2n interpreter an? mest ion the approprintp staff officer until v7u -?p.t thnt information. This informetion, coupled brithyour p=rsoc~l ohservgtian, will eive vou r?working kn7wled;e of the situation pt $3 times. Fers?ne11Q ._ conduct PI" interroerti9ns t
thrqurh friendly lines, talk to our personnel who
interview civilinns c?,rr.ing
asca.ped. This P,oes not tnk,?lone and the results mqre then justify the ef-
fort 2nd time ex-oanded.
YOU will note the term "pers?nel ol?servetion" has ?een use?. Assume
th,otyou are the commsndar of any size unit of the America Army engaged
in com%,-lt.%W $0 you keep yourself informed? You do so thrauch ::series
of reports from your staff officers, followed hy freauent personel in-
spections. In your position es Fn rdvisor to P unit-of the HqrefinArmy the
same system applies. These inspections must include both the edainistrstive
end tPcticP1 sitmtisn. Dose inspecti,9ns ;rreessential if you are to PC-
comnlish your missinn succ~ssfullv.
The folIowinE sucpstions pre offered 3s 13ossi?lernePnsof m&ing vnur joF)an easier r)neto perform. They may result in greatly imnr?vinp your strtus in your unit. over!. th?uzh you are not in a nosition of canmnnd, tr.y to be a leader - set finexemale for your Qfficers. Yau must \e. neat, cleen, sn~~eoldierly in a3Denrance 8t 2l.Itimes no mRtter how irifficult it nily>e to maintain yourself so. R-rneEY9rthat no one respects a sloven. If you find 8.woundefisolcf.ier from your unit, t&e
him to the rid station in your stetiqn periodicrllv cqncernina care of the l+lounded.
jeep. Check the ~?id. Show an interest in the soldiers ~nilofficers, A-k auestigns c?%ut their
clothing. Are they werm enouch? ?o they hF.vegloves or socks? If dis-
crepancies are found - do something alout it.
Appendix # 2
2
Skm
c9,nfiirence
in your
unit.
hlva:m
trr
tQ build
Ysprit
3e
Corps.
Be sufficiently awc?reof the situation so that you l7TY vhen ailVj_Oe ne9C?eA..Then z3.ve it frcdp. VOX must know enor4Th<ifthe situation ?t all times to be capa+le flfriving pt)Vic't. If you I% nqt know, 30 not
is
Five i3r'Yice.
The Americ,nn aC1,Vis;r in may !:e is fPcC$ -liln ngq my the p??epr 11~~: Of take the fiel?, Or in P hegdOua.rters, Or wh,erPVer
d.if?ia~lti.Ps. Fe solution to some qf these imhC:ssitj1R. Rs a rnsult of this feeline, advkors IeAst reeistpnce. T!?is nttitde $oes not fyet the
he
*ifficulties often
jo? done, To ad: is tn l=t drwn t;:?e other AC?Visors iz i RlAS, thgt there pre A'sricPn nf:Picsrs rnd Tpan s~rrir;;r in 911 levds
?e?e+er of the
Forear,Army. The77r?re f;lcec' -,rnl-l~~s with the SZITIP thzt ?V_Iare. The amount of effort exnen(7~?ii hy ;TJU C?S ,on id j.x-xfW91 to secilre itccurr2tP, timely information will i.nci g;lse the effect.k2zf,ers Of the 2fivis9rs owrati3g nc?jacent to you. Americnn lives. Th? lsorti0n.d tc the liack cf effort aa.;y rrsuii, -in anecessary co&at effscti;ren~Ss of 2 Toreen unit is nr,d. enthusiasm of the &iericm Loss of
rlirectly pm-
efficiency
aclvisor.
ADnendix # 2