SUDAN AND ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY INTRODUCTION

In this essay my aim would be mainly to try to clarify why and in which way Israel supported an African-muslin country, such as Sudan. My article is also an attempt to define the complicate and instable relations that occurred inside the African country that let foreign countries to support a particular faction rather the another, such as Israels support to the Anya-Nya movement, the Southern Sudanese rebel movement. First of all I will focus on the first Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972), making a short introduction about the ethnic , cultural and political causes of the war, in order to sketch and understand the main events happened during the war. Then I will try to analyze the ideology, the political and economical reasons of Israeli foreign policy in the Horn of Africa and in the Sub-Saharan Africa, and finally I will develop Israeli foreign Policy toward Sudan, in particular during the first civil war. It is also my intention to give some hints about how, since the first Sudanese Civil War, some alliances were already quite clear and developed after, during the second civil war (1983-2005), and resists also after the proclamation of independence of the South Sudan (9 July 2011).

CHAPTER I: HOW ETHNICY, CULTURE AND POLICY IN SUDAN INFLUENCED THE FIRST CIVILE WAR (1955-1972)
When medieval Arab travelers arrived in Sudan called it Bilad al-Sudan, literally meaning the land of the blacks1, but a lot of differences between the Southern region and the northern one have always existed. The Southern region is inhabited by numerous African ethnic groups corresponding to three major linguistic groups: Sudanic, Western Nilotes, and Eastern Nilotes2, where Sudanic people are divided into the Moru-Madi and the Azande. The Moru-Madi were the first inhabitants of Southern Sudan, while Azande occupy a vast area in the heart of Africa, including the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Nilotes are distributed over a
S.S.POGGIO, The First Sudanese Civil War. Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in the Southern Sudan,1955-1972, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p.9. 2 E.OBALLANCE, Sudan, Civil War, and Terrorism, 1956-1999, London, Macmillan, 2000.
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large area of northeast Africa and Southern Sudan; it is possible to divide them into Western and Eastern Nilotes. The first ones can be distinguished into Dinka-Nuer and the Lwo-speaking, they are the largest ethnic group in Sudan, Dinka lead a nomadic life style, while Nuer are pastoralist and occupy both banks of the White Nile.3 Easter Nilotes are related and claim a common ancestors, for this reason can be gathered in a unique group called Kuku. What it is important to notice in this fragmentation inside the Southern region is that the boundaries which separate it from its neighbors are artificial, since they are the product of Egyptian-English colonial administration. Thus, some ethnic groups such Azande have settlement in Congo and others like Nuer occupy part of Western Ethiopia. Really different is the ethnic and cultural situation in the North Sudan, where the arrival of the Arabs in the sixteenth century changed completely the preexisting structure, forcing Nuba people to retreat to the Nuba mountains4, and imposing in the territory the Arab culture, language and religion. The process of Arabization and Islamization carried on in the Centuries produced identity problems in the Sudanese men closed between being African and being Arab. To worsen the situation, the Arabs, especially those of the Gulf Countries, used to see Northern Sudanese not as Arabs, but as abid, slave in Arabic5. African Arabs were seen at the periphery of the Arab identity. Despite this sense of inferiority felt by northern Sudanese, during the decades they have managed to create alliances and diplomatic relations with countries in Nord Africa, in the Middle East and in Sub-Saharan Africa. Besides, they were able to exercise economic and political power over the whole Sudan, with the result that the Sudanese economy, private and public institutions, and foreign affairs were dominated by people from the North, while the vast majority of the black African Sudanese have been marginalized. This situation created the seeds for a conflict between North and South Sudan. One consideration should be done on the fact that, when Sudan gained its independence from Egypt on January 1, 1956, were the educated and highly politicized elite in Khartoum who inherited the political and economical power from Egypt and Great Britain. Instead of creating a unique African-Arab civilization and reorganizing
For further information about Nilotes see the anthropologist E.E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, The Nuer: A description of the models of livelihood and political institution of a nilotic people, New York, Oxford University Press, 1940. 4 S. MUSA RAHHAL, The right to be Nuba: The story of a Sudanese Peoples struggle for survival, Lawrenceville, N.J., Red Sea, 2001, pp.6-8. 5 S.S. POGGIO, Ibid.,. p.18.
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the richness of African, Arab and European civilization, they decided to keep all the powers in their hands and to exclude the majority of African black people. The neglected South attempted to rise its voice, in particular about the new matter of creating a federal government, but northern leaders baked away from commitments to create it, because that would mean giving the south substantial autonomy.6 What let the civil war started was when, on 18 August 1955, some members of the British-administered Sudan Defense Force Equatorial Corps mutinied in Torit, one of the most important city in the Southern Sudan. The cause of the mutiny was a trial of a southern member of the national assembly and a false telegram urging northern administrators in the South to oppress Southerners. The most of the mutinies were suppressed, while survivors came to the towns and began an uncoordinated insurgency in rural areas. What happened in Torit was not just a simple mutiny, but as professor Poggio stated [] was a rebellion by Southern patriots against all forms of injustice imposed on the South by the Nord. It was the first attempt by African people in Southern Sudan to express their political aspirations, their strong belief in African nationalism, and above all, their assertion of Africanism over Arabism.(POGGIO,2008:194) The rebels in rural areas were poorly armed and bad organized, this kind of guerrilla, was a little threat to the ex-colonial power and to the newly formed Sudanese government. Nevertheless, the insurgents gradually developed into a secessionist movement composed of mutineers and southern students. These groups formed, what was called, the Anya-Nya guerrilla army, which arose determined to seek independence for the South. Starting from Equatoria, the region where the mutiny take place, between 1963 and 1969 Anya-Nya spread throughout the other two southern provinces: Upper Nile and Bahr al Ghazal.7 The instable government was not able to take advantage of rebels internal ethnic divisions and weaknesses, since the first independent government of Sudan, led by Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari, was quickly replaced by a coalition of various conservative forces, which was overthrown in the coup d'tat in 1958. Popular dissatisfactions for the military government provoked protests that led to a creation of an instable government in 1964, which bought another military coup in 1969.8 At this point, what is important to underline in my analyzes , is how this struggle between the southern independent movement and the Khartoum government became
6 7 8

E. O'BALLANCE, The Secret War in the Sudan: 19551972, Hamden, Connecticut, Archon Books, 1977, p. 41. E. O'BALLANCE, Ibid., 1977, p.62 For more detailed information about the history of Sudan see M. H. FADLALLA, Short History

of Sudan, iUniverse, 2004.

internationalized. The First Sudanese Civil War was seen in the framework of the Cold War tension between East and West and in the contest between Israel and the Arab power. In fact, by 1969 the rebels had developed foreign contacts to obtain weapons and supplies. Israel, for example, trained Anya Nya recruits and shipped weapons via Ethiopia and Uganda to the rebels. Anya Nya also purchased arms from Congolese rebels and collected money for them in the south and from among southern Sudanese exile communities in the Middle East, Western Europe, and North America. The rebels also captured arms, equipment, and supplies from government troops.9 Government operations against the rebels declined after the 1969 coup. However, when negotiations failed to result in a settlement, Khartoum increased troop strength in the south to about 12,000 in 1969, and intensified military activity throughout the region. In that period the Soviet Union revealed to be the biggest supplier of weapons for the Sudanese government. USSR has always regarded the Red Sea region as strategically important for consolidating its influence in the Middle East and in Indian Ocean. For this reason, in the late 1960s it increased also its help arising to $100 million the arms agreement with Sudan. In this way it granted aid that would allow the government to continue to prosecute the war. During this period, in fact, Sudan obtained some Soviet-manufactured weapons from Egypt, most of which went to the Sudanese air force. By the end of 1969, however, the Soviet Union had shipped unknown quantities of 85mm antiaircraft guns, sixteen MiG-21s, and five Antonov-24 transport aircraft.10 In 1971 Joseph Lagu, who had become the leader of the southern forces, proclaimed the creation of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). Anya-Nya leaders became united behind him, and nearly all exiled southern politicians supported the SSLM. This was the first time in the history of the civil war that the separatist movement had a unified command structure able to accomplish the aim of secession and the formation of an independent state in South Sudan. The Sudanese government believed it could stop the fighting and stabilize the region by granting regional self-governments. By October 1971, Khartoum had established contact with the SSLM. After consultations, a conference between SSLM and Sudanese government delegations was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in February 1972. Initially, the southerners demanded a federal state with a separate southern government and an army that would come under the federal president's command only in response to an external threat to Sudan. Eventually, however, the two sides,
9

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http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-civil-war1.htm S.S. POGGIO, Ibid., p.167.

with the help of Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie, reached an agreement.11 What deserves notice is that Ethiopias emperor was not the only actor who promoted a peaceful agreement. The mediation of the leaders of the World Council of Churches (WWC) and the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), which had proved material and financial resources to the Southern Sudanese refugees in the neighboring countries, together with the Church World Service (CWS) of New York, became instrumental in facilitating peace talks between the Khartoum administration and the SSLM. In exchange for ending their armed uprising, southerners were granted a single southern administrative region with defined powers. For example, the cabinet named by the regional president would be responsible for all aspects of regional government except such areas as defense, foreign affairs, currency and finance, economic and social planning, which were dominion of the central authority.12 Unfortunately, the Addis Ababa Agreement revealed to be only a temporary respite. Infringements by the north, due to the weakness of the agreement, led to increase civil disorders in the south. They started in the mid-1970s and brought to the 1983 army mutiny with the result of the Second Sudanese Civil War. The main reasons of the weakness of the Addis Ababa agreement are underlined by the professor Poggio as failures in clarifying the position of the North in terms of central authority (POGGIO,2008:191). He continues with examples: []For instance, although the South possessed mineral resources, the North, as central authority, controlled these resources. The North also neglected to provide financially for the regional government, []. The agreement moreover failed to clarify the financial needs of the regional government, and the South depended primarily on the national treasury in Khartoum. (POGGIO,2008:191).

CHAPTER II: ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD EAST AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
At this point it is essential to analyze the history and the ideology of Israel to understand why it decided to intervene and support a lot of East African and SubSaharan African state, and in which way it shaped and influenced their policies. It was on 14 May 1948 when David Ben-Gurion, the Executive Head of the World Zionist Organization and president of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, declared "the
11 12

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-civil-war1.htm Ibid.

establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz Israel, to be known as the State of Israel," an independent state upon the termination of the British Mandate for Palestine, 15 May 1948.13 Since its proclamation, the main objective of Israeli foreign policy was to mobilize all the resources of diplomacy for its protection and preservation. From 1948 to 1950, Israel adopted a policy of non-alignment and as such, it tried to have contact with the independent states of Asia, the geographic region to which it belongs. Unfortunately Israel was not able to establish diplomatic relations with many Asian countries. Besides, Arab/Muslim states of Asia refused any diplomatic contact with it. Consequentially, one of the plausible reason why he sought the support of the African states was Israeli disappointment with the Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia from 18 to 24, 1955. It provoked a shock to Israel because it showed the growing hostility on the part of non-aligned world.14 Twenty-nine countries participated, among them fourteen were Arab and Muslims, also Palestinian leaders were there. Israel was not invited to attend because Arab/Muslims pressure. Moreover, a resolution hostile to Israel was adopted, supporting the Palestinian. As a consequence, in spring of 1957, when Gahna gained its independence, Ben-Gurion asked him to establish an Israeli Legation there, affirming that it had to stop the encirclement by a hostile Arab world and build bridges to the emerging nations on the black continent. Israel adopted the policy of establishing friendly relations, greater identification and international alignment with as many emerging Sub-Saharan African nations as possible. We can divide Israels relation with Africa into three main periods: The Golden Years, in the 1960s, when the majority of independent states in Africa had diplomatic relations with Israel; the 1970s, after the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when almost all African countries cut their relations with it; and in the 1980s and 1990s, with the return of Israel to Africa.15 During the 1960s Israel established diplomatic relations with thirty-three American countries.16 As I already stated, the main political motivation was to preserve the condition of survival of the Jewish people bringing international respectability to Israel. Consequentially, the achievement of a positive image in Africa
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration+of +Establishment+of+State+of+Israel.htm 14 A. ODED, Africa in Israeli Foreign Policy-Expectation and Disenchantment: Historical and Diplomatic Aspects , Israel Studies, vol.15, n.3, Special Issue: The making of Israeli Foreign Policy / Guest Editors: Gabriel Shaffer and Nathan Adrian, Fall 2010, pp.122-124 15 Ibid., p.122. 16 Ibid., p.122.
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become a major goal for its foreign policy, where the idea of respectability was not also a political goal, but also include an economic, social and moral character of the Jewish state.17 Besides political aims there were also pragmatics motives that led Israel entry to Africa, such as economic and commercial interests. First of all, we have to underline the strategic position of the Horn of Africa: Ethiopia and Eritrea are geographically close to Israel and the Red Sea had a peculiar importance in order to assure maritime passage to Southern Africa, while the ports of Kenya and Tanzania were important for Israeli cargo on their way to the Far East and the Southern Africa. Furthermore Africa, in general, is rich in row materials. Israeli idea was to import them directly and sell there its industrial products. We have to mention also the Islamic factor as strategic. As it is reported by the Israeli scholar Arye Oded, one-third of the African population is Muslim, therefore the economic and social cooperation with them might keep calm the Arab-Israeli conflict. (ODED,2010:125). Essential to understand Israeli foreign policy is ideology, what is called sense of messianic mission (CAROL,2012:37). The professor Carol continue stating: []Throughout the century of dispersion, Jews have maintained an extraordinary bond with the Bible, a belief in the concept of the Chosen People and a vision of a unique role in the messianic era to unfold. (CAROL,2012:38). As the prophet Isaiah 49:6, stated in the Old Testament: I will also give thee [Israel], for the light to the nation, that My salvation may be unto the end of the earth.18 The messianic mission is also tied to emotional and humanitarian causes: Israel also felt a sense of identification and partnership of fate with Africans. Since the Jewish people were long victims of racial discrimination, felt affinity for the Africans. Concretely, Israel was willing to contribute in the nation-building and development to the newly independent countries in Africa through assistance programs, establishing special institutions for the training of young local people. Golda Meir herself, Israeli Prime Minister in 1969, invested much time and energy in the Israeli-Africa relations: she visited Ghana in 1958 and she carried on strong ties with Kenya. She used to highlight how the motives for Israel entrance to Africa were a mixture of political and humanitarian reasons: as for the political, in the 1950s, Israel felt isolated by the Arab pressure from the world, as for the humanitarian, international cooperation programs and technical aid were carried on successfully.19
S.CAROL, From Jerusalem to the Lion of Judah and beyond: Israels Foreign Policy in East Africa, iUniverse, 2012, p.29. 18 The Holy Scripture, Tel Aviv, Israel, Sinai Publishing, 1967, p.997. 19 A. ODED, Ibid., p.126
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Israeli activity was not limited to humanitarian and political affairs, but also to technical: technical cooperation, especially training personnel for agriculture, irrigation, development of arid zone was one of the primary aim in Israeli foreign policy. In particular, a special unit was created called MASHAV (Hebrew acronym for the Center for International Cooperation), which in the 1960s became a large division that collaborate with international organization, among them the U.N. agencies. Another important training institute was the Afro-Asian Institute for Labor and Cooperative Studies. In the training centers, between the years 1958 and 1971, thousands of Africans and students from the Third World were trained. MASHAV sent 4,341 Israeli experts abroad; among them 2,763 worked in Africa, the majority in agricultural projects.20 What is important to underline is that Israels technical cooperation had positive reactions in Africa and influence positively the idea of Israels presence in the Third World, especially during the 1960s. The MASHAV technical cooperation also had an impact on the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and Africa in the 1980s and 1990s. (ODED,2010:131). The Golden Years came to an end with the Six-Day War of 1967 fought by Israel and the neighboring states of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. As it is reported by the professor Carol it was a watershed of Israeli-African relations (CAROL,2012:381). Israel revealed to have a strong military power in the Middle East, besides, it occupied the Egyptian territory, which acquisition was by force. This fact was seen as a threat for other neighboring African states. As a result, the new emerging idea about Israeli occupation of the area won, was to see the Jewish state as an imperial western country supported mainly by US. In the early 1970s the African countries began to frozen the relationship with Israel, in a process that peaked in 1973 with the Yom Kippur war. Such a deterioration of relations was also to attribute to the fact that Arab countries influenced the African ones in order to take advantages from them. As professor Oded remember to us [] Nine member countries of the Arab League belong to the OAU (ed. Organization of African Unity) to which Israel had no access. In fact, ever since the OAU was founded, in 1963, its Arab delegates had persevered in their efforts to include the Arab-Israeli conflict on the agenda of the OAU. The Arab countries were successful in exploiting the fact that about one-third of Africas population is Muslim. (ODED,2010:133). Arabs strategy was to promote their cause by increasing Islamic activities against Israel. When Muammar Qadhafi assumed power in Libya in 1969, he followed Abd l-Nasirs aim to remove Israel from Africa. He also threatened jihad against
20

MASHAV, Annual Reports, 19581971

Ethiopia and Chad because they were still supporting Israel, while to others, such as Uganda, Niger and Gabon he offered financial reward, since they severed their relations with Israel. The process of frozen the ties with Israel started with Guinea, in 1967, followed with Uganda in 1972, where the president Amin, close friend of Israel decided to severe its relations mainly because Israel refused to furnish his country with an exaggerate amount of money and weapons. As a consequence, the president went to Qadhafi; the Libyan chief agreed to assist him financially and militarily only on condition that he expelled all the Israelis from Uganda.21 Precisely, since 1973, Libya and other Arab countries intensified their financial, political and diplomatic efforts in Africa in order to prevent Israel from coming back there. The most remarkable thing to put attention on, was how Israel continued, in that period, to have informal and practical relations with these African countries. In fact, for examples, a lot of African scholars attended international conferences in Israel, while in Nigeria and in Kenya Israelis continued their business in their companies. The return to Africa was gradual and started in the early 1980s. The main reasons for the rapprochement recognized by the professor Oded, were, first of all, the peace between Israel and Egypt, which started with Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, in 1993, between Israel and completed in 1982. Furthermore, the Oslo Accord

Palestine and the peace treaty with Jordan in 1994, not only helped the process of restoration the relations between Africa and Israel, but also helped the image of Israel. Important was also the fact that since the 1990s many African countries stated to fear the radical Islamism supported by Libya, Iran and Sudan, and, as a consequence, they saw Israeli support as a way to reduce the menace. Last, but not least, were the outcomes of the Soviet Union disintegration: pro-Soviet countries such as Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia, established or renewed diplomatic relations with Israel. (ODED,2010:137). After the analysis of the trend of bilateral relation between Africa and Israel we have to point out how Israeli foreign policy has become, during the years, more selective, realistic and pragmatic, based on mutual interests and adaptable to the ever-changing international climate (CAROL,2012:387). The enthusiasm and the ideological motivation have been replaced by pragmatic considerations and economic and strategic outputs.
For further information about Israel and Uganda relation see A.ODED, Uganda and Israel The history of a complex relationship, Jerusalem, Hebrew, 2002.
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In fact, technical cooperation, currently, is still strong and updated, since Israeli companies are engaged in communication, computerization and infrastructure projects. Nowadays Israel has only nine embassies in African key countries: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Cote dIvoire, Angola, and Cameroon.22

CHAPTER III: ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SUDAN

After giving general ideas about the trend of Israeli foreign policy in Africa from his proclamation till nowadays, I want to focus now on diplomatic, economic and military relation toward Sudan. What the professor of Middle Eastern history at United States Air Force Academy , Jacob Abadi affirmed how Israel-Sudanese relations were unique for their secrecy and inconsistency, mainly because of the result of Sudanese political instability.23 Since Sudan gained its independence, in 1956, bilateral contacts were established with Israel, but the instable nature of the Sudanese state, caused mainly by inter-tribal conflicts, made them discontinuous and the most of the times secrete. Till 1958 military coup, Khartoum had pro-Western orientation, but with the general Abbud, Sudanese foreign policy changed for supporting the Egyptian president Nasser and severing contact with Israel.24 After another coup in 1969, Nimeiri came to power. Just to have a brief view of the presidential history of Sudan, Nimeiri in the 1980s imposed an Islamic regime ruled by Sharia, such radical choice threatened Israel and other African neighboring countries. Another military coup in 1985 brought Sadiq alMahdi to the government, which remained to the power until 1989 coup, when the actual Omar al-Bashir take the control of the state. With the influence Hassan alTurabi, an Islamic politician, they adopted extremely hostile attitude toward Israel.25

Data are update to 2010 and refers to A. ODED, Africa in Israeli Foreign PolicyExpectation and Disenchantment: Historical and Diplomatic Aspects , Israel Studies, vol.15, n.3, Special Issue: The making of Israeli Foreign Policy / Guest Editors: Gabriel Shaffer and Nathan Adrian, Fall 2010 . 23 J.ABADI, Israel and Sudan: the saga of enigmatic Relationship, Middle Eastern Studies, London, Vol.35, July 1999, No.3 p.19. 24 J.LEFEBVRE, Middle East Conflicts and Middle-Level Power Intervention in the Horn of Africa, Middle East Journal, Vol.50, No.3, Summer 1996, p.390 25 For more detailed information about the history of Sudan see M. H. FADLALLA, Short History
of Sudan, iUniverse, 2004

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What I want to demonstrate is how Israel, despite the anti-Israeli policy adopted during the history of the independent Sudan, could establish episode of bilateral cooperation. As stated by the professor Abadi: [] The bilateral contact were a result of pragmatic consideration on both sides. (ABADI,1999:20). Examples could be in the fact that, since its independence, Sudan was looking for securing itself from foreign attacks. On the other side Israel wanted to establish a huge arsenal on Sudanese territory, in order to support African and middle Eastern countries which asked help to it, but also in order to have them as allies. (ABADI,1999:21). Evidences of bilateral cooperation where mainly on economic sphere. In fact Sudan was still under Egyptian domination and used to export its agricultural products and cattle to Israel, until 1950, when the Egyptian government decided to force the Italian vessel Dimavo, on the way to Israel, to stop and open its cargo of cotton-seed in Port Sudan. London, concerned about good relationships between Sudan and Israel, affirmed that Egypt had no legal right to ban Sudanese trade with Israel, as it was subject of internal Sudan legislation.26 Anyway the most important thing, at that time, was not to deteriorate relations between Egypt and Israel, therefore they treat the matter as an isolate incident. Since Sudan and Israel economic cooperation was in any case restricted, Egypt would recompense the Sudanese losses.27 Another episode of bilateral cooperation, in this case in political field, was at the eve of Sudanese independence. The Umma Party was looking for possible allies to support an Independent Sudan, and since Egypt was their common enemy, Israel could be the potential figure that could help Sudan. Israel, in fact with its influence in the western world, especially in United States and Great Britain, could intercede on Sudan for financial, economic and political independence and stability. Anyway, the most remarkable and influential aid was given by Israel to support, not Sudanese government, but the Anya-Nya separatist movement during the first Sudanese Civil War. They were predominately Christian blacks, fighting against northern Arab/Muslims, and, as it is reported by the professor Abadi, this Israeli action had the strategic aim to support dissident minorities in Arab countries, such as supporting Kurds in Iraq and Druze in Syria. (ABADI, 1999:22).

G. R. WARBURG, The Sudan and Israel: an Episode in Bilateral Relations Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.28, No.2, April 1992, pp. 385-387 27 Remember that the trade in that period was all in one direction from Sudan to Israel. The figures show the decrease in trades as follows: in 1949 - 540,000, in 1950- 726,000, in 1951 - 697,000, in 1952- 343,000 and in 1953 - 8,000. For further details about this episode see WARBURG, The Sudan and Israel: an Episode in Bilateral Relations Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.28, No.2, April 1992, pp.385-96.

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Its interesting to notice how, this military relations has begun. In June 1967 , Lagu, one of the most important figure in the separatist southern movement, after the Six-Say War, wrote to Israeli prime minister to congratulate him on the victory of Israeli forces over the Arab. Lagu was also fighting the Arabs in Southern Sudan and if Israel supported the Anya-Nya forces, he would defeat the Sudanese army, making difficult for Sudan to sent troops to Support Egypt in Sinai. Israel accepted, and from then till the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, he consistently sent military assistance and training to Southern Sudan.28 Anyway, by the time Lagu contacted Israel, Israelis had already diplomatic relations with Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Congo. Among them, Emperor Selassie of Ethiopia let Israel to use its airspace for military trainings and for the training of Anya-Nya soldiers. Indeed, Selassie was sympathetic to Southern Sudan, as Khartoum government was supporting Eritrean guerrilla fighting for the independence from Ethiopia.29 Between 1963 and 1972 also the President of Kenya was sympathetic to the southern Sudanese cause, as he permitted Israeli planes to refuel in Nairobi after dropping arms at Anya-Nya bases.30 Stepping back to the worsening of the diplomatic relationship between the Khartoum government and Israel, we have to remember when before the Six Day war, Sudan sent a contingent of forces to Egypt. In fact, despite the differences between the two countries, Sudan wanted to express solidarity to Nasser and the other Arab countries. As a result, Khartoum severed its diplomatic relations with Israel and the western countries. In December 1969 it signed the Tripoli Charter in which it declared to align its foreign policy with Egypt and Libya. Therefore, in the 1970s, Sudans foreign policy supported Muammar Gaddafis plan to mobilize all Arab states against Israel. During the Yom Kippur War, in 1973, Sudan tried to sent soldiers to the Egyptian front. Consequentially, such forms of Arab solidarity did not pass unnoticed to Israel, which, in response continued, and even increased its support to the Southern rebels. Back to 1971, Khartoum attitude was more hostile than ever, since Israel was openly blamed by the Sudanese government for helping rebels groups. Furthermore, also Sudans Communist Party, which was ideologically anti-Israel, was even prone to have relations with Egypt and Libya in order to defeat Zionism. (ABADI, 1999:25). The tension in the Israeli-Sudanese relations were reshaped with the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, which terminated Israeli involvement in Southern Sudan,

S.S. POGGIO, The First Sudanese Civil War. Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in the Southern Sudan,1955-1972, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p.139 29 Ibid., p. 159 30 Ibid., p. 161

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for that moment. As a result, the agreement improved temporarily Sudans relationships. An episode of political and economic cooperation, which deserve to be mentioned, was when, during the Seventies, Israelis wanted to turn Sudan into a huge arsenal containing arms to be used for special projects, such as helping the son of the deposed Shah of Iran, to return to his country and removed Khomeinis regime. The political aim of such operation was the containment of the Islamic factor which was spreading worldwide. On the other side, Sudan was paid generously by Israel for its sustain.31 What is also important in my analysis is to understand how the president Nimeiri (1969-1985) was able to rule the country between a strong favoritism towards Palestine and the necessity to keep contact with Israel. In fact, as soon as he come to power in 1969, Nimeiri's regime committed itself to the Arab cause and to the struggle against Israel. Nevertheless, he did not want to ruin his image in Washington's eyes, so he had to reduce his sympathy with the radicals in the Palestinian camp. Actually, it was only in the 1980s when Nimeiri decided to moderate his behavior towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: he began talking about negotiations and agreements as a way to solve Palestinian dilemma. (ABADI, 1999:29). However, ties with the Islamic world were still strong and they led Khartoum in 1988 to recognize the State of Palestine, on one side, and to give asylum to Palestine extremist, on the other. Furthermore, according to United States reports cited in Abadi essay, Sudan accepted the sum of $30 million from Iran to construct training camps for Muslim terrorists. (ABADI, 1999:30). As a result, Israel started to be involved again in supporting the rebels in the South regions during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005). John Garang, leader of Sudans Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), obtained shipments of weapons from Israel through Kenya. Therefore, as stated by Carol, the other History professor in his book, the South Sudanese could not forget the assistance from Israel during the two civil wars. As the Jewish State set the path to the nowadays independent south Sudan, Southern Sudanese are grateful and still have economic, diplomatic and social ties with it. (CAROL,2012:376). Stepping back to the history of Sudan, in 1993, it is important to remark how it was transformed into an Islamic authoritarian single-party state with Bashir at the
More details about this operation are reported in J.ABADI, Israel and Sudan: the saga of enigmatic Relationship, Middle Eastern Studies, London, Vol.35, No.3, July 1999, p.26
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Government, and Turabi as influent

Islamic politician. As reported by Abadi in an

Arabic television interview in 1994, the Islamic leader Bashir, denounced publicly Israel for supplying arms to Garang and added that Israel had used it has a tool in the imperialist campaign led by United States against Sudan. Besides, Israel was using Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea in order to interfere in Sudanese affairs, using them as a base of operation against its country. (ABADI,1999:32). To worsen even more the relation with Israel, Bashir expressed reservation to the Israeli-Palestinian agreement, while Turabi was even more critical, expressing disappointment for Palestinian surrender to the West. Turabi argued also that it was largely due to the existence of the Zionism lobby that United States become hostile to Islam. However, in another interview always reported by Abadi, he denied to provide asylum to the radical Hizballah, and he also denied any connection with Hamas. (ABADI,1999:35) Although all of these hostile declarations, episodes of bilateral cooperation continued, in particular in security matters. The purpose was to involve Israel in a mediating role with US and to pressure the Jewish state to limit its aid to Garangs rebels in order to use it to improve Sudans economy. As we have seen pragmatism was the key point in the bilateral relation between Sudan and Israel. What we can understand from the analysis of the resources, is that Sudan as Islamic country, would continue to denounce Israel foreign policy, but episode of secret or practical co-operation are likely to reappear in the future.

CONCLUSION
With my essay I tried to give the main ideas about the dynamics of the Israel foreign policy and about the history of the independent Sudan. I focused mainly on the first Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972), making an effort to understand the causes and why the presence of international actors, such as Israel. I also followed the current interpretation of the bilateral relations between Israel and Sudan, that gives more relevance to the pragmatic aspect, rather than the ideological and the humanitarian one, which was the first approach used by Israel in its diplomatic relations toward Africa. Finally I also had the intention, with my work, to clarify the saga of these bilateral ties, which still deserves more attentions and further studies, since the dynamics and complexity of the situation, are constantly influenced by international changes.

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BIBLIOGRAFY
A. ODED, Africa in Israeli Foreign Policy-Expectation and Disenchantment: Historical and Diplomatic Aspects, Israel Studies, vol.15, n.3, Special Issue: The making of Israeli Foreign Policy / Guest Editors: Gabriel Shaffer and Nathan Adrian, Fall 2010, pp.121142. E.E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, The Nuer: A description of the models of livelihood and political institution of a nilotic people, New York, Oxford University Press, 1940. E. OBALLANC, Sudan, Civil War, and Terrorism, 1956-1999, London, Macmillan, 2000. Holy Scripture, Tel Aviv, Israel, Sinai Publishing, 1967, p.997. G. R. WARBURG, The Sudan and Israel: an Episode in Bilateral Relations Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.28, No.2, April 1992, pp. 385-396. J.ABADI, Israel and Sudan: the saga of enigmatic Relationship, Middle Eastern Studies, London, Vol.35, July 1999, No.3 p.19-41. 15

J.LEFEBVRE, Middle East Conflicts and Middle-Level Power Intervention in the Horn of Africa, Middle East Journal, Vol.50, No.3, Summer 1996, p.387-404. MASHAV, Annual Reports, 19581971. M. H. FADLALLA, Short History of Sudan, iUniverse, 2004. S. CAROL, From Jerusalem to the Lion of Judah and beyond: Israels Foreign Policy in East Africa, iUniverse, 2012. S. MUSA RAHHAL, The right to be Nuba: The story of a Sudanese Peoples struggle for survival, Lawrenceville, N.J., Red Sea, 2001. S. S. POGGIO, The First Sudanese Civil War. Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in the Southern Sudan,1955-1972, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

SITOGRAFIA
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-civil-war1.htm http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration +of+Establishment+of+State+of+Israel.htm

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