A.C. No. 5333 October 18, 2000 ROSA YAP PARAS vs.

JUSTO DE JESUS PARAS THIRD DIVISION [A.C. No. 5333. October 18, 2000.] (A.C. No. CBD 371) ROSA YAP PARAS, complainant, vs. ATTY. JUSTO DE JESUS PARAS, respondent. Angara Abello Concepcion Regala & Cruz for complainant. SYNOPSIS A disbarment case was filed by Rosa Y. Paras against her husband, Atty. Justo de Jesus Paras, charging the latter for forging her signatures in the bank in loan documents and for immorality for siring a child with another woman. After the parties submitted their pleadings and other pieces of evidence, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP found respondent guilty as charged and recommended his suspension from the practice of law. The Supreme Court upheld the findings and recommendations of the CBD, finding the evidence against the respondent overwhelming. Continued possession of good moral character is essential to remain in the practice of law. Disbarment, however, should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the desired end. SYLLABUS 1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; PRACTICE OF LAW; REQUIRES CONTINUED POSSESSION OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER; CASE AT BAR. It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law (People vs. Tunda, 181 SCRA 692 [1990]; Leda vs. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]). In the case at hand, respondent has fallen below the moral bar when he forged his wife's signature in the bank loan documents, and, sired a daughter with a woman other than his wife. IaSCTE 2. ID.; ID.; DISBARMENT; DECREED ONLY IN A SERIOUS CASE OF MISCONDUCT. However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar (Tapucar vs. Tapucar, Adm. Case No. 4148, July 30, 1998). Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired (Resurrecion vs. Sayson, 300 SCRA 129 [1998]). DECISION MELO, J p: This has reference to a case for disbarment initiated by complainant Rosa Yap Paras against her husband, Atty. Justo de Jesus Paras. The parties exchanged tirades and barbs in their copious pleadings, hurling invectives, cutting remarks, and insults at each other. Reduced to its essentials, Rosa Paras charged her husband with dishonesty and falsification of public documents, harassment and intimidation, and immorality for siring a child with another woman. Respondent denied the allegations, contending that his wife, in cahoots with her family, is out to destroy and strip him of his share in their multi-million peso conjugal assets. The parties come from wealthy families in Negros Oriental. They were married on May 21, 1964 and have two grown-up children. They have vast sugarlands and other 1

businesses. Respondent was a Municipal Judge for 14 years and served as Mayor in their town for 2 terms during the administration of President Aquino. Complainant is a businesswoman. Sometime in 1988, their marriage fell apart, when due to "marital strain that has developed through the years," respondent left his wife and children to live with his mother and sister in Dumaguete City and thence started his law practice. Complainant, in the meantime, filed a case for the dissolution of their marriage, which case is still pending in court. The complaint charged: DISHONESTY, FALSIFICATION and FRAUD . . . respondent obtained loans from certain banks in the name of complainant by counterfeiting complainant's signature, falsely making it appear that complainant was the applicant for said loans. Thereafter, he carted away and misappropriated the proceeds of the loans. . . . to guarantee the above loans, respondent mortgaged some personal properties belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of complainant. GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT AND CONCUBINAGE Respondent is . . . engaged in the immoral and criminal act of concubinage as he maintained an illicit relationship with one Ms. Jocelyn A. Ching, siring an illegitimate child with her while married to complainant. UNETHICAL AND UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Respondent abused courts of justice and misused his legal skills to frighten, harass and intimidate all those who take a position diametrically adverse to his sinister plans by unethically filing complaints and other pleadings against them. He utilized strategies to obstruct justice. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE (Respondent) utilized strategies to obstruct justice. In the criminal actions initiated against him, respondent used his legal skills not to prove his innocence but to derail all the proceedings. (Complaint, Rollo, p. 2) In his Answer, respondent interposed the following defenses: (1) On the Charge of Falsification of Public Documents: That during the sugarboom in the 1970's, his wife executed in his favor a Special Power of Attorney to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan authorizing him "to borrow money and apply for and secure any agricultural or crop loan for sugar cane from the Bais Rural Bank, Bais City . . ." (Rollo, Annex "3", p. 262) (2) On the Charge of Forgery: That the Report of the National Bureau of Investigation which found that "the questioned signatures (referring to the alleged forged signatures of complainant) and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were written by one and the same person. . ."(Annex "B" of the Complaint, Rollo, p. 26) was doctored, and that his wife filed against him a string of cases for falsification of public documents because he intends to disinherit his children and bequeath his inchoate share in the conjugal properties to his own mother. (3) On the Charge of Grossly Immoral Conduct and Concubinage: That this is a malicious accusation fabricated by his brother-in-law, Atty. Francisco D. Yap to disqualify him from getting any share in the conjugal assets. He cites the dismissal of the complaint for concubinage filed against him by his wife before the City Prosecutor of Negros Oriental as proof of his innocence. Respondent, however, admits that he, his mother and sister, are solicitous and hospitable to his alleged concubine, Ms. Jocelyn Ching, and her daughter, Cyndee Rose (named after his own deceased daughter), by allowing them to stay in their house 2

and giving them some financial assistance, because they pity Ms. Ching, a secretary in his law office, who was deserted by her boyfriend after getting her pregnant. (4) On the Charge of Obstruction of Justice: That "the legal remedies pursued by (him) in defense and offense are legitimate courses of action done by an embattled lawyer." The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines investigated the complaint against respondent, summarizing the causes of action as follows: (1) Falsification of complainant's signature and misuse of conjugal assets; and (2) Immorality and criminal acts of concubinage with one Ms. Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching (for) siring an illegitimate child with her while married to complainant, and, abandonment of his own family. (Rollo, Report of the IBP, p. 34) No actual hearing was conducted as the parties agreed to merely submit their respective memoranda, depositions, and other pieces of evidence attached to their pleadings. Thereafter, the CBD found respondent guilty as charged and recommended: (1) Respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months on the first charge; and (2) Respondent's indefinite suspension from the practice of law on the second charge. (ibid., p. 57) The CBD held that the dismissal of the criminal cases against respondent for falsification and use of falsified documents (Criminal Case No. 11768) and for concubinage (I.S. No. 93-578) will not bar the filing of an administrative case for disbarment against him. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for conviction, while in an administrative complaint, only a preponderance of evidence is necessary. The CBD gave credence to the NBI Report that "the questioned signatures (referring to the signatures appearing in the loan agreements, contracts of mortgage, etc.) and the standard sample signatures of respondent were written by one and the same person." This affirms the allegation of complainant Rosa Yap Paras that her husband forged her signatures in those instruments. Respondent denies this but his denial was unsubstantiated and is, therefore, self-serving. In finding respondent liable for Immorality, the CBD relied heavily on the uncontroverted sworn affidavit-statements of respondent's children and three other eyewitnesses to respondent's illicit affair with Ms. Jocelyn Ching. For a better appreciation of their statements, their affidavits are hereby reproduced in full. Thusly, "I, DAHLIA Y. PARAS, of legal age, single, resident of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, but presently living in Dumaguete City, after being duly sworn hereby depose and say: 1. I am a nurse by profession. I finished my BSN degree at the College of Nursing, Silliman University. 2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras and my father Justo J. Paras. My father has left the family home in Bindoy and now lives at his mother's house at San Jose Ext., Dumaguete City. 3. My father has a "kabit" or concubine by the name of Ma. Jocelyn Ching. They have a child named Cyndee Rose, who was delivered at the Silliman University Hospital Medical Center on July 19, 1990. 4. Jocelyn used to be the secretary of my father and Atty. Melchor Arboleda when they practice law together in 1988 to 1989. Their relationship started in 1989. When she became pregnant, my father rented an apartment for her at the Amigo Subdivision, Dumaguete City. 3

5. Following delivery of the baby, my father built a house for Jocelyn in Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental. My father spend time there often with Jocelyn and their child. 6. I used to visit my father at San Jose Extension these past years, and almost every time I was there, I would see Jocelyn, sitting, watching TV, serving coffee in my father's law office, and one time, she was washing my father's clothes. 7. I first saw their child Cyndee Rose in 1992, about early May, at San Jose Extension. I was there to ask for my allowance. He was there at the time, and when I looked at Cyndee Rose closely, I became convinced that she was my father's daughter with Jocelyn. 8. Incidentally, I had an elder sister also named Cindy Rose (now deceased). 9. In September 1992 when I went to visit my father, I saw toys and child's clothes in my father's room. 10. Whenever, I saw Jocelyn at San Jose Extension, I wanted to talk to her or be alone with her, but she would deliberately avoid me. I could see that she was hiding something from me." p. 109, Records. SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 1. . . . sometime during the period of April-September, 1992, I made several visits to my father at his mother's house in San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City, where he had moved after he left our home in Bindoy; 2. That these visits were made on different times and different days of the week; 3. That most of my visits, I would meet a woman who was also living at my father's place. This woman is now known to me to be Ma. Jocelyn Ching; 4. That my basis for observing that Ms. Ching was living in my father's house is that during my visits, whether during office hours or after office hours, I would meet her at my father's place, not his office; she was wearing house clothes and slippers, such as skimpy clothes, shorts and T-shirt, not street or office clothes; she was generally unkempt, not made up for work or going out; on one occasion, I even saw her, washing my father's clothes as well as a small child's clothing; and she conducted herself around the house in the manner of someone who lived there; cIHDaE 5. That on one of my visits, I confirmed that Ms. Ching was living with my father from Josie Vailoces, who was then a working student living at my father's place; 6. Ms. Vailoces subsequently confirmed under oath the fact that my father and Ms. Jocelyn Ching were living together as husband and wife at my father's place in a deposition taken in connection with Civil Case No. 10613, RTC-Dumaguete City, Branch 30, the Honorable Enrique C. Garovillo, presiding. A copy of the transcript of the deposition of Ms. Vailoces is already part of the record of this case. For emphasis, photocopies of the pertinent portion of the written deposition of Josie Vailoces is hereto attached as Annexes "A" and "A-1". p. 111, Records Respondent's son has this to say: "I, RHOUEL Y. PARAS, 15 years old, single, resident of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, but presently living in Dumaguete City, after being duly sworn according to law, depose and say: 1. I am a high school student at the Holy Cross High School, Dumaguete City. 2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras, and my father Justo J. Paras, a lawyer. 3. My father has left our home in Bindoy, and now lives at his mother's house in San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City. He is not giving us support any more. 4. However, from October 1991 to December 1992, I was getting my allowance of P50.00 a week. I would go to their house at San Jose Extension and personally ask him for it. 5. In October 1992, between 11:30 AM and 1:00 PM, I went to San Jose Extension for my weekly allowance. I asked Josephus, an adopted son of my father's sister, if my father was around. Josephus said my father was in his room.

6. So I went direct to his room and because the door was not locked, I entered the room without knocking. There I saw my father lying in bed side by side with a woman. He was only wearing a brief. The woman was wearing shorts and T-shirt. 7. They both appeared scared upon seeing me. My father hurriedly gave me P100.00 and I left immediately because I felt bad and embarrassed. 8. Before that incident, I used to see the woman at my father's house in San Jose Extension. Every time I went to see my father, she was also there. 9. I later came to know that she was Ms. Jocelyn Ching, and that she was my father's "kabit" or concubine. 10. I am no longer getting my weekly allowance from my father." p. 112, Records Added to the foregoing sworn statements of respondent's children is the damaging statement under oath of Virgilio Kabrisante who was respondent's secretary when respondent was mayor of Bindoy, Negros Oriental which reads as follows: "I, VIRGILIO V. KABRISANTE, of legal age, married, Filipino, a resident of Malaga, Bindoy, Negros Oriental, after having been sworn in accordance with law, do hereby depose and state that: 1. I personally know Justo J. Paras, having been his secretary during his incumbency as Mayor of Bindoy, Negros Oriental. In fact, through the latter's recommendation and intercession, I was later on appointed as OIC Mayor of the same town from December 1986 to January 1987. 2. When Justo J. Paras decided to practice law in Dumaguete City, I became his personal aide and performed various chores for the same. As his personal aide, I stayed in the same house and room with the latter. 3. Sometime in January 1989, Justo J. Paras confided to me that he felt attracted to my lady friend named Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching. He then requested me to invite the latter to a dinner date at Chin Loong Restaurant. 4. Conveying the invitation which was accepted by Ma. Jocelyn Ching, the latter, Justo J. Paras and myself then had dinner at the above-mentioned restaurant. 5. At the behest of Justo J. Paras, I invited Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching, on several occasions, always to a picnic at a beach in Dauin, Negros Oriental. Said invitations were always accepted by the latter. 6. At each of the above-mentioned picnics, I observed that Justo J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching had become more and more intimate with each other. 7. Sometime in March 1989, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening on a Friday, I accompanied Justo J. Paras to the area in front of the Silliman University Medical Center, where he said he was going to meet someone. 8. After waiting for a few minutes, Ma. Jocelyn Ching arrived and immediately boarded at the back seat of the Sakbayan vehicle I was driving for Justo J. Paras. The latter then requested me to drive both of them (Justo Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching) to Honeybee Motel somewhere in Sibulan, Negros Oriental. 9. When we arrived there, Justo J. Paras asked me to wait for them outside the room, while he and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching entered the said room. 10. I waited outside the room for about two (2) hours after which the two of them emerged from the room. We then proceeded to Chin Loong to eat supper. 11. After eating supper, we dropped Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching off in front of the Dumaguete City Cockpit. 12. This meeting was repeated two more times, at the same place and always on a Friday. 13. On April 3, 1988, I went home to Bindoy and stopped working for Justo Paras." pp. 56-57, Records. SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 1. Sometime in May 1989, I returned to Dumaguete City to look for a job, having been jobless since I left Dumaguete City to go home to Bindoy, Negros Oriental. 2. While looking for a job, I stayed at the house where my friend, Bernard Dejillo was staying at Mangnao, Dumaguete City. My friend Bernard Dejillo was occupying a room at the second floor of the said house which he shared with me. 5

3. Sometime in the last week of May 1989, in the course of my job hunting, I met Justo J. Paras. Having not seen each other for some time, we talked for a while, discussing matters about the barangay elections in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. EDACSa 4. When our discussion was finished, Justo J. Paras asked me where I was staying, to which I answered that I was staying at the aforementioned house. He then requested me to find out if there was an available room at the said house which he could rent with Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching. I told him that I would have to ask my friend Bernard Dejillo about the matter. 5. When I arrived at the house that evening, I asked my friend Bernard Dejillo about the matter, to which the latter signified his approval. He told me that a room at the first floor of the same house was available for rental to Justo Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching. 6. The next day, I immediately informed Justo J. Paras of Bernard Dejillo's approval of his request. 7. Sometime in the first week of June 1989, Ma. Jocelyn Ching moved in to the room she had rented at the first floor of the house I was also staying at. 8. Almost every night thereafter, Justo J. Paras would come to the house and stay overnight. When he came at night Justo J. Paras and I would converse and while conversing, drink a bottle of Tanduay Rum. Oftentimes, Ma. Jocelyn Ching would join in our conversation. 9. After we finish drinking and talking, Justo J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn Ching would enter the room rented and sleep there, while I would also go upstairs to my room. 10. The next morning I could always observe Justo J. Paras came out of said room and depart from the house. 11. The coming of Justo J. Paras to the house I was staying ceased after about one (1) month when they transferred to another house. 12. I myself left the house and returned to Bindoy, Negros Oriental some time in June 1989. 13. Sometime in January 1993, on a Saturday at about noontime, I went to the house of Justo J. Paras to consult him about a Kabataang Barangay matter involving my son. When I arrived at his house, I noticed that the same was closed and there was no one there. 14. Needing to consult him about the above-mentioned matter, I proceeded to the resthouse of Justo J. Paras located at Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental. 15. When I arrived at the said resthouse, Justo J. Paras was not there but the person in charge of the said resthouse informed me that Justo J. Paras was at his house at Barangay Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental. The same person also gave me directions so that I could locate the house of Justo J. Paras he referred to earlier. 16. With the help of the directions given by said person, I was able to locate the house of Justo J. Paras. 17. At the doorway of the said house, I called out if anybody was home while knocking on the door. 18. After a few seconds, Ma. Jocelyn Ching opened the door. Upon seeing the latter, I asked her if Justo J. Paras was home. She then let me in the house and told me to sit down and wait for a while. She then proceeded to a room. 19. A few minutes later, Justo J. Paras came out of the same room and sat down near me. I noticed that the latter had just woke up from a nap. 20. We then started to talk about the matter involving my son and sometime later, Ma. Jocelyn Ching served us coffee. 21. While we were talking and drinking coffee I saw a little girl, about three (3) years old, walking around the sala, whom I later came to know as Cyndee Rose, the daughter of Justo J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn Ching. 22. After our conversation was finished, Justo J. Paras told me to see him at this office at San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City, the following Monday to discuss the matter some more. 23. I then bid them goodbye and went home to Bindoy, Negros Oriental.

24. I am executing this affidavit as a supplement to my affidavit dated 22 July 1993." pp. 58-60, Records (Ibid., pp. 44-52) The CBD likewise gave credence to the sworn affidavits and the deposition of two other witnesses, namely, Salvador de Jesus, a former repairman of the Paras' household, and, Josie Vailoces, a working student and former ward of the Paras' family, who both gave personal accounts of the illicit relationship between respondent and Jocelyn Ching, which led to the birth of Cyndee Rose. De Jesus swore that while doing repair works in the Paras' household he observed Ms. Ching and Cyndee Rose practically living in the Paras' house (p. 85, Rollo, Annex "H"). Vailoces, on the other hand, deposed that she was asked by respondent Paras to deliver money to Ms. Ching for the payment of the hospital bill after she gave birth to Cyndee Rose. Vailoces was also asked by respondent to procure Cyndee Rose Paras' baptismal certificate after the latter was baptized in the house of respondent; she further testified that in said baptismal certificate, respondent appears as the father of Cyndee Rose which explains why the latter is using the surname "Paras." (p. 87, Annex "1", Rollo) The findings and the recommendations of the CBD are substantiated by the evidentiary record. ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANT'S SIGNATURE The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation on the signatures of complainant Rosa Yap Paras and respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis-avis the questioned signature "Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the questioned bank loan documents, contracts of mortgage and other related instrument, yielded the following results: CONCLUSION: 1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were written by one and the same person. 2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA YAP PARAS were not written by one and the same person. (Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, italics ours;) The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent forged the signatures of complainant. However, an analysis of the above findings lead to no other conclusion than that the questioned or falsified signatures of complainant Rosa Y. Paras were authored by respondent as said falsified signatures were the same as the sample signatures of respondent. To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by complainant to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural Bank of Bais City. Instead of exculpating respondent, the presence of the SPA places him in hot water. For if he was so authorized to obtain loans from the banks, then why did he have to falsify his wife's signatures in the bank loan documents? The purpose of an SPA is to especially authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign for and on behalf of the principal using his own name. ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit statements of his children and three other persons who used to work with him and have witnessed the acts indicative of his infidelity more than satisfy this Court that respondent has strayed from the marital path. The baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose Paras where respondent was named as the father of the child (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his naming the child after his deceased first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn 7

Ching and the child to live in their house in Dumaguete City bolster the allegation that respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms. Ching, the mother of his illegitimate child. It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law (People vs. Tunda, 181 SCRA 692 [1990]; Leda vs. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]). In the case at hand, respondent has fallen below the moral bar when he forged his wife's signature in the bank loan documents, and, sired a daughter with a woman other than his wife. However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar (Tapucar vs. Tapucar, Adm. Case No. 4148, July 30, 1998). Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired (Resurrecion vs. Sayson, 300 SCRA 129 [1998]). In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wife's signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family, the penalties to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this decision be spread in respondent's record as an attorney, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned. SO ORDERED. Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. THIRD DIVISION [A.C. No. 4947. February 14, 2005.] ROSA YAP-PARAS, petitioner, vs. ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, respondent. RESOLUTION GARCIA, J p: Before us is this verified Petition 1 filed by Rosa Yap-Paras praying for the disbarment of her estranged husband Atty. Justo Paras on alleged acts of deceit, malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. On 18 January 1989, respondent filed his comment 2 to the Petition. In a Resolution dated 10 February 1999, 3 the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The background facts are summarized in a Report and Recommendation dated 13 January 2004 4 of Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, which Report reads in part, as follows: "Complainant alleged that on February 9, 1965 the children of Ledesma de Jesus Paras-Sumabong namely Conegunda, Justo, Corazon, Carmen and Cataluna all surnamed Paras executed a Special Power of Attorney prepared by the respondent to sell parcels of land located in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental giving authority to their mother to sell the subject real properties previously registered in the name of the heirs of Vicente Paras wherein respondent was one of the signatories therein. prLL Complainant alleged that on May 4, 1966 on the basis of said Special Power of Attorney, Ledesma J. Paras-Sumabang executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Aurora Dy-Yap over the subject real property located in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental which was with the respondent's full knowledge since he was residing at the

house of Soledad Dy-Yap at that time and from that time, the Yap family had been in possession of the subject real property up to the present. Complainant alleged that sometime in June 1998 her attention was called to the fact that a free patent title to the aforesaid property was issued in respondent's name and upon verification with the DENR, Bureau of Lands, Dumaguete City, complainant was able to get copies of the documents for lot Nos. 660, 490 and 585 pertaining to the Notice of Application for Free Patent dated April 2, 1985 signed by the respondent; over the aforesaid lots previously sold by Ledesma de Jesus to Aurora D. Yap; Quitclaim/Renunciation of Property Rights and Interest Over Real Property executed by Ledesma de Jesus dated May 28, 1985; Letter of Application dated April 2, 1985 signed by respondent under oath before Apolonio Tan authorized officer to administer oath; Letter of Certification signed by Apolonio Tan dated June 4, 1985 and Order of Approval dated August 19, 1985 signed by District Land Officer Teopisto L. Gallozo with a Free Patent No. 328 in the name of respondent Justo J. Paras. Complainant alleged that the aforementioned application was made by the respondent without her knowledge and consent and those acts of deceit, machinations and falsification of documents were deliberately willfully, and maliciously committed by the respondent in violation of Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171 of the RPC; in betrayal of his oath as a lawyer and a transgression of the Canons of Professional Responsibility. Complainant alleged that respondent surreptitiously obtained a free patent title over real properties which had been previously sold by his own mother to Aurora D. Yap and now still under the control and possession of complainant's natural family, a fact respondent allegedly withheld from the Bureau of Lands which he had full knowledge in successfully causing the release of a free patent in his name and unjustly and unlawfully deprived the rightful owners of their legitimate title to the said property in betrayal of the court to pervert the administration of justice in gross violation of his oath of office. xxx xxx xxx In his Comment, respondent alleged that complainant was obviously not the owner of the properties and considering that the properties were applied for free patent titling during their marital union prior to its breakage, complainant was likewise a communal owner thereof and as such was also complaining against herself. Respondent alleged that later on, a great portion of the public lands classified as forested zone in Matobato were declared and reclassified into public agricultural lands, then publicly surveyed and parcelized by lots identified in the survey map based on actual or known occupants; then the Bureau of Lands allegedly made a public announcement that the lands were available for private ownership thru Free Patent Application available only to native settlers or natural born Filipinos. Respondent alleged that none of the Yaps including complainant being native or natural born Filipinos muchless Aurora D. Yap who in 1985 was said to be already an American citizen; complainant and her family; the Yaps prevailed upon him to apply for free patent over said questioned properties for the reason that respondent had already occupied the properties; introduced improvements thereon; acted as owner thereof; and could easily align his right to the property which had been identified in the public survey as "Heirs of Vicente Paras", otherwise the questioned properties allegedly according to the Yaps will be applied for and awarded to other qualified natural born Filipinos. Respondent alleged that Free Patent Application was filed by him over the communal property of him and the complainant as well as those purchased by him including the portion whose occupancy of a public land was purchased by Aurora D. Yap from Ledesma Vda de Paras upon the prodding of the Yaps for all of them were not qualified to apply for ownership of an agricultural public land via free patent; none of them being a natural born Filipino or native settler and were disqualified from a gratuitous grant of public land from the government. 9

Respondent alleged that the whole idea of giving to him and the complainant the properties was hatched and executed by the Yaps, most particularly Atty. Francisco D. Yap to circumvent the law and prevent the properties from being given by the government to some other qualified persons. He allegedly applied for issuance of free patent in good faith and thereafter took dominion and control of the properties in the concept of a legitimate owner under authority of a gratuitous grant of the government. Respondent alleged that complainant or any member of her family much less American citizen Aurora Dy Yap had not made any prior demand for the return of the questioned properties; nor filed a complaint under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law; nor filed an administrative remedy before the DENR for the cancellation and reversion/transfer of the Free Patent and Title to them; nor brought any action in any civil court for either quieting of title, or cancellation of free patent title or recovery of ownership or whatever. Respondent alleged that even without such civil court determination on whether or not complainant or her family were qualified to become grantee of a government gratuitous grant of public agricultural land, if the Honorable Supreme Court will decide that complainant, her mother, brothers and sisters were within the ambit of the term natural born citizen or native citizens under the 1946 Constitution and to them rightfully belong the ownership of the questioned titled public agricultural lands; and that he can never be guilty of the Anti-Dummy Law consequent to such cession, respondent alleged that he will gladly deliver and transfer title to them. Respondent alleged that he sought and prayed for recovery of possession of all conjugal/communal properties including the herein questioned properties for after he left the conjugal home in 1988 possession of all these properties, real and personal were until now with the complainant and her biological family. Respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the petition for lack of merit." Complainant subsequently filed a Reply 5 to respondent's Comment, therein refuting respondent's claims that he was used as a "dummy" since complainant and her siblings had previously acquired Free Patents in their names. Complainant further alleged that respondent is morally unfit to continue to be an officer of the court because of his falsely declaring under oath that he had been occupying the subject real property since 1985 when in fact he did not and was never in occupation/possession thereof. On 27 August 1999, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an Order 6 noting the filing of the last pleading and setting the instant case for hearing. Several hearings 7 were conducted wherein complainant presented all her witnesses together with their respective affidavits and supporting documents, 8 which were all subjected to cross-examination by the respondent. Likewise, respondent presented his CounterAffidavit 9 and supporting documents. Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner concluded her Report and made a recommendation, as follows: "From the facts obtaining respondent committed deceit and falsehood in having applied for free patent over lands owned by another over which he had no actual physical possession being aware of the fact that the same was previously transferred in the name of Aurora Yap; an act which adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law in violation of Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. cSATDC "It is immaterial as to who instituted the complaint for as long as there was a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility which partakes the nature of proper disciplinary action pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys.

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"Wherefore in view of the foregoing, the Undersigned respectfully recommends for the suspension of Atty. Justo Paras from the practice of his law profession for a period of three (3) months from receipt hereof. "It is also hereby recommended that the IBP Chapter wherein respondent Paras is a registered member be furnished a copy of the Order and notified of the said suspension for proper enforcement." Via Resolution No. XVI-2004-120 dated 27 February 2004, 10 the IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report of the Investigating Commissioner but modified the latter's recommended penalty by recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for violation of Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The case is now before us for confirmation. We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be sanctioned. We find, however, that the recommended penalty is not commensurate to the gravity of the wrong perpetrated. The Court has always reminded that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession 11 as the bar should always maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing among its members. By and large, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. 12 To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. 13 In Marcelo v. Javier, 14 we held: "It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorney's right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish the attorney. "An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counsellor which include the statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. These statutory grounds are so broad as to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity. It is a settled rule that the enumeration of the statutory grounds for disciplinary action is not exclusive and a lawyer may be disciplined on grounds other than those specifically provided in the law. Generally a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court, or an unfit or unsafe person to enjoy the privileges and to manage the business of others in the capacity of an attorney, or for conduct which tends to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public."

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Indeed, the practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. 15 One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. And in the recent case of Bergonia v. Merrera, 16 we ruled: "Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioner's honorable membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients. . . ." In the instant case, it is clear to the Court that respondent violated his lawyer's oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society and to the courts, the obligation to obey the laws of the land and to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court. Respondent has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court in his acts of applying for the issuance of a free patent over the properties in issue despite his knowledge that the same had already been sold by his mother to complainant's sister. This fact, respondent even admitted in the comment that he filed before this Court when he alleged that the said properties were public land under the Forestal Zone "when the mother of the respondent ceded to Aurora Yap some portions of entire occupancy of the Parases". 17 Moreover, respondent committed deceit and falsehood in his application for free patent over the said properties when he manifested under oath that he had been in the actual possession and occupation of the said lands despite the fact that these were continuously in the possession and occupation of complainant's family, as evidenced no less by respondent's own statements in the pleadings filed before the IBP. Anent his argument questioning the status of complainant and her family as "natural born citizens", this Court holds that the instant case is not the proper forum to address such issue. Furthermore, as correctly held by the Investigating Commissioner, "[i]t is immaterial as to who instituted the complaint for as long as there was a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility". Likewise, any other action which the parties may make against each other has no material bearing in this case. For, it must be remembered that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. In line herewith, this Court in In re Almacen, 18 held: "Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. . . ." The facts and evidence obtaining in the instant case indubitably reveal respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures 12

of the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby occasioning sanction from this Court. At this juncture, we take note that on 18 October 2000, in our Decision in A.C. No. 5333 formerly A.C. No. CBD-371, entitled Rosa Yap Paras v. Atty. Justo de Jesus Paras, respondent was previously meted with suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months on the charge of falsifying his wife's signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments, and for one (1) year from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family. Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of respondent's prior misdemeanors for which he was penalized with a six (6) month and one (1) year suspension from the practice of law, his deplorable behavior in the present case which grossly degrades the legal profession warrants the imposition of a much graver penalty. WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance and likewise be entered in the record of respondent as attorney. SO ORDERED. DCcHIS Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1. Rollo, Vol. I at pp. 3-9. 2. Rollo, Vol. I at pp. 266-273. 3. Rollo, Vol. I at p. 346. 4. Rollo, Vol. II at pp. 618-626. 5. Rollo, Vol. II at pp. 1-5. 6. Rollo, Vol. II at p. 11. 7. Hearings were conducted on 15 October 1999, 12 November 1999, 16 December 1999 and 27 January 2000. 8. Rollo, Vol. II at pp. 32-223. 9. Rollo, Vol. II at pp. 259-296. 10. Rollo, Vol. II at p. 617. 11. Canon 7, Code of Professional Responsibility. 12. Agpalo, R.E., Legal Ethics, [1989 ed.], 87. 13. Abragan v. Rodriguez, 429 Phil 607 [2002]; Maligsa v. Cabanting, 338 SCRA 912 [1997]; and Fernandez v. Grecia, 223 SCRA 425 [1993]. 14. 214 SCRA 1 [1992], citing People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 NY 465, 60 ALR 851 [1928]; Ledesma v. Climaco, 57 SCRA 473 [1974]; Tajan v. Cusi, 57 SCRA 154 [1974]; Ex parte Wall, 107 US 265, 27 L ed 522, 2 S Ct 569; Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]; Daroy v. Legaspi, 65 SCRA 304 [1975]; Diaz v. Gerong, 141 SCRA 46 [1986]; In re Pelaez, 44 Phil 567 [1923]; Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 112 [1985]; Erectors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 166 SCRA 728 [1988]; and Mortel v. Aspiras, 100 Phil 586 [1956]. 15. Sebastian v. Calis, 344 SCRA 1 [1999] and Sabayle v. Tandayag, 158 SCRA 497 [1988]. 16. 398 SCRA 1 [2003] with note: The Code of Professional Responsibility requires in Canon 10 that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court"; Canon 8, "a lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues . . ."; and Canon 15, "a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client."

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17. Paragraph 5 (b) of respondent's Comment dated 03 December 1998, Rollo, Vol. I at p. 268. 18. 31 SCRA 562 [1970]. A.C. No. 4947 June 7, 2007 ROSA YAP-PARAS vs. JUSTO PARAS SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION [A.C. No. 4947. June 7, 2007.] ROSA YAP-PARAS, petitioner, vs. ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, respondent. RESOLUTION GARCIA, J p: For resolution is this Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment 1 dated April 11, 2005, filed by herein petitioner-movant Rosa Yap Paras against respondent Atty. Justo Paras, for the latter's alleged violation of a suspension order earlier meted upon him by the Court. The motion alleges: 4. That the respondent in this case admits that he has continued his practice of law and in fact filed pleadings in court after the receipt of suspension on the ground that the alleged filing of his motion for reconsideration suspends or interrupt (sic) the running of the period to appeal, and prays that for his violation of the suspension order, the respondent be declared in contempt of court and be disbarred. Briefly, the facts may be stated as follows: On September 9, 1998, herein petitioner-movant filed a verified Petition 2 praying for the disbarment of her estranged husband respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras alleging acts of deceit, malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly immoral conduct and violation of oath as a lawyer committed by the latter. On February 14, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution 3 finding Atty. Paras guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the Court resolved to suspend Atty. Paras from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. Per records, the aforesaid Resolution was received by Atty. Paras on March 18, 2005. Thereafter, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated March 28, 2005. 4 During the pendency of Atty. Paras' motion for reconsideration, complainantmovant filed with the Court the instant Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment, alleging thereunder, inter alia, that Atty. Paras violated the suspension order earlier issued by the Court with his continued practice of law. In time, the Court issued a Resolution dated July 18, 2005, 5 denying for lack of merit Atty. Paras' motion for reconsideration, to wit: Administrative Case No. 4947 ( Rosa Yap Paras vs. Atty. Justo Paras) Acting on the respondent's motion for reconsideration dated March 28, 2005 of the resolution of February 14, 2005 which suspended him from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, the Court Resolves to DENY the motion for lack of merit. The Court further Resolves to NOTE: (a) the complainant's opposition dated April 11, 2005 to the said motion for reconsideration with leave of Court; HSIDTE (b) the respondent's motion dated May 6, 2005 for immediate resolution of the motion for reconsideration; and

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(c) the complainant's motion for contempt and/or disbarment dated April 11, 2005, praying that respondent be declared in contempt of court and ordered disbarred and to REQUIRE the respondent to COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice. In the same resolution, the Court required Atty. Paras to comment on petitionermovant's Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment. After more than a year, or on September 12, 2006 Atty. Paras filed with the Court a Manifestation, 6 stating that he had completely and faithfully served his one (1) year suspension from the practice of law from August 25, 2005, the day after he received the denial resolution on his motion for reconsideration, to August 24, 2006. It appearing that Atty. Paras failed to file a comment on the Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment, the Court issued another Resolution dated November 27, 2006 requiring Atty. Paras to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for such failure and to comply with the said resolution within ten (10) days from receipt. Consequently, a Comment on Motion for Contempt and Explanation on Failure to Timely File Required Comment 7 was filed by Atty. Paras denying all the allegations in petitioner-movant's Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment. He likewise claimed that he had never done nor made any conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, nor undermine or put to naught or violate any of the pertinent causes enumerated in Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court. Here, we are called upon to impose on Atty. Paras the highest punishment to an erring lawyer disbarment or to hold him in contempt for his failure to comply with this Court's resolutions. In a number of cases, 8 we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the purpose of disbarment is not meant as a punishment to deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the courts and the public from members of the bar who have become unfit and unworthy to be part of the esteemed and noble profession. Likewise, the purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court to assure respect for court orders by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice. We find no sufficient basis to support petitioner-movant's allegation that Atty. Paras violated the Court's suspension order, what with the fact that Atty. Paras himself took the initiative to inform the lower courts of his one-year suspension from law practice. 9 It is clear, however, that all lawyers are expected to recognize the authority of the Supreme Court and obey its lawful processes and orders. Despite errors which one may impute on the orders of the Court, these must be respected, especially by the bar or the lawyers who are themselves officers of the courts. It is well to emphasize again that a resolution of the Supreme Court is not be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. 10 Court orders are to be respected not because the justices or judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the government. This is absolutely essential if our government is to be a government of laws and not of men. 11 Here, Atty. Paras admitted that he had been less than prudent, and indeed fell short, of his obligation to follow, obey and comply with the specific Order of the Honorable Supreme Court contained in Its Resolution dated July 18, 2005 due to his deteriorating health condition which required him to undergo a coronary angiogram and 15

bypass graft. 12 He likewise expressed his profound and immeasurable sorrowness amidst regrets for his delayed compliance with the Court's order. Given the above, the Court takes this opportunity to remind the parties in the instant case, as well petitioner-movant's counsels, to avoid further squabbles and unnecessary filing of administrative cases against each other. An examination of the records reveals a pervasive atmosphere of animosity between Atty. Paras and petitioner's counsels as evidenced by the number of administrative cases between them. It is well to stress that mutual bickerings and unjustified recriminations between attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive sympathy from this Court. 13 Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy, fairness, candor and civility. 14 All told, the Court deems a reprimand with warning as a sufficient sanction for Atty. Paras' failure to promptly comply with its directives. The imposition of this sanction in the present case would be more consistent with the avowed purpose of a disciplinary case, which is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court. 15 ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment is DENIED. However, Atty. Justo Paras is hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to observe the respect due the Court in not promptly complying with this Court's resolution, with WARNING that a more drastic punishment will be imposed upon him for a repetition of the same act. SO ORDERED. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur. Carpio-Morales, J., is on official leave. Footnotes 1. Rollo, pp. 1062-1065. 2. Rollo, Vol. I at pp. 3-9. 3. Id. at pp. 1000-1009. 4. Id. at pp. 1021-1028. 5 Id. at p. 1132. 6. Id. at pp. 1139-1141. 7. Id. at pp. 1165-1173. 8. Geeslin v. Navarro, Adm. Case No. 2033 and 2148, May 9, 1990, 185 SCRA 230; citing Diaz v. Gerong, Adm. Case No. 2439, January 16, 1986, 141 SCRA 46 and Daroy, et al. v. Legaspi, Adm. Case No. 936, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 304 and Mariano Y. Siy v. National Labor Relations Commission and Elena Embang, G.R. No. 158971, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 154. 9. Rollo, p. 1136. 10. Ong v. Grijaldo, Adm. Case No. 4724, April 30, 2003, 402 SCRA 1 and Guerrero v. Deray, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1466, December 10, 2002, 393 SCRA 591. 11. Luis N. De Leon v. Joey Y. Torres, 99 Phil. 462. 12. Rollo, p. 1166. 13. Asa vs. Castillo, Adm. Case No. 6501, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 309. 14. Canon 8, Code of Professional Responsibility. 15. Gamilla v. Marino, Jr., Adm. Case No. 4763, March 20, 2003, 399 SCRA 308.

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