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Since October 2001 America has spent over a decade fighting a war in Afghanistan in the wake of the tragic events of 9/11. Which was initially intended to eradicate the presence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and soon afterward the highly ambitious goal of building centralised democracy was subsequently added to the combat mission. As a result Afghanistan today remains a country destroyed by nearly 3 decades of continuous warfare and with less than 3 years remaining till Afghan forces inherit sole combat responsibility at the end of 2014. The fact remains that Ten years after the invasion of Afghanistan, the goal of eradicating militancy and achieving political stability in the region remains as elusive as ever (Cortright, 2012). Moreover from every aspect of Afghan society whether political, social or economical it is abundantly clear that fundamentally the mission has not been a success and America is not winning the war in Afghanistan. Since the US-led military campaign has not succeeded in defeating their enemies and restoring political stability to the country (Indurthy, 2011) and many military and strategic objectives have yet to be achieved that will secure the afghan state and endure after US troop withdrawal at the end of 2014. Hence Americas war in Afghanistan has been an absolute failure, as the US-led campaign to stamp out the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, secure and re-build Afghanistan for over a decade has not succeeded. On a Political level the country faces many problems such as rampant corruption, a lack of good governance, and fraudulent elections, thus creating a problem of political legitimacy for the Karzai regime (Indurthy, 2011). And even after ten years of nation building the social conditions of many afghans has not improved much either and are ranked among the poorest of the world as poverty and the protracted armed conflict have created a grim socioeconomic situation and literacy rates are among the lowest in the world (Rahim,2010). Additionally the financial situation of

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Afghanistan are just as dire since with a GDP of only about $13 billion a year the country needs billions of dollars and massive infrastructure building to provide education, health, and the minimum basic needs of life to its people (Indurthy, 2011).

Yet despite the failures in many areas of the war, several military successes have been made in armed combat against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces within Afghanistan and the Afghanistan Pakistan tribal border region. For example the shooting and killing of Osama bin laden, the most wanted terrorist in the world fulfilled one of the main reasons for the invasion of allied troops in Afghanistan in fall 2001(Horak 2011). And the ISAF campaign has regained Momentum and the Taleban appear to have been worn down in Helmand and Kandahar (Theo & Rudra, 2011). However beyond these important accomplishments the status quo remains that while the insurgency and illegal armed groups do not yet have the capacity to pose strategic threats to the government, they still create a sense of insecurity that hinder economic reconstruction and weaken government influence in remote areas (Hussain & Soherwordi, 2012).

Firstly since the establishment of good governance is also essential for fostering the development of security and an economic recovery (Jalali, 2006) therefore the issue of corruption is highly significant in a country such as Afghanistan. Not only has the degree of corruption in Afghan government undermined the legitimacy and effectiveness of the infant democracy (Theo & Rudra, 2011). It has also meant that without the rule of law, the political scene, including the elections has become a playground for people with guns and money inside and outside the government (Jalali 2010). And as a result it is no surprise that experts and the afghan people have little hope or confidence about either the future prospects

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about Afghan government or the war, since the nation building efforts of America and the international community in Afghanistan have not been a success.

And correspondingly corruption is in effect endemic in Afghanistan and has infected nearly every section of Afghan society. It includes Karzai, his kin, politicians, police, judiciary, and provincial governors in varying degrees. Some of these people are also linked to the drug trade, and Karzai has done little to address this problem (Indurthy, 2011). As a consequence this is perhaps the most appalling aspect of this war, as great amounts of blood and treasure from the international community are in reality propping up and supporting a highly corrupt regime and political system to avoid the country once again largely falling into the hands of the Taliban. However the tragic irony is that by doing so not only does the Taliban look more like an appealing alternative to populace in remote areas in Afghanistan such as Kandahar and Helmand province. Since it also gives the Taliban a major political advantage among the populace in these areas and effectively ensures their ability to sustain a protracted insurgency and remain a significant security threat in these areas of the country. And from this view it can be scene that America is also fighting a war on a political front which is just as important as the military campaign in Afghanistan, one in which not only does the current Karzai regime effectively support the Taliban in but one in which America is also losing in. And the stark reality is that Afghan politicians depend on the well-entrenched patronage system for survival and the capacity to govern, tackling corruption would mean targeting the bedrock of the Afghan government (Theo & Rudra, 2011). Thus even ten years after the initial invasion America is no closer to creating a government capable of being trusted by its very own people in Afghanistan.

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Additionally the war on the political situation gets even worse from here because not only is the corruption which already deeply embedded in Afghan society bad enough for the war effort. Since eliminating corruption within the Afghan Government combined with the attendant costs for the existing patronage system, is likely to attract strong opposition from. And in most cases the patronage network in Kabul can be traced back to key power brokers at the regional level (Theo & Rudra, 2011). Hence the sheer level of corruption present in Afghanistan not only is just by itself able just to hinder the international communitys efforts at nation building; the problem is actually great enough to undermine the legitimacy of the Afghan government and also the strategic progress made by the US-led coalition so far.

Secondly another major area in which the issue of corruption is closely intertwined is that of poverty and since Afghanistan is still among one of the poorest nations in the world after over a decade into the war. This seriously calls into question if whether the nation building experiment in Afghanistan will ever be a success at all. For example from a social standpoint currently, forty-six percent of Afghan children dont attend school and as a result its a sure bet that illiteracy will continue to retard Afghanistans progress (Aikins, Hanson & Traub, 2011).

Therefore it is difficult to claim that the war been success in Afghanistan when only the people who live in the capital and other major cities which are firmly secure and under the control of the afghan government benefit from the nation building effort; when nearly half of the countrys population cant even read.

Similarly the economic climate is just as poor in Afghanistan given that so much of their economy is based on the illicit drug Opium. Since the country now produced 90% of the

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worlds opium (Jalali, 2006) and two fifths of Afghanistans real GDP is made up by opium cultivation and processing and this problem is further exacerbated, since the rest of their economy is either made up of subsistence farming or directly dependent upon international aid (Lievan, 2009). Consequently not only would rebuilding the Afghanistan economy would at least at some point require for the authorities that be, not just to eradicate the incredible amount of poppy fields in the country but also for them to provide a viable alternative currently to the way many Afghans earn a living.

Thus Poverty and eradication have to be attacked simultaneously (Jalali, 2006) and so far during the course of the war neither of this has been achieved; much to the detriment of the afghan people and the general war effort. This point is true for several reasons, for example to begin with the farmers receive only less than 20% of the drug revenue in Afghanistan whereas the rest goes to a nexus of traders, traffickers, illegal militia commanders, and corrupt (Jalali, 2006).

Additionally the major scope of the challenge that drugs present in Afghanistan are further complicated by the facts; that while it is mostly true that the Taliban derives much of its income from the heroin trade. Unfortunately, this is also true of the Karzai Administration. Since many of its members, at both national and provincial level, are major figures in the trade (Lievan, 2009).

Hence it is clearly evident that in addition to suffering from endemic corruption, high illiteracy rates and extreme poverty, all of these problems are vastly amplified by the illicit drug trade in Afghanistan. As a result not only does this help support the insurgency it nurtures it; since subsistence farmers depend on these crops to earn a living and much of the
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Karzai administration are very intimately linked to many drug lords in Afghanistan. Furthermore this also means that much of the nation building goals of the Afghanistan war are most likely to fail since the country is so enormously dependent on the sale of narcotics and international aid as sources for much their revenue just to survive. And finally the US-led coalition also faces a strategic defeat in the Afghanistan war in addition to the failed efforts of the nation building effort over the past decade. Since the use of extensive military force to eliminate the Taliban and its Al-Qaeda supporters has not yielded positive military results in Afghanistan (Hussain & Soherwordi, 2012).Which is somewhat reminiscent of the failed Soviet war in Afghanistan during the cold war, as like then today the insurgencies guerrilla tactics are just enough to greatly de-stabilise or even control several isolated regions away from major population centres such as the capital. This is still happening 3 years after the US president Obama announced 3 objectives to deny Al Qaeda a safe haven, reverse the Talibans momentum and strengthen the Afghan government and its security forces, so that they can take lead responsibility for its future (Christine, 2010). Similarly although there are troops in Afghanistan the Taliban have training camps, staging areas, recruiting centres (madrassas), and safe havens in Pakistan. (Jalali 2006) Furthermore while the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) such as Predator Drones in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) tribal area; have undoubtedly dealt a serious blow to terrorist networks operating in the region. It is safe to say that the ISAF military campaign in Afghanistan no matter how successful it is, cannot eliminate all the main insurgent groups still remaining in Pakistan (Jalali 2006).

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And while President Obamas overall strategy for Afghanistan was to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and the allies in the future. (Christine, 2010) 3 years later The Taliban movement has shown greater resilience over the years and has deepened its roots amongst the Afghan populace. Particularly, their resistance had increased in the Pashtun-dominated in the north-southern provinces along the Pakistan border (Hussain & Soherwordi, 2012).As a result this highlights how greatly Americas war in Afghanistan has failed, due to their inability to prevent insurgents from using the porous and isolated Af-Pak border region as safe havens. This situation is also exacerbated by the poor condition of the Afghan national security forces (ANSF) that are planned to take lead combat responsibility by the end of 2014. As for starters the Afghan National Army (ANA) lacks the most basic aspects of any adequate modern defence force; the military suffers from insufficient combat power, the lack of indigenous air support and the absence of a self-sustaining operational budget (Jalali, 2006). And this is further complicated by the fact that around 90 percent of ANA recruits are illiterate, compared to the national illiteracy rate of 75 percent (Christine, 2010) And by comparison the Afghan National Police (ANP) are said to be the weakest, since they lack proper training, equipment, and ethics, even to be lacking uniforms (Indurthy, 2011)

Thus it is obvious that given the conditions on the ground and the wider region there is no way Americas war in Afghanistan can succeed, since insurgents can operate with relative impunity within the tribal Af-Pak border regions. And as a result the insurgency is able to regenerate and regroup at will since they are simply not enough coalition forces to cover the entire area.

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In fact even with all the advanced weapons of the 21st America simply cannot win since due to the intrinsic nature of guerrilla warfare and Afghanistans mountainous terrain that favour the insurgents. Consequently this also calls into question how the ANSF are supposed to not only hold onto isolated areas in Afghanistan? But also, if they even have the ability to defend the capital without Americas direct military support? Therefore it is unmistakable that America is essentially failing everywhere in Afghanistan due to the product of important factors such as endemic corruption, extreme poverty and a resilient insurgency. And while Victor Davis Hansons assessment that a corrupt Afghan government and its Western allies will probably not be defeated or expelled from the major cities there (Aikins et al., 2011); which no doubtedly includes main population centres Such as Kandahar, Herat and the capital Kabul. It is also true however that this is only possible if America continues to support Afghanistan. Since foreign aid pays most of the cost of the security forces which a result the long term sustainability of the army and police is a major challenge (Jalali, 2006). Consequently the Afghan government needs to greatly strengthen its control of rural areas and deliver required services (Jalali, 2006) in the future to reduce Taliban influence and help the populace in remote places isolated far away from Kabul. And if the US-led coalition hasnt archived this yet after so many years it is very unlikely that the ANSF are going to either, because developing the ANA and ANP "without regard to the other weaknesses in the Afghan government, such as the rule of law, corruption, and the influence of non-state power brokers, would still seriously undermine the effectiveness of the force (Jalali, 2010). Lastly given that the key to the development of democracy and prosperity in Afghanistan is building a viable and capable state and a robust economy (Jalali 2006). And since the underlying dynamics of the war as of this writing are unlikely change even till the end of

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2014 when the bulk of the US-led coalition plan to make their departure especially because the Taliban led insurgency particularly in the south and east, the presence of illegal armed groups, and the illicit drug trade are still remain the main security threat in Afghanistan (Jalali 2006) and still today go largely unscathed. Chiefly because of the sheer amount of corruption in the Afghan government, a lack of coalition troops to cover the vast areas involved and the poor state of the ANSF. In conclusion the combined force of endemic corruption, extreme poverty and a highly resilient insurgency has simply produced a war in which America cannot win. And since the problem of drugs in Afghanistan is generally considered the single most challenging factor to the long-term security and development of the country (Jalali 2006) its only rational to conclude America has failed to control the drug problem in Afghanistan. In addition this, the overall assessment that the Americas war in Afghanistan war has not succeeded and will not any time in the future is logical. Given that after ten year of nation building project, the current government is highly corrupt and the country still remains a largely underdeveloped state; after adding a failed military campaign to eradicate the Taliban in Afghanistan the verdict is that America is failing in Afghanistan and will continue to do so in the future.

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..................................................//References

Ali A Jalali. (2006). the future of Afghanistan. Parameters, 36(1), 4-19. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.uws.edu.au/docview/198074734?accountid=36155

Ali A Jalali. (2010). Afghanistan in transition. Parameters, 40(3), 1-15. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.uws.edu.au/docview/859113235?accountid=36155

C Christine Fair. (2010). "Clear, build, hold, transfer": Can Obamas afghan strategy work? Asian Affairs, an American Review, 37(3), 113-131. Retrieved fromhttp://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.uws.edu.au/docview/755429902?accountid=36155

CHAUDHURI, R., & FARRELL, T. (2011). Campaign disconnect: Operational progress and strategic obstacles in Afghanistan, 2009?2011. International Affairs, 87(2), 271-296. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.00973.x

Cortright, D. (2012, spring; 2012/10). Winning without war: Non-military strategies for overcoming violent extremism.21, 197+. Retrieved from http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.uws.edu.au/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA299537381&v=2.1 &u=uwsydney&it=r&p=LT&sw=w

Horak, S. (2011). Afghanistan ten years after... Defence & Strategy, 11(2), 24/10/2012-17-28. doi: 10.3849/1802-7199.11.2011.02.017-028

Lieven, A. (2009). The war in Afghanistan: Its background and future prospects. Conflict, Security & Development, 9(3), 333-359. doi: 10.1080/14678800903142706

Rahim, T. (2010). The future of Afghanistan: An afghan responsibility. International Review of the Red Cross, 92(880), 993. doi: 10.1017/S1816383111000063

Rathnam Indurthy. (2011). THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN. International Journal on World Peace, 28(3), 7-52. Retrieved fromhttp://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.uws.edu.au/docview/900377817?accountid=36155

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Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi. (2012). Withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan (endgame): Issues and challenges for Pakistan. Journal of Political Studies, 19(1), 129-141. Retrieved fromhttp://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.uws.edu.au/docview/1024812098?accountid=36155

Victor Davis Hanson, James Traub, Ann Marlowe, & Matthieu Aikins. (2011). AFPAK 2020: A symposium. World Affairs, 173(6), 16-34. Retrieved fromhttp://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.uws.edu.au/docview/857079363?accountid=36155

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