BC

1 :OOp m-3 :0 0 p m

Manchester Ballroom C, 2nd Level

Th outh Chin S a: The N w Cruclbl US-Ch n latlon ?

Chaired by Eric Hyer, Brigham Young University

in

Ch inese Assertiveness and U .S. Rebalancing : Confrontat ion in the South Ch ina Sea? Carlyle A . Thayer, University of New South Wale s Un it ed St ates' New Leverage in the South Ch ina Sea? Cu rrent Trends amid a New Asia-Pacific Str ategy When th e Eagle and Dragon Dan ce Will the Rice Sta lks Get Trampled?: Major Pow er Dynamics and ASEAN Julio Santiago Amador III, Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies Into the Maritime Labyrinth: A Prologue f or Peac e or Armed Conflict?

- As ciall n f rAsian SlUdi s

ChineseAssertivenessandU.S. Rebalancing:Confrontationinthe SouthChinaSea?

CarlyleA.Thayer

PeoplesLiberationArmyNavyType056StealthFrigate

PapertoPanelonTheSouthChinaSea: TheNewCrucibleinUSChinaRelations? AnnualConferenceoftheAssociationforAsianStudies ManchesterGrandHyattHotel,SanDiego March22,2013

ChineseAssertivenessandU.S.Rebalancing: ConfrontationintheSouthChinaSea?
CarlyleA.Thayer* Introduction
In2011RobertKaplanwroteanarticlewiththeprovocativetitle,TheSouthChinaSeais theFutureofConflict.1KaplannotedthatChinawasexpandingitsnavyandwouldemerge asamaritimepower.HeforecastthatEastAsiawouldbecomethecentreforthestruggle for naval primacy between China and the United States. According to Kaplan, the South ChinaSeawillbeofcriticalstrategicimportanceduetoitsgeographiclocationandenergy resources. Rising regional energy demand will make the South China Sea the ever more central guarantor of the regions economic strength and is an obvious arena for the projectionofChinesepower.2Kaplanofferedthisnetassessment:
JustasGermansoilconstitutedthemilitaryfrontlineoftheColdWar,thewatersoftheSouthChinaSea may constitute the military front line of the coming decades. As Chinas navy becomes stronger and as ChinasclaimontheSouthChinaSeacontradictsthoseofotherlittoralstates,theseotherstateswillbe forcedtofurtherdeveloptheirnavalcapacities.TheywillalsobalanceagainstChinabyrelyingincreasingly on the U.S. Navy, whose strength has probably peaked in relative terms Worldwide multipolarity is alreadyafeatureofdiplomacyandeconomics,buttheSouthChinaSeacouldshowuswhatmultipolarity 3 inamilitarysenseactuallylookslike.

Kaplanconcludedhisarticlebyaskingrhetorically:canconflictintheSouthChinaSeabe properly controlled? To which he answered: my argument thus far presupposes that majorwarfarewillnotbreakoutintheareaandthatinsteadcountrieswillbecontentto jockey for position with their warships on the high seas.4 Kaplan further argued that regionalstateswouldmodernizetheirarmedforcesatthesametimeastheUnitedStates

CarlyleA.ThayerisEmeritusProfessor,TheUniversityofNewSouthWalesattheAustralianDefenceForce Academy,Canberra.Email:c.thayer@adfa.edu.au.
1

RobertKaplan,TheSouthChinaSeaistheFutureofConflict,ForeignPolicy,188,September/October2011, 7685.
2 3 4

Ibid.,82. Ibid. Ibid.,83.

adjustedtotheemergenceofChinasbluewaternavy.StabilityinEastAsia,heconcluded, willrestonabalanceofpowerratherthanChineseorU.S.hegemony.5 This paper is a case study of SinoAmerican strategic rivalry in the South China Sea. The paperisdividedintofiveparts.Part1considersthemaritimedimensionsofChinasriseand whetherornottheSouthChinaSeaisacoreinterest.Particularemphasisisgiventothe modernization of Chinas South Sea Fleet, the development of the Ya Long Naval Base on HainanIsland,andtheexpansionofChinasparamilitaryfleets.Part2identifiesU.S.national interests in the South China Seafreedom of navigation and over flight, unimpeded lawful commerce, the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes and continued naval supremacy. Part 3 considers the U.S. policy of rebalancing in the AsiaPacific and its implications for SoutheastAsiasmaritimedomain.Part4examinesthevariedresponsesbyregionalstates toincreasedChineseassertivenessinadvancingitsterritorialclaimsintheSouthChinaSea. Part 5 explores three possible outcomes: armed conflict, a modus vivendi between China andtheUnitedStates,andcontinuedcooperationandfriction.

Part1ChinasCoreInterestsandMaritimeObjectives
ChinasCoreInterests
In 2010 speculation arose that China had declared the South China Sea a core interest alongwithTaiwan,TibetandXinjiang.InApril2010,TheNewYorkTimesreported:
In March, Chinese officials told two visiting senior Obama administration officials, Jeffrey A. Bader and JamesB.Steinberg,thatChinawouldnottolerateanyinterferenceintheSouthChinaSea,nowpartof Chinascoreinterestofsovereignty,saidanAmericanofficialinvolvedinChinapolicy.Itwasthefirst timetheChineselabeledtheSouthChinaSeaacoreinterest,onparwithTaiwanandTibet,theofficial 6 said.

There was media confusion over which Chinese official spoke to the visiting American officials.TheWashingtonPostreported:
In March, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Cui Tiankai told two senior U.S. officials that China now viewsitsclaimstothe1.3millionsquaremileseaonparwithitsclaimstoTibetandTaiwan,anislandthat 7 ChinasaysbelongstoBeijing.

JeffreyBader,inasubsequentaccount,elidedthispoint;hewrote:

5 6

Ibid.,8485.

Edward Wong, Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power, The New York Times, April 23, 2010. Bader was senior director for East Asian affairs on the National Security Council; Steinberg is the Deputy SecretaryofState.
7

JohnPomfret,U.S.takesatougherlinewithChina,TheWashingtonPost,July30,2010.

4
IrecalledtheincreasinglystrongarticulationofChinasindisputableclaimsintheareathatIhadheard duringmyvisittoBeijingwithSteinberginFebruary2010[sic],aswellasoccasionalassertionsbymilitary 8 andmidrankingcivilianofficialstotheeffectthatthesewaterswereofcoreinteresttoChina.

SecretaryofStateHillaryClintondisclosedthatatthe2ndU.S.ChinaStrategicandEconomic DialogueinBeijing(May2425,2010)StateCouncillorDaiBingguostatedChinaviewedthe SouthChinaSeaasacoreinterest.AccordingtoClinton:

And whenChina first told us at ameetingoftheStrategic andEconomicDialoguethattheyviewed the SouthChinaSeaasacoreinterest,Iimmediatelyrespondedandsaid,Wedon'tagreewiththat.Sothey wereonnoticethatiftheywere Question:WasthatDaiBingguothatsaidthattoyou? Yes,yeah.Soiftheywereintheprocessofextendingtheireffortstoclaimandcontroltothedetrimentof international law, freedom of navigation, maritime security, the claims of their neighbours, that was a concerningmatter.Andtherefore,weworkedwithalotoftheASEANcountrieswhoaredirectlyimpacted and12ofusraiseditatheASEANRegionalForumlastJulytomakeitclearthatissueslikethathavetobe 9 resolvedinaccordancewiththeruleoflaw.

AreviewofChineseacademicandmediacommentaryonthisquestionpublishedinAugust 2010concluded:
While no Chinese official has spoken about what core national interests means, there is a growing chorus from within the country for the Peoples Liberation Army to defend these core interests in the disputed region. Recent news coverage has brought the term core national interests into the same spotlightasnationalsovereignty:andterritorialintegrityandraisestheissueofhowChinadefinesthe 10 termandwhatitcovers.

InOctober2010,aU.S.officialnotedthattherewasaninternaldebateinChinaaboutthe coreinterestissue.Theynow,inatleastsomeofourinteractionswiththem,appearto havebackedawayfromthecoreinterestargumentandseemtobeseekingotherwaysto articulatetheirapproachtotheseissues,hesaid.11Since2010,Chineseofficialshavebeen ambiguousaboutwhetherornottheSouthChinaSeahasbeenraisedofficiallyininternal

JeffreyA.Bader, ObamaandChinasRise:AnInsidersAccountofAmericasAsiaStrategy (Washington,D.C.: BrookingsInstitutionPress,2012),105.

9

Interview with Greg Sheridan of The Australian, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Melbourne, Australia,November8,2010.
10

CaryHuang,AbolderChinaassertscoreinterestsbutwillitact?,SouthChinaMorningPost,August12, 2010.ForanexampleofChinesemediadissimulationsee:LeHongmei,UnwisetoelevateSouthChinaSea tobecoreinterest?, PeoplesDailyOnline,August27,2010.Foradetailedcriticalexaminationofthecore interest issue see: Michael D. Swaine, Chinas Assertive Behavior, Part One: On Core Interests, China LeadershipMonitorNo.34,2011,125.
11

Quoted in Phil Stewart and John Ruwitch, U.S. see crisis fear easing over South China Sea, Reuters, October13,2010.AhighrankingU.S.officialiscitedasmakingthesamepointinKazutoTsukamoto,Yusuke Murayama and Kenji Minemura, At key meet, Beijing tones down stance on South China Sea, The Asahi Shibun,October14,2010.

policy documents to a core interest or core national interest.12 The Chinese media, regionalspecialistsandpopularnationalists,however,continuetorefertotheSouthChina Seaasacoreinterest.Forexample,TheGlobalTimesstatedinJuly2012,AstoChina,itis notinterestedinbeinginvolvedinfrequentwrangleswithVietnamandthePhilippinesover theSouthChinaSea,whichismerelyoneofitscoreinterests.13 If the South China Sea is not officially one of Chinas core interests, China nevertheless does have major interests. These include regional stability, secure sealanes, access to fisheries and other natural resources (oil and gas), and unresolved territorial claims. According to Xinhua, China plans to conduct forty naval exercises in 2013 to hone its combatskillsandhelptroopsreadythemselvesforbattlewithanemphasisonChinascore securityrelatedinterests.14

MaritimeObjectives
Chinas 2010 Defence White Paper enumerated four national defence objectives: (1) safeguarding national sovereignty, security and interests of national development; (2) maintaining social harmony and stability; (3) accelerating the modernization of national defence and the armed forces; and (4) maintaining world peace and stability.15 Chinas military strategy to achieve these objectives is encapsulated in National Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period that propounds an operational doctrine termed Active Defence.16 Chinas Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is tasked with three essential missions: defeatinginvasionfromthesea,defendingterritorialsovereignty,andprotectingmaritime rights. Its primary area of operation is focused on the socalled first and second island chains. The first island chain refers to the line of islands that runs northsouth from the Kuriles,Japan,theRyukyuIslands,Taiwan,thePhilippines,andIndonesia.Thesecondisland

12

EdwardWong,ChinaHedgesOverWhetherSouthChinaSeaIsaCoreInterestWorthWar,TheNewYork Times,March30,2011.
13 14 15

Chinapatient,notreckless,overislands,GlobalTimes,July1,2012. QuotedinAgenceFrancePresse,Chinanavygetsnewstealthfrigate:statemedia,February27,2013.

ThePeoplesRepublicofChina,StateCouncil,InformationOffice, ChinasNationalDefensein2010(Beijing: March2011).

16

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2011, A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Washington,D.C.2012).

chainextendsfurthereastofChinascoastandincludesalinerunningnorthsouthfromthe KurilesthroughJapan,theBonins,theMarianas,theCarolines,andIndonesia. With respect to Chinas maritime domain, China pursues a defence doctrine known as OffshoreDefenceorNearSeasDefence.17TheNearSeasincludetheYellowSea,East China Sea and South China Sea and are a PLAN priority. Chinas phenomenal economic growthhasbeendrivenbyexportorientatedtrade.ThishasincreasedChinasdependency on maritime routes to export goods and to import natural resources. As a consequence, Chinahasaninterestinprotectingvitaltraderoutesorsealinesofcommunication(SLOCs). Chinese defence analysts have expressed concern about what has been termed the MalaccadilemmathethreattoChinasnationalsecuritybytheclosureofnarrowstraits or choke points in Southeast Asia.18 Chinas economic growth also has fueled a rising demand for fish and other aquatic resources, minerals on the deep seabed and hydrocarbons(oilandnaturalgas).ChinaclaimsmostoftheSouthChinaSeaonthebasisof historicrights. The PLAN is tasked with developing the capability to conduct six offensive/defensive maritime campaigns: blockade, antisea line of communication (SLOC), maritimeland attack,antiship,protectionofmaritimetransportation,andnavalbasedefence. Fivepointsmaybedrawnfromtheabovediscussion: First, Chinas spectacular economic rise has provided the basis for increased defence spending that in turn has led to the transformation and modernization of all military services, including the PLAN (see below).19 At the March 2013 session of the National Peoples Congress China raised official defence spending by 10.7 percent to 720.2 billion

17

NanLi,TheEvolutionofChinasNavalStrategyandCapabilities:FromNearCoastandNearSeastoFar Seas, in Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher D. Yung, Michael Swaine and Andrew NienDzu Yang, eds., The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011),109140.
18

ThomasM.Kane,ChineseGrandStrategyandMaritimePower(LondonandPortland:FrankCass,2002),127 128.
19

For a discussion of Chinas defence spending consult: Joachim Hofbauer, Priscilla Hermann and Sneha Raghavan, Asian Defense Spending, 20002011: A Report of the CSIS DefenseIndustrial Initiatives Group (Washington,D.C.:CenterforStrategic&InternationalStudies,October2012),811.

yuan or US $115.7 billion.20 Chinas defence modernisation is in many respects a normal development. Second,ChinaplaceshighestpriorityonTaiwanandnationalreunification.AftertheTaiwan Straitscrisisof199596,whenChineseattemptstointimidateTaiwanresultedinU.S.naval intervention, China has sought to forestall future intervention by U.S. carrier forces by extendingitsnavalreachbeyondthefirsttothesecondislandchainbydevelopingcounter interventioncapabilitiesorwhatthePentagontermsantiaccess/areadenialcapabilities. Third, Chinas rise has raised the salience of protecting its major SLOCs from the Gulf of ArabiathroughtheSouthChinaSeatoitseasternseaboard. Fourth,ChineseresourcenationalismhasraisedtheimportanceoftheSouthChinaSeawith respecttooil,gas,mineralresourcesandsovereigntyclaims.IncreasinglyPLANoperations haveextendedintotheSouthChinaSeawithaparticularfocusonthewatersadjacentto thePhilippines. Fifth,asChinabecomesaglobalpowerwithwidespreadeconomicandpoliticalinterests,it willdevelopabluewaternavytoprotectitsinterestsmuchfurtherafield.
ChinasForceCapabilityDevelopment

There are nine main elements to Chinas naval modernization program: antiship ballistic missiles,antishipcruisemissiles,submarines(conventionalandnuclear),aircraftcarriers,21 surface combatants, amphibious ships, landbased aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, nuclear and electromagnetic pulse weapons and maritime surveillance and targeting systems.22FiveelementsofPLANmodernizationareofparticularsignificancetotheSouth

20

Xinhua,Chinas2013draftbudgetreport,ChinaNationalPeoplesCongress,March5,2013andAndrew Erickson,ChinasMilitaryBudgetBump:WhatitMeans,TheWallStreetJournal,March5,2013.
21

In2012,ChinacommissionedtheLiaoning(formerlyVaryag)aircraftcarrierandpromptlyconducteditsfirst landings and takeoffs by J15 fighters. The Liaoning is an old ship and will be used primarily for training purposes.The Liaoning usesaskyjumptoassisttakeoffsthatlimitthekindsofaircraftandpayloadsthatcan belaunched.The Liaoning willalsoembarkhelicopters.Itisunlikelythe Liaoning willbefullyoperationaluntil after2015attheearliest.TheLiaoninghasbeenhomeportedinQingdaowiththeNorthSeaFleet;see:Why China sent its aircraft carrier to Qingdao, IISS Voices, March 7, 2013. China is now researching the development and construction of its first nuclearpower carrier; see: Angus Grigg, China makes plans for nuclearnavy,TheAustralianFinancialReview,February25,2013.
22

RonaldORourke,ChinaNavalModernization:ImplicationsforU.S.NavyCapabilitiesBackgroundandIssues forCongress,CRSReportforCongress(Washington,D.C.:CongressionalResearchService,July31,2012),834. See also: Ronald ORourke, PLAN Force Structure: Submarines, Ships, Aircraft, in Phillip C. Saunders,

SeaFleet:submarines,aircraftcarrier,surfacecombatants,amphibiousshipsandmaritime surveillanceandtargetingsystems. Several of the factors promoting Chinas military modernization intersect with respect to Southeast Asias maritime domain and the South China Sea in particular. This is most evidentinthemodernizationoftheSouthSeaFleetandtheconstructionofamajornaval baseonHainanIslandonthenorthernreachesoftheSouthChinaSea.
SouthSeaFleet

ThePLANcurrentlyoperatesfournewclassesofdomesticallybuiltsubmarinesinaddition to the Russian Kiloclass conventional attack submarine (SS): Jin class or Type 094 nuclear poweredballisticmissile(SSBN);ShangclassorType093nuclearpowered(SSN);Yuanclass orType041(orType039A)SS;andtheSongclassorType039/039GSS.23Thesesubmarines are armed with one or more weapons systems including antiship cruise missiles (ASCM), wireguidedandwakehomingtorpedoesandmines.TheKiloclasssubsarearmedwiththe SN27 Sizzler ASCM. By the end of 2010 the PLAN had 31 relatively new modern attack submarines in commission. Given current production rates and life expectancy the PLAN could have a force of 75 modern submarines by 202024.24 China has accorded the South Sea Fleet new priority. The PLAN has redeployed its newest attack SSNs and SSBNs from theirtraditionalportofQingdaotoHainanIsland. The PLAN also deploys five new classes of indigenously build guided missile destroyers (DDG) in addition to the Russian Sovremennyclass: Luhu (Type 052), Luhai (Type 051B), Luyang(Type052B),LuyangII(Type052C)andLouzhou(Type051C).Asof2012,thePLAN hadfourteenofthesedestroyersundercommission;anadditionalsixLuyangIIdestroyers

Christopher D. Yung, Michael Swaine and Andrew NienDzu Yang, eds., The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities,EvolvingRoles(Washington,D.C.:NationalDefenseUniversityPress,2011),141174andAnthony H. Cordesman and Nicholas S. Yarosh, Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development: A Western Perspective.Washington,D.C.:CenterforStrategic&InternationalStudies,July30,2012,104130.
23 24

ORourke,ChinaNavalModernization,1015. ORourke,ChinaNavalModernization,15.

are currently under construction. Eight destroyers are currently deployed with the South SeaFleetincludingtheLuyangandLuyangIIclass.25 The PLAN deploys five classes of indigenously built frigates: Jiangwei I (Type 053 H2G), JiangeiII(Type053H3),JiangkaiI(Type054),JiangkaiII(Type054A)andtheJiangdao(Type 056) stealth frigate.26 The PLAN currently has 28 of the first four classes of frigates under commission;nineType056frigateshavebeencommissionedwithelevenmoreexpectedto beproduced.27FortyfourfrigatesofalltypesarecurrentlydeployedwiththeEastSeaand South Sea Fleets.28 Of Chinas twentyeight amphibious ships, 26 are currently deployed with the East Sea and South Sea Fleets. The South Sea Fleet also is home of the largest marine battalion, amphibious platforms and Chinas largest hospital ship. According to a recentstudy:
Somewhat surprisingly, as this text has shown, many of the newest DDGs, frigates, and submarines tend to be based in the South China Sea. This configuration does not necessarily supportaTaiwanconflict,butdoesmatchafuturemissionofescortingoilconvoystotheMiddle East, or asserting greater sovereignty over Chinese claims to the South China Sea. The Luyang DDGs 168 and 169 and the Luyang DDGs 170 and 171 forms the core of two battle group formationsbasedatYulin[YaLong]fordistantoperations.29

TheSouthSeaFleetheadquartersatZhanjing,Guangdongprovince,formsthecentralhub ofamajorcomplexofstrategicspaceandtacticallongrangeradarsandcommunicationsto support operations in the South China Sea. These electronic systems link Woody Island, Fiery Cross Reef and other Chineseoccupied features with local and fleet commanders. Also, they are augmented by the combat and other electronic systems of PLAN warships, aircraft and paramilitary vessels. Zhanjiang and other ports on China southern coast are equipped with navigation aids as radio beacon navigation differential global positioning

25

AndrewS.Erickson,ChinasModernizationofItsNavalandAirPowerCapabilities,inAshleyJ.Tellisand Travis Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia 201213: Chinas Military Challenge (Seattle and Washington: National BureauofAsianResearch,2012),99.
26

ORourke,ChinaNavalModernization,2526;Xinhua,PLANavytakescommandofnextgenerationfrigate, Global Times, February 26, 2013; Chinese Navys type056 frigate makes debut, Peoples Daily Online, February 28, 2013; and Agence FrancePresse, China bolster navy with stealth frigate, Herald Sun (Melbourne),February26,2013.
27 28 29

AssociatedPress,Chinalaunchesstealthfrigateamidoceantensions,February26,2013. Erickson,ChinasModernizationofItsNavalandAirPowerCapabilities,99.

JamesC.BussertandBruceA.Elleman, PeoplesLiberationArmyNavy:CombatSystemsTechnology,1949 2000(Annapolis:NavalInstitutePress,2011),189.

10

system (RBNDGPS). The South Sea Fleet HQ at Zhanjiang also maintains a radar and computervesseltrafficservice(VTS).
HainanIsland

Since the 1980s, China has maintained RBN aids at Haikou, Haifou and Sanya on Hainan Island.In1999,threenewRBNDGPSsystemswereactivatedatBaohujiao,YangpuandYa Long Naval Base at Ya Long Bay near Sanya. In addition, facilities at Dongfang and Haikou alsooperateradarandcomputervesseltrafficservices(VTS).In1965,Chinaconstructedits firsthighpoweredlowfrequency(LF)stationonHainantosupportsubmarineoperations. OneofChinaveryfirsthighpoweredverylowfrequency(VLF)stationswasbuiltatYaLong Naval Base to communicate with submarine and surface ships. Hainan houses several electronic intelligence (ELINT) stations, including one on a mountaintop in the southwest directed at Vietnam.30 The Peoples Liberation Armys (PLA) Lingshui Air Base on the southeastcoastalsooperatesanELINTstationwithanestimated1,000signalanalysts. ThefacilitiesatYaLongNavalBaseincludepiers,docksandundergroundsubmarinepens.31 The PLAN stations several major surface combatants, amphibious landing craft, and conventionalandnuclearsubmarinesatYaLong.ContinuedconstructionindicatesthatYa Long will be able to accommodate larger advanced surface combatants such as assault ships,attackandballisticmissilesubmarines,andeventuallyoneormoreaircraftcarriers. TheSouthSeaFleethastheimportantmissionofsecuringtheStraitofQiongzhoutoprotect southernChinaandHainanIsland.Fromthisperspective,thedevelopmentofanavalbase atYaLongmaybeseenasdefensiveinmotivation. However,astwoAmericannavalanalystshaveconcluded:
By homeporting new vessels in southern Hainan, China appears to be carrying out a naval strategy in the South China Sea of exerting regional maritime control incrementally. Extrapolating from the rapid growth of its communications, intelligence gathering, and naval supply structure on Hainan and its island bases in the South China Sea, China appears to have linkedthesebaseswithamodernelectroniccommunicationsnetwork.Manyoftheislandsand reefsoccupiedintheSCShaveafewbuildingsandafewantennaswitharudimentarypier.The only allpurpose base including aircraft shelters and support is located on Woody Island.

30 31

BussertandElleman,PeoplesLiberationArmyNavy,142.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2011, A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Washington,D.C.2012).

11 Although crude, such outposts are being improved, if space is available, and could add to the PLANsoverallmobilityandabilitytooutmaneuveranyregionalcompetitors.32

The development of the Ya Long Naval Base raises important questions about Chinas strategicintent.ContinuedconstructionatYaLongNavalBasesuggestthatitwillbeamajor militarybasethatwillprovideChinawiththecapacitytosurgeexpeditionaryforcesintothe South China Sea and beyond. The Ya Long base will also provide China with a forward presencetoprotectitsSLOCsthroughtheMalaccaandSingaporeStraits.
NuclearSubmarines

ThedevelopmentofanavalbaseinYaLongBayhasstrategicimplicationsforthebalanceof powerintheAsiaPacific.AnalysisofconstructionactivitiesindicatesYaLongNavalBasewill be capable of housing nuclear submarines capable of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles.Portionsofthebasearebeingbuiltundergroundtoprovidefacilitiesthatcannot beeasilymonitored.Thehardenedundergroundtunnels,forexample,canprotectvessels rangingfromSSNsuptoLuyangclassDDGs.Whenthesefacilitiesarecompletedtheywill provide China with the potential capability to station a substantial proportion of its submarinebased nuclear deterrent force there. The deployment of nuclear submarines, including ballistic missile submarines, will introduce a new geostrategic dimension to the regional balance of power. Chinese nuclear submarine deployments will attract the continuingattentionoftheU.S.Navyinconductingmilitarysurvey/intelligencegatheringin thewatersoffHainan. SatelliteimageryhasconfirmedthepresenceofasingleChineseType094Jinclassnuclear submarineatYaLongsincelate2007.TheType094isasecondgenerationnuclearpowered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and represents Chinas most lethal naval strike weapon. This marks the first permanent deployment on an SSBN to Chinas South Sea Fleet. Five moreChineseJinclassSSBNsareexpectedtobecomeoperationalincomingyearsandYa Longisexpectedtobecometheirhomebase. Chinasmostmodernstrategicnuclearsubmarineisnotyetfullyoperationalbutwhenitis the submarine is expected to carry twelve Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles. This class of submarine will be even more potent if China succeeds in equipping the missiles with multiple warheads. Chinese nuclear subs will be able to patrol and fire from concealed

32

BussertandElleman,PeoplesLiberationArmyNavy,180.

12

positions in deep waters off Hainan island if China can develop the necessary operational skills.
NavalExercises

China regularly conducts major naval exercises to showcase the growing prowess of the PLAN.In2010Chinaconductedthreemajornavalexercises.Thefirstexercisewasheldin earlyApril2010andinvolvedthelongrangedeploymentofsixteenwarshipsfromthePLAN drawnfromtheNorthSea,EastSeaandSouthSeaFleets.ThePLANflotillaconductedlive firingexercisesnorthofthePhilippinesbeforesteamingtowardtheMalaccaStraits.Upuntil thisexerciseChinasSouthSeaFleetwastheonlyfleettooperateintheSouthChinaSea. ThesecondnavalexercisewasconductedinlateJuly2010.Itwasthelargestofitskindand involvedtwelveofChinasmostmodernwarshipsfromeachofitsfleets.Thisexercisewas notable for the Chinese media coverage of live missile firings and the presence of senior commandersfromtheCentralMilitaryCommissionandthePLAChiefofStaff,GeneralChen Bingde.33 In November 2010 the PLA Marine Corps held the third major exercise in the SouthChinaSeainvolvingmorethan100ships,submarinesandaircraftand1,800marines. In July 2011, China conducted antisubmarine exercises off Hainan involving surface combatantsandlandingcraft.34InNovember2011,Chinaconductednavalexercisesinthe Western Pacific.35 In May 2012, the PLAN conducted tactical formation exercises and helicopter training missions involving two destroyers, two frigates and a Landing Platform Dock (LPD). The Type 071 LPD is one of the largest combat vessels in the PLAN and can embarkareinforcedbattalionofmarinesaswellaslandingcraftandmediumhelicopters. TheexercisewasheldaboutmidwaybetweenTaiwanssoutheastcoastandLuzoninthe northernPhilippines.36 Chinese naval exercises in the East China Sea in October 2012 involved PLAN warships exercisingwiththeparamilitaryvesselsfromtheChinaMarineSurveillance(CMS)andthe Fishery Law Enforcement Command (FLEC). A total of eleven ships and eight aircraft took

33 34 35 36

Xinhua,July29,2010.

China:navalexercisesinSouthChinaSea,AllVoices,June17,2011. TheEconomicTimes,November23,2011. J.MichaelCole,TaiwanmonitorsChinesenavalmoves,TaipeiTimes,May10,2012.

13

part.37AstatementissuedbythePLANEastSeaFleetnoted,Thisexercisewillsimulatea situationwhereforeignlawenforcementvesselsobstructandinterferewithourmaritime surveillanceandfisheriesadministrationvesselsonamissiontosafeguardmaritimerights andenforcethelaw.InthisexercisetheEastSeaFleetrespondedbydispatchingafrigate, hospital ship, tugboat and advanced fighters and helicopters for support, cover and emergency rescue.38 Although this particular exercise was held in the shadow of dispute overSenkakuIslanditholdsimplicationsforthePhilippinesandVietnamaswell. PLAN exercises can be viewed as a demonstration by China that it is now capable of deploying beyond the first island chain to the second. The implications are clear: China is developingthecapacitytosustainlargernavaldeploymentsintheSpratlyarchipelagoand furthersouthforlongerperiods.
CombatReadyPatrols

On June 28, 2012, Geng Yangsheng, a spokesperson for Chinas Ministry of Defence, revealedthatChinahadcommencedcombatreadypatrolsindisputedwatersintheSouth ChinaSea.InreplytoaquestionaboutVietnamsrecentairpatrolsovertheSpratlyislands, GengstatedtheChinesemilitaryhasalreadysetupanormal,combatreadypatrolsystem inseasunderourcontroltoprotectnationalsovereigntyandoursecurityanddevelopment interests.39InanembarrassingincidentforChina,oneofitsfrigatesonroutinepatrolran aground near Half Moon Shoal near Palawan island on July 11, 2012.40 The frigate reportedly had been intimidating Philippine fishing craft found in the area. Six PLAN ships and smaller utility boats came to the frigates rescue and refloated it four days later. The frigateleftthearea.41

37 38

EastChinaSeatension:Chinaconductsnavalexercises,BBCNewsAsia,October19,2012.

Ariel Zirulnick, Chinas naval exercises in East China Sea send warning to regional rivals, The Christian ScienceMonitor,October19,2012.
39

QuotedinZhaoShengnanandZhangYunbi,ChinaPledgestoprotectmaritimesovereignty, ChinaDaily, June 29, 2012 and Sutirtho Patranobis, China to set up new military base in south China sea, Hindustan Times,June28,2012.
40 41

AgenceFrancePresse,Chinanavyshipstrandedindisputedwaters,July13,2012.

ManuelMogatoandBenBlanchard,Chinafrigateheadshome,avertsS.ChinaSeastandoff,Reuters,July 15,2012;JimGomez,AssociatedPress,Chinaremovesgroundedwarship,easingseatensions, TheChristian Science Monitor, July 15, 2012; and Edward Wong, Freed From Shoals, Warship Heads Back to China, The NewYorkTimes,July16,2012.

14

ThisisasignificantdevelopmentbecauseuptonowthePLANhasplayedarelativelylow keybehindthescenesroleinSouthChinaSeaincidents.ShipsbelongingtotheCMSforce ortheFLEChavemainlyconductedChinassurveillancepatrols.

ParacelIslands

Developments on Hainan have been paralleled by Chinas construction activities in the Paracel islands. In 1990, China constructed 1,200 foot runway on Woody island that has been extended twice to it present length of 7,874 feet. The airstrip on Woody Island can accommodate fighter aircraft such as the Su27 and Su30MKKs, H6 bombers and large supply transport aircraft. The facilities adjacent to the runway include four hangers. Air traffic is controlled by Type 791 Xband precisionapproach radar. Other military infrastructureonWoodyIslandincludesnavaldockscapableofaccommodatingfrigatesand destroyersandafueldepot.PLAsoldiersarebasedonWoodyislandtoprotecttherunway andothermilitaryfacilities. China has also built militaryrelated facilities elsewhere in the Paracels. A weather station hasbeenbuiltonPattleIsland,whileRobertIslandhousesaradiobeacon,theonlybeacon south of Hainan. The docks on Duncan Island are being expanded. A Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)stationhasbeenoperatingonRockyIsland,thehighestpremonitory,since1995.42 Thisstationcouldprovideairorsurfacewarningandsupportairmissionsorshiptargeting. Open sources report that China may have stationed the HY2 antiship cruise missile on WoodyIsland.43 On July 19, 2012, Chinas Central Military Commission officially decided to establish a militarycommandinSanshaCityafteritselevationtoprefectureleveladministrativestatus. The garrison was placed under the PLA Hainan provincial subcommand within the Guangzhou Military Command. The Sansha military garrison has been assigned responsibilityfornationaldefencemobilization,militaryoperationsandreserves.According to Defence Ministry spokesperson Geng Yansheng, China may set up local military commandorgansinthecity[Sansha]accordingtorelevantregulations.44SeniorColonelCai

42 43 44

J.MichaelCole,ChinaDeployingMilitaryGarrison;toSouthChinaSea?,TheDiplomat,July23,2012 BillGeertz,WoodyIslandMissiles,TheWashingtonTimes,June15,2001.

Xinhua, Chinese military may establish presence in Sansha: defense spokesperson, Ministry of National DefenceofthePeoplesRepublicofChina,June28,2012.

15

Xihong was appointed commander of the Sansha garrison and Senior Colonel Liao Chaoyi wasnamedPoliticalCommissar.45 AccordingtoaJapanesesource,ChinasdecisiontoestablishasecurityareainSanshais consideredpreparationforfullscalemilitaryactionintheSouthChinaSea.46Thisviewis disputedbyretiredU.S.RearAdmiralMikeMcDevittwhoarguesthatamilitarygarrisonin Sanshawillnotaffectthemilitarybalanceorsignalimminenthostilities.McDevittpointsout thatanymajormilitaryoperationsintheSouthChinaSeawouldbemountedfromHainan wherethePLAhasmajorbases.AccordingtoMcDevitt,puttinggarrisonsonWoodyIsland or elsewhere in the Paracels would effectively maroon these guys, so the only advantage wouldbejustshowingtheflagtosay,Weareserious.47 Accordingtoregionalsecurityspecialists,thestandingupofamilitarygarrisoncommandon WoodyIslanddoesnotrepresentanattempttobuildabaseforforwarddeploymentinto theSouthChinaSea.48Intheirview,theSanshamilitarygarrisonismerelyanadministrative response to the upgrading of Sansha to a prefecturelevel city. Military garrisons do not commandPLAmainforcecombatunits,PLANavyforPLAAirForceunits.
SouthChinaSea

ChinahasalsoconsolidateditsmilitarypresenceintheSouthChinaSeabyconstructionon several of the features it currently occupies.49 China occupied Mischief Reef in 1995 and builtitsfirststructuresintheSouthChinaSea.ThesewereexpandedinOctober1998with the addition of three octagonshaped wooden structures and two twostory concrete towers one at each end. The towers bristle with SATCOMM and HF antennae for communications. The towers are thought to house ELINT and radars. The facilities on

45 46 47

Chinastepsupclaimsoverworldsmostdisputedwaters,NationalPost,July27,2012. Chinashardlinestancecauseforgraveconcern,TheYomiuriShimbun,July26,2012.

Kirk Spitzer, New Garrison, Old Troubles In The South China Seas, Battlefield, July 26, 2012. http://battlefield.blogs.time.com/2012/07/26/newgarrisonoldtroublesinthesouthchinasea. Another analystargues,theSanshagarrisonhasminimaloperationalvaluebarringasignificantupgradeinnavaland air infrastructure to enable sustained operations and is mainly an example of Chinese coercive diplomacy. See:OrianaSkylarMastro,TheSanshaGarrison:ChinasDeliberateEscalationintheSouthChinaSea,Center foraNewAmericanSecurity,EastandSouthChinaSeaBulletinno.5,September2012.
48

Dennis J. Blasko and M. Taylor Fravel, Much Ado About The Sansha Garrison, The Diplomat, August 23, 2012.
49

John J. Tkacik, Investigating the Chinese Threat, Part One: Military and Economic Aggression, Testimony fortheHouseCommitteeonForeignAffairs,March28,2012,1418.

16

MischiefReefhassincebeenupgradedwiththeconstructionoftwonewpiers,ahelicopter pad,anavynavigationradar,severalantiaircraftgunsandanantishipcruisemissilesystem (eithertheHY2orC801). A 200foot long concrete building was constructed on Fiery Cross Reef. It houses a naval High Frequency (HF) yagi radar antenna (Bean Sticks), two Electronic Counter Measures (ECM)radomes,andseveralwhipcommunicationandmastantennas.Thevariousantenna support different requirements, such as radio signal surveillance and Long Range (LR) communications. The facilities on Fiery Cross Reef also include satellite communication (SATCOMM)andmeteorologicaldishes. ChinesefacilitiesonJohnsonSouthReefincludefouroctagonshapedhutsandarectangular two story building on a concrete base supporting two towers. One SATCOMM and three masthead antennas are mounted on the roof. Chigua Reef contains an identical building structureplusawoodenbarracks.SubiReefhostsawoodenbarracks,atwostorybuilding withaSATCOMMantennaandahelicopterlandingpad. In summary, Chinese facilities in the South China Sea will give the PLAN an enhanced capability to exercise its sovereignty claims over this area. According to naval specialists, Althoughsmallinsize,ifnecessarythesefacilitiescouldsupportfutureChineseexpansion throughout the area, and could perhaps even support a limited naval conflict in this congestedregion.50
ChinasParamilitaryFleets

Chinasmaritimesurveillancefleetisestimatedatmorethan300vesselsonlytwoofwhich, the Haixun 11 and Haixun 31, weighed more than 3,000 tons. In October 2010, China announceditwouldbuildthirtysixnewCMSvesselsformaritimelawenforcementoverthe next five years. In May 2011, the CMS announced it would recruit 1,000 more law enforcementofficials,bringingitstotaltoover10,000personnel.AndinJune2011,China announcedplanstoexpanditsmaritimesurveillanceforcetosixteenaircraftandatotalof 350vesselsby2015. ChinasobjectiveofenforcingitsjurisdictionintheSouthChinaSeathroughanincreasingly modern civilian enforcement fleet was highlighted in late July 2012 with the launching of

50

BussertandElleman,PeoplesLiberationArmyNavy,145.

17

theHaixun01.51TheHaixun01weighsinat5,418tonsanditslargestandmostcapableship inChinasmaritimesurveillancefleet.Itcantravel18,500kmwithoutrefuellingandreacha topspeedof37kmperhour.TheHaixun01iscapableofsupportinghelicopteroperations. Also,itcanberth200passengersandcomesequippedwithanemergencymedicalsurgery. Insum,Chinahasdevelopedanenhancedcapabilitytoexerciseitssovereigntyclaimsover theSouthChinaSeaandprotectitsvitalSLOCsthroughtheMalaccaandSingaporeStraitsas wellasthecapacitytosurgeexpeditionaryforcesintotheSouthChinaSeafromthesebases withaconsiderablyshortenedlogisticstail.Byextension,Chinawillalsohavethecapacityto interdict the same SLOCs on which Japan, Taiwan and South Korea are dependent. These developments portend a greater Chinese capacity to assert regional influence and to challengeU.S.navalsupremacy.

Part2U.S.NationalInterestsintheSouthChinaSea
WhentheObamaAdministrationtookofficein2009,itquicklyasserted,theUnitedStates isbackinAsia.TheUnitedStatespromptlyaccededtotheAssociationofSoutheastAsian Nations(ASEAN)TreatyofAmityandCooperation,appointedapermanentambassadorto theASEANSecretariatandrevivedtheannualASEANUnitedStatesleadersmeeting. In early 2010 Jeffrey Bader and Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell convened an interagencygrouptoreviewU.S.policytowardstheSouthChinaSea.UptothenU.S.policy hadbeenlimitedtonottakingsidesonterritorialclaims. Theinteragencygroupreviewed intelligencethatChinesenavaldeploymentstotheSouthChinaSeahadincreasedmarkedly since 2000, along with a rise in incidents between China and claimant states and Chinese intimidation of companies seeking contracts with Vietnam to explore for oil and gas. Interagencydiscussionsresultedinanew,morecomprehensivearticulationofU.S.policy. AssistantSecretaryofStateKurtCampbellandhisstaffdraftedastatementofU.S.policyon theSouthChinaSeafordeliverybytheSecretaryofStateattheseventeenthmeetingofthe ASEAN Regional Forum to be held in Hanoi in July 2010. Bader and Campbell contacted

51

ChinaLaunchestheCountrysLargestandMostAdvancedPatrolVessel, TheMaritimeExecutive, July30, 2012.

18

otherdelegationsscheduledtoattendtheARFmeetingandurgedthemtospeakoutabout internationalrightsintheSouthChinaSea.52 ThefirstpublicarticulationofthenewU.S.policywasmadebySecretaryofDefenseRobert Gates at the ninth ShangriLa Dialogue held in Singapore from June 4th6th. In his presentationSecretaryGatescalledforopen,transparent,andequalaccesstotheglobal common, including the maritime commons, for security, for trade and commerce, and freepassage.HethendirectedhisremarkstotheSouthChinaSea:
In this respect, the South China Sea is an area of growing concern. This sea is not only vital to those directlyborderingit,buttoallnationswitheconomicandsecurityinterestsinAsia.Ourpolicyisclear:itis essential that stability, freedom of navigation, and free and unhindered economic development be maintained. We do not take sides on any competing sovereignty claims, but we do oppose the use of force and actions that hinder freedom of navigation. We object to any effort to intimidate U.S. corporations or those of any nation engaged in legitimate economic activity. All parties must work together to resolve differences through peaceful, multilateral efforts consistent with customary internationallaw.The2002DeclarationofConduct[sic]wasanimportantstepinthisdirectionandwe 53 hopethatconcreteimplementationofthisagreementwillcontinue.

Thenextmonth,SecretaryofStateHillaryClintonformallydeliveredthenewU.S.policyon the South China Sea to a closed session of the ASEAN Regional Forum. A dozen other countries also spoke on this issue.54 She later presented the main points to a press conference.SecretaryClintonstated:
TheUnitedStates,likeeveryothernation,hasanationalinterestinfreedomofnavigation,openaccessto Asias maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea. We share these interestswithnotonlyASEANmembersandASEANRegionalForumparticipantsbutwithothermaritime nationsandthebroaderinternationalcommunity. The United States supports a collaborative, diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various territorialdisputeswithoutcoercion.Weopposetheuseorthreatofforcebyanyclaimant.Whilethe United States does not take sides on the competing territorial disputes over land features in the South ChinaSea,webelieveclaimantsshouldpursuetheirterritorialclaimandthecompany[sic]andrightsto maritimespaceinaccordancewiththeUNconventiononthelawofthesea.Consistentwithcustomary international law, legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely fromlegitimateclaimstolandfeatures. The U.S. supports the 2002 ASEANChina declaration on conduct of parties in the South China Sea. We encourage the parties to reach agreement on a full code of conduct. The U.S. is prepared to facilitate initiativesandconfidencebuildingmeasuresconsistentwiththedeclaration.Becauseitisintheinterest of all claimants and the broader international community for unimpeded commerce to proceed under lawful conditions. Respect for the interests of the international community and responsible efforts to

52 53

Bader,ObamaandChinasRise,104105.

Dr.RobertM.Gates.SecretaryofDefence,UnitedStates,StrengtheningSecurityPartnershipsintheAsia th Pacific,PresentationtotheFirstPlenarySession,the9 IISSAsianSecuritySummit,TheShangriLaDialogue, Singapore,June5,2010.IISSisanacronymforInternationalInstituteofStrategicStudies.

54

Bader,ObamaandChinasRise,105.

19
address these unresolved claims and help create the conditions for resolution of the disputes and a 55 loweringofregionaltensions.

ClintonconcludedbynotingthatresolvingSouthChinaSeadisputeswaspivotaltoregional stability. In sum, if in 2010 Chinese assertions that the South China Sea was a core interest,theUnitedStatesrespondedbyproclaimingthatithadanationalinterestinthe SouthChinaSea.

Part3U.S.StrategyofRebalancing
When Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea raised U.S. and regional security concerns,theU.S.Navydeployedthirtyoneofitsfiftythreefastattacksubmarinestothe Pacific and stepped up its antisubmarine warfare program. Eighteen of the U.S. subs are homeportedinPearlHarbor;theothersarebasedinGuam.56InlateJuneearlyJuly2010, inacalculateddemonstrationofnavalpower,theUSS Florida,USS Michigan,andUSS Ohio submarines, simultaneously surfaced in Diego Garcia (Indian Ocean), Busan (South Korea) andSubicBay(thePhilippines),respectively.57Allofthesedevelopmentstookplacebefore the formal announcement that the United States would rebalance its forces in the Asia Pacific. The heightened importance of the AsiaPacific was underscored in January 2012 with the releaseofanewnationaldefensestrategy, SustainingU.S.GlobalLeadership:Prioritiesfor 21stCenturyDefense.Thisdocumentstated:
U.S.economicandsecurityinterestsareinextricablylinkedtodevelopmentsinthearcextending fromtheWesternPacificandEastAsiaintotheIndianOceanregionandSouthAsiacreatinga mixofevolvingchallengesandopportunities.Accordingly,whiletheU.S.militarywillcontinueto contributetosecurityglobally,wewillofnecessityrebalancetowardtheAsiaPacificregion.Our relationshipswithAsianalliesandkeypartnersarecriticaltothefuturestabilityandgrowthof theregion.Wewillemphasizeourexistingalliances,whichprovideavitalfoundationforAsia Pacificsecurity.Wewillexpandournetworksofcooperationwithemergingpartnersthroughout the AsiaPacific to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests [emphasisinoriginal].58

55

HillaryRodmanClinton,SecretaryofState,RemarksatPressAvailability,NationalConventionCenter,Hanoi, July23,2010.
56 57

NavyTimes,July21,2010.

TheChosunIlbo,July8,2010and TimeMagazine,July8,2010.Eachofthesesubmarineshasbeenmodified tocarry154conventionalTomahawkcruisemissiles.

58

SustainingU.S.GlobalLeadership:Prioritiesfor21 CenturyDefense(January2012),2.

st

20

The United States also is developing an airsea battle concept to counter Chinas development of counter intervention or areadenial/antiaccess capabilities. The airsea battleconceptisbeingdrawnuptoenabletheUnitedStatestoprevailinconflictswhere areadenial/antiaccesscapabilitiesarewelldeveloped.AccordingtothenewU.S.defense strategy one of the ten main missions for U.S. armed forces is to project power despite antiaccess/areadenialchallenges.59InresponsetoChinasuseofasymmetriccapabilities, includingelectronicandcyberwarfare,ballisticandcruisemissiles,advancedairdefences, miningandothermethods,tocomplicateouroperationalcalculus,theU.S.military
will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in antiaccess and area denial (A2/AD) environments. This will include implementing the Joint Operational Access Concept, sustaining our undersea capabilities, developing a new stealth bomber, improving missile defenses, and continuing efforts to enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space basedcapabilities[emphasisinoriginal].60

TheObamaAdministrationpolicyofrebalancingtowardstheAsiaPacificincludesthefull spectrum of economic, diplomatic, political and military engagement. The U.S. Pacific Command will continue to reinforce the four pillars of the rebalance partnerships, presence,powerprojection,andprinciples(freeandopencommerce,accesstotheglobal commons, rule of law, peaceful settlement of disputes, promotion of democracy and universalhumanrights).61 RebalancingwillresultinsomeforceposturechangesintheAsiaPacificbutwillnotresultin a major buildup of U.S. forces. For example, former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta statedthatthenumberofU.S.NavyshipsintheAsiaPacificwouldincreasetosixtypercent ofthetotalfleetby2020.Atpresent,theU.S.Navytotals285shipsofwhich157,orfifty fivepercent,areassignedtothePacific.TheU.S.Navyplanstodevelopafleetof306ships by2019.Thiswouldmeananadditional23shipswouldbedeployedwiththePacificFleet

59 60 61

Ibid.,4. Ibid.,45.

TheRebalance:OneYearLater,RemarksbyAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforAsianandPacificSecurity AffairsMarkLippertatCSISGeorgetownU.S.StudiesCenterConference,February27,2013.Citedhereafteras Lippert,TheRebalance:OneYearLater.

21

(foratotalof180)ifbudgetrestraintsdonotreducethisnumber.62ThenumberofU.S.Air Forceplaneswillbeincreasedby2017accordingtocurrentplans. U.S.priorityontheAsiaPacificwillresultintheintroductionofnewplatformsandbetter capabilities,includingthedeploymentofVirginiaclasssubmarines,fifthgenerationfighters, P8 aircraft, cruise missiles and enhanced Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance.63 New developments in U.S. military technology will see the introduction of more sophisticated undersea drones and unmanned systems for intelligence gathering, reconnaissance and surveillance such as Large Diameter Unmanned Underwater Vehicles andPersistentLittoralUnderseaSurveillanceSystems.64 U.S.rebalancingalsowillleadtoanincreaseintherotationofU.S.navalandairforcesto the region, including deployments to Australia, Guam and the Philippines. U.S. Littoral Combat Ships will be rotated through Singapore. Sequestration will impact on the U.S. Pacific Command unless Congress decides otherwise; but overall the U.S. will remain the most powerful naval and air force in the region. It will be more widely dispersed than previouslyandmorecapableofinterveningifcalledupontodoso.

Part4ResponsesbyRegionalStates
Chinasmilitarymodernisationandtransformation,especiallynavalmodernisation,coupled withincreasedChineseassertivenessintheSouthChinaSea,hascreatedasecuritydilemma forSoutheastAsiasstates.65Chinaseffortstosafeguarditssecuritybydevelopingwhatit considersareasonableforcestructuretodetertheUnitedStateshascreatedinsecurityin severalASEANstatesduetoChinaslackoftransparency.

62

MichaelMcDevitt,CriticalMilitaryIssues:TheRebalancingStrategyandNavalOperations,Presentationto NewApproachestoSecurityinNortheastAsia:BreakingtheGridlockworkshop,Washington,D.C.,October9 10,2012.

63 64

Lippert,TheRebalance:OneYearLater.

MarkJ.Valencia,TheSouthChinaSea,MilitaryActivitiesandtheLawoftheSea,Paperpresentedtothe International Conference on Major Law and Policy Issues in the South China Sea: European and American Perspectives,cosponsoredbytheInstituteofEuropeanandAmericanStudiesandtheCenterforAsiaPacific Studies,AcademiaSinica,Taipei,Taiwan,October78,2011.InOctober2012,theU.S.Navysuccessfullyfired sixRafaelSpikemissilesfromanunmannedsurfaceprecisionmodule(USVPEM)inthefirstdemonstrationof st this capability. Navy Demonstrates 1 launch of Spike Missiles from Unmanned Surface Vehicles, NAVSEA OfficeofCorporateCommunications,October26,2012.
65

Forarecentappreciationsee:AndrewShearer,SoutheastAsiaandAustralia:CaseStudiesinRespondingto Chinas Military Power, in Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia 201213: Chinas Military Challenge(SeattleandWashington:NationalBureauofAsianResearch,2012),241275.

22

ASEAN states have been circumspect in public statements but their concerns can be discernedbythesignificantriseindefenceexpendituresandthekindsofweaponsystems and platforms that they have acquired. Several regional states are developing their own antiaccess/areadenial capabilities.66 In addition, Southeast Asias arms procurements go beyond force modernisation and include the introduction of new capabilities that can be operated at extended ranges. It should be recognized, however, that not all of these new capabilities have been acquired in response to Chinas military build up. The subsections below reviews force modernization developments in the Philippines, Vietnam and elsewhereintheregion.

ThePhilippines
In 2011, in response to Chinese assertiveness in its EEZ and Kalayaan Island Group, the Philippines drew up a new defence strategy focused on both internal security operations andexternalterritorialdefence.TheAquinoAdministrationallocatedP11billiontosupport forcemodernisationoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines(AFP).InMarch2011,AFPChief ofStaffGeneralEduardoObanannouncedplanstoupgradetheairfieldonPagAsaisland. TwomonthslateraPhilippinenavystudyrecommendedtheacquisitionofsubmarinesasa deterrentagainstfuturepotentialconflicts.67 InSeptember2011,PresidentAquinoannouncedthat4.95billionpesoswouldbeallocated to top up the defence budget.68 These funds were earmarked for the purchase a naval patrol vessel, six helicopters and other military equipment in order to secure the Malampayaoilandgasproject.In2012,thePhilippinegovernmentbeganimplementation of a fiveyear modernization program totalling P40 billion. In July 2012, the Philippines announceda U.S. $1.8billionfundtopurchasea refurbishedfrigate,C130aircraft,utility andcombathelicoptersaswellasotherdefenceequipment.69 In 201112, the Philippines took delivery of two former U.S. Coast Guard Weather Endurance Cutters. The first cutter has been assigned to operate in waters off Palawan in

66

RobertKarniol,VietnampreparestobetterprotectitsS.ChinaSeaclaims, TheStraitsTimes, January10, 2012.

67 68 69

PhilippineDailyInquirer,May17,2001. AgenceFrancePresse,September7,2011. ManuelMogato,PhilippinesRefusestoBudgeonSouthChinaSeaRow,Reuters,July23,2012.

23

WesternCommandwiththemissionofprotectingthePhilippinesEEZ.ThePhilippinesalso expectstotakedeliveryofthreenewTaiwanmanufacturedMultiPurposeAttackCraftand procure a third U.S. Coast Guard Hamiltonclass Cutter.70 The Philippines has signed an agreement with Italys Defence Ministry to acquire military equipment, possibly including frigatesandaircraft. ThePhilippineshaspresentedthePentagonwithawishlistofnewequipmentincluding: coastal radar, longrange patrol aircraft, strategic sea lift vessels, three offshore patrol boats,twotofivenavalhelicopters,airdefenceradar,sixjettrainers,surfaceattackaircraft, antishipmissiles,andasubmarine.71 ThePhilippineshasalsoreachedouttoJapan,SouthKorea,FranceandtheUnitedKingdom for defence acquisitions. In September 2011, during President Aquinos visit to Tokyo, he and Prime Minister Noda agreed to strengthen maritime security ties by holding frequent highleveldefencediscussionsandbysteppingupcooperationbetweentheirCoastGuards anddefencerelatedauthorities.PrimeMinisterNodaagreedtoincreasetheinvolvement of Japans Coast Guard in training their Filipino counterparts.72 Following a visit by South Koreas President Lee Myungbak to Manila in November 2011, President Aquino announced that the Philippines would purchase military equipment form Seoul. The Department of National Defense was reported to be drawing up a list including aircraft, helicopters,boatsandothermilitaryequipment.

Vietnam
In2009,inamajordevelopment,Vietnamannouncedthatitwouldprocuresixconventional diesel powered Kiloclass submarines from Russia. These are scheduled to be delivered in 2014. The Kiloclass submarines are likely to be equipped with seaskimming 3M54 Klub antishipmissileswitharangeof300kilometres. In2011,Vietnamsteppedupitsforcemodernizationprogramwhenittookdeliveryoffour

70 71

Reuters,April13,2011andAgenceFrancePresse,September3,2011.

The Philippine Star, August 24, 2011. For a discussion of U.S. arms sales and transfers to the Philippines consult: Ronald ORourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: IssuesforCongress,CRSReportforCongress(Washington,D.C.:CongressionalResearchService,October22, 2012),4042.
72

TheWallStreetJournal,September28,2011.

24

additionalSu30MK2multirolejetfighters.TheseareexpectedtobeequippedwiththeKh 59MK antiship cruise missile with a range of 115 km. Vietnam currently has on order sixteen more Su30MK2 jet fighters.73 Also in 2011, Vietnam also took delivery of two Gephardclass guided missile stealth frigates armed with Kh35E antiship missiles with a rangeof130kmandtwoSvetlyakclassmissilePatrolBoats.74Inaddition,Vietnamlaunched itsfirstindigenouslybuiltOceanPatrolVesselandtrooptransport.75InOctober,whileona tour of the Netherlands, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung gave his approval for the purchase of four Sigmaclass corvettes, two of which are slated for construction in Vietnam.76 In2011,VietnambeefedupitscoastaldefencesbyacquiringitssecondBastionlandbased antiship ballistic missile system. Vietnam reportedly has acquired Israeli Extended Range ArtilleryMunitionsballisticmissileseffectivebeyond150km.InOctober2011,President TruongTanSangmadeastatevisittoIndiaandrequestedIndianassistanceinfourareas: submarinetraining,conversiontrainingforpilotstoflySukhoi30s,transferofmediumsized patrolboats,andmodernizationofportfacilitiesatNhaTrang.77Thelocalmediareported that India was considering whether or not to sell Vietnam its BrahMos supersonic cruise missile.78InFebruary2012,RussiaannounceditwillcoproducetheUranantishipmissile (SSN25Switchblade)withVietnam.79 InNovember2011,Vietnamannounceda$3.3billiondefencebudgetfor2012,areported riseof35%over2010.AccordingtoIHSJanesVietnamsannualnavalprocurementbudget hasincreasedby150%since2008toUS$276millionin2011.Thenavalbudgetisprojected toriseto$400millionby2015.80Vietnamisseekingtodevelopanantisubmarinewarfare

73 74

ThanhNienNews,July3,2011.

The Voice of Russia, June 22, 2011; BBC Vietnamese Service, August 24, 2011 and October 25, 2011; and InterfaxAVN,October11,2011.
75 76 77 78 79 80

BBCVietnameseService,October3,2011. BBCVietnameseService,October18,2011. TheHindu,November9,2011. BusinessInsider,September20,2011. RIANovosti,February15,2012. QuotedinTheEconomicTimes,November14,2011.

25

capabilitybyacquiringeithertheU.S.P3OrionoftheSpanishAirbusMilitaryC295.81

Regional82
According to one noted regional security analyst, naval acquisitions in Asia have become especiallydisturbing,withundeniablesignsofactionreactiondynamicsandNortheastAsia inparticulariswitnessinganemergingnavalarmsrace.83Defenceanalystsestimatethat 86 submarines will be added to the fleets in the AsiaPacific by 2020 of which 30 will be Chinese.84 China currently has the largest submarine fleet and most extensive plans to expand its numbers including the Type 095 nuclear attack submarine (SSN) and Type 094 JinclassSSBN.ChinaisexpectedtobasebothattackandballisticmissilesubmarinesatYa LongNavalBaseonHainanIsland.ThisprospecthasledAustralia,Malaysia,thePhilippines, Singapore and the United States to step up investment in their antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Security analysts warn that the proliferation of submarine fleets may be destabilizing in times of tensions and crises due to the complexities of command and control. In Southeast Asia the conventional submarine has become the new hallmark of naval acquisitions. Vietnams purchase of Kiloclass submarines is part of a regional trend.85 Indonesia, the first country in Southeast Asia to acquire submarines, has indicated it will replace them with newer South Korean models. Indonesia reportedly will boost defence spendingby35%in2012.86Singaporehasupgradeditssubmarinefleetbytakingdeliveryof twoArcherclasssubmarinesin2011.87Singaporereportedlyisinthemarketforfourorfive

81 82

AviationWeek,February17,2012.

Richard A. Bitzinger, Recent Developments in Naval and Maritime Modernization in the AsiaPacific: Implications for Regional Security, in Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher D. Yung, Michael Swaine and Andrew NienDzu Yang, eds., The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011), 2340 and Richard A. Bitzinger, Military Modernization in the AsiaPacific: AssessingNewCapabilities,in StrategicAsia201011:AsiasRisingPowerandAmericasContinuedPurpose (SeattleandWashington,D.C.:NationalBureauofAsianResearch,2010),79111.
83

DesmondBall,AsiasNavalArmsRace,Paperpresentedtothe25 AsiaPacificRoundtable,ISISMalaysia, KualaLumpur,29May1June2011.

84 85 86 87

th

BusinessWeek,November25,2011. AviationWeek,February17,2012. AlJazeera.net,November7,2011. TheStraitsTimes,December3,2011.

26

P3COrionmaritimepatrolaircraft.88MalaysiahasacquiredtwoScorpeneclasssubmarines. Both the Singaporean and Malaysian submarines are equipped with Air Independent Propulsion systems. Thailand and the Philippines are currently considering acquiring their ownconventionalsubmarines. Regionalforcemodernizationhasandwillcontinuetoresultintheintroductionofincreased numbers of warships equipped with new technologies and weapons systems. A recent review of regional force modernization over the last decade highlights the introduction of new capabilities such as standoff precisionstrike, longrange airborne and undersea attack, stealth, mobility and expeditionary warfare and, above all, new capacities when it comes to greatly improved command, control communications, computing, intelligence, surveillanceandreconnaissance(C4ISR)networks.89Thisreviewconcludes,newtypesof armaments promise to significantly upgrade and modernize the manner of war fighting in theregion[and]fundamentallychangetheconceptandconductofwarfare.90 In summary, Southeast Asias arms buying spree, although largely intended for defensive purposes, may have a destabilising impact on regional security. According to Vice Admiral ScottSwift,CommanderU.S.SeventhFleet,hisprimeconcernisnottheoutbreakofamajor conflict but any tactical trigger with strategic implications I do have concerns about a specificbrushupthatcouldresultinatacticalmiscalculation91Sofartherehavebeenfew ifanyindicationsthatthisissueisbeingeffectivelyaddressedbyASEANcentricmultilateral organizations.

Part5SinoAmericanRivalry:PossibleOutcomes
This section explores three possible outcomes of SinoAmerican naval rivalry in the South China Sea: armed conflict, a modus vivendi between China and the United States, and continuedcooperationandfriction.

88 89

FlightGlobal,December15,2011.

Richard A. Bitzinger, A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions, ContemporarySoutheastAsia,31(1),April2010,6364.
90 91

Bitzinger,ANewArmsRace?ExplainingRecentSoutheastAsianMilitaryAcquisitions,64.

QuotedbyStephenCoates,USPacificcommanderwarnsoftacticalerrors, TheChinaPost,November10, 2011. Admiral Smith also noted that he expected diplomacy to prevail in the event of a brushup and compromisetoprevail.

27

ArmedConflict
Chinas increasing assertiveness has raised regional security concerns about Chinas strategic intentions and its challenge to U.S. primacy. Several Southeast Asian states have sought reassurance from the United States that it will continue to remain engaged in the region.TheUnitedStateshasrespondedtoChinasnavalbuildupbyrebalancingitsforce postureintheAsiaPacificbystrengtheningitspresenceonGuam,steppingupweaponsand equipmentsalestothePhilippines,negotiatingnewarrangementswithAustraliagivingthe U.S. greater access to training facilities near Darwin, and basing Combat Littoral Ships in Singapore.92 U.S. diplomatic intervention in the South China Sea dispute, coupled with its policy of rebalancingitsforceposture,hasprovokedanegativeifnothostilereactionbyChina.China views the U.S. as an outside power whose intervention will only complicate matters. At a conference hosted by the Australian Chief of Army in October 2012, PLA Lt. Gen. Ren Haiquanofferedthisbluntassessment:
Some countries pursue strategies such as rebalance to the AsiaPacific and looking East and are increasing their strategic investment. Several countries do not let go the Cold War mentality. They are consolidatingmilitaryalliancesysteminAsiaPacificandstrengtheningtheirmilitarypresenceandmilitary 93 deterrencecapability.

These developments, however, do not presage armed conflict between China and the UnitedStates.Despiteitsnavalbuildup,thePLANcurrentlyisnomatchfortheU.S.Navy.94 The PLAN has been circumspect in its involvement in South China Sea territorial disputes. The United States has been careful not to become entrapped by regional allies the Philippines and Japan in their territorial disputes with China. In sum, armed conflict betweenChinaandtheUnitedStatesintheSouthChinaSeaappearstheleastlikelyofthe three scenarios under review. A study by the RAND Corporation of possible conflicts over thenextthirtyyearsthatcouldcauseaChinaU.S.militaryclash,includingtheSouthChina

92

Craig Whitlock, Navys next stop in Asia will set China on edge, Checkpoint Washington, November 18, 2011
93

QuotedbyBrendanNicholson,ChinesetopbrassbagsUSinfluenceintheregion, TheAustralian,October 31,2012.

94

China, however, will increasingly develop the capabilities to challenge U.S. naval primacy in the Western Pacific. For a balanced assessment consult: Dan Blumenthal, The Power Projection Balance in Asia, in st ThomasG.Mahnken,ed., CompetitiveStrategiesforthe21 Century:Theory,History,andPractice(Stanford: StanfordUniversityPress,2012),168183.

28

Sea, concluded, We do not believe a ChinaU.S. military conflict to be probable in any of thecases.95

SinoAmericanModusVivendi
TheObamaAdministrationhasrepeatedlyemphasizedthatitspolicyofrebalancingisnota policyofcontainingChina.Forexample,AdmiralSamuelJ.LocklearIII,Commanderofthe U.S.PacificCommand,recentlystated,TherehasalsobeencriticismthattheRebalanceisa strategy of containment. This is not the caseit is a strategy of collaboration and cooperation.ThisviewwasreiteratedbyAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforAsiaandPacific Security Affairs Mark Lippert who declared, the rebalance is not [a] zerosum game with Beijing or a contain China strategy. In fact, a strong bilateral relationship with China is an importantpartoftherebalance.96 The U.S. and China currently have in place nearly sixty mechanisms for coordination and collaborationonstrategicpolicyissues.TheObamaAdministrationhassoughttomanageits relationswithChinathroughnewmechanismssuchastheStrategicandEconomicDialogue (S&ED)andConsultationsonAsiaPacificAffairs.Militaryrepresentativesareincludedboth aspartoftheS&EDprocessandtheseparateStrategicSecurityDialoguewithintheS&ED. There is little evidence, however, that militarytomilitary contacts and strategic dialogue havereducedstrategicmistrustandraisedtransparency.97Chineseofficialsrepeatedlyraise three obstacles to bilateral defence cooperation in their discussions with the United States:continuedU.S.armssalestoTaiwan,U.S.intelligencegatheringinChinasExclusive Economic Zone, and FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act restrictions on military interaction with the PLA. U.S. policy towards the South China Sea policy represents an additionmajorirritant. ItisunlikelythatChinaandtheUnitedStateswillreachagreementtocollaboratejointlyas equals to manage security in the South China Sea. This is because the currents of

95

James Dobbins, David C. Gompert, David A. Shlapak and Andrew Scobell, Conflict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence, Occasional Paper (Santa Monica and Arlington: The RAND Corporation,2011),1.TheothercasesincludedNorthKorea,Taiwan,CyberSpace,JapanandIndia.
96 97

Lippert,TheRebalance:OneYearLater.

See the sobering review offered by Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing U.S.China Strategic Distrust,JohnL.ThorntonChinaCenterMonographSeriesNo.4,Washington,DC:TheJohnL.ThorntonChina CenteratBrookings,March2012,733.

29

regionalismaregrowingstronger.ItismorelikelythatChinaandtheUnitedStateswillwork separatelythroughmultilateralinstitutionstosecuretheirinterests.TheEastAsiansecurity architectureiscurrentlyevolvingasaresultoftheexpansionoftheEastAsiaSummit(EAS) in2011toincludetheUnitedStatesandtheRussianFederation.Atthe2011EASinformal leaders retreat, sixteen of its eighteen members raised concerns over maritime security issues.ChinawastheonlycountrytoarguethattheEASwasnotanappropriatevenuefor such discussions. Nevertheless, the EAS Chairs concluding summary noted that maritime securityhasbeenestablishedasalegitimateagendaitem.PresidentObamahasstatedhe willraisemaritimesecurityatthisyearsEAS.InadditiontotheEAS,twoothermultilateral institutionsmaydevelopandplayaroleinmanagingregionalsecurity:theASEANDefence MinistersMeetingPlusandtheEnlargedASEANMaritimeForum. In sum, the prospects that China and the United States will reach a modus vivendi to collaborate in maintaining security in the South China Sea, while more likely than armed conflict,willnotbeconflictfreeduetocontinuedstrategicrivalryandmistrust.

CooperationandFriction
At the same time as he Obama Administration has sought to engage and cooperate with China, the U.S. has called on China to be more transparent and open about its military modernization.ThenewU.S.defensestrategystateswithrespecttoChina,forexample:
Over the long term, Chinas emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways. Our two countries have a strong stake in peace and stabilityinEastAsiaandaninterestinbuildingacooperativebilateralrelationship.However,thegrowth of Chinas military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to 98 avoidcausingfrictionintheregion.

ThePentagonhassoughtconsistentlytokeepchannelsofcommunicationopenwithChina through three established bilateral mechanisms: Defense Consultative Talks (DCT), the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), and the Special Policy Dialogue/Defense Policy Coordination Talks (SPD/DPCT). A review of these mechanisms demonstrates that it has been very difficult to isolate purely militarytomilitary contacts fromtheirpoliticalandstrategicsettings.99

98 99

SustainingU.S.GlobalLeadership:Prioritiesfor21 CenturyDefense(January2012),2.

st

Carlyle A. Thayer, Enhancing Transparency? U.S.China MilitarytoMilitary Contacts and Strategic Dialogues,PresentationtoInternationalConferenceonTheU.S.andChinainRegionalSecurity:Implications

30

What does a balance sheet on the performance of these multilateral mechanisms tell us aboutU.S.Chinamilitaryrelations?Onthenegativesideitmustbenoted,first,thatU.S. Chinamilitarytomilitarycontactshavegonethroughcyclesofcooperationandsuspension. In 2009 a U.S. diplomatic cable reported a senior PLA official as observing, the defense relationship lags behind other aspects of the overall bilateral relationship and it is often caughtinaviciouscycleofprogressandsuspension.100TheseniorPLAofficialnotedthat withtwoexceptionsallothersuspensionsinmilitarytomilitaryrelationsweretheresultof U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. A Congressional study published in 2012 notes that China promotes repeated cycles of suspending contacts and then leverages the timing of their resumption.101 U.S. defense officials characterize this as the politicization of militaryto militarycontacts. Ontheplussidethefollowingaccomplishmentscanbenoted:(1)exchangevisitsbyhigh leveldefenseofficials(defenseministersandchiefsofdefenseforces);(2)regularDefense ConsultationTalks;(3)continuingworkingleveldiscussionsundertheMMCA;(4)agreement onthe7pointconsensus;102(5)noseriousnavalincidentssincethe2009USNS Impeccable affair; (6) continuing exchange visits by senior officers (7) the initiation of a Strategic Security Dialogue as part of the S&ED process; (8) agreement to hold meetings between CoastGuardsand(9)agreementonanewworkinggrouptodraftprinciplesestablishinga frameworkformilitarytomilitarycooperation.103 Second,sincemilitarytomilitarycontactswerefirstinitiatedin1980untilthepresent,the U.S.andChinahaveonlybeenabletoreachonemilitarytomilitaryagreement,theMMCA.

forAsiaandEurope,cosponsoredbyStiftungWissenshaftundPolitikandKonradAdenauerStiftung,Berlin, FederalRepublicofGermany,June1819,2012.
100

2009U.S.ChinaDefenseConsultativeTalks(DCT),Session1:MilitarytoMilitaryRelations,U.S.Embassy, Beijing,July1,2009.
101

Shirley A. Kan, U.S.China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,February10,2012,4.
102

The7pointconsensuswasreachedinWashingtoninOctober2009betweenSecretaryofDefenseRobert GatesandbyGeneralXuCaihou,ViceChairmanoftheCentralMilitaryCommittee.Thesevenpointsinclude: promotinghighlevelvisits;enhancingcooperationintheareaofhumanitarianassistanceanddisasterrelief; deepeningmilitarymedicalcooperation;expandingexchangesbetweenarmiesofthetwonations;enhancing theprogramofmidgradeandjuniorofficerexchanges;promotingculturalandsportsexchangesbetweenthe two militaries; invigorating the existing diplomatic and consultative mechanisms to improve maritime operationalsafety.
103

Thayer,EnhancingTransparency?U.S.ChinaMilitarytoMilitaryContactsandStrategicDialogues.

31

Anevaluationofthehealthofthisagreementisnotgood.AseniorPLAofficialofferedthis evaluation, We signed the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) in 1998 butoverthepast11yearsthemechanismfailedtoplayaneffectiverole.104Areviewofthe MMCAwrittenbytheU.S.principalnegotiator,arguedthatitremainstheonlymiltomil agreementbetweenthesetwonationsandisofonlylimitedeffectivenessbecauseitisheld hostagebyChinaoverU.S.actionsincarryingoutourstatedobligationsundertheTaiwan RelationsAct.105 Inweighinguptheplusesandnegativesinthebilateralrelationshipthebottomlineisthat despite the deficits the United States and China will persist in engaging with each other. Bothsidesunderstandthatmilitarytomilitarycontactsareacriticalcomponentofbilateral engagement. Without such interaction there is a risk that mistrust between the two militariescouldspilloverandhaveamajornegativeimpactonbilateralrelationsingeneral. It is likely that strategic mistrust will persist through lack of greater transparency and militarytomilitary relations will continue to exhibit elements of cooperation and friction. When incidents and disputes arise between the two militaries, the civilian leadership will intervene,asithasinthepast,toresetbilateralrelations.Insum,SinoAmericanrelationsin theSouthChinaSeaaremorelikelytobecharacterizedbycooperationandfrictionthanthe othertwoscenarios,amodusvivendiandarmedconflict. Inconclusion,thefindingsofthispapergenerallybearoutthemainargumentofKaplans thesisthat
the struggle for primacy in the Western Pacific will not necessarily involve combat; much of what takes place will happen quietly and over thehorizon inblankseaspace,at aglacialtempobefittingtheslow, steady accommodation to superior economic and military power that states have made throughout history.Warisfarfrominevitableevenifcompetitionisagiven.
106

104 105

2009U.S.ChinaDefenseConsultativeTalks(DCT)SmallGroupSession,U.S.Embassy,Beijing,July1,2009.

BruceLemkin,U.S.TaiwanRelationsAreNoThreattoChina, DefenseNews,November8,2012.Lemkin wasDeputyUnderSecretaryoftheU.S.AirForce(InternationalAffairs)from200310

106

Kaplan,TheSouthChinaSeaIstheFutureofConflict,79.