A.

General Concept

responsibility of the employer and the Union and is characterized as a legal obligation. In the case at bar, (1) respondent Union was a duly certified bargaining agent; (2) it made a definite request ro bargain, accompanied with a copy of the proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement, to the Company not only once but twice which were left unanswered and unacted upon; and (3) the Company made no counter proposal whatsoever all of which conclusively indicate lack of a sincere desire to negotiate. From the overall conduct of the company, it is indubitably shown that it disregarded its obligation to bargain in good faith.

1.

Kiok Loy vs NLRC (Policy Declaration)

FACTS: In a certification election held, the Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa, a legitimate late labor federation, won and was subsequently certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Sweden Ice Cream Plant. The Union furnished the Company with two copies of its proposed collective bargaining agreement. At the same time, it requested the Company for its counter proposals but the requests were ignored and remained unacted upon by the Company. As a result, the Union filed a "Notice of Strike", with the BLR on the ground of unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining. In the labor arbiter: due to series of postponements, and non-appearance at the hearing conducted it ruled that the Company has waived its right to present further evidence and, therefore, considered the case submitted for resolution. NLRC: ruled that respondent Sweden Ice Cream is guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain, in violation of Section (g) Article 248 (now Article 249) Issue: WON respondent is guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain? Held: YES The Court affirmed the NLRC, and ruled that, petitioner Company is GUILTY of unfair labor practice, because the jurisdictional preconditions of Collective Bargaining establish such as: 1. possession of the majority representation; 2. proof of majority representation; 3. a demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) Collective bargaining which is defined as negotiations towards a collective agreement, is one of the democratic frameworks under the New Labor Code, designed to stabilize the relation between labor and management and to create a climate of sound and stable industrial peace. It is a mutual

2.

Almario vs Philippine Airlines (Nature, Purpose, Interpretation) G.R. No. 170928, September 11, 2007

Unjust enrichment: Article 22, CC recognizes the principle that one may not enrich himself at the expense of another. Form of "enrichment:" Enrichment of the defendant consists in every patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in money

FACTS: This is a complaint for reimbursement of training costs filed by PAL against its pilot, Almario. Almario was initially hired as a Boeing 747 Systems Engineer. Later on, he successfully bid for the higher position of Airbus 300 First Officer, for which he was given additional training at PALs expense. After completing the course, Almario served as A-300 First Officer of PAL but after eight months of service, he tendered his resignation for personal reasons. PAL then wrote him a letter, stating that they invested heavily on his professional training on the basis that he continue to serve the Company for a definite period of time which is approximately 3 yrs. In short, PAL wanted Almario to reconsider his resignation, otherwise they would be compelled to ask reimbursement for the training costs from him. Despite this, Almario pushed through with his resignation. Hence, a reimbursement case was filed.

In the lower court, PAL invoked the existence of an innominate contract of do ut facias (I give that you may do) with Almario in that by spending for his training, he would render service to it until the costs of training were recovered in at least 3 yrs. They based the period of 3 yrs to a decision of the Secretary of Labor concerning PALs CBA with its employee-union. For his part, Almario denied the existence of any agreement with PAL that he would render service to it for three years after his training, failing which he would reimburse the training costs. The lower court ruled in favor of Almario. On appeal, CA found Almario liable under the CBA and under Article 22 of the Civil Code. Hence this appeal. ISSUE:

enjoyment, but also of non-payment of compensation for a prestation or service rendered to the defendant without intent to donate on the part of the plaintiff, or the failure to acquire something which the latter would have obtained. The injury to the plaintiff, however, need not be the cause of the enrichment of the defendant. It is enough that there be some relation between them, that the enrichment of the defendant would not have been produced had it not been for the fact from which the injury to the plaintiff is derived. In the present case, PAL invested for the training of Almario on the expectation that they may recover by availing of Almarios services for at least three years. This expectation was not fully realized, however, due to Almarios resignation after only eight months of service following the completion of his training course. He cannot, therefore, refuse to reimburse the costs of training without violating the principle of unjust enrichment. B. Duty to Bargain

HELD:

Whether or not Almario is obliged to reimburse the costs incurred by PAL for his training 1. Union of Filipino Employees vs Nestle (Meaning of Duty)

The petition fails. The rationale of the three-year period is the prohibitive training costs. At an earlier time, when the CBA between PAL and its employees were still negotiated, the Secretary of Labor basically ruled that PAL should be allowed a return on investment for their pilots training expenses. Thus, the provisions that pilots 57 years of age shall be frozen and pilots less than 57, provided they have previously qualified in any companys turbo-jet aircraft, shall be permitted to occupy any position in the companys turbo-jet fleet, were incorporated in later incarnations of the CBA. When Almario took the training course, he was about 39 yrs old, 21 yrs away from the retirement age of 60. Hence, with the maturity, expertise and experience he gained from the training course, he was expected to serve PAL for at least three yrs to offset the prohibitive costs thereof. Article 22 of the Civil Code applies. This provision on unjust enrichment recognizes the principle that one may not enrich himself at the expense of another. Enrichment of the defendant consists in every patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in money. It may consist of some positive pecuniary value incorporated into the patrimony of the defendant, such as: (1) the enjoyment of a thing belonging to the plaintiff; (2) the benefits from service rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant; (3) the acquisition of a right, whether real or personal; (4) the increase of value of property of the defendant; (5) the improvement of a right of the defendant, such as the acquisition of a right of preference; (6) the recognition of the existence of a right in the defendant; and (7) the improvement of the conditions of life of the defendant. The enrichment of the defendant must have a correlative prejudice, disadvantage, or injury to the plaintiff. This prejudice may consist, not only of the loss of property or the deprivation of its acts: Eugenia Nunez, Liza Villanueva, Emmanuel Villena, Rudolph Armas, Rodolfo Kua and Rodolfo Solidum were either employed as sales or medical representatives of Nestle Philippines. Said employees availed availed of the companys car loan policy. Nunez, Villena, Villanueva and Armas were dismissed for having participated in an illegal strike. Kua and Solidum were dismissed for certain irregularities. Said employees filed complaints for illegal dismissal in the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed their complaints and upheld their dismissal. They appealed to the NRLC where their appeals are pending. Meanwhile, the company filed a civil suit to recover possession of the cars subject of the car loan policy, after the dismissed employees failed and refused to either settle the remaining balance of the cost of their respective cars, or to return them to the company for proper disposition. The dismissed employees sought a temporary restraining order in the NLRC to stop the company from cancelling their car loans and collecting their monthly amortication pending the final resolution of their appeals in the illegal dismissal case. The NLRC en banc granted the petition for injunction. The company filed a petition for certiorari, alleging that the NLRC does not have jurisdiction over the issue in the absence of any labor dispute related to the same. The petition was granted by the Supreme Court, annulling the NLRC resolution in the petition for injunction. Issue: Whether there is labor dispute arising or related to the issue involving the car loan policy so as to provide the NLRC jurisdiction over the petition for injunction. Topic: Labor Dispute; Definition Held: [N] Labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. The power of the NLRC to issue writs of injunction, as found in Article 218 of the Labor Code, can only be exercised in a labor

dispute. Nestls demand for payment of the employees amortizations on their car loans, or, in the alternative, the return of the cars to the company, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves debtor-creditor relations, rather than employee-employer relations. Although the illegal dismissal case is still pending resolution before the NLRC, the terms of the car loan agreements are not in issue in the labor case. The rights and obligations of the parties under those contracts may be enforced by a separate civil action in the regular courts, not in the NLRC.

order compelling the respondent union to submit to grievance and arbitration the issue listed in the notice of strike; (3) the recovery of the expenses of litigation. NLRC dismissed complaint SC: In the case under consideration, the grounds relied upon by the private respondent union are non-strikeable. The issues which may lend substance to the notice of strike filed by the private respondent union are: collective bargaining deadlock and petitioner's alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement. These grounds, however, appear more illusory than real. Collective Bargaining Deadlock is defined as "the situation between the labor and the management of the company where there is failure in the collective bargaining negotiations resulting in a stalemate"11 This situation, is non-existent in the present case since there is a Board assigned on the third level (Step 3) of the grievance machinery to resolve the conflicting views of the parties. Instead of asking the Conciliation Board composed of five representatives each from the company and the union, to decide the conflict, petitioner declared a deadlock, and thereafter, filed a notice of strike. For failing to exhaust all the steps in the grievance machinery and arbitration proceedings provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the notice of strike should have been dismissed by the NLRC and private respondent union ordered to proceed with the grievance and arbitration proceedings. As regards the alleged violation of the CBA, we hold that such a violation is chargeable against the private respondent union. In abandoning the grievance proceedings and stubbornly refusing to avail of the remedies under the CBA. private respondent violated the mandatory provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Abolition of departments or positions in the company is one of the recognized management prerogatives. WHEREFORE, Petitioner San Miguel Corporation and private respondent San Miguel Corporation Employees Union PTGWO are hereby directed to complete the third level (Step 3) of the Grievance Procedure and proceed with the Arbitration proceedings if necessary.

2.

SMC vs NLRC (Deadlock)

Facts: San Miguel Cooperation, alleging the need to streamline its operations due to financial loses, shut down some of its plants and declared 55 positions as redundant listed as follows: seventeen (17) employees in the Business Logistics Division ("BLD"), seventeen (17) in the Ayala Operations Center (AOC), and eighteen (18) in the Magnolia-Manila Buying Station ("Magnolia-MBS") Respondent union filed several grievance cases for the said retrenched employees, praying for the redeployment of the said employees to the other divisions of the company. The grievance proceedings were conducted pursuant to Sections 5 and 8, Article VIII of the parties' 1990 Collective Bargaining Agreement During the grievance proceedings, however, most of the employees were redeployed, while others accepted early retirement. As a result only 17 employees remained when the parties proceeded to the third level (Step 3) of the grievance procedure. In a meeting on October 26, 1990, petitioner informed private respondent union that if by October 30, 1990, the remaining 17 employees could not yet be redeployed, their services would be terminated on November 2, 1990. The said meeting adjourned when Mr. Daniel S. L. Borbon II, a representative of the union, declared that there was nothing more to discuss in view of the deadlock. Union gave notice of strike based on: a) bargaining deadlock; b) union busting; c) gross violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such as non-compliance with the grievance procedure; d) failure to provide private respondent with a list of vacant positions pursuant to the parties side agreement that was appended to the 1990 CBA; and e) defiance of voluntary arbitration award SMC filed complaint with NLRC based on: : (1) the dismissal the notice of strike; (2) an

It is only the Tripartite Wage Productivity Board of (the) Department of Labor and Employment C. Bargainable Issues (DOLE) that could approve exemption (of) an establishment from coverage of (a) Wage Order . . . ISSUES: 1. WON the condonation of the implementation of Wage Order No. NCR-02 and 02-A contained in Sec. 3, Art. VIII, of the CBA was valid HELD: NO Reasoning A Collective Bargaining Agreement refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit, including Fashions, Inc., through its president, respondent Nonito Zamora, filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter on behalf of its one hundred and fifty (150) members who were regular employees of petitioner Manila Fashions, Inc. The complaint charged petitioner with non-compliance, with Wage Order No NCR-02 and 02-A mandating a P12-increase in wages effective 8 January 1991. As a result, complainants' basic pay, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, legal holiday pay, night shift differential and overtime pay were all underpaid Petitioner countered that the failure to comply with the pertinent Wage Order was brought about by the tremendous losses suffered by it which were aggravated when the workers staged a strike on account of the non-adjustment of their basic pay. To forestall continuous suspension/closure of business operations, which petitioner did for three (3) months, the strikers sent a notice that they were willing to condone the implementation of the increase. The condonation was distinctly stated in Sec. 3, Art. VIII, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) dated 4 February 1992, which was voluntarily entered into by the parties and representsa reasonable settlement The Union realizes the companys closeness to insolvency and, as such , sympathizes with the companyscondition. Therefore, the Union has agreed, as it hereby agrees, to condone the implementation of Wage Order o. NCR-02 and 02-A. The complainants admitted the existence of the aforementioned provision in the CBA; however they denied the validity thereof inasmuch as it was not reached after due consultation with the members. The Labor Arbiter sustained the claim that the subject provision of the CBA was void but based its conclusion on a different ground : . . . While it is true that both union officers/members and (petitioner) signed the agreement, however, the same is not enforceable since said agreement is null and void, it being contrary to law. Disposition Petition is dismissed 2. Standard Chartered Bank vs Confessor to a CBA may not by themselves, set a wage lower than the minimum wage. To do so would render nugatory the purpose of a wage exemption, not to mention the possibility that employees may be unwittinglyput in a position to accept a lower wage. The cases that petitioner relies on are simply inapplicable because, unlike the present case which involves a stipulation in the CBA in contravention of law, they are concerned with compromise settlements as a means to end labor disputes recognized by Art. 227 of the Labor Code and considered not against public policy by doctrinal rules established by this Court. If petitioner is a financially distressed company then it should have applied for a wage exemption so that it could meet its labor costs without endangering its viability or its very existence upon which both management and labor depend for a living. The Office of the Solicitor General emphasizes the point thatparties mandatory provisions for grievances and arbitration machineries. As in all other contracts, the parties in a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Section 3, Art. VIII, of the CBA is a void provision because by agreeing to condone the implementation of the Wage Order the parties thereby contravened its mandate on wage increase of P12.00 effective 8 January 1991. Also, as stated by the Labor Arbiter, it is only the Tripartite Wage Productivity Board of the DOLE that could approve exemption of an establishment from coverage of a Wage Order.

1.

Manila Fashions Inc vs NLRC

Manila Fashions, Inc. v. NLRC, 264 SCRA 104 (1996) FACTS: Respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Manila

Standard chartered bank-intl bank (resp) Standard chartered bank employee union ( petitioner ) exclusive bargaining agent of the bank file EES aug. 1990 the bank and the signed a 5 year CBA. With a provision to renegotiate on the 3rd year. rior expiration of the 3rd year, the union initiated the negotiation Feb 18, 1993 through its. Pre. Edie Divina Garcia union sent a letter containing its proposals covering political provisions. With the list of the members of the panel. Feb 24, 1993 petal harris, banks country manager, sent counter-proposal in non-economic provisions and also attached list of the member of its panel. Before commencement of the negotiation, union ( __ divina Garcia ) suggested to banks HR man. And head of negotiating panel ( diokno ), that bank lawyers should be excluded from the negotiating team. bank acceded. Diokno suggested that umali be excluded. (dube pres.) however umali was retained thereof. March 12, 1993 , parties met and set ground rules for the NEG. diokno suggested to keep it a family affair there were provisions in non-economic both parties did not agree both agree to put a notation of deferred/ deadlocked may 18, 1993 - NEG commenced - union suggested economic provi Next MTG. ___ made same presentation. Umali asked bank to validate unions guest mated and_____ banks insufficiency of counter proposal. June 19, 1993 union suggested that if bank wont make necessary changes it would seek 3rd party. bank made its revised counter- panel except for the signing bonus and uniform provisions of the CBA, both did not agree on the remaining economic provisions. June 21, 1993 union declared deadlocked and filed notice for strike Bank filed for ULP against the union charges: 1. violated its duty to bargain 2. violated no strike no lockout 3. ask for damage

Sec. labor and employment (SOLE) Assured jurisdiction and consolidated complaint Oct 29, 1993 sole released order dismissing cases against for both parties. And gave economic awards Both filed for motion for reco. SOLE denied both. March 22, 1994 both signed CBA April 28, 1994, union filed petition for certiorari Bank prayed for dismissal, that union was estopped as it signed the CBA SOL. GEN. suggested PFT. Be dismissed ISSUES 1. whether or not union was able to substantiate its claim of ULP from banks alleged interference surface bargaining making bad faith proposals and refusal to furnish relevant data a. interference suggestion made by diokno not anti-union b. surface bargaining can be seen in the totality of____ not present. Moreover duty to bargain doest not compel either part to agree or make a concession. c. Bad faith provisions no basis. Many were to be retained d. Refusal to furnish data (guest mates) union did not put into written as required by labor law. 2. grave abuse of SOLE part. no merit. No showing acted in capricious or arbitrarily. Even if public interest is not a requisite in ULP. 3. union being estopped from filling suit/ ILP when it signed CBA. approval of __ doesnt mean union waived its ULP claim against the bank during the pas negotiations. 4. union engaged in blue-sky bargaining bank failed to prove that proposals by the union were exaggerated and

The wages of 17 probationary employees were increased according to the WO. On various unreasonable. DISPO January 2001 TSPIC implemented the CBA-mandated salary increase. As a result, nine Decision Affirmed. Petition Dismissed. D. Collective Bargaining Agreement regular employees (respondents) received less wages. TSPIC's HR Department notified 24 employees that due to an error in the automated payroll system, they were overpaid and the overpayment would be deducted from their salaries in a TSPI Corp vs TSPI Corp Employees Union (Definition) staggered basis, starting February 2001. TSPIC explained that the correction of the erroneous computation was based on the crediting provision of the CBA. Facts: TSPIC is engaged in the business of designing, manufacturing and marketing integrated circuits to serve the communication, automotive, data processing and aerospace industries. TSPIC Employees Union is the registered bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of TSPIC. TSPIC and the Union entered into a CBA for the years 2000 to 2004, which included a provision on yearly salary increases starting January 2000 until January 2002 for regular employees within the bargaining unit as such: 10% on 1 January 2000, 12% 1 January 2001 and 11% on 1 January 2002. The same provision also states that the wage/salary increases for the years 2001 and 2002 shall be deemed inclusive of the mandated minimum wage increases under future Wage Orders that may be issued after Wage Order No. 7, and shall be considered as correction of any wage distortion that may have been brought about by the said future Wage Orders. The CBA also provided that employees who acquire regular employment status within the year but after the effectivity of a particular salary increase shall receive a proportionate part of the increase: (1st quarter: 100%; 2nd quarter: 75%; 3rd quarter: 50%; 4th quarter: 25%) 1 January 2000 all regular rank-and-file employees received a 10% increase in their salary, including nine of the respondents. 6 October 2000 Wage Order No. 8 was issued raising the daily minimum wage from 223.50 to 250 effective 1 November 2000. Held: No. The CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions. If the terms of a contract, as in a CBA, are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of their stipulations shall control. Sometimes, though the provisions of the CBA seem clear and unambiguous, the parties sometimes arrive at conflicting interpretations. Here, TSPIC wants to credit the increase granted by WO No. 8 to the increase granted under the CBA. The Union, on the other hand, insists that the crediting provision finds no application in the present case, since at the time WO No. 8 was issued, the probationary employees were not yet covered by the CBA, particularly by its crediting Issue: Does the TSPIC's decision to deduct the alleged overpayment from the salaries of the affected members of the Union constitute diminution of benefits in violation of the Labor Code? The Union asserted that this constituted diminution of pay. TSPIC and the Union agreed to undergo voluntary arbitration on the solitary issue of whether or not the acts of the management in making deductions from the salaries of the affected employees constituted diminution of pay. Arbitrator Jimenez held that the unilateral deduction made by TSPIC violated Art. 100 of the Labor Code. The CA affirmed this decision. dates during the last quarter of 2000, these 17 employees attained regular employment and received 25% of 10% of their salaries.

1.

provision. The CBA states the specific condition that the wage/salary increases for the years 2001 and 2002 shall be deemed inclusive of the mandated minimum wage increases under future wage orders that may be issued after WO No. 7, and shall be considered as correction of the wage distortions that may be brought about by the said future wage orders. Thus, the wage/salary increases in 2001 and 2002 shall be deemed as compliance to future wage orders after WO No. 7. The intention of the parties is clear: As long as an employee is qualified to receive the 12% increase in salary, the employee shall be granted the 12% increase; and as long as an employee is granted the 12% increase, the amount shall be credited against any wage order issued after WO No. 7. Respondents should not be allowed to receive benefits from the CBA while avoiding the counterpart crediting provision

of PAL.After several negotiations a the questioned PAL- PALEA Agreement which provided for among others the suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA for a period of ten (10) years, provided the certain safeguards are in place. Issue WON the PAL-PALEA agreement stipulating the suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA unconstitutional and contrary to public policy Held: No. A CBA is a contract executed upon request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining representative incorporating the agreement reached after negotiations with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment, including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement. The primary purpose of a CBA is the stabilization of labor- management relations in order to create a climate of a sound and stable industrial peace. In construing a CBA, the courts must be practical and realistic and give due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose which it is intended to serve. The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary collective bargaining negotiations undertaken in the light of the severe financial situation faced by the employer, with the

2.

Rivera vs Espiritu (Contract Duration and Renewal)

Facts: As a result of a three week strike staged by PAL pilots affiliated with the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) PAL which was already financially beleaguered suffered serious losses, PALs financial situation went from bad to worse. Faced with bankruptcy, PAL adopted a rehabilitation plan and downsized its labor force by more than one-third. In protest to such action PALEA went on strike which when PAL and PALEA agreed to a more systematic reduction in PALs work force and the payment of separation benefits to all retrenched employees. President Estrada thru AO 16 created an Inter-Agency Task Force to address the problems of PAL. PAL management submitted to the Task Force an offer by Lucio Tan, Chairman a plan to transfer shares of stock to its employees which has a provision regarding the suspension of the Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) for 10 years. PALEA Members rejected the offer.Subsequently, PAL informed the Task Force that it was shutting down its operations because given its labor problems, rehabilitation was no longer feasible, and hence, the airline had no alternative but to close shop. PALEA sought the intervention of the Office of the President in immediately convening the parties, the PAL management, PALEA, ALPAP, and FASAP, including the SEC under the direction of the Inter-Agency Task Force, to prevent the imminent closure

peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting industrial peace at PAL, but preventing the latters closure. We find no conflict between said agreement and Article 253-A of the Labor Code. Article 253-A has a two-fold purpose. One is to promote industrial stability and predictability. Inasmuch as the agreement sought to promote industrial peace at PAL during its rehabilitation, said agreement satisfies the first purpose of Article 253-A. The other is to assign specific timetables wherein negotiations become a matter of right and requirement. Nothing in Article 253-A, prohibits the parties from waiving or suspending the mandatory timetables and agreeing on the remedies to enforce the same. In the instant case, it was PALEA, as the exclusive bargaining agent of PALs ground employees, that voluntarily entered into the CBA with PAL. It was also PALEA that voluntarily opted for the 10-year suspension of the CBA. Either case was the unions exercise of its right to collective bargaining. The right to free collective bargaining, after all, includes the right to suspend it.

The acts of public respondents in sanctioning the 10-year suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA did not contravene the protection to labor policy of the Constitution. The agreement afforded full protection to labor; promoted the shared responsibility between workers and employers; and the exercised voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation to foster industrial peace." Disposition petition is DISMISSED. 3. United Kimberly vs Kimberly-Clark (Interpretation, Administration, Enforcemenet) United Kimberly Clark Employees Union-PTGWO v. Kimberly Clark Phil., G.R. No. 162957, March 6, 2006 FACTS: Petitioner is the labor union representing rank and file employees of respondent. Way back in 1980, the parties agreed o include in their CBA a provision which states that the company agrees to employ immediate relative of an employee who had retired, resigned, died provided that the employee had rendered at least ten years service. There were no other standards set with regard the acceptance of the said recommendees and as a matter of fact, even high school graduates were accepted. In 1991, a case was filed against the company for refusing to employ a nephew of a retiring employee (Kimberly Clark vs Lorredo) as apparently the retiring employee had children who he did not recommend and the company was questioning this. In any case, the company lost in this case but as part of the ruling of the Court, it was stated that Kimberly was not obliged to unconditionally accept the recommendee since the latter must still meet the required employment standard theretofore set by it. Even a qualified recommendee would be hired only on a probationary status. As such, KCPI was not left without its own safeguards under the agreement. In 1995, the company issued the now questioned guidelines which among others required that such recommendees must be at least 18 years of age but not more than 30 years old at the time of the hiring, and (b) have completed, after graduating from high school, at least a two- year technical/vocational course or a third year level of college education. Moreover, where both husband and wife are employees of the company, they shall be treated as one family; hence, only one of the spouses would be allowed to avail of the benefit. The Union and the company agreed to postpone the implementation of said guidelines until January 1, 1997 but only with respect to the educational qualification. And the guidelines were in fact implemented in the

second half of 1998. A voluntary arbitrator ruled on the controversy saying that the company cannot upgrade the educational qualification as this is contrary to what has been in existence and what had been a practice. Appeal was filed with the CA which reversed the resolution of the voluntary arbitrator with regard the upgrade of the qualification of the recommendee. Hence this appeal. ISSUE: WON the CA erred in ruling that, under Article XX, Section 1 of the 1997 CBA, respondent is required to hire only those recommendees of retired/resigned, deceased or disabled members of petitioner who had completed at least a two-year

HELD: NO. In the present case, the parties are in agreement that, on its face, Article XX, Section 1 of their 1997 CBA does not contain any provision relative to the employment qualification standards of recommendees of retired/resigned, deceased or disabled employees of respondent who are members of petitioner. However, in determining the employment qualification standards for said recommendees, the VA should have relied on the November 7, 1995 Guidelines issued by respondent, which reads: D. Definition of the phrase immediate member of the family of an employee 1. The phrase immediate member of the family of an employee shall refer to the employees legitimate children and in default thereof to the employees collateral relatives within the third civil degree. 2. A resigned/retired employee may be allowed to recommend a collateral relative within the third civil degree (e.g., brother, sister, nephew or niece) as his/her replacement only in the following cases: a. Where the retired/resigned employee is single or if married has no legitimate children. b. Where the retired/resigned employees children are still minors (below 18 years old) at the time of his/her separation from the company. (Emphasis added)

E. General Provisions 1. The privilege to recommend a replacement can be exercised by the employee concerned only once. Thus, in the following cases, a recommendee who has been hired on probationary status can no longer be substituted with another recommendee. a. where the recommendee fails to pass in his performance evaluation. b. where the recommendee resigns without completing his probationary period. c. where the recommendee is dismissed for cause. d. where the recommendee dies during his probationary period.1 [48] Respondent issued said Guidelines in light of the ruling of this Court in Kimberly Clark Philippines v. Lorredo. Respondent saw it imperative to do away with its practice of accommodating ecommendees who were mere high school graduates, and to require higher employment standards for them. By agreement of the parties, the implementation of the Guidelines was deferred until January 1, 1997, unless revoked or amended by the 1997 CBA. Petitioner proposed that the practice of hiring recommendees of retired/resigned, deceased or disabled employees who were union members, who were at least high school graduates, be included in their CBA, but respondent did not agree. Hence, Article XX, Section 1 of the 1997 CBA of the parties remained intact. There was thus no more legal bar for respondent to implement the November 7, 1995 Guidelines. By executing the 1997 CBA, in its present form, petitioner is bound by the terms and conditions therein set forth. The Court has recognized in numerous instances the undoubted right of the employer to regulate, according to his own discretion and best judgment, all aspects of employment, including but not limited to, work assignments and supervision, working methods and regulations, time, place and manner of work, processes to be followed, and hiring, supervision, transfer, discipline, lay off, dismissal and recall of workers. Encompassing though it could be, the exercise of this right is not absolute. Management prerogative must be exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employers interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws, valid agreements such as the individual contract of employment and the collective bargaining agreement, and general principles of justice and fair play.2[49] Disposition Petition is denied

In this case, the Court finds that respondent acted in accord with the CBA and the November 7, 1995 Guidelines, which, by agreement of the parties, may be implemented by respondent after January 1, 1997.

4. University of San Agustin Employees Union vs Court of Appeals Case Digest (Grievance Machinery/Voluntary Arbitration)

This is a case between the University of San Agustin Employees Union-FFW (UNION) and The University of San Agustin (UNIV). Sometime on 2000, the parties agreed on a 5-year CBA, the economic provisions of which are effective for 3 years only. After the lapse of 3 years, the parties negotiated on the economic provisions but did not agree on the terms during the remaining 2 years of the CBA and beyond. Since the parties did not agree on the computation of tuition incremental proceeds (TIP) which shall be the basis for the increase of salaries, they underwent a preventive mediation proceedings at the NCMB. Still unresolved, the Union declared a bargaining deadlock and thereafter filed a Notice of Strike at the NCMB, which was expectedly opposed by the Univ through a Motion to Strike-out Notice of Strike and Refer the Dispute to Voluntary Arbitration, since the CBA contained a "no-strike, nolockout" provision, and a grievance machinery for settling disputes, including a voluntary arbitration mechanism should the grievance machinery fail to settle the dispute. The NCMB, however, failed to resolved the Univ's Motion Thereafter, both parties made a joint request for the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On September 18, 2003, he SOLE assumed jurisdication, and with such assumption of jurisdiction, any strike or lockout was strictly enjoined. The day after the SOLE assumed jurisdiction, and on the same day that the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order (AJO) was supposedly served to both parties, the Union staged a strike. Union members refused to receive a copy of the AJO assailing that only the Union President is authorized to receive the same. The Union filed a Petition Declare Illegal Strike and Loss of Employment Status of the striking employees, which Petition was filed at the NLRC. Such Petition was later on consolidated with the case pending before the SOLE, at the request of the Univ. The SOLE rendered a Decision resolving the various economic issues over which the parties had a deadlock in the collective bargaining, and likewise dismissed the Petition to Declare Illegal Strike. The University elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals after its Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the SOLE.

The Court of Appeals partially granted the Petition. It declared the strike as illegal, but affirmed the SOLE's decision regarding the economic issues. Both the Univ and the Union filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration. Basing on the CA's decision, on April 7, 2005, the Univ served the striking employees with their notices for termination and concurrently, the Union filed with the NCMB a second notice of strike, this time on ground of alleged union busting. On April 22, 2005, the parties again took initial steps to negotiate the new CBA but said attempts proved futile. Hence, on April 25, 2005, the Union went on strike. In reaction, the University notified the Union that it was pulling out of the negotiations because of the strike. On August 23, 2005, the CA, acting on the parties' respective motions for reconsideration, promulgated the herein challenged Partially Amended Decision. Finding merit in the respondent University's motion for partial reconsideration, the CA ruled that the SOLE abused its discretion in resolving the economic issues on the ground that said issues were proper subject of the grievance machinery as embodied in the parties' CBA. Consequently, the CA directed the parties to refer the economic issues of the CBA to voluntary arbitration. The CA, however, stood firm in its finding that the strike conducted by the petitioner Union was illegal and its officers were deemed to have lost their employment status.

Voluntary Arbitrator, as provided in Art. 261 and 262 of the Labor Code. The peculiar facts of the instant case show that the University was deprived of a remedy that would have enjoined the Union strike and was left without any recourse except to invoke the jurisdiction of the SOLE.

Thus, the Union and its dismissed officers file this Petition to the Supreme Court, on the following issues: 1. 2. Whether or not the strike was illegal and the Union Officers deemed to have lost their employment status on their failure to return to work immediately upon the service of AJO issued by the SOLE. Whether or not the economic provisions of the CBA should be referred to Voluntary Arbitration. Supreme Court resolved the foregoing issues as follows:

The

On the first issue, the SC ruled that ART. 263 of the Labor Code provides: . "..Such assumption or certification (of the SOLE) shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout." The phrase "immediately return to work" indicates an almost instantaneous or automatic compliance for a striker to return to work once an AJO has been duly served. Therefore, the act of the striking employees is violative of the foregoing provision. On the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled that economic benefits, which included the issue on the formula in computing the TIP share of the employees, is one that arises from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA, and these matters should be referred to a