Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Cixriai Baxx
Ciiii ni i i r\, Tiaxs iaiixc\
axi Cixriai i zari ox
Jakob de Haan, Sylvester C.W.
Eijfnger, and Sandra Waller
The adoption of the euro in 1999 by 11 member
states of the European Union created a single currency
area second in economic size only to the United States.
The euro areas monetary policy is now set by the
European Central Bank (ECB) and its Governing
Council rather than by individual national central
banks. This CESifo volume examines issues that have
arisen in the rst years of ECB monetary policy and
analyzes the effect that current ECB policy strategy
and structures may have in the future.
After a detailed description and assessment of
ECB monetary policy making that focuses on such
issues as price stability and the predictability of policy
decisions, the book turns to two important issues
faced by European central bankers: the transparency
and credibility of decision making and the ECBs
decentralized structure. After showing that
transparency in decision making enhances credibility,
the book discusses the ECBs efforts at openness, its
political independence as guaranteed by law, and its
ultimate accountability. The book then considers the
effects of the decentralized ECB structure, focusing on
business cycle synchronization, ination differentials,
and differences in monetary policy transmission in
light of the enlargement of the monetary union. The
book also discusses options for ECB institutional
reforms, including centralization, vote weighting, and
cross-border regional banks.
Jakob de Haan is Professor of Political Economy and
Scientic Director of the research school SOM at the
University of Groningen. Sylvester C. W. Eijfnger is
Professor of Financial Economics at the Center for
Economic Research and the Department of Economics
and Jean Monnet Professor of European Financial and
Monetary Integration at Tilburg University. Sandra
Waller works at Bavarian Landesbank, a state-owned
private institute.
CESifo Book Series
The MIT Press
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142
http://mitpress.mit.edu
Tui Euioiiax
Cixriai Baxx
Ciiii ni i i r\, Tiaxs iaiixc\,
axi Cixriai i zari ox
The authors succeed marvelously in providing the dosage of institutional and theoretical analysis
necessary to understand the functioning of the ECB. As a result this book will be a must not only
for ECB watchers but also for students interested in European affairs.
Paul De Grauwe, Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium
This is a well-researched, carefully written, and nicely balanced study of the monetary policy
mechanisms of the European Central Bank, focusing on the political economy aspects of its
decision-making processes. Besides giving a detailed and generally favourable study of the status
quo, the authors advocate a more complete and overt shift towards an ination targeting strategy, a
continuing focus on transparency and accountability, and greater centralisation of decision making,
especially after the accession countries join the eurozone.
Charles Goodhart, Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics and Political Science
,!7IA2G2-aeccga!:t;K;k;K;k
0-262-04226-6
Jakob de Haan, Sylvester C.W. Eijfnger,
and Sandra Waller
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Continued on back ap
The European Central Bank 3/17/05 2:05 PM Page 1
The European Central
Bank
CESifo Book Series
edited by Hans-Werner Sinn
Marc Gradstein, Moshe Justman, and Volker Meier
The Political Economy of Education: Implications for Growth and Inequality
Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka, in cooperation with Chang Woon Nam
The Decline of the Welfare State: Demographics and Globalization
Jakob de Haan, Sylvester C. W. Eijfnger, and Sandra Waller
The European Central Bank: Credibility, Transparency, and Centralization
The European Central
Bank
Credibility, Transparency,
and Centralization
Jakob de Haan,
Sylvester C. W. Eijfnger, and
Sandra Waller
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
2005 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any elec-
tronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage
and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher.
MIT Press books may be purchased at special quantity discounts for business or sales
promotional use. For information, please email special_sales@mitpress.mit.edu or write
to Special Sales Department, The MIT Press, 5 Cambridge Center, Cambridge, MA02142.
This book was set in Palatino by SNP Best-set Typesetter Ltd., Hong Kong and was
printed and bound in the United States of America.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Haan, Jakob de.
The European Central Bank: credibility, transparency, and centralization / Jakob de
Haan, Sylvester C. W. Eijfnger, and Sandra Waller.
p. cm. (CESifo book series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-262-04226-6 (alk. paper)
1. European Central Bank. 2. Banks and banking, CentralEuropean Union countries.
3. Monetary policyEuropean Union countries. I. Eijfnger, Sylvester C. W. II. Waller,
Sandra. III. Title. IV. Series.
HG2976.H325 2005
332.11094dc22
2004059701
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Series Foreword vii
Preface ix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 The Start of the Monetary Union 1
1.2 Main Issues 2
2 The ECB: Structure, Strategy, and Policy 9
2.1 Introduction 9
2.2 Structure of the E(S)CB 10
2.3 Monetary Policy Strategy of the ECB 11
2.4 Monetary Policy of the ECB 16
2.5 ECBs Evaluation of Its Monetary Policy Strategy 21
2.6 Conclusions 25
3 The ECBs Strategy: An Assessment 27
3.1 Introduction 27
3.2 Predictability of Policy Decisions 27
3.3 Ination Objective 36
3.4 Role of the First Pillar 47
3.5 Ination Forecasts 56
3.6 External Value of the Euro 57
3.7 Asset Price Ination 74
3.8 Interest Stepping versus Smoothing 78
3.9 Conclusions 80
4 Transparency, Accountability, and Credibility of the ECB 83
4.1 Introduction 83
4.2 Transparency and Disclosure: Theory and Evidence 85
vi Contents
4.3 Transparency of the ECB 94
4.4 Accountability of the ECB 108
4.5 Blinders Survey on Credibility 112
4.6 Credibility of the ECB 117
4.7 Conclusions 123
5 Centralization or Decentralization 125
5.1 Introduction 125
5.2 The Decentralized Eurosystem 125
5.3 Risks of Decentralization 130
5.4 Diverging Business Cycles in the Euro Area? 137
5.5 Different Ination Rates in the Euro Area 148
5.6 Differences in Monetary Policy Transmission and Financial
Structure 160
5.7 Conclusions 167
6 New Member Countries 169
6.1 Introduction 169
6.2 Central Bank Independence and Convergence 170
6.3 Implications of Enlargement of the Monetary Union 192
6.4 Conclusions 210
7 Options for Reform 213
7.1 Introduction 213
7.2 Options for Reform 215
7.3 The ECB Proposal 220
7.4 Conclusions 223
8 Conclusions 225
Notes 229
References 239
Index 261
CESifo Book Series
Foreword
This volume is part of the CESifo Book Series. Each book in the series
aims to cover a topical policy issue in economics. The monographs
reect the research agenda of the Ifo Institute for Economic Research
and they are typically tandem projects where internationally
renowned economists from the CESifo network cooperate with Ifo
researchers. The monographs have been anonymously refereed and
revised after being presented and discussed at several workshops
hosted by the Ifo Institute.
Hans-Werner Sinn
Preface
This book offers our syntheses of the debate on the European Central
Bank (ECB), focusing on two sets of issues: the transparency and cred-
ibility of the ECB, and its decentralized setup. We argue that these
issues are relevant for evaluating the performance of the ECB since
1999. These issues play an important role in the discussion of the ECBs
monetary policy strategy and debate on institutional reform of the ECB.
Parts of this book were presented at seminars and workshops at
various places, including the Bank of England (London), CESifo
(Munich), the ECB (Frankfurt), the University of Antwerp, the Center
for European Studies at Harvard University, and the Bundesbank
(Frankfurt). We would like to thank the participants in these seminars
and workshops for their stimulating comments. Thanks are also due to
Lex Hoogduin, Julius Horvath, and Jan-Egbert Sturm for their com-
ments. We also would like to thank three anonymous referees for their
very helpful suggestions.
We also would like to express our gratitude to a number of our co-
authors of papers that have, in one way or another, found a place in
this book: Ivo Arnold, Helge Berger, Adam Elbourne, Petra Geraats,
Robert Inklaar, Bas Kiviet, Linda Toolsema, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and
Peter van Els. Special thanks are further in order to Maaike Beugels-
dijk, Carin van der Cruijsen, David-Jan Janssen, Olaf de Groot, Richard
Jong-a-Pin, Robert Inklaar, and Jrg Reddig for their assistance in gath-
ering data and other research assistance. Last we would like to thank
the Nederlandsche Bank for providing valuable data and Dana Andrus
for editorial support.
The European Central
Bank
1.1 The Start of the Monetary Union
On January 1, 1999, Europe entered a new era with the adoption of a
single currencythe euroby eleven of the fteen member states of
the European Union (EU). Greece joined the euro area in 2001. For the
rst time since the Roman empire a large portion of Europe now shares
a common currency.
1
The launch of the euro has created the worlds
second largest single currency area in terms of economic size after the
Unites States.
It is the rst time in history that countries of anything like this
number, size, or global economic weight have gathered together on a
voluntary basis to share a currency and pool their monetary sover-
eignty. With the start of the nal phase of the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU), participating countries no longer have their own mon-
etary sovereignty. Monetary policy in the euro area has been delegated
to the European Central Bank (ECB). The Governing Council of the
ECB is responsible for taking monetary policy decisions. This Council
consists of the Executive Board of the ECBmade up of the president,
the vice president, and four other membersand the central bank gov-
ernors from the twelve euro countries. Together with national central
banks, the ECB is part of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).
While the ECB is responsible for policy decisions, national central
banks play a role in implementing monetary policy.
2
The ECBs primary objective, as laid down in the Maastricht
Treaty, is price stability. In 1998 the ECB announced its interpretation
of price stability: maintaining ination below 2 percent in the medium
term. It also developed a so-called two-pillar strategy to accomplish
this objective. The instruments and procedures through which the
Eurosystemnamely the ECB and the national central banks in the
1
Introduction
2 Introduction
euro area
3
conducts its operations are working smoothly. Financial
operators learned to cope with the new money market in just a few
weeks.
Not so long ago, the idea of merging the monetary systems of the
EU countries seemed fantastic. Nevertheless, a plan for doing so was
drawn up by the Delors Committee. This committeenamed after its
chairman, Jacques Delors, who was at the time the president of the
European Commissionwas authorized by the European Council in
June 1988 with the task of studying and proposing stages leading to
economic and monetary union. Its report proposed three stages in a
gradual move to monetary union, but stressed that the timing of each
stage required a political decision. Many ideas of the Delors Commit-
tee found their way in the Maastricht Treaty, named after the place in
the Netherlands where the leaders of the EU countries met to take a
decision on EMU.
Then, with the ink of this blueprint barely dry, the forerunner of the
single currency, the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European
Monetary System (EMS), almost collapsed, casting doubt about the
project. Many skeptics asked what hope there could be for a monetary
union among countries unable to keep national currencies aligned.
4
Indeed, sometimes EMU was perceived as an ambitious project that
would never y, just like the emu, the large Australian bird. Still the
European governments carried on. With the start of the monetary
union in January 1999 their vision became reality.
1.2 Main Issues
With the 1999 start of the monetary union, the ECB became respon-
sible for monetary policy making.
5
Chapter 2 describes the ECBs
monetary policy strategy and policy decisions in some detail. The
monetary policy strategy of the ECB, which was announced on October
13, 1998, consists of three main elements: a quantitative denition of
price stability, a prominent role for money in the assessment of risks
to price stability (at the time called the rst pillar), and a broadly
based assessment of the outlook for price developments (the second
pillar). In accord with the rst pillar, the ECB uses a quantitative ref-
erence value for the annual growth rate of a broad monetary aggregate
(M3) by which it can assess whether monetary developments pose a
risk to price stability. The denition of price stability adopted was a
year-on-year increase of the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices
(HICP) for the euro area, which was not to exceed 2 percent in the
medium term.
In December 2002 the ECB Governing Council decided to evaluate
the strategy, taking into account the public debate and the outcomes of
research undertaken by staff of the Eurosystem. The results of this eval-
uation were published in May 2003. The Governing Council agreed
that in the pursuit of price stability, it would aim to maintain ination
rates below but close to 2 percent over the medium term. According
to the Council, this clarication underlines the ECBs commitment to
provide a sufcient safety margin to guard against the risks of dea-
tion. It also addresses the issue of the possible presence of a measure-
ment bias in the HICP and the implications of ination differentials
within the euro area. The Council also decided that in the presenta-
tion of the arguments for a certain policy decision, the president of the
ECB would start with what is now called the Economic Analysis (i.e.,
the previous second pillar). Most academic observers considered these
decisions to imply that the rst pillar had become less important.
Although they were generally argued to be in the right direction, many
such observers claimed that the steps taken by the Governing Council
did not go far enough. Svensson (2003) stated, for instance, that It
would have been better to throw the reference value on the garbage
heap of history where it belongs.
Chapter 3 offers our assessment of the ECBs monetary policy
strategy. We focus on issues like the denition of price stability, the
predictability of policy decisions, and the role of the rst pillar. In
this chapter we also discuss the role of the external value of the euro
in the ECBs strategy.
The rest of the book deals with two sets of issues that European central
bankers are faced with. Arst important issue for the ECBas it is for
every central bankis its transparency. According to the Code of Good
Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF 2000a)
6
:
The case for transparency of monetary and nancial policies is based on two
main premises. First, the effectiveness of monetary and nancial policies can
be strengthened if the goals and instruments of policy are known to the public
and if the authorities can make a credible commitment to meeting them. In
making available more information about monetary and nancial policies,
good transparency practices promote the potential efciency of markets.
Second, good governance calls for central banks and nancial agencies to be
Introduction 3
4 Introduction
accountable; particularly where the monetary and nancial authorities are
granted a high degree of autonomy. . . . In making the objectives of monetary
policy public, the central bank enhances the publics understanding of what it
is seeking to achieve, and provides a context for articulating its own policy
choices, thereby contributing to the effectiveness of monetary policy. Further,
by providing the private sector with a clear description of the considerations
guiding monetary policy decisions, transparency about the policy process
makes the monetary policy transmission mechanism generally more effective,
in part by ensuring that market expectations can be formed more efciently.
By providing the public with adequate information about its activities, the
central bank can establish a mechanism for strengthening its credibility by
matching its actions to its public statements.
The ECB tries to be open. There are, for instance, regular press con-
ferences, a monthly bulletin is being issued and the president of the
ECB appears before the European Parliament four times each year.
Recently the ECB also started to publish staff forecasts (i.e., projections)
of ination. All this has led Otmar Issingmember of the Executive
Board and chief economist of the ECBto conclude that in terms of
transparency, the ECB can emerge proudly from the comparison to any
other leading central bank (Issing 2001a, p. 14). However, nancial
market reports often suggest that the ECB has not been very success-
ful in explaining its policies to nancial market participants. For
instance, in the Goldman Sachs Weekly Analyst of June 25, 1999, it
was stated that the ECB has not yet succeeded in giving an entirely
clear and convincing message on monetary policy issues to nancial
markets. In chapter 4 we analyze the transparency of the ECB.
As follows from the citation of the IMF Code of Good Practices on
Transparency, it is often argued that transparency may enhance the
credibility of the policy maker. Although economists often base their
models on the notion of credibility, little is actually known about it. For
instance, how can a central bank become credible? Should a central
bank be independent to be credible? In a survey among central bankers,
Blinder (2000) asked his respondents how important credibility is. It
appeared that there is a broad consensus among central bankers that
credibility is very important. Blinder also asked his respondents how
a central bank can build credibility. On a scale from 1 (unimportant) to
5 (of the utmost importance) the answer granting a central bank inde-
pendence received an average score of 4.51, becoming the second
highest score after a history of honesty (4.58). Do nancial market
participants agree with central bankers that credibility is important?
And if so, why, and how can it be built? And how is the ECB rated in
terms of credibility in comparison to, for instance, the US Federal
Reserve and the Bank of England? Chapter 4 reports the outcomes of
a survey similar to Blinders among private sector economists on the
credibility of the ECB.
The ECB isat least in legal termspolitically independent. Not
only does the Maastricht Treaty prohibit the ECB from taking orders
from politicians, the members of the Executive Board are appointed for
eight-year, nonrenewable terms, insulating them from pressures to
please politicians in order to get re-appointed. National central bank
governors have, at minimum, ve-year contracts. As follows from the
citation of the IMF Code on Good Practice on Transparency, indepen-
dent agencies should be accountable. The nal issue in chapter 4 is
therefore the accountability of the ECB.
The second main issue on which the book focuses is the decentralized
structure of the central bank of the euro area. As will be explained in
more detail in chapter 2, in the initial setup of the ECB presidents of
national central banks have a majority in the Governing Council. This
is unlike the US central bank structure, with just 5 members from the
regional Federal Reserve Banks within the decision-making Federal
Open Market Committee of 12 members. Also in comparison with the
German Bundesbankwith 9 votes from the Land central banks within
the Bundesbanks Central Bank Council of 17 membersthe ECB is
very decentralized. Critics of the ESCB sometimes argue that its decen-
tralization is a design aw. For instance, The Economist stated that:
The Governing Council is supposed to set interest rates according to conditions
in the euro area as a whole, but there is a risk that national governors will be
unduly inuenced by conditions in their home country. Small countries may
also carry undue weight in the system. . . . A weak centre, combined with
strong national interests, could create conicts that undermine the whole
systems credibility.
7
There are at least three conditions that must be met for a common mon-
etary policy to succeed without causing frictions among the members
of the monetary union (Guiso et al. 1999). First, members must agree
on the ultimate goals of the common monetary policy. This issue was
largely settled through the Maastricht Treaty and the ensuing ratica-
tion process, leading to the adoption of price stability as the primary
objective for the ECB. Second, the common monetary policy will be
easier to implement if the member countries business cycles are
Introduction 5
6 Introduction
aligned and if ination rates are very similar. If various countries (or
sizable regions) in the monetary union are not at the same points in the
business cycle or have different ination rates, decision making on the
appropriate monetary policy stance becomes a difcult task. It is clear
that countries in the euro area sometimes have different ination rates
and business cycles, although some authors have argued that mone-
tary and economic integration will lead to more business cycle syn-
chronization (e.g., see Frankel and Rose 1998). Third, the monetary
policy transmission mechanism should operate in a similar fashion
across the member countries of the monetary union. Differences in the
transmission mechanism could mean that the appropriate size and
timing of monetary policy decisions are difcult to assess. Moreover, if
the burden of adjustment is not equally shared across countries, sizable
distribution differences may create political tensions. Chapter 5 deals
with these issues. In particular, in this chapter we examine the degree
of business cycle synchronization in the euro area, the ination differ-
entials among the euro countries, and (the persistence of) differences
in monetary transmission across these countries.
Although the ECB is a very young institution, there is already a
debate going on about its reform in view of the recent enlargement
of the European Union. The new EU members (eight eastern European
countries and two southern European countries) are expected to apply
soon for euro area membership. Negotiations about EU membership
started with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia,
and Cyprus in March 1998; in February 2000 negotiations were opened
with Slovakia, Malta, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, and Lithuania.
8
The European Union has outlined a three-step approach to the mon-
etary integration of the accession countries. The applicants must rst
join the European Union, next enter the Exchange Rate Mechanism II
(ERM II), and, nally, after fulllment of the Maastricht convergence
criteria, accede to the euro area.
To qualify for EU membership, an applicant must have a strong
market economy and stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the
rule of law, and human rights. Furthermore the country must have
largely adapted its laws to comply with EU legislation, known as the
acquis communautaire, and have the ability to implement that legisla-
tion. In December 2002 the European Union decided that all applicant
countries, except for Bulgaria and Romania, could become EU
members in 2004. Bulgaria and Romania will enter at a later stage.
At some point in time, the new EU members will join the euro area
(chapter 6). Furthermore in the near future three EU members that
are currently not members of the euro area might adopt the euro (the
United Kingdom, Sweden, and Denmark). So membership in the
Eurosystem could increase from the current 12 to 27. In the absence
of modication of the current ECB statute, this enlargement could
have severe consequences for the efciency of monetary policy making
in the euro area. A larger ECB Council would experience great dif-
culties in decision making. Without reform of the current ECB Statute,
the size of the ECB Governing Council could increase from 18 to 33,
making it by far the largest monetary policy-making institution among
OECD countries. Due to this increase in membership, discussion
and voting procedures will likely become more time-consuming and
complicated.
A second reason why the issue of reform of the ECB is on the polit-
ical agenda is related to the decentralized nature of the ECB.
9
Since
almost all accession countries are small in economic terms relative to
current euro area members, enlargement within the given institutional
setup will signicantly increase the degree of overrepresentation of the
areas smaller member countries in the Council in terms of relative eco-
nomic size. For instance, in a monetary union with 27 members the
current ECB statute implies that the representatives of its smallest 17
member states, representing only about 10 percent of the areas aggre-
gated GDP, could determine monetary policy decisions in the euro
area. Overrepresentation, while not necessarily a problem per se, has
the potential to introduce an unwelcome bias into the ECBs decision
making, if country representatives put at least some weight on national
economic developments and these developments deviated notably
from the behavior of euro area aggregates. Since the bulk of the acces-
sion countries are transition economies, they may be subject to idio-
syncratic shocks and somewhat higher structural ination than the core
of the euro area. Chapter 6 therefore discusses business cycle synchro-
nization, ination differentials, and monetary policy transmission in
the accession countries.
There are various ways how the ECB can be reformed, like central-
ization (the Executive Board will become responsible for policy deci-
sions), vote weighting (the vote of a national central banker depends
on the size of the economy), representation (one central banker repre-
sents various central banks), extending regional central banks across
Introduction 7
8 Introduction
national borders, and rotation (the governors of national central banks
have rotating voting rights). The ECB has chosen for a system of
rotation, in which national central banks have rotating voting rights,
depending on the size of their economies. Many academics have criti-
cized the ECB proposal and favor more centralization. Chapter 7 there-
fore presents various options for reform of the ECB. The nal chapter
of the book offers our main conclusions.
2.1 Introduction
The Maastricht Treaty made the European Central Bank (ECB) politi-
cally independent. Nowadays it is widely believed that central bank
independence and an explicit mandate for the bank to restrain ina-
tion are important institutional devices to ensure price stability. It is
thought that an independent central bank can give full priority to main-
taining low levels of ination. In countries with dependent central
banks other considerations (notably, re-election prospects of politicians
and low levels of unemployment) can interfere with the objective of
price stability. The example often mentioned is the German central
bank. Because the Deutsche Bundesbank was relatively autonomous,
Germany had one of the best postSecond World War ination records
among the OECD countries. The statute of the ECB is largely modeled
after the laws governing the Bundesbank.
This chapter starts with a brief description of the structure of the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) (section 2.2), followed by a
discussion of the monetary policy strategy of the ECB (section 2.3) and
actual policies since 1999 (section 2.4).
1
The monetary policy strategy
of the ECB has three main elements: a quantitative denition of price
stability, a prominent role for money in the assessment of risks to price
stability, and a broadly based assessment of the outlook for price devel-
opments. In December 2002 the ECB Governing Council decided to
evaluate this strategy in the light of the experience, taking into account
the public debate and the outcomes of research undertaken by staff of
the Eurosystem. The results of this evaluation were published in May
2003. Section 2.5 discusses the results, while the nal section offers our
conclusions.
2
The ECB: Structure,
Strategy, and Policy
10 Chapter 2
2.2 Structure of the E(S)CB
The European System of Central Banks consists of the European Central
Bank and the national central banks. The ECB and the national central
banks of the countries that have adopted the euro are often referred to
as the Eurosystem. If all member states of the EU adopt the euro, the
Eurosystem and ESCB will be synonymous.
The ESCB is governed by the decision-making bodies of the ECB: the
Governing Council, the Executive Board, and the General Council
(see gure 2.1). The Governing Council of the ECB is the most important
decision-making body of the ECB. It consists of the Executive Board of
the ECB and the governors of the national central banks of the coun-
tries in the euro area. The Governing Council is responsible for for-
mulating monetary policy, including decisions about intermediate
objectives and interest rates. The Council decides, in principle, by
simple majority. At the time of writing, 12 out of the 18 members in the
Governing Council are presidents of national central banks, who have
been appointed by their respective governments. However, when
taking monetary policy decisions, the members of the Governing
Council of the ECB are not expected to act as national representatives
but rather in a fully independent personal capacity. The setup of the
ECB is therefore based on the principle of one person, one vote. This
way national central bankers are involved in monetary policy deci-
Figure 2.1
Structure of the European System of Central Banks. (Source: Eijfnger and De Haan 2000)
ESCB
15 National central banks: 3 outs and 12 ins:
ECB
Governing Council Executive Board General Council
President President Executive Board of the ECB
Vice president Vice president and
Governors of the central banks of the
Up to four other members Governors of
countries in the euro area
national central
banks
Eurosystem
sions, and in this respect the ECB differs from other central banks in
federal countries (see chapter 5 for a further discussion). In looking
ahead to the enlargement of the monetary union (see chapter 6),
various proposals were put forward to reform the ECB. These reform
proposals are discussed in chapter 7.
The Executive Board of the ECB consists of the president, the vice
president, and up to four other members. The Executive Board imple-
ments monetary policy decisions taken by the Governing Council. In
doing so, it may give instructions to national central banks. The Euro-
pean Council appoints members of the Executive Board. Their term in
ofce is eight years and is not renewable. A system of staggered
appointments has been applied for the appointment of its rst
members.
As long as not all EU member states use the euro as their currency,
the General Council will also play a role within the ESCB. It consists of
the president and vice president of the ECB and the governors of the
national central banks of all EU member countries. As the central banks
of the EU countries that have not (yet) adopted the euro continue to
pursue national monetary policies, they will not participate in deci-
sions related to the single monetary policy for the euro area. In the
General Council they will, however, have the opportunity to discuss
monetary policy issues and their exchange rate relations with the euro.
2.3 Monetary Policy Strategy of the ECB
The primary objective of the ESCB is price stability.
2
However, the
Maastricht Treaty does not provide a specic denition of this objec-
tive. In October 1998 the Governing Council of the ECB dened price
stability as follows: a year-on-year increase of the Harmonized Index of
Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area, which does not exceed 2
percent in the medium term. Issing et al. (2001) point out that this quan-
tication is in agreement with the stated preferences of European gov-
ernments as expressed several times in the European Councils Broad
Economic Guidelines.
The HICP is a comprehensive measure for ination, reecting the
focus of the general public on consumer goods.
3
The aim of an ina-
tion rate below 2 percent clearly delineates the maximum rate of
ination deemed to be consistent with price stability. The wording
year-on-year increases implies that persistent price decreases
that is to say, deation in the measured price indexwould not be
The ECB: Structure, Strategy, and Policy 11
12 Chapter 2
considered to be consistent with price stability either. The Governing
Council explicitly announced that price stability is to be maintained
over the medium term, thereby acknowledging that price levels may
be temporarily distorted by short-term factors. As Issing (2001a, p. 10)
states:
[T]he track record of the ECB . . . cannot be assessed on the basis of temporary
deviations from price stability caused by external and unavoidable shocks. In
view of the lags with which monetary policy affects the economy, a central bank
cannot ensure price stability at each and every moment in time in the face of
exogenous shocks.
The wording for the euro area highlights that areawide develop-
ments, instead of specic national or regional factors, are the only
determinants of decisions regarding the single monetary policy. Ayear-
on-year increase of the HICP for the euro area as a whole represents
price stability, even if increases in national price indexes are above 2
percent per year. As Issing (2001a, p. 8) puts it:
[R]egional ination differentials [should] not be considered as a necessary
source of problems . . . the differentials may be reecting the appropriate eco-
nomic adjustment to the temporary insurgence of disparities in productivity
growth or to the realization of other asymmetric shocks.
At the time the monetary policy of the ECB was introduced, it rested on
the strategy of two pillars (ECB 2004). The rst pillar is a prominent role
for money. As ination in the long run is considered to be a monetary
phenomenon, the ECB Governing Council announced a quantitative
reference value for the annual growth rate of a broad monetary aggre-
gate (M3). The focus on M3 was supported, according to the ECB
(2001), by its favorable empirical properties such as a stable money
demand function. Furthermore M3 is known to be a good indicator of
ination (Issing et al. 2001). A reference value for M3 growth was set
at 4.5 percent but was not considered intermediate monetary target, in
order to avoid an automatic monetary policy reaction to uctuations
in M3 growth that may not be associated with inationary pressures,
but that may result, for example, from. . . nancial innovations (Issing
1999a, p. 20).
Although the rst pillar is sometimes presented as only referring to
M3 growth (e.g., see Begg et al. 2000), the ECB concerns itself not only
with the extent to which M3 growth deviates from the reference value,
it also analyzes the underlying causes. Quite a lot of attention is cur-
rently being paid, for instance, to the growth rates of the components
of M3, notably the growth rate of credit supplied to the private sector
(see section 3.4 for further details).
The second pillar is a broadly based assessment of developments
regarding the outlook on prices and the treats to price stability in the
euro area as a whole. A wide range of economic and nancial indica-
tors is used for this purpose. These variables can be grouped as (1) gap
measures (i.e., measures of the discrepancy between output, or its
factors of production, and their equilibrium values), (2) measures of
cost pressure, (3) international prices and exchange rates, and (4) other
asset prices. The indicators used are as follows:
HICP and other price indicators in the euro area. This includes producer
prices, which are a leading indicator for HICP ination. In addition
prices in the world markets for raw materials are closely monitored,
especially the price of crude oil.
4
Included in this category are the dea-
tor of the euro areas gross domestic product (GDP) as well as the
deators of its components. Also real estate prices are watched, where
possible.
Indicators for the real sector. This includes the real GDP and its
components, and also the production of the manufacturing, and other
sectors. The capacity utilization rate also belongs to this category of
indicators.
Exchange rates. The eurodollar exchange rate, and the (real and
nominal) effective exchange rates, are closely monitored by the ECB.
The initial decline of the euro vis--vis the dollar has had quite some
impact on ination in the euro area (see section 3.6.1 for a discussion).
Does the central bank provide an explicit policy rule or strategy that
describes its monetary policy framework?
Does the central bank disclose how each decision on the level of its
main operating instrument or target was reached?
Only the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Bank of England get
the full score for procedural disclosure. The Bank of Japan, the Sveriges
Riksbank, and the Federal Reserve Bank all earn 2 points. Both the Bank
of Japan and the Federal Reserve loose 1 point under the rst question
above, since they dont provide an explicit policy rule or strategy that
describes its monetary policy framework. The Sveriges Riksbank earns
no points under the last question above, since it has no actual voting
records available.
Policy disclosure means prompt disclosure of policy decisions. In
addition it includes an explanation of the decision, and an explicit
policy inclination or indication of likely future policy actions. It is quan-
tied by the following questions:
Does the central bank regularly evaluate to what extent its main
policy operating targets (if any) have been achieved?
A credible central bank can more easily act as a lender of last resort
in a nancial crisis (e.g., during a market crash or bank run) without
creating fears that it has lost its dedication to ghting ination.
Central bankers are public servants that have a duty to be open and
truthful.
The central bank should have a history of doing what it says it will
do.
The central bank governor should take a personal loss (e.g., lower
salary or step down) if ination rises too high.
Absence of high scal decit and debt ratio create central bank
credibility.
The survey was held for the rst time in May 2000. More than 200
people lled in the questionnaire. This gave a response rate of 45
percent. The survey respondents included economists from various
countries, allowing us to differentiate between economists located in
EMU countries and those located elsewhere. We could also differenti-
ate between economists afliated with nancial institutions (banks,
insurance companies, etc.) and those working for rms or research
institutes. Last, the survey allowed us to determine whether the ina-
tion experience of the respondents country was systematically related
to the answers given.
Table 4.8 summarizes the main ndings for the rst questions of our
survey. Note that the gures for questions 3 and 4 are ranking aver-
ages and cannot be compared to the ratings of Blinders survey. As far
as the importance of credibility is concerned (Q1), our respondents
gave almost as high a mark as central bankers, although the standard
deviation is somewhat higher. Also as far as the relationship between
credibility of a central bank and its dedication to price stability is con-
cerned (Q2) the average score of our respondents is very close to those
of Blinders survey among central bankers. Professional economists
apparently agreed more on this issue with central bankers than with
academic economists.
With respect to the question of why credibility is important (Q3),
some notable differences between the two surveys show up. The
strongest divergence of rankings is on the usefulness of credibility for
Transparency, Accountability, and Credibility of the ECB 119
120 Chapter 4
changing tactics. Our respondents give this reason for the importance
of credibility the highest ranking, whereas the central bankers in
Blinders survey placed this fth. Another interesting result is the
ranking of the importance of credibility for price stability in both
surveys. Although central bankers put this on top of their list, our
respondents ranked it third. The role of credibility in central bank inde-
pendence is only minor according to our respondents. This result is in
line with Blinders ndings for academic economists, who ranked it
seventh. However, central bankers give it rank 4.
With respect to the question as to how credibility can be built (Q4)
the rankings of our respondents are broadly in line with those of the
central bankers (and academic economists) in Blinders survey. A
history of honesty and central bank independence gets the highest
ranking in both surveys. Personal incentives for central bankers are not
regarded as adequate to earn credibility.
Table 4.8
Our survey of private sector economists about credibility
Standard
Question Issue Average deviation
Q1 Importance 4.66 0.49
Q2 Related to dedication to price stability 4.02 0.61
Q3 Less costly disination 3.31 (2) 2.09
To keep ination low 3.40 (3) 1.68
To change tactics 3.26 (1) 1.72
To serve as lender of last resort 3.74 (4) 1.71
To defend the currency 3.96 (5) 1.91
Public servants should be truthful 5.82 (7) 1.70
For support of independence 4.53 (6) 1.86
Q4 Importance of CBI for credibility 1.80 (1) 1.32
Importance of transparency for credibility 3.13 (3) 1.46
Importance of history of honesty for 2.93 (2) 1.43
credibility
Importance of history of ghting ination for 3.70 (4) 1.36
credibility
Importance of being constrained by a rule for 4.85 (5) 1.47
credibility
Importance of incentives (personal loss) for 6.38 (7) 1.07
credibility
Importance of small decit and low debt ratio 5.26 (6) 1.49
for credibility
Table 4.9 shows the outcomes of three subsamples of our respon-
dents: economists from euro-area countries, economists afliated with
a nancial institution, and economists based in countries that had rel-
atively high ination rates in the past.
19
The answers from economists
from banks and insurance companies as to the reasons why credibility
is important and how it can be built turned out to be very much in line
with the results for our total sample. The same was true for economists
located in the euro area and in countries with relatively high ination
rates in the past.
Last, we asked our respondents to rank seven central banks with
respect to their credibility, Can you rank (from 1 to 7, where 1 is highest)
the following central banks in terms of their credibility?
Transparency, Accountability, and Credibility of the ECB 121
Table 4.9
Our survey of private sector economists about credibility: Economists from EMU coun-
tries, nancial institutions, and high-ination countries
High-
EMU Financial ination
Question Issue based Institutions countries
Q1 Importance 4.65 4.78 4.67
Q2 Related to dedication to price 4.10 4.15 4.03
stability
Q3 Less costly disination 3.29 (2) 2.82 (1) 3.43 (3)
To keep ination low 3.38 (3) 3.49 (3) 3.75 (4)
To change tactics 3.41 (1) 3.12 (2) 3.33 (1)
To serve as lender of last resort 3.62 (4) 3.81 (4) 3.85 (5)
To defend the currency 3.99 (5) 4.28 (5) 3.40 (2)
Public servants should be truthful 5.75 (7) 5.99 (7) 5.71 (7)
For support of independence 4.57 (6) 4.54 (6) 4.57 (6)
Q4 Importance of CBI for credibility 1.89 (1) 1.75 (1) 1.75 (1)
Importance of transparency for 3.05 (3) 3.09 (3) 3.36 (3)
credibility
Importance of history of honesty 3.01(2) 2.97 (2) 2.89 (2)
for credibility
Importance of history of ghting 3.71 (4) 3.59(4) 3.88 (4)
ination for credibility
Importance of being constrained 4.79 (5) 5.18 (5) 4.75 (5)
by a rule for credibility
Importance of incentives 6.43 (7) 6.19 (7) 6.36 (7)
(personal loss) for credibility
Importance of small decit and 5.11 (6) 5.35 (6) 5.05 (6)
low debt ratio for credibility
122 Chapter 4
Banca dItalia
Bank of England
Bank of Japan
Banque de France
Deutsche Bundesbank
Federal Reserve
Table 4.10 presents our ndings for the credibility marks of the various
central banks. Our respondents gave the Federal Reserve the highest
mark, closely followed by the Bundesbank. The credibilities of the Bank
of England and the ECB were clearly higher than those of the Bank of
Japan and the Banca dItalia. Note that the ranking of central banks in
terms of credibility is the same as the ranking in terms of transparency
(table 4.4). One explanation may be that our respondents considered
the concepts to be closely related. Alternatively, they could have simply
ranked central banks on the basis of their recent performance.
Finally, table 4.11 shows the scores for three different groups of
respondents in our sample: economists based in an EMU country,
economists afliated with nancial institutions, and economists from a
high-ination country. Interestingly economists from EMU countries
gave the ECB a somewhat higher rating. The rating of the ECB by econ-
omists afliated with nancial institutions was a bit lower than in table
4.9, but the opposite can be seen for economists from high-ination
Table 4.10
Rankings of central banks in terms of their credibility
Central bank Average Standard deviation
Banca dItalia 6.42 (6.29) 1.02
Bank of England 3.74 (3.56) 1.19
Bank of Japan 5.48 (5.71) 1.29
Banque de France 4.86 (4.82) 1.14
Deutsche Bundesbank 1.89 (2.25) 1.12
European Central Bank 3.86 (3.52) 1.39
Federal Reserve 1.79 (1.59) 1.10
Note: The gures in parentheses in the second column show the outcome of a second
survey held in October 2001.
countries. To examine whether over time the credibility of the ECB had
improved, we repeated question 5 in another survey held in October
2001. In table 4.10 the results of this second survey are shown in paren-
theses. It is reassuring to see that the rank of the ECB had improved
somewhat.
So far we have only analyzed and compared the results of the total
samples of both surveys. However, the samples do differ signicantly
in sizethe sample of the rst survey was almost twice as big as in the
follow-up surveyand in composition. Some participants took part in
the rst survey but not in the second, and vice versa. The answers of
experts who participated in both surveys allowed for a more in-depth
analysis of the change of assessments and opinions over time. Unfor-
tunately, this reduced the sample to 58 participants. It turned out that
the results for this group were identical to those of the full sample (not
shown). Respondents in EMU countries gave the ECB a higher rating
in the follow-up survey. Although they generally considered the ECB
a bit less credible than most other respondents, among respondents
from nancial institutions the ECB gained ground and surpassed the
Banque de France.
4.7 Conclusions
We distinguished among ve aspects of openness of central banks:
political, economic, procedural, policy, and operational disclosure.
From the review of the theoretical literature on central bank disclosure
and transparency we found no consensus over the desirability, from an
Transparency, Accountability, and Credibility of the ECB 123
Table 4.11
Rankings of credibility of central banks: Economists from EMU countries, nancial insti-
tutions, and high-ination countries
Financial High-ination
Central bank EMU based Institutions countries
Banca dItalia 6.30 6.24 6.23
Bank of England 3.95 3.71 3.65
Bank of Japan 5.53 5.80 5.68
Banque de France 4.83 4.76 4.90
Deutsche Bundesbank 2.03 1.94 1.94
European Central Bank 3.56 4.03 3.70
Federal Reserve 1.81 1.50 1.90
124 Chapter 4
economic point of view, of the various categories of disclosure and
transparency. Clearly, more study needs to be done on the economic
consequences of disclosure and transparency.
According to the Eijfnger-Geraats index of disclosure, the ECB has
a relatively good overall rating due to its good scores for political and
economic disclosure. The ECB also has a high rating in terms of most
other indicators for central bank disclosure. This contrasts with the
ndings of various surveys among private sector economists, includ-
ing our own, in which the ECBs operations were perceived to be
opaque. Our indicator for accountability suggests that the ECB does
not rank high, although the ECB goes further than required by law in
providing information. As to perceived credibility, the respondents in
our survey did not give the ECB a high rating. Still our results suggest
that over time the credibility of the ECB has increased somewhat. The
views of our respondents as to how important credibility is for mone-
tary policy making and its determinants are broadly in line with those
of central bankers.
5.1 Introduction
As we pointed out in chapter 1, within the Eurosystem the national
central banks play an important role. Unlike other similar central
banks, the ECB is very decentralized. This is not only true for the imple-
mentation of monetary policy (as discussed in chapter 2) but also for
the decision-making process within the Governing Council of the ECB.
In this chapter we consider rst, in section 5.2, the decentralized
nature of the Eurosystem. In section 5.3 we show how this decentral-
ized setup can be problematic. A crucial factor is the extent to which
the countries in the euro area are alike. Where countries (or sizable
regions) are at different points in the business cycle or have diverging
ination rates, decision-making on the appropriate monetary policy
stance becomes a difcult task. Furthermore, if the monetary policy
transmission mechanism differs across the member countries of the
monetary union, the appropriate size and timing of monetary policy
decisions become difcult to assess. Various authors have argued that
monetary policy transmission differs substantially among countries in
the European monetary union because of differences in nancial struc-
tures. In sections 5.4 to 5.6 we turn to analyze synchronization of the
business cycles of the countries in the euro area, their diverging ina-
tion rates, and the differences in monetary transmission across EMU
countries. In section 5.7 we present our conclusions.
5.2 The Decentralized Eurosystem
Regional central banks have a very strong voice in the decision making
of the Eurosystem. Table 5.1 compares the ECB with the German and
American central banks in terms of the power of the regional central
5
Centralization or
Decentralization
126 Chapter 5
banks. It follows that the decision-making structure of the ECB is less
centralized than that of comparable central banks. In terms of voting
power, the position of the Executive Board within the Eurosystem is
therefore relatively weak. Bini Smaghi and Gros (2000) argue that its
powers are also limited in some other respects. First, the Board has the
responsibility to set up meetings of the ECB Governing Council, but it
does not have an exclusive power of initiative. Second, several com-
mittees have been created in all major areas of ECB competence to assist
in the work of the Eurosystem. These committees are mandated by the
Governing Council and alsogenerally via the Executive Board
report to the Council. Third, the Executive Board has no budgetary
autonomy, since the Governing Council has to approve the budget.
Finally, the ECB has no control over the many activities performed by
national central banks. They are free to perform certain functions,
unless the Governing Council decides by two-third majority that these
activities interfere with the objectives and tasks of the Eurosystem.
The ECB also differs considerably from the Federal Reserve and the
Bundesbank in terms of economic size. Table 5.2 shows the distribu-
tion of the share in total GDP of the member central banks of the
Bundesbank, the Federal Reserve, and the Eurosystem. Note that in
the United States the regional central banks are close in size, whereas
in the euro area the economic sizes are uneven. Germany is in-between:
the central banks of NordrheinWestfalen (22 percent) and Bavaria (17
percent) have substantially more economic power than most of the
other banks.
As a consequence of the institutional setup of the Governing Council,
political power and country size diverge. As shown in gure 5.1, for
seven out of the current twelve countries in the monetary union the
Table 5.1
Distribution of voting power: Center versus regions
Bank Center Regions Center/region
Bundesbank before 1957 1 9 0.11
Bundesbank before 1992 7 11 0.64
Bundesbank before 1999 8 9 0.89
Federal Reserve System 7 5 1.40
ECB 1999 6 11 0.55
ECB 2001 6 12 0.50
Source: Berger et al. (2004).
Centralization or Decentralization 127
Table 5.2
Share in total GDP of central banks (distribution), 1999
Share in GDP (%) Germany
a
United States EMU
05 0 1 7
510 5 10 2
1015 2 0 0
1520 1 1 1
2030 1 0 1
>30 0 0 1
Total 9 12 12
Source: Berger and De Haan (2002).
a. Germany: 1998.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
35
GER
FRA
ITA
ESP
NLD
BEL
AUS
FIN
GRC
PRT
IRL
LUX
Share (%)
Economic weight (EW)
Political weight (PW)
1 Council seat
Figure 5.1
Economic and political weights of central banks in the current euro area. (Source: Berger
et al. 2004)
128 Chapter 5
political weight (i.e., 1/18 or about 6 percent of all votes in the Gov-
erning Council) exceeds economic weight (i.e., their share of the euro
area GDP).
Another important difference with the Bundesbank and the Fed is
that the staff employed by the ECB is much smaller than that of the
central banks of its system (see table 5.3). In time this imbalance may
be corrected.
1
As Bini Smaghi and Gros (2000) point out, any proposal
by the Executive Board of the ECB to increase staff has to be approved
by the Governing Council. An opposite situation exists in the United
States, where the Board of Governors responsibility is to approve the
budgets of district banks.
Besides staff size, there is the relevance of staff qualications. This
has many dimensions, an important one being the staffs research activ-
ities. As sidebar 10 shows, based on publications in international jour-
nals relative to the size of the staff involved in research, the position of
the ECB is surprisingly strong.
Table 5.3
Staff: Total size and size of the research departments, 19901999
Averages
Central Bank of Total staff Research staff Ratio
Austria 1,243 50 0.041
Belgium 2,695 49 0.018
Denmark 582 33 0.057
Finland 826 45 0.055
France NA NA NA
Germany 2,761 69 0.025
Greece 3,240 118 0.038
Ireland 621 23 0.037
Italy 9,229 212 0.023
Luxembourg 141 22 0.156
Netherlands 1,655 95 0.057
Portugal 1,966 129 0.067
Spain 3,175 253 0.080
Sweden 807 42 0.056
United Kingdom 4,050 116 0.031
ECB 633 110 0.172
Source: Eijfnger et al. (2002).
Notes: Data for Luxembourg and the ECB refer to 199899; data for Sweden refer to
199298. For Portugal the data until 1996 include statistics staff.
Centralization or Decentralization 129
10 Research Output of European Central Banks
From the perspective of a regional central bank in a decentralized sys-
tem of central banks quality of research is important (Goodfriend 1999;
Angeloni 1999). The diversication of research within a system of central
banks brings a variety of analytical perspectives to policy deliberations
that are invaluable in an increasingly complex economy. Moreover a
system of regional banks harnesses competitive forces to encourage inno-
vative thinking within the central bank.
Eijfnger et al. (2002) surveyed the research output of the European
central banks for the period 1990 to 1999. The questionnaire pinpointed
the following concerns:
Total staff. How many employees were working at your central bank
during the last ten years?
Research staff size. How many employees were working at the eco-
nomic and research departments, measured over the same period?
p
, p p p
ECB Board NB
= + -
( )
b b 1
p p
p i i
in, out. = + =
,
,
D i
p
y i
i i
e
i
in, out, = - + = p p e ,
134 Chapter 5
the weight associated with output losses, l, as well as its ination target
is the same as in the in region:
(6)
From equations (1), (2), (5), and (6), it is straightforward to derive the
preferred policies of both regions. As Berger (2002) shows, the preferred
policy of the out region differs from that of the in region in two
respects. First, the more ambitious output target implies a higher rate of
ination. Second, to compensate for the presence of structural ination,
the out regions central bank aims for lower tradable-goods ination.
The Executive Board can be assumed to choose a monetary policy that
minimizes the loss function based on economically weighted euro area
averages of the headline ination and output, in line with the policy
targets specied in the Maastricht treaty:
(7)
where c [0, 1] is the economic weight (e.g., the share in aggregate euro
area GDP of the in region). From equations (1) and (2), it is easy to
show that this implies that the higher the ination in the out region is
and the higher the regions impact on euro area ination, the lower the
Board will set tradable-goods ination to compensate the impact of struc-
tural ination in the out region on the overall euro area ination rate.
Berger (2002) shows that under this setup, and assuming rational
expectations, equilibrium ination in the euro area will be
(8)
The rst part on the right-hand side reects the Boards intention to com-
pensate for the out regions structural ination by lowering tradable-
goods ination, weighted by b, which is the Boards vote share in the
ECB Council. The second element in (8) summarizes the conicting
policy objectives of the out region itself. On the one hand, the regions
central bank also aims at decreasing tradable-goods ination to com-
pensate for its higher structural ination rate (-D
p,out
); on the other, the
presence of a more ambitious growth target gives rise to an inationary
bias (ly*
out
). The net effect of these competing forces on equilibrium ina-
tion depends on the ambitiousness of the out regions growth target,
the importance of the output target in its loss function, and the size of
its structural ination problem. Finally, the third element on the right-
hand side of equation (8) shows that the ECB will shift tradable-goods
ination in the euro area to counter regional output shocks. The weight
allocated to either regions output shock is the sum of the weights
attached to output stabilization in the relevant region by the respective
central bank (i.e., (1 - b)(1 - g) for the out and (1 - b)g for the in
*
.
, ,
p c g l
l
l
c g e c g e
p p ECB out out out
out
= - -
( )
+ -
( )
-
( )
- ( )
-
+
+ -
( ) [ ] + -
( )
+ -
( )
-
( ) [ ] { }
b b y
b b b b
in
1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1
D D
L y y
Board in out in out
= + -
( ) [ ] + + -
( ) [ ] cp c p l c c 1 1
2 2
,
L y y
out out out out
= + - ( ) p l
2 2
* .
Centralization or Decentralization 135
region) and the Board (i.e., b
c
in case of the in and b(1 - c) in case of
the out region).
How does actual monetary policy in the euro area as described in
equation (8) deviate from a benchmark policy that would be imple-
mented if all Governing Council members were solely interested in
targets specied by the Maastricht treaty? A reasonable benchmark
policy rule along this line is one that stabilizes economically weighted
euro area averages of output and ination around zero. The idea is to
keep, on average, prices stable and output at its natural level:
(9)
In words, * is the rate of tradables ination that minimizes the loss func-
tion L* subject to equations (1) and (2). If monetary policy were con-
ducted in line with this rule, introducing rational expectations would
yield equilibrium tradables ination of
(10)
A comparison of the benchmark euro area policy with actual ECB
policy as depicted by equation (8) reveals a number of crucial differences:
* .
,
p c
l
l
ce c e
p
= - -
( )
-
+
+ -
( ) ( )
1
1
1 D
out in out
* * p cp c p l c c = + -
( ) [ ] + + -
( ) [ ]
( ) ( )
arg min
s.t. 1 and 2 .
in out in out
L y y 1 1
2 2
136 Chapter 5
Table 5.5
Weighted and nonweighted ination and output growth in the euro area, 2000 and 2001
Ination Ination Output Output
Country in 2000 in 2001 growth in 2000 growth in 2001
Austria 2.0 2.3 3.0 1.0
Belgium 2.7 2.4 4.0 1.0
Finland 3.0 2.7 5.6 0.7
France 1.8 1.8 3.8 1.8
Germany 2.1 2.4 3.0 0.6
Greece (2.9) 3.7 (4.1) 4.1
Ireland 5.3 4.0 11.5 5.9
Luxembourg 3.8 2.4 7.5 3.5
Italy 2.6 2.3 2.9 1.8
Netherlands 2.3 5.1 3.3 1.3
Portugal 2.8 4.4 3.5 1.7
Spain 3.5 2.8 4.1 2.8
Nonweighted average 2.9 3.0 4.7 2.2
GDP weighted average 2.3 2.5 3.5 1.5
Source: Own calculations based on data from De Nederlandsche Bank.
Table 5.6
Governors of national central banks and their political backgrounds, 2001
Political Government responsible
Country Governor background for appointment
Austria K. Liebscher C S + C
Belgium G. Quaden S L + S +
Finland M. Vanhala C S + C + L
France J.-C. Trichet C C
Germany E. Welteke S S +
Greece L. D. Papademos S S
Ireland M. OConnell ? L
Italy A. Fazio C S + C
Luxembourg Y. Mersch C C + L
Netherlands N. Wellink C S + L
Portugal V. M. Ribeiro Constncio S S
Spain V. Caruana C C
Source: Berger and De Haan (2002).
Note: S: socialist or social democratic; C: conservative or Christian democratic; L: liberal;
+ other parties than S, C, or L.
Centralization or Decentralization 137
political background, and the political color of the government that
appointed the governor. Although the indicator is very crude, it sug-
gests that there are differences in the degree of conservativeness
appearing in the euro area.
6
Adebatable question is whether these dif-
ferences in preferences are in decline, meaning whether there is con-
vergence in preferences.
5.4 Diverging Business Cycles in the Euro Area?
In the previous section we noted that differences in the business cycle
in the various EMU countries could affect the voting behavior of
national central bank governors in the Governing Council of the ECB.
7
Business cycles can differ across countries for various reasons. First,
countries experience different shocks. Second, they respond differently
to common shocks. This may be caused by differences in the reaction
of policy makers to a common shock or because of differences in the
national or regional composition of output (Wynne and Koo 2000). Also
differences in nancial structure may lead to differences in the mone-
tary policy transmission mechanism (see section 5.6). Various studies
have pointed out that business cycles in the euro area diverged con-
siderably in the past (e.g., see Christodoulakis et al. 1995).
However, no matter how important divergent business cycles were
in the past, in assessing dangers for suboptimal monetary policy
making by the ECB, the crucial question is how likely it is that busi-
ness cycles will diverge in the future. Two views have been put forward
on this issue. According to a study by the European Commission
(Emerson et al. 1992) further economic and monetary integration will
lead to less divergence. For one thing, economic policies in the euro
area will be more similar. As Lamfalussy (1997)the rst president of
the European Monetary Institute, the predecessor of the ECBputs it:
With the emergence of a . . . stability culture in the conduct of monetary and
scal policies, the risk of asymmetric policy reactions during the coming years
would appear to me to be much smaller than any time since the end of the last
war.
Krugman (1991), on the other hand, has argued that trade integration
does lead to regional concentration of industrial activities. In Europe a
similar concentration of industries can be expected to take place as in
the United States (e.g., Silicon Valley), mainly because of economies of
scale and scope. In such a concentration process, sector-specic shocks
138 Chapter 5
can become region-specic shocks, thereby increasing the likelihood of
asymmetric shocks and diverging business cycles.
8
In the ongoing debate over business cycle synchronization in the
euro area, two related issues are being discussed. The rst is whether
business cycles in the euro area have become more similar. The second
is what factors drive business cycle synchronization.
9
On the rst issue, the literature has not yet reached a consensus
whether business cycles of the countries in the euro area have con-
verged.
10
In table 5.7 we illustrate this in summarizing the main aspects
of some representative studies. The differences between the various
studies are explained in part by the use of different data. Other reasons,
however, include the use of different methods of identifying business
cycles and assessing convergence. As pointed out by Massman and
Mitchel (2003), competing methods for the computation of a business
cycle have been suggested. One prominent view is that an economic
time series can be decomposed into the sum of trend and cyclical
components, although there remains disagreement over how the trend
should be identied and estimated. An alternative view rejects the
concept of trend-cycle decomposition and denes a business cycle in
terms of the turning points in the original data series, hence not relying
on the estimation and extraction of a trend series. There is also no con-
sensus on how convergence between business cycles should be gauged.
Suggestions include looking for increased bivariate correlation of cycli-
cal components, for decreased cyclical disparity, or for evidence of an
emerging common factor that drives individual countries business
cycles.
As to the second issue, the various factors considered to affect busi-
ness cycle synchronization include trade relations (Frankel and Rose
1998), specialization (Imbs 2004a), monetary integration (Fats 1997),
nancial relations (Imbs 2004a), and the presence of borders (Clark and
van Wincoop 2001).
A good illustration of the debate on the degree of business cycle syn-
chronization in the euro area is the controversy between Artis and Zhang
(1997, 1999), who conclude that European business cycles have become
more synchronized, and Inklaar and De Haan (2001), who nd that
cycles are better correlated (against Germany) in the period 1971 to
1979 than in the period 1979 to 1987. They argue that this is inconsis-
tent with Artis and Zhangs (1999) view that increased monetary inte-
gration, specically after the creation of the ERM in 1979, and business
cycle synchronization are positively related. According to Artis and
Centralization or Decentralization 139
Table 5.7
Studies on business cycle synchronization in the euro area
Measure of Convergence
Study Data used cycle measure Conclusions
Artis and OECD monthly PAT, HP, Lead and lag Cycles have
Zhang data of linear bivariate become more
(1997, 1999) industrial trend; two correlation with groupspecic after
production subsamples Germany and ERM, correlations
(pre- and United States not different acoss
post-ERM) lters after ERM
Inklaar and Ibid. HP, two Ibid. Mixed outcomes,
De Haan subsamples no replication of
(2001) (pre- and results of Artis and
post-ERM) Zhang (1999)
Wynne and Penn World Baxter-King Pairwise Null of no
Koo (2000) Tables of GDP, correlations, correlation
annual data using GMM between EU
founding members
rejected, but lower
correlation with
more recent
members
Dpke OECD data of HP, linear, Rolling Correlations
(1999) Big 5 euro area segmented contemporaneous among most
countries trend correlations based countries and the
on 5-year moving euro area increases
average of each but that of
country with Belgium falls
euro area
Agresti and ECB euro area Baxter-King Contemporaneous Each country
Mojon wide model and lagged cross- highly correlated
(2001) (AWM) data of correlation between with euro area as
GDP and GDP each country and whole, with lowest
components for the euro area values for
10 countries periphery
Harding and ECB AWM data Harding- Correlation and Relatively low
Pagan (2001) of GDP for Pagan rule regression methods correlations among
euro area, on level on binary series member countries
OECD data for series and and euro area
United States detrended
(linear, HP,
PAT) series
Massmann OECD Various Pairwise Properties of the
and Mitchel monthly data methods correlation business cycle
(2003) of industrial coefcients using depend on how
production, a method of the business cycle
1960:12000:8 moments is measured. Euro
estimator; the area has often
entire alternated periods
Zhang, the ERM forced countries to follow similar monetary policies
and has thereby reduced the possibility of following independent mon-
etary policies. The latter are often regarded as a major source of asym-
metric (demand) shocks. Not surprisingly, European monetary policy
makers welcomed results suggesting that business cycles have become
more similar in the euro area. For instance, Trichet (2001, pp. 56) states
that
. . . we can be reasonably condent in the increasing integration of European
countries, and in the fact that economic developments are becoming more and
more correlated in the area. This has been highlighted, in the academic eld,
by several empirical investigations: I would mention authors like Artis and
Zhang (1999) who found evidence that business cycles are becoming more
synchronous across Europe.
140 Chapter 5
Table 5.7
(continued)
Measure of Convergence
Study Data used cycle measure Conclusions
distribution of all of convergence
correlation and divergence
coefcients is in the last 40 years
analyzed, using
rolling windows
Artis (2003) IMF Quarterly Band-pass Stylized facts Not much
GDP data for ltered analysis and evidence of a
22 countries, series cross-correlations European cycle
including ten
countries in
the euro area
Darvas and OECDs Hodrick- Cycle correlation Rather strong
Szapry Quarterly Prescott with euro area, comovement with
(2004) National and band- leads/lags, the euro area for
Accounts GDP pass lter volatility, most EMU
and persistence of members; more
components the cycle, and a synchronization
for 10 euro measure of over time
area countries; impulse response according to all
quarterly data the correlation
between 1983 measures
and 2002 calculated,
grouped in four particularly since
nonoverlapping 1993
5-year
periods
Source: Update of table provided by Massmann and Mitchel (2003).
Centralization or Decentralization 141
Massman and Mitchel (2003) re-consider the evidence that sparked
this controversy between Artis and Zhang and Inklaar and De Haan,
using forty years of monthly industrial production data to examine the
relationships among the business cycles of the 12 countries in the euro
area, employing eight different measures for the business cycle. They
compute pairwise correlation coefcients for the 12 countries business
cycles using a method of moments estimator that also yields an asso-
ciated measure of uncertainty. To examine the evolution of this estimate
over time, Massman and Mitchel use a series of rolling windows, rather
than windows of xed width. Their measure of convergence of busi-
ness cycles exhibits common features across the alternative measures
of the business cycle. Interestingly Massman and Mitchel nd that there
have been periods of convergence and periods of divergence. The esti-
mated mean correlation coefcient for the 12 European business cycles
is on average positive and signicant, but there has been considerable
volatility. The correlation was trending upward until the mid 1970s and
reaching peaks of around 0.8, for most measures of the business cycle.
Then correlation, in general, falls to zero in the mid to late 1980s and
is statistically insignicant, lending support to Inklaar and De Haans
(2001) nding that correlations of euro area countries with Germany
were higher in 1971 to 1979 than in 1979 to 1987. Correlation then rose
in the late 1980s to values in the range 0.6 to 0.8, before slumping quite
rapidly in the early 1990s. Since then correlation between the euro area
countries has risen but remained volatile; during the mid 1990s corre-
lation even appeared to have declined. The estimates for the most
recent period indicate that the correlation for the 12 European cycles
has risen from the trough in the early 1990s.
Also Darvas and Szapry (2004) nd evidence in support of more
business cycle synchronization in the euro area since the run-up period
to EMU. These authors draw on GDP data and also on the extent of
synchronization in the major expenditure and sectoral components
of GDP. Their results suggest that Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands show a high degree of synchro-
nization by all measures used. This result applies not only for GDP but
also for its components. The synchronization signicantly increased
between 1993 to 1997 and 1998 to 2002.
11
Portugal, Finland, and
Ireland show the lowest correlation with the euro area cycle, particu-
larly for consumption and services. It should, however, be pointed
out that when correlations are calculated with the euro area, an
upward bias is created, since all countries are, by denition, included
142 Chapter 5
in the euro area aggregate. This bias may be substantial for the bigger
countries.
An alternative approach to assess business cycle similarities is to
examine to what extent there is evidence of an emerging common
factor that drives individual countries business cycles. Artis (2003, p.
2) is a recent example of this approach. In his study he comes to less
optimistic conclusions than in his previous work with Zhang: the
European business cycle is a more elusive phenomenon than we
might have expected; whilst some European countries seem to stick
together, there are many which do not. In any case, the US and Japan
are often to be found as closely associated with those European coun-
tries that do stick together as with others. In line with the conclusions
of Massman and Mitchel (2003), Artis nds that there is no coherent
movement toward an exclusively European cycle.
Artis et al. (2002) also nd no systematic convergence or divergence
tendencies in the classical business cycle (where turning points are
identied on the basis of an absolute decline, or rise, in the value of
GDP). The level of dispersion of the member countries growth rates
peaked in the 1970s, declined until 1985, and creeped up in 1990 to 1995
and again in 1999 to 2000. Dispersion was relatively small during the
periods 1985 to 1990 and 1995 to 1998. The volatility of growth in the
last 15 years has been lower than in the period 1970 to 1985. When Artis
et al. (2002) use the deviation cycle (whose turning points are dened
as points where deviations occur in the rate of growth of GDP from an
appropriately dened trend rate of growth), they nd stronger evi-
dence in favor of convergence, since there is a systematic tendency for
cross-sectional dispersion to decrease over time.
Artis et al. (1999) use univariate Markov switching autoregressions
(MS-AR) for individual countries to detect changes in the mean growth
rate of industrial production and a Markow switching vector autore-
gression model (MS-VAR) to identify a common cycle in Europe. They
see evidence of a common unobserved component governing the busi-
ness cycle dynamics in Europe, such as might suggest the existence of
a common business cycle. Similarly Forni and Reichlin (2001) show that
the business cycle of European regions can be decomposed into a Euro-
pean component, a national component, and a regional component,
with the European component having a larger role than the national
components. The share of the European regions GDP variance that is
explained by the common European business cycle ranges between 40
and 60 percent for most countries of the euro area (Portugal and Greece
being the exception) while the share of the national components ranges
between 20 and 35 percent. The rest of the variance is driven by the
regions idiosyncratic components.
12
Last, Kaufman (2003) uses time series on industrial production
growth of individual countries to investigate whether there is a
common growth cycle for the euro area countries and whether the syn-
chronization has changed over time. She uses an autoregressive panel
data framework and Bayesian simulation methods. Her results support
the idea of increasing synchronization among the euro area countries
due to the integration process.
One of the factors that may affect business cycle synchronization is trade
intensity. Theoretically trade intensity has an ambiguous effect on syn-
chronization. Standard trade theory predicts that openness to trade
leads to increased specialization in production and interindustry
patterns of international trade. If business cycles are dominated by
industry-specic shocks, higher trade integration, by bringing about
more specialization, can lead to decreasing business cycle correlations.
Furthermore the higher integration in both international nancial
markets and goods markets cushions any asymmetric shocks to
contries because of the diversication of ownership and specialized
production structures (Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 2003). On the other hand,
if business is dominated by intra-industry trade, deeper trade links will
not necessarily result in deeper specialization along industry lines. In
that case industry-specic shocks can lead to more symmetric business
cycles. Intensive trade relations between countries may also lead to the
export or import of a business cycle caused by demand uctuations, as
changes in income in one country will normally also lead to a changed
demand for foreign goods.
Despite this theoretical ambiguity, starting with Frankel and Rose
(1998), many studies have found support that trade intensity will, in
general, enhance business cycle synchronization. Most studies exam-
ining this issue nd a positive association in the trade between coun-
tries and their business cycle synchronization, regardless of the way in
which the trade relationship is modeled. However, more recent studies
tend to nd somewhat lower effects than those reported by Frankel and
Rose (1998). For instance, Gruben et al. (2002), using the same group
of 21 countries as Frankel and Rose, conrm their general conclusion,
that increased trade leads to increased business cycle correlation, but
Centralization or Decentralization 143
144 Chapter 5
nd the trade effect on business cycle correlation to be about half
the Frankel and Rose point estimate (see section 6.3.1 for further
references).
13
Gruben et al. (2002) also nd that increases in interindustry trade
which may indicate specializationturn out not to have a signicant
effect on business cycle synchronicity. As pointed out by Imbs (2004a),
specialization is likely to affect the international synchronization of
business cycles. Two economies producing the same types of goods will
be subjected to similar stochastic developments in case of sector-
specic shocks. Countries with similar production patterns will also
react similarly to aggregate shocks. In contrast to Gruben et al. (2002),
Imbs (2004a) nds that similarities in economic structure result in cor-
related business cycles. In other words, specialization reduces business
cycle synchronization. However, the evidence reported by Otto et al.
(2001) is not in line with this view.
There is little agreement whether monetary integration will lead to
more similar business cycles. An argument can be made in both direc-
tions. As suggested by Lamfalussy (1997), monetary integration may
cause more similarity, since there will be less asymmetry in monetary
policy. Also indirectly monetary integration may lead to more syn-
chronization via the impact of exchange rate stability on trade relations.
In a drastic departure from past empirical studies that failed to nd a
signicant link between exchange rate stability and trade, Rose (2000)
reports extremely large positive effects of common currencies on the
volume of trade. The most dramatic, and widely cited, of his ndings
is that two countries sharing the same currency trade three times as
much as they would with different currencies (Rose 2000, p. 7). Roses
estimates of the trade-creating effects of adopting common currencies
are obtained using a gravity model in which bilateral trade is a func-
tion of the relative economic size and distance between two trading
partners. Rose also includes several variables that are intended to
capture trading partners cultural and historical links and membership
in regional trading blocs. The key feature of Roses gravity model is
the inclusion of two monetary variables: a dummy variable to indicate
whether trading partners use the same currency and a measure of the
volatility of the bilateral exchange rate. Glick and Rose (2002) use a
much larger data set and nd that a common currency doubles trade.
14
Other studies, however, arrive at considerably lower effects (see section
6.3.1 for a further discussion).
Monetary integration may also lead to less business cycle syn-
chronization. To the extent that exchange rates are considered as a
shock-absorbing mechanism, xed exchange rates may lead to less
synchronization if the countries in the monetary union face asym-
metric shocks. In face of an external shock, a xed exchange rate regime
requires the central bank to follow a policy so as to maintain the peg,
forcing all the adjustment to take place in the real economy rather than
in the exchange rate.
According to Artis and Zhang (1997), business cycles in Europe were
more similar after the start of the ERM than before, which they inter-
pret as evidence that monetary integration will enhance business cycle
synchronization. Other studies report less support for the view that
exchange rate stability in Europe has led to more synchronization of
business cycles. Frankel and Rose (1998), for instance, include an ERM
dummy variable in their empirical model and nd that its coefcient
is not robust. Also Baxter and Stockman (1989) and Inklaar and De
Haan (2001) report no effect of exchange rate stability on business cycle
synchronization. Furthermore, possible evidence that since the run-up
to EMU there is more business cycle synchronization may not reect
the effect of monetary integration. As pointed out by Darvas and
Szapry (2004), the business cycles of nonEMU European countries
and the United States, and to some extent Japan and Russia, have also
shown greater co-movement with the business cycle in the euro area.
De Haan et al. (2002) have analyzed whether trade relations and
exchange rate stability have affected the synchronization of business
cycles in 18 OECD countries over the years 1961 to 1997.
15
To calculate
the correlation between business cycles they rst detrended the series
with a Hodrick-Prescott lter and calculate correlations of cyclical devi-
ations for the period 1961 to 1997. These authors have estimated the
following simple model:
(5.1)
where p
ij,t
denotes the correlation of the business cycles of countries i
and j during the period t. Dummies (a
0,t
) are included for the four sub-
periods (196173, 197379, 197987, and 198797). The denition of
trade intensity (wt
ijt
) is the same as in Frankel and Rose (1998):
(5.2) wt
X M
X X M M
ijt
ijt ijt
i t j t i t j t
=
+
+ + +
. . . .
,
r a a a m
ij t t ij t ij t ij t
wt v
, , , , ,
log , = + ( ) + +
0 1 2
Centralization or Decentralization 145
146 Chapter 5
Table 5.8
Estimates of the relationship between business cycle correlation and trade intensity and
exchange rate volatility
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 44.4 44.6 68.7
(8.45) (4.28) (5.33)
Dummy 19601973 -12.3 -10.0 -7.6
(-3.24) (-2.48) (-1.85)
Dummy 19731979 17.2 16.7 16.9
(4.02) (3.95) (3.97)
Dummy 19791987 0.8 0.6 0.9
(0.25) (0.18) (0.26)
Trade intensity 2.51 3.03
(2.51) (2.87)
Exchange rate volatility 2.52 4.50
(1.23) (2.15)
Source: De Haan et al. (2002).
Note: t-statistics in parentheses, n = 612; all parameters are multiplied by 100.
or the total trade (export X plus import M) between countries i and j
divided by the sum of the trade of each country. The exchange rate
volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the growth rate of
the exchange rate. Their results, shown in table 5.8, suggest that both
higher trade intensity and more exchange rate volatility are related to
synchronization of business cycles. The fact that more exchange rate
volatility leads to more business cycle synchronization may be inter-
preted as support for the view that exchange rates may function as an
adjustment tool. This conclusion is conrmed by the negative sign of
the Bretton-Woods dummy and the positive value of the oating
period dummy. These results suggest that exchange rate uctuations
may reduce asymmetries between countries.
Also nancial integration has been argued to affect business cycle syn-
chronization. As pointed out by Imbs (2004a), the impact of nancial
integration on synchronization is not unambiguous. On the one hand,
a limited ability to borrow and lend internationally hampers the trans-
fer of resources across countries and can increase GDP correlations. If,
on the other hand, investors have imperfect information or face liqui-
dity constraints, limiting capital ows can decrease GDP correlations,
as investors herd (or withdraw) capital from many destinations simul-
taneously. Financial integration may also lead to specialization, and
therefore less synchronicity. Using a variety of alternative measures of
nancial integration, Imbs (2004a) nds evidence that economic
regions with strong nancial links are signicantly more synchronized.
Interestingly Imbs (2004a) obtains similar estimates across US states
and across countries with substantially different monetary policies,
suggesting that the synchronization of business cycles is not an artifact
of an international convergence of monetary policy making. Imbs con-
cludes that the positive direct effect of nance on synchronization dom-
inates the negative indirect effect, working via higher specialization.
Using some new indicators for nancial integration (including bilateral
asset holdings), Imbs (2004b) reports that apart from an inuence on
goods trade, nancial liberalization has a direct positive effect on busi-
ness cycle synchronization. Jansen and Stokman (2003) nd that capital
ows have played a role in synchronizing business cycles in recent
years. For a sample of industrial countries in the period 1995 to 2001,
they report that FDI linkages can explain the pattern of international
business cycle linkages even better than foreign trade relations.
Finally, Clark and van Wincoop (2001) suggest that the presence of
borders matters when it comes to business cycle synchronization. They
nd for the four largest European countries that within-country corre-
lations are substantially larger than cross-country correlations. These
results continue to hold after controlling for exogenous factors such as
distance and size. They nd that the lower level of trade between Euro-
pean countries, and, to a lesser extent, the higher degree of sectoral spe-
cialization, can explain most of the observed border effect.
Artis (2003) also examines which factors affect business cycle aflia-
tion, departing from the idea that business cycles are the result of orig-
inating shocks feeding into a propagation mechanism. Asynchronous
cycles may therefore arise from the interraction of different (nonsym-
metric) propagation mechanisms with common shocks just as much as
they arise from asymmetric originating shocks with similar kinds of
propagation mechanisms at work. For instance, more or less exible
labor markets will make for less or more persistence in the response to
a shock. On the basis of panel data estimation using averages over
three periods (197079, 198092, and 19932001) Artis (2003) concludes
that the variables relative nancial structure (measured as the ratio
of private credit to stock market value traded) and relative share of
oil imports are signicant with a negative sign. Relative labor
market exibility is not signicant, while the role of trade is more
ambiguous.
Centralization or Decentralization 147
148 Chapter 5
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, we conclude that there is still
no consensus on whether business cycles of the countries in the euro
area have become more similar recently. This is due to the use of dif-
ferent data and methods of identifying business cycles and assessing
convergence. There are various factors that may affect business cycle
synchronization, such as trade relations, specialization, monetary inte-
gration, nancial relations, and the presence of borders. There is con-
siderable support for the notion that trade intensity enhances business
cycle synchronization, but the effect of trade specialization on business
cycle synchronization is less accepted. There is little agreement whether
monetary integration and nancial integration will lead to more similar
business cycles. The presence of borders is likely to matter for business
cycle synchronization.
5.5 Different Ination Rates in the Euro Area
Ination differentials in the euro area have increased recently. As
pointed out by Remsperger (2003), in the convergence and start-up
phase of EMU, the average annual rate of ination in Austria, France,
and Germany was 0.8 percent. At that time the critical 2.3 percent mark
(1.5 percent above the ination in the three best-performing countries)
was not being overshot by any country. Between 2000 and 2002 Austria,
France, and Germany again had the lowest ination in the euro area,
although their average ination rate was now 1.8 percent. Together
with the margin allowed by the ination criterion, this produced a crit-
ical value of 3.3 percent. The ination in no fewer than three founding
members of the monetary unionIreland, the Netherlands, and
Portugalexceeded that level.
Ination differentials in the euro area since the beginning of 1999
have been quite marked. Notably Ireland, Spain, Greece, and Portugal
have been persistently at the top of the ination league table; also price
increases in the Netherlands were generally higher than average ina-
tion in the euro area. In contrast, German ination has been below the
euro area average (see table 5.9).
16
Viewed over a longer time period, the degree of ination dispersion
in the euro area, measured in terms of the standard deviation,
decreased over time, especially during the second half of the 1990s. The
unweighted standard deviation declined from around 4 percentage
points at the beginning of the 1990s to about 1 percentage point at the
start of the monetary union (ECB 2003b).
According to the ECB (2003b), the current degree of ination dis-
persion in the euro area is close to that observed in the United States.
However, as we pointed out in chapter 3, owner-occupied housing
is included in the US CPI but not in the European HICP. As argued
by Remsperger (2003), this is important because there is hardly any
other component where regionally divergent price developments have
such a major impact as they do in housing. The interregional standard
deviation of the changes in rents is greater than that of services, which,
in turn, is larger than that of industrial goods (excluding energy).
House prices increased by 10 percent a year and more in Ireland, the
Netherlands, and Spain while less in other countries. Thus, if owner-
occupied housing were included in the HICP, the divergence of ina-
tion rates in the euro would take a sharp rise, perhaps even exceed the
dispersion of ination rates in the United States. Also the ination
differentials in the euro area are more persistent than those in the
United States.
Ination differentials are caused by many factors, including differ-
ent consumption patterns, scal policies, differences in the dependence
on trade, convergence of price levels of traded goods across euro area
countries, different productivity developments, and diverging business
cycles. We will discuss each factor in turn.
Differences in ination rates in the monetary union due to consump-
tion patterns may be attributed to differences in the shares of
Centralization or Decentralization 149
Table 5.9
Ination differentials relative to the euro average, 19902002
19901993 19941998 19992002 1999 2000 2001 2002
Austria -0.8 -0.4 -0.4 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5
Belgium -1.1 -0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 -0.7
Finland 0.3 -0.9 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 -0.2
France -1.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.7 -0.3
Germany -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.7 -0.5 -0.9
Greece 12.9 5.4 1.1 1.0 0.6 1.2 1.7
Ireland -1.6 0.3 2.1 1.3 2.9 1.5 2.5
Italy 1.6 1.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.4
Luxembourg -0.6 -0.6 0.3 -0.1 1.5 -0.1 -0.2
Netherlands -1.4 -0.3 1.3 0.9 0.0 2.6 1.7
Portugal 6.0 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.5 1.9 1.4
Spain 1.9 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4
Source: ECB (2003b).
150 Chapter 5
individual consumer goods and services in total consumption across
countries. The weights used in calculating HICP in the separate coun-
tries are only harmonized; they do not reect the actual consumption
baskets of these countries. So there are differences between the calcu-
lated ination rates and the actual ination rates. However, research
by the ECB (2003b) indicates that differences in consumption patterns
across the euro area countries do not have a major impact on ination
dispersion. Also the prices of the same goods may show different
developments across countries as they may be administered. Prelimi-
nary estimates by the ECB (2003b) suggest nevertheless that the mag-
nitude of the impact of administered prices on ination dispersion in
the euro area has been relatively small in the period 1999 to 2002.
Countries in the euro area may experience different ination rates
due to differences in their scal policies. Although the scope of national
scal policy is limited by the Stability and Growth Pact, it can put pres-
sure on ination. According to Hendrikx and Chapple (2002), for
instance, VAT and energy tax increases in 2001 led to an increase of the
ination rate in the Netherlands of approximately 1 percentage point.
These indirect tax effects should be temporary as they represent a one-
off change in the price level. In their empirical estimates of ination
differentials in the euro area, Honahan and Lane (2003) did not nd
much evidence that national scal policy differences contributed to the
ination dispersion.
Likewise differences in dependence on trade may lead to ination dif-
ferentials. The nominal effective exchange rate of the euro had declined
by about 20 percent in October 2000, before recovering in the period
from 2001 to 2003. The impact of exchange rate shocks on consumer
prices is determined by the share of imported goods in private con-
sumption and the strength of the pass-through effect. As pointed out
in section 3.6.1, the pass-through is not uniform across the countries in
the euro area. Price developments may therefore differ in the short to
medium term even with uniform shocks.
One important factor inuencing pass-through is the openness
toward trading partners outside the euro area. In general, extra-
openness should be reected by a higher weight of extraeuro area
goods in a countrys overall goods basket and, therefore, a stronger
pass-through effect from exchange rate changes on domestic prices
(ECB 2003b). A member country that depends on imports from a non-
member country will experience different inationary pressures if the
euro exchange rate depreciates as compared to a member country that
conducts all its trade with other member countries (Hfner and
Schrder 2002). In addition to the direct impact of exchange rates on
consumer prices, there may be a cyclical effect of exchange rate shocks
via a change in the competitive position, which is also determined by
an economys degree of openness to countries outside the euro area.
The econometric estimates of the ination differentials of Honahan and
Lane (2003) suggest a signicant role for effective exchange rate
changes. Their point estimate implies that a relative deprecation of 3.5
percent is associated with an additional 1 percentage point of ination.
This is a large effect. The Irish nominal effective exchange rate depre-
ciated 11 percent during 1998 to 2000, while the French exchange rate
weakened by only 4 percent. According to these estimates, differences
in the effective exchange rates of Ireland and France led to an ination
differential of 2 percentage points in this period.
Most of the differences in the effective exchange rate across countries
in the euro area reect differences in their trade patterns. However,
as pointed out by the ECB (2003b), euro area countries with similar
degrees of extra-openness had very different ination rates, indicat-
ing that other factors are also important for the divergence of ination
in the euro area. One such factor is also related to trade: differences in
oil dependency. Oil prices tripled in 1999 and 2000. Since countries in
the euro area differ in terms of oil dependency, oil price changes may
also have led to ination differentials. However, research by the ECB
(2003b) suggests that the relationship between oil dependency and
ination differentials is rather weak.
Countries in a monetary union share the same currency but need not
have the same price level. If price levels differ initially across countries
forming a monetary union, then price level convergence will generate
temporary ination differentials (Duarte 2003). Existing research for
the United States suggests that price level differences can be persistent.
For instance, using consumer price data for nineteen US cities from
1918 to 1995, Cecchetti et al. (2002) report that price level differences
were large and persisted by as much as 1.55 percentage points
in annual ination rates measured over ten-year periods. Similarly
Parsley and Wei (1996) employ commodity level price data for 48 US
cities from 1975 to 1992 and nd persistent deviations from the law of
one price for both traded and nontraded goods.
In the European Union, price levels differ across countries. Accord-
ing to the European Commission (2002b), indirect taxation, the struc-
ture of distribution networks, market power or competition, and
Centralization or Decentralization 151
152 Chapter 5
inefcient services sectors are the main factors accounting for much of
the remaining differences in the prices of tradable goods. At least some
convergence of price levels of traded goods has already occurred in the
euro area. Increased market integration and price transparency associ-
ated with the adoption of a common currency will further reduce the
scope for deviations from the law of one price. Rogers (2001) has exam-
ined price level convergence, using a unique data set of prices of 168
goods and services across 26 European cities in 18 countries between
1990 and 1999. There was evidence of convergence for traded goods in
the rst half of the 1990s but none of convergence for nontradables over
the decade. Table 5.10 is reproduced from this study. The empirical esti-
mates by Rogers (2001) for ination differences across Europe show
that countries with low prices in 1999 experienced higher overall ina-
tion in 2000. Rogers also obtained data for US cities, which provides a
useful comparison, since the United States has long been a functioning
monetary union. Rogers found little evidence of an active process
toward price convergence across US cities. More recently Honahan and
Lane (2003) nd that a considerable part of the ination differentials in
the euro area can be explained by price level convergence. Their point
estimate indicates that a country with a price level one-third below the
European average will experience an additional 1 percentage point of
ination.
17
Thus ination of traded goods prices and nontraded goods prices,
or both, can bring relatively high ination to countries with low prices
following economic integration. Since price level convergence works
mostly through tradables, some of the current divergence of ination
Table 5.10
How much have prices in the euro area converged?
Standard deviation of prices across locations
Price index 1990 1995 1999
Euro Area
Overall 0.12 0.12 0.11
Tradables 0.12 0.08 0.06
Nontradables 0.27 0.33 0.31
United States
Overall 0.16 0.15 0.17
Tradables 0.05 0.04 0.04
Nontradables 0.51 0.52 0.57
Source: Rogers (2001).
in the euro area may be transitory. However, to the extent that price
level convergence occurs through the relatively gradual process of con-
vergence of productivity and living standards, the resulting cross-
country ination differentials may be long-lived (see Rogers 2001).
The Balassa-Samuelson effect (Balassa 1964; Samuelson 1964) suggests
that prices of nontraded goods may converge as well. In a convergence
of productivity levels, the initial low-productivity low-price level coun-
tries will experience faster productivity growth and price rises com-
pared to the high-productivity high-price level countries. To show this
mathematically, we take the simple model of a two-country world, both
countries operating with a small open economy, two commodities, one
scarce factor (labor), and constant input coefcient technology. We
assume that the prices of nontradables are not equalized across coun-
tries. Another crucial assumption is that the growth rate of real wages
in the traded goods sector is determined by the growth rate of labor
productivity. So
(5.3)
where a, p, and wstand for changes in productivity, prices, and nominal
wages, respectively, while the superscripts T and NT refer to the trad-
able and nontradable sector. Ination in tradables is the same due to
international trade arbitrage:
(5.4)
where the asterisk denotes the foreign country and e denotes the
change in the exchange rate. It is assumed that wage increases in both
sectors are the same so that
(5.5)
Say that over time the productivity growth in the tradable goods sector
of a country exceeds that in the nontradable goods sector. Clearly,
higher productivity growth in the traded goods sector will entail higher
wages in both sectors. Let ination be dened as the weighted sum of
the tradables and nontradables price ination, with a and (1 - a) the
traded goods and nontraded goods sectors share in GDP:
(5.6)
Now assume that a a*. The ination differential between the home
and foreign country can then be written as
p ap a p =
T NT
+ -
( )
1
a a
NT NT T T
+ = + p p ,
p p e
T T
= +
*
,
w a
T T T
- = p ,
Centralization or Decentralization 153
154 Chapter 5
(5.7)
We see in (5.7) that the difference between the ination rates equals the
rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate plus the (common)
share of nontraded goods in the consumption basket, multiplied by the
excess of the productivity growth differential between the traded and
nontraded goods sectors in comparison to this productivity differential
abroad. The high ination that results from rapid productivity growth
in the traded good sector is nothing more than an equilibrating
mechanism. Without this equilibrating mechanism the country with
high productivity growth would gain competitiveness and accumulate
current account surpluses.
The Balassa-Samuelson effect can explain ination differentials in a
monetary union if the countries in this union show large difference in
income per capita. The euro area includes many economies in which
GDP per head is considerably below the EU average. In these so-called
catching-up countries, productivity, especially in manufacturing, is likely
to grow faster than in the other EMU countries. The resulting sector
price increases inuence relative prices and push ination to levels
above those recorded in more advanced economies.
According to De Grauwe and Skudelny (2000), the prices of non-
traded goods grew faster than the prices of traded goods in all EMU
countries because labor productivity growth in the tradable goods
sector exceeded labor productivity growth in the nontradable goods
sector. Figure 5.2 shows the average productivity growth over the
period 1971 to 1995 as reported by these authors.
p p e a - = + - ( ) - - ( ) [ ] * * * . a a a a
T NT T NT
5
4
3
2
1
0
A BL DK FIN FR GE IT NL PO SP SW UK
T
NT
Figure 5.2
Average productivity growth in European countries (%), 1971 to 1995. (Source: De
Grauwe and Skudelny 2000)
Co-integration tests for 11 EU countries for the period 1975 to 1995
by Alberola and Tyrvinen (1998) suggest that sustained ination
differentials of 2 percentage points exist between the more and
less advanced euro countries due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
However, De Grauwe and Skudelny (2000) nd in their panel estimates
for the period 1970 to 1995 for 12 EU countries that the average bilat-
eral ination differential caused by the Balassa-Samuelson effect gen-
erally does not exceeded 1 percentage point. These authors also
estimated the maximum bilateral ination differentials due to the
Balassa-Samuelson effect. The calculations showed that the ination
differential can go up to 8 percent in absolute value.
Sinn and Reutter (2001) also estimated the contribution of the
Balassa-Samuelson effect to ination differentials, but they found for
most countries a smaller impact. To construct a complete sample for all
members of the currency union, they had to restrict the tradable goods
sector to agriculture and manufacturing and treat the remainder as the
nontradable goods sector (construction, services, electricity, gas and
water supply). Ination rates were higher in countries where the inter-
sectoral growth difference was higher (see equation 5.7). To avoid dea-
tion in any one of the countries, the aggregate ination rate for all
countries taken together must rise as countries become more diverse
in their productivity differentials. The following equation serves as the
basis for the empirical estimates of Sinn and Reutter (2001):
(5.8)
Here
min
is the minimum aggregate ination rate compatible with the
requirement that no single country will face a deation, b
i
is country
is share in aggregate value added, a
i
NT
is the share in value added pro-
duced by country is sector of nontraded goods and (a
i
T
- a
i
NT
) is the
change in the marginal product of labor in the traded goods sector
minus the change in the marginal product of labor in the nontraded
goods sectors of country i.
Equation (5.8) can be explained as follows: Imagine a fully developed
industrial country, such as Germany, whose manufacturing sector
enjoys no particular productivity gains relative to the nontraded goods
sector (no change in relative prices) and the relative prices of nontrad-
able goods is rising in all other countries. The price of traded goods
cannot fall without generating a deation in this industrially mature
p
p b a a
min
,...,
min . = - ( ) - - ( ) [ ]
=
=
i
i
n
i i i
i n
i i i
a a a a
1
1
NT T NT NT T NT
Centralization or Decentralization 155
156 Chapter 5
country. The aggregate price level must rise so as to accommodate for
the required increases in the relative prices of nontraded goods in the
other countries that result from the productivity increases in the traded
good sectors. This is covered by the rst term on the right-hand side
of the equation. To understand the second term on the right-hand side
of the equation, consider that even the most industrially mature
country can experience some extra productivity growth in the traded
goods sector. The price of traded goods can fall in this country without
effecting a deation because of compensation from the increase in the
price of nontraded goods. As a consequence the no-deation constraint
is relaxed. Because the price of traded goods is falling, the relative price
of nontraded goods can increase in all countries without implying as
much ination as before (Sinn and Reutter 2001).
As pointed out by the ECB (2003b), it is difcult to isolate the Balassa-
Samuelson effect from other historical inuences on ination, in
particular, differences in monetary and exchange rate policies across
countries. There is actually a large spectrum of estimates of Balassa-
Samuelson effects and contradicting results for individual countries. In
table 5.11 we present a summary of studies on the importance of the
Balassa-Samuelson effect in the euro area (recalculated for euro area
ination of 2 percent), including the studies that are discussed here.
Although these studies are not all directly comparable because of dif-
ferences in methodology and sample periods and because of a wide
variety of results, some broad patterns are discernible. For instance,
Germany and France are generally below the average, while Greece
and Ireland are above the average. This result is broadly consistent
with the fact that catching-up countries can expect to experience a real
appreciation. Nevertheless, there is the slim chance, as pointed out by
the ECB (2003b), historically, that their catching-up will not in every
case lead to high ination or an appreciating nominal exchange rate, as
is the case of Ireland. Indeed, as Honahan and Lane (2003) convincingly
argue, little, if any, of the Irish ination deviation is a reection of the
Balassa-Samuelson effect. Irelands boom has been apparently largely
due to employment growth, and not exceptional productivity gains.
Furthermore some of the estimates of the Balassa-Samuelson effect are
not in line with actual ination after the start of the monetary union.
For instance, Belgium and Finland are sometimes found to have high
Balassa-Samuelson effects, but this is not conrmed by actual ination
differences. Conversely, the Netherlands has had a higher ination dif-
ferential than predicted by the Balassa-Samuelson model (ECB 2003b).
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
o
r
D
e
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
1
5
7
Table 5.11
Equilibrium ination rates implied by Balassa-Samuelson effect according to selected studies
Alberola and Average HICP
Tyrvinen HICP IMF (1999) Canzoneri et al. De Grauwe Sinn and ination
Sample 19751995 Proxy IMF
a
19601996 19731997 and Skudelny Reuter
b
19871995 19952002
c
Belgium 3.1 2.0 3.8 2.6 2.1 1.8 1.7
Germany 1.3 1.9 1.5 1.0 1.7 1.0 1.2
Greece 2.7 2.8 5.3 3.8
Spain 3.1 2.3 2.4 2.0 2.5 3.0
France 1.7 1.9 2.8 2.4 1.6 2.3 1.5
Ireland 3.4 3.0 3.4 3.1
Italy 2.4 1.9 2.7 2.8 2.4 2.5 2.8
Netherlands 2.3 2.3 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.5
Austria 1.8 2.5 1.8 2.5 2.4 1.5
Portugal 2.7 4.3 2.1 1.8 3.0
Finland 2.3 2.9 2.6 1.4 3.7 1.6
Euro area 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9
Standard deviation 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.6 0.4 1.1 0.9
Source: ECB (2003).
Note: Euro area ination normalized to 2 percent.
a. The IMF (2002) calculates an HICP proxy, which assumes that the historical trend differential between price developments of industrial goods
and services between 1995 and 2001 remains the same. This measure is immune to some of the criticism of the other BS studies as it relies directly
on observed ination rather than on productivity differentials. However this analysis also entails an important caveat in that it is based on a
short period, which does not comprise a complete business cycle, and therefore may be biased.
b. Sinn and Reutter (2001) assume that historical productivity differentials will be reected in equally large ination differentials between sectors.
Most other studies do not nd a unitary relationship, implying that the dispersion found by Sinn and Reutter is likely to be upward biased.
c. Greece since 1997.
158 Chapter 5
The Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis is based on the assumption that
PPP holds in the long run in the traded goods sector. Furthermore rel-
ative prices of the nontraded and traded sectors are assumed to mainly
depend on the different evolution of productivity in the two sectors.
Ortega (2003) has investigated whether such long-run hypotheses can
be accepted across the main European economies (Germany, France,
Italy, and Spain). The sample period covers 1970 to 2001 for Italy and
Germany, 1978 to 1999 for France, and 1986 to 2001 for Spain. She nds
that deviations from PPP are persistent for the sample periods under
consideration, although somewhat less than is typically found in the
literature. Ortega splits up the real exchange rate into that of the traded
sector and the differential across countries of the relative price of the
nontraded sector. The latter is further broken into its determinants,
namely the cross-country differentials of relative markups, relative
labor costs, and relative labor productivities. Ortega nds that the
driving forces of the relative price differentials differ across countries
and periods. They persistently diverge from the predictions of the
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis.
Business cycle differences may also contribute to the ination differen-
tials in the euro area. As we pointed out in the previous section, busi-
ness cycles diverge among the countries in the euro area. Countries
with output above trend tend to have upward pressure on ination,
while countries with output below trend will experience downward
pressure on ination. Figure 5.3 plots the average ination rate after
the euro was adopted in each euro area country against its average
output gap in the same period. The plot suggests a positive relation-
ship between the average output gap and average ination.
Business cycles can be out of sync for various reasons. Remsperger
(2003) argues that one reason could have been the nominal convergence
process in the run-up to EMU. The elimination of the residual foreign
exchange risk since the beginning of 1999 and the dwindling of the risk
premia brought about a largely uniform interest rate level on capital
markets. In some countries this could have generated a substantial eco-
nomic boost. It was exactly in those countries that already had rela-
tively high ination that the fall in real interest rates pushed up prices.
18
An important factor was the rapid rise in property prices encouraged
by the convergence of interest rates (Remsperger 2003). Indeed,
Honahan and Lane (2003) report a fairly strong negative cross-sectional
correlation between real interest rate declines in the run-up to EMU
and commercial property ination in 1995 to 2001 (the correlation is
-0.67). This source of ination differentials is only temporary. The
expansionary effects of real interest rate changes over time are offset
by the equilibrating effect of changes in national competitiveness trig-
gered by an increase in ination differentials.
Ination differentials among economies in a monetary union lead to
changes in their real exchange rates. Owing to a real appreciation,
countries with higher-than-average ination rates suffer a loss in price
competitiveness, while countries with relatively low ination rates gain
in price competitiveness. The consequence is that export demand in the
countries with higher ination rates tends to decline, which has a damp-
ening effect on prices in these countries. Conversely, demand tends to
increase in countries with lower ination rates. The coolant effect of real
appreciation through a loss of competitiveness is likely only to operate
at a gradual pace. This persistence mechanism is reinforced if the wage-
setting process is not perfectly exible, such that current rather than
prospective ination inuences wage determination (Honahan and
Lane 2003). Arnold and Kool (2002) have examined the regional ina-
tion dispersion in the United States. They nd that the pro-cyclical
impact of a lower real interest rate dominates the countercyclical impact
Centralization or Decentralization 159
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Average output gaps
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
i
n
f
l
a
t
i
o
n
Figure 5.3
Output gap and ination, 1999 to 2002. (Source: OECD, Economic Outlook)
160 Chapter 5
of the real exchange rate in the short term. So, when regional ination
differentials occur, initially they tend to increase.
In conclusion, like in other monetary unions, ination differentials
exist and are likely to remain in place in the European Monetary
Union. From our review of the literature we nd that despite the pop-
ularity of the Balassa-Samuelson argument, the evidence in support of
it is not very compelling. Other factors, like different reactions to the
development of the external value of the euro, price level convergence,
and diverging business cycles seem to be more important. Regional
ination dispersion appears to be an adjustment mechanism through
which regional economic imbalances are corrected. Ination differen-
tials can, however, become problematic in two instances. First, if the
composition of the group of countries with above average ination
remains constant, the political support for monetary union and the
ECBs policies will likely erode in these countries. This can put
pressure at national central bankers. Second, if an ination differential
in a particular country is transitory, it can be a potentially dangerous
trigger of persistence mechanisms that continue to operate after the
original shock has disappeared. Overshooting can occur through
pricewage dynamics, especially if current ination feeds into future
wage growth (Honahan and Lane 2003). There may be differences in
the way expectations are formed across the euro area countries. Accord-
ing to Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2002) the expectation formation in
the wage- and price-setting process in Germany has been forward-
looking, whereas in other countries it has been geared more to the past.
This can have a signicant impact on price dynamics and give rise to
ination differentials as pointed out by Remsperger (2003). For
example, an oil price shock that affects wages in one country because
its expectation formation is oriented to the past does not necessarily
affect wages in other countries, so temporarily this situation creates
ination differentials.
5.6 Differences in Monetary Policy Transmission and Financial
Structure
It may be difcult for the ECB to keep ination in the medium term
below 2 percent if the impacts of monetary policy decisions differ
across countries in the euro area. Many critics of EMU have considered
the differences in monetary transmission across countries in the euro
area as an (additional) argument against a common currency.
In this section we examine two aspects of monetary transmission.
First, we review in section 5.6.1 recent research on the so-called pass-
through of monetary policy decisions (the extent to which changes in mon-
etary policy interest rates are reected in market interest rates). Among
other things, the impact of monetary policy on the real economy
depends on how changes in policy rates are transmitted to market
interest rates. Two elements are crucial for the transmission of mone-
tary policy decisions: the degree to which changes in the policy rate
affect the cost of borrowing and the speed of adjustment of market rates
to changes in policy interest rates. We analyze to what extent the pass-
through of policy interest rates differs across countries in the euro area
and whether there is convergence of the pass-through.
Second, we examine recent studies in which asymmetries in monetary
policy transmission are related to differences in nancial structure. The
best-known study in this area is by Cecchetti (1999, p. 22), who argues:
Most economists believe that the monetary transmission mechanism will vary
systematically across countries with differences in the size, concentration, and
health of the banking system, and with differences in the availability of primary
capital market nancing. The countries of the EU differ quite dramatically in
all of these dimensions that would seem to matter, leading to the prediction
that the impact of interest rates on output and prices will not be consistent
across countries. While the estimates of the impact of interest rate changes on
output and ination tend to be quite imprecise, they do differ, and in the way
that is predicted by the state of the countries nancial systems.
In contrast, in summarizing a large project on differences in monetary
transmission across euro area countries, the ECB concludes in its
Monthly Bulletin of October 2002 that the empirical evidence does not
suggest that there are systematic differences among countries in policy
transmission that are robust across different studies and methodolo-
gies. In section 5.6.2 we analyze this issue in some detail.
5.6.1 Pass-through of Monetary Policy Decisions
Various studies have investigated the pass-through empirically in a
multicountry setting. Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) report important
differences in pass-through in EMU countries. Table 5.12 shows their
estimates of the short-term (initial) effect for the six biggest EU coun-
tries. Also the results of similar studies by Borio and Fritz (1995), BIS
(1994), and Mojon (2000) are presented in this table. Mojon (2000) exam-
ines the pass-through in these six EMU countries for the period 1979
to 1998 for a whole range of deposit and credit rates (but which cannot
Centralization or Decentralization 161
162 Chapter 5
be fully compared across countries) and conrms the conclusion of
heterogeneity of previous studies. Hofmann (2002) analyzes the pass-
through in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain over the period 1984 to
1998, using the Johansen co-integration analysis. He concludes that
innovation in the money market rate is fully passed through to short-
term and long-term business loan rates over time. In the short run the
response of lending rates is, however, sluggish.
Although the EMU countries now share the same currency, their
nancial systems show considerable differences. As pointed out by
Mojon (2000), national segmentation in the retail banking industry will
remain signicant despite the EMU because retail banking involves
heavy investments in advertising, in a network of ofce branches, and
in customer services. Also differences in regulation can cause retail
banking markets to remain segmented along national lines. Then there
are differences in the balance sheet structure of households and rms
as they only gradually adjust to the new monetary regime. As a con-
sequence the pass-through from policy-controlled interest rates to bank
interest rates will tend to remain country specic. This potential source
of asymmetry in monetary transmission is particularly relevant in the
euro area where bank rates are a key determinant of the cost of capital
and the yield on savings.
Toolsema et al. (2002) examine this issue in some detail using rolling
regression techniques in an error correction framework. These authors
estimate their model rst for the period 1980 to 2000, and then apply
rolling regressions. The idea behind the latter approach is to take a
Table 5.12
Short-run and long-run effects of policy rate increase of 100 basis points on lending rate
(basis points)
Belgium Germany Spain France Italy Netherlands
Cottarelli and 21 37 36 12 52
Kourelis (1994) 87 100 94 83 82
Borio and Fritz 61 11 0 43 26 108
(1995) 127 105 117 74 122 108
BIS (1994) 85 18 43 14 125
Mojon (2000) 96 68 65 86 50 99
Note: Top row shows the short-run effect, and next row the long-run effect. The BIS and
Mojon studies only report short-run multipliers. The short-run effect refers to impact
multipliers for Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), and BIS (1994), to one-month multipliers
for Borio and Fritz (1995), and to three-month multipliers for Mojon (2000). For the latter
we report the multipliers that refer to short-term loan rates.
xed number of observations and to redo the regressions, every time
adding one observation at the end of the sample while dropping one
at the beginning. The results indicate whether the monetary policy
transmission has been stable over time in the country under consider-
ation and whether or not convergence has occurred. They nd that the
long-term equilibrium multipliers in all countries have moved toward
similar levels. In other words, this evidence suggests that there is con-
vergence of long-term multipliers. This process is visible in windows
that start at the end of the 1980s.
Over all, most recent evidence on pass-through of monetary policy
suggests that there has been a tendency toward convergence, although
it is unclear to what extent differences as reported in the earlier litera-
ture have fully disappeared. In this regard Mojon (2000) and Toolsema
et al. (2002) conclude that some differences still exist, whereas Hoffman
(2002) nds that monetary policy changes are fully transmitted to
market rates in all countries in his sample.
5.6.2 Monetary Transmission and Financial Structure
There is plenty of evidence that monetary policy has a diverging effect
on many countries in the euro area (e.g., see Rawaswamy and Slk
1998). Anumber of studies claim that asymmetries in monetary policy
transmission in the euro area result from differences in nancial struc-
ture (e.g., see Dornbusch et al. 1998; Cecchetti, 1999). Cecchetti (1999)
bases his view on the lending view of monetary policy transmission,
according to which monetary policy actions change the reserves avail-
able to the banking system, thereby affecting the willingness of banks
to lend and, ultimately, the supply of loans. Countries in which rms
are more bank dependent and banking systems are less healthy will be
more sensitive to ECB interest rate changes. Cecchetti (1999) relates the
estimates of monetary policy impact on output and ination of Ehrman
(1998) to indicators for nancial structure. He nds that countries with
many small banks, less healthy banking system, and poorer direct
capital market access display a greater sensitivity to monetary policy
changes than do countries with big, healthy banks and deep, well-
developed capital markets. Table 5.13 is reproduced from Cecchetti
(1999).
The nal column in table 5.13 shows the predicted effects of mone-
tary policy on output and ination, with higher values indicating a
stronger lending channel and therefore a larger impact. The indicator
is an average of the rst three columns. The rst column summarizes
Centralization or Decentralization 163
164 Chapter 5
Cecchettis assessment of the importance of small banks, which is based
on more detailed information on the number of banks, the number of
banks per million population, and the concentration ratio for the top
ve banks. The second column summarizes indicators for the health of
the banking system (return on assets, loan loss provisions, net interest
margin, and operating costs). The scores as reported in the third
column are based on the number of publicly listed rms, the extent of
secondary equity and debt markets, and the ratio of bank loans to all
forms of nance.
Table 5.14 connects the predicted effect to the estimated effects in the
model of Ehrmann (1998) as reported by Cecchetti (1999). It is remark-
able thatin contrast to what Cecchetti (1999) suggeststhe linkage is
not very strong. Indeed, if we plot Cecchettis indicator for nancial
structure and the estimated impact on production growth, a positive,
but insignicant effect shows up (see gure 5.4). So the evidence is that
differences in nancial structure do not cause much difference in mon-
etary transmission. This conclusion is broadly in line with the outcomes
of a Eurosystem research project, which is summarized in sidebar 12.
Table 5.13
Summary of factors affecting the strength of the monetary policy transmission
mechanism
Predicted
Importance of Bank Availability of effectiveness of
small banks health alternative nance monetary policy
Country (1) (2) (3) (4)
Austria 3 2 3 2.67
Belgium 1 2 1 1.33
Denmark 2 2 1 1.67
Finland 1 3 2 2.00
France 2 3 2 2.33
Germany 3 2 2 1.67
Greece 2 2 3 2.33
Ireland 1 1 3 1.67
Italy 2 3 3 2.67
Netherlands 1 2 2 1.67
Portugal 1 3 3 2.33
Spain 2 2 2 2.00
Sweden 1 3 3 1.67
United Kingdom 1 1 1 1.00
Source: Cecchetti (1999).
Table 5.14
Predicted and estimated effects of monetary policy
Predicted effectiveness
Maximum impact on
Country of monetary policy Output Ination
Austria 2.67
Belgium 1.33 -0.72 -0.05
Denmark 1.67 -0.48 -0.34
Finland 2.00
France 2.33 -1.30 -0.21
Germany 1.67 -1.21 -0.48
Greece 2.33
Ireland 1.67 -0.76 -0.25
Italy 2.67 -0.64 -0.25
Netherlands 1.67
Portugal 2.33 -0.39 -0.28
Spain 2.00 -0.46 -0.23
Sweden 1.67 -0.56 -0.11
United Kingdom 1.00 -0.53 -0.37
Note: Second column reproduces column 4 of table 5.13; the third and fourth columns
show the maximum impact of a 100 basis point increase in interest rates as reported by
Cecchetti (1999) on output and ination.
y = 0.1976x + 0.3295
R
2
= 0.109
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Financial structure indicator
M
a
x
i
m
a
l
o
u
t
p
u
t
e
f
f
e
c
t
Figure 5.4
Financial structure and impact of monetary policy
12 Differences in Monetary Policy Transmission: The ECB
View
In its Monthly Bulletin of October 2002 the ECB reports on a large-scale
research project on monetary transmission in the euro area.
19
As pointed
out by the ECB, there are two approaches to determining the importance
of the different channels in affecting the evolution of prices and output
in the euro area. On the one hand, structural econometric models can be
used to try to disentangle some of the channels and identify their rela-
tive quantitative importance at the macroeconomic level. A drawback is
that the analysis is dependent on the model, and the result can be driven
partly by modeling choices. On the other hand, disaggregated data from
balance sheets of nonnancial rms and banks can be used to analyze
specic key links in the transmission mechanism, such as the role of
nancial factors and the supply of bank credit. This approach is promis-
ing because of the importance of bank lending as a source of nance in
the euro area. With this type of research, however, it is not always easy
to deduce the macroeconomic importance of evidence in favor of nan-
cial factors playing a role. Both approaches have been used in this project.
The main results of the research can be summarized as follows:
Investment seems to be an important driving force behind output
changes in the wake of a monetary policy shock. The results conrm that
business investment is sensitive both to changes in the user cost of capital
and, to a more limited extent, to liquidity or cash-ow effects. Financial
and credit constraints seem to play a role in explaining the response to
monetary policy in some countries and for specic groups of rms or
banks but are not of central importance for the euro area as a whole. The
empirical evidence does not suggest that there are systematic differences
among countries in policy transmission that are robust across different
studies and methodologies. However, there is evidence for diverging
monetary policy measures affecting economic sectors and also evidence
that the effects of monetary policy on output is stronger in periods when
the balance sheets of households and rms are weak, such as during a
downturn.
A number of studies have used large-scale macroeconomic models at
the disposal of the European Central Bank and the national central banks
of the Eurosystem to compare the effects of monetary policy. Table 5.15
gives the results of a common monetary policy experiment with these
econometric models, using a 100 basis point rise in the policy interest
rate over two years. As the results show, this measure is found to lead to
a maximum aggregate drop in output in the national models of about 0.4
percent after two years. Asimilar effect is found for ination, but in this
case it occurs two years later. There are some notable variations in the
results across models with respect to both the magnitude and timing of
the effects. The impacts on output and prices were found to be relatively
modest in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg and rela-
tively strong in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece.
5.7 Conclusions
A consequence of the decentralized Eurosystem is that many of its
central banks have political weight that exceeds their economic weight.
While not necessarily a problem, this structure can introduce an unwel-
come bias into the ECBs decision making if country representatives
put some weight on national economic developments and these devel-
opments deviate notably from the behavior of euro area aggregates.
Although members of the ECB Governing Council do not act as
national representatives, but as fully independent persons, it is cer-
tainly possible that national economic welfare plays at least some role
in the (voting) behavior of regional representatives in the ECB Council.
Indeed, if national background should not play any role in the ECB
decision-making process, why then have the European governments
not delegated monetary policy fully to the Executive Board in the rst
place? The hypothesis of regional inuences in a federal central bank
system is supported by recent studies on US and German monetary
policy.
Centralization or Decentralization 167
Table 5.15
Effects of 100 basis point rise in the policy interest according to models of national central
banks
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Consumption deator Real GDP
Belgium -0.10 -0.18 -0.21 -0.17 -0.12 -0.15 -0.20 -0.10 -0.05 -0.03
Germany -0.05 -0.19 -0.38 -0.56 -0.56 -0.28 -0.33 -0.09 0.15 0.26
Greece -0.16 -0.24 -0.29 -0.35 -0.38 -0.41 -0.78 -0.69 -0.72 -0.74
Spain -0.04 -0.25 -0.46 -0.68 -0.86 -0.12 -0.43 -0.62 -0.56 -0.39
France -0.07 -0.10 -0.12 -0.14 -0.16 -0.15 -0.28 -0.25 -0.16 -0.08
Ireland -0.09 -0.15 -0.15 -0.17 -0.22 -0.25 -0.48 -0.43 -0.38 -0.32
Italy -0.15 -0.33 -0.47 -0.50 -0.37 -0.26 -0.60 -0.55 -0.21 0.05
Luxembourg -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.13 -0.17 -0.25 -0.27 -0.23 -0.15
Netherlands -0.12 -0.20 -0.22 -0.30 -0.38 -0.20 -0.27 -0.25 -0.22 -0.16
Austria -0.10 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 -0.25 -0.47 -0.49 -0.36 -0.32
Portugal -0.07 -0.22 -0.26 -0.27 -0.35 -0.12 -0.56 -0.81 -0.74 -0.61
Finland -0.53 -0.50 -0.17 -0.02 -0.08 -0.34 -0.24 -0.15 -0.22 -0.25
Aggregate -0.09 -0.21 -0.31 -0.40 -0.40 -0.22 -0.38 -0.31 -0.14 -0.02
Euro area- -0.15 -0.30 -0.38 -0.49 -0.66 -0.34 -0.71 -0.71 -0.63 -0.57
wide model
Source: Van Els et al. (2001).
168 Chapter 5
There is quite some evidence that within the euro area, countries
diverge in terms of their business cycles, ination, andto a lesser
extentmonetary transmission. Our ndings cannot give a denite
answer to the question of whether business cycles will become more
or less synchronized under EMU. It is likely that EMU will further
intensify trade relations among the EMU countries, and this will lead
to more synchronization according to most studies. However, there is
also evidence indicating that monetary integration can lead to less syn-
chronization as the stabilizing inuence of exchange rate uctuations
is removed.
The evidence discussed in this chapter further suggests that ination
differentials within the euro area can be persistent. As far as the dif-
ferences in monetary transmission are concerned, it appears that
differences in the estimated impact of monetary policy on output
and prices across countries do not tend to be robust across different
methodologies, data, and models.
20
Although differences in transmis-
sion can be detected in individual studies, they are often not statisti-
cally signicant and moreover inconsistent across studies. Also the
connection between transmission differentials and differences in nan-
cial structure can be questioned. When it comes to the pass-through of
monetary policy measures to money market rates, there is evidence
suggesting at least some convergence.
What are the policy implications of the analysis? Our analysis seems
to lend some support to the view of euroskeptics as it appears that the
optimism on synchronization of business cyclesas, for instance,
expressed by Trichet (2001)is not fully warranted: there is only mixed
evidence that further integration will lead to more synchronization
of business cycles and ination differentials will not disappear.
The upcoming enlargement of the monetary union will probably only
increase economic divergence. In order to limit the risks of suboptimal
policies due to diverging economic developments, we advocate a more
centralized decision-making process within the ECB. In chapter 7 we
will return to the issue of ECB reform. However, next, in chapter 6, we
discuss the future enlargment of the Monetary Union.
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we discuss the implications of the enlargement of the
European Union (EU) for EMU. The current members of the monetary
union will be joined by a number of new entrants that have substan-
tially lower incomes per capita. On May 1, 2004, ten countries joined
the European Union, and Bulgaria and Romania will become members
in 2007. The new EU countries are members of the EMU with a so-
called derogation. After a two-year waiting period, their convergence
will be evaluated based on the Maastricht criteria. At the earliest, the
new EU member states may therefore join the euro area in 2006 after a
positive assessment.
Several other countries, notably Slovenia and Estonia, are aiming to
join the euro area very soon after EU accession, and the incumbent
members of the monetary union are not likely to be able to do much
to keep the aspirants out.
In section 6.2 we assess the convergence achieved so far. Apart from
fullling the Maastricht criteria, the new member countries should
have an independent central bank before they can enter the monetary
union. Section 6.2 therefore starts with a review of the independence
of the central banks in the acceding countries. In the remainder of the
section we try to nd an answer to the question of whether a quick
entry into the monetary union is in the best interest of these countries
and, if so, which exchange rate will be optimal in the intermediate
period.
What are the implications of the entrance of new member countries?
Will the enlargement of EMU threaten the viability of the monetary
union? In other words, is enlargement of the monetary union in the
interest of its current members? Section 6.3 deals with these questions.
6
New Member Countries
170 Chapter 6
Similar considerations as those dealt with in chapter 5 (i.e., business
cycle synchronization, ination differentials, and nancial-structure-
related differences in monetary transmission) will be discussed. Section
6.4 offers our conclusions.
6.2 Central Bank Independence and Convergence
6.2.1 Central Bank Independence
Negotiations about EU membership started with the Czech Republic,
Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia in March 1998, while
in February 2000 negotiations were opened with Bulgaria, Malta,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia. To qualify for membership
the applicants must have largely adapted their laws to comply with EU
legislation and have the ability to implement that legislation. This
implies that, before entry, the applicant countries should also have
implemented those aspects of the Economic and Monetary Union
acquis communautaire as dened by Title VII of the EC Treaty. This leg-
islation refers to the prohibition of direct public sector nancing by the
central bank, the prohibition of privileged access of the public sector to
nancial institutions, and independence of the national central bank.
In this section we discuss the recent literature on central bank inde-
pendence that relates to the new member countries. Most of this liter-
ature focuses on the transition countries; much less is known about
Malta and Cyprus.
As we saw in chapter 4, it is often argued that central bank inde-
pendence (CBI) is crucial for the credibility of monetary policy. Alarge
body of empirical research on industrialized countries has provided
evidence that a high degree of CBI is positively correlated with lower
average ination rates.
1
Many countries in transition delegated mone-
tary policy to a (legally) independent central bank. However, legal
independence is not enough, as stressed by Jean-Claude Trichet (2002),
at the time governor of the Banque de France, at the Munich Economic
Summit, June 8, 2002:
The effective implementation of the acquis communautaire is not only a legal pre-
requisite for accession to the EU. It also implies the effective transformation
of accession countries economic framework, which should facilitate their inte-
gration into the EU and, later, the euro area. In this context, it should be ensured
that there is no discrepancy between the central banks formal status in the leg-
islation and the implementation of that legislation. We consider that compre-
hensive concept as an essential contribution to the clarity and the credibility of
the single monetary policy. It is of utmost importance that all present and future
Member States respect this economic and institutional ground rule of the
European framework.
The main purpose of this section is therefore to analyze the degree of
legal CBI achieved by the new member countries and to analyze to
what extent it has been implemented.
In the literature, various denitions of CBI and proxies for CBI can
be found. The bottom line of indicators for CBI is that they all try to
measure how much inuence government has on monetary policy
making. Most indicators are based on central bank laws. Still the
criteria taken into account, the grading and weighting methods, and
the interpretation of laws differ widely across various studies. Conse-
quently it is no surprise that research on CBI comes up with sometimes
strikingly different results.
Most of the research on CBI refers to industrial countries. However,
the literature on legal and, to a lesser extent, actual CBI in countries in
transition has increased substantially in recent years. Simultaneously
various indexes of legal independence have been built.
2
Relevant con-
tributions are Cukierman et al. (2002), Hochreiter and Kowalski (2000),
Lybek (1999), Loungani and Sheets (1997), Radzyner and Riesinger
(1997), Malizewski (2000), and Dvorsky (2000).
Table 6.1 presents various indexes of legal CBI. Loungani and Sheets
(1997) derive two indexes of CBI: the rst covers the goal of economic
and political independence (CBI-DF), while the second assesses simi-
larity between the analyzed law and the statute of the Bundesbank
(SIB). Lybek (1999) has built an indicator for 15 former Soviet republics
consisting of 21 criteria, including most of the elements found in earlier
CBI indexes. Malizewski (2000) has constructed a slightly modied
version of the index of Grilli et al. (1991) for transition countries.
3
Similarly Cukierman et al. (2002) have calculated the values of the
independence index of Cukierman (1992) for the transition countries.
Also Dvorsky (2000) has calculated CBI for the CEEC-5 applying the
Cukierman index. The diverging results in table 6.1 illustrate that
the degree of CBI largely depends on the design of the index and the
criteria included.
It is remarkable that at least on paper most central banks in the new
member countries are independent. On average, aggregate legal inde-
pendence is substantially higher than in developed economies during
the 1980s (Cukierman et al. 2002). After the most recent central bank
New Member Countries 171
172 Chapter 6
reform (enacted in 1997), the central bank in Poland has, for instance,
a score of 0.89 on the Cukierman index compared to 0.69 for the
Bundesbank during the 1980s.
It has been widely acknowledged that, especially in developing
countries, legal indicators of CBI are often incomplete and noisy indi-
cators of actual CBI. Central bank legislation may not always be
implemented as initially intended for several reasons.
4
So there may be
substantial deviations between the law and actual practice (see also
sidebar 13). Furthermore the selection of criteria, the grading and the
weighting imply arbitrariness to a certain extent and are, therefore,
subject to discussion.
In response to these shortcomings of legal CBI indexes, Cukierman
(1992) and Cukierman et al. (1992) provide a different approach to mea-
suring CBI. Their proxy is based not on central bank laws but on the
actual average term in ofce of the central bank governor. This indica-
tor is based on the assumption that a higher turnover rate of the central
bank governor (TOR) reects a lower degree of CBI. The TOR is cal-
culated as follows:
Table 6.1
Legal central bank independence in (potential) new EU member states
Loungani-
Sheets
Cukierman
Country Dvorsky CBI-DF SIB Lybek Maliszewski et al.
Bulgaria NA 0.88 1.00 NA 15 0.55
Cyprus NA NA NA NA NA NA
Czech Republic 0.70 0.88 1.00 NA 13 0.73
Estonia NA 1.00 0.67 19 13 0.78
Hungary 0.75 0.31 0.72 NA 10 0.67
Latvia NA NA NA 15 12 0.49
Lithuania NA 0.13 0.33 18 15 0.78
Malta NA NA NA NA NA NA
Poland 0.90 0.50 0.61 NA 14 0.89
Romania NA 0.50 0.56 NA 7 0.34
Slovakia 0.69 NA NA NA 11 0.62
Slovenia 0.60 NA NA NA 11 0.63
Note: The index of Cukierman et al. (2002) is the most recent LVAW index after CB
reform and removal of the ruble.
New Member Countries 173
13 CBI and the Rule of Law
Eijfnger and Stadhouders (2003) present an extension of the empirical
research on the relationship between CBI and ination. According to
these authors, legal arrangements are a prerequisite of CBI, but the trans-
lation of these legal arrangements into actual practice is of much greater
importance. Eijfnger and Stadhouders argue that the translation of legal
to actual CBI mainly depends on the rule of the law in a country. The
authors therefore introduce institutional quality indicators (IQIs) as
proxies for the rule of the law. These indicators are treated as a missing
link between legal and actual CBI. The idea behind this approach is that
if there is an interaction between legal CBI and IQIs, a measure for actual
CBI can be constructed using the IQIs as correction factor for legal CBI.
The outcome is a measure for effective CBI.
Eijfnger and Stadhouders construct proxies for actual CBI for both
developed and developing countries and test whether the institutional
environment is relevant to achieve price stability. They nd that the rule
of law and the institutional framework do matter in keeping ination
low, especially in countries in transition. Legal independence is a neces-
sary, but not sufcient, condition for actual CBI; it needs to be accompa-
nied by much liberalization. The peculiarities and characteristics of
transition economiesnarrow capital markets and limited access to
foreign nancing, large price shocks, and macroeconomic imbalances
undermine over ambitious institutional reform plans the same as they
do the rule of law. The effectiveness of CBI entails a high degree of
freedom to build up the central banks reputation.
Eijfnger and Stadhouders investigate effective CBI in transition
economies by using legal transition indicators (LTIs). These indicators
are provided by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD) and are measures for the quality of the commercial legislation in
terms of two criteria: extensiveness and effectiveness of commercial law.
The overall legal transition indicator is signicantly and positively cor-
related with ination during early phases of transition. This result sug-
gests that during these phases the ambitious institutional reforms are
inefcient because macroeconomic imbalances and huge price shocks
raise the temptation to bend the law. When liberalization has reached a
sufciently high level, the legal transition indicator becomes signicantly
and negatively related to ination. The measure indicative of effective
CBI comes from multiplying the index of legal CBI (based on the LVAW
indicator of Cukierman et al. 2002) by the legal transition indicator.
174 Chapter 6
(6.1)
The idea behind this approach is that central bank governors who are
not as willing to follow government instructions will more often be dis-
missed than cooperative ones. Of course, it is possible that a low TOR
score is the result of a central bank governor being more compliant to
government, and who therefore remains longer in ofce than his rene-
gade colleagues. Another reason to cautiously regard this indicator is
that a governor who resigns could have done so for voluntarily, per-
sonal reasons.
The studies in which the TOR is used as a proxy for CBI generally
conclude that there is a signicant relationship between the TOR and
the inationary picture of developing countries. However, Sturm and
De Haan (2002) have extended the data set covering almost twice as
many countries as Cukierman (1992) and included information from
the 1990s. Their ndings are in sharp contrast to most of the previous
work, leading to the conclusion that in developing countries the
turnover rate of the TOR is often not related to ination. Likewise
Lybek (1999) failed to detect any connection between the number of
governors to the average annual ination and average annual growth
in the countries of the former Soviet Union for the period from 1992 to
September 1998. However, the period taken into account was probably
too short to obtain reliable results. Lybek also provided some anecdo-
TOR
Number of central bank governors
Length of actual term of ofce years or fractions of years
=
( )
.
Table 6.2
Legal transition (LTI) and effective CBI
LTI LVAW LVAW
*
LTI
Bulgaria 0.57 0.55 0.31
Czech Republic 0.86 0.73 0.63
Estonia 0.86 0.78 0.67
Hungary 0.86 0.67 0.58
Latvia 0.57 0.49 0.23
Poland 0.86 0.89 0.77
Romania 0.57 0.34 0.19
Slovak Republic 0.57 0.62 0.35
Slovenia 0.57 0.63 0.36
Source: Eijfnger and Stadhouders (2003).
tal evidence that some CB governors resigned before their term of-
cially expired due to increasing political pressure. Apparently some
governors stayed in ofce because they pursued an accommodating
monetary policy.
It is interesting to observe the degree of effective CBI in the
transition countries using the TOR as a proxy. The TOR can offer
valuable insight on the gap between legal and actual CBI (Cukierman
et al. 2002). Nevertheless, the short history of central banks in
transition countries should make one careful in drawing conclusions.
Any small shift in the base period can lead to big differences in the
TOR.
Radzyner and Riesinger (1997) have calculated the TOR for the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic.
They conclude that although all central banks covered enjoy a com-
paratively high degree of legal CBI, the actual term of ofce was sig-
nicantly shorter in some countries. The highest TOR is recorded in
Poland (see table 6.3). Dvorsky (2000) has updated the study of
Radzyner and Riesinger (1997).
5
Except for Slovakia, the countries
New Member Countries 175
Table 6.3
Central bank independence in (potential) new EU member states: TOR
Legal term
Country Radzyner-Riesinger Dvorsky Lybek in ofce
a
Czech Republic 0.23 0.13 6
(12/923/97) (12/928/00)
Estonia 0.32 5
(1/929/98)
Hungary 0.38 0.23 6
(12/913/97) (12/918/00)
Latvia 0.16 6
(1/929/98)
Lithuania 0.62 5
(1/929/98)
Poland 0.49 0.35 6
(2/893/97) (2/898/00)
Slovakia 0.23 0.26 6
(11/923/97) (11/928/00)
Slovenia 0.17 0.11 6
(6/913/97) (6/918/00)
a. Source: Hochreiter and Kowalski (2000).
176 Chapter 6
monitored came up with a lower TOR compared to 1997, mainly
resulting from a longer base period and almost no personal changes at
the top of the central banks. The highest TOR is again registered for
Poland (0.35), which is quite interesting, since Poland has by far the
highest scores in terms of legal CBI. According to Dvorsky, the high
TOR is exclusively due to the frequent changes of governors from 1989
to 1992 and does not adequately reect the positive track record after
1992. Sidebar 14 provides some further discussion of the Polish case.
14 CBI in Practice: Poland
According to Radzyner and Riesinger (1997) and Dvorsky (2000), Poland
had a very high TOR. In terms of legal independence, the Polish central
bank is in the top ight of central banks and displays the highest scores
in applying various measures of legal CBI. This apparent paradox is,
however, quite easy to explain. The high score for the TOR in the refer-
ence period (19892000) is exclusively due to the frequent changes of
central bank governors in the very early stage of transition from 1989 to
1992.
The frequent changes from 1989 to 1992, however, turned out to be evi-
dence of the high political dependence of the National Bank of Polands
(NBP) at the time. Both Pakula and Baka resigned after the appointment
of a new government. Wojtowicz, the third governor was tripped by
a nancial scandal and served the shortest term in ofce. When
Gronkiewicz-Waltz was governor, a number of important central bank
law amendments were approved. In 1998 a new legal and institutional
framework for Polands central bank and the whole banking system was
adopted. The key issues taken into account were as follows (see NBP
1998):