PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES Preamble Republicanism

Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
- Republican form of government: one constructed on the principle that the supreme power resides in the body of the people. Its purpose is the promotion of the common welfare according to the will of the people themselves (usually determined by the rule of the majority). - In a republican form of government, sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. - Democratic: the Constitutional Commission to the 1987 Constitution added this phrase. This shows that the Philippines is not just a representative government but also shares some aspects of direct democracy. - Ex. Initiative and referendum

Purpose of the separation of powers: to prevent the concentration of authority in one person or group of persons that might lead to irreparable error or abuse in the exercise to the detriment of republican institution. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

Manifestations 1. Nemo est supra leges - Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778

The primary question is: Shall the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands? The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question. By authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? One can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands and these women, despite their being in a sense lepers of society, are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil 778).

The Court held: 1. That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of powers into the legislative, the executive and the judicial. 2. That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted. 3. That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries. 4. That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. 5. That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Rule of majority Accountability of Public Officials Bill of Rights Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws Separation of Powers

6. That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

7. That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members. 8. That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission. 9. That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.

Issue: Did President Truman have the constitutional authority to seize and operate the steel mills? In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the President did not have the authority to issue such an order. The Court found that there was no congressional statute that authorized the President to take possession of private property. The Court also held that the President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces did not extend to labor disputes. The Court argued that "the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker (Youngstown Co, vs. Sawyer, 343 US 579, 96 L.Ed. 1153).

- Bowsher v. Synar, 478 US 714

The Congress cannot control the execution of its laws; since it doesnt possess this power, it cant delegate it to its agents. The CG is an agent of the Legislature because Congress can remove him by a process other than impeachment. The CG exercises executive power. Thus, the Act is unconstitutional.The CGs function under the Act is the very essence of execution of the laws since (1) it entails interpreting the Act to determine precisely what kind of budgetary calculations are required and (2) the CG commands the President to carry out, without variation, the CGs directive regarding the budget resolutions. Interpreting a law enacted by Congress is the very essence of executions of the laws. Once Congress passes legislation, it can only influence its execution by passing new laws or through impeachment. The Constitution only explicitly provides Congress the power to remove executive officers by impeachment. Also, the Constitutional Convention explicitly rejected language that would have permitted impeachment for maladministration, with Madison arguing that so vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate. Thus, Congress can only remove a member of the executive branch through impeachment (Bowsher vs. Synar, 478 US 714).

10. That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.

11. That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party,and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.

12. That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

- Senate v. Ermita (E.O.464), G.R. No. 169777

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. For what republican theory did accomplish?was to reverse the old presumption in favor of secrecy, based on the divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity, based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty. Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have given up something of much greater value ? our right as a people to take part in government (Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464), GR 169777).

13. That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protest against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139).

Principle of Blending of Powers

Instance when powers are not confined exclusively within one department but are assigned to or shared by shared by several departments.

Principle of Checks and Balances - The Steel Seizure case, 343 US 579, 96 L.Ed. 1153

7. Non-delegation of powers - Phil. Interisland Shipping Ass'n. v. CA, GR 100481, Jan. 22, 1997

The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. When he issued E.O. No. 1088, President Marcos was authorized under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution to exercise legislative power, just as he was under the original 1973 Constitution, when he issued P.D. NO. 857 which created the PPA, endowing it with the power to regulate pilotage service in Philippine ports. Although the power to fix rates for pilotage had been delegated to the PPA, it became necessary to rationalize the rates of charges fixed by it through the imposition of uniform rates. That is what the President did in promulgating E.O. No. 1088. As the President could delegate the ratemaking power to the PPA, so could he exercise it in specific instances without thereby withdrawing the power vested by P.D. No. 857, Section 20(a) in the PPA "to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees... for the services rendered by the Authority or by any private organization within a Port District (Philippine Interisland Shipping Ass'n vs. CA, GR 100481, Jan. 22, 1997).

authorities. In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil 56).

a. Tariff Powers to the President

a. (Sec. 28 (2), Art. VI; (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

Potestas delegata non delegare potest

Premised on the ethical principle that delegated power constitutes not only a right but also a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.

b. Emergency Powers to the President

b. Section 23 (2), Art VI) (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

Permissible Delegation
The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 which provides for a system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted of crime is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws. As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief Executive. But, probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. The Court held that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment. The power to make laws or the legislative power is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of the Philippines. The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest. The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local

- First Emergency Powers cases, 84 Phil. 368

Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope." The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency." The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law,"; for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet the approval of the President, and the Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be, the law.

More anomalous than the exercise of legislative function by the Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its authority is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended while Congress was in session and be revived after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be limited. Congress by a two-third vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and the President in turn could treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic apprehension; in two instances it materialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only by the best interests of the country as they saw them, a former President promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and the present Chief Executive issued an executive order on export control after Congress had refused to approve the measure. What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the same paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer. He said he issued the call for a special session of the National Assembly "when it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In so far as it is insinuated that the Chief Executive has the exclusive authority to say that war not ended, and may act on the strength of his opinion and findings in contravention of the law as the courts have construed it, no legal principle can be found to support the proposition. There is no pretense that the President has independent or inherent power to issue such executive orders as those under review. After the convening of Congress new legislation had to be approved if the continuation of the emergency powers, or some of them, was desired. In the light of the conditions surrounding the approval of the Emergency Power Act, we are of the opinion that the "state of total emergency as a result of war" envisaged in the preamble referred to the impending invasion and occupation of the Philippines by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization of the Government, principally the impossibility for the National Assembly to act. The state of affairs was one which called for immediate action and with which the National Assembly would would not be able to cope. The war itself and its attendant chaos and calamities could not have necessitated the delegation had the National Assembly been in a position to operate (First Emergency Powers Cases, 84 Phil 368).

principal authority to determine the indefinite duration of the delegation of legislative powers, ? in palpable repugnance to the constitutional provision that any grant thereunder must be for a limited period, necessarily to be fixed in the law itself and not dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic will of either the Congress or the President. Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and did not thereby become a regular statute, it may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formally declaring the termination of the emergency powers. To contend that the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to produce effect, would lead to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, "while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law." Insofar as the Congress had shown its readiness or ability to act on a given matter, the emergency powers delegated to the President had been pro tanto withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage. We can take judicial notice of the fact that the Congress has since liberation repeatedly been approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and many others purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task the Congress must be deemed to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself and to withdraw the same from the President. Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the President should be allowed to exercise emergency powers for the sake of speed and expediency in the interest and for the welfare of the people, because we have the Constitution, designed to establish a government under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy. In line with such primordial objective, our Government is democratic in form and based on the system of separation of powers. Unless and until changed or amended, we shall have to abide by the letter and spirit of the Constitution and be prepared to accept the consequences resulting from or inherent in disagreements between, inaction or even refusal of the legislative and executive departments. Much as it is imperative in some cases to have prompt official action, deadlocks in and slowness of democratic processes must be preferred to concentration of powers in any one man or group of men for obvious reasons. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times of war or other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution (2nd Emergency Powers Cases, 92 Phil 603).

- Second Emergency Powers cases, 92 Phil. 603

As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that the National Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to the President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto. This eventuality has in fact taken place when the President disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing all Emergency Powers Acts. The situation will make the Congress and the President or either as the

c. Delegation to the People

c. Sec. 32, Art. VI; Sec. 10, Art X; Sec. 2, Art. XVII; RA 6735);

Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative

body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof. Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

- Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain (Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659).

- De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 Legislative standard need not be expressed

d. Delegation to Local Government Units e. Delegation to the Administrative Bodies Power of Subordinate Legislation - Miners Association v. Factoran, GR 98332, Jan. 16, 1995 The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment. The questioned administrative orders are reasonably directed to the accomplishment of the purposes of the law under which they were issued and were intended to secure the paramount interest of the public, their economic growth and welfare. The validity and constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 are sustained, and their force and effect upheld (Miners Assn vs. Factoran, GR 98332, Jan. 16, 1995). Principle of Subdelegation of Powers Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency Tests for valid delegation a. Completeness Test Law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions so that there is nothing for the delegate to do except to enforce it. b. Sufficient Standard Test Maps out the boundaries of the delegates authority by defining the legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under which it is to be pursued.

- Hirabashi v. United States, 320 US 99

Did the President's executive orders and the power delegated to the military authorities discriminate against Americans and resident aliens of Japanese descent in violation of the Fifth Amendment which restrains discriminatory legislation by Congress as amounts to denial of due process? The Court found the President's orders and the implementation of the curfew to be constitutional. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the unanimous Court, took into account the great importance of military installations and weapons production that occurred on the West Coast and the "solidarity" that individuals of Japanese descent felt with their motherland. He reasoned that restrictions on Japanese actions served an important national interest. The Court ducked the thorny relocation issue and focused solely on the curfew, which the Court viewed as a necessary "protective measure." Stone argued that racial discrimination was justified since "in time of war residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of a different ancestry (Hirabayashi vs US, 320 US 81).

- Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253

The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices. The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes."

There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions. The question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of the power granted and whether in any event the grant of power to him is included in the subject expressed in the title of the law. On the question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation. With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business." Indeed, as the original eleven administrative regions were established in accordance with this policy, it is logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" in view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces now constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative regions (Chionbian vs. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253).

8. State Immunity (supra) 9. Election through popular will