IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

VARDUI ROSE BARSAMYAN, ) S-148712

)
Petitioner, ) 2d Dist.No. B188695
)
Vl ) (LASC No. BS099858;
) Trial Ct.No. 5WL01545)
APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE )
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF )
CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF )
LOS ANGELES,
$UPREtVIT.
COURT
Respondent, FILED
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,) AU6 _ ] ZOO8
) Frecletl_k I(. Ohric:._
Real Party in Interest. ) Clerk
)

PETITION FOR REHEARING

MICHAEL P. JUDGE, PUBLIC DEFENDER

OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

Karen Nash,
John Hamilton Scott,
(State Bar No. 58258)
Deputy Public Defenders

Appellate Branch
320 West Temple Street, Room 590
Los Angeles, Califomia 90012

Telephone: (213) 974-3050

Attorneys for Petitioner

 TOPICAL INDEX
Pa.__.q__

PETITIONER FOR REHEARING 1-2

ARGUMENT

I THIS COURT SHOULD CONFIRM THAT AN

ATTORNEY IS NOT "ENGAGED" UNTIL SUCH TIME
AS A MATTER IS TRANSFERRED FROM A MASTER
CALENDAR TO A TRIAL COURT 2-5
II THE 10-DAY PERIOD FOR COMMENCEMENT OF
TRIAL BEGINS WHEN COUNSEL IS NO LONGER
CONSENTING TO DELAY OF TRIAL 5-7
Ill THIS COURT SHOULD SPECIFY WHEN AN
ATTORNEY IS "ENGAGED" IN A DIRECT CALENDAR
COURT 7-10
IV THIS COURT SHOULD STATE WHETHER IT IS
DECIDING IF THE PROSECUTION IS ENTITLED TO

UNJUSTIFIED TRIAL DELAY, AND IF SO, SHOULD

CONFORM TO THE STATUTES AND RULES BY
PROHIBITING SUCH DELAY 10-13
V THE "PERSONAL OBJECTION" RULE OF JOHNSON
TO DELAYS WITHIN THE 10-DAY PERIOD SHOULD
NOT BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED TO
PETITIONER 13-14

CONCLUSION 15

-i-
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
ti Pa_a
Cases

.Bailon v. Appellate Division

(2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1331 11
il
B_ v. Superior Court
(1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 483 12

Malengo v. Municipal Court

II (1961) 56 Cal.2d 813 12

People v. Alvarez
(1989) 208 CaI.App.3d 567 11

e Peo_p._eg___le
v. Henderson
(2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 922 11

v. Johnson
(1980) 26 Cal.3d 557 13

Peo___.e_o_le
v. Superior Court (Lavi)
(1993) 4 Cal.4th 1164

Rhinehart v.
(1984) 35 Cal.3d 772

Townsend v. i._,_2.9.E_EJ_
(1975) 15 Cal.App.3d 774 1,5,6,7

Statutes

Penal Code

§ 1050 2,10
§ 1050, subd.(e) 11
§ 1382 10,11

-ii-
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Pa_a
Court Rules

California Rules of Court

rule 4.113 2,11

rule 4.115(a) 8
rule 4.115(b) 2,11

-iii-
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

VARDUI ROSE BARSAMYAN, ) S-148712

)
Petitioner, ) 2d Dist.No. B188695
)
Vl ) (LASC No. BS099858;
) Trial Ct.No. 5WL01545)
APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE )
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF )
CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF )
LOS ANGELES, )
)
Respondent, )
)
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,)
)
Real Party in Interest. )
)

PETITION FOR REHEARING

TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND ASSOCIATE

JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA:

Petitioner hereby respectfully seeks rehearing in this court.

Rehearing is necessary in order that this court may make its
opinion internally consistent regarding when an attorney may be
impliedly consenting to delay prior to the actual commencement of trial.
Rehearing is necessary so that this court may bring its decision
into conformance with Townsend v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d
774 regarding when an attorney's implied consent to delay ceases.

-1-
 Rehearing is necessary so that this court may address an
unresolved issue presented for review which, in view of this court's
decision, has become of vital importance in trial courts which operate

on a direct calendar system.

Rehearing is necessary so that this court may expressly state
whether the prosecutor is permitted to delay cases without justification,
despite the contrary requirements of Penal Code section 1050 and
rules 4.113 and 4.115(b) of the Rules of Court, or may expressly state
that the issue is not being resolved.
Rehearing is necessary so that petitioner is not prejudiced by

the retroactive application of an objection requirement of which

petitioner and her counsel were unaware at the time of the contested
delay in this case.
ARGUMENT
I
THIS COURT SHOULD CONFIRM THAT AN ATTORNEY IS
NOT "ENGAGED" UNTIL SUCH TIME AS A MATTER IS
TRANSFERRED FROM A MASTER CALENDAR TO A TRIAL
COURT

This court states, "[W]hen the trial court required counsel to

designate a single case to be sent to the trial department for trial, and
thereafter assigned the George matter to the trial department, counsel

was unable to bring petitioner's case to an immediate trial." (Slip opn.,

p. 8; emphasis added.) This court again states that, "[O]nce the court
selects or counsel agrees on which case will go to trial and the court
sends that case to an open trial department.., the defense is no

longer ready for immediate trial in the other cases." (Slip opn., p. 11;
emphasis added and deleted.) Finally, this court states that"[O]nce the
calendar department selects or requires counsel to select one of his or

her competing cases for trial and sends the case to the trial department

-2-
for trial, the attorney can no longer be considered ready to proceed in
the remaining cases set for the same day." (Slip opn., p. 15; emphasis
added.)
Although petitioner obviously disagrees with this court's
conclusion, given the number of cases which do not go to trial in the
scenario posited above (including the George matter in this case),
given the requirement that a master calendar only send cases in which
both sides are ready to open courts for immediate trial, petitioner does
not believe that the rule stated above is unworkable. (Cf. Peo.__0.g_
v.
Superior Court (Lavi) (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1164, 1177.) However, in this
court's introduction to its ruling, this court states, "[W]hen appointed
defense counsel appears for trial in two matters, and the calendar court
selects or requires counsel to select a single matter to be sent to a trial
department for trial, counsel necessarily consents to continuance of the
remaining matter." (Slip opn., p. 2.)
As may be seen, this statement of the rule has left out the
critical condition that the case not only be "selected" to go to trial, but
that the case actually be sent to a trial department. Given that this
court stated the additional requirement at least three times in the body
of its opinion, it appears likely that the truncated statement in the
introduction to the body of the opinion is merely a typographical error,
which may be easily corrected.
Petitioner notes, however, that a rule that counsel consents to
delay when a case to be tried is chosen, even if that case is never sent
to a trial department, would lead to chaos, especially if the prosecution
is to be permitted to delay matters without justification. Under the rule
as stated in the introduction, counsel may appear on two matters. The
court may say that one matter will be tried, but then delay both matters
for a considerable length of time.

-3-
 As petitioner has stressed, this is not fancy, it is reality. When
the defense is the _ party required to prepare for trial once a case is

beyond the initial statutory period, it is a simple fact that the prosecutor
does not prepare for trial until after the defense has indicated a ready
status and commenced the 10-day period. Consequently, it is assured

that ev_yp__case outside the initial period will be delayed after the
defense indicates readiness for trial. 1j

This is not an overwhelming problem in a master calendar court,

where all cases in which the defense is ready will remain until the
People are also ready, and when defense counsel will not be found to
be impliedly consenting to delay until the People are ready and the
case is sent out for trial. However, it is certainly unfair and unjustified
to assert that counsel is unavailable for trial in all but one of several

cases because a master calendar has stated that one case will be tried,
when, in fact, all the cases are delayed and none is sent to a trial court,
and the People may not be ready for trial in _ of the matters.
Again, it does not appear that this court intended such a

draconian rule, and the problem can be easily corrected by bringing this
court's introductory statement of the rule on page 2 of its opinion into
conformance with this court's discussion and application of the rule as
found on pages 8, 11, and 15 of that opinion. This can be simply done
by the addition of a few words from this court's later discussion:
"[W]hen appointed defense counsel appears for trial in two matters, and.
the calendar court selects or requires counsel to select a single matter
to be sent to a trial department for trial, and sends the case to the trial

_J As petitioner has consistently acknowledged, this problem

could be alleviated if this court firmly stated, in accordance with statute
and rule, that the prosecution is no__t entitled to delay cases without
justification, and that bot__.b_h
sides are obligated to diligently prepare for
trial.

_4 _
the trial department for trial, counsel necessarily consents to
continuance of the remaining matter." This court should grant
rehearing and make that correction.
II

THE 10-DAY PERIOD FOR COMMENCEMENT OF TRIAL

BEGINS WHEN COUNSEL IS NO LONGER CONSENTING TO

DELAY OF TRIAL

In Townsend v. Superior Court, su_gp__,

15 Cal.3d 774, this court
determined that counsel who was engaged in a conflicting matter was
impliedly consenting to delay in all other matters until such time as
counsel was free to commence the proceedings in those other matters.
(Id., at p. 783; see slip opn., pp. 10-11 .) However, in the introductory
portion of this court's opinion, albeit in dicta, this court states a different
rule. "[W]hen defense counsel consents to continuance in the manner
described above [by becoming "engaged"], such consent initiates the
running of a new 10-day period following the date to which trial is
continued .... " (Slip opn., p. 2, emphasis added.)
This court cites nothing in support of this conclusion. The issue
of when the statutory period recommences under these circumstances
was not an issue presented for review, nor is it presented by the facts
of the case before this court. Consequently, the issue was not
discussed by the parties. However, it appears clear that this court's
statement is incorrect.

If a defendant's case is being delayed due to the implied

consent of the defendant's attorney, then that delay is justified only so
long as the attorney continues to impliedly consent to the delay. As
held in Townsend, that consent ends when the attorney is available,
not on the next calendared date.

For example, pursuant to this court's opinion, in this case

petitioner's counsel impliedly consented to delay when, on September

-5-
15, 2005, the George matter was sent to a trial court. The court
delayed petitioner's matter to September 16, 2005. However, counsel's
implied consent to delay did not last __..vond September 15, 2005,
because the George matter was settled. It was at that moment that

counsel became again unconditionally ready and available to try

petitioner's matter, and it was therefore at that moment that the 10-day
period upon the commencement of petitioner's trial commenced
pursuant to Townsend.
Nothing in Townsend suggests that an attorney's implied
consent to delay due to unavailability can extend beyond counsel's later
availability simply because the trial court has selected some future trial
date. A defendant is entitled to have the 10-day period within which his

or her trial must commence measured by the consent of counsel to

delay, and _ by the consent of counsel to delay. As this court itself
stated, it is "readiness for trial" which is the pertinent inquiry in
determining the applicability of the 10-day period (slip opn., p. 9), and

not the random factor of a trial date selected by a court.

For example, a master calendar may select a certain case for
trial, send it to a trial court, and based upon the attorney's then-existing
implied consent to delay, continue the attorney's remaining cases for
seven days. However, the trial case may not last seven days. The
defendant may unexpectedly enter a guilty plea, orthe prosecution may
discover its witnesses are not available, or the trial may simply proceed
more quickly than anticipated. The attorney will then return to the
master calendar court, perhaps only two days later. That attorney's
remaining clients are not impliedly consenting to a further five days of
delay, since their counsel is then unconditionally ready and available to
commence trial. Their speedy trial rights cannot be sacrificed for seven
days due merely two days of implied consent.

-6-
 Indeed, this court has not placed any limitation upon the delay
which may be ordered once counsel has one case transferred to a trial
court. Can those remaining cases be delayed for any length of time

chosen by the master calendar, perhaps to accommodate the trial

court's own trial scheduling? Again, the issue must be whether counsel

is impliedly consenting to delay due to unavailability. When counsel is

no longer unavailable, then there is no more implied consent, no matter
what date may have been calendared for a future trial.
Under this court's dicta, a defendant's trial may be delayed

based upon an assertion that the defendant's attorney is impliedly

consenting to delay when, in fact, that attorney is unconditionally free
to commence trial proceedings in that defendant's case. Such a rule
is contrary to Townsend, and contrary to the fundamental principles
underlying implied consent to delay discussed by this court in this case.
This court should grant rehearing and either remove that dicta from its
opinion, or correctly state that the 10-day period commences upon
counsel's availability, not upon the next calendared trial date.
III
THIS COURT SHOULD SPECIFY WHEN AN ATTORNEY IS
"ENGAGED" IN A DIRECT CALENDAR COURT

As discussed above, this court's conclusion that an attorney is

engaged in trial, and is thereby impliedly consenting to delay under
Townsend, when a case is sent from a master calendar to a trial court
is not an unreasonable conclusion (though petitioner believes it will

result in unnecessary delays in many cases, as it did in her case).

However, that is because of the settled principle that a master calendar
is only to send cases in which both sides are ready to an available court
for immediate trial. This rule does not, however, address the question
of when an attorney may be "engaged" for the purposes of Townsend

in a direct calendar court. Criminal courts in California are permitted to

-7-
operate with either a master calendar or direct calendar system. (Cal.
Rules of Ct., rule 4.115(a).)
When a case is in a direct calendar court, there will be no order
transferring the matter to an available trial court for immediate trial.
Instead, the matter will remain on the calendar of the same court until

it is either settled, tried, or dismissed. The rule cannot be simply that

counsel is "engaged" once a case is selected to be tried, since, as
discussed above, that "selection" may bear no relationship to the

People's ready status, and will not result in an immediate trial. Instead,
the "selected" case will be delayed, along with all the other cases, to
some later date, when trial in the "selected" case may, or may not,
commence.

In Los Angeles County, a delay of eight days following defense

counsel's announcement of readiness is automatic in most

misdemeanor cases (even those cases within the initial statutory

period). _2_
A rule that counsel is engaged in one case, selected for trial,
and is impliedly consenting to delay in every other case, is simply
unworkable in such a system. It would mean that counsel is unable to
commence trial promptly in every other case on calendar on that day,
since a new 10-day period, and consequent 8-day delay, would occur
in those cases. Moreover, it would mean that counsel would be
unavailable in every trial-ready case which might appear on his or her
calendar for over a week. The issue is thus, as stated in the Issues on
Review: "Does an attorney remain 'engaged in a conflicting trial' if the
conflicting case is not tried, but is delayed to a later date?" This issue
remains unresolved.

-_ Again, this system is predicated on the idea that the

prosecutor need not, and therefore will not, prepare for trial until after
the defense is ready.

-8-
 Unlike a master calendar court, a direct calendar court does not
have an obligation to set cases for trial only when both sides are ready
and the court is available to commence trial immediately. Instead, trials
are most often calendared for future trial dates, with the understanding

(at least, until now) that counsel would remain available to handle other
matters in the meantime. This court's rule, if applied to a direct

calendar, would result in defense counsel being unavailable in other

cases, even though counsel was doing nothing but wait for the arrival
of that future date. Petitioner's counsel can represent that he has

heard from those responsible for administering large public defense

offices throughout California that this court's rule, if applied in direct
calendar courts, will lead to massive confusion, inefficiency, and

expense.
Consequently, while the rule adopted by this court will work
(with some inefficiency) in a master calendar system, it will be simply
disastrous in a direct calendar system. Petitioner suggests that the rule
which will work in a direct calendar system is the rule that she has
proposed: counsel is impliedly consenting to delay in other cases only
when trial in one case has commenced within the meaning of Rhinehart
v. Municipal Court (1984) 35 Cal.3d 772. However, if this court
disagrees, this court must nevertheless set forth a rule which can
operate efficiently in a direct calendar court, without resulting in the

unavailability of counsel for a week or more due to counsel's

"engagement" in a trial which, though ready, has been continued for
that length of time.
Indeed, even under petitioner's proposal, this court has left the
law unclear whenever ready cases are delayed and counsel's
unavailability does no._._tt
affect counsel's ability to try that case. For
example, assume that an attorney announces ready for trial on a

matter, which is then continued for eight days over express objection,

-9-
which this court would acknowledge would put the case on the eighth
day of the 10-day period. The next day, counsel commences a
different trial, which is completed in three days, a not-uncommon
occurrence in a direct calendar court, or even in a master calendar

court. On the "8 of 10" date for the first defendant, the attorney is again
ready and available. If the attorney impliedly consented to delay due
to his temporary engagement in a trial, even though he is available on
both dates that the first defendant's case is on calendar, then it would
appear that the defendant whose case was delayed to the "eighth day"
will lose his speedy trial right because of his counsel's implied consent
to delay on a date when that defendant's case was not even on
calendar. This simply cannot be the rule.
Petitioner thus urges this court to grant rehearing in order to
address these manifest problems with its present discussion.
IV

THIS COURT SHOULD STATE WHETHER IT IS DECIDING IF

THE PROSECUTION IS ENTITLED TO UNJUSTIFIED TRIAL

DELAY, AND IF SO, SHOULD CONFORM TO THE STATUTES

AND RULES BY PROHIBITING SUCH DELAY

At points in its opinion, this court intimates that the prosecution

may be able to delay trials absent good cause. Petitioner has briefed
at length why unjustified delay is not permitted, whether that delay is
sought by the defense or the prosecution, and whether that delay is
within or beyond a statutory time limit. (See Petitioner's Answer to
Amicus District Attorney.) PetiUoner incorporates that argument herein,
so as to avoid setting it out at length. Suffice it to say that both the
Legislature, in Penal Code section 1050, and the Rules of Court, in

rules 4.113 and 4.115(b), have prohibited a_gyunjustified delay of trial.

Any interpretation of Penal Code section 1382 which conflicts with that

settled principle does not withstand analysis.

-10-
 This court states that various decisions have held that a court

should not dismiss a case based upon delay within the 10-day period
of section 1382. (Slip opn., pp. 20-21 .) This is undisputed. However,
dismissal is not the only means of preventing unjustified delay. The

most obvious means of doing so is by den__ an unjustified motion to

continue. That is the means specified by the Legislature:
"Continuances shall be granted _ upon a showing of good cause."
(Pen. Code § 1050, subd. (e); emphasis added.) It is also the means
specified in the Rules of Court: "Motions to continue the trial of a
criminal case are disfavored and will be denied unless the moving
party, under Penal Code section 1050, presents affirmative proof in

open court that the ends of justice require a continuance." (Cal. Rules
of Ct., rule 4.113; emphasis added.) The rules reiterate this
requirement: "A__o..y
request for a continuance, including a request to trail
the trial date, must comply with rule 4.113 and the requirement in
section 1050 to show good cause to continue a hearing in a criminal
proceeding." (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 4.115(b); emphasis added.) Even
in cases where it has been found that the prosecutor can compel an
unjustified delay (an erroneous holding to petitioner's mind), it has been
recognized that such delays remain improper and that a court may
punish and deter such delays by appropriate sanctions. (_ v.
Henderson (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 922, 939-940; but see Peo_gP_g_
v.
AIvarez (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 567,577-578: Penal Code section 1050

"is applicable to any request for a continuance in a criminal case.")

As petitioner has previously discussed, most of the cases cited
by this court do not hold that the prosecution is entitled to delay trials
without justification, but only that a dismissal within that period is
improper. (See Pet. Ans. to D.A., pp. 6-7, and n.b. fn. 1.) This court
states that the court held in Bailon v. A opellate Division (2002) 98

CaI.App.4th 1331 [erroneously cited as ".Bailon v. Superior Court] that

-11-
the prosecution is "entitled" to delays within the 10-day period. No such
holding can be found in Bailon, which emphasizes that the prosecution

may obtain such a delay "if necessary," quoting Medina v. Supedor

Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1287. (Id., 98 Cal.App.4th at p.
1346; emphasis original.)
It is true that included in part of the long discussion of man_.v
reasons why a defendant need not object to a delay of trial sought by
the prosecutor within the 10-day period in _ v. Superior Court
(1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 483 is a suggestion that the prosecutor will be
able to secure a delay despite objection, which _ mean that the court
is also compelled to submit to the prosecutor's demands. However, ff

that is what B__ is saying, the only authority cited for that proposition
is Malengo v. Municipal Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 813, 815-816. As

petitioner has discussed, Malengo did not hold that Penal Code section
1050 is inapplicable to the prosecutor, or, if it did, it has long since been
superseded by later legislative and judicial action. (See Pet. Ans. to
D.A., pp. 4-11.) _ certainly cannot be followed as the on_
authority permitting unjustified trial delays.
As has been noted above, if the prosecution is permitted to
delay trials for no reason, then the only party which is required to
promptly prepare for trial is the defense. The 10-day period cannot
commence until the defense is ready. Consequently, if the defendant
desires a trial within that 10-day period the defense must diligently
prepare for trial by that date. If the prosecution can secure a delay
merely by demanding it, then the prosecution can, and does, simply
ignore the matter until it has been delayed for eight days or more. As
discussed above, this situation could be disastrous in a direct calendar

court, leading to prolonged unnecessary delay. This court should not

foster such a rule.

-12-
 It is true that the question of the prosecution's right to delay

trials without good cause was not one of the issues presented for
review, and the point was not extensively discussed by counsel for real
party. The discussion arose in amicus briefing submitted by the District
Attorney and answered by petitioner. The issue is not directly
presented by the facts of this case, and accordingly this court may find
that the issue should not be discussed at all in this opinion. If so, then
this court should avoid any claims that this court is settling this issue by
noting that it does not intend to do so. If, however, this court does
intend to address the issue, then this court should grant rehearing so
that its opinion may conform with the statutes and Rules of Court which
prohibit _ unjustified delay.
V

THE "PERSONAL OBJECTION" RULE OF JOHNSON TO

DELAYS WITHIN THE 10-DAY PERIOD SHOULD NOT BE
RETROACTIVELY APPLIED TO PETITIONER

This court notes that had petitioner personally voiced an

objection to the delay which occurred in this case when her counsel
became engaged in a conflicting trial, her right to speedy trial would
then have been protected under Pe_._ep_ple
v. Johnson (1980)26 Cal.3d
557. (Slip opn., p. 25.) This court faults petitioner for not entering such
a personal objection. However, this court is certainly under no illusion
that lay people charged with criminal offenses are familiar with the
intricacies of criminal procedure. If a defendant is going to voice such

a personal objection, it will only be after the defendant's attorney has

explained to the defendant her rights in this regard, and the effect of her
silence.

In this case, petitioner's counsel was objecting to delay,

vociferously. There is no indication in the record that petitioner herself

was agreeable to a delay-indeed, is fairly certain that she was not.

-13-
However, counsel did not know, and thus did not advise her client, that
the client had to als__.Q
voice such an objection for it to be effective.
Although it was known that a defendant had to personally object to
delays _ statutory time limits, there was no reason for counsel to
know that a personal objection was needed to delays within statutory
time limits, since that rule was not established until this court's ruling in
thi__._s
case. Indeed, undersigned counsel did not know that rule, either.

It is certainly unfair to h.old that petitioner waived her right to

speedy trial because she did not personally object to a delay when
neither she nor her counsel were aware that such a personal objection
was necessary. Future litigants will, of course, be well advised
regarding the necessity for such an objection. Not only is it unfair to
petitioner to impose that requirement upon her, it is also an invitation to
a renewed attack in the trial court based not upon a direct denial of
petitioner's right to speedy trial, but upon the ineffective assistance of
counsel in failing to advise petitioner of the means to protect that right.
This court should accordingly grant rehearing in order to provide
that the rule that a defendant must personally object to delay within the
lO-day period is not to be applied to the petitioner in thi._ss
case.
//
//
#
//
//

//
//
II
//
//
//

-14-
 CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, petitioner respectfully urges this

court to grant rehearing.
Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL P. JUDGE, PUBLIC DEFENDER

OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

Karen Nash,
John Hamilton Scott,
Deputy Public Defenders

• -° • tj

By 4/"'Z___

JOHI_ HAMILTON SCOTT

,7 Deputy Public Defender

Attorneys for Petitioner

-15-
 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Counsel of Record hereby certifies that pursuant to the California

Rules of Court, the enclosed Petition for Rehearing is produced using 13-

point Roman type including footnotes and contains approximately 4,233

words, which is less than the 14,000 words permitted by this rule. Counsel

relies on the word count of the computer program used to prepare this brief.

TJ ASTER
Deputy Public Defender
 DECLARATION OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, declare I am over eighteen years of age, and not a party to the within
cause; my business address is 320 West Temple Street, Suite 590, Los Angeles, California 90012;
that on August 21, 2008, I served the within PETITION FOR REHEARING, VARDUI ROSE
BARSAMYAN, on each of the persons named below by depositing a true copy thereof, enclosed
in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid in the United States mail in the City of Los
Angeles, addressed as follows:

BILL LOCKYER, ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
300 SOUTH SPRING STREET
LOS ANGELES, CA 90013

PRESIDING JUDGE
LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
111 NORTH HILL STREET
LOS ANGELES, CA 90012

CLERK, APPELLATE DIVISION

LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
111 NORTH HILL STREET
LOS ANGELES, CA 90012

ROCKARD J. DELGADILLO, CITY ATTORNEY

CRIMINAL APPEALS SECTION
500 CITY HALL EAST
200 NORTH MAIN STREET
LOS ANGELES, CA 90012

CLERK, COURT OF APPEAL

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
300 SOUTH SPRING STREET
LOS ANGELES, CA 90013

I further declare that I served the above referred-to document by hand delivering a copy
thereof addressed to:

STEVE COOLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY

APPELLATE DIVISION
320 WEST TEMPLE STREET, SUITE 540
LOS ANGELES, CA 90012

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on
August 21, 2008, at Los Angeles, California.