A

JOURNAL

OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

May
143
151

1985

Volume 13 Number 2
Socratic Eironeia Rousseau
Virtue
and

Ronna Burger
Peter

Emberley
Webking

the Management of the Passions

Adams'

177 195

Robert

and

Individual Rights in John

'Will'

Defence

Donald J. Maletz
Vukan Kuic

The

Meaning

of

in Hegel's

Philosophy ofRight

213

Foreword for
Alain"

"The Politics 215 Yves R. Simon "The Politics

translated

of
Alain"

by

Yves R. Simon

of

by

John M.

Dunaway

233

Walter Nicgorski

Leo Strauss

and

Liberal Education

Book Reviews
251
Maureen Feder-Marcus Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche
without

Masks

by
on

Ofelia Schutte
and

261

Richard

Velkley

Dialogue
Plato

Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies

and

with an

by Hans-Georg Gadamer, translated Introduction by P. Christopher Smith

and

268

Will

Morrisey

Beyond Objectivism

Relativism: Science,

Hermeneutics,
Wisdom 277

and

Praxis

by

Richard J. Bernstein;

G. W. F. Hegel:

an

by Stanley
as

Introduction to the Science of Rosen

Larry

Arnhart

The Artist

Thinker: from Shakespeare to Joyce

by
Short Notices
285
J. E. Parsons, Jr.

George Anastaplo

Eighty
Guide

Years of Locke Scholarship: a Bibliographical by Roland Hall & Roger Woolhouse; John

Locke's Moral

Philosophy by

John Colman
edited

287

Will

Morrisey

Rhetoric

and

American

Statesmanship

by

Glen

Thurow &
Freedom:

Jeffrey
an

D. Wallin; Power, State,

and

Philosophy
and the

Interpretation of Spinoza's Political by Douglas J. Den Uyl; John Stuart Mill Essaxs

Pursuit of Virtue

in Political

by Bernard Semmel; Philosophy by J. E. Parsons, Jr.

inter >retation
Volume 13
number 2

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Hilail Gildin Seth G.

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Socratic

elgcoveia

Ronna Burger
Tulane

University

"Oh Heracles! Here is the customary predicted that when it was for you to

elgcoveia of

Socrates,

and this

knew,

and

answer you would not wish

answer

to, but

would

be

ironic

and would

do anything

rather

than

if

something."

someone asks you

Republic

337a

Readers
ner of

of

the Platonic dialogues are surely familiar

and

Socrates

the

reaction

thought unrecognizable apart

with this customary man But since, indeed, Socrates might be from his ironic speeches, and particularly his ap

it

provokes.

parently
of

dissembling
by

professions of
references

ignorance, it

comes as a surprise to realize

that there are only

these uttered

five

in the Platonic himself

corpus

to Socratic elgcosia, two

the same speaker in the same context, and one

on

imagining
Plato
puts

this

reproach against

the part of others.

by Socrates, Assuming that

is

which

nothing into the dialogues arbitrarily, we are compelled to ask what it brings these cases together, apart from all others, in a class of their
to

own.1

The
express

references

Socratic

elgcoveia

are, to begin with, accusations;

practiced

they

hostility

against

the deliberate deceit

by one

who says means.

partic

ularly
treats
gard

when

he belittles himself
the

just the

opposite of what

he
as

Aristotle

elgcoveia as

defect,

contrasted with or

boastfulness
speech

the excess, in re

to the

chean

truthfulness, Ethics no8a23). This kind

mean of on

sincerity in

and action

(Nicoma
ob

of self-depreciation

is

justified, implies,

Aristotle

serves, only

the part of the great-souled man when compelled to

deal
a

with

the

many

whom

he

despises

(ii24b30);
of one's

it

is

not,
or

he

weapon

of self-protection
elgcoveia

in the face

superior

equal.

If the

practice

of

is motivated, then, is
a certain

by

contempt would

for

one's

inferior,

the suspicion that

one

is

a victim of that practice

understandably

arouse resentment.

Of

course, there

pleasure, than

a sense of

superiority presumably, for those

who are spectators rather

victims.

It does logues

not seem accidental make

that the

who

this

accusation against grounds:

only three individuals in the Platonic dia Socrates might well be grouped to

gether on

independent

Republic
a

and and

certainly the speeches of Thrasymachus in the Callicles in the Gorgias have always struck readers as variations on

the third, that of Alcibiades in the Symposium, shares certain funda theme, mental features in common with them. This is reflected not only by the views these men express, but also by the structure of the dramatic representations in
1
.

These

reflections on

the references to Socratic eigcovEia were prompted

of

by

an

comment on

ered at

Charles Griswold's paper, "On the Interpretation the meeting of the American Society for Aesthetics in

Socratic

and

Platonic

opportunity to deliv
Irony,"

October,

1981.

144
which

Interpretation they
appear.

All three

enter

the discussion at the

a

end of a succession of

speakers,

and each understands

himself to occupy

biades
series

proposes to provide the

of speeches on

egcog,

fitting conclusion, by transforming the

after

which will

crowning position. Alci illuminate the entire

topic into a speech about

Socrates,

the

ironic beloved
and

who pretends

to be a lover (Sym. 2i4b-d). Both to the way Socrates has treated the
explode

Thrasymachus
two speakers

Callicles,

listening

before them, are filled with indignation; they into the discussion or Thrasymachus, Socrates suggests,
prepared

furiously
pretends

at

least

to

to

stand

up

against

the

unfair

manipulations

through

which

Socrates

prevented

the

previous

speakers

from

defending

the implications of

their views (Rep. 336c, Gorg. 482c-e).

Socrates is is
misguided

not only unfair, according to Thrasymachus and Callicles, but he in the opinions he is assumed to hold about the right way of life. what

Since this is just Callicles

seem

he

professes

to be his primary concern, Thrasymachus and

torn between pitying and

blaming
for

Socrates for his ignorance. In

or are meant gentleness

any case, the speeches harsh that Socrates is pedagogy to be ironic

Socrates'

they

address

to him are
them

to appear
expect

so

compelled

to

beg

if they

their

successful. stance

This,

of

course,

they

take only as another sign of

toward them (Rep. 336e-337a, Gorg. 489d-e). In as

suming,

however,

that Socrates is interested only in

teaching,
attitude

not

in

learning

from them, they confirm their profoundly contradictory the one hand they must teach Socrates, because he is a

toward him. On

simpleton who practices on

justice
do
not

out of naivete

(Rep. 343a-d, Gorg. 484c-d); yet,

not explain

the other

hand, they

trust him and could

that distrust if he were as foolish and

simple as

they
be
a

allege.

They

suspect there

is

more

to him and resent the possible

concealment of an seems to

inner

core

behind

facade

of

innocence. Now Alcibiades

for his It is
also

most

step ahead: he no longer wavers between two views of Socrates, intimate experiences, he discloses, have led him to see the truth of
his speeches, hidden
within a

Socrates'

character and of

deceptive

outer shell.

not only because of the superior insight they because of their outspokenness in doing so that

wish

to communicate, but

all

three interlocuters con to the discussion.

sider

themselves able to

make

an

important

contribution

Alcibiades
condition
proud of

makes a point of

in

vino Veritas

excusing his frankness as the result of his present (Sym. 21-je). But Thrasymachus and Callicles are it
exemplifies

their outspokenness as a confirmation of their teaching:

of courage and

just the kind

mark of

freedom from

constraint which

they

praise as the
of over

human

excellence.
of

They
those

believe themselves capable, therefore,

who preceded

coming the limitations

radical

them,

who were on

insufficiently

because they

were

held back

by

shame, based

merely conventional

grounds.

It is just the
which

openness of which all three

puts

interlocutors

are so

Socrates

into

question when

he
the

accuses each of
end of

however, harboring hidden in

proud,
must

terests.

Alcibiades, Socrates judges by

his speech,

in fact have

Socratic Eironeia
been very
undivided

145

sober while

pretending
of as

to

be

out of control:

he

almost succeeded

in his
as

attempt to veil the

true object

his speech, namely to

Alcibiades'

maintain

Socrates

his

lover
rather

and

Agathon

the undivided object of his love (Sym. 222c-d).

With this

light-hearted uncovering of hidden motive, Socrates does not deny, of course, but ignores the possible truth of portrait of him. He displays the same avoidance when he calls attention to Thrasy
Alcibiades'
machus'

report, that

It was evident, Socrates observes in his narrative Thrasymachus only pretended to make a point of getting him to answer; in fact he was eager to speak in order to do himself credit, since he be lieved he had a most excellent answer to the question (Rep. 338a) one which
self-concealment.
was

meant, among

other

He he

was perhaps

things, to advertise the mistaken, Socrates admits Callicles

499c).

usefulness of after

his

own skills.
with

his

long

discussion

Callicles,
have

in

having

assumed that

was able and unlike

willing to be

as open as
not

claimed to

be (Gorg.

Now

Callicles,

Thrasymachus, may

pretended to speak
purposes:

frankly

and with good will

in

order

intentionally
in
But the

to hide

his true

Callicles,
be
what

unlike

Thrasymachus, has
(cf. Phaedrus

no stake

an art of mak useful

ing things
ness of

appear to

they

are not

26ic-d).

Callicles'

candor and

friendship

depends

on a

third condition, knowl

of

edge,

and

it

should not

into

question.

be surprising if his satisfaction Socrates first confirms his confidence in

(Gorg. 487b); but

that condition is put

wisdom

Callicles'

by

ac

knowledging
ans would

that he has been sufficiently educated, "as the majority of Atheni

what emerges as

say"

the conversation progresses is

an

the extent to
and

which which

Callicles

maintains

the opinions of
of

Athenian

"gentleman,"

it is this

determines the limits

playful

his

outspokenness with

Socrates

Socrates is appropriately accuse him of elgcoveia. In

cusers; for convention, Socrates
Socrates'

doing

in unveiling the hidden motives of those who so, nevertheless, he turns the tables on his ac

while their claim to a superior shows each to

insight depends

on

their freedom from

be far less liberated than he believes himself

"touchstone"

to be. None of them is able, therefore, to provide an adequate test

soul

to

(cf. Gorg.

486d-487a).

Alcibiades,

at

least,

seems to

be

aware of a tension within

ence of

himself: he
while

admits that the shame

he feels in the

pres

Socrates is

strength,

its disappearance
2i6a-c).

Socrates is his

greatest weakness

(Sym.

he is away from Thrasymachus and Callicles,

as soon as

in contrast, are proud aware, at least at first,

of the radical

teachings

they

expound; but

they

are un

of their commitment
with

to opinions inconsistent

with

those

teachings,
The

which

furnish Socrates
which

the weapon he needs to refute them.

and

alleged

insight

Thrasymachus
concerns

Callicles share, despite their

master and

contrary interpretations

of

it,

the dialectical power play of

slave. Justice, according to Thrasymachus, is nothing but the rules laid down by the stronger to further his own advantage (Rep. 338c-339a); it is that which is

laid down, according to Callicles, by the weak who band together in self-defense against the naturally strong (Gorg. 483b-484c). While Thrasymachus betrays his self-understanding
as a

little man, resentfully

compelled

to satisfy the inter-

146
ests

Interpretation
powerful, Callicles identifies himself
combined

of the

with of

the naturally superior,

resentfully restrained by the Thrasymachus gets caught in

narrow
which

force

the
of

inferior

many.

But

Socrates'

net

because

the tension between his

understanding

of self-interest and a standard of perfection

in the

arts

to

he,

as a practioner of

the "art of

rhetoric,"

necessarily
of

ascribes

(Rep.
nar

340c-342e).
row

And Callicles

gets caught

because

the tension between his

understanding

of pleasure and an unacknowledged

standard, of nobility or
that all pleasures are

greatness,

which prevents

him from is the

defending

the

claim
-c).

equal, hence

pleasure as such
which

good

(Gorg. 499b

The tension

Alcibiades

recognizes

the teachings of

Thrasymachus
not of

and

in himself, the tension implicit in Callicles which Socrates brings to light and

exploits, is the result,

tion

their liberation

being insufficiently come that insufficiency

stronger"

radical.

Thrasymachus
reflected

from convention, but of that libera and Callicles might have over
on

had they

adequately

the meaning of "the

self-

or

"the

nature"

superior

by

who are entitled

to rule, and what the

interest is to

which

their efforts should

be directed. Without that reflection, they

may be on the way toward, but have not consistently carried through, the radical liberation which Socrates alone seems to have achieved. Yet while the doctrines
of

Thrasymachus

and

Callicles

conflict with the conventional opinions whose cast

trammels

they believe they have

paradox

off, the Socratic

perspective

seems,

para

doxically,

to support the conventional opinions

from

which

it is

more

thoroughly
his

liberated. It is this

that lies behind the contradictory attitude toward

and

Socrates that Thrasymachus

ironic treatment
tions scorn, his

Callicles

display

in their

accusations against
of

of them: while

Socrates

seems

to be an advocate
which could many.

the conven

they

irony

is

a sign of

superiority
the

be

explained

only

by

freedom from the But

while

unreflective opinions of

alienation

they may have an inkling of the self-sufficiency of Socrates, in their from it, Thrasymachus and Callicles have no adequate understand
source.

ing

of

its

Having
sense,

defined justice
Socrates'

as

the

interest

of

the

stronger,

Thrasymachus tries to
ruler

escape
who

attack

by

restricting the stronger to the (Rep. 340c-34ia);

in the

precise

by

definition

cannot err

by

the

end of

their

discussion, he
alone

seems to

suspect, but

without

fully

understanding,

that
who

Socrates is

never mistaken about admits

may have the correct interpretation of this precise ruler, his true advantage. By the better who should rule,

Callicles he is
alone

unable or

eventually that he means the wiser (Gorg. 49ia-d); but, though unwilling to be persuaded by him, he too suspects that Socrates
correct

may have the

understanding

of

the wiser

who

are

by

nature

stronger.

Now Alcibiades
sufficiency, but just

seems as

to have more than an

inkling

of

Socrates'

self-

little understanding, perhaps, of its source. He accuses Socrates of practicing tigcoveia in concealing his true status as beloved behind the guise of a lover. He claims to have opened up Socrates and discovered within
the moderation which makes

him look down

on

the

beauty,

wealth, and

honor

Socratic Eironeia
admired vine and

147

by

the many; the

so

images he discovered
and

within

Socrates he found

so

di

golden,

beautiful

wondrous, that he
21 6c- 2 17a).

was

willing to do whatever
speeches of

Socrates

might command
adds as an

(Sym.

And the

Socrates,
ex

Alcibiades

afterthought,
up,

are themselves clothed with a

ridiculous

terior; but ers, filled

when opened with

they

show

themselves to be more divine than all oth

images

of virtue most

fitting

for

whoever

is to be

a gentleman

(22ie-222a). But if Alcibiades has

men which ages within of

caught a glimpse of

that ironic disdain for

lies behind Socrates

which

Socrates'

outermost

veil, he has

not seen

behind the im
the nature
of

and

his

speeches:

he

shows no comprehension of

that egcog

does

move

Socrates,

and alone accounts

for his disdain

hu

man egcog.

In

order

to

bring to

elgcoveia, Socrates the desire to be the source of

light the contradictory attitude of those who accuse him of must disclose its root. What he discovers in all three cases is
the

master of

dfjuog. It is the
and

need

for honor from the many that is learned from Socrates (Sym.

Alcibiades'

weakness,
which

that is precisely the uncomfortable

truth about himself

2i6a-c).

he

admits

to

having

Thrasymachus believes he

can shock

the naive

Socrates

by teaching

him that the shepherd, far from being concerned with the good of the sheep for their own sake, cares for them only with an eye to the benefit for himself and his
master

(Rep.

343a-c).

But Socrates

puts

Thrasymachus in his

proper place

by identifying
for his
Just
of as

him

with

this shepherd, subordinated to a master and dependent

own good on

the sheep he attempts to control through his art of speaking.

explains so

he himself, Socrates
and of

to

Callicles, is

moved

Alcibiades

philosophy
and of

Callicles is

moved

by by a

dual love
of
yet

dual love

Demus,
in the

son of

Pyrilampes,

the Athenian

dfjuog

(Gorg. 481C-482C);

Callicles'

case of

dual allegiance,

unlike that of

Socrates,

the beneficial

effects of one cannot serve as a corrective

the

other.

If he is to

achieve at

for the potentially disastrous effects of that friendship with the dfjuog for which he longs,
the
end of

Socrates

reminds

Callicles
what

their

discussion, he

must make

himself

like it,
goal over

which

is just

Callicles

wishes to avoid.

Having
in his
the

discovered the force

encounters with

which moves must

these men, Socrates has a

common

dfjuog

brings

as

demonstrate that the desire for mastery its consequence enslavement to it. Since Socrates, in
not seem

them: he

in attaining that mas desirable, they disdain his apparent dfjuog they tery powerlessness. But the resentment they express in their accusations against his elgcoveia betrays just the opposite: they are half aware that his indifference to the
the
eyes of

his accusers, does

which

to

have

succeeded

over the

consider so

desire for mastery over the dfjuog brings as its consequence freedom from it. To the extent that Socrates reveals their enslavement he implies his liberation, and
thus turns their disdain into envy of what

they

suspect

is his hidden

power.

disdain is especially well illustrated by envy exchange of accusations between Socrates and Callicles. the otherwise puzzling When Socrates playfully warns Callicles that he must be more gentle if he wants
This
unstable condition of

and

148

Interpretation
continue

Socrates to
with

being

attending his lessons, Callicles understandably ironic. But Socrates forcefully denies the charge; he
character

charges swears

him

"By

Zethus,"

the Euripidean retorts, he

Callicles'

to

whom

Callicles just

appealed

when, Soc
what ex

rates now

spoke so

ironically to him
alluded

(Gorg. 485c,
the
man of

489c).

But

actly

was

irony? He

to

Zethus,

the

field,

and

to his

musical

brother Amphion to
public-political; and

symbolize when

two ways of

life,

the

private-philosophic

and the

he

argued

that the former

should not

be

con

tinued beyond youth, since real

men must

be devoted to the

latter, he

seemed

only to express his genuine conviction,

rates

which

he hoped to

communicate

to

Soc

for his

own good. a

To describe the unmanly individual who needs philosophy beyond the appropriate time, Callicles
the philosopher, he charges,

whipping for continuing cites a line from Homer:

is

compelled

to whisper

in

a corner with a cf.

few

glory"

boys, "shunning
ix. 441).

the

ayoga where men get

(Gorg. 483d,

Iliad 1.490,

Callicles seems, in the first place, to be unaware of the fact that Socrates is seldom far from the ayoga; he has, after all, just described the philosopher as knows nothing of the laws of the city, nothing human pleasures and desires (484c-d, cf. Theaetetus
a man who of men's
173c-

characters,

of

175b).

Perhaps,
He

however,
the

Callicles'

irony

is

intended, in

part, to

imply
of

the

difference between
assembly.

ayoga of

the Athenian marketplace and that

made a rather odd choice

the Homeric

has, in any
philosophic

case,

to illustrate the limitations of the

by likening Socrates to Achilles; and while the context refers to Achilles sulking by his ship in private, out of wounded pride, he remains the
life
great warrior whose absence

only
which

proves to

his

countrymen

their utter depen

dence

upon

him. The line to

signs of manliness

war and

Callicles alludes, moreover, juxtaposes two debate in the ayoga where men become preem

inent; but Callicles

sumably to

omits the

advocate the

ambiguous words could

former, oddly enough, just when his purpose is pre strong man's life of action. With this omission, his be interpreted more as a praise of Socrates than a con

demnation;
can't

of

course, the

irony

which

Socrates
as

recognizes

in these words,

one

help

but surmise, may have Callicles

accusations against

its unwitting
more

victim rather

than

in

tentional perpetrator.

That the
cuser

Socrates

betray

the limitations of the ac

than of the accused

is

confirmed

by

the only other reference in the Platonic

corpus

to Socratic elgcoveia. Near the end of

his trial Socrates ironic

surmises

he

were

to

justify

his

allegiance

to the philosophic enterprise

think him

obedience
are

to the god, the

jury

would

by (Apology

that, if appealing to his

since

37e);

they

in fact condemning him of impiety they must consider his entire anoXoyia a long exercise in irony. But Socrates is in a bind: although he cannot appeal to the
god,
since

they believe him impious, they

his devotion
worth

would

believe him

even

less, he

adds,

if he

were to argue that

to philosophy

is based

on

the conviction that

the unexamined life is not

Socrates'

claim to

piety;

yet such

living (38a). The jury might resent the irony of irony would be compelled by their inability to

Socratic Eironeia
comprehend mitment

149
which

the

truth,

Socrates has simultaneously revealed,

us

of

his

com

to the

Socrates'

elgcoveia

self-justifying worth of philosophy. is necessitated, Plato shows

here, by

the ignorance of

dfjuog; it is equally necessitated, as the other explicit references show, by those whose desire to enslave the dfjuog binds them in an essential relation to it.
the

They

are prevented

by

this

desire from

being

persuaded

by

Socrates

even when

they follow the implications of his arguments; they are forced to look up to Socrates with a suspicion of his strength, while looking down on him because they do
not
rates'

irony
what

really understand it. in refusing to offer his

Thrasymachus'

resentful charge against own answers

Soc

to the questions he raises is

thus paradigmatic: since Thrasymachus does not understand what philosophy the standard of

knowledge is

which

it

presupposes

but does

not

is, fulfill, he

could not edge of

possibly grasp the truth behind his own ignorance. The charges deeds
can

Socrates'

claim
against

to possess only knowl

Socrates'

speeches and

be

ascribed

to

Plato, then,

not as

self-concealing judgments of Socrates

than

but

of

the speakers

who express

them,

whose words mean more

they realize;
in the Pla

the accusations against Socratic elgcoveia are themselves tonic dialogues ironically.

represented

Rousseau

and

the

Management

of

the Passions

Peter Emberley
Carle ton University, Ottawa

Rousseau has commonly been

of

understood

to desire a

return

to one or

another

the classical accounts

of

the nature of man, to accept a

Christian,
as

albeit unor

thodox, understanding
of

of

the human soul, or to point forward to Kant's account

of reason.

the radical

sovereignty
upon

Thus, he has been interpreted

seeking

ei

ther to re-establish Stoic natural law doctrines or Socratic philosophy, to found the moral life
or

Christian

compassion and the promptings of the

conscience,

to articulate a

model of autonomous moral

law.
expresses
of

Basing their assessments

in the First Discourse, Rousseau's
or

on views

Rousseau

in the Social Contract,

the Savoyard
Vicar"

in the "Profession

Faith

of

these often elaborate commentaries

tend, nonetheless, to

give short shrift

to

serious reservations about

the role of reason and the ambiguous sta

evidence of which we shall examine

tus of conscience in his

presently.1

teaching

generally,

on his moral theory, or accounts of his disagreement have contemporaries, unfortunately dwelled only briefly on Rousseau's

Commentaries

with

his

psycho-

The Institute for the Humanities,

study.

University

of

Calgary, generously

provided support

for this

confusion and

of Rousseau's critique of modernity has produced a great diversity and occasional among his interpreters and critics especially in the desire to see this critique as unqualified unambiguous. However, to praise the classics is not to counsel their imitation, just as to damn the
.

The force

moderns

is

not

to

deny

the necessesity

of

taking

leaf from their book. Those

who

have

nonetheless

in assimilating Rousseau to ancient thought are: M. Einaudi, The Early Rous seau (N.Y., 1967), K. F. Roche, Rousseau, Stoic and Romantic (London, 1974), M. Ellis, Rous seau's Socratic Aemilian Myths (N.Y., 1977), and A. Schinz, "La Notion de Mercure de been
somewhat zealous
vertu,"

France, vol. I, no. 12, 1912, pp. 532-55. Imposing Christian ideas upon Rousseau's thought, by an other interpretation, requires overemphasizing the centrality of the vicar's "Profession of and a
Faith"

number of

Rousseau's letters

while

ignoring the implications

of much

that

Rousseau

writes elsewhere

and

being

insensitive to the interpretive difficulties (dramatic

and

theoretical)

that arise

these statements of religious belief literally. This

issue is too difficult to

address

here

although

from taking it has

raised by C. Orwin, "Humanity and Justice: The Problem of Compassion in the Thought of Rousseau", Ph.D. Diss., Harvard, 1976; J. Cropsey, "The Human Vision of Rousseau: Reflections in Political Philosophy and the Issues of Politics (Chicago, 1977); and A. Bloom, intro on duction to the Emile (N.Y., 1979). As examples of interpretations that have taken Rousseau's reli

been

Emile,"

R. Grimsley, Rousseau and the Religious Quest (Oxford, 1968); P. M. defoi du vicaire Savoyard (Fribourg, 1914); J. F. Thomas, Le Pelagianisme Profession La Masson, deJ.-J. Rousseau (Paris, 1956). R. Masters in The Political Philosophy of J. -J. Rousseau (Princeton,
gious themes as central see

1968), despite his

careful textual exigesis, accepts

the "profession of

faith"

too readily

but only

by in

terpreting

away the traditional meaning of conscience, cf. p. 75, n. 79. For overly-rationalist and
see
ofJ.-J.

Kantian interpretations

The Question
1967).

Rousseau (N.Y., 1954);

R. Derathe, Le Rationalisme deJ.-J. Rousseau (Paris, 1948); E. Cassirer, and A. Levine, The Politics of Autonomy (Amherst,

152

Interpretation
which

logical principles,
tion.

he himself

nonetheless articulates with singular atten

Why

this

scant appraisal of

his

educational

treatise, the

Rousseau's psychology has occurred is because Emile, has often been interpreted as a mere prole

gomena or supplement

to his more substantial moral

method

teaching
moral

elsewhere.

It has be im

been

understood

to be merely the

by

which

his

theory

can

plemented. moral

Yet,

would propose

that an adequate understanding of Rousseau's

teaching

cannot

be

separated

from his

emphatic concern to elaborate an

employs

effective

morality.

The

particular

psychology he

to make morality

effective

brings about,

at the same

time,

a significant transformation of the mean

ing

of

the "moral
need

life."

to his psychology arises because of Rousseau's episte In the Emile, Rousseau appears to accept modern counsel by abandoning the idea of an autonomous reason and by reducing internal experi ences of the mind to transformations of sense impressions. Moreover, he sub

The

for

attention

mological position.

jects former theories positing the existence ideas, or innate principles of knowledge to
such possibilities

of

complex,

natural

faculties, innate
avoid of

critical appraisal.

To

imputing
student

to the mind, Rousseau

"statue-man."

"constructs"

the mind
much

his

through a judicious manipulation of

impressions,

in the

spirit of

Condil

lac's

construction of

his

At the same time, in an interesting departure from Locke's sensationalism, he introduces the idea of a causal connection between sense impressions and feel

ings

of pleasure and pain.

part of

Rousseau's

analysis of

the passions thus constitutes

an

integral

his

epistemological position.

The

careful manipulation of sensi

bility is intended, Rousseau claims, to ensure a sound perception of reality and the proper cultivation of the mind's faculties as well as to define the way in
which

those

faculties

will

be

exercised.

The
moral

psychological

inquiry
moral

is

crucial too
or an

because in the

absence of a

distinctive
regulating

faculty, innate

ideas,

independent

reason capable of

the human soul, Rousseau

is

compelled

to explain or find a new basis

and motive

for the

moral experience.

As

a moralist and

teacher of an effective morality, he is

concerned

to reveal how the moral life comes into

a crucial role

being

and

is

sustained.

Since

the passions

in motivating play forming a man to act upon these standards, an understanding of Rousseau's psychology is necessary if we are to comprehend the novelty of his moral theory.
standards of conduct and

in

One

cannot

begin to

appreciate
alteration

tion of the

fundamental

Rousseau's psychology without the recogni he introduced into accounts of human nature.

This

was

his

argument that man's nature not

is

modified

in time

by

external circum

stances.

Therefore, he claims, it is

to engage in introspective

inquiry to

simply determine the

possible

to examine social men or

nature of man.

Although
men,

vari

ous passions and sentiments appear as natural characteristics of

Rousseau
pas

denies that

most are part of man's original endowment.

The predominant

sions observable

in contemporary

men

developed historically; to understand their

Rousseau
origin

and

the

Management of the Passions

153 for his changing

nature.

it is necessary to examine the attribute In the Second Discourse, Rousseau

of
"perfectibility"

of man responsible
attributes man's

malleability to the

faculty
men

and claims that

it is the

characteristic

distinguishing

from beasts. Previous

each

accounts of

human

nature were

claims, because

identified

contingent characteristics

defective, Rousseau as fundamental, or

passions, thus

failed to

comprehend
great a

the

simple origin and

derivation

of complex

according too
was

to

enforce

complexity to the human soul. One of the results of this obligations, justify inegalitarian human relations, and demand
and religious restraints not natural or advantageous

certain

political, moral,

to
an

the human soul. Rousseau's science of the passions is intended to

display

economy lieved were the layers

character of

of explanation and
of

simplicity deceit and confusion covering the question of the human nature from which false inferences had been made.
problem of what a

of

derivation that dissolves

what

he be
real

The interpretive
"natural"

is however

difficult
to

one. or

tation, is it the capacity

only

learn,

Rousseau means by perfectibility and the Is perfectibility simply malleability, is it imi is it a latent form of reasoning? Is the natural
"natural"
"artificial"

what constitutes the original

endowment, does it include later accretions,

and what standard would

distinguish

from

additions

to the

human The

repertoire?

Commentators have been his discussion is Is

man

puzzled

by

Rousseau's

ambiguous

discussion.2

context of

an argument an

mechanical necessity.

simply

proving man's exemption from ingenious machine, whose sentiments

offer evidence

are reducible

to

material

causes, or does his behavior

to merit the

positing
as

of a spiritual substance?

Although

"perfectibility"

appears

to replace, or
explained

to offer a less the

controversial explanation

for the

effects of what
not

had been

metaphysical

"freedom

will,"

of

the

it is

unambiguously
proves

evident

from has

Rousseau's discussion

"perfectibility"

whether

a spiritual substance or explains man's

conclusively distinctive nature.

that

man

out, Rousseau at no point explicitly denies that perfectibility can be explained mechanistically nor does the remain der of his discourse rely upon the metaphysical notion of "freedom of the

As

other commentators

have

pointed

will."3

Indeed,

no more references are made

to

"purely

acts"

spiritual

nor

to

man's

posed exemption

from
to

mechanical necessity.

What is

"perfectibility,"

and

sup does

Rousseau

propose

explain

the genesis of
meant

man's nature on

the basis of mecha to

nistic causes?

Perfectibility
retort

is

to be

an observable phenomenon subject

empirical proof and scientific explanation.

2.

Can it

nonetheless cover

those

"spiri-

Also, H. Benda, "Rousseau's Early Discourses: Man, Society, Journal of Political Science, vol. 5, 1953, pp. 13-20, and vol. 6, 1954, pp. 17-28, and and Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 39, M. Jack, "One State of Nature; Mandeville and
turn to all fours
State,"

Voltaire's stinging is a good

to

Rousseau's

second

discourse that he himself

preferred not

to

re

example.

Rousseau,"

1, 1978, p. 119, M. Plattner, Rousseau's State of Nature (Dekalb, 1979),

no.

misconstrue

Rousseau's teaching. Exceptions to this

and

misinterpretation and the

include

W. Galston, Kant

Problem of

History (Chicago,
3.

1975).
pp. 46-51.

Cf. Marc Plattner, Rousseau's State of Nature, 1979,

154
tual

Interpretation
while

acts"

remaining true to
while

empiricism?

Could perfectibility be
which are not?
endowment

understood

being mechanistically Rousseau turns to the origin

swers

the cause of

faculties

of man's

distinctive

to provide an

to these

questions.

He

claims

that

perfectibility is
at all were

faculty that arose fortu

not

itously

and that
.

it
It

need not cannot

have developed
said

it

for

various external

circumstances

be

therefore that the development of perfectibility

nor

is Ideologically
Rousseau
gests

ordered

by

nature,

indeed

are

the

other

faculties

which

admits also emerged

due to "countless

accidents."

that there are

primitive men

in

whom

oped and who are

thus

still

in the

state of

nature.4

sug perfectibility may never have devel It appears from this hesitant

Rousseau

even

beginning
manent,

of man's

history

that he is not directed

by

God's will,

natural

tendency

toward some determinate end. Nor

makes quite clear

"self-perfection"

for Rousseau

that it has also

nor by any im is perfectibility been "the source

of all man's

misfortunes."5

Thus it

appears
or more

from Rousseau's description that

precisely, adaptability to
circum

perfectibility is merely malleability,

stances.

This

explanation of

the

concept

is

supported

by

considering

what

Rousseau
to distin
such

takes to be the relation between

guish men

reason and perfectibility.

Continuing
them."6

from animals, he

writes:

"...

animals can neither

formulate

ideas

nor even acquire the

appears

thus to be dependent

perfectibility which depends on Perfectibility upon ideas for its development. Now, Rousseau

also claims that reason

is

acquired

by,

and

the growth of ideas is a

response

to,

the necessity
cumstances progress of

satisfying different needs. Needs alter according to changing cir and the mind develops to accommodate the change in needs. The
of reaction

the mind is thus a

considered

to changing circumstances. Because per

upon

fectibility
openness nature.

is

by

Rousseau to depend

this process, it appears that

to change stimulated

by

external, physical causes characterizes human

Nonetheless,
and animals.

this obscures rather than clarifies the

not

distinction between

men

For it is

the case, Rousseau advances, that animals are

writes

not al

tered

by

circumstance.

He

that animals were at some point

physical causes
. . .

similar species

to

each other until

"various

in time very introduced into certain is

not

the varieties we

notice."7

Moreover,

this alteration
were

predetermined;

the diverse characteristics these animals

nature."8

developed

"not inherent in their

It

cannot

therefore be simply malleability with respect to varying phys

ical

causes that characterizes man's

more

than

infinite

malleability?

Rousseau

distinctiveness. Can perfectibility be nothing states that perfectibility is "almost

un-

4.

mard),
5.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, OZuvres Completes, 4 III. 208.

vols.

(Paris: Bibliotheque de la

Pleiade, Galli

Ill,
Ill,

142.
149.

6. Ill,
7.

123.

8. Ibid.

Rousseau
limited.'"'

and the

Management of the Passions

not unlimited.

155
as

It is therefore

Moreover,

the

faculties

Rousseau de

have bounds; the mind is depicted as having "a generally limit of the perfection of which it is Thus man is not wholly inde terminate. But what is it in human nature that limits his malleability? Is it simply
scribes them appear to
susceptible."10

physical structure or are

there also behavioral limits?

man's capac

ity to

Another possibility of what Rousseau means by perfectibility is imitate the activities of others. Man's distinctiveness consists

of

his

greater

adaptability
animals are

learning limited by instinct but

and and

capacity.

This is
man,

confirmed

by

Rousseau's

claim

that
able

who

is

not governed

by instinct, is

to learn from them: "... men, dispersed among the animals, observe and imitate their

industry

thereby develop in
cannot

themselves the instinct of the

animals."11

This
this

passage suggests

that perfectibility is a type of imitation.

However,

again

interpretation

be the

right one

because Rousseau

gives an example of

a monkey's

perfectibility.12

capacity for imitation, and monkeys obviously lack the faculty of Rousseau implies that imitation is a purely mechanical act and
cannot

thus we may infer that it

seau
bility.13

be the distinctive
mere

characteristic of man.

Rous

actually explicitly distinguishes

imitation from the

faculty
by

of perfecti major

Nonetheless,

each of

the examples

by

which

he illustrates the
an

transitions of man's evolution due to perfectibility is constituted

of either

imitation

beasts,

nature,
a

or other

men.14

specifically human form of imitation. Animal's instinct per forms the functions of deliberation and choice; men, lacking instinct, can none Perhaps there is
theless choose to
adopt

the instinct of animals.

Yet, Rousseau has

The

not provided

an unqualified argument

for this freedom

of choice.

reformulation required

up this ambiguity of man's distinctiveness would be that man contributes consciously to his alterations whereas animals are simply passively modified. This however is not evidently the solution since Rousseau denies that men have
to
clear

that

self-consciousness. would

From

all

Rousseau
perhaps,

wishes

to claim on

behalf of perfecti
that the real

bility, it

be

more coherent

on

his part, to

suggest

ground of

the distinction is another, or

much as

man's

learning

capacity, his ability to judge one

choice over not take

quite

precisely

his

rationality.

Yet Rousseau does

wishes

this step,

his

argument appears

to

require

it. Rousseau

to

understand

human

nature with reference to

"the first

and simplest operations of notion of

the human
appears

soul,"

which are require

"anterior to
of

reason,"

but his

perfectibility

denies.15 We shall rationality which he return to Rousseau's understanding of rationality in the second part of this paper. Another ambiguous element of Rousseau's account has to do with what per-

to

precisely this fact

9. 10.
11.

Ill, 142. Ill, 174.

III.
135.

12. 13. 14.

15.

Ill,
Ill, Ill,

211

Ibid.
135, 148, 165, 167, 171-73125-26.

156

Interpretation is
meant

fectibility

to achieve. If
must

mechanical

necessity, it

perfectibility is to take man out of the realm of free man from the mere capitulation to his desires.

Perfectibility is
of occurs

then the absence or restraint of certain

desires,

or particular sorts

desires. However, Rousseau

claims that this regulation or restraint of

what

desire in his

in

animals as well.

In

fact,

had distinguished
a natural

men and animals set upon their

initial formulation
whereas man

was

that the latter had

limit

desires,
so
sensual

had

no such

limit.

Animals'

behavior is

regulated

by

instinct
to

that their self-preservation remains

excesses

intact,

whereas men were given

that

endanger

their self-preservation. If man's exemption

from

mechan

ical necessity requires a limitation of desire, paradoxically it has its model in ani mal instinct. Perfectibility appears to be in part the capacity to regain a natural instinct with which man was not endowed. However, it must be distinguished

from

mere

instinct

by

the

fact that

man

chooses this own nature.

regulation, or

in

other again

words, that
appears

he actively
natural.

participates

in his

This, however,
which

to

require support

by

reason and

self-consciousness,

Rousseau

denies to be It is
and

useful at

this point to remind ourselves what Rousseau is

trying

to prove
sets

then to determine

if his is

arguments are sufficient.

The task Rousseau

him

self
man

is "to
. .

separate what
"

original

from

what

is artificial, in the

present nature of

and

nature was no

distinction.16 If man's his teaching depends decisively upon this more than his history this task would be impossible to perform and

the

"natural"

original was all

would

be

meaningless as a standard of natural man's

right. If per Rous

fectibility
of

that was inherent in

nature, then Rousseau's discussion

the development of unnatural

faculties

would collapse.

The

purpose of and

seau's genetic analysis

is precisely to determine

some

elementary

fundamen

tal features of human nature and then to

judiciously
appears

manipulate man's adapt

ability

so

that the various faculties created are

consistent with some original

fea

ture of primitive
plements

other

life. Thus, perfectibility be a faculty that sup inherent faculties and ensures that human behavior can be
to

sufficiently adapted to guarantee an optimal replication of the original condition. However, it also appears to produce or be instrumental in producing both arti

ficial

and natural modifications of

"artificial"

the

original endowment.

The

origin of

the

in

man

is however

somewhat ambiguous.

Al

though the artificial cannot

simply be formed
cause of

originating
must either

cause.

If

man

is the

by nature, it must still have an the artificial, his capacity to fabricate it

an

be

natural or artificial.
man's

Without

infinite regress, there

that somehow

must

be

at some point

in

development

an occurrence

forms

the ar

tificial. The
an active

implication is that

man responds

to some circumstance that produces

force that

either supplements or opposes and

impedes the
give a

preoccupa

tions of his
rection

primitive condition.

What is that force

and

does it

to the indeterminate

character of perfectibility?

decisive di When perfectibility be-

16.

Ill,

123.

Rousseau
comes

and the

Management of

the

Passions

157

directed in

what criterion
rest?

such a way as to cause distortions in man's character, upon does the distinction between artificial and natural modifications

Perfectibility
of condition

alone

does

not appear to

form, namely
sary

explaining for the phenomenon

elsewhere to
"natural"

man's

distinctive

satisfy the task it is meant to per nature. It supplies only the neces
Rousseau describes. It is

of alteration that

necessary to look

discover the

cause of man's nature and

of

it may

re

quire a redefinition of

the

to solve some

the questions with which we

have been

confronted.

We

must

look to Rousseau's

analysis of

the human

soul

to

resolve our

dilemmas.
begins
the classical and

Rousseau's

analysis

with a substantial repudiation of

modern rationalist's claims

giving primacy to
to both the

reason

in the

growth of

ideas

and

the regulation
of reason

of

the passions. Rousseau's

matters applies

opinion with respect

to the impotence
mind and

in these

functioning

of

the

the re

straint of appetites.

For the

classical

rationalists,

reason was autonomous and

creative, decisive in the accumulation of

ing,

and

the consciousness

reflected on

its

own

states;

knowledge, the growth of understand of identity. Moreover, in its highest activity, reason thought, thinking itself, or philosophy, was seen as
The
classical rationalists understood

man's

highest

achievement. a

the mind to be

capable of

apprehending

reality beyond the

autonomous

appearance of natural
summum

phenomena,
of

to discern final causes, and to come to comprehend the

man aspiration.

bonum

hu

As well, this
precepts

faculty

of reason could restrain men's and

desires, legislate
These
alists,

to man's

"baser"

nature,

draw the

mind

beyond its

particular existence to a

transcendent,

universal order.

metaphysical assumptions were

rigorously

criticized

by

modern ration

although

they

themselves retained the notion of an autonomous reasoning

capacity
gin of

and natural

faculties. Even Locke, epistemology

whose attack on

innate ideas

and

whose seminal sensationalist

oriented speculation

toward the ori

ideas

and

sensory perceptions,
of

nonetheless retained

the assumptions of the

irreducibility
mind sions. about

of the mind's operations,

the autonomy of the constitution of the

of reason over

from that
Locke's

the

body,

and

the regulatory ability

of

the pas

Rousseau followed many

epistemology.

his

contemporaries

Disputing

Locke's

rationalism and

in voicing his

reservations pedagogical
"
. .

proposals to

employ

reason with

children, Rousseau
a condition objects to

countered with

you

employ a metaphysic he is not in him all of a sudden from sensible

only

to understand

by

thus

transporting
not

intellectual

objects."17

Rousseau

recommends an experiential and affective

education,

and a strict empirical

science of observation
power of reason as

for his student, but also expresses reservations about the such. The aim of his method, Rousseau claims, is to prevent
mysterious qualities either

the mind

from

inferring

to the world or to
artificial or

itself. His

critique of earlier philosophers

is that

each

had imported

historically

17.

IV,

256.

158

Interpretation
faculties to their
great an ability.

contingent
son

explanation of the

human mind,
of

and granted

to rea

far too

Natural functions
explained

the

mind and natural processes

of

the

world

that should

have been

by

the

laws

of

physics, mechanics,
conceptions

and

chemistry, had instead been attributed

"soul," "instinct,"

with mysterious and

proposals

like

"substance,"

"final

cause,"

"conscience."

The inference

of mysterious causes gious and moral

had

produced

faulty educational

oppressive reli

practices,

and even political

despotism. granting
innate capacity to explanation, he provides, is
an

Rousseau's
the mind
meant

epistemological account questions

for

complex operations.

The economy

of

to forestall making any

cannot gain

metaphysical assumptions.

Thus, he indicates

that
ra-

the mind

knowledge beyond

efficient causes and

that its power is

tiocinative; that the mind cannot grasp what man's nature is intended to be; that the senses must be trained to act on their proper objects; that there is no natural
mechanism

that

coordinates capacities

the various

sensations

come

only tion; that sound reasoning can only be guaranteed by relying on the indubitability of the fact of impenetrability given by touch; that an appeal to logical relations is not sufficient to dispel illusions of perception; that coming to self-consciousness is
not self-initiated or achieved
"not-self"

determinate

through trial and error, repetition, and

together; that the faculties be habitua

by
.

introspection but instead

requires conscious

ness of

the

(the

resistance of external

bodies);
for

and

that the

mind

is

only focused by attention to needs There are two features of this

of

account crucial

our purposes.

The first

these

is Rousseau's
of

reduction of reason to calculation or

knowledge
sufficient

the

moral good

for it leads him to insist that Rousseau Reason

reason

separating it from is no longer

for guaranteeing

morality. ends.

suggests that reason

usually

will

be

employed

to serve vicious

supports mere self-interest

and, in

opposition cannot narrow

to Hobbes's informed judgment to the contrary, selfish calculation

relied upon

be

for

moral conduct.

Since

men calculate

from

their own

interests,

there will often be no basis for

fulfilling

obligations when these

conflict with self-interest.

will not

Calculating
if he

reason provides no guarantee

that a

man

break his

obligations

can appear

to be

keeping

them,

or

ignore his

obligations,

have only
quate

hoping perished long

incentive for
morality.

all others will sustain

ago,"

the practice. "The human race would

preservation

Rousseau claims, "if its

members."18

had depended

on

the reasoning

of

its

Thus,

reason cannot provide an ade passion to provide mo

moral

conduct,

and

instead he turns to

tives for

His "In

student will
vain

be

shown the need

for morality

by

the laws

of

pleasure and pain:

does tranquil
act."19

reason make us approve or

criticize; it is

only

passion which makes us

Whereas the

classical rationalists

had

as

sumed

that knowledge was sufficient to ensure action, Rousseau suggests that the

ancients

had

not

been adequately

aware of reason's

dependence

on

the passions.

This
18. 19.

extension of the sensationalist

334. 453.

epistemology to incorporate the functions

IV, IV,

Rousseau
of

and

the

Management of the Passions

feelings

159

the

body

with respect to

of pleasure and pain constitutes the second

major point

important for
the

our purposes.

By including the
own

operations of

the

body,

Rousseau

opposed

view

that the mind was a substance possessing an inde

pendent existence and

had insisted that

their sense
could arise

men

sharply distinguished his do not have an experience

and

theory from Locke's. Locke

between
and pain

of the causal connection

impressions
from

feelings

of pleasure and pain.

Pleasure

sensation or reflection

but do

not need

to accompany them.

Rousseau's logical
Rousseau

acceptance of

Condillac's theory
the

of attention

directs the

epistemo

inquiry

towards

an analysis of

the passions. "Reason alone is not

of

active

insists, in denying

independence
never

reason, "It
great."20

sometimes

re

done anything Interest based on need motivates the mind to acquire knowledge. "Present interest, that is the far."-1 greater mover, the only one which leads For Rousseau, the surely and fundamental activity of the mind resides not in itself but in psychological forces. Desire and aversion provide the motions required to activate the mind. The laws governing
...

strains, it arouses rarely, and it has

pleasure and pain

direct the

mechanism of understanding:

it is by their activity that our reason is perfected; we seek to know only because we desire to have pleasure; and it is impossible to conceive why one who had neither de sires nor fears would go to the trouble of
reasoning.22

Reason is
men's

relegated

in Rousseau's thought to the in

men's affairs

role of

servant, administering to

desires. Its

role

is

one of calculation and counsel as to the

means of

fulfilling

the ends proposed

by

the passions rather than imperative

command and sovereignty.

Reason

cannot correct passions passions which

serves them.

Rousseau writes, "it is only

extent

because it naturally make us The ra

act."23

tionalists had not realized the

to

which

the mind depended on the passions.

When Rousseau
rather

speaks of an

"active

mind"

he

means one animated

by

passion,

than one that is spontaneous and creative.

view constitutes a clear rejection of

This
reason

the classical rationalist's view that

is

man's essential attribute and man's nature.

that

reflection upon

its

own states

is the

mark of and

the fulfillment of
capable of

This

active part of

the soul was, for Plato

Aristotle,

regulating man,

a sufficient motive pletes

for
or

action.

determining his proper end, and being Rousseau, by contrast, denies that reason com
of

the individual

determines the form

his happiness. Reason is but the

not explicable
of of

scout and

spy

of

the

passions.

Man's happiness is
as we shall

from the

per

spective of the philosopher estimation of out

but,

see, from that

than

the

lover: "... the

With

happiness is less the

concern of reason

sentiment."24

the

cooperation of

the passions, sensibility, and

imagination,

reason

is fee
the

ble. This
20.

epistemological account makes

necessary

a search

for the

causes of

21.
22. 23.
24.

iv, 645 IV, 358 IV, 481 IV, 453 iv, 503

160

Interpretation
The
connection

mind's activities.

is found in his
agement of
will

psychological analysis.
passions gives

between his epistemology and theory of virtue The regulation of a man's mind by a man
order

his

rise to

in

a man's moral world. reason

The

passions

be adequately

regulated not

by

their education through

but

by relying

on a method that capitalizes on

their conflict.

Rousseau's

analysis of

the passions

begins

with an

investigation

of

fundamen

tal passions, which

in turn

generate all

the others. If the

nature of man can

be

consciously

scientifically determined and its underlying causes controlled, man can self manage his life. Rousseau's genetic analysis is meant to expose the
supposed natural

faculties

and sentiments as artificial and products of society:

well to conclude

But

would

it be reasoning

from the fact that it is in

ourselves and see

man's nature

to

have
ral?

passions, that all the passions that we

source

feel in

in

others are natu swollen a

Their

is natural; it is tme. But

constantly
grows and

countless alien streams

which one could

have

it. It is

great river which

in

hardly

find

few drops

of

its first

waters.25

Nonetheless,
man's nature mands on point
of

the source can be discovered and it is necessary to do so if a is to be consciously formed and the confusions of previous de human nature are to be avoided. The behavioral expression of that first
same passion as oneself
"26
.

is the

it

was

for Hobbes: "The first law

of nature

is the

care

preserving

Amour de soi, self-love,

our

governs all

human

conduct:

Our first duties

are to

ourselves,

all our natural movements relate

well-being.27

primary sentiments are centered on ourselves, in the first instance to our preservation and our

The

interplay

of the mind and

the

body

exemplified

in the

emergence of self-love.

for the well-being of the individual is Amour de soi emerges from a more

fundamental
over others

cause:

the capacity for sensation. A man prefers some sensations

are accompanied

because they

by

pleasure or absence of pain.

Desire

for

a specific object

that provides pleasure transforms gradually into the senti to other objects

ment of

love,

and aversion

issues eventually in the

the

sentiment of

hatred. Love

of pleasure and

hatred

of pain produce

the passion of self-love: "The source of all the passions is sensibility; tion determines their bent."28

sensibility that governs imagina basic

Rousseau finds
cerns of most
sion cal

what

is

essential on

to human nature in the

motives and con

men, based

the
of

fundamental
the

principle of self-love.

It is

a pas politi

that supports the premise

and

hierarchy
25.
26.

inequality

equality invalid. Amour de

of all soi

men,

and

thus renders

is

a passion

that preserves a
fea-

man and adapts

according to his changing

needs and

desires. The decisive

IV, IV,

491. 467.

27.
28.

IV, 329. IV, 492,

501.

Rousseau

and

the

Management of the Passions

161
solely on his is healthy, Rousseau
of the

ture of this passion

own

is that it is absolute,
and powers.

focusing

a man's attention

concerns, needs,

This

passion of self-love

advances, because it generates self-care, self-esteem,

and
an

"gentle

and affectionate

passions."2''

Rousseau
opinions,

calls

it

also many "absolute

sentiment

because it is
nor

not motivated at

by

other's

nor standards

drawn from others,

man within nature

does it feed
not

the expense of others. This passion keeps

nor would

for it is
sion

harmful to him

it

cause

him to

act against

his first

pas

of

self-preservation.

It is only

with

the advent of "alien

causes"

that

modifications are
where

introduced into de

man's nature which

bring
to

about a condition contradiction with a

"man finds himself outside

of nature and sets

himself in

himself."30

Thus,

amour

soi

is the

passion closest

nature and ensures again.

mildness of

human

existence which men would never

know
to

Rousseau's

rhetoric

concerning its
that

gentleness needs

be

somewhat

tempered

by his
harm

subsequent observation

primitive men

one another. also

them, is
to
so much

The creature, too stupid incapable of revenge or hatred. His desires limited to
and

simply have no grounds to to judge others or relate himself to

what

he

needs
not

preserve

himself,
that

his imagination

largely

inactive, he is
in

gentle

from

good will as when

through indifference to others.

Moreover, Rousseau
conflict with

makes clear need

this

man's natural gentleness comes will use

his

for self-preservation, he be
acts without

force be

or violence.

Nonetheless,

these

would as

lingering

resentment, or concern for such

imaginary goods
self-

honor,
The

glory,

or recognition.

They

would

simple spontaneous acts of

preservation. gentleness of which

Rousseau

speaks

is

more

precisely the

absence of

malicious violence.

Rousseau's
rather

account of

the ideal

character of

this primitive

age

is thus dramatic

than precise since a creature oblivious to the presence

most of

of others would also

lack

the distinctive human characteristics

account

More

over, it is

ambiguous

in Rousseau's

just how de
the
soi.

long
The

the moment

actually

lasted in

which men acted

where that presence end

only involved a recognition

development

upon amour

presence of another
"other"

of

other as an

meant an

to a

man's primitive preoccupation with

himself.

At this
nearly

point

in

man's

a second passion emerges that generates

all of

the others. This passion is another

role of

form

of

self-love, but

once acti

vated, plays the decisive

determining
is

the direction of the original passion.

Rhetorically,

Rousseau describes this

second

form

of self-love as

the relative

passion responsible

for

all the

misery that

present

in

social

life:
nature and their

Amour-propre
effects,
animal

and amour

de

soi, two passions

very different in their

must not

be

confused.

Amour de

soi

is

a natural sentiment which

to

watch over

its

own preservation and

which,

modified

by

pity,

produces

humanity

and virtue.

inclines every directed in many by reason and Amour-propre is only a relative senti-

29. 30.

IV, IV,

493.
491.

162
ment,

Interpretation
artificial and

born in society,
anyone

which

esteem

for himself than for is the true

else, inspires in

inclines every individual to have a greater men all the harm they do to one an

other and

source of

honor.31

Rousseau
nature

goes on to add

that amour-propre could

not

have

existed

in the

state of of

for it is based

on comparisons that

natural,

savage man was

incapable

making.

Most

commentators

have taken this initial

account as

Rousseau's final

word

regarding the
that
amour

passion of amour-propre. soi

Thus Rousseau has been taken to lead to

mean

de

is

healthy

and can under certain conditions

praisewor

thy

conduct,

while amour-propre soi

is disruptive
seen as

and

is

responsible

for the disorder

while
amour-

of men's
propre

lives. Amour de

is

natural, therefore good,

is

seen as unnatural and

therefore bad. This simple account can not, how the texts nor

ever,

withstand a careful examination of

does it

solve

the problem
endow

we examined above.
ment

How

can

the

original state of nature or

the original

to

man provide a standard

torical animal and

his

earlier stages are natural was

for evaluating contemporary life if man is an his irrecoverable? If what is good were only

the natural, and

men could at

if the

historically
or

contingent and

irrecoverable,
spirit of

then

best

resign

themselves

be

nostalgic.

However, Rousseau's

social

teaching is intended
enment
propre.

to

go

beyond traditional pessimism; in the

Enlight

optimism, he has

a method

to impart for managing the passion of amour-

Throughout the Emile Rousseau

judiciously

trains and

manipulates

this

passion, seeing in it

a more constructive possibility.

Moreover,
although

as

shall

argue,

he does been

not conceive of amour-propre as

unnatural,

it may

not

have

part of

the

original endowment.

Although

amour-propre

may

not

have been

operative

originally in

primitive

man, it appears from Rousseau's account that

it

emerged quite

urally from ture. There

unified self-love and

thus

was a natural modification of

suddenly and nat human na

amour-propre

are two major

indications that Rousseau includes

two passions and a
qualifies

in

his

account of the natural.

First,

after

his initial

account of the

lengthy
original

description
statement

of

the pathology of amour-propre ,

Rousseau

his

by

claiming that
men,
our

amour-propre

is

responsible

for "what is best

and worst

among
the de

our virtues and our

vices,

our sciences and our errors, our conquerors and

philosophers."32

Thus,

amour-propre cannot

simply be the

cause of

terioration of men's
multiplies

lives. Rousseau

recognizes that this passion unleashes and

when

many
the

of

the worst passions, but is also creates others which,

properly

controlled, constitute the most

distinctive human

sentiments.

Second,
necessarily
gave rise

fact that

men

became involved in
The

a social context means that

they

are relative creatures.

mere observation of another as an

was not

"other"

to comparison. If there was a time when amour-propre

natural,

31.
32.

IV, Ill,

219. 189.

Rousseau
it
must

and

the

Management of the Passions

163

have been

the end of his

a very brief duration. Indeed, Rousseau acknowledges at discourse that man's original nature has become naturally trans

formed. He

now

lists the faculties

He

of

the soul as reason,

imagination,

memory,

and adds amour-propre. even

makes no claim
with

that these are somehow unnatural,

of

though as a comparison

the

beginning

his

account

shows, these fac

ulties were not part of man's original endowment.

In the

onstrated.

Emile, the natural character of amour-propre is more adequately dem Indeed, as I propose to demonstrate, in this pedagogical treatise he en
in the
service of

lists

amour-propre

to create the that

can

distinctly

human forth to

attributes. support

refining his student, employing that passion There are numerous explicit passages
this
reading.

be

marshalled

First,

at

the end of Book

"

III,

Rousseau

writes quite

unequivocally that

amour-propre
passions."33

is

natural:

amour-

propre, the first and most natural of all the

statement can

This

perhaps

be

explained

by

another claim made elsewhere

surprising in the Emile, re

not confound
state."34

minding the reader again that man's nature is historical: "One must what is natural in the savage state with what is natural in the civil

None

theless,

although amour-propre now means

Rousseau

by

the

"natural,"

may be natural, and it remains to be seen what this does not mean that it is necessarily

unqualifiedly good. Indeed, Rousseau makes perfectly clear that amour-propre is the passion responsible for the harmful passions with which men have been inflicted. How Although
can amour-propre

be both

good and
of

harmful?
sentiments that arise

amour-propre

issues in many
the passion

the

irascible

when men compare

themselves to others, Rousseau's analysis suggests that it

only

generates them.

Thus,

is

not

rancour, spite,

or viciousness

but

is, instead,

the generating cause

characteristically vanity, envy, of them. In the

Second Discourse Rousseau blurs the

and appears

process of
of

's development
passions.

to

suggest

that it is simply any

these corrupt

In the
can

Emile, however, his judicious

be be
molded

manipulation of amour-propre suggests

that it

by

imagination

and channelled
education.

for

good purposes.

Thus, it

appears

to

malleable and subject

to

The

problem of amour-propre comes about

because,

unlike other

passions,

it

has

no particular object

to
to

which

it is naturally directed:
amour

The

sole passion natural

man

is

de soi,
to

or amour-propre taken
us

in

an extended

sense.

This

amour-propre

in itself or

relative

is

good and useful; and since

neutral.

it has
good

no
or

necessary

relation

to others, it is

in this it

respect

naturally

It becomes

bad only
applied

by

the

application made of

and the relations given

to

it.35

When
that

to the right objects,

amour-propre need not

issue in those

relations

bring

misery to the human soul.

amour-proprel

What precisely is
33.
34. 35.

The

careful

dissection in the Emile

reveals

IV,

488. 764.
322.

IV, IV,

164
that
of

Interpretation
composed of

it is

four

stages:

(a)

comparison,
and

(b)
the

introduction

of a standard

merit,

(c)
or

calculation of relative

status,

(d)

consequent perception of

freedom
guishes

dependence. The decisive

amour

characteristic of the passion which

distin

it from

de

soi

is that

whereas

the latter

was a simple and absolute an affirmation of

sentiment of
and

self-preoccupation,

amour-propre

involves
It is

the self

is

an expression of

the desire for approbation. It is

a psychological process

introducing
it
cover

to the mind an

idea

of relative worth. either

a relative passion

because dis

makes man an object of

study,

in the

eyes of others

or, as we

shall

shortly, in

a man's recognition of

his

own

identity. Amour-propre is the this, it

creates all

first

passion

that takes a man outside of himself and in

the hu

man passions and sentiments which arise

Rousseau dwells predominantly ills arise because amour-propre is

upon one another relative creatures. with others.

on

from the plurality of men. the ills fostered by amour-propre These

.

responsible

for making
are

social men

depend

for their
Their

own esteem and

they

transformed from absolute to the comparisons

passions are corrupted esteem

by

they

make

Men begin to

themselves not so much

what

for their in

own actual

abilities and accomplishments situations.

outside of

but for

these

represent

relation

to other's

by they determine their own merit is drawn from themselves. Moreover, from their initial attempt to elicit recognition
standard which

The

from

others and even to tyrannize

others,

evolves a

dependency and enslavement

then no longer self-sufficient

to the whims, opinions,

or

and will of others. real powers self.

Men

are

self-motivating,
the

and

their

bellishing
men

imaginary, displayed

atrophy for they are intent solely on em Opinion begins to rule men's hearts and
simple and natural preservation and

become

subjected to needs

beyond their

are governed

by imaginary

pains and pleasures.

It is

a subjection more

disabling
Super

than political servitude

because it is

an enslavement of

the

human

soul.

fluous lost

wants produce

control over

factitious ills, his life.

and

the

man subject

to them

finds that he has

This pathology of amour-propre occupies much of Rousseau's writings. At the point of its development, amour-propre has become the divisive passion that
accounts

for

all men's misery.

When

men compare

themselves to others,
wish

they

re

turn to themselves either satisfied or unhappy.

They

to be esteemed, and

they believe
relation

that their

to

others.

happiness is very much the product of how they stand in Appearance then becomes the primary purpose of human striv

ing

as men seek

glory,

honour,

and precedence over others.

Here

amour-propre

animates

ambition, greed, revenge, pride,

hatred,

malice and

distrust; life be

comes a race whose

only

garland

tain a worth
selves. attain

in the

eyes of others.

being foremost. Men relentlessly seek to ob They will allow no more superiority over them
that others might strive to
gain

is

This is

combined with a constant apprehension

it. From this

men are

emerges a
as

Now

exactly

superiority over others by any means. Hobbes had described them: predatory competitors superiority
at

desire to

who assert

their wills and want others to value their

the same rate

as

they

set upon

it themselves.

Moreover, spying

out

the motives of others, a

Rousseau

and

the

Management of the Passions

the same intentions. Hatred

165
misery
are produced

man sees others

acting

with

and

when a man observer amour-propre own.

limits his This is particularly the case when a man sees another enjoying pleasures, achieving honor or glory, or gaining any position of superiority. Amour-propre in this form is a factor separating men; the desire to be foremost makes rivals of
others
opposes and

in

because it

artists, statesmen,
than

heroes,
he
partial

himself

and since

just comparisons,
tified

Nothing is more pleasing to a man only what pleases him, he constantly makes un to only his own particular case.
and philosophers.

values

Amour-propre is

also responsible

for the

political

hierarchies

formerly
and

jus
in he

by

the classical accounts of the soul. The ethic of

account to

honor is

exposed

Rousseau's
writes, are

be

a corrupt

form

of amour-propre.

Glory

honor,

"illusions
in
classical

of the

passions."36

tuous

man

thought

is,

as

The magnanimity expressed by the vir it was for Hobbes, only a disguise of vanity; does
not represent a more

courage or

is simply

an expression of self-love and

noble,

elevated,

condition of mankind. existence of a

the

imaginary

is misplaced, for it depends on natural, hierarchical order and the privileged posi
pride

Men's

tion of man in that order. The morality of honor, pride, and magnanimity are cor ruptions that have caused discord, enmity, and oppression.

Rousseau's
ate

solution of

to human ills is

not

to devise social

institutions to

allevi

these distortions

the human soul. Rousseau's account is

innovative be
be its

cause

he

employs the notion of man's

perfectibility to
seen

solve the problem of

amour-propre.
natural

Rousseau denies that the

corruption of amour-propre need

development. Whereas Hobbes had

the vicious passions as irreduc

ible
and

and natural

forms

of

self-love, Rousseau suggests that

of the

they

are

derivative
.

secondary transformations
picture of

The

the social

underlying development of amour-propre that Rousseau

source, amour-propre

paints

ends with certain qualifications:

Extend these ideas

natural

and you will see where our amour-propre gets the

amour

form

we

believe

to it and how

in

great

de soi, ceasing to be an absolute sentiment, becomes pride souls, vanity in small ones, and feeds itself constantly in all at the expense of

their

neighbors.37

This

passage suggests

of others nor

corrupt

that amour-propre does not naturally feed at the expense does it naturally assume the forms it has taken on in social life. The forms of amour-propre can instead, Rousseau appears to propose, be

forestalled

by a proper nurture of that dominant passion. Subsequently he reveals that it can be used for good ends. "Amour-propre
but dangerous It
instrument."38

is

useful

The

passion

ing

advantageous or

disruptive

on

the basis of

is morally indifferent, becom the object toward which it is di

the
conse-

rected.

need not produce an acceptance of another's opinions and

36. 37. 38.

IV, IV, IV,

534494. 536.

166
quent

Interpretation

dependency.

ludiciously
whether

used, the comparisons it

makes can

be

used

for

other,

more advantageous

tasks.39

Rousseau

reveals

that the

sorts of compari

sons made not:

determine

the modifications of

amour-propre are natural or

as soon as amour-propre

young
with

relative / is constantly in play and the returning to himself and comparing himself them. The issue, then, is to know in what rank among his fellows he will put him

has developed, the

man never observes others without

self after

having

examined

them.40

The issue thus is

not whether

Emile
on the

will exercise

his

amour-propre

but

whether

he

will

be free
on

or

dependent

basis

of

these comparisons and

whether

he

will

judge for

his

own standards or another's once

he has

made

the comparison.
revised crite

We
rion

now can suggest a more

satisfactory

account of

Rousseau's

distinguishing

the natural from the artificial. Amour-propre generates

comparisons of which the

lute

sentiment of preoccupation

majority lead to a man's enslavement. Here his abso is eroded and his happiness becomes more intan
on others.

gible or even

lost because it depends

Enslaved to If he
were

others

he

can no

longer

assure

himself

of

his

own contentedness.

to make
a more

judgments intense
and

that did not have this effect

while at

the same time

a positive

developing

lasting happiness,
The judgments
ture because

this

would

indicate his

development in his
freedom thus
him

character.

and

resulting
which

passions that produce

conform

to na
and

they

recapture

in

part

original state and make are

happy

self-sufficient; those

issue in

dependency

factitious.

It is up to the tutor to determine whether amour-propre will provide the soul with generous or irascible passions. Rousseau makes clear that it should be used
to construct

healthy

sentiments and this will

depend

decisively

upon

the sorts of

judgments
.

made:

the first sentiment aroused

in him

by

this comparison
soi on

is the desire to be in the first

position.
gin

This is the

point where amour

de

turns into amour-propre and where be

one
.

to

arise all

the passions which the

depend

this

But to decide

whether

among envy
41
. .

these

passions

dominant

ones

in his

character will

be humane

or gentle or cruel and

malignant,
and

whether

they

will

be

passions of

beneficence
he
will

and commiseration or of

covetousness,

we must

know

what position

feel he has among

men

The

comparisons

Emile

makes are crucial

in

passions.

It is imperative that Emile judge prudently

on

determining the state of health of his and surely. Employing the

39.
and

Locke had,

the one

hand,

recognized

direction from

which

the actions of men take their

the passion amour-propre as "the principal spring rise" and attributes to it all the significance
by"

Rousseau does. Yet, he argues for reasoning with children for "they love to be treated as rational and reason "should be the greatest instrument to turn them (Section 81, Some Thoughts Concerning Education). Rousseau is decidedly more consistent, recognizing that since amour-propre is the most powerful passion, it is the passion by which the lessons of reason must be
creatures"

developed.
40. 41.

IV, IV,

534. 523.

Rousseau

and

the

Management of the Passions

passions , and

167

theory

of

countervailing

in the

absence of an autonomous and cre

ative reason

to guarantee prudence, Rousseau enlists another passion to achieve

the moderation of amour-propre. This passion is to ensure the soundness of

Emile's judgment
virtue.

with respect to

the comparisons he makes,

and create a social

Whereas it is
eration, it is fear

amour-propre which causes men to

which ensures passion
real

stray from

sound

delib

that men engage and

develop

their prudence.
of

Amour-propre is the

that

disguises from
of

men

the reality

their exis

tence,

obscuring the

limitations

life. From the

precedence,

and vain

hopes,

men must

be

awakened

imaginary world of power, by the brute resistance of

awakening

the real world. Just as Hobbes had conceived

men

his

political project as

from their complacency, Rousseau seeks to remind forgetful men of just how much they have to fear. Fear counsels well, and Rousseau follows a tradi
tion
of modern

thinkers who recognized that fear is a stable and

an effective morality.

certain passion

on which

to ground

Rousseau

adopts part of

Hobbes's

analysis of

fear

as the

basis

of

his

own.

There

are

two

features in
as

particular which are

important for

our purpose.

First,
rela

Hobbes identifies fear

tions among
men.

the enduring basis of sound reasoning about the

and

Stressing

intensifying

the fear of the consequences of the

the hands of other self-seeking sovereign Hobbes magnifies the concern for se in the absence of power, men, curity and derives from it the motive for abiding by the law. Prudent calculating men who fear much and who can reckon the means of avoiding death discover
state of nature and what men would experience at

the meaning of justice. For

Hobbes, fear is
aspirations

to be used for a specific

political

task,
the
self-

namely to

guarantee obedience of

to the law. His state of nature doctrine

reveals

insubstantiality
interest, love
nerability
thus
used

imaginary
and raise

(self-sufficiency

and unenlightened

of

honor

vanity,
of

and religious obligations not commanded

by
is

the sovereign) that

of men.

hopes

avoiding the fundamental

to
right reasoning.

and permanent vul

Death is

a natural and powerful sanction

for injustice

and

by

Hobbes to

restore men

Fear

of violent

death dis
goods

solves

the

appearance of

the

pleasures

to be obtained from the

imaginary
can avoid.

men pursue and makes

them acutely aware of the pains

they
of of

Thus

sound

reasoning

about obligation emerges not

from

consideration of

the great

and noble ends men

what

is

most

may achieve, for these are a product powerful and real in men's lives. Fearfulness

vanity, but from

death

rather

than

agreeableness of

life keeps

men on

the

straight and narrow road

to justice. Fear

dispels vanity and enlightens men to the true precariousness of their condition. The second feature of Hobbes's account has to do with the precise description of the fundamental fear. He describes it as not simply fear of death but fear of vi
olent

death. For Hobbes,

their satisfaction

men are relative

creatures; their

happiness is but

notable of

fe

licity,

is

recognized superiority, and

their fear

is that

dis

honor. Their

appetites or aversions are not

merely

sensual

compounded with

168

Interpretation
or

the praise

blame

of others.

Fear is the
"

perception of not

taining

precedence.

For Hobbes, fear is

superiority:
.

pleasure

but

of

losing

die."42

continually to out-go the next Whereas animals fear anything that produces displeasure, arises from a consideration of others in the race.

simply continually to be out-gone is misery, before is felicity. And to forsake the course is to
.

not

that of

being capable of main being denied the next

men's

fear

fear

The worry of being denied felicity or notable success prefigures the ultimate death. The fear is of violent death because the emphasis is on losing stat
the hands
of and

ure at

in the

eyes of others

Aversion from
more

shameful

death is the

main part of

fear. The

man who

desires honor

than he fears dishonor is not

acting

prudently.

the expense

The vanity associated with imagining future pleasures feeds at of others. Only fear can purge this excess of expectation and thereby

make men prudent. violent

In the

absence of a

death

must generate a moderation of

regulating reason, the passion of fear of desire and dispel the vanity associ

ated with pleasures.

For Rousseau too, as we have seen, vanity or amour-propre is the passion to be combatted. As for Hobbes, fear is the tool he uses; not a lofty virtue or an in dependent reason but a solid passion serves to moderate or mute the vicious pas
sions of amour-propre and ensure that a man acts prudently. seau's notion of prudent not

However, Rous
applies

fear is

more comprehensive

than that of Hobbes. Emile is made

merely

by

the fear of violent death. In

fact, Rousseau

his

general critique of ported of the

the

passions

Hobbes particularly to his analysis of fear. Hobbes had im of social men into his understanding of natural men. His view death
was

artificially contrived for it made necessary the Hobbes of so restricting the fear of death that an autocratic society becomes a logical necessity as a solution to what would otherwise be terror. Hobbes was contradictory, Rousseau claims, for al though he described man as naturally apolitical, individualistic, and indepen
of violent

fear

transition to civil life. Rousseau accuses

dent, he
in it

also

described the

natural condition as one where

the passions displayed

only be understood by reference to social conditions. Thus Emile's fear is not as narrowly focussed. His fears are
could

not meant

to

be

historically
His is

or

socially

contingent

but

rather to relate

a more comprehensive and consistent

even

his life,

in the

absence of spectators.

to the natural facts of life. fear that intrudes to every facet of Thus Rousseau's concern is not mere that a citizen would
men.

allegiance to a sovereign and a guarantee

keep

his

obliga

tions, but

a more

sustaining bond between

will

Hobbes had for

suggested that

fear
that

gives rise to the narrow calculation of self-interest.

Rousseau takes

this one step

further: Emile's fearfulness is

a more reliable and

be

channelled to provide

a social virtue

socially

binding

force in

men's coexistence.

Fear becomes

an even more creative and positive passion

combine

it

with amour-propre

to create a virtue.

in Rousseau's account, for he will Out of fearfulness for himself,

42.

Thomas Hobbes, Elements of the Law.

i.ix.21.

Rousseau
and exposed

and

the

Management of the Passions

169

to the common lot of men, Emile will extend his care for himself

to others, at the same time

Hobbes's fear drives

seau's
we

men

satisfying his relative regard for himself. Whereas into the private calculation of their interests, Rous

into the commonality of their social existence. Before turn to this manipulation of the passions, let us step back and observe how fear
extends men

Emile's fear is fabricated.

Throughout his
precariousness of more

Emile regularly is reminded of his vulnerability, the human life, and his susceptibility to pain and suffering: "the
education

he

gets used

to suffering

...

the

more

the sting of strangeness is taken from

him."41

He is to be

made conscious of

the variability and flux of

men's

life,

made vul

nerable

to the countless accidents which prevail in

lives,

and accustomed con

to

an

increasing

severity in

feeling the harshness

is to be
stage of

of man's

lot. A fearfulness
Emile's

nected

to man's corporal condition

a major part of

perception of

existence.

The frontispiece to this his

his

education

depicts Achilles
and

being

dipped into the river Styx. Emile too is to be

achieved

made

invulnerable

this is to be

him. However, rather than in tending to produce courage as the virtue, Emile is to be brought to a sense of fear and the ability to be adaptable: "one must show him the sad lives of man's love,

by impressing

precariousness upon

one must make

him fear
of

it."44

The training
of

this

virtue

is

initially
will

the

body

prepares a mind

that

wholly somatic. The hardy constitution not be overwhelmed by alteration. Rous

vigor"

seau claims prevent

that at an early age a "primitive

"fibres"

must

be inculcated

so as

to

that "importunate

sensitivity"

that cannot

withstand

the shock of change.

prepared

The

child's

are still soft and

flexible

and so can

be

for later. A
for
a

future

state of mind appears as an effect of

the interaction between external stim

ulus and the constitution of

the body. What begins as a

able

"salutary

precaution

making the texture of the fibres more flexible and flexibility.45 model for future mental and moral

to adapt

becomes

Becoming

accustomed

to in

creasing burdens
moral severity.

of physical

severity

prepares

Emile's sensibility for future

There
as

are

two prominent

examples of

the tutor contriving Emile's

lessons

so

to harden his soul

by

fear. At

one point

the tutor reveals that vices are really

excessive and and

somatic

diseases. Emile thus learns to fear too

felicitous ill. He

an exu
moder

berance
ates

by

the aversion he has to

being

bedridden

treated as

Much later, but continuing this same deadens the rampant excursions of Emile's Rousseau psychological principle, imagination by exposing him to hunting and to death. Emile's nascent sexual himself through fear
of suffering.
passion"

passion

is

suppressed

by

"ferocious

and

he is "accustomed to
the
soul.

blood,

cruelty"

to

so as
enough

to

prevent a premature

softening

of

"it is
4344.

for

me

that

it

serves

to

suspend a more

Rousseau writes, in dedangerous

passion

45.

IV, IV, IV,

378.
507. 278.

170

Interpretation sanguinary
of
preoccupations.46

fense
sure

of such

Inclination is

curbed through expo

passio

to the

mortal condition of all animate

life;

the "drunkenness of

is

muted

by

the fear

death

and the sense of suffering.

Thus

not reason

but fear is

the

instrument for

used

to

ensure moderation.

Fearfulness brings him to

reasonable mutes

ness

consciousness of

the

precariousness of

human life particularly

an

the

effects of

vanity and imaginary hopes. of forestalling That it is for this purpose

that Rousseau
awakens

imaginary

sense of superi

ority "Let his

Emile's fearfulness is

made clear somewhat

later:

man, the

haughty head at an early age feel the harsh yoke that nature imposes on bend."47 heavy yoke of necessity under which every finite being must
prevent perceptions of

Rousseau thus indicates his intention to

products of amour-propre periences
.

reality

which are

The

capriciousness and

irregularity
Men

of most men's ex

lead to distortions high

of their understanding.

exaggerate

their own

powers or claim too

a station

for themselves. Fear

returns men to

their

mor

tal condition; as a reliable counselor, it prevents men

from

such errors that arise

from overestimating their own powers. This limited, and hence sound, self-consciousness is the basis
ception of

of man's per

his

place

in the

world.

His is

not

the proud
nor

bearing

of

the

magnani man

mous man who

knows his

privileged

place,

the bold confidence of the

who stands above

nature, creating meaning solely for himself and

stance

his
of

own

destiny. The
in

in defiance

of nature

leads to the

the man who sees himself the master of the universe.

neither respect and awe of nature's

determining domineering hubris Rousseau s fearing man

thus led naturally to
thus reflect on his existence, to other

lives

beneficence

and

contemplate on

eternity,

nor

does he dominate
not transcend

over nature and

freedom. Rousseau's
nor withdraw

man

does

in

abject

self-pity.

Rather, he
social

his particular, extends his bond

with

miserable

sentiments

suffering,

fearing
his
all

men and

thus forms a

them.

Fearfulness
scious of subject
station.

and

his

perception of precariousness ensure that

Emile is
as

con

real nature as a

suffering being. He is to

perceive

himself
a

forever

to

the ills under

which men suffer and

liable to fall to

less fortunate

The

purpose of

cumstances so
can

this is to ensure that Emile is adaptable to changing cir that when fortune obliges him to seek another station or home, he

so without any loss of happiness. But the emphasis on fearfulness has a important function, revealing how much more ambitious Rousseau's inten tions were than Hobbes. The more comprehensive fear is used for a more com more

do

prehensive

task.
constitution

Since

man's

is

decisively

governed alone

amour-propre and regulated.

fear

it is from these fear is

only two principles that the human soul must be

comparisons
amour-

by

Fear

can moderate amour-propre

because the

propre makes on sions.

46.

behalf

of

can

forestall the
in

emergence of the

harmful

pas

When
IV, 645. IV, 320.

amour-propre

engaged

imagining

the pleasures of others, it

47.

Rousseau
produces man men

and

the

Management of the Passions

covetousness,
not command and vanity.

111

envy, regret,

jealousy,

unhappy because he does

others'

these same

Moreover, it makes a pleasures. Moreover,

same pleasures,

observing making them

enjoyment makes them want to

enjoy the is

thereby
Then

dependent

upon others. governed

A very different

sentiment emerges when amour-propre

by

fear.

compassion can rests

develop
in

from

imagining

the pains of others. The motive

for beneficence
arises

man's natural awareness of and aversion to pain and

from the ills

used

others experience that men

a social virtue.

in turn fear for themselves. Fear

others,
a man succors

can

be

to produce

By extending aid to
amour-propre

his

own

fear for himself. Moreover, his

is

gratified

because he

re

depends upon him. Observing other suffering men and com himself to a man feels the pleasure of not suffering as they do and them, paring his amour-propre is gratified in his feeling useful. It is relative to himself that a
alizes

that the other

man shows
superiority.

pity to

others.

If he feels

susceptible to

pain, he

will not

glory in his

Pity

requires

the development of amour-propre but then is able to

passions

forestall vanity
man's

and

the

irascible

if

a man

weakness which makes

him

sociable,"

feels equally vulnerable. "It is Rousseau writes, and "it is our

common miseries which turn our

provide

hearts to

humanity."48

Vulnerability
in the

and

fear

the basis

by

which men's passions can

be

enlisted
and

construction of

social relations. others creates a

sense of

the

precariousness of

life

imagining the
ethos of

pains of and

bond

of respect and mutual

which and

forbearance. The
revealed

honor
of

glory,
propre

on

the

other

hand

has been
discord.
suffers

to be the product

amour-

creates

only enmity

Imagining
fear

the pleasures of other men

inspires envy
no need of
compassion.

and

"amour-propre

too in making us
use of

feel that this

man

has

us."49

Thus in the judicious

a solution

and amour-propre to elicit

Rousseau finds

to the

problem of man's nature.

Although this
virtue, the

dampening

of pride and

vanity

by
has

fear has
not

produced a social

complete satisfaction of amour-propre

been

achieved.

There

fore,
is

thus

far,

the human

constitution

is

on

the right path although

its

condition

unstable.

Rousseau

employs another route

to ensure that amour-propre

education

is

sat

isfied in
virtue.

healthy

manner.

This

route

involves his

students'

to

moral

For Rousseau,
son and so a

as we

have seen, the

of

moderation of

desire
to

cannot occur

by rea

He

sees

channeling human nature as

the

passions will

be

required

produce self-restraint.

more malleable

than the classical and modern rational the agency of imagination those
passions.

ists had believed

can

and so suggests that

others objects

by

desires

be directed to

thereby moderating the

is that it has
no object

The

problem of amour-propre

to

which

it is naturally
the other pas

directed. Because there is

no autonomous reason and

because

all

sions are a product of amour-propre,

48. 49.

the

solution

to the

problem must

be

gener-

IV, IV,

503. 503.

am

indebted to Orwin.

op. cit. supra,

for this

analysis of compassion.

172
ated

Interpretation
within

from

the passion itself. Amour-propre

must generate passions

that in

turn moderate their own source. The regulation of

its activity is
that

possible

only

by

its

own

interest,
passion

true

or

imaginary. Love is the

agent

achieves

this:

On this
pends

the final form his

way

of

only one he will feel intensely in his whole life, de is going to take. Once fixed by a durable passion, his thinking, his sentiments, and his tastes are going to acquire a consistency

[love]

perhaps the character

which will no

longer
to

permit

them to

deteriorate.50

Rousseau

seeks

find in the
Love
gives

attachment of one sex to the other

the basis of the

moral experience.

Emile the

motive

that

ensures

his

decency, health,
is
moralized:

sound

judgment,

and virtue.

Through love the human

machine

We have

made an active and

make

thinking being. It remains for us, in

and

order

to complete the

man, only to
sentiment.51

him

loving

feeling being

that

is to say, to

perfect reason

by

Love,

and not

contemplation, is "the supreme happiness of

life."52

Emile's

vir of

tuous conduct

is to be

motivated

by

the illusions

of

love

and

is

art's

taming

man's appetites:

ture's

inclinations."53

"Far from arising from nature, love is the Even more interestingly it especially
pleasureable

rule and serves

bridle

of na

to moderate

amour-propre

The

most

intensely
most

inclination

of amour-propre

because it is

connected needed

and

sensuality is the desire to be loved. To be admired, loved, and gratifying pleasure to amour-propre and it can be more easily satisfied than any other desire for recognition. Moreover the sat harmlessly
to

is the

isfaction

of amour-propre sake of

in the

desire for the

Emile love

assuring

and

loving relationship gives rise to the regulation of being worthy of that love. This occurs in the
imagination. The tutor
with which

skillful employment of amour-propre and an

conspires that

imagined ideal

of the

beloved

he

can make

judicious

perceptions about social relations and sound moral valuations:

It is

unimportant whether the object

I depict for him is

imaginary; it
suffices that

suffices that everywhere

it

make

him disgusted

with

those that could tempt

him; it

he

find

comparisons which make

...

him

prefer

his

chimera to the real objects

that strike his eye

By

providing the my young

not

prevent

man

imaginary object, I am from having illusions

the

master of comparisons and

objects.54

I easily

about real

Worth is in the
soul.

determined

The ideal is

by an objective criterion inferred from a natural order imaginary and based on what is advantageous to the so
Thus,
not reasoned

cial preservation of

the individual.

judgment
of

about the rela wisdom.

tions of men, but the

imagined ideal becomes the basis

Emile's

Only

50 51
52

53 54

IV, 778 IV, 481 IV, 654 IV, 494 IV, 656

Rousseau

and the

Management of

the
can

Passions
be

173
toward noble ideals

if amour-propre, the desire to be

inspired

foremost,

channeled

by imagination, by

can man's relative regard

for himself be
of

fully
and

satisfied.

Rousseau's
scribed quired.

account regains some of the

intensity

the moral experience de

the classics, but without the conflict between appetite

not calculate

duty

it

re

Emile does
nor

his

moral

duties in the

manner of

the Hobbesian
obedience

bourgeois,

does he feel torn between inclination

manner of

and

imposed

in

morality Emile's soul between desire unity is

no

of

submission, in the

the Christian. There is no conflict in thus the project of

and

duty,

and

keeping his

soul

in

achieved.

The

resolution

is different from that in Eden because there is

dread,

shame, temptation,
and

or motive

is

made

legitimate
or

is

seen as

the natural basis for

quelled

for deception. Moreover, sexual desire morality. Immediate desire

for

fulfillment,
ideal

immoderation, is

by

an act of will

that stems from the

imaginary
his desires
tween

a man wishes

to attain. Man lives up to his own

ideal, regulating
be torn be

by
of

commitment to a
others'

law he has

set

for himself. He
will

will not

his desire

and

expectations, but instead

be

motivated

by

the

possibility
writes

attaining the greatest happiness. His ideal is his desires. "Let

your condition

a rule

that

is

a natural

modification of

limit

desires,"

your

Rousseau

in

depicting
the

the regulation of desire

by

the

imaginary
soul."55

ideal

and

in "show is
an

ing
law

him the necessity for exercising

natural of
things."56

strength of

Moral

regulation must

extension of

minds

necessity The moral ideal may not have been in the necessity to moral of man in the state of nature but it represents the natural modification of

under which man

falls; Emile

"extend the

the original promptings, advances his

ervation of

freedom,
"new

and

is

advantageous

for the Here

pres
man

the being. Love

gives man

reasons

to be

himself."57

becomes
and

conscious of

be

virtuous.

his ability to be good, for he can regulate his inclinations Previously he had been good without virtue:
combat

But he he

would

have had nothing to

good without so

in

order to

follow his inclinations

and thus

would

have been
to love

merit; he
passions.

would not

have been

virtuous and now

he

knows how to be
to
order and

in

spite of

his

The

mere appearance of order

brings him

it.58

The fulfilled desire that

to

woman offers and

the

ideal in

which she partakes serve

create men's moral strength.

strength and enlists amour-propre surest art

In arousing desire, woman encourages men's in a man's relative regard for himself: "The

for animating the

unites with made

strength

is to

make

amour-propre

desire

and

the one

it necessary by resistance. Then triumphs in the victory that the

of the

other

has

him

win."59

The

achievement which

ideal

satisfies

amour-

propre:

"He has that

amiable

delicacy

flatters

and

feeds

amour-propre

55
56

IV, 820
Ibid.

57
58

59

IV, 801 IV, 858 IV, 694

174
with

Interpretation
oneself."60

the good witness of

The ideal

sets

in

motion a self-approbation

that

deeply

satisfies amour-propre

The

operative principle and

in

leading

men

to virtue

is this

passion.

Since

reason

is inactive

place them.

incapable of restraining the appetites, a dominant passion must re Amour-propre issues in acts of virtue because virtue is merely a spe Men's desire to be foremost
and

cial case of that passion.

their need

for

approba

tion need not

feed

at the expense of others nor

malleability, the need

merit

for

approbation can

rely on their recognition. Given its be internalized so that the standard of

within.

by

which a man assesses

himself comes from

The ideals inspired

by

imagination love
of
self-

act to moderate the passions.

approbation.

Virtuous

conduct emerges

from the

Rousseau "I

uses amour-propre

to instill in his student a

. . .

concern

for

self-scrutiny:

see no problem

he

will want

to outdo

himself."61

self-regulation

brings

on

the

being his own competitor Virtue is flattering to amour-propre because self-approval of dignity and honor. Such a man's
others'

in his

sense of

honor is
of

not related

to

opinions

but to the

opinion

that a man en
what

tertains
others a

himself. It is

a virtue more respectable

than simple regard for

think; it is a self-regard, a sublime selfishness, that can serve to moderate man's inclinations. The self-regulating man will not do some things that will
own view of

debase him in his

of

himself. What is honorable is

what of

he

as a

judge

himself

would choose.

man's amour-propre

likes to think

his

perfections

and

passionately it flatters

seeks what

forming
when

virtuous acts and

flatters it. Men thinking themselves worthy of per being loved become more virtuous. Virtue is attractive
and

amour-propre

it does

so

because

of the pleasure of

self-

approval.
cation

Amour-propre directed toward

a
.

virtuous

deeds

receives moral qualifi

and

determinate form. Herein lies the

solution

to the

problem

of

amour-propre

Herein

also

lies Rousseau's form

he

solution to
.

the problem of the tyrannical will, that

response

most corrupted

of amour-propre

Plato's
in

in the Republic

was

to

enlist

that will,
and

which of

sees as a natural modification of

a new republic speech.

spiritedness, in the
who sees that pri

fame

glory

founding

Rousseau,

will as

unnatural, subverts it to sublime selfishness

by directing

it toward the he

vacy

of

domestic life. The love

man's

of private

intimacies binds
soul, but the
virtue.

pleasure and

justice
will

together. A
act morally.

love

of

himself is the

strongest motive to ensure that

Not the
man

noble perfection of the

new

self-regulation of the
virtue

love-smitten

becomes the

basis for

Thus,

becomes love's

labor

regained.

Man is

not required to

transcend his sensual nature in

becoming
being:

moral and the management of

moral conduct.

the passions

becomes the

chief means

to produce

Rousseau
from

employs the natural passions to create a moral

"... it is
must

always

nature

itself that the too,

proper

instruments

to regulate nature
virtues

be drawn. "": This

means

however,

that the classical register of

60. IV, 806. 61. IV, 454. 62. IV, 654.

Rousseau

and the

Management of the Passions

The
classical

175

is substantially
and moderation

altered.

list

and order

wisdom,

justice,

courage,

represented the regulation of account

distinct

and ordered parts of the

soul.

For Rousseau this

is

no

longer

meaningful

because

man's corporal

existence of passions neled

limits his

moral possibilities. amour-propre and

His

energies can

be

chan on

by fear

and sublimated

by

imagination but they take

and

the

form in the

homely

virtues of

domesticity. Love
of

intimacy produce

all

the

virtues a man needs:

decency, fidelity, love

family, humanity,

a sense of

hy

giene, modesty,

and sensitivity.

To conclude, Rousseau's psychology

moral world regulation of

of

fear

and amour-propre

is based

on

the assumption that the skillful manipulation of

fundamental
of

appetites creates a conduct.

because these
the nature of

are

the

main

determinants
is

human

The

man

is essentially many

similar to the self-regulation of the

universe.

The

principle of the physical world

chaos and

force;

matter submits

to the laws

of motion.

After initial

"accidents"

arising from "fortuitous

now

causes,"

the particles arrange themselves in that ordered universe that

men's eyes.

ap

pears

before

Occasionally,

the order is disrupted

by

flux in the

phys

ical world, like the Lisbon earthquake. By analogy, the principle of the human soul is physical sensibility and this active principle submits to the laws of plea sure and pain. There is initial confusion and many errors but eventually the per
ceptions, passions, and
sentiments are ordered and control of man's

happiness

becomes

a matter of self-conscious

direction. Men's
The discursive

passions are their whole na

ture as there is no natural, independent reason, toward

moral or

nor a natural

tendency

of

the soul

intellectual

activity.

persuasion of a

philosopher-

legislator
natural and

who

leads the

soul

to

its

natural

perfection, thus aiding it to fulfill its

rejected.

potential,

relies on a metaphysic

Rousseau has

The love

of

God

the intervention of His grace,

generated

which was once seen as

necessary to suppress

the passions

by

self-love and

to direct

men

towards their divine origin,

is

also now of no significance.

However, Rousseau
power alone

retains

the notion that it

is

not within an

individual's
now

to

acquire

happiness.
place of

Replacing

philosopher and

priest, it is

the

educator who

takes the

God. Where the

grace and precepts of

God had

failed, because they had

tion of psychology
rality.

made men slavish or

imperious,

the judicious applica

by

the educator

is

now meant

to produce an effective mo

Thus, man's nature is emptied of any longing, or limit, and the educator becomes fully
The
soul of

natural moral responsible

capacity,

spiritual

for the inculcation

there is no in

of morality.

is

no

longer
nor

an ordered phenomenon since

natural communion with
normal character

herent tendency
The disorder
of

growth,

any

the passions is seen as the

eternity or God. of the human soul

and the role of the educator

Since
tor's
role

man's

is hence significantly enhanced. dispensation is a disorderly network of passions, it is the

which

educa

to provide the conditions under

the consequences of passionate

and

action are

beneficial. The

operations of

sensibility

the pleasure-pain

mecha-

176
nism are

Interpretation
directed
or

harnessed

by

the educator.

Understanding
be
constructed

man's nature as

malleable means
management of

that the human

constitution can

by

the

judicious boldness

fundamental

passions.

It is he

an

innovation in founders

political science al

ready inaugurated
and prudence

by

Machiavelli

when

praised

who used

(virtue)

to establish new orders:

actions and

And in examining their

life,

one sees that

fortune into

provided which

them with noth

could

ing

other

than the

occasion which gave

pleased.63

them the

matter

they

intro

duce

whatever

form they

Henceforth,
ter
educator or

the management of the passions rather than the

of education

formation

of charac

becomes the technique

legislator
as

to

virtue.

The

emphasis on the will of

the

the dominant force in establishing conformity of con

duct is dent

a consequence of

denying
the

the existence of or accessibility to a transcen

realm.

Henceforth,
"human

political scientist could speak of

"human

behavior"

character"

rather than

and see

his

role as creator of order rather than as

facilitator in the
It is

cultivation of natural

faculties.

an open question whether this

does

not pose the most serious

dangers

of

potential abuse where

quished

human

for the

purpose of

freedom, dignity, and privacy are simply relin some imposed, imagined ideal. For Rousseau the
that rationally

ideal

was

freedom,

and moral restraint was an unqualified good.

in Rousseau's thought,

however,
can

justifies this
remind us vicious

choice of

There is nothing ideals.

Some

of the political experiences of this manipulation

chological

be

when

century linked to

how insidious psy ends. The intrusions

satisfies

and manipulations of amour-propre

the educator

who

incidentally thereby

his

own

are not a matter of

deliberate

and self-conscious choice on

natural

the

part of the recipient.

Insofar

as

the ideals are not created in light of

long
is to

ings

and

constraints, but

rather are

simply imposed through the

one

management of

skillfully developed
give

passions and

sentiments,

may

question whether this

too

much power

to technical specialists whose self-criticism and responsi

rather

bility
know

do

not extend

beyond the
of

limited

"efficiency."

aim of

The

recipients

of this

"management

otherwise since

lack the rigorous reasoning and reflection to their faculties have been restricted to use in the self-scru
the
upon

self"

tiny they have been

relation to their imaginary ideals. Rousseau's psychology lays the modern foundation of much political administra tion and behavioral regulation, although he himself continued to raise the ques

taught to engage

in

tions of the ultimate good for man. It could

raised again

be that these

questions

have to be

in

modern applications of psychology.

63. N. Machiavelli, The Prince,

ch.

6,

p. 33.

Virtue

and

Individual Rights in John

Adams'

Defence

Robert Webking
The

University

of Texas

at

El Paso

I
John Adams is
a most

important figure in

the thought and politics of the

American Revolution. General

commentators on the thought of the

Revolution

tend to depend upon Adams more than any other author as a source

for

ex

plaining upon Adams is that he revolutionary in the creation Thoughts

and
on

what

the Revolution was all

was

about.'

One

reason

for this dependence

politics, in colonial

very influential in Boston

radical

politics of

as a

leading
writes

member of

the Continental
with

Congress,
in

and

the new government that came

the Revolution. "His

circulated

Government,"

John Paynter, "was widely

1776

helped hasten
colonies.

and shape

the formation of independent states out of former

. . .for

His Report of a Constitution the Commonwealth of Mas sachusetts was adopted with few changes, by that state, in 1780, and became the model for movements toward constitutional revision in other
British
states."2

The ican

special attention given

to Adams

by

students of

political

one of the country's most

was

thought, however, does influential

not stem

eighteenth-century Amer merely from the fact that he was It

stems

politicians.

from the fact that he

the most thoughtful of those influential revolutionary politicians. Gordon

observes

Wood

that "no one read more and thought more about law and
Adams.3

politics"

during
was

the revolutionary period than

country's most

Pauline Maier

adds

that Adams
was

"perhaps the

learned

student of
and

politics."4

Because it
Adams'

based

upon extensive

reading

of political

history

philosophy,
contemporaries.

politi

cal thought

is

more complex

than that of most of

of an

his

My

effort

especially difficult aspect of understanding John Adams as constitution maker. in that arises problem especially thought, a arguments During the dispute that culminated in the Revolution, John

Adams'

here is to

present an

Adams'

were were

like those in the Declaration

of

Independence. He

argued that the

British
argu-

failing

to secure the individual rights of the American colonists. His

1 See Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969); Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cam bridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); and Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution (New York: Random House, 1972). Adams receives the longest entry of the American revolutionaries in
.

both Bailyn's index

thur Lee
2.
are as

and

Wood's index. In Maier's book only the

entries on

Samuel Adams

and

Ar
lie-

long

as the one on

John Adams.
of a

John Paynter, "John Adams: On the Principles

Fall 1976,
p. 58. p. 287.

Political

Science,"

Political Science

viewer, vi, 3. 4.

p. 35.

Wood, Maier,

178

Interpretation
in the teaching
the
of modern political philosophers
natural

ments originated

that politics
rather

should concentrate upon

securing the

rights
the

of

human beings

than

upon

teaching human beings

Yet there is
opposite path.

lofty

virtues of

classical and

Christian tradi

tions.5

another persistent strain

in

Adams'

thought that appears to

take the

At times Adams does

argue the need

for

virtue.

In the

days before the Revolution, the argument about the need for virtue was subordi nate to the argument about rights. Adams argued that citizens must be virtuous if

they

are

to

restrain

themselves from violating one another's

rights.6

Still there
virtue as

are

occasions, relatively rare, when Adams treats the production of

rather

the purpose of government

than as a means to another purpose,

that

of

securing individual rights. This

ancients'

presents a

difficulty

because the

modern

teaching
beings loftier

that government exists to secure

argument

natural rights

is based

upon an explicit

rejection of the
virtuous.

that government's purpose is to make the

moderns argued

human
the

Neither the

ancients nor

that it

was possible and

to achieve both the security of the rights to

virtues.

life, liberty,

and

property

Governments

must aim

primarily

at one or

the other since the

project of

securing

rights appeals

to the selfish material and physical

desires

of

human beings,
controlled.7

while

the project of creating virtue

demands that

such

desires be

The

difficulty

appears

in Thoughts
of

on

Government. There Adams begins

government."

by

He continues to society is the end of write that "All sober inquirers after truth, ancient and modern, pagan and Chris tian, have declared that the happiness of man, as well as his dignity, consists in

stating that "the

happiness

Confucius, Zoroaster, Socrates, Mahomet, not to mention authorities re (iv, 193). Yet when Adams moves from this dis ally sacred, have agreed in cussion of ends to a discussion of forms, he also moves from ancient authorities
virtue.
this"

to modern ones.

His

second

list is

composed of
Hoadley."

"Sidney, Harrington, Locke,

Of these
modern or

Milton, Nedham, Neville, Burnet,

writes, "The
past, has
wretched condition of

and

thinkers he
years

this country,

however, for ten

fifteen

frequently
a

reminded me of their principles and

reasonings"

(iv,

194).

From there Adams lar assembly,

goes on

to outline

a scheme of government

involving
on

a popu

council,

and an executive without

elaborating

the

influence
an

of ancient and modern principles over

this scheme and without

sets of principles.

indicating
goal

awareness of the tension

5.

between the two

letters
liberties"

See, for example,

struggle

the

"Novanglus"

where

Adams

argues

that the

Americans'

in the

revolutionary beings leave the

is to "preserve the

naturally theirs,
a contract

and where

he

argues that

human

state of nature

by forming
-

to establish a government to secure their

liberties. Charles Francis Adams, ed., The Works of John Adams (Boston: Little & Brown, 1 851), 10 vols. vol 4, pp. 14. 128, and 1 1 177 passim. Citations to The Works will be indicated hereafter by volume and page numbers appearing in the text. 6. See John R. Howe, Jr., The Changing Political thought of John Adams (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), Ch. II. 7. For a good discussion of the impossibility of uniting ancient and modern political principles, as well as for an application of this discussion to the American regime, see Martin Diamond, "Ethics Way," and Politics: The American in Robert H. Horwitz. ed., The Moral Foundations of the Ameri can Republic (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1979), pp. 39-72.
,

Virtue

and

Individual Rights in John

the

Adams'

Defence
not

179 only
work

Fortunately,
ment

sketchy Thoughts
Adams'

on

Government is

Adams'

on political architecture.

understanding of why a certain form length in his three- volume work, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States written in 1786 and 1787. Gordon Wood writes that the Defence "was the only comprehensive description
of govern

is best is

elaborated at great

of

American

constitutionalism that the period

of

produced."8

In this

work

there is

thorough

discussion it is

the ends and means of government. Through a study of

this discussion
virtue and
of

possible to gain an

understanding

of

the relationship between

rights, between

ancient and modern political

principles, in the thought

John Adams.

II
The Defence is
defend the form
American

an argument about

forms

Adams'

of government.
most of

goal

is to

of government

instituted

states against a criticism made

written

by by the

the constitutions
philosopher

in the

French

M. Turgot.

In

1778

Turgot had

that the constitutions adopted

by

the American states

they had declared their independence from Great Britain were each char acterized by "an unreasonable imitation of the usages of England. Instead of
after

bringing
land has

all

the

authorities

into one, that

a

of

the nation,

they have
king"

established

different bodies,
a

house
of

of

representatives, a council, a governor, because

Eng
The

house

commons,

house

of

lords,

and a

(iv,

279).

attempt to balance different governing authorities, Turgot continued, was ne cessary in England to control the strength of the monarchy. It is unnecessarily work, written in response divisive, however, in a nation of equal men.
Adams'

to

Turgot, but for both European

the
usefulness of

and

American audiences, is designed to demon

strate
of

the creation of three governing authorities and the

power

danger

governing Adams was, of course, aware of the similarity between the American consti tution and the British form of government. His argument, however, is that the
uniting

all

in

a single

democratic body.

similarity did

not arise

from

blind

reverence of

the

former

colonies

for the

mother country, but from a careful understanding of the nature of human beings and their governments. He produced the Defence, Adams writes, "to lay before

the

public a specimen of

that kind of reading

293-94).

constitutions"

American

(iv,

and reasoning Adams is firm on the

which produced point

the

that the Amer

ican

system

is the

product of

reasoning

and not prejudice:

"The United States

of

America have exhibited, perhaps, the first

the
simple principles of

example of governments erected on

(iv, (iv,

292).

Adams
authority
the

agrees with

Turgot that

government must

be "founded
purpose must

on

the natural
preserve

alone"

of

the

people

293),

and

that

its

be to

rights and

liberties

of the people.

He disagrees

with

Turgot

on

the question

8. Wood,

p. 568.

180

Interpretation
democratic assembly can In his letter to Price, Turgot had
secure those
written of

of whether a single
effectively.

rights

and

liberties
of

the

inadequacy

the

definition

tent to define

liberty offered by many s response was that it makes a liberty as the rule of law. difference for liberty whether the laws are just or unjust, that is, whether they se
of
republican writers.
Turgot'

Such

writers were con

cure or violate

the rights of human beings

the Frenchman's that it

(iv,

278).

In responding to Turgot, cheerfully

and even equal

agree,"

Adams leaps

upon

observation. possible

"I

shall

he

writes, "with M.

Turgot,

is very

that

laws,

laws,
will

their made by common consent, may deprive the minority of citizens of government that (iv, 402). The great problem, then, is to find a system of
recognize at once

the people's claim to

political

authority

and

the

need

to ensure

that the

governmental power

is

used

by

the people and their officers

people"

for

"protecting
only

lives, liberties,
are

and properties of

the

(iv,

557).

The if there
a

overall argument of

the Defence is that this

objective can

be

reached

three institutions

dividing

senate,

and a separate executive.

governing This political

authority: a

house

of

commons,

arrangement uses

three discoveries in the

Lycurgus,"

constitution of a

free government,

since

"the only the institution

of

which

three are

"representations, instead

of

collections, of the
and of the

people; a total

separation of

the executive

from the legislative power,

judicial from both;

branches"

and

balance in the legislature,

Even these
or great

by

three

independent,
in have
not

equal

(iv,

284).

improvements,

the only progress

the science of politics

in two

three thousand years, Adams writes,

governments.

been

frequently

employed

in making

Apart from the Americans,

only the British have seen the importance of these discoveries.

not mere

It is this fact,
at

and

prejudice, that makes the British constitution,

in theory

least, "the
clearly
un

most stupendous

fabric

of

human

invention"

(iv,
for

358).

The

specific ends a

that Adams

has in
these

view

government are more

derstood through
government must an executive.

discussion
made

of of

modern

forms.

Adams'

argument

is that

be

up

three parts: a house of commons, a senate, and

These three

parts represent present

different

parties made

up

of

different

natural orders of

human beings

in any

community.

The

commons repre aristocracy.

sents

the many, and the senate represents the

characterize

few superior, the Adams

It is

difficult to
represents

the executive,

for

although

says that the executive

the natural party of the one

(iv,

385), he does

not make clear what that

Adams'

natural order

is in

communities without
who

hereditary

monarchs.

argument

is

about

the few and the many

account

form interest

groups whose not

desires

and

rights

must

be taken into

by

government.

He does

discuss the

executive

in

the same

depth

or as an

interest

similar

to the other two that must be

of

addressed
govern-

for

reasons of justice and stability.

His discussion
Peter Shaw's

the executive

is

of a

9.

This

argument

from Adams

opposes

contention that

Adams

reinstated

British

governmental principles out of remorse caused

by "bringing

down

authority."

paternal

Peter Shaw,
p.

American Patriots
126.

and the

Rituals of Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard

University

Press, 1981),

Virtue
mental

and

Individual Rights in John

whose

Adams'

Defence
a

-181

power,

importance lies primarily in

either the

being

third power in govern

dominating.10

ment capable of

preventing The democratic branch of the legislature is simply essential in a free govern ment. If the end of government is, as Adams quotes from Marchmont Nedham, 'the good and ease of the people, in a secure enjoyment of their rights, without
or
"
oppression'

few

the many from

"

(vi, 65), it
branch
a

seems essential that the people

have

at

least

some share

in

governmental power.

Americans know,

writes

Adams, "that

popular elections

of one essential

of the

legislature, frequently repeated,

or of or of

are

the only possi

ble

preserving the government of laws preserving their lives, liberties, or properties in (iv, 466). Of these rights, Adams treats property as the most impor tant throughout the Defence. It should be noted, however, that according to
means of

forming

free constitution,
men,

from the domination

of

security"

Adams the security of property is erty. He writes that the word

which

intimately related to the

or

"republic"

security of life and lib "signified a government, in originally

and of

the property

of

the public,

people,

cured and protected cannot

by

law. This

idea, indeed,
personal

every one of them, was se implies liberty; because property

be

secure unless

the man be at

discretion,
liberties
create a

and unless

he have his

liberty to acquire, use, or part with it, at his liberty of life and limb, motion and
argues that

rest, for that

and

purpose"

(v,

454).

Adams

for the

people

to secure their

property from government that, in

and

oppression addition

they

must use

their natural authority to

to creating a popular

branch,
any

gives power

to

the

few

to the one. Adams demonstrates

through argument and with many

examples that

"it may be laid down

will soon

governmen

as a universal maxim that

including,

perhaps

especially, a democratic one, "that has not three independent

branches in its legislature

nobility"

become

an absolute

monarchy

or an arrogant

(iv, 37

1).11

To

understand

the

need

for
to

branch

of

the legislature representing the

means

few, it
pri

is

necessary to be

precise as

what

Adams

by

the few. Adams is not

marily
agrees

concerned about

using the

wisdom and virtue of

the few best. While he

on

that there usually is

than

more wisdom

brought to bear
and while

decision-making
that

in be

aristocracies

in democracies (iv, 295),

he

argues

it

would

best to try to make use of the positive qualities of the few best in government, it is not the few best he has in view when he speaks of the natural order of the few. The group with which Adams is concerned can be understood by examin

authority"

ing

distinction he The

makes

between "principles

of
ought

and

"principles

of

power."

principles of

sought

in

office

holders.

authority are qualities that They include "virtues of the

to be the qualities

mind and
&c."

heart,
The

such as

wisdom, prudence, courage, patience, temperance, justice virtues ought to translate into power, but most often they do
10. 1 1
ment
.

(iv,

427).

These

not.

qualities

See Paynter,

pp.

65-68.
indicates

As this

passage

by

speaking

of

"three branches in the

legislature,"

Adams'

argu

in the Defence is
concern

not about separation of powers,

but

more about mixed government.

His

pri

mary

is to

grant

to each major class a share of

governmental power.

182
that are

Interpretation

likely

to

belong to
such as

possessors of

power, the

principles of

power, are "the

goods of

fortune,

riches, extraction,

knowledge,
no means

and

(iv,
connected

427).

Adams includes

virtue"

with wisdom or
which

knowledge, necessarily by (iv, 427), because it comes from education and travel,

"which is

are usually more available to those of wealth and good birth. Adams further discriminates between the principles of power by noting that "riches will hold the first place, in civilized societies, at least, among the principles of

(iv,
wealth more

427).

Thus,

the

superior

few in
and

most societies will particular more

be defined

by

quality by by any quality that divides the naturally superior and the naturally inferior. The in terest of the few to be represented in the senate, then, is the interest of the
than
other

in

than

virtue, the

real

wealthy.
Adams'

willingness natural ones when

to consider

only

conventional superiorities rather

than

discussing

political representation

indicates his fundamental in hu

choice

to adopt

modern political principles and

to reject ancient ones. The an

nature that

cients'

understanding
mans should adhere

of mixed government assumed an order

to.

It

was understood to

son, to
power

secure wise rulers who might

be critically important, for that rea discern that natural order and use political

wise

effectively to teach people to live well. Despite the claim that rule by the or virtuous is just, a mixed regime might be established to quiet those who

would seek political power

for

selfish reasons or

to cope to

with

the problem of

there

being

an

insufficient is
a

number of virtuous people

cient mixed regime

form designed to

bring

as much
Adams'

In any case, the an virtue to bear on political

rule.

rule as possible under given

circumstances.12

mixture,

unlike the an

cients', is not meant to secure the rule of wisdom but merely to prevent selfish groups from being able to use the power of politics to harm one another's rights.

As his "principles

authority"

of

are replaced

by

his "principles

power"

of

as the

things to be taken into account in mixing government, the

concern

ancients'

fundamental

to secure virtuous rulers is rejected.

presents

Adams

two results, both

disastrous for the

people's
of

rights, that

could with a

follow from

failing

to supplement the

democratic branch

the

legislature

senate to represent the wealthy.

of their own

The

people

The first possibility is that the wealthy, deprived government, will make the people's branch their own. have less money, less time to be concerned with politics, and fewer branch
of

political arts than

the rich. The people's

disinclination to
be further
292).

spend time on politics

(iv,

308; v, 457)

puts

the wealthy, who are well-known and visible, at a clear ad

advantage can

vantage

in

elections.

This

cultivated

by the rich
include
writes

through the use

the use of well-developed political arts

of wealth

(iv,

These

arts can

to corrupt the people

an opposition

in

order to win elections.

Adams

that if the

wealthy "found
12.

among their

constituents to their elections

[they]
"

For

discussion
Joseph
pp.

of

this sort of ancient political argument see

Leo Strauss

and

Cropsey,

eds.,

History

1963), especially

Harry V. Jaffa, "Aristotle in of Political Philosophy (Chicaao: Rand McNally,

94-125.

Virtue
would

and

Individual Rights in John

have
to
recourse

Adams'

Defence

183

immediately
art,

to entertainments, secret

popular

and even

bribes,

to

increase their be similar,

parties"

intrigues, and every (iv, 444). Since the

con

merits of candidates

in

elections tend to

and

since, therefore, the

citizens'

scientious

votes will

tend to be divided

the

balance

of electoral power

fairly equally in most elections, tends to be held by "the most profligate and un
end result

principled, who
wisdom or

will sell or give

virtue"

(iv,

444).

The

away their votes for other considerations than is that "he who has the deepest purse,
prevail"

or

the

fewest

Adams'

people are

using it, will generally (iv, 444). argument, then, is that he who moves from the premise that the the best protectors of their own liberty to the conclusion that legisla
scruples about

tive

power ought

to be contained in a single

democratic assembly fails to

under

stand

that the people are unlikely to be able to maintain control of that assembly.
the

Instead,
into
an

few

rich are

likely

to turn that
rule

oligarchy (vi,

59).

Once the

by

seemingly democratic government the people has become in fact rule by

will

the rich, it is
struggles

likely

to degenerate still further. The rich

will eventuate

form factions. The in

between factions
406).
of

in

civil war.

The

civil war will end

tyranny (iv,
the security

The

people are more

likely

to

keep

their power, and therewith

their rights, if

they

give to

the rich a part of the legislative power

and

that belongs exclusively to the

quire an

rich.

"The rich, the well-born,

the able, ac

esty
ate:

and plain

influence among the people that will soon be too much for simple hon sense, in a house of representatives. The most illustrious of them
separated

must, therefore, be
this

from the mass,

and placed

by

themselves in a sen
290).

is,

to all honest to seek

and useful

intents,

ostracism"

an

(iv,

The rich

will

be less

likely

control of

the people's branch if

ambition.

they have

their own to pro

tect their property and satisfy their

By

this method, the people's

maintained as

branch,
branch.

so essential

for the

preservation of

liberty, is

the people's

Even if the

people should maintain

their power in a single

legislative

assem

bly, it is safe to say, Adams argues, individual rights. "We may appeal
over,"

that

they

would not use

that power to secure

we

to every page of
volume of the

history

have hitherto
proofs as

turned

writes

Adams in the third

Defence, "for

irre

fragable,

that the people, when

they have been unchecked, have been

any

unjust,

tyrannical, brutal, barbarous,

controllable usurped
power. rights of

and cruel, as

king

or senate possessed of un without one

The majority has eternally,

the

and

exception,
made

minority"

the

(vi,

10).

Specifically,

legislature

up

of

a single popular

assembly

could not

be

expected

to pay the

"sacred

regard to

property"

liberty"

as

(v, 152) which it ought. "Property is surely a right of mankind as well (vi, 8-9). A popular assembly might restrain itself from moral or reli
from taking the property of the wealthy for a while, "but the time be long before courage and enterprise would come, and pretexts be in
to countenance the majority through
abolition of

gious motives would not vented

by degrees,
them"

in

among

(vi, 9)

debts

and

dividing all heavy taxes on

the property the rich. The the

major-

people, it seems, may be the safest repository of their own

rights, but

184

Interpretation

ity is clearly not the safest repository of the rights of the minority. The rich mi nority "ought to have an effectual barrier in the constitution against being robbed, plundered and murdered, as well as the poor; and this can never be without an in
dependent
If
need
senate"

(vi, 65).
to secure

government exists

for

a senate

to represent the wealthy does

.

individual rights, it must have a senate. But the not follow only from considera
It
also

tions of justice to the rich minority

follows from

a consideration of

the

well-being

of all.

Adams

writes that once a poor

and

majority has
and

succeeded

in its

unjust redistribution of

property

the

precedent of redistribution

is

established
until

"there

must

be

a perpetual succession of precarious to

divisions

squanderings,

erty became too

it"

be sought,

and universal

idleness

and

prop famine

(vi, 133). An insecure right to private property would result not in gross to the rich, but also in a worsened economic condition for injustice only all. Both justice and the self-interest of the people, then, suggest the establish
would end ment of a senate

to represent the interests of the few

rich.

Ill
There is in the Defence the While the primary focus is government, there are a few
example, Adams
of government presents

same

difficulty

found in Thoughts

on

Government.
as

upon

the security of

individual rights
At

the end of

places where another goal appears.

one

point, for

this formula for the purpose of government: "the end

is the

greatest

happiness
all"

of

the greatest number,

318).

same time the stipulated rights of

(iv,

saving at the This definition is made more

quotes with approval
a course of

specific

by

noticing that two

volumes

later Adams from

Aris

totle's conclusion "that a

happy

life

virtue"

must arise

Elsewhere, Adams writes justice, temperance, and

virtue,"

that virtue

involves the

classical virtues of

(v, 458). "prudence,

but that its most sublime form is "Christian "which is summarily comprehended in universal benevolence" (vi, 206). In the to the Defence Adams writes that "whether the end of man, in this stage of his existence, be enjoyment, or improvement, or both, it can never
"Preface"

fortitude,"

be is

attained so well

in

bad

government as a good
at once

one"

(iv,

294).

The

statement

the two goals and that Adams may be undecided as to which ought to be sought. It is
possible

an

interesting

one, for it suggests

that there is a

distinction between
virtuous

for human beings to find the

there is no tension

greatest enjoyment

in

actions,

and

in

such a case

between

enjoyment and

improvement. But it is
enjoy
of

easy for most human beings to come to the ment lies in virtuous action, and in such cases
not

realization that the greatest

are

they

likely to define enjoyment

more narrow

in terms

of physical and material pleasures only.

This

definition

enjoyment

is the

one

Adams has in

mind when

he distinguishes
the

enjoyment as po

litical

goal

from improvement. Now the

major argument of

Defence,

the ar

gument that government must

be properly

structured to secure

individual rights,

Virtue
is

and

Individual Rights in John

Adams'

Defence

185
enjoyment.

an argument

that appeals primarily to the narrow

of

human desire for

This is especially true

people

the right to property,

whose protection encourages most

material

to acquire the things that lead to the satisfaction of

desires.

It is true that property can be used to support virtue rather than simply to grat ify appetites. Wealth is essential, for instance, for the exercise of the virtues of

liberality
goal

and magnanimity.

is far different from the

goal.

But the security of the right to property as a political need for property that arises when virtue is the polit itself does
not create

ical

Property

in

and of

virtue,

and people are

far

more

likely
rather

to seek to acquire it for reasons of material well-being than as support for the primary goal of government is to secure the right to property
Adams'

virtue when

than to make people virtuous.

If the

rights

and

Adams'

dedication to the security of especially the right to property, the goal of improvement is present in statements that human happiness consists in virtue, in performing duties
goal of enjoyment present
material well-being.

is

in

to others and not in supplementing one's own

Adams'

Inspection

of

argument

in the Defence

reveals

that indeed he did understand there to

as ends of man as well as a

be

a tension

between

enjoyment and

improvement

corresponding tension between rights and a government whose

tion
man of

a government whose goal goal

is to

secure

individual

is to

create virtue
while

in human beings. Inspec

the argument

indicates further that

Adams himself believed that hu

believed that
when

happiness is indeed found in virtue, he

rights and

also

the goals of
choose

securing
Part

encouraging

virtues

conflict, government should

to

secure rights.
Adams'

of

concern

for

government ought officers must seek

to secure the

is wholly subordinate to his opinion that the rights of all. If government is to be just, then its
virtue

common good rather right

than the satisfaction of narrow selfish

must not rob

interests. Thus if the

to property is to be secure, the majority

majority.
Adams'

the minority, and the minority must not rob the

According

to John R.

Howe,

this

was

the basis of

concern

for

virtue

in the 1770s, although,

the unjust use of

Howe argues, Adams had become less Defence

about

sanguine

by

the time of the writing of the

the possibility that

power.13

genuine virtue could restrain

governmental

Certainly

it is

correct

that in the Defence Adams coun

what

sels against an expectation that a

would restrain

desire to do

is

good

for

one's

fellows

the

unjust actions of course of

Several times in the

cent of the caution

governing bodies. the Defence Adams makes

chapter of

statements reminis

in the fifteenth
writes

Machiavelli's Prince. "In the insti

tution of
reason ought always

Adams, "it
and

must

be

remembered never

that,
as

although

to

govern

individuals, it certainly
human
again:

did

since the

Fall,
as

and never

will, till the

and will

Millennium,

nature must

be taken

it

is,

it

has been,

be"

(vi,

115).

And

"To

amuse and

flatter the
the

people nor

with compliments of qualities that never existed

in them, is

not

duty

the

13.

Howe,

pp.

108-31.

186

Interpretation

right of a philosopher or

mankind, and adapt

legislator; he must form his institutions to facts, not

that the number of

true idea and judgment of

complime

(vi,

98-99).

The

important fact
of

about
rather

virtue, but

human nature, then, is not that men are sometimes capable human beings that dependably act from

is very small indeed (vi, 8, 211). Government is needed pre cisely because people, if left to themselves, will violate one another's rights (vi, 7). It is foolish to expect genuine virtue to be useful in securing behavior for the
virtuous motives
common good.

Such
is

virtue

is simply too

unusual and

too difficult to create.

or as a means

Whether
of

virtue

considered as the end of

human beings
particular

to the

security it. One stems from the

individual rights, the Americans have

Americans'

size of

the

country.

difficulties in creating Adams notes that Socra duties

tes and Pythagoras argued that politics would be oppressive "until mankind were

habituated, by

education and

discipline,
and

to regard the great

of

life,

and

to

consider a reverence of
principal source of

themselves,

the esteem of their fellow citizens, as the

556-57).

enjoyment"

their

(iv,

Notice here

Adams'

recogni

tion that the goals of virtue and enjoyment are not always tuous acts can

incompatible,
be

that vir

be

seen as

the greatest source of enjoyment. But he continues to

say that this

small

alternative of

educating

people

to virtue

"might"

plausible

in

community, but is utterly unrealistic for a large

one.

"The
so

education of a

end"

great nation can never accomplish so great an

(iv, 557),

that in a

large

community it is unlikely in the extreme that people will identify enjoyment with virtue. Thus Adams at once acknowledges and rejects the best political alterna
tive.
and

If

government could create virtue

it

would

be

good

both for the community

a great nation.

its individuals. This alternative, however, is not available to Large communities cannot expect to create a virtuous citizenry.
The
comes other special

difficulty

the

directly

from the

goal of

Americans have in creating virtue in securing individual rights. John Adams

to acquire

citizens realizes

quite well

that human beings

who seek

virtuous than

human beings
the

who are not

property are less likely to be taught that they have a right to property.
of a republic.

Toward the
of a

end of

Defence, Adams discusses Montesquieu's understanding

republic, noting that for Montesquieu virtue is the spring

Adams correctly decides that Montesquieu has in mind neither Christian nor clas sical virtue, but a kind of love of the republic that will lead to sacrifices of self-

interest for the equality part of human for it "never

suggests
more and a

community.
of

This love

of
of

the republic requires these last

both

love

of

love

frugality. Neither
209).

nature

(vi,
a

It is true

existed

in

nation, if it ever

two, Adams writes, is any that frugality is a virtue, but a passion did in an individual" (vi, 209). Adams

that republican virtue as

discussed

than the absence of ambition and avarice caused true that

by Montesquieu may be nothing by poverty (vi, 207). Cer

tainly it is
erty
and

for

Montesquieu,

republican virtue requires a satisfaction

with poverty.

price

for

Earlier in the Defence Adams noted the connection between pov virtue, but he argued that human beings would not choose to pay such a
virtue

(vi,

97).

Virtue
Of

and

Individual Rights in John

in
and of

Adams'

Defence
virtue.

187

course wealth

itself is

not

hostile to

As has been noted,

Aristotle Adams

argues that a certain amount of wealth

also argues

that

material

luxury

is

an

is necessary for virtuous actions. evil only in excess. The problem is

wealth.

not wealth

itself, but
more

the dominance of the desire for

about

When human be

ings become
about rather

concerned

improving

their

virtue, then the opportunity to pursue

than supportive of
will

wealth

well-being than becomes destructive of virtue

material

it.

Adams'

argument

is that

given

the opportunity,

most

human beings
and

live lives in
most

pursuit of wealth rather than

must

in

pursuit of

virtue,

that, therefore, hope

of

human beings

live
are

without

luxury

and without re

alistic

attaining

luxury

if their lives

to be free from a dominance

by

the desire for

This poverty that can make virtue more easily attainable is especially unlikely in free states, for the love of wealth is so domi nant in human beings that with the liberty to pursue riches they will almost uni
material well-being.

versally

choose

to pursue riches. Adams

writes

that "to expect self-denial

all

from
and

men"

who universal
Adams'

experience"

have the "power to gratify themselves, is to disbelieve (vi, 61).

argument

history
will

that the opportunity to

pursue material

well-being

lead

most

human beings to live lives later

whose purpose

is the

pursuit of material
most

luxury is
were

an argument made

by

dominated
of a

by

a taste

for

material well-being.

Tocqueville in observing that Tocqueville

Americans

wrote of

the existence
argued

"universal,
could

natural, and

instinctive human taste for

comfort."

He

that

this taste could be prevented from

becoming
it
could

the purpose of life

if

material

well-

being
if

be taken for

granted as

be

by

the

old aristocrats of

Europe

or

material advance was

impossible

as

it

was

for the

serfs of

feudal Europe. But

people are

when material advance

is

possible and material position

purpose of

is insecure,
natural

likely

to

live lives
writes:

with

the primary

Tocqueville

"If one tries to think

what passion

pursuing is most

material well-being.

to

men

both

stimulated and

hemmed in

by

the obscurity

of their

birth

and

the mediocrity of

their

fortune, nothing

seems

to suit them better than the taste

for

comfo

Be

Americans, Tocqueville finds that "love of cause this is the of human pas comfort has become the dominant national taste. The main current
circumstance of most

sions

with running in that direction sweeps everything along freedom to the that Tocqueville Adams and agree, then,

it."14

pursue

property

any"

makes

it true that "a free

people are

the

most addicted

to

luxury

of

(vi,

95).

The addiction, Adams writes, grew especially quickly in America. "In the late unusual quantity of money flow in upon them, and, war, the Americans found an
without

the least degree of prudence,

foresight,

consideration or

measure, rushed

headlong

into

a greater

degree

of

luxury

than ought to

have

crept

in for

hundred

years"

(vi,
the

96).

But though the

Americans

war accelerated

the

growth of

luxury,

the politi

cal principles of the

made
14.
rence

together with their

a

happy
J. P.

physical circumstances

growth

of

luxury

inevitable. "In
in America,

country like America

where

the

Alexis de Tocqueville,

Democracy
1969),
pp.

ed.

by

Mayer,

trans,

by

George Law

(Garden City:

Doubleday,

533

"34-

188

Interpretation
for

means and opportunities

ness not to expect

it"

(vi.

luxury are so easy 96). Only if the right

and

and so plenty,

it

would

be

mad

to property

were

insecure

would

poverty

grow

in America (vi, 133),

only

with

virtually inescapable poverty

would widespread genuine virtue

be

a realistic possibility.

Adams, then,

understands

that classical or Christian virtue on a large scale

is

unlikely in America because of human nature, the size of the American nation, and American political principles. He knows that the doctrine of individual rights
exacts a

toll in

virtue.

If

politics

is to

encourage

those rights and especially the

right to property, the

citizens will

be less

virtuous than

they

might otherwise

be.

Knowing

this price, Adams argues that it is

nonetheless more

important for

poli

tics to secure individual

rights than it is for

politics

to

encourage virtue.

More

over, Adams

argues

that those kinds of political communities that can succeed in

citizens are

producing
the

virtue

in their

to be blamed precisely because

they do

so at

price of

individual

rights.

Not be
of ral

all

restrained

luxury is evil. by law and

Adams

writes

that

luxury

in

excess

is

evil and ought

to

morality (vi,

97).

However,

the most effective restraint

a natu

luxury

allows no luxury at all. This prohibition frustrates poverty desire of human beings to improve their condition (iv, 520). Adams
material ease even

argues

that human beings ought to be free to seek

though this

free

dom

will

lead many to the

of

evil of excess

luxury. This point,

as well as another made

justifying

the choice to pay a price in virtue to secure

liberty, is
letter to

in

Adams'

discussion

Sparta.
once mentioned

Cousin Samuel Adams

would

in

a private as

friend that he
Sparta."15

have liked to

see

Boston

established

"the Christian
was

Al

though the context clearly

indicates that Samuel Adams

referring to the

need

for

virtue as a means

phrase as an

for securing individual rights, some commentators take the indication that the revolutionaries had it in mind to establish a classi
virtue.16

discussion of Sparta in the Defence is very interesting. John Adams appreciated the accom plishment of ancient Sparta. He knew that laws had sought to shape
cal republic whose goal was
Lycurgus'

In this context, John

Adams'

character and excellent

had

succeeded so 542).

longevity (iv,
"three

thoroughly that the Spartan regime had Furthermore, Adams has mild praise for
balance."

enjoyed

Lycurgus'

It was not perfect, writes Adams, but it built along the right lines (iv, 553). Yet final judgment on the Spartan constitution is that it was "not only the least respectable, but the most detestable in all (iv, 555). Adams is aware that in this assessment he differs with the "aristocratical philosophies, his
system of orders and a was a system
Adams'

Greece"

torians,

antiquity"

and statesmen of

(iv,
that

553).

Indeed it is

Adams'

acceptance of

modern natural rights principles

leads to his

strident criticism of
used

Sparta. In

particular, Adams criticizes the measures Lycurgus

15.

to shape the character

Harry
vol.

Alonzo Cushing, ed., The Writings of Samuel Adams (New York: Octagon Books, Gordon Wood,
see

1968),
16.

iv, p. 238.

Notably

Wood,

pp.

114-18.

Virtue
of the ate

and

Individual Rights in John

so as

Adams'

Defence

189

Spartans

to make them concerned only with the public good. To cre

this attachment "it was

necessary to

extinguish

every

other

appetite, passion,

and affection

in human
of

nature"

(iv,

553).

Adams

objects to:

The

equal

division

property; the banishment

with

of gold and

silver; the prohibition of

and

travel and

intercourse

strangers; the

prohibition of

arts, trades,

agriculture;

the discouragement of

literature;
(iv,

the public meals; the incessant warlike exercises; the

doctrine that every

citizen was the

property

of the

state;

and that parents should not

educate their own children

553).

That

is, Adams
in
a

criticizes the
civil

laws

invading
rest as

individual rights in the

is"

name of vir of a man con

tue. The
chained

Spartans'

liberty, he
a

concludes, "was little better than that

dungeon

liberty

to

he

(iv,

555).

And it is in this
government

text that
never

Adams

reminds

his readers,
555).

with

emphasis, that

"should
sav

have any

other end

than the greatest happiness of the greatest number,

ing

rights"

to all their

(iv,

Clearly, then,
rights.

when

the things needed to secure

rights conflict with

the things needed to produce virtue, as

choice

they do
his

with

the right

to property,

Adams'

is for

There is
mise act

more to

Adams'

condemnation of

Sparta

and

refusal

to compro

individual

liberty

than the argument that human beings ought to be able to

material well-being.

to satisfy their natural desire for

There is his belief that

the

dignity
which

of

individuals

can

be

realized

control their own actions.

This
to

point can

only if they have the personal liberty to be made through reflecting on a passage in Aristotle's Politics. Adams
that since human

in

Adams

objects of

an argument made argument

quotes a

summary

Aristotle's

felicity

consists

"in

the operations of virtue, and chiefly in the exertions of those whose

occupations are not

prudence,

wisdom and

primarily

concerned with

the exercise of those

not

virtues,

such as

husbandmen,
Aristotle,"

artisans,

and

merchants, ought

be

allowed to

be

citizens

(v,

455).
of
writes

This "dogma
most

Adams, "is

the most unphilosophical, the

inhuman and cruel that can be (v, 457). Although it is true, Adams writes, that farmers tend to be inattentive to public affairs (v, 459), it is nonetheless true that they must be allowed to participate in the election of the legislature if
man

conceived"

has

liberty is to have any meaning at all. Adams argues that so long as a "any small property, by which he may be supposed to have a judgment
his
own"

and will of

(v, 456), he
writes

must

be is

allowed a role

in

government.

Of

Aristotle's
so

argument

he

that "there

no

doctrine,

and no

fact,

which goes

far

as this toward

forfeiting
note

to the human

species

the character of rational crea

tures"

(v,

456).

It is instructive to
cussion.

that Adams appears to misinterpret Aristotle

in this dis in

For Aristotle it is precisely the fact that human beings

conclusion

are rational crea politi will

tures that leads to the

cal communities.

that the most reasonable ought to rule

If the

most reasonable

rule, then more reasonable

behavior

be

required of all

than if all rule together. But

for Adams

what

is

more

important

190

Interpretation
things, but that they have an opportunity to reason, however imperfect it may be, in making public and private For Adams the observation that human beings are rational creatures
reasonable
conclusion

is

not that all people

do

exercise
choices.

leads to the

that

all

human beings
to

must

be

allowed

to use reason in that the

public affairs.

He does

not appear

comprehend

Aristotle's

argument

fact that human beings lic

act affairs to

are rational creatures means that

they

ought to allow pub

be directed

by

the most
manner.

reasonable

among them in order that all may

cannot

in

more
without

reasonable

Humans

be

human, according
how

to

Adams,
human

the opportunity to guide their wills

by

their rational
no matter of

faculties. A
good the

being
how

who acts always as much

he is told

by

superior,

laws

or

the actions correspond to the

demands

human. It is far
mistakes than

more

dignified for that

person

to rule

virtue, is not really himself and make frequent

to live a

thoroughly

virtuous

life

under command.

IV
Adams
argues that since

human beings

and nations are expect

passions and prejudices

(vi, 211), it is foolish to

are more

ordinarily actuated by tyranny to be prevented

case under

by

the virtue of citizens and rulers. This is

where

ment,

human beings
argues

especially the likely to be moved

free

govern material

by

desire for

well-being.

Adams
as

measures, such
selfish quire

further that it is wrong for governments to take strong Lycurgus did, that would be necessary to stifle these narrowly

desires, for such measures would make it impossible for humans to ac luxury even in moderation, and such measures would also deny human be

ings the It

liberty

and

dignity

appropriate to their

humanity.
of government under which
self-

is, therefore, interested human beings

despite their cluding between them. When
sire a popular

most prudent to create a

will

form

be

neither oppressive nor unjust

toward one another

selfishness.

This is the attraction, for

a

Adams,

of a mixed system

in

branch,

senate,

and a separate executive

to

hold the balance

the de

for luxury, as States, Adams writes that "the best

calculated to prevent course of

discussing the dangers for communities brought by well as the inevitability of the growth of luxury in the
problem ought

United

to

be,

to

find

form

of government

ordinary
selfish

tage of the mixed

luxury, when, in the things, it must be expected to come (vi, 94). The advan system is that it can do the job of preventing the bad effects of
in"

the bad effects and corruption of

desires from
even

being
for

realized

(vi,

98).

With the

members

of

the three

branches acting mutually

selfish

purposes, the three branches "restrain

each other

by

the

laws"

(v,

90), so that oppression and

abandoned a

injustice do
his

not result.

Paradoxically, having

dependence

upon virtue

to restrain tyr

anny in government, Adams insists that that it is better than any simple form at
this argument

an advantage of

mixed government

is

producing

virtue

(v,

289).

To

understand

it is necessary to

recall

the evils of unmixed aristocracies and de-

Virtue
mocracies.

and

Individual Rights in John

Adams'

Defence

191
and

In democracies the majority is led to the few will oppress the many. Because tocracies,
effective check on

"rob"

the minority,

in

aris

mixed government places an

though the vices and

both parties, neither will be able to commit its crimes. "Al follies of mankind, no more than their diseases and bodily be wholly
eradicated,"

infirmities,
branches
mit"

can never

Adams writes, "the balance

encourage the
system

of

three

appears to afford all

that the constitution and course of things

not

will ad of

(vi,

182-83).

Although it does

classical or

Christian virtues, then,

,

neither

positively does the mixed

the

formation

courage vices

and
.

herein lies the

great advantage of

mixed and

positively balanced sys

en

tem over others

within

It

restrains the passions of men so preserve

that

they

can

only be

satisfied

boundaries that
the

the rights

of all.

During
about

decade before the Revolution, Adams had been very disturbed the system used to fill governmental positions in the British colonies. The

best

example

is

that of Thomas

Hutchinson, lieutenant

governor and

then gover

Massachusetts. Not only did Hutchinson himself hold as many as four po litical offices simultaneously, but he also obtained governmental posts for his rel
nor of
atives.

To Adams the

system

did

not reward skill and

hard work, but

written

family

connections and political scheming.

ams'

Edmund S. Morgan has

that "Ad

dedication to

work was more and more affronted

by

the

sight of men who was

had discovered
more obnoxious

a political shortcut

to

success and wealth.

There

nothing

to him than the

man who satisfied

crown."17

his

ambition and avarice

by

obtaining in the Defence

appointments

from the

The

system

for

which

Adams

argues

would not promote

the vices

encouraged where offices are

Adams'

filled

by
so

corrupt means.

Herein lies

a major advantage of

"trinity
(v,

in

unity":

it

parties"

curbs

"the audacity of individuals and the turbulence of "by doing justice to all men on all occasions, to the minority

316).

It does

as well as the ma

jority; and by forcing all men, majority as well as minority, to be contented with (vi, 152-53). This failure to encourage men to develop the vices that lead to
it"

success under a corrupt system

is

perhaps the greatest encouragement

Adams'

to virtue,

or rather

lack

of

discouragement to virtue, that

all, for Adams claims that the

system provides. mixed system of government

Yet this is

not

does
gues well

more

to

create virtue than

simply to actually

restrain vicious

behavior. Adams

ar

that his balanced

as certain
analysis

government

encourages certain patriotic virtues as

bourgeois

virtues.

Here, though, it
makes no claim

must

be

remembered

that

Adams'

is

comparative.

He

that the

system

for

which

he

argues makes
make either

human beings benevolent

or selfless,

but he does

claim

that

it

will

them act better than

they

would under a system

dominated

by

faction

of

the rich or the poor. The

key reason
the

for this is

that the checks and

balances it

in

a mixed system allow neither

rich nor

the poor to command, and make

unchecked power

more

likely

than

it

would will

rewards of
17.

society

be be distributed justly. This just distribution

were either

faction to have

that the

of rewards
of

is

Edmund S. Morgan, The

1976), p. 13-

Meaning

of Independence

(Charlottesville:

University

Virginia

Press,

192

Interpretation

likely

to result in

liberty

and

prosperity (vi,

159).

Both the prosperity

and

the

steady inability of the idle and vicious to gain financially encourage frugality and industriousness (vi, 90). Furthermore, the liberty, along with the desire for lux ury, support a desire for knowledge, especially knowledge that is likely to result
well-being (v, 289). mixed system to produce a kind of pa is the ability of triotism in the people. As the well-being of each becomes more connected to the
material

in increased

Finally,

Adams'

there

nation

than to a party,
"trinity"

which

it

will when no

party is

able

to dominate the govern

of

ment, the

indeed becomes
more

"unity,"

and a

"love

law, liberty,

and

country"

(v, 289) becomes

likely

than

in

a pure

democracy

or aristocracy.

The

sort of patriotism about which

Adams

speaks

here is described

by

Tocque

ville:

There is

another sort of patriotism more rational perhaps

than

[a

simple

feeling

of

love for

country]; less generous,

engendered

less ardent, but

more creative and more

lasting, it is
rights,
and

by enlightenment,
a

grows

by

the aid of

laws

and the exercise of

in the

end

becomes, in
which

sense,

mingled with personal

interest. A

man understands

the

influence

his

country's

well-being has
useful

on

his own; he knows the law

allows

him

to contribute to the production of this well-being, and try's prosperity, first as

a

he takes

an

interest in his

coun

thing

to

him

and

then as

something he has

created.18

Adams

makes no claim that

the virtues encouraged under a

mixed system

would come man

be the moving force behind the beings. He argues only that their influence
to the many nor the few

conduct of all or even some would

hu

be

greater under a system

where neither

holds

unchecked political power and where

both

parties are

forced to

work

together to govern than it would under a system

where either

party held

absolute power.

V
There is
a genuine

lack

of

clarity in John

Adams'

political writings.

The
an

difficulty
with

stems

from

Adams'

appreciation of the arguments made

both He

by

cient political

philosophers and

by

modern

political philosophers.

agreed

the ancients and the

Christians that human happiness is to be found in the

He

possession of

the

lofty

virtues of character.

believed,

accordingly, that the

goal of ancient politics was a great one

because it involved

bringing

out

the best

in human

nature.

Adams

also

believed, however,
liberty. Such

that the means that

would

have
the

to be used in any realistic attempt to reach that goal were unacceptable because

they

required severe restrictions on

restrictions would

involve

effective

a real choice

stifling for

of

free

will

and,

virtue.

man nature rather

In removing than fulfill it. In the

in virtuous actions without hence, freedom, they would actually destroy hu

would result

absence of spartan measures to remove the

18.

Tocqueville,

p. 235.

Virtue

and

Individual Rights in John

Adams'

Defence
choose would

193
virtue,
and

opportunity for
vices of ucation's

vice only education could make people human beings are strong enough that only a fool

the

depend

upon ed

ability to

make people choose virtue.

Since

people cannot

be

expected to

live

as

they

ought,

and should not

be

forced to, Adams

selfish

believed,

the course recommended

purpose

by prudence

is to

construct

a political system whose

rowly
tuous.

Adams'

is merely to control the effects of nar behavior and not to create human beings who will be genuinely vir system, accordingly, is based upon the belief that to preserve lib primary
virtue.

erty is
action

more

important politically than to inculcate its

citizens the
also
"sublime"

The disadvantage

of a

system with

this goal is great. Not only can it not be expected to initiate positive
virtues

to create in

Adams believes necessary to

virtues

human

happiness, but it

tends to discourage the formation of those

through

encouraging human beings to pursue wealth by protecting property and liberating people to indulge their natural desire for luxury. This profound disad
vantage,

however, is finally
is to

outweighed

system whose goal

secure

than

any

realistic alternative.

by a great practical advantage. A mixed liberty likely to result in less vice and injustice Liberty being as important as it is, and human im
is
political alternative of virtue
Adams'

perfections
available

being

what

they
not

are, this imperfect

is the best

because it does
the desire for

discourage the formation

although

in the way that

system

more unjust regimes encourage writes

do. In the final analysis,

tends to

luxury, it

also secures

liberty,

and

Adams,

the people

living

under

it

"may

be

happy

if they

because it does so, (vi, 88).

will"

Adams
goals.

understood what

had been lost in the

rejection of classical political

He believed that human beings

virtuous.

were

genuinely

But he

also

could be genuinely happy only when they believed that in practice politics was not ca

pable of

making

people virtuous and

that

an attempt

to use political power to

political action could

make people virtuous would result

in disaster. The best that

do to

contribute

to

human virtue, Adams believed,

Adams'

was to restrain vicious

behav

ior. Thus Adams

them
result

accepted classical political goals

for human beings but

rejected

for

politics.

The lack

from

a shallow or

political thought, then, does not clarity in incomplete understanding of the basic political alterna

of

Adams'

tives. It stems from John

thoughtfulness.

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by institutional,

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style sheets of the respective

The

Meaning
University

'Will'

of

in Hegel's

Philosophy

of Right

Donald J. Maletz
The of Oklahoma

Hegel's

Philosophy

that politics
this

I do

not

of Right is devoted to a systematic exploration of the idea can only be understood in terms of freedom and its realization. By merely mean that Hegel places freedom high on the scale of goals to
root of all politics

pursue, but that for him the

is

freedom,

or an original sponta

neity from which all order that we call right or wrong, just or unjust, originates. Although this freedom may express itself in negative forms, ultimately it con
tains
able an effective

way

of

striving for the realization of freedom in a practical and reason life. From this striving, the human experience gains its orientation in
and wrong.

matters of affairs

right

Hegel holds that the deepest

and

power

is this

original

freedom,
"no"

that

man

in the

modern state must whether we

free."

governing human be under

stood as

its

product.

The

ultimate

law that

we

obey,

know it

or

not,

is

not

the law that says

presents

but the law that

says

"be

Hegel

his

analysis of

freedom itself (in

to the

contrast

to his study of free

dom

as

result) in the
an

"Introduction"

Philosophy

Right.1

of

The

argument

is

stated

in

extraordinarily terse form as a series of thirty-three theses is

and

bluntly

declaring what freedom gel is frequently read as

individualism. But his free

explaining how it is the basis of right. Today He though his fundamental concern were to insist on the in

tegration of the individual into community and state and thus to overcome
real aim

liberal
the

is first

and

foremost to

construct an ethics of

will and of the primacy of the spiritual over the natural,

in

senses supersed

ing

a simple contrast

between the individual

and

and

the social. The pieces in Hegel's

account of

both
one

tion unless

community do not fall into their proper propor individuality understands them from the point of view of their common foun
of

dation,
relation one can

the

logic

freedom

enunciated

in the

"Introduction."

It is only in their

"reality'

to that

original

force,

'energy'

the true

and

in human affairs, that

cer

grasp the

significance of each

"Introduction"

The
tain

argument of

the

in its relationship to the other. descriptive.2 Except for is austerely

rather

heavy

polemics against opponents who

today

seem

unworthy

of He-

PR. For the text, I have used G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber Rechts(Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Fromann, 1973-74). philosophie, 1818-31, 4 vols., ed. Karl-Heinz Ilting References will be to volume and page number of this edition, or to the paragraph number () pro vided in all editions. Volume II of the Ilting collection is a critical edition of the PR as published in
I
.

Henceforth

cited as

1820,
and

while

the

other volumes contain extensive material

from Hegel's

manuscripts and

lecture

notes

from

transcriptions of

his lectures

made

by students.
1945).

Translations

are

from the English

version

by

T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford Knox's

2. vol.
rendering.

University Press,

cited as

'K'; but I have occasionally

modified

Method,"

Cf.

Kenley
no.

xxiii,

Royce Dove, "Hegel's Phenomenological 4 (June 1970), pp. 615-41 on the

"descriptive"

method of

The Review of Metaphysics, the Phenomenology.

196
gel's

Interpretation
without extensive
reference

attention, the discussion proceeds

to what

could

loosely

be

called as

the traditional views concerning

freedom,

natural right

and will.

However,
but
a new

I have previously tried to show, Hegel had these tradi

tional views in mind, reflected on

solutions

them,

and proposed not an adoption of

propounded.3

their
well-

known,

was attentive

reply to the questions they in his early work to the advantages

with must come

Hegel,

as

is

of classical

thought and

the classical polis, but he eventually came to agree

other moderns

the

view of

Hobbes

and

that all obligation

from will,

so that the state

is to be from

conceived as
nature."

the product

of an act of choice

by

which we remove ourselves

by

But he thought the meaning of will and freedom inadequately fathomed Hobbes, and Hobbesian thought left relatively few explicit traces in his ma

ture

teaching,

except

for the fundamental

respect

contrast

between

nature and

freedom
in

and perhaps a

heightened

for the importance

of struggle and conflict

defining
stand
will

human identity. Hegel

state"

attributes

to Rousseau the

discovery

that "will

is

the principle of the

right in terms

of

he holds that Rousseau is thereby the first to under This comment alludes to the emphasis on "thinking
and
itself."

in the Social Contract, and, more fundamentally, adopts the anthropology presented in the Discourse on Inequality (PR 258 Remark; 29 Remark). In
the latter

book, Rousseau
free
for

claims

that the human world emerges out

of an original

independence from determination

by

nature.

The human
a

being

is

equipped with a general

faculty
"ideas"

"perfectibility,"

of
and

rooted construction of a world

in

mysterious

capacity for

in

which

the fundamental priorities can

not

be

shown to

be

prescribed

by nature. But,
will and

achieve

the adequate exposition of

a

Hegel thought, Rousseau failed to hence of right. He "takes the will

and

only in

determinate form

as the

individual will,

he

regards as a

the universal
'general'

will not as

the absolutely rational element in the will,

but only

will

which proceeds out of

this individual

will as out of a conscious will.

The

result

is

that he reduces the

union of

individuals in the

state to a contract and therefore to

something based

on

their
. .

"

given express consent

arbitrary wills, their opinion and their capriciously (PR 258 Remark). Rousseau's doctrine makes the primary thing "the
or rational
truth"

fundamental,
own private

substantive and not

will of a single person

in his

self-will,

the absolute

will, and

mind as a particular

individual,
3.

not mind as

it is in its

(PR

29 Remark).
'Introduction'

See Donald J. Maletz, "An Introduction to Hegel's

vol.

to the

Philosophy of

Right,"

Interpretation,
Manfred Riedel
mit

13,

no.

(January
note

cited

in this article,
Politik,"

1985); on Hegel's view of the tradition, 4. Cf. also Karl-Heinz Ilting, "Hegel's
Life,"

der

by Auseinandersetzung
see the works

aristotelischen

Joachim Ritter, "Morality and Ethical Richard Dien Winfield (Cambridge: MIT
4.
Naturrechts,"

Philosophisches Jahrbuch, vol. 71 (1963/1964), pp. 38-58; and in Ritter, Hegel and the French Revolution, trans.

Press, 1982), pp. 151-82. PR 1, 240. On the eventual priority of the modern principle, see Manfred Riedel, "Hegels Kritik des in Studien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969); and Shlomo Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge
1972).

of Philosophy, 3 vols., trans. E. S. Haldane Frances H. Simson (New York: Humanities Press, 1968; reprint of 1896 edition), m, 315-19; Riedel, Burgerliche Gesellschaft und Staat (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1970), pp. 11, 26-32.

See

also

Hegel's Lectures

University Press,

on the

History

and and

The

Meaning

'Will'

of

in Hegel's

Philosophy

of

Right

197

Hegel
will

claims to

deepen these beginnings in

of

recognition of

the importance of

by

examining the meaning

"Introduction"

freedom both

as origin and as goal. of

He in

quires

in the

about

the

implications

the original

emancipation
non-

from
ture,"

nature.

What

are

its

consequences?

naturalness

that sets men adrift?

Is it merely a lack, a kind of Or does this freedom have its own kind of "na
as

so that we might speak of

end?

it

intelligible

and even as
world?

Further, how does it comport

rearranging things in
must come not

with

the natural

containing a certain Surely the freedom of

the spirit, however understood, is not unaffected

by

the natural world, nor can

it

be

capable of

whatever some

arbitrary direction it
way In the
with

might choose.

This freedom
confines

to terms in

the natural world, which

but does

direct human

"Introduction,"

endeavor.

he

offers an
world

account of

how this Less

primal

freedom

organizes

itself, generating
account of
with

human

as

its

product.

immediately

visible

is his

the the

self-education

by

which

the primal freedom comes to a reconciliation

natural world and possibilities.

adapts

itself to its limits in is freedom.

an act of conscious realism about

human

The

result of

a world we can call a realization of what

is right, the

state as a real

ization The

exposition of

freedom

and will

begins, properly
claims

speaking, in the fourth

thesis of the

Philosophy

of Right. Here Hegel

that "The basis of right

is,

in general,
will

mind

[or spirit]; its

precise place and point of origin

is the

will.

The

system of

is free, so that freedom is both the substance of right and its goal, while the right is the realm of freedom made actual, the world of mind brought
out of

forth

itself like

nature."

a second
right,5

This

statement

follows

brief but telling

argument about positive

in

which

Hegel tries to

show

for knowledge
but it

of right on

"the

right"

science of positive

why we cannot rely (jurisprudence). Knowl

edge of the actual

laws

of a given

country
what

can

tell us what is enforced,

he argues,

cannot explain

adequately

is

at work

acts of choice expect the

by

which we change or criticize

in the positing of law or in the laws and institutions. Further, we

law to

attain a certain systematic

orderliness, coherence, and consis

tency. But

whether

it does

so or not

is

unknowable

by

the

standards of positive

law itself

as

long

as

jurisprudence is
right.

concerned

only

with what

is

enforced and

not also with what not

is

We
of

inevitably

ask whether a given

law is

justified,
but
must

merely

enforced.

Study

right

cannot

be

content with

the given

turn to
the

mind or

ground"

of

spirit. "Man thinks, and wants to find in thinking his freedom and the world he inhabits. The right must have something to do with

what can command rational assent.

This is already inherent in

"form"

positive

law itself,
set

insofar

as

it

contains a

hazy

orientation toward

and a certain

implicit

of general categories
right cannot stand

from

which

it

acquires

justification

or coherence.

Positive

by

itself. It is

confronted

by

the critical mind, which cannot

identify
5.

the right solely

by
law

what

is enforced,
commonly

and cannot

conscientiously indulge
except

Positive

right means what

is

more

called positive

law,

that it includes both

the

written and

the

unwritten

(i.e.,

customs, mores, the

'way

of

life').

198

Interpretation
reasons

the habit of giving good

for bad things,

critical

which

is

so characteristic of

the

merely legal mind (3 Remark). But what is the meaning of the

faculties

that are not

ruled

by the estab
mind

lished

structure of

the laws? What is their source

,

and result?

Is the free
of

only

a permanent critic of

or

is it itself compatible
mind

with some

kind

law? The

problem

the possible independence of the

roots of

from the

given or

leads back to the

chological"

right. Hegel turns to

which

"mind"

"spirit,"

"psy looking for the

source of that

independence

first

comes

to sight as the critic of

right but

also as

the source of the

as

conceptual structure

existing ultimately implicit in the

the mind or spirit

right

as

such, insofar

it is worthy

of the name.

The transition from

positive right

( 3)

to the realm

of

( 4)
the

is

abrupt.

It has the

character of a

confrontation, not a

deduction, imitating
over another

radicalism of the view that

cally sanctioned the free spirit or mind,

holds to the priority of thinking institutions. Positive law is challenged by

which

existing, histori realm, that

of

lays down its

own

rules,

which

is ultimately free in
"system"

the sense of a procreator of criticism and

something of its own. fully developed and rendered explicit,

spirit,
which

judgment, and which finally builds Positive right should be, when its implicit is
a manifestation of

the nature of mind or

world.

in its freedom

seeks a realization of

itself in the

In

so realiz

ing itself,
"second
seemed

according to

its

own

ena of nature and

history

and

inner necessities, it takes up the existing phenom works them into an order which one may call a

nature."

initially

The right properly speaking is a certain congruence of what to be opposites: positive right, with all that it means concerning
the constraints
of

the acceptance

of

imposed

by

circumstances, and,
now understood

on the other

hand,
nally

the inner freedom

realized existence

the mind or spirit,

to want an exter

in the

practical world at

hand. The
Geistes,"

notion

that these two

can and must cohere

is

advanced

by

Hegel

as

the meaning of his insight into the

"nature

of mind

[or

spirit]"

("die Natur des is the for

4 Remark). Their
the development of

effective coherence

in the

modern state

culmination of

both. The PR is devoted to the

attempt to substantiate

the claim that the inner

freedom does

of the mind or spirit reaches out crime and

actualization

in the

world of
and

prop
state,

erty, contract,
and
ner

punishment, morality,
out

family,
is

civil

society,

only in this world. This reaching freedom but its completion.

so

not an abandonment of

the in

What is the will, through

that it may
will as a

which

this reaching out is achieved? Let

will."

us note

first
of a

be

somewhat

misleading to speak of "the

We tend to think

faculty,
as

alongside our other

an

faculties,

and yet

Hegel denies that it is

faculty,

entity psychology (PR I, 241; 4 Remark). Rather it is freedom itself; the will cannot be distinguished from freedom. "The free is the will. Will without freedom is an
methods of empirical

he denies that it is

accessible to

the

empty word, just

a particular

as of

way

freedom is only real [effectual] as will, as subject Will is thinking, thinking as setting itself over into existence, as a
. .

The
drive to

Meaning
give

'Will'

of
existence"

in Hegel's
(PR iv,

Philosophy
It is the
elements;

of

Right

199

itself

102).

practical element of thinking.

Thinking
which

has both theoretical

and practical

one without the

other,

es

pecially the theoretical treated in

ignores

or sign of

isolation from the practical, is an abstraction lived.6 Freedom is the first result thinking which is thought. Freedom is at the first level self-distinction from the animal
the reality of

inner capacity to abstract from natural determination (PR iv, 106-7, m, in; K 227). The human world is characterized throughout by the capacity for emancipation from natural determination. Hegel would not deny that excel
world, the

lence in thinking is rare, but he human. thinking is general The

on

would assert

that the emancipating aspect of

crucial

theses on the will, the fifth through the seventh, are an elaboration
of

the meaning

freedom.

not

simple; that it is

They argue that freedom is complex and manifold, inherently dialectical; and that, properly understood, it is not
positive when carried

negative and of

destructive but

through consistently in terms

which

its

own

inner logic. The

parts.

will

has

three-fold structure,

he

examines

in

each of

its

Thesis five. The first

nacy."

"element"

of

the will is an "element of pure indetermi

"Everyone,"

says

Hegel,

will

find in his
be"

"self-consciousness"

to "abstract from everything

self"

which

he

might

and

the ability likewise to "determine him

and no

toward a particular content (PR 11, 114; iv, 111). No natural need
other source can

limitation from any

spirit

finally

resist

this capacity of the

mind or

can

The capacity for abstraction and withdrawal be developed to completion, and will then be found in its purest form in the
to

deny,

refuse,

or repudiate.

"pure thinking
purged of all

oneself,"

of

kind

of

thinking

the pure self, the general self

that is specifically individual and particular.

element of will or

This first

from

specific content.

It

seems not

primary; but Hegel does velopment; for

"educated"

freedom is negative, a capacity for withdrawal first chronologically as well as first in the sense of thematically discuss its beginnings or historical de

here,

as

throughout the

PR, his study

m).

examines

the

will with

fully
a

reflective

powers

(PR iv,

It

cannot

be natural, for it is It is
egotistical:

reflective emancipation seems

from the limitations

"I"

of the natural. a

it

to culminate in a distinction
general and abstract of an

between, first,
the

pure,

thinking

self, which is

thereby
"I"

(reaching

of man

generally, abstracting from

the

ond, the

world of

existing individual7) particulars, hence the

and without effective

world of

individuality,

and,

sec

life

and action.

This freedom in fashion

partakes of

both the theoretical

and the practical: the theoretical

because it is de
acts a

pendent on a sort of

thinking

of

the self, the

self and

practical

because it

both in positing this abstractly pure contents and claims. The practical

in negating the bondage

seems more

of specific

element

fundamental,
3rd edition

though

6. PR iv, 102-8; Cf. K 226-27, PR hi, 108-10;

234-357.

and

Encyclopedia,

(1830),

PR iv,
1970),

Hi.
pp.

Judith Shklar, Freedom

and

Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge

University

Press,

53, no.

200
never

Interpretation
separate

categorically
motive, to

from the theoretical. Behind the

pure act of gulf

thinking

lies
T

comprehend what

is, in
gulf

order

to

overcome

the

between the

and

the external world. But that

by

which undifferentiated experience

in an act has first to be posited, is knowingly split apart into subject, which
which

'willed,'

thinks and acts, and object, as that toward

thinking

and action are

directed

(PR iv,

102-8).
us examine more

But let

indeterminacy."

closely the practical meaning of this "element Does it have a consequence beyond the inner
Hegel
argues

of pure

'psychological'

influence it
to see this

exerts?

that it may and,

of will made

indeed,
a

that it is not uncommon

action.

highly

restricted

form

into

basis for

Now

when

this pure, abstract

self-hood goes over

functions
litical

as a

"negative

will,"

which

has

a most

it is, then it destructive influence "in the po

to action as

and

in the

religious."

ing
It

that it remains

course of

life, it

can

or wrongly believ purely theoretical it comes to determine a while purely actually have "the feeling of its only insofar as it destroys.

theoretical,"

"Remaining

existence"

but every actual form of life requires some distinct order, both institutions and individuals; and such particularization in ex ternal life is perceived as a constraint on, not a realization of, this inner abstract
pretends to want

"positive

reality,"

freedom.

"Only
as

in

destroying
as

ing

of

itself,

existent."

thing positive, "such

life"

something does this negative will possess the feel The negative will may imagine that it creates some universal (the French Revolution) or "universal
equality"

religious
not.

("the fanaticism

of

the Hindu pure contemplation"), but it does to some sort of order, to

while
a particularization of

"Such actuality leads

at once

organizations and

individuals alike;
(PR

it is precisely
iv,
113-

out of

the annihilation of

particularity and negative freedom Hegel's

"Western"

objective characterization

that the self-consciousness of this

14).
and to

proceeds"

Remark;

something (revolution, the terror) which is He

alludes

examples refer to

"Eastern"

(religion)

something
the
mod

now a significant element of

ern

in

politics.

in the

"Preface"

to a certain negativism that arises

from

modern

genitors,

a source of

philosophy and which is, nevertheless, despite its rationalist pro irrationalism in practice and of an inability to grasp the (PR 11, 6 iff.; K
terror"8

character of sound practice

4ff.

). What is apparently rational,

political

re

liance

on the

"form"

of

thinking
and

as a guide
or

in

life,

can conduce to

the

"maximum

of

frightfulness

to a moralism in

which

the sovereign

subjectivity of conscience can lead to a similar, if less overt, nihilism, as repre sented in the refusal to attend, on claims of moral principle, to any lessons pre
sented

by

the objective

world.9

8. PR 29 Remark, 258 Remark. Hegel associates the extremism in practice with tendencies in Rousseau's thought. Cf. Shklar, Freedom and Independence, pp. 58, 65. 9. PR 140 Remark. Hegel clearly has the French Revolution in mind, but he does not name it
specifically.

against those

In general, his polemics in the PR are directed less for whom the modern liberation of the mind

against

the state and its officials than

to mean a negative
pp.

stance toward all

existing institutions. Cf.

('enlightenment') seems Shklar, Freedom and Independence,

I73ff.

He

ex-

The

Meaning
six.

of 'Will in Hegel's
portrait of the

Philosophy
a

of

Right

201
shown

Thesis
what

In his

first
can

element of will,

Hegel has
to be a

both
un

that element is and also how

about this

it

lead to

bizarre kind

of practice.

He

derstood clarity

kind

of abstract self-consciousness with

modern

de

velopment, commencing essentially Descartes; but he must also be read to mean that there is an inherently destructive potential allied with this discovery.10

Clarification hence
a

of pure selfhood
of

is

an

grasp But how is it to be Since Hegel

the

basis

of

right,

but taken

important step on the road to freedom and by itself it is a misleading half-truth.

self-regarding self it. It would be possible

corrected?

emphasized the practical consequences of this

hood,

one might anticipate a practical argument against

to argue (in the manner of

Burke, for example)

against

the critical freedom of the

as such.

modern self-consciousness

by defending

positive

right
of

Thus, it

might

be

held that historical developments

contain a

kind

hidden

wisdom superior to

anything that might be achieved through rational insight. Yet this is not Hegel's course. Though his "philosophical is profoundly concerned with history, it never argues as though history, history were some kind of independent
right" 'from'

authority

sufficient to show the one-sidedness of

rationalism.11

Hegel's
of

exposi

tion of the calamitous practice coming from a one-sided version

the will is as

strong (if briefer) as anything said by others who opposed new, specifically mod forms of extremism. But his insight into the overcoming of the danger takes a totally different course.
ern

Hegel

poses

the question, is the abstracting

will upon which

the experience of

the pure self rests complete in itself? He believes it is not and that the most con
clusive argument against

it is

not

the

argument

from
sixth
"I"

history
"self"

but the

argument

from the
over"

nature of

there is a second

free willing itself. Thus, in his element inherent in the will. The
its

thesis, Hegel argues that or must be a "goinga positing of a definite means something

from

undifferentiated

indefiniteness (that is the

of
own.

pure

self) to

specific, determinate

content

Positing

choosing to be something definite in actual existence, knowingly choosing to live as this or that. The act of positing choice is not loss of nerve, a moralistic repudiation of the

knowingly

more

intense freedom

of

purely

abstract egotism.

Far from
self.

such a

compromise, it

is in fact

the self-criticism of the abstract, negating

The

criticism emerges

should ask about the implications of sympathy for statesmen who think the (PR ii, 66-69; K 7-9); il is apparently his view that the most danger various current ous threat to thought and to practice in his day comes not from the state but from the not only liber

'state'

presses a certain

'philosophies'

ated

but hyperliberated

mind.

For his

views on

the French

Revolution,
PP-

see also

The

Phenomenology

Clarendon of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: and Modern Hegel Charles and Taylor, terror"); 1979),
10.
pp. iooff.

Press,

1977).

Society

355-63 ("absolute freedom and (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

Manfred Riedel, Theorie

on the

und

Praxis im Denken Hegels (Stuttgart:

Kohlhammer,

1965),

pp.

82-84. Lectures
11.

History

Except,

perhaps, in a

of Philosophy, ill, 223-24, 228, 250-51. more popular work such as the Lectures on the

Philosophy
1975),
p.

of World
note 2.

History. Cf. Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press,

219

202

Interpretation
which

through recognizing that the movement of reflection

stract self contained a motive:

led to the pure,

ab

it

was at

basis

a quest

for freedom
but

through con

scious repudiation of subject

everything
that
of the

limiting, confining
a

and one-sided.

But it is then

empty definite at purely one-sided, namely being nothing all. Wanting to be utterly free and nothing more is an unwitting bondage to a most limited mode of life, one which can only destroy or deny whatever is
rejoinder

to the

being

purely

self-conscious

otherwise

self

is itself

a new

form

and it is an insight that ulti definite. As this deeper self-understanding dawns mately cannot be avoided, because the motive toward freedom necessarily turns

inward to

examine

itself

then there must follow a turn in a

means

new

direction. limitations
of

The turn in
purely
negative

a new

direction

understanding the terrible

and critical

freedom. The negating

complete,

freedom

possible

to the free

will must

be

subjected to critical examination and overcome.

not a

In

so

doing,

the

will moves toward a more

lesser,

self-realization.

It is true that

its

achievement of will

this higher

realization must proceed

through the

former

stage.

There

be

no clarification of

clear will of

toward

it,

unless there

the meaning of self-conscious choice, and no is first the achievement of the pure detachment

the reflective self and then a self-critical reflection on the

presupposed as a stage

limitations

of pure

detachment. Radical autonomy is

come; the

to be consciously over
as a

fully
its

realized will wills

to be something

definite

deliberate

over

coming In what
than the

of

own propensities toward a contentless

freedom.
will

precise

way

can

it be

said

that this second element of the

a self-criticism of
"infinite"

is higher

first, beyond

the

fact that it is rivalled

it? Hegel
which

argues that

there is in the will an impulse toward the self-sufficient, whole,

nected with

that

is complete,
con

not

by

another of equal worth.

This

impulse,

freedom itself, was manifest in the reflections that drove thought not just toward a critical distance from the existing world but to ward a dogmatic, categorical distinction between all of the existing world and the
the meaning of
pure

by

reflecting self. Yet that one-sided distinction proved not infinite but limited, its own criteria. It is limited and therefore merely abstract because it stands
sepa more

rates

simply in opposition to the world; it rejects worldly limitations as such and itself from them. In that sense, it is one-sided because it can do no
"no"

than respond
ment of the

with a resolute

to what the world presents. The second ele

of

will,

however,

the act

knowing

choice, is

called

by

Hegel the

Unendlichkeit") (PR 6 Remark). In choosing to be something definite, as a knowing refusal to be radically autonomous and nothing else, we have the self-conscious particularization of the thinking self. Its aim is to be something definite, as a self which could be radically free in a negative sense but wills instead to be in existence as something living and definite; it is a
"concrete
universal,"

"truly

infinite"

("wahrhafte

the purely universal and abstract made alive and

definite,

knowingly
imposes,
This

accepting conforming to the limitations which but also realized in such a way that it is no longer
or

all

definite

existence

merely

abstract.

state

is, for Hegel,

the fruitful unification

of

the finite

and the

infinite,

the

The
limited

Meaning
with what

'Will'

of

in Hegel's

Philosophy

of

Right

203
to speak more

is unlimited,

complete and self-sufficient.

condition

Or,

accurately, we should
considered

say that, for Hegel, this

the

is

what alone can

be

such

infinite, completely satisfying because, Hegel holds, there can be no fuller form of freedom
seven.

to be the

and sufficient.

And it is

than this.

Thesis
will

is the unity
while self. or

of

In the concluding both of these

statement on the will

itself,

we

learn that "the

particular and

moments."

It is

being

something

definite,
not

stracting limit
which

of the thinking, ab retaining the "self-identity and In the act of choosing some defined realization, the free self does restrict itself because it regards that choice as a "possibility
"ideal,"

universality"

by

it is

not constrained and

in

which

it is

confined

itself in
as a

it"

(PR

7).

This is
of

"individuality,"

"not

only because it has put individuality in its immediacy

accordance with

unit,

our

first idea

individuality, but individuality in

in this
sense
will

its

concept; indeed

individuality
the

(ibid.). The
purposes of

elements of

described in

is just precisely the concept 5-6 can only be separated for

miss

itself"

analysis; to treat them as wholly distinct is to

will

the underlying

unity

elements must

itself. But it is a unity which is an end, not a beginning. The two be consciously and actively brought into harmony, so that their implicit unity becomes explicit and fully realized as itself a project of willed
of

the

self-realization.

The

seventh

elements

perhaps

thesis has introduced nothing new, except the statement that the described in the two preceding theses constitute a whole. But this is the most difficult point of all. Hegel does not hesitate to refer to the con
character of such a

tradictory
be

unity, for it is not

altogether unlike

holding that the

the
particular

one and the

unified?

many Hegel continues, in the

can

be

one.

In

what sense can remark

the

universal and

to

7:

It is "the task

of

logic

as

purely

speculative

philosophy to prove and

as
consciousness."12

explain

this innermost secret of speculation,

ultimate spring of all negativity relating itself to itself, this indicates Hegel hereby the precise point of activity, life and but he also shows why the on his dependence of his "philosophic

of

infinity

right"

"logic,"

PR has itself
thesis
about

"logic-like"

a
character

character:

it is

one

form in
of

which a more

fundamental
and con

"ultimate"

"all"

the

of the
"will"

sciousness manifests
"logic,"

itself. In the
"Will"

spring we have the

motive

activity,

life,

point where not

psychology,

and right coincide.

"right"

is the
of

energy
and at the

only
of

of the

human The
also

"activity"

"life"

world, in

which

figures, but
energy

more generally.

unity arising from a itself.13 That of life

Cf. Hegel's lucid
and

certain sort of contradiction

motive

is

heart

"right"

but

can

become

explicit

in man,
See

and

making it
7 Re

12.

comment on speculative

thought, PR iv, Remark.

1 18-19.

also

11, 124;

mark; in, 117, 119;

13. self and

Encyclopedia
118:

(1830),
to

378

PR 111. 122; iv,

only

"Man

appears as a

being full

of contradictions,

he is the
"

contradiction

it
it

through this

does he

come

consciousness.

It is the
can

strength of
. .

the mind

[spirit]

that

can endure this contradiction

in itself;

no other natural

being

hold it

Cf. Taylor, Hegel

and

Modern Society,

pp.

43. 62ff.

204

Interpretation
own

explicit, for its

strives.

sake,

is, in Hegel's

"will"

view, the

end toward which

Will, in
Hegel
calls

this

"will"

teaching, takes on an aspect that is no longer exclusively human. an innermost key to life and activity. In the world there is,
"generally,"

somehow,
each an

a relationship between the intelligible and the particular, insofar as is as thing both itself and also capable of being conceived more instance of a kind, genus, form, or essence. In the human realm, this relation
'develops'

and contains its own kind of teleology, ex ship becomes active. It pressed in the fact that the relationship is an end, as well as a beginning. Hegel's doctrine may at first glance seem obscurely cosmic. But it is in a certain sense an attempt

to interpret

mon assertions

is in fact typically modern, as can be seen in the com advanced as self-evident truths in modern thought about right:
what

that 'free

thought'

and

'free

speech'

are sacred and an

ends, that an ultimate

himself,'

dignity be
as

longs to
such

man as a

'rational

being'

'end in

that the

individual

(cf. PR
great

is worthy of respect because he contains a trace 273 Remark [at the beginning]). These and deal for the human
of ultimate worth.
world and

of

the universally human

similar assertions claim a contains

implicitly

hold that it

in itself

some

thing

Hegel's theme,
source of

after

the initial exposition the

manner

of

the meaning of

'will'

as the

right, is to

elucidate

in

which

the particularization of the

will occurs.

If

5-7 have described the inner

structure of the

will, has this de

piction of the practical element of

thinking
the

shed

any light

on our

grasp

of

right?

Hegel argues, in the

the will toward some
of growth

"Introduction,"

remainder of

that the reaching out of

process with an order

definite

embodiment

is

an

intelligible

toward full maturity. In his treatment of this process, the

of

daunting
part

complexity

the argument in terms

of

both language

and

thought is due in

to the weaving together of three

importance
understand

of

the natural

different issues. First, there is a discussion of the impulses and their role in action; here the problem is to
life"

the natural will, the natural in the will, "natural

will

and

its implica
related to
own?

tions for the

the

(PR iv,

121).

Second,

there is a

discussion, closely
of the will

first,

of

the problem of whether and how the

to

'content'

is its in

Does

will come

be

a master of

itself, controlling its

forces
and

own experience

some on

sense,
them?

or

is it the

product of external

hence

always
of

dependent
the
will.

Third,

there is a constant examination of the

aimed at

'finitude'

This
ulti

discussion is

showing that

'finitude'

is

not

the last word,

because

mately the will achieves

something complete, self-sufficient,

and whole.

Particu

larizing
pletes

and

that

individualizing the inner freedom of the mind perfects and com freedom, bringing it to realization in a way which is satisfying, hence
by
another condition of equal worth.
of

'infinite,'

not rivalled

Let
of

us

turn

first to his treatment

the natural

will.

In

discussing the first stage

willing,
said

we are not

dealing

with an animal what

level
and

be

that

it is automatically

its drives

life. Of the animal, it can instincts are. It cannot (so far

of

The
as we

Meaning

'Will'

of

in Hegel's

Philosophy

of

Right

205 individ

know)

separate

deed from

consciousness and

hence has

no will or

uality (PR iv, 124, 121; 1, 245). The will, even at the most basic the capacity for abstracting from the immediacy of natural life. It
and object.

level, implies
separates self

But it

also

chooses,

determining

itself toward

some

goal,
own

"translating
activity
and

the subjective purpose

some external

means"

into objectivity through the (PR 8; I05ff.). from

what

use of

its

Purpose
generating

obtains content either content of

is

at

hand in the

external world or

by

from the
various

will

itself. At the level

and

of natural

will,

purpose

fol

lows the lead

lus-response impulse in

the

"impulses, desires
course of
animal

finds itself determined in the

mechanism of

nature"

inclinations whereby the will (PR 11). This is not the stimu
"will,"

the

but

a natural

a response

to

natural

which some element of

freedom

and self-determination

is

present.

It

is

will

in the form

of conscious

receptivity to the impulses deprived

of

of nature and an

im

plicit

ability to impose order on them. As this ordering

develops,

the conscious

element

increases. The
Natural

external stimuli are

their simple, unmediated

naturalness.

stimuli

by

themselves are chaotic and

conscious

discordant;

whatever

order

is

achieved must

derive from

direction it

and arrangement of these

impulses.

Hegel

argues

that the "natural

will,"

even when

makes

its

choices an

intelli
incom

gently, is unable to overcome a kind of

plete self-realization. role of will

"abstractness"

that

is to say,
the

This is his fundamental

criticism of attempts

to limit the

to

riding
most

herd

over

the

natural

drives,

or

to

make

mind

solely

"scout

spy"

and

for the

passions.

Even

when choices are made

impulses in the
range,
and

intelligent

manner

conceivable, choice

is

among the natural still limited in its

dependent

on stimuli

derived from
either

an external source.

Willing

re

mains a prisoner of content

"given

from

within or

from

without."14

What

ever one chooses

mains.

from this limited palette,

a certain arbitrariness of content re

Even the

maximum

levels

of self-control

leave

one enchained

by

the fact
can

that any choice one

might make

is unsatisfying,

'finite,'

because the desire That it

be directed equally to another object. Let us examine the character of the dissatisfaction
arise

more closely.

must

is

crucial

to Hegel's
most

case.

For he

claims to show that no form of the natural and

will,

even

the

intelligently

ordered, can satisfy,

'right.'

that therefore the will to

nature.

necessarily

seeks

for something beyond intelligent

response

That

something more is what he eventually calls The perfected natural will is the will in which there is the highest degree of responsiveness to every conscious self-regulation, so that instead of mindless
provocative

stimulus, one attains a

self-control

by

means of which will

to regulate

and

harmonize the impulses. When achieved, there

natural

be

an

implicit freedom

from
dom
14.

impulses inherent in the ability to

made explicit.

regulate

them.

The implicit free

self-under-

can

be

As this is done, it
I believe Hegel

gives

rise to

a certain

PR

15-

By

"from

within,"

means

the desires and passions; content "from

refers

to

external

things as objects of desire.

206
standing.

Interpretation
This self-understanding,
mean when

it

reaches will as

clarity, interprets

its

own

freedom to
freedom.

'arbitrariness'; it interprets

arbitrary autonomy

("Will-

kiir"), thinking

that exactly the arbitrary power to pick and choose constitutes

When freedom is
as

understood as

arbitrariness, then the

will understands over

itself
con

follows: "the

self-

reflecting, independent and infinite ego stands

its

tent, i.e., its

and able

various

impulses,
each.

and also over

the further

separate ways

in

which

satisfied"

these are actualized and

(PR

14).

It is tied to It

no particular

impulse
only
one

to

abstract

from

(PR iv,

132).

regards each choice as

in the autonomy with which one possibility among from chooses now this, now that. Far abstruse, this outlook is so common as to be banal. "The idea which people most commonly have of freedom is that it is ar
many.

Freedom is

actualized

bitrariness
as

ability to do what we 15 Remark). necessary (PR Arbitrariness is ultimately a deficient kind

please"

and

thus to

be directed to

no choice

of

freedom. This is
essential
civil

not

to say that it

is unimportant; on the contrary, Hegel later finds it it both in the economy of the will itself and also in
mains

to make a place for

society.15

But

still a

it

re

defective because it holds

the
will.

implicitly
choice

that no

particular

thing is

decisive

actualization of

Every

is relativized,
means

as one

possibility among

many, and preserving the arbitrariness

"abstract"

knowingly

that one will always retain the consciousness of

view

relativizing choices so independence from them. This

the negative emancipating
arbitrariness:

is

at

bottom

an

freedom, preserving

thrust of
as

pure withdrawal.

It leads

finally

to a doctrine of ultimate
so must

the

will

is here

seen as

arbitrary

freedom,

the

world

be

a collection of

arbitrary possibilities. But as one draws out the

that one can begin to see
an

consequences of this view of

freedom, Hegel holds

the internal
natural

inner

contradiction that corresponds to

dialectic

of

the

will.

The

premise of arbitrariness

is the freedom from

de in

termination that allows standing aside the will that takes satisfaction

from impulse. This freedom is

at work

from its arbitrary autonomy. But freedom can and must become self-critical, turning in upon itself and examining the sufficiency of arbitrary independence. If, as Hegel contends, will contains a striving toward
full
of

satisfaction and
partial

actualization, then there

of

cannot

help

but be

a self-criticism

the

freedom

the merely

two

ways.

First, it leads
pointless

to a notion of

arbitrary will. Arbitrariness is defective in an indefinite number of possibilities with permanently

nowhere
achieve and

no one goal as predominant and none as

satisfying.

Instead,

one

has

only restless,
tion.
able

movement,

leading

except, perhaps, to

exhaus

Second,
to
make

the arbitrary will

fails to

pick and choose at

whim, it

still remains

embody freedom. Even if dependent on external stimuli. It

freedom.16

fails to

"its

content"

the content and product of its

Thus, it is

15. PR 185, 187, 206. Consider the illuminating treatment of this issue in M. B. Foster, The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel (New York: Russell and Russell, 1965), Chs 3-4 16. Cf. PR 21, 15.

The
not

Meaning
of

'Will'

of

in Hegel's

Philosophy

of

Right
and

207
cannot resist

its

own master and not

completely self-determining;
(PR

it

the

dawning

this insight.
"contradiction"

The arbitrary will is not in a formal logical

14 Remark). It is
to the

a contradiction an

sense

but in the It
to

sense of a

self-contradiction,

incom

plete mode of self-realization. reflections

cannot

last, for it leads

emergence of

that

force the

mind

move toward

something fuller.

The
a

self-contradiction encountered

in

all attempts

productive,

not a

debilitating,

contradiction.

the question, what, if anything, can be an

will?

to refine the arbitrary will is Above all, it forces the raising of appropriate content or aim for the free

Can any

object of choice

be

decisively

satisfying,

or

is there only

an end

less

number of possibilities? and

This

question

leads to

reflection on

the variety of the

'happiness'

discordant impulses
intelligible
attempt and

then to the development of an idea of

total of satisfactions. This

an a result of an
arbitrariness

conception of a sum

idea is

to

conceive a rational system of

the

impulses,
and

so are

that the

contingency affecting each singly is purged sonable whole (PR 17-20; m, 142-43).

they

integrated into

a rea

It is important then that there be

and needs.

an

insight into the

whole range of

impulses

Such insight

here

associated

by

Hegel

"education,"

with

the task of
sense

said to

have "absolute

worth"17

seeks a wholeness not

in the
get

both

of a sum

of satisfactions or

(so that the desires do

another)

any longer

in the way

of each other

arbitrarily

succeed one

and a wholeness

in the

sense of universality.

That is to say, desire

as such

is

made a matter

for

critical

reflection, so that there

and on

is

a commencement of reflection on

the meaning of desire

of

the general
course

i.e., human
of thought

subjection

to it. The idea

happiness arising from this

such, not the
satisfaction of

is

an

idea

of

happiness for
or

man as

this or

that individual and this

that desire.

Every

pursuit of rational

insight (in this

case, into the impulses

the

and

desires) is

a pursuit

that generalizes,

inquiring into
goal or

phenomenon as a whole.

In the idea

of

happiness, is it
will

the sum total of

pleasures

that
at

is the

is it

the imposition

of rational order?

This

question seems

to be
of

the core of Hegel's

of

reasoning as to why the free the idea of right, its true

pulses rationally,

has to interpret the idea

In the
process

happiness in terms
order

end.18

of

attempting to

the im

"educate"

to

them, there
as

emerges

the view that the

and natural

impulses

"should be freed both from their form

and also

immediate

determinations,
(PR
19).

content"

Bringing

from the subjectivity and contingency of their to them into rational order must mean subjecting them
hence

thoughtful eval
"natural"

uation and

freeing

oneself

from

thoughtless

bondage to the

and

Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, education is 20, iv, 136-37. Hegel's term for 17 PR John Cumming (New York: Seabury Truth and Method, translation edited by Garrett Burden and "Hegels Bildungskonzeption im geschichtlichen Press, 1975), pp. 10-19. See also Otto Poggeler,
Zusammenhang,"

"Bildung."

Hegel-Studien,
comments on

vol.

15 (1980),

pp. 241-69.

'eudaimonism,'

18.

Cf. Hegel's

PR iv, 135; m, 143-45; K

231.

208

Interpretation
way in which they present themselves to unreflective happiness is then a stage in the development of the
experience.

"contingent"

The idea
toward
motive

"spiritual"

of

drive The

freedom,

toward maximum rational self-determination (PR iv, 138).

quest

hidden in the

for the idea

of

happiness,

when undertaken as a criti

arbitrary freedom, is not primarily a hedonistic motive but from the will's drive toward freedom as self-determination.
cism of

one

coming

The

spiritualization of

happiness

means

"that the impulses

to

should

become the
pro

volitions."

rational system of

the will's
of

Further,

"grasp

them

like that,

ceeding
of

out of

the concept
20).

the will, the

is the

content of

the philosophical science

right"

(PR

The

goal of

fully

developed

will

is the

state of

being

self-

determining
this

in

a rational

inner

condition.

way This does

with an appropriate external mode of

actualizing
more usual

not mean

discarding
in

happiness in its "the

meaning; Hegel is not an

ascetic.

It

means an absorption of

immediacy

of

instinctive
what

desire."

This "process

of absorption

or elevation to

is

called

the activity of thought. The self-consciousness

universality is which purifies its itself

object,

content and aim and raises

them to this universality effects this as think

ing getting its own way in the making "its freedom its
and also seeks

will."19

The thoughtful

will gives

content

by

object."

That

is, it

seeks

the "rational

mind"

system of

to fashion the

world so

that it accords with rational mind, so that

actuality"

"this

system shall

be the

world of

immediate

(PR

27).

"Dies, daB
as

ein

Dasein iiberhaupt, Dasein des freienWi liens

iiberhaupt die

ist, istdasRecht.
might

Esistsomit

Freiheit,
as
us

Idee"

als

(PR

29).

(This

be translated

follows:

"This is the right

an existent of

is thereby freedom more vividly put for

made over

any kind as an existence of the free will. Right Perhaps the meaning of this principle could be idea.") as follows: This is what right is: that natural life should be

way of life where the free will exists in an effective manner. Freedom thereby becomes not just wish or dream but a realization of thought in
a
practice.

into

Hegel
or

now gives a

slavery.20

It is

clear

clarifying example, mentioning the that for him this is the fundamental
self-emancipation.

alternative of

freedom

social and political al

ternative. Will

is

freedom,

Hegel

finds, in

the emergence of
spirit.

freedom from slavery, the

"Introduction"

representative movement of the

human

In the

we are shown

the principles of this movement. But this gains ex through the rebellions

ternal expression

in

history

by

which

slavery is
'thinking'

over-

19. PR 21 Remark. Note here the implication that the peak of brings into pre dominance. Patrick Riley, Will and Political Legitimacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), cites the observation of Michael B. Foster that Hegel's as it relates to the state is "im
'will'

"will"

(See Foster's The Political Philosophies of Plato perfectly differentiated from [New York: Russell and Russell, 1965; reprint of 1935 edition], pp. I3lff.) Riley's study comparable view of Leibniz: "to will is nothing but the striving which arises from thought,
reason."

and

Hegel

also cites a
or

to

strive also

for something
remarks

which our

thinking
cf.

recognizes"

(p. 221,

note 53).

(p. 17): it is "with Hegel

20.

PR 5

21

Remark;

[that] the 40 Remark,

concept of real will

Commenting on Hegel, Riley as a kind of knowing

begins."

49 Remark,

57 Remark.

66 Remark,

356.

The

'Will'

Meaning

of

in Hegel's

Philosophy
of

of

Right

209
mind

thrown and
or spirit.

freedom developed. At the basis

rebellion,

however, lies the

does

not

The basic turning point between slavery, in all its forms, and freedom, have to do with questions of power but with self-understanding. All from deficient
self-understanding: not

slavishness comes

"the

slave

does

not

know

his essence, his

infinity, freedom, he does

man

know himself as
himself"

essence."

He fails

to see himself this way

because he fails "to

think

(PR

21

Remark).

Thinking liberates
ness, that which

is

self-imposed or which

from slavishness, especially from the deepest slavish is permitted because one fails to give

thought to oneself.
gins

But

when

thinking

arouses

itself,

and

turns

inward,
which

one

be in

to see oneself in terms of the

'man,'

"universal"

element

(to

see oneself as an

stance of

not

merely

as this or that particular

individual),

is the de

cisive rebellion against unfreedom.

Hegel has

provided

the account

of

how the desire for freedom

to be one that agrees
quest

can

become

ex

plicit and coherent.

His

position seems

with common sense supreme expres

insofar
sion of

as common sense

holds that the

and

for freedom is the

be
adequate

right

and that

laws

institutions

should

to

insure freedom.
philosophic sci

But

common sense cannot

by

itself explain this impression. The

elucidating the source
say,
and

ence of right gives

it

rational

form,

the goal of right. It

brings it back to reason,

that
accomplished

one might

finding that the

own

only

serious

liberation is

by "thinking
in the

getting its

way in the

will."

"Introduction"

Hegel's

argument

has developed

a new account of

the

'psychology'

at was perhaps

the basis of right. He has built on the views

see the

first to

human

as

free,

perfectible,
modern

of Rousseau, who historical, self-creating,

and emancipated

from the determinism that

shown

thought associates with the

a

idea free

of nature.

But Hegel has

how to

develop

free subjectivity, free both in its

in aiming toward the goal of

emancipation

psychology adequate to from natural determination and

unable

being fully free,

to

be

satisfied

(once the

which mind is awakened) with anything less than freedom. He offers a doctrine does not oppose freedom to reason but holds that the awakening of the mind is

perfecting of mind is the only way to complete freedom. As he later argues, this view is also one in which freedom as individual public spirit can be coherently brought together in a autonomy and freedom as
the
source of

freedom

and the

reasonable order without suppression of either.

Hegel's psychology

of

right directs
of

us

first to the inner

to find

principles of

right

as

they
the

arise

from the

quest

('will')

thinking
be

an appropriate mode of exis

tence. What thinking is

actual world.

implicitly

must

achieved

in

a realized

way

of

life in

Second,
We

we are taught
struggle

by

Hegel to look for the

"freedom,"

external mani

festation is

of

this essence. in the

for

understood as emancipa

tion from
which

slavishness.

must

look especially to that kind

of

of self-emancipation

not

just

an

overthrowing

the

master

in

order

to enslave oneself anew

of

(to

new masters,

to desires or passions, to

uncritical

indulgence

whim) but is

210

Interpretation

arising from thought, from an attempt to live up to what one is being. This is rebellion that stands for an idea, an interpretation of thinking man and freedom.
self-emancipation

as a

But Hegel

what as

exactly is the meaning of the the final achievement of the fully

'infinite'

existence realized will?

that

is

presented

by
its

Hegel

presents

outline rather

to

explain

generally in the how the will reaches

civil

"Introduction."

The

remainder of

the PR attempts

out

to create or assimilate abstract rights, moral

ity, family,
ciples.

society,

and state and

thereby form
Europe.

a world adequate
'state'

to its prin

This

process comes to

highest fruition in the

achieved

in varying

degrees

within

the

various states of modern

In wanting to be something definite and existent, the will must reach out to the existing world, so that it can have opportunities for work, action, politics, and
public

life. In

so

doing, it

accepts

to some degree the existing "positive

right"

and makes an accommodation with

elevation and

it. This

accommodation

undeniably
as

means an

improvement
own

of positive right.

The

rational

will, seeking realiza

tion,

must

in its

way be interested in

reform.

Positive right,

it tends to de

velop by itself, is disorderly, incoherent, a blend of the reasonable and the acci dental. The rational will returns to the mundane world, looking for a vehicle for a
rational

life. It

will

der,

seek

to make

necessarily attempt to put the realm it achieve clarity about its purposes
to distinguish between what is

of positive

right into
is

or

and

meaning, insist that

and what exclu

the law

must come

fundamental

sively existing world that it pian illusions.

a compromise with circumstances. adopts will seem

This influence

of rational will on the who

insignificant only to those

harbor

Uto

Nevertheless, if rational
mundane

will alters positive right while

there are effects in the other

direction

as well.

making peace with it, The insistence on a return to the

world, in order to seek

an effective existence within

it,

means that the

rational will must conform particular and therefore

particular

to the limits of a mundane world. It attaches itself to a

a given

limited entity
realities of

people, its law

and

customs, its

historical
in the

situation

with all of

the constraints that this

entails.

It

must

therefore educate
as

itself to the
main.

the particular situation and accept them

they

are

It

must undergo an education

of

in

realism.

It

must posit

it

self within gel's

the conditions
not

the time.

Thus, it is precisely
study but

characteristic of

He

PR that it does
suitable

lead to

creation of an

istent,
mind

for

comtemplation and

ideal city that is timelessly nonex not suitable for real existence.
and with the thesis that the

The PR

ends rather with an embrace of world and

history

must,

An be

aspect

does, lower its heaven to the mundane world. of this teaching, however, remains paradoxical, if
sense.

the term might

one might

used

here in its looser

Borrowing

the

terminology

of

Plato,

say that the will described by Hegel insists on returning (from pure selfhood, from abstraction) to the cave. It does not return to the conventional world merely as a concession to the limitations of mundane life. On the contrary, the will's in
sistence on

returning to the

mundane world

is

a criticism of all claims

to indepen-

The

Meaning
hence in is

'Will'

of

in Hegel's

Philosophy

of

Right

211
ab

dence from that

stract,

mundane world. principle

not

Such independence is
and, Hegel

illusory; it is merely
would

realizable

say, inferior in

principle

to what is realizable

in the

mundane world.

knowing existence within

mundane of

the cave

intrinsically
"infinite,"

superior to

Now Hegel holds that the

world,

realization of

solitary independence outside of it. the free will, within the

unification of might

is

a perfected and

thought toward realization

in

life,

satisfying beyond which there

He
would not

the impulses
much

be

to desire

but there is nothing

more to

'will.'

deny

that the particular

thing

right, historical period) with which the free will becomes associated is finite and thus limited; is nothing that simply by itself infinite. But, he holds, a finite thing can be the vehicle of an infinite pur
country,
system of positive
"exists"
pose.21

(people,

This

combination of

the purely universal (the purest freedom of the ra

tional will) with the particular and

finite is the highest truth

and the supreme end.

Hegel thus
what will

argues

that the

mind can
with

find its

satisfaction

in

bringing

together

is originally be harmonious

"spiritual"

the mundane world, as reformed; the result

and

indeed the only

world.

fully

adequate

satisfied.

As this is understood, there

the existing, historical

ceases to

be

way in which will can be need for systematic discon

which would repudiate

tent

with

That temperament

the world in order to look to heaven

that the world can or will

or which

believes, in

a more practical

vein,

be

remade

in

accordance with the standards of

heaven
of a a

(utopianism) becomes irrelevant, just

fuller insight into the
criticism of
real character of

a stage on the road to

the

development

freedom. Hegel's in

view

is, in its essence,

live. It is

any

attempt

to divide systematically the ideal

world

toward which
a cri

the

mind or spirit strives of

from the

mundane world

which we

tique

religion,

of ahistorical

philosophy,

and of Utopian politics.

Hegel's teaching is intended, ment of his reflections but also as

own

as we must always

recall, not only as a state

a characterization of what

is:

"philosophy

is its

time

grasped

in

thought"

(PR n, 72; K

11).

It

might

be
of of

useful

to observe in

this

context

that there may be a

part correct

Surely
is the

he is in

in

difficulty in his reading holding that a leading theme

idealism,
But is this
view the

the

modern world.

the modern outlook

systematic critique of

religion,

and utopianism

in the

name of

history

and mundane realism.

leading

theme? Or

would

it be

necessary to say that modern life has been repeatedly challenged, to great effect both for good and bad, by views and then movements which borrow enough (the certainties of from that older temperament to be called "secular
the religious mind
attached

religions"

now

to secular
"will"

causes)?22

Hegel's

suggestion

that

this mentality
mundane

will

disappear,
to be

as
Utopian.

world,

seems

live rationally within the But if the existing world is then torn be is
educated

to

tween those wanting to to

confront

bring

the mind or spirit down to earth and those

wanting

the

mundane world with

the

absolute righteousness of

their religious

21.

22.

PR in, 117; 11, 526-28; K 101. Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime
2.

and the

French

Revolution, Part I, Chs.

2-3; Part

III, Ch.

212
or

Interpretation
or political

idealist

cause, then the divisions

would

of

the existing

world appear more

insuperable than Hegel

lead

us to anticipate.

Perhaps then it is
of the mind
Utopian us

possible

that there is a need for a

certain critical

independence

grasp

and evaluate

these divisions. If so, is Hegel again

the congruence
with no reason

of mind and mundane world will

leave

by holding that infinitely satisfied,

which we

in

for loyalties divided between

what

the mind might see and what

the mundane

world offers?

Foreword for "The Politics

VUKAN KUIC

Alain"

of

by

Yves R. Simon

University

of South Carolina

This

article was

first

published

in two installments in La Vie intellectuelle in

,

Paris, in December 1928 and lanuary theoretical, and biographical interest.

In the
past

1929.

It is here

reprinted

for its historical,

fifty years,

the world has changed more and more

dramatically than
some re

in any
spects
and

equivalent period

in history. As this

article

shows,
of

however, in
remain

things have remained the same. The

lessons

history

unheeded,

the political debate goes on as before. the practice of politics depends

Second,

this article lets us see how in

about

timately
ture of

on

its theory. It is beliefs

the na

society that determine views of justice, equality, war, and peace. Finally, this article is worth reprinting because it marks the beginning of Yves R. Simon's quest for a decent and realistic political theory, culminating in his Phi
man and

losophy
until

of Democratic Government. Alain's real name was Emile Chartier,

and

from before the turn

He had
good

of

the century

the Second World War this teacher of philosophy and

newspaper columnist

was a major

figure

on the

French intellectual
and

scene.

gone to school with

Leon Blum. Elie many

Halevy

Paul

Valery
retired

were

his

friends.

Among

his

students who and

later become famous

were

Sartre, Merleau-Ponty,

Andre

Maurois,
but he
until

Simone Weil. Alain

to
write on
.

from the College

Henry

IV in 1939,

continued

many topics,

including

art, religion, and politics,

his death in

1951

Counting

works published

posthumously, his bibliogra

phy contains more than sixty books. An English translation of his 1934 essay, Les Dieux, was published in New York in 1974. Many of his students, who used
to
refer

to him as "The

Man,"

have testified that he taught them how to think,

and

even the most severe critics of his philosophy have invariably paid tribute to his mind and character. Some have called him a modern Montaigne, not without rea

For instance, nothing is easier, he liked to say, "than to use memory to imi And because with little ingenuity one can prove almost any tate thing, the really difficult thing, he cautioned, "is to know what one wants to
son.
intelligence."
prove."

But he is

perhaps

best known for his famous

political advice

to

"obey but

Clearly, Alain knew how to state any problem to catch attention. appeal only to To "obey but may seem like a rule of conduct that could the French, but variations of this idea have also been popular elsewhere. It is be
resist." resist"

cause so
least"

government is many Americans believe that "the best that promising to "get the government off the people's

one

that governs

back"

has helped democratic in Rous

chains?

candidates

become President. Slogans

much of

such as

these,

as well as the

Problematik in
seau.

the

academic

literature, have
who

a common source

Why, Rousseau

asked, is man,

is born free,

everywhere

in

214

Interpretation

and ever since theorists of

perceived as an

democracy
conflict

have been trying to

man and the

get around what

is

irreconcilable

between

state,

liberty

and au

thority.

True,
But

some of these theorists are suspicious of

Rousseau's solution, in

which an abstract general will makes

it

possible

for individuals to be "forced to formulation

of the central

be

free."

not

many have

challenged

his

peculiar

problem of politics and continue thus to exercise their

ingenuity

in

ternative compromises. The majority

would not

of

contemporary theorists of
that there can not be

know how to defend the

proposition

devising al democracy liberty with

out authority.

Yves R. Simon
this article

When he

wrote

ate student of philosophy.

among the exceptions. in 1929, Simon was a twenty-five-year-old gradu He already had a degree from the Sorbonne and was
stands out

about to receive another one

from the Catholic Institute in Paris. He did

not

know

his teaching career would bring him to America to stay. Arriving as a visiting professor, Simon continued to teach at the University of Notre Dame until 1948, when upon invitation from Robert M. Hutchins, Morti it then, but in ten
years
mer

J. Adler,
at

and

lohn U. Nef he joined the

graduate

Committee

on

Social

Thought

the

His bibliography,
publications on a

University of Chicago, where he stayed until his death in 1961. including books, major articles, translations, and posthumous

large variety of subjects contains over one hundred items. But the best known of Simon's work is his Philosophy of Democratic Government,
published

in

1951

It has been

reissued and

lapanese, Korean, Portuguese,

tise on the subject,

many times and translated into German, recently into Italian. This is a complete trea

covering

all aspects of

democratic

government

from

universal

suffrage, majority rule,

and parties

to

its

problems with modern technology.

But

its

greatest contribution consists

in resolving Rousseau's false dilemma

renders

by

show rend

ing
ers

how

and

why it is that

as

liberty

authority necessary, authority

liberty

possible.

weak spots

In this article, Simon does something less ambitious. He identifies several in Alain's interpretation of politics and exposes their origin in the all

too common assumption that

posed to each other. was quite enough.
and secure all

liberty

and

authority going
of

are

by

their very

nature

For

young

student

against the sage of the

op land that

It

would

take Simon another

twenty

years or so to work out which proves that to

the details of a

different theory
what

democracy,

"obey but

resist"

is

not

the answer. In reading this article,

however,

one senses

that Simon already

knew exactly

it

was

that needed proof.

'The Politics

Alain"

of

By

Yves R. Simon
by

Translated
Mercer
University'

Iohn M. Dunaway

As

philosophy

professor

in

city in Brittany,
to produce a

Alain1

became

editor-in-chief

of a radical a writer

newspaper.2

At that time, according to his

stimulus

own

account, his career as

began. In the

daily

few

pages of topical
above all

journal

ism, he found "the

indignation,
of responses

conditions of

true thought, that is to say

emotion,

revolt."1

His first
of the

writings were political and

began

with a series of

to

issues

day. From these

a a

responses

inspirations

the

moment prompted

emerge,

without

by feelings, it seems ever reaching, however,

philosophy began progressively to truly scientific level.

born a radical, and my father and maternal grandfather were radicals, in opinion, but in class, as a socialist would say, for they were of only lower middle class and rather poor. I have always had very strong feelings the "I
was not against

tyrants and an egalitarian

passion."4

This

sentence resembles the

lan
the

guage of the men of

1793;

modern revolutionaries

have

long

ceased

to

lay

blame
rail on

on

tyrants,
are

and

the Internationale's imprecations against the mining and

the maxims of the chant

kings

today

more popular than

du

depart.5

For

February 24, 1848, the victorious bourgeoisie solidly entrenched in its po armed to the teeth and loom sitions and having suddenly seen the Fourth ing before it moved hastily to the other side of the barricades. The split that had formerly existed between feudal lords and bourgeois would now exist be
Estate6

tween the bourgeoisie and the

"t.n."

proletariat.

Alain's historical

position

is

clear:

he

(Notes
1
.

bearing

the

notation

have been

added

by

the translator.)
was

Emile Chartier, known to the

literary

world as

Alain,

born in

1868 and

has taught

philoso

Lycee Henri IV. where he is presently teaching. His principal po phy in Lorient, in Rouen, and at the Citoyen litical works (Mars ou la guerre jugee, 1921; Elements d'une doctrine radicale, 1925; Le collections of articles that first appeared of exception Mars, the with contre les Pouvoirs, 1926) are, little known to the public, in the Depeche de Rouen, Libres Propos, and L Emancipation. Relatively Alain's students were to be Alain enjoys an exceptional influence among his students. (Several of important thinkers and writers, among them Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Andre Maurois.
come rather

Alain died in
2.

1951

t.n.)
"radical-socialism,"

Radical:

often referred

to in France as

the radical party grew out of the

fall

of

the Second Empire in

1870.

Its

approximate position on

the political spectrum

today

would

be

"radical"

somewhat

left

of center, a

bit less
avec

than

communism or socialism,

(t.n.)
18, 1928.
p. 303.

Alain,"

3.

Frederic Lefevre, "Une heure

Elements d'une doctrine

Nouvelles
referred

litteraires, Feb.
Elements,
soldiers as

4
5.

radicale.

hereafter

to as

Chant du depart: the song traditionally sung

by

French

they left home for

on the

war.

(t n.)

6. Fourth Estate:
General

a somewhat

ironic term that designates the proletariat; based

recognized

Estates
nobil

of the ancien regime, which

commoners,

only three

political or social

entities

clergy,

ity,

and

(t.n.)

216

Interpretation
Third Estate
who

is

a son of the

has

not

defected in the face

of the working-class

threat.

Radical like his father

and

his

ancestor who was

the enemy of the nobles,

or

Alain

remains on the side of the rebels without

favoring Marx, Proudhon,

modern world
what

Bakunin.7

He does not agree that there

second

is

room

in the

for two his

ne

gations, the
possible

of which would tend to

destroy

the

first had

made

the Bourgeois Revolution and the Proletarian Revolution. In

eyes,

the

same spirit of

independence that

once put the

nobility to

flight

must

break,

one after

the other, all

injustices

and servitudes. with

With

a proud and obstinate

with a style

mind,

unshakable, audacious, and graceful

whatever

thought,
mains a

both

polished and

forceful, Alain, in

journalist
mastered

who

perfectly
or set

his

genre.

is writing a half-column of Is anyone likely to undertake

moves toward
aroused

propos.*

he writes, re No author has more lines? There just is

paints

a philosophical proof

up the framework of a grand design in the space of

Alain

fifty
a

not enough space.

quick

discovery by
his
reader

soundings, he

in

strokes,

content

if he has

from

drowsy lethargy
subtle,"

and

left him to
my

ponder or meditate.

"He is

not

only

elegant and

writes one of about some profitable

friends,

"but

by teasing

the

brain, he
a

also often

brings

reflection

in the

mind."

reader's

"Bosses
sue

versus

Marxist

would cry.

For Alain,
an

however,
another

the is

is between

officers and enlisted men.

One is born

officer,

is born he is

an enlisted man. a man made

The born

officer

is

a person convinced

from

childhood that

for commanding is the impatience of the little

great. as

others.9

The

passion

that gives

life to Alain's talent

"important,"

man outraged propos

by

those who presume themselves

against the

Untiringly, Alain directs

calls
them.10

after propos

he

Power-hungry

politicians, generals, priests, academicians,

one

technicians, found in a drawing

aimed sion.

popular

writers, fashionable women, high functionaries, any room inspires in him a furious aversion and often some

well-

barbs. A

good

observer, Alain

excels

Basically indulgent, he does

of all people.

not reproach

in revealing the hidden side of a pas the elite for weaknesses that are

the

lot

What he

cannot

tolerate is the

insolence

of

the powerful,

who think acquire

they have

a natural right

to give orders, to humiliate others, and to

and without

at a price of their own

choosing

accountability
on such specific

services

that most often are a nuisance and always

depend

on

their own good pleasure.

This criticism,
neither

all the more

judicious in that it bears

a moralist's work.

facts, is

simply

nor

principally

If Alain doesn't describe the

socialist writer who clashed with

7.

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865):

and
whose

maverick

French

Karl Marx

influential among French socialists. Bakunin, Mikhail (18141876): Russian-bom revolutionary leader and writer, proponent of collectivist anarchism, influenced by Proudhon. (t.n.)
were

ideas

8. Propos:

literally,

"remarks."

This term

came to

have

a particular significance e.g.

,

for Alain. It des

sur

ignated the
9.
10.

genre

that he patented in his

le bonheur, Propos de

litterature,

etc.

brief, (t.n.)

aphoristic

essays,

Les Propos

d'

Alain, Propos

Elements, p. 15. Elements, Le Citoyen

contre

les Pouvoirs, Mars,

passim.

"The Politics of
high

Alain"

217

functionary

the way Moliere describes the miser, it is because in his eyes

the passions of the powerful are above all an attribute of power their condemnations of bad
on the other

itself. For

all

kings,

the Scriptures honor the royal function.

Alain,

hand,

thinks that bad

kings

his

satire of

blaming
fail to

the system rather

perceive the

bad because they were kings, and than individuals develops into a doctrine.
were such a method of philosophizing?

Who

could

dangers in

Even the
of

most understandable essential with

whim, once crystallized

into

thesis,

runs

the

risk

replacing the

the accidental. He who thinks he is made for com

arrogant.

manding others is this? Like any art partly

paint,
acquired
another

often or

insufferably

But

what

may be

concluded

from

science, governing

requires aptitudes

by

the individual. In the sense that one

partly innate in and person may be born to

aptitudes

to navigate, and still another to philosophize, it is legitimate to say

that a person was

born to

command. reasons must

The

existence of

innate

for

gov

erning is
a out

one of

the historical

hereditary aristocracy. One by nature and history to

their rights
.

why many have thought it good to establish severely judge those who have been singled
as

function
would

leaders but

shirk

their duties and re

nounce

These truths

be difficult to

preserve

in

doctrine born

out of an

angry outburst against "the Alain is not a reformer. "The true

important."

politics,"

mark of a positive

he writes, "is
to carve

not to seek to replace one political system

small

by

another, but

rather

out

but

effective changes

in the
up

system

the Third

Republic, he
and

puts

with

A citizen of already in the irresponsible president, the responsible

existence."11

ministers,

the legislative houses. Radicalism

is

not a particular

kind

of politi

cal organization;

against the powers

it is nothing that be. While it may be

other

than the continuous action of the citizen

called outmoded

by

some,

radicalism

is actually Though it
protest.12

assured of an eternal youth

grows

because it

requires an effort each moment.

faint

with each gesture of

respect,

it is born
Alain is

anew with each

Let

us

dismiss

one misconception

from the

outset.

so assiduous

in

picking
on

quarrels with

those in power, he could

be

mistaken

for

libertarian. But

rules out such an interpretation. Far from many occasions he categorically for peace among citizens based on their waiting (with the absolute individualists) he does not accept Proudhon 's theory that order can be the product of a

goodwill,

contractual system of pure coordination, exclusive of all

hierarchy

or subordina

tion. The order of

which

Alain declares himself

partisan,

and which

he

seems

to value as
without

much as

anyone,

is imposed from

above and cannot and

be

conceived

authority

and coercive

force. Order is good,

its

maintenance

is

pos

sible

there is only by power. Thus But it is precisely here that the thrust

never a question of

dismissing
Citizens

authority.13

of

his

criticism

lies: Power tends

will always

by
be

nature

to

grow

excessive, aggressive,
p.

and exorbitant.

1 1

Elements,
Elements,

53; along the 13, 118,

same

lines, ibid.,

p.

154.

12.

pp.

122-23.

13.

Elements,

p. 278.

218

Interpretation
governed and

sufficiently
those the

they

will always

be too
a

much so

if they

give

free in

rein

to

who govern.

The

political parts.

whole,

by

necessary spontaneity, tends toward

regard

extermination of

its

Alain

professes unqualified pessimism

to

power.

Society
great

is

a great

beast that is incapable

of

listening

to reason and whose

instincts
This

scoff at

justice.
of which you and

Leviathan,

are small

parts, is not at

all civilized.

It is

child or a

savage,

as one might say.

Whatever it is

able to

do,

that

it does

immediately;

its soul, if it has one, does not distinguish between might and right. If it makes prom ises or signs treaties, it does not consider itself bound by its word; it is only a ruse to buy time. History gives ample proof of this, and men in power, enlightened by such a
philosophy, quickly adopt the
same maxims.

And ordinarily they

are pardoned

every

thing if only they

Now it
seems

succeed. me

to

that any democratic

movement grows

in

opposition to the reac

tions of the great beast and tends to balance the natural association, organism,

let

us

say the

social

by

kind

of contract

wrongly

called

social, for it is
of

an antisocial contract. and

One then

promises and swears to resist the

possible

instincts

the great beast

to subjugate

them insofar as

to the rules of justice that are accepted

by

individuals.14

Hence, Alain, like Pascal

in the temporal
self, shocked, surprised,

and

Rousseau,

acknowledges that there

is

no

justice him

manifestation of political order.

But

whereas

Pascal

resigns

and

indignant,

and whereas

Rousseau

promotes

ideas

for reform, Alain simply proposes to render the monster of society harmless by checking its immoderate impulses with the justice and reason of individuals. If it is
a question of posed

submitting Leviathan to the rules of justice, it is a submission im from the outside, for it is impossible to moralize the great beast. Reason,
and prudence are on the side of
and violence.

justice,

the

individual. On the

side of

society

there are instinct

Alain

calls

this a natural association,

alien

but is that

a reason

to conclude that all

moral order

is

to political society? The

one will

than the

State, but no
morality.

family is a natural society even more contend that the family is purely instinctive and re
for
man

bellious to

If it is

natural

to live

in

political

society

under

the

inevitable law

of subordination of

the parts to the whole and the parts to

another

(which is necessary in any kind of whole, organized entity), it is by virtue of man's reason, not his instinct. A natural thing in a higher sense (if by human na
ture one means nothing
other

than the essence of

man with

his specificity
not

and

his

distinctiveness
of

considered as a principle of nature one means what creation of

activity), the State is

the product

nature, if

by

is first

given and precedes all rational

elaboration. of man's

The

the

State,

which

is necessary to the full development

all

nature, is in but very slight measure the work of instinct. It is above

the work of science, art, and prudence, three virtues of the

intellect.
or even a
ac-

Those

who govern all ethics

have

accustomed us to such a scorn of morals

disregard for
14.

that the essential

amorality
pp.

of

the State

is commonly

Elements,

p.

140; along the

same

lines, ibid.,

283-84,

Mars,

pp. 149-152.

"The Politics of
cepted.

Alain"

219
might

At the very most one for individuals, in which acts

or not

say that there

are

two moral standards: one

are perceived as good or evil

according to

whether

they

conform

to the ultimate goal of man; and the other for

good or evil

States, in

which acts are

judged be

according to whether or not

never

they

conform to a

generalized self-interest.

Even if Machiavelli had

philosophy,

existed, Machiavellian

ism

would

still

a popular

by

reason of

its

great

facility. One
content with

accomodates

oneself

to

having
feels

Moloch

or

Leviathan

as

master,

one's

fate

provided one

capable of

resisting its invasions.

approved
even

No human

conduct can

be in any way

precept of general morality.

Moreover,

by reason if it violates any disregarding the rules of general

foreign to it. It is itself that
part

morality, politics cannot

of

be
its

subject to

morality

or

morality

which

has

as

object the common good of the perfect society.

It is

possible

that certain acts of the public powers may fall within the province of art,
such as

not

prudence,

fiscal, military

or

industrial techniques. But

order of use and

aside

from the
prin

fact that these

ciples

acts remain

subject, in the
never

exercise, to the

of general
receive

and only dered.

have any character but that of morality, they a moral meaning from the human ends to which they

means

are or

Why is there, then, such a strong prejudice in favor of the amorality of the State? Why do so many people, honest in their private lives, seem never to have
questioned, in their
public

functions,

the morality of their

acts? at

It

must

be

observed

in the first

place

that the statesman finds himself

the in

tersection of raging
of

collective passions.

There

more

than anywhere else the

man responsible

risks
for
a

being

influenced is
all

are

at

their gravest.

Second, any
order

specific good

the more inclined to overcome his scruples if that good con

cerns a greater number.

commits a crime that

Hence,

father, in
have

to save his family's

inheritance,

if he had had only to think of himself. Alain has masterfully described the pitfalls of power. But against Alain

he

would not

committed

we maintain are

that the vices of the powerful,

although of considerable of power.

frequency,
a

but

accidents and not

the necessary effects

If there is indeed

Levi

not devoid of morality simply because it is a great beast, and it be paying too high a compliment to Machiavelli to accept his definition of the Prince as correct. By exerting one's reason in the order of morality and of in stitutions, it still remains possible to restore political society to its true nature,

athan, the State is

would

which

is the

union

in

durable

and self-sufficient whole of a multitude

desig
of

nated

by history to pursue Alain hardly fears that

order.

in

common

the perfection of human life.

Leviathan
on

might grow

lax

and neglect seem

its function

live

maintaining and let live. Hence, in

the fables: It

The governed,
each of

only too disposed to his innumerable political propos, Alain again

the other

hand,

calls the citizen

wisdom of

back to his

duty

of relentless resistance.

Let

us take to citizen

heart the for

an

is

our master who

is

our enemy.

If the

in

stant slackens from his hostility, if he is trusting for an instant, his honor, his There is no good master; the good sheppossessions, and his life are in danger.

220

Interpretation
the

herd,
most

as well as

bad, leads his

higher
price

animals one

day

to the

slaughter,15

but the

good shepherd gets a

for them. There is

no good

government; the

tolerable government is the one which is the best

monitored.16

Freedom is
total of real

resistance,
politics.
"

democracy

is resistance;

resistance

to power is the
conserves

sum

Power,

even republican

power,

inevitably

the temperament

of

the Prince. But through the

Republic, it is in

the Prince's own palace that the

people establish their

counter-balancing

power of reprimand and protest.

That is
end

why tyranny can lead a silent existence outside history, but the Republic is lessly divided by the conflict between power and
citizen.18

The

classic

distinction between

political government and

despotic

government

could find no place in Alain's thought; in his eyes, all power is despotic. This is a rash generalization. The idea of a government in which the supremacy of the whole is harmonized with the autonomy of the parts surely seems chimerical to

him. It is true that

essary that the
absorption ests

all public power

tends to be intrusive.

Consequently, it is

nec

parts of the political whole

if

one wants

them to escape an

equally harmful to the

common good and whose

the most particular

inter

possess a right

to resistance

limits

and mode cannot

be

arbitrary.

But

who would not perceive

societies

that the necessity for this resistance, common to all in practice, is but incidental to the political order; that it varies in in
to the perfection of power; that resistance to authority, even ex

verse proportion erted within

the

never

be

confused with one part of

fairest limits, is but a negative auxiliary of liberty and could it? To make this recourse, which is necessary for safe
the political order, the very essence of
real politics

guarding

is prop

erly to turn the As defined

ended
other

political order upside

down.

by Alain,

the conflict between governing power and citizen may be

by

the latter's defeat: that is the silence of despotism accepted. On the the citizen's victory does not effect
a an end

hand,
for

to the struggle, but only

restrains

time the adversary's harmfulness. Peace is out of the question. The

peace of the sheepfold concludes witness

in the drama

of

the slaughterhouse. We thus

this paradox: the pacifist Alain professes a

theory

of power

that presup

poses a veritable metaphysics of war.

Let
nized

us call a

philosophy

of antagonisms

any doctrine which,

having
which

recog

the

fecundity
a

of certain

struggles,

regards

them as universal, perennial,

and necessary.

In Hegelian terms,

one could

say, it is any doctrine

limits

itself to opposing

thesis and an antithesis without anticipating their reduction

to the unity of a superior

looking
whose

toward synthesis.

term, or which contents itself with antinomy without Far removed, it seems, from the intentions of Hegel, antinomy only
as a

intrepid
one

monism uses

kind
the

of springboard

for setting

itself in
15. 16. 17. 18.

leap firmly into the unity of synthesis,

p. 20. p.

philosophy

of antagonisms

Elements,
Elements,

Le Citoyen,

150.

p. 18 et passim.
p. 29.

Elements,

"The Politics of
has been vigorously
tions of nationalist

Alain"

221

by P. -I. Proudhon; underlying various manifesta it has found its full development among the revolu thought,
outlined

tionary

syndicalists of

the

Georges

Sorel19

school.
whom

Could it be that M. lulien

so

Benda has let himself be

Trahison des

corrupted

by

him

he

bitterly

criticizes?20

His

clercs attributes

to the two powers, spiritual and temporal, an

battle.21

equal

duty

to resist each other in an eternal

However,
which

peace, accord,
evil

harmony,

and

unity

are

inherently

good

things

become

only

under certain

conditions,
can

whereas conflict and

division,

since

tain

conditions.

ralist

only The philosophy of antagonisms rests on the foundation of a plu metaphysics, with which it crumbles as soon as the true properties of meta

they

are principles of

destruction,

become

good things

under cer

physical
area.

unity are acknowledged. This vale of tears is not essentially a combat It is here below, and not just in Abraham's bosom, that justice and peace There is nothing in the
eternal antagonism.

must embrace one another.

natural

that presupposes necessary and

passions

make-up of society What is true is that guilty

lust

as

divide us, and evil occurs in the human species more often than good. war is legitimate only if it is waged with a view to peace and strikes only
to resuming work, the citizen's resistance to power has
no acceptable unless

with a view

meaning The doctrine

it tends to

culminate

in the

perfect

unity

of the political order.

of antagonism rests on a misunderstanding.

Because
,

a certain

kind lant

of peace
22

some conclude
aside

ubi solitudinem faciunt pacem appel is sleep, barren and dead that life is expressed necessarily by struggle, war, and

revolt; that

standing against inertia of slaves subjected to the ty the powers-that-be, there is room only for the rant. But peace is measured by unity. lust as there exists a certain unity contrary to the notion of multitude, there exists a certain peace that is the enemy of life.
This unity stands on the side of matter; this peace, imposed by brute force, is ap propriate for societies torn apart by passions. Insofar as their minds unify them,
men

from the

permanent opposition of the citizen

become

capable of an order

in

which

the

perfection of peace coincides with

the

abundance of

life.
(1847- 1922): engineer and socialist

19.

Georges Sorel

thinker

best known for his Reflexions

sur

la

violence

man.

(1908), in which he espoused the concept of war as a necessary and salutary influence on Anti-intellectualist in his writings, he was an important contributor to Peguy's Cahiers de la

quinzaine.

(t.n.)
(1867- 1956): rationalist and

20.

Julien Benda

intellectualist thinker
published a

who attacked

Bergson

and

Peguy
ernist

for intuitive thought.

Preferring

classical

values, he
and

tendencies in philosophy,

social

thought,

literary

scathing indictment of mod criticism in La Trahison des clercs

(1927). (t.n.)
21.

Let
of

us note that

Alain's

conception of

the general relations of Church and State

of

is

analogous

to those

Sorel, M. Edouard Berth (principal disciple

Alain's
religious politics without

Sorel)

and

Benda. But it is impossible for

on religion.

us to explain we wish

having

first

examined

his ideas

Moreover,
be

especially to point out that if M. Benda's ideas on the in serious error, La Trahison des clercs seems nonetheless an
certainly one of the most significant of our time. : "Where they make a desert, Ubi solitudinem
.

spiritual and

the temporal seem to

admirable work

in

more

than one re

spect and

22.

they

call

it

peace."

(t.n.)

222

Interpretation
as we

Leviathan,
morality.

It

must

have seen, will never willingly bend to the rules of common be taken as it is. But this voracious beast never gives up trying its image.

to

mold

the citizen to

Nothing

can

characteristics of ual

the individual. But it is

possible

like itself. Therein lies the

against

supreme ruse

confer on society the for society to make the individ of power. Since Leviathan cannot be

be done to

divided

Leviathan,

when

the citizen ceases to think as an

one could not

individual,
in
as

power reigns

uncontested.23

Consequently,

be too

vigilant

suring that the

raise one's

natural

individuality

enemy to its highest degree

of power exerts surveillance under conditions

that

of purity.

Since

all gatherings of

men participate

the

politics of

the citizen

in society, they, like society, are impulsive and unreasonable; is the work of isolated men. We are far from the pro
spirit of

foundly
to

organizing

Auguste Comte

often cited

by

Alain

who used

say that

we can no more make a points.

line

by juxtaposing
"In

society (Some Bergsonian

out of

individuals than

we can

draw

syndicalist will add: no more

not a matter of

than
a

one can make movement out of atoms at

action,"

rest.) But it is

making
with

society.

concerted

writes

Alain, "strength is
remain

added

to strength, but the

ideas thwart

and cancel each other.

There

the means of a giant

ideas

of a child.

If

we want a public

life worthy

of present

sary that the individual remain everywhere an

rank or
mad."24

humanity, it is neces individual, whether in the first

thinks;
all assemblies are

the last. There is none but the individual who

considerable number of

historical facts rise

against

these affirmations. One

thinks of the Roman Senate

council of a village where well

whose wisdom astonished

kings,

or a municipal

peasants,

deliberating

on matters with which

they

are

acquainted,

often give a good example of prudence.

on

But does

not

Alain's
to

critique
an

bear

fully

Jacobin
while

democracy, in
force Alain's
of

which one sees

thought

reduced

innocuous average,
head,"

reaches colossal proportions?

expression,25

"A

powerful

brute

with a

tiny

to use

State

presents

itself. An adversary
the

is precisely how the Jacobin Jacobinism in that he refuses to worship the

majority, Alain
embraces

popular will and rejects

tyranny

of the

the individu
over

alist concept of

Jacobin It is

the

whole system.

democracy hardly surprising

a concession which

threatens to take

that thought is reduced to what

can

be

produced

by the good pleasure of the man

rails at the

in the street;

neither

is it surprising that
attributes a

there is born an inordinate force

of pure and simple

head-counting.
of

Now, if Alain excessively

superior wisdom to
ercises which

foolishness
that each

assemblies, he
the

multitudes,

provided

of

individuals

therein ex

his thought in
individual

a state of

isolation. "A

electors,"

mass of

he writes, "in
some
accu-

errors clash and correct each other must

154.

finally give

23.

Elements,

p.

24.

Le Citoyen,
p. 144.

p.

159; in the

same

sense,

Elements,

pp. i68ff.

Cf. in

particular p. 172, the no

tion of a
other.

Senate dispersed among the

p. 157.

citizens and able to communicate with them

but

not with each

Mars,

25.

Elements,

"The Politics of
rate picture of

Alain"

223

the common interest.

sum

Bring together five hundred deputies

interests
not to

and

it is

impossible for the

edge of

total of these

look

more

like
of

true knowl

the people's needs than can be arrived at

by the

survey

the most impar

tial

sociologist."26

Certainly, it is
multitude.27

a multitude will prevail

who compose prompted and which goes

that

not absurd to suppose that the judgment of in quality over the judgment of the majority of those Yet it is necessary that each one's thought be some

directed in

cancelled out

directly by the interplay

against

way by the prudence of institutions, a notion Alain's individualist ideas. For if something is to be
of

opposites, how do
their wisdom?

we

know that the

prevents us

error of

in

dividuals

will

be cancelled,

not

Nothing

from

imag

ining
ror,

a multitude

will

agreeing to exalt the worst within itself. If radicalism is an er the individual errors of fifty thousand electors be neutralized in the
the elected radical? And will the

person of

individual
single

errors of two

hundred

fifty-

one radical

deputies

offset one another

in the

voting

of an evil

law? The

addition of opinions voiced

by

individuals does

not constitute an

outcome, but
except

purely

simply a sum of either justice or iniquity. It is nothing lessons of experience, often ignored by the costly In keeping with his individualist principles, Alain mistrusts
and
passions.28

the

parties29

and

fiercely
The
general

attacks proportional

representation, which, among

to vote for the
man rather

other

drawbacks, fa
program.30

vors their

interplay. He

wants us
other

than the

deputy

is nothing

than the citizen's permanent

each one's opinion and

delegate for the

monitoring

of power.

Whereas

suffrage express popular resistance second

degree

of

that

resistance.

the very fact of in the first degree, the deputy represents the His role is entirely one of criticism, denuncia

tion,
and

and

questioning; his first

duty

is to

remain

entirely free in
constituents.31

relation

to power
minis-

the

powerful and

entirely

submitted

to

his

Finally

the

26. 27. 28.

versal

Elements,
Let

p.

128.
ch.

Cf. Aristotle, Politics, Bk. in,

no one misunderstand our
wrote

12.
we are not

intentions:

putting

democracy

on

trial here. "Uni

unable

suffrage,"

P.

-J.

Proudhon, "is

a sort of atomism

by

which the

legislator,

to have

the

people speak

in the unity
man"

of their essence,

invites the

citizens

to express their opinion

by the head,
philosopher

virttim

("man

by

or

"individually"), in absolutely

the same way as the Epicurean

explains sense of alist

thought, will, intelligence, by combinations (Solution du probleme social, par. the

word"

of atoms.

It is

political

atheism, in the worst

5).

Strangely

enough, the critique of individu

analogous to even

democracy by

revolutionary
the

syndicalists

faithful to Proudhon 's thought is strictly

the associationists
we

that formulated

against of

psychological atomism of

by

the

disciples,

the

freest among them,

conceive of a

William James

and

M. Bergson. But
system proper

do

not

believe that the

notion of

dem

ocratic government entails the

individualist

to

modern

democracies. One may easily

as

democratic society

whose elements would not

be individuals

such, each added to the

natural and contractual societies existing prior to the other, but rather the already social members of State. Thus, suffrage by virtue of the very fact that it would be the expression of legitimate socie would be limited on the side of evil and in ties, having each in its order shown proof of vitality

clined

to the

side of good. p.

29. 30. 31.

Le Citoyen,

141. I77ff.

Elements, Elements,

pp. pp.

195, 198.

224

Interpretation
and

ter, representing the third

last degree

of civic

resistance, is the one

work.32

delegated

by
of

the citizens to the surveillance of a particular

proper

Supreme

advocate of

the people, his

function is to

monitor

the higher administrations, citadels

make

power, to take the majority side against them, to

it impossible

at

any

moment

for them to gratify their natural appetite for Thus, we have a government deprived of any role
the task of restriction, a
prevent there not
government which much governing.

tyranny.33

of

directing,

with

is

not to meddle

only in governing,
war,"

charged

but to

being

too

"The

minister of

writes

Alain, "is
alissimo

the head of the

army."34

Let

us understand each other.

The

gener

is the
view of

supreme commander of movements

to be accomplished

by

the

army in
of

its

own particular end.

But the

minister of

war,

as representative

the

Prince,

commands

the army's movements

proper end.

in

relation

to the common good

of

the multitude, the State's

a particular subordinate

The

generalissimo pursues

simply pressly

end, the

minister pursues

that same end

purely insofar as it is

and ex

to the State's general end. Alain's

error seems

to lie in hold

governing to be analogous with the other functions of the economy. Give the road-builder a free reign, he writes, and he will block up the road and make traffic impossible. Give the government free rein, and it will ex

ing

the

function

of

haust society
and virtuous

with

expeditions.35

military

We

must

denounce this

assimilation of

what pursues a particular good and pursues

the end that is for the whole, good,

life

of

the entire multitude. The

limits
of

of political power are

only

defined

by

the State's position

in the

hierarchy

values; the

legitimate

auton

omy

of

imperfect

persons and societies

the primacy

of spiritual power not

limits from below the State's authority, limits it from above. Any particular function, on

the contrary, is limited

only

by

reason of

by

reason

of the

proximity to other particular

things

its degree in the hierarchy, but also interests. They are essentially

different
This

orders of

whose confusion supposes a

fanciful

conception of the

nature of the

State.
resistance,
which

power of

is

expressed

by

public

opinion, voting,

par

liamentary
produce plaud. would

and ministerial

monitoring, is true spiritual

power.36

Designed to

liberty, it

requires a refusal on the part of

revolt must never

the citizen to respect and ap

But the interior

then perish,

develop

into

disobedience, for

order

without which

there is no liberty. The good citizen swears to

will always

obey

and not

to respect. The superior's command

or

be executed, but
of

whether

it is just

criminal, interior assent

schism extended

will

be equally
and

refused.

Can
ual?

you

imagine this in

into the very

intimacy

the individ
on

This citizen,

enslaved on

the temporal side

exhausting himself

the
re-

spiritual side

an eternal negation?

Alain

claims that a stubborn refusal of

32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

Elements, pp. I3ff. p. 94. Elements, p. 173, andLe Citoyen, Elements, p. 14. Le Citoyen, pp. 143-145. Elements, p. 231, pp. 276?.
,

p. 153.

"The Politics of
spect

Alain"

225
exactness of
obedience.37

is favorable to
It is

tions on which this affirmation

them.
against nature

is

founded,

we challenge

Whatever may be the observa the import attributed to

for

man

to be so divided against

himself;

an obedience

totally deprived
the

of respect would

theory

of

the citizen against

be essentially inhuman. At the conclusion of the powers, instead of order and liberty we have
all

a soulless

tyranny. It
more

is,

on one

hand,

heaviness,

and on the other of

hand

a spiri
radi

tual

license

deeply

anarchical than all the

disorders

the street. The

cal separation established

by

Alain between the

principles of order and those of

liberty presupposes
human society is only
give a
presupposes

a profound misapprehension of

those two terms. The order of

an order of of

free

moral agents or grounded

it is nothing; Leviathan
and

can

parody
the

it.

Liberty is
of
order.

in the intelligence

faculty

constitute and

the essence of

adhering in common to the It is not enough to say,

rational as

consequently dispositions that

are correlative terms; one must recognize common root in the rational nature of man. have their erty Even the worst of radicals has little sympathy for socialism. The enemy of any who willingly rail at indi system, he has a severe mistrust of doctrinaire
men38

liberty

does Alain, that order that human order and lib

vidualism,
portional advent of

sometimes speak

ill

of

democracy, usually lapse into opposing

recourse to

pro

representation, do

not

disdain

violence,

subordinate the

justice to their

party's

triumph,39

and,
an

above all

else, have the unbear

and moral government

able naivete

to believe in the possibility of

of

intelligent

that is the servant time to the study

pages on

the

governed.40

Even though he

appears

to have

given

little

of economic

problems, Alain has

outlines a quite
industrialism.41

written

some remarkable

the

subject

in

which

he

penetrating

criticism of certain

dominant tendencies in ian is independent omy in the

modern

Unwilling

to accept the unitar

of a people
of econ

concepts so widespread
of

among socialists, he thinks the economy

of government and that the various coexist

its form

forms

proprietary, collectivism and communist

same

may

State, according

to the

exigencies of

the various
care

advantageously functions and the

wishes of the nomic

parties.42

contracting equality desired by

proper

Finally, he
is incapable

takes
of

to show that the eco

and of assur

socialism

realizing justice
equality,
and

ing

its

duration in the

absence of political

that political

solution to the problems of the economic or equality contains in itself the virtual der.43 Alain is not particularly frightened by criticisms raised against the pluto

cratic character of modern

democracies.

Everything has
nomic powers.
37. 38.
39. 40. 41. 42.
43.

been

said on the servitude of political powers

exaggerations

in

regard to eco

Whatever may be the

p. 282.
p. 25. p. 220. p.

due to

passion or

dogmatism,

Elements, Elements,
Elements, Elements,
"Let us

165.
power,"

seek p.

productivity, 232; Le

not

in Le Citoyen,
1 33-

pp.

195-207.

Elements,
Elements,

Citoyen,
14; Mars,

p. 189.
pp.

pp.

141,

97,

226

Interpretation
often

it is

fact that the State's freedom is

limited

on the side of good and

drawn

out on the side of evil

with political reform

by

the appetites of the wealthy.

All
with
,

who are concerned

preoccupy themselves
authority,
which

justifiably

reducing to unity,

by

suppression or subordination of one of and political

the two terms

the effective power of

financiers

is

alone acknowledged

by law

and alone

responsible.

An

excellent classification of reformers could

be

established accord

ing
into

to the solutions proposed.

tions and
a

intentions

of

its leaders notwithstanding,

settles

Collectivist socialism, which, the sincere declara seems destined to develop

the
question

State socialism,

in the

manner of a

Gordian knot

by

making the State the

supreme manager of economic power.

Conversely,
hybrid

revolu

tionary
in
of

syndicalism pursues

the complete absorption of political

programs propose a

power within

the economic organism.

which

Various democratic

system

the economic and political representatives as such share the

the nation. As

for Communism, insofar

a

as

it is

possible to

governing define that which is

than a

defensive reaction,

movement, an attitude, a protest,

rather

doctrine, it

seems

that,

syndicalist and

federalist

by intent,

it

can reach

the slightest begin

nings of realization

only

under a

particularly
powers.

violent

form

of

State

socialism.

Among itary monarchs

which

the properly political solutions, one

endowed with

favors the

restoration of

hered
give to

broad

Another

proposes

simply to

the head elected

by

the people extensive means of observing the programs to to be

he has

sworn

President Wilson's

faithful, despite political intrigue. Such is the intent of doctrine, a man better known in France for his humanitarian
reform projects.

ideology
does

than

for his domestic

Alain's

solution

is

original:

It

not examine the credentials of

of public affairs.

the powers that

be, foreordained by history

with

for the direction

However,
to

to these powers,

the financial

artistocracy, it opposes,
one

as antithesis

thesis,

an organ of resistance which must

day

constrain,

"save themselves In firm description

prised that

by by

virtue of or

its liberal

and egalitarian

essence, the rich to

pleasures."44

justice"

to

"destroy

themselves in base
191

an article entitled
of

Plutocracy, dated September 9,

power

1, Alain

presents a

financial

exerting its
the

effect on elections. not see

"I

am sur

socialists,

who are so aware of

danger, do

that the Repub

lic's

syndicalist's

is precisely in voting by laughter in reading those lines. In the realm of foreign policy, Alain holds firm,
salvation

arrondissement."45

can

just imagine

and and

has for
in favor for He

long
of

time,

against secret

diplomacy

and

peace through peaceful position

means.46

military preparations, Before 1914, he was

securing op

noted
law.47

an energetic

to the Russian alliance and to the three-year

entered the war

as a volunteer and gleaned

from that

experience some new arguments against

44. 45. 46. 47.

Elements, Elements,

p. 142.

p. 42.
p. 32.

Le Citoyen,

The three-year law: mandatory military

service,

(t.n.)

"The Politics of
power, as well as a

Alain"

227
Let
us note

wealth of observations.

that the

war seems not

to

have

modified at

Alain's thought

on a single

important lines

point.

The

criticisms that

he

directs Few
the

the politics of 1922 follow the same

as those that

he

was

already
war and

formulating
deeper

in

191 2 against

the actions

of

M. Poincare.
the psychological origins of
as

writers

have

cast as much

light

on

motives of

the

man of arms.

Here
of

elsewhere, Alain demonstrates

exceptional analytical gifts. common change

With

shrug

the shoulders he rejects the

idea,

so

among socialists, that wars in economic regimes would

passions remain

are caused

by conflicting interests and

to
them.48

that a

put an end

Interests

always give

in, he

writes, but

intransigent;
one,
a

war

is born

of passions.

rather

forced point, perhaps, but economy entails, among

a valuable

nonetheless.

Even though the

modern

fearful tendency to set peoples against one another in unjust conflicts, it is extremely naive to impute to the capitalist system sole responsibility for quarrels that are often the work of popular imperialism.
other

evils,

Alain

reduces

to its true proportions the efficaciousness of patriotism,

which

is

usually incapable of assuring the execution of civic duties in peacetime and not life.49 Nevertheless he rails at those who very costly in regard to the sacrifice of

identify
plunder

the that

warrior's passion with men

those

of

the thief

and murderer.

It is

not

to

out over order

war.50

fight; if that were true the base love of money would soon win All war is waged in the name of rights, and each offers his life in
honor.51

to save his

With

at

least

a partial

success, Alain

pushes

to great

lengths his

analysis of

the sense of honor in the

soldier.

Consequently, he invites his

for

readers to acknowledge their own

responsibility

bringing
or

about

the

catastrophe.

Before

heaping

the blame on the

kaiser,

the

czar,

capitalism, let

each examine

his

conscience and ask passion

himself if he hasn't
war.

promoted, if only

Alain

furiously

his inertia, the effects of opposes the idea of war's fated

by

that give birth to

inevitability.52

The

will

decides

between

war and

peace,

although war

is

produced without

one gives

in to its

causes even

in the

slightest

positively willing it if degree. Peace can only be main Alain tirelessly denounces
pow

tained at the cost of a constant,

er's affinities

concerted effort.

for

war.53

The
most

conduct of

war, and specifically of modern warfare,

pages.

inspires

some of

his im
He

beautifully
in

bitter

He

forcefully

describes that for little, the

massive action of survival of the

mense armies

which personal valor counts

fittest is

replaced
48

by

their massacre, and

p. 251.

enthusiasm gives

way to a bleak

passivity.54

Elements,

49
50 5i
52

Mars, pp. 9-10. Le Citoyen, p. 63; Mars,

Le Citoyen,
p.

pp.

41, 46.

47-

67.
p.

Mars,

pp.

156, 162, 186; Le Citoyen,

pp. 239-40.

87.
and

53
13454.

Elements,

War

reinforces

despotism

despotism leads to

war.

Mars,

pp.

80,

Le Citoyen,

p. 42

TK

Interpretation
reiterates

willingly

that all the evils of peacetime could never produce as much

of
war,55

grief and ruin as a

few days

but he does
on

not

annoy the

reader

by

linger
Simi

ing,

as would a

Georges

Duhamel,56

the horrors that he has witnesed. He

goes right

to the point,

which

is

a pure and simple condemnation of war.

larly,
ish

when

he

relates

the

abuses of

military power, it is

not to seek out and pun

some officer or general.

He

comes close

state of war required them to act as

crimes, the better to accuse the

system.57

them, alleging that the individuals' did. He passes over they quickly This is a clever method, but it leads to
as

to absolving

injustice,
cept

as much

by

its indulgence

by

its

severity.

am not prepared to ac

the requirements of discipline as an excuse

for

certain atrocious

judgments

rendered pline of

by

war councils

nor

to agree that

such abuses prove

in

general

is to be

condemned.

I find here

again that

that military disci deplorable confusion

the essential and the accidental, pointed out earlier in relation to the

theory

of

power.

The

same criticism

is to be

applied

here,

with

the addition that no power

is

so

ready to be abused and so capable of deadly abuses as military power. On the justice itself of war, Alain's thought develops into several theses. In

the

first place, he
wrongs made

affirms

that

war

than the
sions

it

purports

to

rectify.58

necessarily entails a greater amount of injustice On this point, there are broad conces
one considers

to be

to

Alain's ideas if
one of

the particular case of

war

modern

European

wars.

It is clearly

the conditions of a just

that it not cause

harm that is disproportionate to the disorders to be

place, Alain
more

redressed.

In the

second

considers

that since war is

incapable

of assuring the triumph of it.59 is the True justice consists right, necessary precondition of be.60 advance the arbiter's sentence, whatever it Revendication

incapable

producing peace, it is all the right. Peace, far from being born of
of of of

accepting in

right, if it is

not preceded

by

this peaceful

disposition

and

limited

holy
ends

war,

which

is

all

the

more

ferocious

by

virtue of

only engender its idealism. But war cul

by it,

can

minates

in the

more or

less full triumph

of

the stronger party, and the

treaty

that

it, imposed by force, is just

another act of

war,

extrinsic to

the juridical

eminently favorable to the maintenance of warlike passions. Like Rousseau,61 Alain acknowledges that the power of the strong cannot create the
order and

slightest shred of moral

obligation.62

He

concludes that the peace

treaty,

sanc

tioning victory, carries for the vanquished only a purely physical submission, alien to the order of the will, which constitutes peace. The logic of is
reasoning
,

55. 56.

Elements,

pp. 253-55.

Georges Duhamel ( 1 884- 1 966): Medical doctor and author of Civilisation 1 1 8) a ( 9 suffering he witnessed in military hospitals during the First World War. The book Prix Goncourt. (t.n.)
tion of the
57.

descrip
won the

Mars,

pp. 27-28.

"One

must never suggest nor allow oneself

humanity."

to

believe

that war

is

compat

ible in any
58.

sense whatever with pp. 235-36. pp.

p.

justice

and

Elements,

Le Citoyen, 60. Le Citoyen,

59.

62ff.
3.

64.

61. Contrat social, I, 62. Mars, p. 174.

"The Politics of

Alain"

229
of

impeccable, but
cibly
same

the conclusion shocks the common sentiment

peoples, invin

persuaded that the

document

signed

following
both

token the honor

of

and conscience of

parties.

just victory commits by the One must point out the

of

equivocacy

the greater and ask oneself whether the power

of

the stronger
to con
whose

party, incapable

creating right, is

not

in

certain circumstances

tribute, in the manner of efficient cause, to formal principle must be sought in universal

likely
right

the

determination

of a

common good.

Finally, Alain
any end,
and

emphasizes that

it is

never

legitimate
death

to accept as a means to
man.63

no matter

how noble, the

certain

of a

He

assimilates

purely simply under the relation of moral quality the action of a commander who launches an offensive, knowing that it will cost a certain number of human

lives,

and

that of

a war council

that has

innocent

people shot

down.64

Why,

then, vilify the latter, if the former was only doing his duty? And if one con demns the latter, how can one justify the former? But if the proposed assimilation is accepted, one must condemn for suicide
the
and man who exposes

himself to
of

certain

death for the

good of

his fellow man,

martyrs

think of the
with

impact

this consequence

one must

denounce

along

military heroes

and conclude with

M. Maxime Leroy:
worth the

Not
not

one

idea,

no matter

how beautiful

and

profound, is

death

of a man.

Is

every idea but

only, will

an approximation?

On the

day

that

humanity

knows this,

and on that

day
age

we make a

decisive step toward peace, toward the call,

repeated

from

to age, of our old misery to the mercy, the nobility of sincere

we see some

agnosticism.6*

Here

important

secrets unveiled
est

in only

few lines. Truth

must

be loved hard

more

than life (durus

witness

hie

sermo).66

If, then,
one must

one wishes to reject

self-sacrifice, the

by

requirements of

truth,

suffering and death, prefer "the nobility

first, according
a

to the

agnosticism."

of sincere

Cer

tainly, it is hardly conceivable that virtue would flourish in would be commonly acknowledged that no idea is worth a
us go

man's

society in which it death. But let

only so far as to observe that since moral acts are specified by their ends, it is impossible to assimilate, as Alain does, the act of imposing death on an inno
cent man or of

exposing her

an

innocent

man

to certain

death. The

ends are essen

tially different. Leaping into

for
a woman and child

the sea in order to make room in an overloaded boat

not suicide

is

but heroic devotion. The

will struggle as

proof

lies in the
to

fact that

one who

thus sacrifices himself

until

go under and will

"I have

always

cling had a strong antipathy for tyrants

all power and above all

the last

moment

to the hope of

long as possible not finding a lifeline.

is the

passion."

and an egalitarian power

Resistance to

power

military

essential

means of radical politics;

equality is its
act."

supreme end.
as a clear

63. "There is
other man.

no earthly end, for a man, that may take If so, it is a criminal Mars, p. 154. p.

inevitable

means the

death

of an

64. Le Citoyen.

1 04.
mine.

65. M. Leroy, Henri de Saint-Simon. Italics 66. Durus est hie sermo: "This is a hard

saying"

(John 6:60).

(t.n.)

230

Interpretation
cries

"What,"

Alain, "is justice? It is

It
would

equality."67

Not

at all a

false equation,
appears

but

an equivocal one.

be

preferable

to say, "All justice is a certain

of

equality,"

for there

exists more

than one

kind

justice. Now it

that in

the

matter of

equality, Alain

propriate

to

commutative

just if the
laws
the
are

values

is only ap conceives only material equality, justice. He correctly observes that an exchange is un and from there concludes that "just exchanged are not
which
equal,68

those that strive to

make all equal:

men, women, children, the

ill,

and

ignorant."

An

accurate statement

if it

means

only that the State

must see

to it

that
as

citizens observe

the laws of equitable exchange; a spurious one if that unequal

it signifies,

it doubtless does, powers that be. Alain

the

individuals

must

be treated
as

as equals

by

the

cannot allow

himself to exclude,

P. -J. Proudhon

did,
the

idea

of

distributive justice,

totius ad partes

for his doctrine

But in

preserves

notion of a political whole endowed with authority.

failing

to recognize

that

distributive justice is

regulated

conceiving it on the model of justice ultimately sacrificed to an illusory equality. writes Alain, "goes against nature, in "The egalitarian
spirit,"

equality of proportion, he corrupts it, commutative justice. As with Rousseau, we see

by

which every egalitarian spirit desires equality and and forces are formed. The is unequal thing justice in spite of everything. If it is objected that such is not the case, it answers,
with a

kind

of

illuminated faith that

such must and shall

be the

case.

It is really

religion

the revolutionary

mystique."70

Illuminated faith, religion,

mystique.

These

are

hardly

know that

such votive candles a political

have ignited

conflagrations.

reassuring terms. We However, there is to

or

day hardly

tique in support of

party which does not appeal to faith its doctrine. Let us examine the notion

lay

claim

to a mys

of a political

faith.

Faith is like

opinion

in that it

excludes

the apperception of objective evidence;

it is like
he does

science

in that it implies firm

assent.

Faith is best defined

assurance of

as a virtue

through which the

not see.

believer, impelled by
supernatural

grace, holds the

superior

that

which a

This

virtue,

to science, entertains only

distant analogy with the belief subjectively certain but always subject to reser vations in regard to free judgment which is born in the soul in the presence of a
truth that
charm.

is only probable, through the effect of eloquence, poetry, or any other This kind of natural faith often takes the place of science in the practical

order and one

may prove capable of is to drift into pragmatism

determining
of which

energetic resolutions.

But

unless

Alain is horrified

or attribute the

faculty of judging to

the will, as the good Cartesian Alain

that a proven conclusion

is

preferable to a probable

does, who would deny judgment, artificially

rend-

67. Elements, 68. Ibid.

69. Totius
70.

p.

143.

ad partes:
.

"From the

whole to the
sur

parts."

Elements

p. 290.

Cf. Propos

The translator
versity, in

wishes

to acknowledge the kind

le Christianisme, pp. I20ff., 131. help of Professor A. Eliot Youman, Mercer Uni

translating

the

Latin

phrases

in this

essay.

"The Politics of
ered certain

Alain"

231
objected

by

heart in thrall? If it is

that the

demands

of action are

pressing, that since proof is

must press

lacking,

as

is

often

the case in political matters, one

us then answer

forward,
in
politics

without an unshakable

inner certitude, let

that

ages of experience

tics. Even
of proven

have sufficiently proven the misdeeds of sentimental poli it is always possible to assure oneself of a certain baggage
rest

truths.

The

is

a matter of prudence, not of faith without grace or a enthusiasm

mystique without gifts.

And if

action, nothing
and

is

more capable of

is necessary for bold inspiring it than the splendor

action,

and

persevering
truths
at the

of proven

the familiar charm of the

singular rules of

which are

known

outset

by

the

prudent.

into the

melee

but

of

releasing bands of cold reasoners acknowledging by judgment alone, scientific or prudential,

not a question of

It is

the legitimate paternity of enthusiasm.

is the only science in the natural order that merits the name of wisdom, it is proper for metaphysics to exert a sovereign, though not despotic, power over any other particular discipline. It alone attains the absolute
Because
metaphysics

universal, as opposed to this

principles.

or

that universal; it alone climbs to to judge

with

absolute

first

Hence it has the

competence

ject

seems

involved, any

conclusion proposed

by

an

finality, insofar as its ob inferior science. Metaphys

ics draws circles, if I may say so, within which freedom is great and outside which there is room for nothing but the absurd. By keeping himself within the
boundaries defined dition
and of

by

metaphysics

the

scholar satisfies

the

most

his security, and at little expense he research doomed in advance to failure.

several particular respects science of

avoids a great

elementary con deal of wasted time

In

the light

of metaphysics

is indispensable to

poli

tics. The

mon good presupposes a

com governing the human multitude in the direction of the definition of the nature of man and his ultimate purpose.

Thus, insofar
politics

as

it

comes under

the rubric of an art, it

is from its

metaphysics

that

learns the
while

general

laws

and

necessary

conditions of

object.

Now

Alain's

political works abound

in

astute moral observations, their serious errors,

properly theoretical concerning the

content

seems marred

by

including

errors

nature of power and and

its

relation to the governed; errors concern

ing

order,

liberty,

justice;
Has he

and errors

concerning

war and peace.

What is the

source of these of philosophy? one at that.

errors?

speculated on politics apart

from

and

in disregard
very logical

That is

hardly likely,

for he is

a philosopher, and a

We

must therefore conclude that

philosophical errors.

Alain's

political errors rather reflect

a number of

deeper

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,

Leo Strauss

and

Liberal Education

Walter Nicgorski

University

of Notre Dame

wrote about liberal education, engaged in it as a teacher, and in it widely through the work of his students. This essay will review and highlight what he wrote about liberal education. It will then contend that his spired efforts

Leo Strauss

for liberal

education constitute a critical contribution to

American higher
such a contri

education

and, in turn, to American democracy. That he intended

bution

could

hardly

be

clearer.

But that

contribution

is

still

in

a seminal

form,

hardly
ings

realized and

Leo Strauss
were

wrote

facing directly

great challenges. about

liberal

education twice.

Both

of these writ was

initially

prepared as speeches.

"What is Liberal

Education?"

de

livered in 1959 at the graduation exercises of The Basic Program of Liberal Edu cation for Adults at The University of Chicago. "Liberal Education and
Responsibility"

was an address given

tute in

Leadership Development,
in this
address

another enterprise
was

in March i960, to the Arden House Insti in adult education. Strauss

recounted

that his invitation

based

on

the expectation that he the previous year.

which

would explain

two

sentences

in his

commencement address of education as

In those sentences, Strauss had written, "Liberal

we

is the ladder by
meant.

try

to

education mass portions

society."

democracy democracy originally is the necessary endeavor to found an aristocracy within democratic A few years later Strauss prepared a single essay from substantial of the two earlier addresses and published it under the title "Liberal Edu
ascend mass

from

to

Liberal

cation and

Mass

Democracy."1

THE NATURE OF LIBERAL EDUCATION

Strauss
"Liberal
of a

wrote

education

both precisely and colorfully about the end of liberal education. is education in culture or toward culture. The finished product

liberal

education

is

a cultured

human

being."

Strauss

understood culture

to

This is

a revised version of a paper presented at the

revision

in Chicago. The versity

1
.

has benefitted from

comments

1983 American Political Science Association by Professor Frederick Crosson of the Uni

of Notre Dame. This essay appeared in Higher Education and Modern Democracy, Robert A. Goldwin, ed. (hereafter referred to as (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), 73-96. "What is Liberal an official University of Chicago publication in Education for from reprinted was "What is ?")
Education?"
.

Public Responsibility, C. Scott Fletcher,

tences that led to his
second address on
Responsibility,"

ed.

(New York:

Norton,

1961), 43-51. The two

on page 46.

key

sen

liberal

education are

found

That
. .

second
.")

piece,

"Liberal Education

and

(hereafter

referred

to as "Liberal Education

appears to

have been

published

initially in

Education: The Challenge

Ahead, C. Scott Fletcher,

editing
as

ed.

(New York:

Norton,

1962), 49-70. The text of both

addresses was reprinted after

the first two essays in

234
mean

Interpretation
cultivation of

"the

the mind, the

accordance

taking

care and

improving

of

the native

faculties Strauss backed headed

does
fact"

of the

mind

in

with

the nature of the

mind.":

Though

suggested
off almost

initially that this meaning of culture is the immediately and confessed the gap between
He
observed

chief one

where

today, he he was

and common usage.

that

his "notion

of

liberal

education

not seem

to

fit

an age which a

is

aware of

the fact that there is

not the culture spoke of

of the

human mind, but

variety

variety

of

cultures."3

Note that Strauss

"the

of a

of cultures and appeared to respect

cultures."

the view that "Western cul

of culture

ture is only one among many

Strauss's initial definition

("the

cultivation of

it

was

not, in the

") was, it seems, intended as universal. That is, Yet he was prepared to language of the day,
the mind
"culture-bound."

acknowledge that

there is some kind

ficity
to be

in

certain approaches

historical conditioning or material speci to the development of the mind. There is something
of

said

for there

being

Western

culture and
as

Eastern

culture

just

as

there seems

to be something to such distinctions

minds.4

that between the English and the

French is

Strauss

made clear

that in the course of

developing

the

mind one

by

no

means, insofar as it is possible, to listen exclusively to the greatest minds of

West.5

the

However,
in
which

all of

Strauss's

apparent concessions

to the plurality of conditions

perspective

the human

mind works were

done from the

that there is the

proper culture and

hence the

proper excellence of the

human

mind.

To

acknowl

edge

the fact of manifestations of the mind conditioned in various the

wholesale

ways

is

not

to

accept

relativizing

of culture

that

is

embraced

by

many

contempo

cultures"

raries who speak of a

"variety

of

and who mean whatever patterns of

suburbia"

behavior

in any group (e.g. "the culture tures of juvenile groups"). This relativized meaning of
are cultivated

of
"culture"

or

"the

cul

in

common us

age compelled

Strauss to

attempt another

description

of

liberal

education.

Education that is liberal has

long

been thought to be in
"is liberation from

some sense

freeing.

"Liberal

education,"

wrote

Strauss,

vulgarity.

The

Greeks,"

he added, "had a beautiful word for vulgarity'; they of experience in things beautiful. Liberal education in things
beautiful."6

called

it

dureigoxaUa, lack
to distinguish
slavelike
work

supplies us with experience

The free

or

liberal

man was once so called

him from the

since

"they

is have very little time for themselves, because they have to

another

slave who

lives for

human

being

or one who

for

Leo Strauss, Liberalism Ancient

unless otherwise

and

Modern (New York: Basic

of the essays as

Books,

1968).

References below,
and

noted,
?,"
.

will

be to the text

they

appeared

in Liberalism Ancient

Modern.
2.

"What is

3.
.

3. 4.

"What is

?,"4.
and

Note especially Pierre Duhem, The Aim "What is

?,"
.
.

Structure of Physical Theory (New York:

Athe-

neum, 1974), 55-106.

5. 7.
?,"
.

6. "What is

8.

Leo Strauss
their

and

Liberal Education

235
the next
day."7

livelihood

and

to rest so that

they

can work on

This free

man, called in the

classical

tradition the gentleman or the

beautiful

man

(xaXog

x&ycc&og), is possible only

sure

when

he has

sufficient material support to

and

have the lei

both to

receive an education

toward freedom

beauty

and to practice the

partially realized virtues in politics and philosophy as he lives a life toward their full realization. Liberal education is then education in the beauty of virtue or to
ward

the

fullness

of

that

beauty.8

It

sets one apart.

Two

aspects of

cation can now

Strauss's first formulation of an understanding of liberal edu be further illuminated. When Strauss took culture in his initial
"the
cultivation of

definition to

mean

the

mind,"

he

can

be

seen

to have claimed

that the peak of virtue is

other

intellectual
way
of

virtue or

understanding

of some

kind. An
mind

but wholly
as a

consistent

appreciating this emphasis on the

and

is to

see

it

statement, true to Aristotle

Plato,

that all the virtues in their com

pleteness would

have intellectual

virtue at their core.

Human
one

virtues are of one

fabric; in
role

their perfection

they

are

"inseparable from human

another."9

The

mind's

in

all of

them makes them

distinctively

virtues.

Strauss first

spoke of

liberal

education as education

"toward

culture."

Here, in

the

simple

line

of

portant

themes

of

his first essay on liberal education, he pointed to the most im all of his work, his persistent interest in the nature of philoso

phy and the relation between philosophy and the city. "Toward Liberal "toward complete we have seen, "toward
a phase of and

culture

is,

as

virtue." wisdom,"

education

is

the possible
.

movement

from

common awareness education

through

philosophy

to philosophy

Strauss distinguished liberal

philosophy.

from

philosophical ed

ucation or

the life of

In the light

of philosophy,
education

liberal

education

takes on
comes to

a new meaning:

liberal

edu

cation, especially
philosophy.

in the liberal arts,

sight as a preparation

for

This

means that

philosophy transcends
of questioning.

gentlemanship.
which

The

gentleman as

gentleman accepts on trust certain most

the themes of investigation and

not

weighty things Hence the

virtue.10

for the

philosopher are

gentlemen's virtue

is

entirely the

same as

the

philosopher's

Philosophy is
ters or
cation

essentially the "quest for the truth "" It will be for the comprehensive truth.
.

about
clear

weighty below that liberal

the

most

mat

edu

is,
and

according to

Strauss, largely
more

accomplished

through participating
propaedeutic

in is

philosophy.

Yet it is
some or

not

the life of philosophy itself; it is

"trusting"

to philos

ophy,
on

in

ways,

than philosophy. Liberal education

the

same

line

"quest"

toward the goal of philosophy.

The

fully

cultured

hu
ed-

man
7.

being

is really the
.

end of philosophy,
10.
and

the perfected philosopher. Liberal

"Liberal Education
"Preface,"

8.
9.
10.

Liberalism Ancient

Modern,

vii.

Ibid.
"Liberal Education
. .

13.

1 1

Ibid.

Underlining is

mine.

236
ucation

Interpretation
in moving toward culture, takes it bearings from the end of philosophy its end at some point along a continuum toward full culture or wis

but

reaches

cation should

dom. In taking its bearings from the end of philosophy, it seems that liberal edu be directed and shaped by those who explicitly move to that end, in
words,

other

by philosophers.
more or

Even

within

the philosophic way of life the end of

full

culture

is only

less

rather than
of

once wrote of

philosophy

as a

way

life

as

simply and wholly follows:

attainable.

Strauss

Being

essentially

quest and

being

not able ever to

become wisdom,

as

distinguished
All
solu

from philosophy, the

problems are always more evident than the solutions.

tions are questionable. Now the right way of life cannot be

an

fully

established except

by

understanding

of the nature of

man, and the nature of

man cannot

be

fully

clarified

except cannot

by an understanding of the nature of the whole. Therefore, the right way of life be established metaphysically except by a completed metaphysics, and there

right way of life remains questionable. But the very uncertainty of all solu tions, the very ignorance regarding the most important things, makes quest for knowl edge the most important thing, and therefore the life devoted to it, the right way of
life.12

fore the

Philosophy's
of

commitment

to the questionableness of all solutions is at the root

with

its tension is

"disproportion"

or

the

city

or

the political. Insofar as

liberal

education

more

trusting

than philosophy, there seems to be some tension or

disproportion between philosophy and liberal education. Insofar as liberal educa tion is achieved through philosophy and moves toward philosophy, there is a ten
sion

between liberal
understood.13

education and

the city or civic responsibility as convention

ally

Strauss

seemed to

hold that there is for liberal

a specifiable point

the continuum that marks the goal

cates the possession of a

or end

education.

This

point

along indi
and

trusting inquisitiveness

an appropriate

decency

loyalty
and

in the

political sphere marked

by

an awareness of and respect

for the life

two.

and task of philosophy.

The

liberally

educated

man, in

being

between the city

philosophy, must experience in some sense the tension

between the

THE MEANS AND CONDITIONS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION

Some

of

Strauss's

most memorable

books. But life is too

12.

short to

live

with
of

lines are, "We are compelled to live with books."14 The attracany but the greatest
and
Philosophy,"

Leo Strauss, "The Mutual Influence

Theology

The Independent Journal

of modern philosophy's pursued

of Philosophy 111(1979), H3-I413. That Strauss saw the situation this way is indicated in his discussion tendency to lower the end of philosophy to that "which is capable of
men."

being actually

He wrote, "We have

by

all

suggested

that the ultimate justification for the distinction between

philosophers and nonphilosophers.
or more

gentle

men and nongentlemen

is the distinction between

purpose of the

If this is true, it

follows that

by

causing the

philosophers,

generally

the purpose which essen

tially
of

the gentlemen to collapse

14.

transcends society, to collapse into the purpose of the nonphilosophers, one causes the purpose " into the purpose of the "Liberal Education
nongentlemen."

"What is

?,"
.

19

6.

Leo Strauss
tion of

and

Liberal Education

237

greatest books was not simply that of a philosopher econo his range of attention and time. He thought that liberal education consists mizing "in studying with the proper care the great books which the greatest minds have

Strauss for the

left behind led him to

Books

"15
. . .

This

endorse the

movement

means of liberal education basic thrust, if not every organizational form, of the Great in America at midcentury. In his i960 address at Arden

conviction about

the primary

House, he
with

thought that "liberal education is

now

becoming
Strauss

almost synonymous

the reading in common of the

could

Great

Books."

then added, "No better

beginning
One

have been

made."16

slip to explaining Strauss's attraction to education via the Great Books through aspects of his biography, and there is something to be said for this
might even though

it is wholly inappropriate to call it an of his education and early interests in Germany and
sonal concerns great

"explanation."

What

we

know
per

what we can

track of

his

through his publications

manifest a

life

of

thinking

through the the lewish time

issues

posed

by the greatest thinkers

His two

in the Western tradition liberal

and

tradition
when

within

that.17

addresses on

education occurred at a

Socrates. The

Strauss is thought to have been turning his attention in a special way to example of Socrates turned out, perhaps surprisingly to some, to
and support not attraction

influence
but
also

his

only the way Strauss thought about liberal education to the Great Books approach. Strauss seemed to relish a Socrates
provided

little known
Those

statement of

by Xenophon:

who offer

it [wisdom] to
we

all comers

tors of wisdom, but

gifted

think that he who makes

for money are known as sophists, prosti tu a friend of one whom he knows to be
he can, fulfills the I can,

by nature,
.
.

and teaches

him

all the good

all

duty of a citizen and a

them to others
wise come

gentleman.

And I teach them

the

good

and recommend

from
men

I think they will get some moral benefit. And the treasures that the of old have left us in their writings I open and explore with my friends. If we
whom

on

any

good
,8

thing,

we extract

it,

and we set much store on

being

useful to one

another.

Socrates'

example seems

to have influenced
and the great
"human"

or

fortified his

a special emphasis of

Strauss in approaching

learning
the

thinkers. Strauss appeared to share

effort

fully

Socrates'

elevation of attention

questions and

to redirect phi

losophy's
tional

from

natural and

divine

matters

to human matters. In conven

terminology Strauss

elevated moral and political

philosophy

over such

ranging and profound inquiries as natural science, metaphysics and theology. Given Strauss's understanding of philosophy as quest and its natural movement
15.
16. 17.
note

"What is

?,"
.

3.
.
."24.

"Liberal Education

Strauss,"

See Walter Nicgorski, "Leo

Modern Age

26

(Summer/Fall,

1982). 270-73. esp.

18.
chant

Xenophon, Memorabilia

i.vi.13-14.

Underlining

is

mine.

Translation is that

of

E. C. Mar

from Xenophon, Memorabilia

and

Oeconomicus (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press,

1959)-

238

Interpretation
it
should

to metaphysics,
political

be clear that the priority Strauss assigned to moral and most a chronological and pedagogical priority rather is at philosophy significance. The great moral and political issues thrust inherent of than one
themselves with a special urgency on the eager student, the person of common

sense, the
cerned

citizen.

Since the activity

of

the

liberally
the

educated person will which

be

con

"with the

taken seriously
city,"

weighty matters, for their own sake, with the

most

with

only things
to

deserve to be

good order of

the soul and of the

these

liberal

education

itself

could

be

expected

emphasize

"weighty

Not only is it useful pedagogically to begin with the horizon of the citizen, but it seemed for Strauss as for Socrates to be the useful and natural start ing point for the philosophic inquirer. This Socratic practical orientation of
matters."19

Strauss for the

meant

that

great writings could not all education.

be

seen

to be of equal significance
more

purpose

of liberal

There

seemed to

be

than his occasional

arts college could
on

learned

playfulness

in Strauss's

reputed remark that a

liberal

be founded

around

four books: Aristotle's Ethics, Aquinas's Treatise

Law,

Kant's Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals and an unmenThis remark was made at St. lohn's College, America's premiere tioned
text.20

Great Books college; it life

and

was there that

Leo Strauss

spent

the last few years of his

of

died. That books

seemed a

fitting

capstone to a advocate

life

thinking

and

writing

about great

and then

coming to

them as the chief means of a lib

eral education.

But there is
great

still need

to understand why

Strauss

advocated
seem

the study of the

books

as the

best

mode of

liberal

education.

There

to be two reasons
of the great

or two

levels to

a single reason.

Strauss, like many

human

others, talked

books

and great minds as exemplars of

excellence.

The task

of

liberal

ed

ucation

is to draw

students

to

such excellence

by

proper exposure

to it. "Liberal

education,"

minds

Strauss wrote, alluding evidently to the contemporary context, "re those members of a mass democracy who have ears to hear, of human
other reason

greatness."21

The happen

is

evident

from

full

appreciation of what

happens

or can
writ

when a student

has had

a proper exposure

to the great minds in their

studied

ings. Strauss What that

states

that the great

books

are to

be

"with

care."

proper
with

meant above all

to him was that the great books must be studied

differences among them. It is in confronting and working through these differences that the mind of the student, and of the teacher, is truly drawn into the company of the greatest minds. Confronted with
attention to

full

the important

the most important matters, the student is drawn away from anything like the experience of indoctrination and drawn into philoso phy. "This of students and teachers "consists at any rate
of such minds on
philosophizing"

differences

primar-

19. 20.

"Liberal Education

11.
Strauss,"

Ted A. Blanton, "Leo

3-

The College (magazine

of

St. John's College) 25 (January,

1974),
21.

"What is

?,"
.

5,

see also p.

6.

Leo Strauss

and

Liberal Education

239
great philos

ily

and

in

way chiefly in
more

listening

to the conversation between the

ophers

or,

generally

and more

cautiously, between the

greatest

minds,

Strauss had in mind though he so listening beautifully insisted that this listening that can liberally educate "demands from us
But
passive was not what

the
of

complete

break

with

the noise, the rush, the

thoughtlessness,
their

the

cheapness

the

Vanity

Fair

of

the intellectuals as

well as of

enemies."23

In fact it

takes

something more than passivity even to hear much of a conversation, for Strauss noted that we students and teachers "must bring about that
monologues"

for "the
It

greatest minds utter

which we must

transform "into

dia

logue."24

seems reasonable

to assume that the "more

would

experienc

pupil's contribu

tion, namely the teacher's,

contribution

is

also needed

be important in making this dialogue. That in various and subtle ways because the dialogue be
"a This
the

tween the greatest minds produces

liberal
and

education as an

absurdity."25

difficulty so great that it seems to condemn difficulty has been only partly revealed
more experienced pupils

is essentially the

incapacity

of

(teachers)

and

less

experienced pupils

(students)
Strauss

to arbitrate the disagreements between and

put the

among the
us to says.

greatest minds.

difficulty
most

this way: "Since the greatest

compel

minds contradict one another

regarding the

important matters, they

judge

of

their monologues; we cannot take on trust what any one of them

On the

other

hand,

we cannot

but

notice that we are not competent to

be

judges."26

Whatever may be involved in liberal education, here it is shown to involve nontrusting, to involve philosophy, and this is a philosophy So it is that "lib that "must be on its guard against the wish to be edifying.
"trusting"

"

eral

education,

which

consists

in the

constant

intercourse
.
.and

with

the greatest

minds, is a

training in
possible

the highest form of

modesty.

at the same time a

training in Now it is
port of
left"

boldness."27

to

appreciate

the fact that Strauss's enthusiasm

for the

re

Socrates'

Xenophon

on

is but

a qualified of

reading "treasures that the wise men of old have enthusiasm. Socrates was reported speaking both of the
one's

importance

teaching

friends
good

all

the good you can and of how

he

and

his

friends
other.

when

coming

on

any

in

reading, extract

it
on

and are useful

to one an
occasions,

In commenting
observed

on this passage of
report

Xenophon

two

separate

Strauss books
22. 23.

that this

indicates

implicitly

that not everything

in those
not

was "defective since of wise men was good and that the report

it does

"What is "What is

?,"7?,"8. dialogues regarding Plato's

was anticipated

24

The

obvious question

by

Strauss

when we

he

ob

served that

"the

even when greatest minds utter monologues

they

write

dialogues. When
minds of

look

at

the Platonic dialogues,

"

we observe that there

is

never a

dialogue among

the highest order

?,"

"What is

7-

25. 26. 27.

Ibid. Ibid.
?,"

"What is

8.

240

Interpretation
.
.of

tell us anything as to what Socrates did regarding those passages.

which

he

did

not

know

whether

they

were

good."28

Strauss's

comments reflect a concern one

that the report, as

it is,

can give a

false

picture

leading

to underestimate the

difficulty
ings

of

thinking

through the mixed elements, good and

bad, in

great writ

and the even more

fundamental

and graver

difficulty

of

knowing

how to

rec

ognize the good.

Strauss

seemed concerned

that the report as it stands might

relations with

be

taken to reveal Socrates as unphilosophic

education

in his

friends. Liberal

through engagement with the dialogue of great minds must

and

involve the

questioning
noble yet

questing spirit of philosophy; it could not but be touched elusive full comprehension that philosophy seeks.
one combine

by

the

How then does

man with

the trustfulness of the

liberally
the

educated gentle

the trustlessness of the philosopher? How

questions of good and evil required

does

one combine

the resolu

tion of pressing

by

liberally
marks

educated with

the dissatisfied pressing for complete understanding that

the genuine phi

losopher? These

questions

simply

bring
on

to the foreground the tensions

between
to these
taught in

the city and philosophy, philosophy and liberal education, and liberal education
and

the city. The writings of

Strauss

liberal

education

lead be

readers

questions.

He did

not prescribe norms or rules

for

what can

given or

liberal

education as opposed

to what must be questioned in philosophy; he did

way what can be expected from pupils and what would be unsettling to them; he did not give a clear and distinct line of separation between liberal education and philosophy. Strauss left these questions, as per
not assert some universal

in

haps they
education,

must

be left, to be

worked out within

in

accord with

the abilities and disposi

tions of the teacher and student

of each struggle with

the context of

each experience of
minds.29

liberal

the struggles of great

For Strauss then, the

great minds approached cation are

means of

liberal

education were

in

a certain way.

The important

conditions

primarily the works of for this edu

the qualities of the teacher

study.

and student and

the

institutional

ambience

in

which

they

Compared

with

his

extensive comments on said

the great books

and

the proper approach to

them, Strauss
of

these conditions. When Strauss spoke

28.

little explicitly and directly about the "proper with which the great
care"

is
29.

?,"

Leo Strauss, Xenophon's Socrates (Ithaca: Cornell 6.

In
an earlier version of

University Press,

1972),

29.

Also,

"What

"What Is Liberal
"warning,"

Education?"

Strauss began the

despair"

address

by indicating

that the substance of it constituted a

and that the

education,
ucation for

would

be

able to avoid

taking

the warning as
seems that the

listeners, because they have had a liberal a "counsel of (see Fletcher, ed., Ed

Public Responsibility, 43). It

on the grave philosophical

difficulties
or

and challenges

ing

results

Yet these listeners are not expected to despair because they have received sufficiently of a liberal education that they know what they have is good even if it is not the whole of wisdom and thus a guarantee of the goodness of which are
a commencement address).

liberal

education

in his raising a question (recall that this is

warning is constituted by Strauss's emphasis imbedded in liberal education and that the warn doubt for his listeners concerning whether they have attained a

Perhaps Strauss's intention was, however, to indicate that they will not despair because a lib eral education gives a person perspective on and hence capacity to accept human limitations, specifi cally limitations on our capacity to attain complete wisdom.
aware.

they

Leo Strauss
books
pils of

and

Liberal Education
explicitly
called

241
more experienced pu

are

to be read, he

for teachers (the

and

the

books)

and students marked and

by humility

docility

before the

great

minds and

by

boldness

independence in assessing

oppositions and tensions.

He
of

also sought a

disposition to carefulness,
permits one not at

seriousness and

honesty

and the

kind

intellectual ability that

necessarily to surpass,

which would

be

rare

indeed, but
in the

the

least to be
degree

engaged

by

the

thinking

of great minds.

The
deli

more experienced

pupil, the teacher,

would need as a rule

to be marked

by these

qualities

greater

as well as

by

appropriate

"perceptivity

and

cacy"

site

for the leader's responsibility in liberal learning. In the light of such requi qualities for liberal education and their variation from person to person, the
of

best form

liberal

education would

be

one-on-one or

triadic,

the student, the

a per

teacher and the great

sonal encounter

books. Education toward

wisdom would

have to be like

to answer sensitively and hence

rightly

questions

where

to

begin
each

how far to try to stretch or ascend. Socrates is known to have taught individual as an individual.30 This liberal education, concerned with the
and

souls of or

those

being

educated,

cannot

be,

as

Strauss has said,

akin to an

industry
the

in any way When on one

machinelike.31

occasion

Strauss

spoke quite

explicitly
not

and

directly
in

about

conditions of
respects.

liberal education, his

with an

statement was remarkable

a couple of
self-

Strauss began

interesting, if

surprising to many,

revelation.

own

that

education

is in

a sense the subject matter of

my teaching
and

and

my

research.
or

But I

am almost
of and

solely

concerned with

the goal or end of education at its best

highest ditions
the

the education of the perfect prince as

most

it

were

very little

with

its

con

its how. The

important conditions, it

seems to

me, are the qualities of

case of the

educator and of

the human

being

who

is to be educated; in the

highest

form

of education those conditions are

thing

to

produce

very rarely fulfilled, and one cannot do any them; the only things we can do regarding them are not to interfere
and

with their

interplay

to

prevent such

interference.32

When Strauss

claimed

that the qualities necessary

and not within

for the highest form

of educa was ev

tion are very rarely found

the power of human making,

he

idently
prince.

speaking Since liberal

of philosophical education and

education

the

education of

the

philosopher-

is significantly

philosophical

and

since

it is

preliminary to
pher,
the
qualities

philosophical education

proper, namely the

said about the

life

of the philoso

one would expect what

Strauss has

for the highest form

That

of education

to be

so

rarity and given nature of in proportionate degree for

near

liberal

education.

conclusion

is

affirmed

directly

the end of the same

30. That which is exemplified regularly in the dramatic accounts of both Plato and Xenophon is Xenophon at the beginning of Book IV of the Memorabilia where explicitly drawn attention to by have varied his method in accord with the disposition of each person acknowledged to Socrates is
with whom 31.

he talked

seriously.
. . .

"Liberal Education

25.
,"9.

32.

"Liberal Education

242

Interpretation
Strauss
cautioned:

speech where
ever

"We It

must not expect

that liberal education can

become

universal education.
minority."33

will always remain

the obligation and the

privilege of a

Strauss's intent,

however, in noting

that the qualities requisite

for the higher

forms

of education are

mantic abandonment
what

beyond human making must not be understood as a ro of human effort to cultivate human excellence. Much of
essays on

Strauss

said

in both his Two

liberal

education and

throughout his work

is indicative
"one

of

the strenuous effort he

comments can

or acculturating.
cannot

things we

do anything to can do regarding them

interference."

produce"

necessary for such cultivation Strauss's intent in having said help clarify the requisite qualities and that "the only
regarded as

are not

to interfere with their

almost

interplay

and

to

prevent such

First, Strauss
he
is

immediately

followed this

state

ment with an example of advice

gives graduate students was to

This advice,
silent student

often

heard from Strauss,

"always
to

assume that

concerning teaching. there is one

and

in

your class who

by

far
of

superior

you

in head
not

in

heart."

Strauss then

explained

the implications
and

this as

follows: "do

have too high

an opinion of your
responsibility."34

importance,

have the highest

opinion of your

duty,

your re

Strauss's

example makes clear

how seriously he took the

philosophic

sponsibility to that rarely

found highest type, the

soul,

who

in

our midst.

So Strauss

at the

bility"

and

before

dealing

with

very start of his "Liberal Education and his more generally applicable topic, talked

may be Responsi
about

the rarest of human types and the need

for

most

to respond to this person, espe

cially
tions

at

the level of higher education,

The

second comment

bearing

on

by stepping aside and not interfering. Strauss's intent in putting the critical condi
note

of education

beyond human making is to

education effort

that Strauss

was

speaking

of

the conditions

for

during

the college years and after. He to

cultivate

was not un

dercutting human
with respect

in the

earlier years of the student

the qualities
even

that later make possible liberal and philosophical education. to the college years and after,
interference"

Furthermore,

Strauss
of

said that we are expected

"to

prevent
qualified

with

the

interplay

the qualified student and the the challenging, delicate and

teacher.

Preventing

such

interference

with

personal experience of ness of

liberal

and philosophical education requires some aware

the

forces that

might or

do interfere

and some

knowledge

of a supportive

ambience

for

such education.

Strauss

gave some

direction both

with respect

to preparation for liberal

and yet

educa

tion and regarding a supportive ambience

for this

higher

education.

Not

surprisingly Strauss seemed to point primarily to a Greek model for education preparatory to liberal education. Besides providing the basic skills as reading, writing
and

reckoning,

such education should consist

primarily in "the formation

education are

taste."

of character and of
33.
34.

"The
24.

fountains"

for this

the

poets.35

"Liberal Education "Liberal Education

.

9.
.

35.

"Liberal Education

11.

Leo Strauss

and

Liberal Education
would

243
those qualities
of character

The taste for the beautiful

e.g.

be

coupled with

honesty, humility
for liberal

and

boldness Strauss

which were noted above as requisite

conditions

education.

recognized that the genuine refinement

was

of character and

taste required for liberal education taste

and conformism

threatened

by

the pres
wrote

sures of common

in

a mass

democracy. Strauss

boldly
the

of

this concern in "What is

can we

Political Philosophy?":

Nor

first place,

tion

say that democracy has found a solution to the problem of education. In is today called education, very frequently does not mean educa the formation of character, but rather instruction and training. proper, i.e.,
what

Secondly,
exists a

to the extent to which the formation of character is indeed

intended,

there

very dangerous tendency to operative fellow, the "regular

virtue and a

identify
i.e.,

the good man

with

the good sport, the co

guy,"

an overemphasis on a certain part of social

corresponding
not

neglect of

those virtues which mature, if

they do

not

flourish, in
other pared

privacy,

to say solitude:

by

educating

people to cooperate with each

who are pre

in

friendly

spirit, one does not yet educate nonconformists, people

to stand alone, to

fight alone, "rugged

individualists."36

portant part

Strauss apparently also thought that religious education often played an im in securing the character formation that was useful to good political
the basis for liberal and philosophical education. He spoke in i960 of
people"

order and

the

"decay

of religious education of
part of

the

and added that

"I

mean more

than the fact that a very large

the people no
on

longer

receive

any

religious

education,
that

although

it is

not

fact."37

It is

clear that

necessary in Strauss's

the present occasion to think beyond

view religious education even when re once characterized

ceived

had lost the

central emphasis sought

that

it. That

education

based

on

the Bible had

to

bring

"everyone to
a

regard

himself as judge
"felt

responsible

for his

actions and

for his thoughts to

God

who would

him."38

The de
contem

need"

mise of

this

religious

education, thought

Strauss,

created a

in

porary society for character education which many took to be a need for liberal education. Strauss wondered if certain proponents of liberal education, some
times quite
universal

time. He asked, "Is

void created

our present concern with

liberal education, correctly understood the liberal education

of religious education? performed

problems of the
.

not

due to the

by

the

to

perform

the function
perform

decay formerly
that

Is

such

liberal

education meant

by

religious education? modern

Can liberal

function?"39

education

Strauss believed that

democracy
dependent

the
on

founding
of

conception of

its

originators

was conceived

to be

the

religious education of

the

people and

the liberal education of the represen

of education seemed to ex

tatives
plain
36.

the

people.

The

decay

of

both these forms

"the

present

of mass

democracy.40

Philosophy?"

Leo Strauss, "What Is Political

What Is Political Philosophy?

and

Other Stud

ies (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1973). 18-19. 37. "Liberal Education

. .

37~38.

38.
39.

"Liberal Education

15-16.

"Liberal Education "Liberal Education

19.
18.

40.

244 As

Interpretation
great as were

the

forces

and

tendencies that Strauss saw working against

the sound

character education

that

was a

necessary preliminary for liberal

education.

educa

tion,

there were equally significant challenges awaiting the well-prepared student

who might arrive at a college or

matter as

cation of

the

positively as kind of person

educators was

university for a liberal possible, Strauss was aware of the

who could

To

put

the

absence

in higher

edu

be

an educator praise

toward

wisdom.

What he

looked for in
colleague wrote

highlighted in the
at

during

Strauss's days

the

Riezler, a New School for Social Research. Riezler,

once gave
humanity."

he

Kurt

Strauss,

was marked

by

"the

virtue of

His interests
could

and sympathies extended

to

all

fields

of

worthy human variety

of

endeavour.

He

easily have become an outstanding scholar in ferred to be a tmly educated man rather than to be his
mind

a great

fields, but he pre

The activity of not of harried

a specialist.

had the

character of noble and serious employment of

leisure,

labor. And his

sense of

wide

ranging interests

and sympathies were never

divorced from his

human

responsibility.4'

Notable in this
"harried

praise and

is Riezler's "sense

of

human

responsibility,"

freedom from
the special to find the

labor,"

freedom from the

qualities

often constricted

humanity

of

ist. Strauss looked for these

milieu of educational

in liberal

educators and seemed

institutions

unsupportive of such

human his

qualities.
with

Strauss specifically
result

wrote about

the "ever

increasing
on

specialization,

the

that a

man's

respectability becomes dependent

to be specialists, but we can

being

specialist.

His

personal

response, also urged upon his students and

friends,

was

that "we are

indeed

compelled

try

to specialize in the most

weighty matters or, to speak more simply and more nobly, in the one thing need ful."42 In light of Strauss's view of the starting point for education and of what is
entailed

in the

movement

toward wisdom,

it is

clear

that this

specialization

"in

needful"

the one

thing

is

hardly

akin

to the specialization usually found in the

challenged

modern university.

Strauss's view,

of

course,

the radical

egalitarian

ism among disciplines

tions.

and subjects that pervades

higher

education and

has

made

curricular structure and coherence a

nearly impossible

objective

in many institu

Strauss

noted

the effects of

also on what entific

is

experienced

education"

being

"in

increasing specialization not only on educators but by the students. He specifically commented on "sci danger of losing its value for the broadening and the
He then
to
called attention

deepening

of

the human

being."

to a widely known but

wholly inadequate
The remedy for
temporal

curricular response

increasing
sought

specialization.

specialization

is therefore

in

a new

kind

of universalism

universalism which and

has been

rendered almost

inevitable

by

the extension of our

spatial

horizons. We
of such

are

trying

to expel the narrowness of specialization

by

the

superficiality
41
.

things as general civilization courses or

Riezler,"

by

what

has aptly been

234.

42.

Leo Strauss, "Kurt "Liberal Education

What Is Political Philosophy?

and

Other Studies,

,"23-24.

Leo Strauss
compared

and

Liberal Education

245

to the

tory
The
not

of all nations

unending cinema, as distinguished from a picture gallery, of the his in all respects: economic, scientific, artistic, religious, and political.
thus
provided

gigantic spectacle

is in the best
pages

case

exciting

and entertaining; of and

it is

instructive
us

and educating.

A hundred

no, ten pages

Herodotus intro variety in human

duce

immeasurably better into the mysterious unity of oneness

spirit predominant

things than many volumes written in the

in

our

age.43

With this books to

statement
educate

Strauss
a

revealed again

his

view of and

the capacity of the

great

in

way

marked

both

by

breadth

by

depth. knew from

not

Strauss leisure
minds.

was

obviously

concerned that

and

the quiet that allowed thoughtful

we

contemporary inquiry into the

education as

educators

the

works of the greatest us

Thus,

recall, he spoke of liberal

demanding
enemies."44

"the

complete

break
Fair

with of

the noise, the rush, the thoughtlessness, the

well as of

cheapness of

the

Vanity

the intellectuals as
of

their

Then

at an

other

time he spoke

liberal

education as

and small voices and

therefore in

becoming
the

consisting "in learning deaf to loudspeakers. Liberal These

words on

to listen to still
educa

tion seeks

light

and therefore shuns

reprinted

limelight."45

the limelight

were

in the

collection entitled

shunning Higher Education and

Modern

Democracy
Liberal
sum

wherein also appeared an

essay

by

Allan Bloom titled "The

Crisis
seem

Education."

of

Bloom's

comments on

the contemporary university

to

up the

concerns of

Strauss.

The university has become omnicompetent and sensitive to the needs of the commu nity. As such, however, it is less a preserve for the quiet contemplation of the perma nent questions which are often forgotten in the bustle of ordinary business and [for] the
pursuit of

those

disciplines

whose

important things,
change

and more a center consecrated

only purpose is intellectual clarity about the most for the training of highly qualified specialists. This
What
was once

has been

by

a transformation of name:

the univer

sity has become the

multiversity.46

And

finally

of those qualities

that Strauss praised

sense of

in Kurt Riezler
to avoiding the

and so evi

dently

sought

in

educators,

"the

human

seems

the

most

difficult to find

and

probably is the
of a
claim can

key,

when

found,

dangers

of

nothing"

narrow specialization and

harried, "much
be
It
was

ado about

pace of

life in

higher

education.

This

understood

Strauss

meant

by

human

responsibility.

only if one pays attention to what Strauss's analysis of the predomi

that human responsibility had to the standards

nant character of

modernity that

led him to
to

see

come,
set

on a wide

scale, to be

understood

mean responsiveness

by

public opinion.

Strauss had
end of
pursued

concluded

that

in

modern

philosophy

Ma

chiavelli and after

"the

philosophy is identified
men."

with

the end which

is

capable of
43. 44. 45.

being

actually

by

all

Strauss

explained

"Liberal Education

,"23.

Note 23

preceding.
,"25.

"Liberal Education

Education,"

46.
122.

Allan Bloom, "The Crisis

of

Liberal

Higher Education

and

Modern Democracy,

246

Interpretation

It follows that
pose which

by

causing the

purpose of

the philosophers, or more generally the pur

collapse

essentially transcends society, to

into the

purpose of

the nonphi

losophers,

one causes the purpose of the gentlemen to collapse

into the

purpose of the

nongentlemen.

In this respect, the

end of

modem conception of

philosophy is may
call

fundamentally
disinterested

democratic. The
contemplation of

philosophy is

now no

longer

what one

the eternal,

but the

relief of man's

estate.47

Later in the sonably

modern age even

the relief of man's estate meaning

as

"health,
from

a rea

long

life

prosperity"

and called

tively

superior

desires is
is then

into

question.

representing Strauss
the
ends

goals

that derive

objec

commented

Since

science

unable

to

justify

for

which

it

seeks the means,

it is in

practice compelled

to satisfy the ends

which are sought

to

which

the individual scientist

.

happens to
at what

belong
of mass

by its customers, by the society and hence in many cases by the

our age or characteristic of our with

mass.

If

we

look

then

only

is

peculiar

to

age, we

see

hardly

more

than the

interplay

taste

high-grade but strictly

at

speaking
sponsive

unprincipled efficiency.

The technicians are, if not responsible,

a mass as mass cannot

any

rate re

to the demands of the mass; but

be

responsible to

any

one or to

anything for

anything.48

This is the
seen as

world of philosopher-scientists or
which

simply

scientists

(with

philosophers

irrelevant) in

"human
that

responsibilit

takes
a

on new

dimensions.

These

new

dimensions

mean

it is

responsibility

without

the transcendent
education that con

that gave meaning to the Strauss defended. No transcendent

standard
ventional

classical conception of

liberal

standard means no aspiration

beyond the

in

each

society

and

that represents a collapse downward

and

of the benefieduca

cient

tension between society

philosophy.

liberal education,

and

between liberal

tion and

DEMOCRACY, LIBERAL EDUCATION

AND THE GERMANIC MODELOF THE UNIVERSITY

In

what

drama in bience

which genuine qualities of

has preceded, modern democracy may appear to be the villain in a liberal education is the victim. Strauss has drawn atten
the student and teacher and,
provide the

tion to the
of

by implication,
for liberal

to the

am

the

institution that

primary

conditions

education.

He found contemporary
ultimate
of

conditions

overwhelmingly
as

unfavorable to

liberal (hence
of

educa
not

tion and pointed at mass

democracy
of

both

a cause and symptom

the

cause)

the unfavorable conditions. The root cause

is,

course, the

modern attack on

the possibility

philosophy in the

classic sense and the popu

larization
mass

of

this

in

an

intellectual

and moral egalitarianism

that can be

called

democracy.
"Liberal Education "Liberal Education
"
.

47.
48.

19-20. 23.

Leo Strauss

and

Liberal Education
not

247
this situation though one
would

Strauss, however, did

false to his
timistic.
and writings on and

totally despair in

be

Also,

this

liberal

education

they were hopeful or op is very important to note, Strauss did not find democracy to be simply natural enemies. First of all, in the spirit of
for

liberal

education to suggest that

Socrates'

appreciation

Athens, Strauss

wrote

We

are not permitted

to be flatterers of

democracy

precisely because

we are

friends

and allies of
which

democracy. While

we are not permitted

to remain silent on the

dangers to

vious
care

fact that

democracy exposes itself as well as human excellence, we cannot forget the ob by giving freedom to all, democracy also gives freedom to those who
excellence.

for human

No

one prevents us

from cultivating

our garden or

from

setting up

outposts which

may
of

come

to be regarded

republic and as

deserving
although

giving

to it

is the necessary,

by

no means

by many its tone. Needless to say, the the sufficient, condition for
a

citizens as

salutary to the

utmost exertion

success.49

Thus Strauss drew

attention to the
name of

democracy
tion
was

in the

fact that, at least to freedom accommodates his

degree, contemporary
educa

and other efforts to ad

vance a classic

liberal

education.

But then, too, he indicated that if liberal

to be more than tolerated in a

democracy,
and said

great effort with no assurance

of success

is

called as

for. Strauss implied here

Furthermore,
mocracy it is to function
quire

directly

elsewhere,

modern

de

more than accommodates and survive as

liberal education; it requires such education if originally intended. Democracy and freedom re
are not to slide

liberally
and

educated

leaders if they

into

mass

democracy
spoke of

and

license

ultimately to "the ladder originally his larger

. .

self-destruction.

Strauss's
greater

statement

from his first

writ

ing

on

liberal

education now comes

into

light. There he Strauss's

liberal
to de

education as

by

which we

try

to ascend from mass

democracy

mocracy "liberal

as

meant."50

The

relation of

concern with

liberal

education to

enterprise

is illumined

by

democracy
the

derives

powerful

recalling his observation that from a premodern mode of

thought.51

Many, from
weaknesses of

left

and

the right, have drawn attention to the

failures

and

American

society.

It is

seen at one

time or another as too commer

or

cial, too materialistic, too narcissistic, too egalitarian,

tues. This is to
not

too void of civic vir

the

occasion

to look at this vast and often

depressing literature or

try

to assess the fairness of various allegations of shortcomings. Here the point

note

is simply to

that very few critics appreciate and point to the critical under

graduate years as one of the ever one assesses

the quality of
24.

primary points of reform in American society. How life or moral character of American society,
Strauss
also wrote

49.

"Liberal Education

"that liberal

or constitutional

democracy
See "Re

comes closer to what the classics

Hiero,"

statement on

Xenophon's
preceding.

demanded than any alternative that is viable in our What Is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies, 113.
Modernity,"

age."

50. 51.

Note 1,

Leo Strauss, "The Three Waves

ed.

of

in Political Philosophy: Six Essays

by Leo

Strauss, Hilail Gildin,

(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975), 98.

248
those
more

Interpretation
with

entrusted

the education of American undergraduates are, perhaps

at a pivotal

than any others, the whole

point, a point

of maximum

leverage,
first

with re

spect to

society. of

In the last

years of adolescence and

years of

adulthood, the leaders

nearly every

significant sector of

America,

the media,

business, law, among

of

others, go to
and most

college.

These

college years are critical years and moral aspects

for human development

development. It is
at

notably for the intellectual

to

not unreasonable
a

lay

goodly

part of at

the blame

for

failed society

the door of

failed education, specifically

and

the door of those

educators who are charged with opment of society's

cal role

guiding a critical phase in the devel shaping leadership. Leo Strauss had a good sense for the vital, criti play
with respect

liberal

education could

to the overall quality and stabil

ity

of

American democracy.
additional observations on

Two

Strauss's

effort

to turn

democracy

to

liberal

education are necessary.

ment and emergence

to

way

of

moving from

the develop leadership of a natural aristocracy. Strauss wrote that the mass democracy to democracy as originally intended was
encouraged
education an

First, like lefferson, Strauss

aristocracy within democratic mass so ciety. Without underplaying the important differences between Strauss and Jefferson on the nature of liberal education, it seems useful to note that both

by founding

through liberal

Jefferson
and yet

and

Strauss did
were aware

not see

liberal

education as universal or
could of

both

were untouched

by

that many who it in their times because

education.

for everyone, benefit from liberal education

material or other condi

the lack of
each

tions supportive of that to be done

The

point

is that

thought that

much was

by

liberal
cieties

education

way of reforming before one reached the limits

education and

extending the
the

opportunities

for
so

of

liberally

educable

in the

they knew.
that

A cally

second observation concerns educated people

frequently

heard

charge that

humanisti

have been known to be indecent

and enemies of constitu

tional democracy. Cases cited vary from Nazi

of organizations

like the Students For humanistic

leaders to cursing revolutionaries Democratic Society. It may suffice to say

fail to distinguish between
experience of

that this

charge and whatever examples are cited often effect of

the decorative
education as

learning and the rigorous

liberal

described

by

Strauss.
cases of the sort under
and

Strauss did, however, take up harder He cited Marx, "the father of

fascism"

discussion here.
stepgrandfather

communism,"

Nietzsche,

"the

of

as

being "liberally

educated on a

level to

which we cannot even

hope

Here Strauss may have erred on the side of the generosity to these learned adversaries, for he proceeded to report that their failures have helped us
to
understand anew a portion of wisdom education

aspire."

(that

in

a certain respect).

In the light

of

is, have helped us to a fuller liberal those failures, it is easier to see, ac

hence to
understand that wis

cording to Strauss
that
wisdom cannot

be

separated

from
to
a

moderation and

dom

unhesitating loyalty stitutionalism. Moderation will protect

requires

decent

constitution and even to the cause of con

us against the twin

dangers

of

visionary

expec-

Leo Strauss

and

Liberal Education

249

tations from politics and unmanly contempt for politics. Thus it may again become true that all
the

liberally educated men will be politically moderate men. It is in liberally educated may again receive a hearing even in the market
pages of

this

way

that

place.52

In the first

Natural Right and History, Strauss

and

reflected on

the

present

dominance in America
the twentieth century. that a nation,

the West

of

German thought
the

of an earlier period

in

He
on

commented on

irony
as

that this

is

not

"the first time

defeated

the

battlefield and,
own

it were,

annihilated as a political

being, has deprived its

conquerors of

the most sublime fruit of victory

by impos
Strauss
that at
po

ing

on

them the yoke of

mind was a

its

thought."53

The destructive
positivism or

yoke

that

had in

relativism, emerging from

of natural
would

historicism,
of

tacked the very

basis

right

and

thus the foundation

the American

litical tradition. One

be unduly

sanguine to

say that at present that

yoke

had been broken, yet many developments, including the force of the thought and teaching of Leo Strauss, have worked to check the spread and grip of that relativ ism
whether

in its

"intellectual"

or casual

forms.
more

However,
than

the hope of reviving and extending liberal education requires

argument against various

having

the better

forms

of relativism.

It

requires

support structures and an environment

informed

by

a proper

liberal

education and

its

conditions.

America's
shaped

universities and

understanding of indirectly her

great

colleges

have, however, largely been

of the nineteenth

by

the

model of

the

German

century.54

universities

This

was

explicitly true of that great

university in Chicago which sheltered and encouraged Leo Strauss for so long. The German universities passed to America their ambitions for ever more spe
cialized

knowledge
to

and

the resulting that

progress of

the sciences, and

were

they

passed

too the

structures

sustain

enterprise.

These

the intellectual "commu

were

nities"

that developed the ideas that so troubled Strauss. These

so notorious

the intellec

"communities"

tual the the

absence of civic
universities.

for intense individualism,

that

personal

virtue.55

Leo Strauss

never wrote about a

rivalry and broad reform of hopeless

pertinent

In

fact, it

appears

he

saw

that

road of reform as so

that he consciously kept his

and
course of

specific recommendations

to the

"modest,

practical"

urging teachers of all subjects to teach with an emphasis "whatever broadens

and

and approach that encourages

ing"

deepens the

understand

as opposed

to that

which at

best "cannot

as such produce more

than

narrow

efficiency."56

and unprincipled

52. 53. 54.

"Liberal Education

24.
and

Leo Strauss, Natural Right For For

a selective

History

(Chicago:

University

of

history

and analysis of the emergence of the modem

Chicago Press, 1953), 2. university, see Charles

of

Wegener, Liberal
1978).

Education

and the

Modern University. (Chicago:

model on

University
liberal

Chicago Press,
de Na
and

the impact of the German university

the American

arts college and a

fense
tional

of the traditional mission of

the

latter,
of

see

Earl McGrath, Values, Liberal Education

university"

Destiny
For

(Indianapolis:

Lilly Endowment,
"the failure

1975).

55.

an examination of

the German

that was

found to be

character

ized

Frederic Lilge, The Abuse of Learning (New York: Macmillan,

56.

by

at neglect of education and a self-centered,

best amoral,

and

fragmented way

of

life,

see

1948).

"Liberal Education

19.

250

Interpretation
was

Leo Strauss
nent and
tion"

in this,
course.

as

in

all

matters,

a champion of

the

"modest,

perti
exer

practical"

But he

was also one who called

for the "utmost

in joining him
was

republic"

at efforts

"salutary

to the
at

and

deserving

to give to

it

its tone. Those This

efforts were

to be directed

inspiring

genuine

liberal

education.

his salutary action for American democracy as well as for human excel lence. Had Leo Strauss never written about liberal education and spelled out its
nature,
means and

conditions, his

students would still

have been

able

to recog

nize

the truth of Strauss's claim "that education is in a sense the subject matter of
research."

my teaching him directly

and

and or

my

And his

students

indirectly and sought

to heed him

namely those who have heard would know that his example
education.

teaching

required attention

to and efforts for liberal

In

a situation

where

the tone and structure of higher education is set

research

largely by

the

model of

the

German

mocracy, those course,

prudent.

efforts

university for liberal

adapted

in

certain ways to

the requisites of mass de

education need

to be great, constant and, of

Book Reviews

Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche

without

Masks.

University

of

Chicago Press,

1983. xvi + 216 pp.:

By Ofelia Schutte. $22.00.)

(Chicago:

Maureen Feder-Marcus
S.U.N.Y. I College
at

Old

Westbury

I
nineteenth-century philosophy takes as its theme the drama of con sciousness, the movement of spirit from alienation to wholeness, from the child
of

Much

like to the

mature.

The

most

influential

of

theirs as the age of

triumph,

rational spirit made manifest. and

nineteenth-century philosophers saw It remained for a few

under

to see the drama very

differently

to understand that
unresolved

the

much vaunted

Reason

of

the age, something

when we

terribly
at

and,

indeed,

explosive was
our vantage

lurking. Thus
point, few

look back
the

the nineteenth century from

as

portrayals of

movement of spirit are as

It is unfortunate, then, that the force

"immoralism"

of

his

critique

compelling is often eclipsed

pushes

Nietzsche's.

by

the

of

his solutions, which, in his later work,

we can appreciate

away

even

the

sympathetic reader.

In light
out

of

this,

Schutte's Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche

of

with

Masks. Schutte

sets

herself the task

rescuing those elements of Nietzsche's

thought that speak to the

and political views. ries

healing

of nihilism

from his

more questionable social

She

presents

Nietzche

as an ontologist whose

basic

catego
and

the

will

to power, the

eternal

recurrence, the innocence of

becoming,

the Ubermensch
ous enough gives us a
which

exhibit an

overarching unity,

although with ambiguities seri

to

warrant a

thorough critique. While providing this critique, Schutte

and

lucid, balanced,
to
read.

dialectically
in the
the

subtle account of

Nietzsche's work,
will

is

a pleasure

The For

central notion

to

examine

critique of

Nietzche is the

to

power.

an adequate

understanding
view

of

will

to power, Schutte requires that we take

as central

Nietzsche's

that all truth

is

metaphorical.

Indeed,

the

notion of

truth as

metaphor

is

so

fundamental to Schutte's reading

of

Nietzche that

she

in

terprets Zarathustra's

most

famous

words
live"

in

an

explicitly

epistemological way.

"God is dead
live"

the Ubermensch shall

means, in Schutte's reading of Nietz

now on metaphorical

sche, that "Metaphysical truth is dead

from

truth shall

(p.

92).

Just

as

Nietzsche

rejects

the

reifications

of Western

metaphysics as

doing

violence

to the protean nature of reality as process and

becoming,

so

too he

discards

a view of

truth as univocal and static. Thus the notion that

reality is the

252
will

Interpretation
must

to power is a truth that

be

understood

contextually to be

part of

Nietz

sche's overall critique of

Western

metaphysics as

essentially dualistic.

nihilistic

For Nietzsche, the dualism that haunts Western thinking is the expression of a respirit, a spirit which bitterly resents what it cannot control. These
name of

senters, in the
the level
of

wisdom, have
and

reduced

time, earth, body, the

"higher"

sensuous whose

to

"mere

appearance"

have

posited a

reality
and the

only

real purpose

is to

negate

life itself.

In the
cedes

conflict of

the

Dionysian,

the

Apollonian,

Socratic

which pre

this positing, the Dionysian carries the greatest ontological weight

with

being

instinctual force, universal energy, the dynamic continuity of life itself. The Dionysian is also the source of human transcendence. For while we identified
are connected to

by

tion."

unity of nature through the unconscious, the ego, its demand for security and control, catches us in the "agony of individua The breaking down of individuated consiousness, the return to the totality
the

"primal"

of what

is,

what

Nietzsche

calls

the

"joy

of

self-

forgetfulness,"

is thus

expressed

by

the Dionysian as well.

The Dionysian,
opposed ated

however, is only

one pole of our

deepest

unconscious

life, for
the

to the sheer swell of unindividuated existence is the

the Apollonian. The tension between the two

beauty

of

individu

form,

is, for Nietzsche,

source of our greatest creative

ollonian, identified

with

activity, but it is also rife with danger. For the Ap the dream image and hence with illusion, seeks to de

lude the individual into

Apollonian

can enchant with

forgetting the universal ground of life. the beauty of individuated form,

And because the it

succeeds.

Illu

sion triumphs over

truth although some aspect of nature's creativity, the uncon

scious, is

preserved.

But

yet a new principle emerges

to usurp the triumph

of

the Apollonian. This

principle

is

not

born

out of

the drive for creativity but speaks for the desire to pu

rify

life

of

those elements that the ego cannot control.

Schutte

understands

this

Socratic

principle of abstract reason as

overpowering the Dionysian from within

and without.

It is

a principle extrinsic

to art, yet "as a

formal

principle

it

succeeds
sensu

the
ous

Apollonian impulse from

form
and

within"

(p.

19).

Conceptual form dislodges

is

even more successful

Socratic

principle replaces
a

in overpowering the Dionysian. For the the liberating but frightening loss of self with its polar
world

opposite,

late

and

reality made into fixed object, a control. The cost, however, is great

for

consciousness to manipu
of

the

fragmentation

human

being

and the

ensuing Just as, for Nietzsche, the overcoming of dualism means the return to the Dio nysian, so Schutte takes this principle as the key to the interpretation of Nietz
sche's own categories.

nihilism of the culture as a whole.

She

wishes to replace a

his

categories with a more

fluid,

metaphorical one.

strictly logical understanding of Such a reading, she claims,

overcomes nihilism and shows

will reveal

the ways in

which

Nietzsche's thought

us where

he himself loses this Dionysian

perspective and

falls into the

rigid im-

Book Reviews

253
thinking. This
philosophy.
will also

peratives of categorical

clarify

some of the paradoxes

that plague

Nietzsche's

The
and

notion of

the will to power,

vacillates
of an

Schutte tells us,

avails

itself

of

two readings the will to

Nietzsche himself Nietzsche treats it

between them. On the

one

hand,

power should and

be the basis

as such.

ontology that allows us to overcome dualism, When he speaks from this metaphorical stand

point, the will to power is compatible with the notion of the eternal recurrence, the innocence of becoming, and the vision of Zarathustra, all of which have as their central message the
will

to

power

along the

overcoming of dualism. But Nietzsche lines of a model of domination:

also views

the

Under the
no

recurrence no

model, there is no sense of separation between cause and effect,

dualism,

ego,

no

will,

and

ination model, the fundamental strong from the

structure

everything is in flux and flowing. Under the dom is the dualism between the strong and the

weak, the active and the reactive, and there is much rhetoric about
weak

dividing the
regardless of

through great acts

of

willing

and

commanding
(p.

statements made elsewhere about the nonexistence of the will

59).

Schutte argues, convincingly, that this second interpretation cannot be recon ciled with the Dionysian perspective. For when the will to power is interpreted as

domination, it
Nietzsche dynamic
with

sets

up
v.

a new

dualism

the strong

vs.

the weak, the active vs. the

reactive, the doer

the deed. This last

also rejects

duality is particularly problematic since traditional concepts of self as false abstractions from the
life. So too the domination
causality, requiring
rejected as
view would

processes of

be incompatible
as a

Nietzsche's force

critique of a view

or coercive

cluding Twilight of the Schutte claims that the

explicitly Idols.
will

by

compelling Nietzsche in many places in is

a

it does

"will"

to power as domination
must

literal understanding
as she

and not a metaphorical one.

Yet is

be

understood

metaphorically,

persuasively
From the
one

argues:

writings of the period of the transvaluation of all values metaphors represent the most truthful

(1883
of

through 1888),

may deduce that

form

knowledge be

cause as relations of

likeness between

various

forms

of appearances

they

are

perfectly

in

harmony

with

the ontological understanding of reality as a world of appearances

express the truth of appearances as metaphysics
which

and change.

Metaphors

had

expressed

the tmth of the thing-in-itself

is

no

longer

credible

to us.

Metaphorical
metaphori

relationships are pluralistic and open-ended.

Any

aspect of

reality may be

cally

related to an

innumerable variety

of other aspects and each metaphorical relation

may be interpreted in

multifaceted ways

(pp.

100-

1).

Thus the

will

to

power as metaphor

is the
critique of

only interpretation
affirmation of

which

"combines Nietzsche's
and art

logic

with

his Dionysian

truth,

life,

(p.

100).

254

Interpretation
then, Schutte
must

Why
even

ask, does Nietzsche lapse into this uncritical and

Her answer here is rather surprising, pointing as it self-contradictory does to a hitherto unrecognized coincidence of feminist and Dionysian perspec
view?

tives. For

Schutte,

the dualisms of Western metaphysics, stemming as

manifest

they do

from the desire to control, inherent

well.

the values of a patriarchal authoritarianism

not only in our religious tradition but in our philosophical tradition as While Nietzsche's philosophy may liberate us from the judgmental Father of the Garden, Nietzsche does not go so far as to free himself from the masculine consciousness

inherent in the

philosophical

"manly"

virtue as
constrained

excellence and power.

tradition, hence his glorification of And in so far as Nietzsche's thought is he

cannot realize

by

these deeper psychic prejudices,

his

project

fully
he

and returns

to the category of the will to power as domination. In so

far

as

extols this

notion, he is not, Schutte tells us, a healer of nihilism but a

harbin

ger of

it in

a more virulent

form.
equation of

will come since

back to Schutte's implicit

the

Dionysian

with

the fem

inine
want

this reading of Nietzsche yields other

outline of of

interesting
those of

points, but first I

to continue the

her

work.

In

one

chapter, Schutte takes up tradi

tional

interpretations
and

Nietzsche, in

particular,

Stern, Kaufman,

Deleuze,

Heidegger. She

sees these other

interpretations

as problematic pre

pretations of the will to

cisely because they fail to distinguish between the metaphorical and literal inter power, and hence the paradigm of the will to power as
at

domination
of

least in

part controls these other readings.

"crude"

For example, in the

case

reading of the will to power, the failure to understand it as the overcoming of dualism leads him to a mere affirma tion of what Schutte calls an "alienated moral namely reason vs.
who

Kaufman

does

argue against a

standpoint,"

passion,

duty

vs.

pleasure,
not see

and similar

dualisms. And in

so

far

as

interpreters

like Kaufman do

they
For

make

Nietzsche maintaining the will to power as domination, the further error of not taking his social and political views seriously.
not

Schutte, Nietzsche's immoralism is

to be

interpreted

as

Danto does. It is

not an ethics.

immorality
Rather,
the

only in the
will

sense of not
when

conforming to traditional Christian

to power,

taken

literally by Nietzsche,

issues in

au

thoritarian political views that must be addressed.

Schutte begins her

own

discussion

of

Nietzsche's

politics with the notion of

the Ubermensch. She points out that again,

two distinct

frameworks,
as a

the literal and

and

Nietzsche's thinking operates within the metaphorical. Schutte extends her

she tells us,

previous criticisms of

Kaufman

Danto. Each,
that

fails to

see the
refer

Ubermensch
ents.

"symbolic

idea"

and claims

it has
be

actual

historical

For Schutte, the

notion of

the

Ubermensch
us what

must

if it is to be
ontic

compatible with

Zarathustra's
it tells

own words.

significance;

as metaphor

it

means

viewed metaphorically She denies the term any to transcend the dualism

and alienation of the

human

condition:
present possibilities of
one must

The Ubermensch transcends the

and creation of

human beings. It is the life's spontaneity from

child
chil-

human beings

learn

about

Book Reviews
dren

255
have been
as

whose consciousness will not superior man

impaired

with nihilistic values as ours

has. The

is

someone who

becomes
of

a master of

dualism,
could

whereas no more

the

Ubermensch

stands

for the transcendence

dualism. There

be

telling

difference between the two types (p.

123).

Thus,

given

the

will

to power as the

symbolizes

the possibility

of self-integration.

overcoming of dualism, the Ubermensch Yet while we can agree with this
no

latter point, it

seems questionable

to hold that the term has

historical

referent.

Certainly in Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche speaks of Goethe as having "disci plined himself into and having a faith that he (Nietzsche) has bap
wholeness"

tized as

Dionysian. Nevertheless, Schutte

goes on to make a

distinction between
which

the Ubermensch and the "superior

concrete

one,"

the "higher

man,"

do

refer

to a
will

historical type. For Schutte, these latter to power taken literally. And in so far as they

notions are come to

the result of the

dominate Nietzsche's

thought,

an elitist

morality

and an authoritarian politics ensue.

"master"

Schutte

argues against the

to Nietzsche

but from his

own

morality not from a Dionysian standpoint. The

perspective external

Rangordnung

repre

sents a set of static categories

that violates life as

process and overcoming. and

In

deed,
of

there is

direct line between Nietzsche's ordering

erects a new absolute on existence

the class categories

the Republic. Nietzsche

and

the metaphysical

fictions

of

individuality
tology
of

causation; human

is

subsumed under a

dualistic

on

fixed types. Apologists say higher

might argue

that the rank order serves life as a

means of preservation

Whether for

we

scending,
all

but any stability thus gained is by way of subordination. life denying, ascending de lower, life affirming of sneaks back in. This a problem is, course, dualism, by definition,
who

those philosophers, Schutte among them,

as the

see the present task of

maintain

thinking

irreducible

category.

overcoming It is Nietzsche
the

of

dualism but
who

who want

to

the moral as an
main

is

most consistent

here in that he

tains that the

of

aesthetic and not

moral

is the fundamental drive

and proper end

human life.

Schutte, in
question of ries and

the course of her discussion of Nietzsche's politics, returns to the

why he abandons the Dionysian viewpoint and posits a set of catego inimical to his original critique. Her answer here is more humanly suggestive
sees particular significance

less strictly feminist. She Homo:

In every
respect
.

in

a passage

from Ecce

you will

find (in Beyond Good

and

Evil)

the same

deliberate turn

ing
a

away from the instincts that had

made possible a

Zarathustra.

All this is

a recuperation: who would guess after all what sort of recuperation such of good-naturedness as

squandering

Zarathustra

represents makes necessary?

(p.

144).

According
need

to Schutte (I am amplifying her

position

here) Nietzsche felt

outpouring

the

to

repress

his

own

Dionysian instincts, his

and

generous

of spirit

having

been

met

only

by increasing isolation

depletion. Nietzsche's

personal

256

Interpretation
extraordinary.

suffering is
tion."

nourishment and

He failed to secure even the most ordinary emotional hence his thinking took a "violent turn in the opposite direc It did, in fact, become authoritarian. Schutte, contrary to other interpreters, holds that Nietzsche's politics are
and

strongly

seriously
argued

antidemocratic:

Kaufman has
ment of

that Nietzsche
portrays

opposed

the

state

because it

restricts

the

develop

individuals. He

Nietzsche

as a champion of the rights of

"self"

"superior"

individuals to self-realization,
approach

still

using the

in

a traditional sense.

A different

is taken

by Tracey Strong,
and

who emphasizes

Nietzsche's interest in the But both Kaufman's

notion

transfiguration of the individual

of self-realization and

ultimately

of society.

Strong's

notion of

transfiguration tend to

depict Nietzsche's
the

goals too altruistically.

In his politics, Nietzsche

was not as concerned with

transfiguration or self-realization of

individuals

as

he

was with

the conditions whereby

a special class of artist-philosopher would acquire power over society.

The

main

issue

for Nietzsche remained, Who

would rule?

(p.

175).

accuses others

Although I think Schutte herself may be guilty of the literalism of which in her discussion of "the "master vs.
"breeding,"

she

herd,"

slave,"

"the

weak,"

sacrifice of as she

the

she reasons

fully

does for

right in raising the political question as both intrinsic and extrinsic to Nietzsche's work.
quite
work

is

Schutte
Morals

reminds us

that in the context of his own

argues

Nietzsche
saw

that all systems of value are

Genealogy of inherently political.

The

Nietzsche

his

own work as a crucial

affect actual social change.

And

aside

historical task, the end of which was to from Nietzsche's own intentions, even if

individual life

could

be

regenerated of political

have to
rule?

ask what

kind

by embracing the Dionysian, we would still life this would entail. In short, who would
this question

For Schutte, Nietzsche's

claimed

answer to

is

clear.

Although the

pro au

death

of a patriarchal
would

God
a

would remove

the source of

other-worldly

thority, Nietzsche
chal

have

this-worldly

substitute.

For the

notion of patriar

domination

marks not

only his
works

politics

but his

social views as

well, his

views of

family,

marriage, and women. A

feminist

perspective
rather

does inform

Schutte's discussion here but it

way.

in

an

intelligent

than an

ideological
or

Schutte is

sensitive

to those aspects
aspects of

of

Nietzsche's thought that ignore

experience.

even

disparage the

"gentler"

human

She has

keen

eye

for

the somewhat
marks

uncritical acceptance of power as

the ground of

being,
his

which often political and

Nietzsche's thought. And in light

views, Schutte concludes that

of

her

examination of

social

Nietzsche's

struggle against nihilism

is in

complete.

Indeed, if
see

one

followed his

social and political views to the end, we as an

would
swer

have to

Nietzsche ultimately
practical affairs

to the ordering of

others what we would quite

have

willed

immoralist. In Kant, the moral an imperative to will for but for universally Nietzsche, the answer is
is the
categorical

the

opposite.

Placing

one's will on a par with others

may be "good

man

ners"

but it is, in the end, decadence.

Book Reviews II
"God is dead
"critical"
.

257

The Ubermensch

live."

shall

We have

seen
a

that Schutte in

terprets these words epistemologically; the phrase

becomes

dialectical tool for

the

reading of Nietzsche's work. While this approach yields much that is valuable, particularly in the way of conceptual rigor, the book does leave one unsatisfied in another way. While Schutte is right in not wanting to see Nietz
sche's

ideas
to

as psychic effluences of a

brilliant but

unbalanced mind, we would

work

also

have

say that it is problematic to treat Nietzsche's

work

wholly

apart

from
rare

the

man

himself. For if his

is

meant to

heal, if he

stands with

those

thinkers who talk to the whole person and not the

hominem"

detached

intellect,

a charge of

"ad

is existentially irrelevant, though it may be logically correct. Schutte's discussion of the will to power would benefit, I think, if we did in
man."

fact "behold the

understood

In her analysis, the

concept of

the will to power is to be

upon

in light

of the

healing

of

dualism. This leads her to look Nietzsche's

own project.

the will
are also

to

power as

domination
the
will

as

contrary

to

Yet there

problems with

to power interpreted as the Dionysian

assent

to the eternal
no

recurrence of all connection ner

things. As Schutte correctly points out there is between saying to life unconditionally and having integrity. Nietzsche, Schutte says,
"yes"

a sense of

necessary in

does

not acknowledge

the possibility of a person

loving
may

life to the fullest be

valid

and yet re

jecting

the

idea

of the recurrence

for

reasons that

perhaps

in that
not

person's
one

life. One may reject the hates life but because one hates injustice
seriously
wish

exact repetition of

the great years of becoming

.

because

or cruelty.

If one is

directly
love

implicated in

injuring

innocent

persons

it

would seem a sign of one's

of

life

not to

to

repeat one's existence

(p.

70).

And be

we might add

that even beyond the question of personal responsibility

no

for

suffering,

we must

say

to many things that do

occur.

Moral Schutte

outrage

may itself

a wholesome response.
existential

Because

of

these the

problems

offers an alterna

continuity,"

tive "model of
she calls

will

to power interpreted from what

"the

standpoint of

inner balance":
grounds one's

The

standpoint of

inner balance
world

tween the self and the

in
. .

a stmcture

continuity in time and the continuity be different from either the recurrence or the

domination The

views of order.

structure of

inner balance begins

with

positing

a sense of wholeness within

capacity of the organism to stabilize itself at any particular stage of its life. itself based on the energy it has available to oneself. On the contrary, one is unto Wholeness does not mean that one is a totality
one's self.

This

wholeness

is

attributable

to the

aware

that the

one chooses

of the specific types of interaction energy available to oneself is a result to have with one's environment. But the interaction is not conducted as a oneself

way way

of
of

losing

in something larger than

environment

oneself

(the

recurrence

model) or as a

exploiting the

to

enhance one's power over

it (the domination

model).

The continuity between

self and world

is based

on

the need of each organism

258
to

Interpretation
its
own

seek

balance in light

of

its

constitutional needs and

the possibilities available

in its

environment.

One finds
Thus

the

new

meaning

of

balance in the
violence

practice of

eliciting

a sense of

wholeness within oneself without

ness.

a practice of

internal

doing honesty

to any of one's centers of conscious

called

and

directness is

for instead

of the

The ego, relaxing its control, assumes a re gentle receptivity toward the total organism. With the ego-mechanism of of lationship censorship lifted, the organism may create its own balance if conditions of health are
average state of

distraction

and self-deceit.

present

(pp. 61-62).

What

can we make of power

Schutte's

view of

here? At best

she seems to

be stretching
although she

the will to
speaks of claim

in the direction

Heidegger's

Gelassenheit,
of

the surrender to
critique of

becoming
in this

rather

than to being. Indeed Schutte does

in her

Heidegger's interpretation
respect:

Nietzsche,

that these two

philosophers are quite close

Nietzsche's theory of reality as flux, or becoming, is not a forgetting of being in the Hiedeggerian sense. On the contrary, it is a recalling of the human consciousness to its
origins

in

temporality. In other words, ontologically, the

are not

differences between Nietz is

sche and

Heidegger
while

too striking, except that Nietzsche's primary category

being"

becoming,
At worst,

Heidegger's is

(p. 85). the neutral abstractions of popular psy

she veers

in the direction

of

chology from which Nietzsche himself would be the first to flee. Neither of these two possible readings is satisfactory. They stretch Nietzsche far beyond his
of own

intentions. Schutte
a more

the Dionysian

with

openness;
ground

self-transcendence as as

seems to be making a tacit identification feminine sensibility, as connoting acceptance, merger, the ability to let be. There may be some

for this;
the
occurs

Schutte
of an

edy,

of

duality
in

points out, Nietzsche does speak, in the Birth of Trag the Dionysian- Apollonian as being like that of the sexes.

But this

early work and even there does not entail the view that the only those gentler qualities, as Schutte presumes. In an anal ogous point, Schutte commends Nietzsche for making us aware of the hidden ground of Western morality resentment with its coincident desires to judge, Dionysian
connotes

control,

and even

to

hurt,

and

for wanting to free

us

from the

patriarchal author

ity

of

the Judeo-Christian God.

prohibitions would

But,

again,
with

even

if

we argue of

that the

lifting

of

Christian why
ness,

do away

some

forms

human

perversity.

would

it

not release others?

Because

of

the very nature of self-conscious

our

instincts

are complex with unexpected

knots

and

twists.

Certainly

the

Greek

myths attribute much

cruelty to the celebrants

of

Dionysius in their fren

naive, launch into fits
of

zies of merger while the vengeful

Homeric

heroes,

undivided and

fury. Achilles's slaying of the Trojan children on Patroclus's pyre and his cruelly disrespectful treatment of Hector's body may be the other side of Dio nysian expression. We could, perhaps, argue that there is yet another ambiguity in Nietzsche's thought, the Dionysian understood as an actual historical stage

Book Reviews
through which spirit

259 has
passed and argue

the Dionysian

as a metaphor

for something

radically
contain

new.

But again, to

that this

new and

higher

stage of spirit would

only those
a

expressions of

feeling Schutte considers to be life-affirming or

the
will

legitimate, introduces
involves

a moral standard outside

to power and one

which

dualism

quite remote

from Nietzsche's
will

philosophy.

How then

are we

to understand the

to

power

in Nietzsche? It

seems to me

that Schutte has some remarks in her concluding chapters that are the
point.

much more

to

It is

clear

that if

we

take Nietzsche's political and social views seri

sympathy."

ously, his is not, to borrow Camus's phrase, "the

remarks on marriage and women contain an

path of

Indeed his

important distinction, that between

instinct
the

and

feeling. Instinct is

synonymous with the universal ground of

and authority.

drives

of

will, strength, gravity,

Feeling,
It is

on the other

being, hand, is
soft,

seen as

subjective,

idiosyncratic,

unstable,

momentary.

also viewed as

weak, unserious, in a word, feminine. For Nietzsche feeling then must be dominated

by

the

will

to power. Yet if
"worldly"

aspect feeling a whole, then the repression of ordinary and the world as us to others binding feeling by the will does not issue in wholesomeness but in a new form of frag not as

is

Nietzsche describes, if it has

a more

stable,

mentation.

As Schutte
"base."

"common"

points

out, the term

what we

has, for Nietzsche,

be
superseded

the

connotation of

Hence

have in
whom

common must

by

the loneliness of the "superior

us

ones"

in

to life

marriage,

family,

common and

precisely those things that bind are sup ordinary human needs

pressed.

It is for this
the fuller

reason

that Nietzsche's
the

own conflicts are a

key

to understanding
ad

cultural significance of

will

to

power.

Literature usually has the

consequences of their philosophy in that its characters play out the the whom Raskolnikov for we have thought. Thus philosophy of the "superior

vantage over

one"

justifies

murder

dinary
also

remorse and

under the power of only to have that philosophy wither horror over the deed done. But in the case of Nietzsche

or we

have

the

character

acting

out the consequences of

his thought. Nietzsche

while

speaks of a regeneration of spirit couched

destiny
was

bears

an

uncanny
this as

resemblance

in very dramatic terms, to Kafka's "Hunger

his

own

Artist."

Nietzsche's He
willed

the path, if

we can coin such a phrase, of grandiose self-denial.

the

void and saw

heroic. When the admiring

the

crowds

failed to

appear

he
of

became his
psychosis.

own audience until

neurotic egotism passed

into the darkness

Schutte begins to

explore

these issues in her closing chapters but doesn't go as the

will

far

as she might.

She

argues against

to

power as social and political

dom

ination but does

sche, that

not point

to the fuller

significance of

the will to power

in Nietz
this is

is,

the will to

power over one's own

ordinary feelings. And

and

yet

enormously important since the primacy are two of the subjectivizing of human feeling
roots of these
phenomena

of will over

feeling defining tenets

the consequent

of modernism.

The

are,

of course,

in both Descartes

and

Luther,

so

that, in

260
a

Interpretation
real

very

sense, the

errant son of a

Protestant

minister played out one of

the

possibilities of

his is

own

denied faith.
to one final
consideration.

This

point

brings

us

At the

center of

Nietzsche's

life
of

and

thought

a religious all

the death of God is

it is surprising that the proclamation question, but absent from Schutte's book. (It appears only in an
and
problem

epistemological guise.)

The

may lie, in part, in

an unwise

tendency

to

subsume
anism.

Western

religion clear

too easily under the category

of patriarchal authoritari

While it is

that this tradition lacks a compelling reality for to pass

over

Schutte,
struggle.
mean

it is certainly a For the price he

mistake paid

Nietzsche's

complex and

intense

for the

rejection of

God is

key to the

more

enduring

ing

of

his

work.

In speaking of Nietzsche's warning against the repression of the Dionysian by Socratic dialectic, Schutte makes the converse warning. Although she does not
elaborate on this replace the
"tethered."

idea, she is certainly right. Although Socratic dialectic cannot artistic impulse, whatever intuitions or meanings we create need to be
One lesson
of the

Meno is that

reason

is

not

just

dissolving faculty

but

By rejecting dialectical reason, ordinary feeling, and religious faith, Nietzsche left himself with no source of stability or con nectedness. Yet despite this, Schutte is sanguine about the power of Nietzsche's
can and refine
work

fix

intuitions.

to

heal the

nihilism of our culture:

Breaking

through the chains of command through which

human

experience

is

gener

ally understood,

dissected,

and evaluated

is the

most

liberating

act and yet the most of

threatening
man

act against the values setbacks

presently controlling the self-understanding

Yes"

hu

beings. Despite the

is

nevertheless promised

affecting Nietzsche's theory of values, such a fixture in Nietzsche's image of the child's "sacred to life and in

the symbol of the Ubermensch (p. 193).

Without mitigating Schutte's laudable

scholarship, I think
pret we must part

contribution to the canon of

Nietzsche

the Dionysian along more

company with her here. For whether we inter feminine lines as Schutte does or as the heroic will

to power of Nietzsche

himself, it remains a problematic prescription for every life. In about the role of the aesthetic in the thinking day healing of nihilism, we might do well to take Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, as another
guide:

It is, therefore, in his purely

one of the most

important tasks
him

of culture to subject

Man to form

even

physical

life,

and to make

aesthetic as

far

as ever the realm of

Beauty
not

can extend, since the moral condition can

from the
make

physical condition.

If Man is to

possess

be developed only from the aesthetic, in each individual case the

faculty to

his judgment

ited

existence

the judgment of the human species, if from every lim he is to find the way through to an infinite one, out of dependent
and will

his

every

condition

to be

able

to make the

leap forward to
of

self-dependence and

freedom, he
natural

must

take care not to be at

any

moment

merely individual, serving merely the

law. If

he is to be ready

and able

to rise out

the narrow circle of natural ends to rational

Book Reviews

261

ends, he must already have practiced himself for the latter while he was within the

former,

and

have already

realized

his

physical

determination
to

with a certain
Beauty.1

freedom

that belongs to

spiritual nature

that

is, according

laws

of

Dialogue

and

Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies

with an

on

Plato.

By

Hans-

Georg

Gadamer. Translated

introduction

Haven: Yale

University Press,

1980. xv + 221

by P. Christopher Smith. pp.: $16.95.)

(New

Richard Velkley

Plato

and

hermeneutics

what

is the

connection?

We

are

led to this
school,

question

by Gadamer, the foremost philosopher of the hermeneutical long occupation was the study of Plato. One wonders if the
attention paid

whose

life

recent explosion of

to Gadamer and hermeneutics has been sufficiently interested in

the

between this apparently most modern and advanced of philosoph ical attitudes, and ancient thought. The translated essays in this volume throw
connection much

light

on

this

problem.

They
of

show that to understand this

connection, one
as well.

must not

only
the

possess a

theory

reading, but the

art of

reading

The

writing

of

essays spans

four decades (the

of concern.

earliest was published

in 1934), but

they display

unity on hermeneutics is in order. way of approach to these concerns, a remark Hermeneutical theory is reflection on the character of all forms of understanding,

a remarkable

By

but it is particularly concerned with understanding premises cannot be taken for granted; with such cases
derstand is
translation
neutical

an

other where

common

where what we seek

to un

alien

because

of

temporal or cultural
account of

distance. Hence the

problem of

is

paradigmatic

for the
of

Verstehen.

Something

like herme

theory,

as a

theory

how to

recover

the sources of an aging tradition,

in any tradition, but as a theory of the method of textual interpretation, it is modern in origin. "... Hermeneutics came to flower in the Romantic era as a that is, consequence of the modern dissolution of firm bonds with
can occur
tradition,"

when modern man

became
of

fully
by

conscious of

Reflection,"

the Scope

and

Function

Hermeneutical

his distance from antiquity ("On in Philosophical Herme

p. 21).

neutics, translated and edited

situation of

David E. Linge,
Hermeneutical

The

specific

historical

hermeneutics does not, however,

view.

exhaust

its meaning, but helps to

not

bring

that meaning into full

familiar,"

thinking is

limited to tex in

tual understanding, but is

present

in

all

human

efforts

to make "the unfamiliar

into the

wherever such efforts are self-conscious.

This

can occur

conversation or anywhere

language is

operative

in

communication.

1.

Friedrich Schiller, On
I977)>
P- II0-

the

Aesthetic Education of Man, trans. Reginald Snell (New York:

Ungar,

262
In the

Interpretation
ancient

world, the closest parallel to

modern

hermeneutics is
realizes

rhetorical

theory. Rhetoric as an art,

like the interpretation

yet to be reached. The understanding is in doubt, that such an argumentative mode in both is necessarily persuasive, using probable arguments, rather than demonstrating in a scientific manner. Modern scientific thinking has

texts, understanding is
of

that a common

tended to conceal the pervasiveness of probable reasoning, yet science

is

always
modern

dependent form
as

on

it,

as common

sense;

furthermore,

scientific thought

in its

ideology

has

acquired

its

status

through the great

rhetorical arguments

its founders, such as Bacon and Descartes. This is the greatest irony, perhaps, in the withering away of rhetorical theory in modern times. Yet it is not rhetorical theory as such to which hermeneutics makes ap
made on

its behalf

by

peal, but it is to the form of philosophical rhetoric developed

pupils. served

by

Socrates

and

his

A distinctive feature is "to

master

of

this rhetoric,

which some modern

thinkers pre

that the arguments

speaking in such an effectively persuasive way brought forward are always appropriate to the specific recep
the

faculty

of

tivity

of

the souls to which

directed."

they

are

The

greatest single source-text of

such a

true art of rhetoric grounded in knowledge of human souls is Plato's

rhetoric

Phaedrus. The true

is brought forward there in

in ignorance
of

opposition to

the
of

false

so

phistical rhetoric which

is

mired

the soul. The nature

the Pla

tonic writing that attempts to

embody the true

rhetoric

is

thread running through

Gadamer's At the

essays.

time, Gadamer has a constant eye on the duality of sophistryfeature of, one could say, human nature. (This duality must be philosophy, related to the fundamental duality of Platonic thought, of the One and the Two.)
same as a

The false

rhetoric of sophistry always accompanies philosophy as its shadow; in Gadamer's view, this insight is the source of Plato's continuing relevance ("Logos and Ergon in Plato's p. 3; "Plato's Educational pp.
Lysis,"

State,"

77-78; "Dialectic
mer asserts

and

Sophism in Plato's Seventh

Letter,"

pp.

122-23).

Gada

that sophistry in Greece created a

hermeneutical

situation not unlike

that created

by

the scientific

Enlightenment

of

the modern world. In both cases,

and

an ancient nomos was most unintelligible

discredited

by the

new

movement,

in fact

rendered al
new

by

the claim of the new movement to provide a

as presented effort

"civic

consciousness."

The Socratic effort,

spirit,
and

combat this new

thus this

is wholly

in the Platonic writings, is to political in nature ("Plato's is this: how

can ethical
made

Educational
sight

State,"

Socrates'

p. 75). and

constant concern

in in has

be preserved,
when

the virtues which make political life possible be

of

telligible,
vanished?

the meaning
own

these virtues once supplied

by

the old nomos,

Gadamer's

hermeneutical

inquiry

with respect

to its contempo

rary
the

context reveals a similar aim.

Modern

scientific consciousness

has distorted into historical

fundamental

ethical components of our

tradition,
called

and

has

converted them

the problem areas of culture, which can

be

the aesthetic and the

of

forms

of modern consciousness.

The impoverishment
of

tradition
of

by

these events
and

compels the return to a

rethinking

the original

meaning

art, scholarship,

Book Reviews
philosophy,
sensus

263
tied them

which

communis, as it was called

essentially to a public-spirited attitude, or to the in the Latin rhetorical tradition (cf. relevant

parts of

Truth

and

Method).

Thus the primary intent of Socratic-Platonic thought is not epistemological or even ontological. That which Socratic rhetoric combats is an everpresent human
possibility, which cannot be corrected
upon

by demonstrative
sight of the

reasoning

grounded

true criteria of

knowledge;

this everpresent possibility is the

reduction of

the human soul to the nonhuman, or

soul

losing

human
pp.

experience of the

("The Proofs

of

Immortality by

in Plato's

Phaedo,"

30-32).

Sophistry
its illness
of the

only
are

exploits and gives expression to this

deficiency

of

insight to

which all souls of

liable;

the soul is not

nature well-formed and must

be healed

by

philosophical reflection. of

In the Lysis, this

whose
of

deficiency
Socrates'

takes the form

of mature

youthfulness
makes

the

interlocutors,

inexperience

friendship
"opposite."

them susceptible to the simplicities

"pre-Socratic"

dialectical formulations
"like"

(which have

quality):

the friend is either

or

This

deficiency of insight (inherent in the nature of youth) could not be remedied by the demonstrative reasoning on friendship which presents the true "friend
ship"

"sameness"

"otherness"

uniting the "good") in

the false
so.

and
a

(or love

"own"

of one's

with

love

of

definition. As in the Phaedo,

Socrates'

aim

is to disabuse

us of

views which obscure

insight,

and

he

"sophistical"

employs

tactics to do
of the

The Phaedo does

not attempt cogent proofs of the

immortality

soul,

but discredits the

prevents one

reduction of

the soul to nonsoul

"harmony". This

reduction

from taking seriously the question of the soul's nature and destiny. To awaken the human experience of the soul (in this case, as necessarily open to the questions about mortality and the next life) is the true end of the dialectic. The tactics ited One
employed

to

bring

this about

and

the degree of their success are lim

souls to genuine

by the
might

quality of the receptivity of the be reminded of Kant's defense

reductions,

interlocutors'

insight.

of

the human experience of freedom

remind

against

physico-mechanical

as

indeed Gadamer does

us

(Phaedo,
and

p.

38).

Yet Kant's
with

mode of argumentation

it is be

unconcerned related

the "specific

is strictly demonstrative, of the soul. This point

should

to the

universalism of

Kantian

morality.

Strict logical phy is

argumentation

is

not

the

soul of a

Platonic dialogue. If
wholly

philoso

such argumentation

only, the dialogues

are not

philosophical.

Yet

their "propaedeutical
separable

function,"

from

philosophy.

preparing for independent philosophizing, is in The propaedeutic exposes our assumptions, which
"mimetic"

are seductive

gether with the seduction toward of

but misleading (esp. "Dialectic and Sophism"). This exposure, to character better insight, occurs in the
which

the

dialogue,

is

crucial

to

its

rhetoric

(cf.

"Phaedo"

essay,
of

pp. 21-22).

The

scene and

depiction kinds

of character provide a
of assumptions.

kinds

of souls and

between seeing way Because the propaedeutic to philoso

relations
of

phy, the
stated or

presentation of which
"systematized,"

is the true function

writing, cannot be
reserved and

literally
ironical

Platonic writing is remarkably

264

Interpretation
Dialectic,"

("Plato's Unwritten
writing in the incredible the

p.

127).

It is

so

difficult to

appreciate

Platonic

modern need

world, because its

egalitarian accounts of

the soul render

perhaps even

for

such rhetoric or propaedeutic

in philosophy;

some of the greatest modern philosophers as

have lost their

reserve and their

irony

they have attempted to address mankind as their interlocutor. Ancient writing, Gadamer notes, is less concerned with statement
in the dialectical

of position

and more absorbed

ments.

encounter with opponents and counter-argu

Therefore it is eminently
a condition of

political

in

nature.

To

understand

it,

one must

know the addressee, dressees

the critical

for understanding any writing. Who are the ad arguments about poetry in the Republic? They are primar
eager

ily
is

ambitious

young men,

to be the founders of a just regime.

not

Accordingly
(cf.

we must see

that the primary thrust of these arguments is

ontological; poetry

being

assessed

in

an atmosphere

highly

charged with political questions

esp.

"Plato

and the

Poets"). And
a

one must add that question:

on

the interest of the interlocu

tors is
public

being deflected toward

is
not a

Socratic

the nature of the soul. The Re

subject

literal

statement of

doctrine

any

laws,

education, or

poetry.

for the
stood.

these matters to any doctrinal statement, any subject is bound up with seeing how it can be under On this ground, Gadamer asserts the superiority of the dialogues as a
a superior statement on
of

But it is

intelligibility

source of

course"

understanding Platonic doctrine. The dialogues are "wholes of dis which make their intention manifest by including their addressees. "In is
not

tention"

psychologically or subjectively, for it is not solely Plato's) possession, but it becomes the possession of anyone who truly understands; intention here is the revealed intent of one who is engaged in a conversation. By preserving respect for the intention of an author, Gadamer de
meant
Socrates'

here

(or

parts

widely and Platonically from many of his contemporaries The ambience of these problems the nature of writing, rhetoric,
.

and

knowl

edge of the

de philosophy sophistry Heideggerian. Gadamer's immersion in Platonic thought is Indeed, cidedly deep a source of a genuine rift between himself and Heidegger. Evidence of Gada
connection of

soul, the

and

does

not seem

mer's of

Platonism is his is
not much

repeated references

to the nature of man; the

"historicity

being"

present,
student.

at

least

not

in the

foreground, in

these writings of

Heidegger's foremost
of

The

problem of nature surfaces

in the discussion in

Plato's

critique of

the poets in the Republic. It surfaces only when the critique

which

is

not understood

literally,

indicates that

nature cannot a new

be
of

approached

literal fashion. Plato is

a new

not

actually advocating

kind

poetry to found

ethos; he is exposing the

true ethos,

inability of any poetry to be the foundation of a that of a well-formed soul. Only philosophy can create the true ethos,
produces an ambiguous praise of

for

poetic

imitation necessarily

justice. If jus
poetic

tice requires

doing one's own

effectively
at the

work well and

minding

one's own

business,
mode.

imitation
thetic
etic

cannot

praise

it, for it necessarily

celebrates a state of

"aes
po

self-forgetfulness,"

which

it induces through the imitative

an excessive trust

All

imitation implies

deepest level

in the

goodness of

Book Reviews
human
nature.

265 is
mindful of the

Philosophy by contrast
takes up
a

"inherent

dissonance"

in

the soul, which it seeks to remedy. (On this point, it is

interesting
his

to note,

Gadamer

also

debate

with

the moral optimism of German aesthetic hu

nature

manism.) In

other

terms, the
a sense

political nature of man entails that

is ty

rannical and willful as well as

having

a potential

for

moderation and

philosophy;
work of a

man's nature

is in

unnatural, for it is in
whole and sound.

need of

the therapeutic

true education to

become

Platonic philosophy

aspires to

be this

true education, and

of

in its pedagogy it

makes use of

imitations,

but

with

the goal

inducing self-remembering
There is
an own use of

rather than self-forgetting.

Plato's

necessity and cal justice and Platonic

myth

ambiguity in Gadamer's discussion emerging here. Does not imitation suggest that he acknowledges, on some level, the legitimacy of those longings of human nature that transcend politi

duty,
is

and

to

which poetic

imitation

responds?

Gadamer
But he

notes

that
self-

a sober

form

of

imitation that leads back from the

cosmic to

knowledge, thereby inverting

that
and of the

the usual path taken

by the

poets.

also notes

its sobriety includes an acknowledgement of the mysteriousness of the soul, limitations of logos in grasping its nature. Are these not also the limi

tations of the city's attempt to define the same through its justice?

Although the

"historicity
of

being"

of

is

not

says, the "finitude this

point

the human

understanding

very explicitly present in these es is a ubiquitous theme. Perhaps at between Platonic

correct
Veritas,"

there

is for Gadamer

a genuine connection

and recent

thinking. But in making this connection, Gadamer must

("

the Heideggerian
pp. I98ff.).

Amicus Plato Magis Arnica Plato very decisively Whereas Heidegger interprets the central images of the Republic
view of

on

the

nature of

knowledge

"correctness"

of of

knowing

proposing literally in knowing, which is merely an anthropocentric hypostatization presentations the human good, Gadamer discloses that the most in Plato propose only an ideal program of an ordered ascent, an ironi
quite

(and derisively),

as

an absolute standard of

"optimistic"

cal one at

founding
an

that, that must be read in context. (In the Republic, the context is the of an ideal city, which requires the sketching out of the knowledge of

ideal ruler.) More generally, the ideas are seen inquiry, being the inescapable condition of any
are not the endpoint of
"finite"

by Plato

as the

self-reflective endless

starting point of discourse. They

dialectic,
and

which
. .

in fact is
p. 1

mind
lectic"

("Dialectic

Sophism.

19,

and

for any human and "Plato's Unwritten Dia

in

general).

In giving this the "unwritten

account of

finite knowing, Gadamer

reveal

makes use of

the studies of

doctrine"

that have helped to

the continuity of thought run

ning through the dialogues.

Building

upon

the insights of scholars such as that the principles of this "doc the crucial

Kramer, Gaiser,
trine"

and

others, Gadamer
all

observed

are alluded

to in

the dialogues.

According to Gadamer,
in ideas (to ideas in

issue
gives

"participation"

for Plato is
no

not

the
rather

of things

which problem

he

definite solution), but human discourse

the

participation of

each

other,

which

renders

possible.

For the

account of

this participation, Plato

266

Interpretation
paradigm of

found the

the relation

"units"

of

many

to a whole, in number, to

be

the best way to conceive the possibility of the unity of many

ideas in
as one

one

logos.
dia

Ideas do
the

not participate
"divisions"

in

each other as subgenera of

genera,

knows from
which

comical undertakes

of genera

in

certain

dialogues. The
off and

dividing

marking into unities; the marking off of every unit idea is always accomplished partially and provisionally, for the interconnection of ideas is infinitely complex.
ralities

lectic

is

an endless task of

gathering together of plu

Hence the

principles of

the One and the indeterminate Two (or the unlimited, the

more and the less) which underlie all dividing and recognizing of wholes; the in determinacy of all definitions means there is no final system of ideas and their re lations. Every logos is inherently ambiguous, suggestive of infinite meanings, and the source of inexhaustible interpretations; the essence of logos is the meta phor.

Since Plato's highest

principles are those of a

finite

and

incompletable

search

for understanding, there is no divine mind. It cannot be said that the weakness of the logos consists in its obscuring a nonhuman kind of knowing from human ap
prehension.

The

weakness

is

rather

the

tendency

of

logos to

present

itself as

self-

sufficient,

whereas

it in fact is inseparable from the human

soul.

(This

same ten and

dency is
means

at the root of

sophistry.) Like the soul, the logos has

foreground

background; both

soul and

that their wholeness

all

logos tend to become foreground phenomena, which and all-pervasiveness are concealed from themselves.

The human soul, in

"own"

that it undertakes, tends to give preference to what

. . .

is its

soul can

its opinions, desires. ("Dialectic and Sophism do this only because it is more than these things to It
"forgets"

p.

112).

But the

which

it

inevitably
or

gives preference.

whole,

inevitably thereby forgetting itself.

logical
"own,"

its

own openness

to the truth,

the

The logos likewise tends to be

"self-forgetful"

in

that it becomes infatuated with the power of

can

demonstrative
of the soul

argument.

Since there

be

no

account of

this

tendency

to hide from itself

by

as

serting its
ted

there can be no adequate logos of the weakness of

logos. Thus

the principles that attempt to make this situation

intelligible
pp.

were never commit

by

Plato to

a schematic

form in writing (ibid.,

on

1 i8ff.).

There is

an endless struggle of the soul with

itself,

embodied

in the Platonic
at

dialogues,
heart
and of

to acquire

distance

itself
and

and

to persuade the

"necessity"

the

things which resists order

Reality

clarity (this is the central question of "Idea in Plato's Timaeus"). The meaning of all Platonic myths is that this
only be persuaded, it is never compelled. Ultimately that which is philosophy itself. Only the philosopher who accepts this
to terms with the
a

necessity

can

truly

soullike eludes
can come

limitation

that the struggle

for insight is

say that the

Ergon,"

philosopher

bafflement before the soul, and learn to see friendly dialogue of the soul with itself. That is to is one who has become the friend of himself ( "Logos
and

and

'p. 10; "Plato

queries.

the

Poets,"

pp. 53-54).
justice"

Concluding
equivalent

to a

Socratic philosophy as "praise of hermeneutical quest for a common understanding

is, it

seems,

of the virtues

Book Reviews
from
within a

267
sense."

"common

This

account of

Socrates

beginning

with opinion

seems

to assume that opinion contains some

as well as

incorruptible

element of

true ethical

insight,
or

opinion will

providing hypotheses for dialectical investigation. In any case, never be wholly replaced by philosophical knowledge of the
virtues,

by wisdom.

Thus

opinion can never

be

revealed as

wholly
as a

conventional.

If the

central cave

image

of

the

Republic

suggests that the chief sources of opinions

in

the city are makers of artifacts, this

ation on

image

must

be taken

deliberate
basic

exagger

Plato's

part

(in

keeping

with

the other

"optimistic"

aspects of the

dia

logue),
opinion

or as

indicating

that the city is based upon another more

stratum of

obliterating. are

that the artifact-makers attempt to corrupt but cannot succeed in wholly If the latter is the case, one can ask whether the crucial corrupters

the sophists, which is the major emphasis in

the sophists exploit a

profoundly
blame

rooted

Plato suggests,
492a-

indeed,
as

that the greatest

which

Gadamer's essays, or whether tendency in the life of the city itself. of all sophists is the city itself (Rep. bestows
on

c).

The

praise and

the city

the baser things and on

the nobler

things,

it

understands

them,

are a great

the

healthy growth of the potential philosopher's

nature of

force standing in the way of nature. The tendency of the city

when

behind this force belongs to the

writes of

the soul. Gadamer refers to it

he

the attachment to one's own, regardless of the goodness of one's own.

not

But Gadamer does be found in

the best

describe it

as

a certain

"inauthenticity"

located primarily in the political; it seems to of the individual. According to Plato even
this tendency, and thus must for philosophy to create an ethos Gadamer suggests? The deeply rooted
cave

and most

just

of cities must accommodate ever possible as

rest upon of

lies (4i4d ff.). Is it then

of

true justice in the city, free

soul

lying,

lie in the
face This

is indeed

not

conventional; the the soul to

image does indeed

on

its

sur

exaggerate the power of

exaggeration could

escape such

from the bondage

of opinion.
we can

itself be expressing

bondage;
of

the belief that

overcome opinion
sophic
no

is

inquiry

is

a very attractive opinion. Could all hermeneutic of the common sense

this mean that philo

"cave"

for

which

there is

"outside"? Even taking into

account

Platonic exaggeration, insight

or

we are not

such common sense embodies sound need not

is

grounded on such

forced to say that insight. One

of opinion

assume, in

other

words, that

discovering
it. The

the defectiveness

presupposes a complete proceed

transcending
sense"

of

criticism of opinion must

indeed
con

from

some

insight; insight into

may
not

the final truth and ethical

insight

tained in the "common

(We

should recall the

fact,

exploited

be the only alternatives for this source. by all Socratic discussions, that common

opinion perhaps

usually or always contains contradictory elements.) Be that as it may, Gadamer understates the extent to which the sophist in the soul is our at
political.

tachment to things

Could it be

said with

that

his hermeneutic

implicitly
and

identifies the "openness to the true

or

whole"

"openness to the

common sense

the

common good"?

And that the two

are embodied

in language, history,
and

tradition? Is it then the case that the tension between philosophy

nonphiloso-

268
phy

Interpretation
be
expressed

should

according to hermeneutics
own

as

the difference between a

and a

nobler attachment

to one's

(language, history,

or

tradition)

baser

one

(pleasure

and narrow self-interest as exploited

mean

by

sophistry)?

If this is the case, it may

mental change substituted

that this recent hermeneutics reflects a

when

funda

that occurred
notion of

in Western thought
for the
ancient

the Romantic movement

"culture"

"city,"

the
of

in

an attempt

to restore

something
city,
upon

the noble "love

own,"

of one's

that

was characteristic of

the ancient

the

basis

"progressivist,"

of

modern, essentially

premises.

The

mod

"culture"

ern notion of particular

is

alleged

to make possible a profound attachment to a

tradition without the limitations of life in closed societies. It is

in this

spirit that

tion not

contemporary hermeneutics regards the immersion in a particular tradi as an end in itself but as the necessary starting point for openness to all horizons Truth is
.

other traditions or

embodied not

in the

universal of

"abstract (po

reason"

but in the
all)

particular culture as engaged

in

conversation with other

tentially
or

cultures.

This

modern solution

to the problem of the relation of truth

inquiry legedly "dogmatic

discredited
ment with

to "concrete

life"

or

the necessities of politics sees its enemy as the al

of

rationalism"

the Enlightenment (or the

"Sophists")
a

which

all traditional allegiances.

Yet it overlooks, perhaps,

basic

agree

its

opponents: an underestimation of on

the harshness of the sacrifices re

or

quired

by

dedication to inquiry,

the one

hand,

by attachment to the city,

on

the other

hand,

and

the

more or

less

exclusive nature of

these dedications. Con

temporary hermeneutics may

philosophy remains fecund: here is yet another profound and engaging variety of the faith in the rationality or perfectibility of common opinion or custom, and the belief that the "historical
reveal

that

modern

process"

is in

some sense

the manifestation of truth.

Historicity

and

Reason: Two Studies

and

Beyond Objectivism
+ 284

Relativism:

Richard J. Bernstein. (Philadelphia:

pp.: cloth

$25.00,

paper

Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis. By University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983. xix $9.95.)
of

G. W. F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science

sen.

Wisdom. By

Stanley

Ro

(New Haven: Yale

University Press,

1974. xxi + 302 pp.:

paper, $8.95).

Will Morrisey

In his commentary
of classical man's perfection or

on

Xenophon's Hiero, Leo Strauss

political

restates

his

assessment

and modern

science.

The former takes "its bearings

and

by

by

how

men ought

to

live,

it culminate[s] in the

descrip-

Book Reviews

269
order."

tion of the best political

The

classics consider that order's realization un

likely

and

dependent

upon chance. not

Modern

or

Machiavellian

political

science,

however,
write
'is'

takes its bearings

chance

by

how

men ought

to live but

live. It teaches that

"could

or should

be

controlled."

by how they do Strauss does not

be controlled"; the word suggests that for moderns and tend to be interchangeable. This tendency culminates in histori cism, the doctrine that "the foundations of human thought are laid by specific ex
and should
'ought'

"could

"or"

periences which are

such."

not,

as a matter of

principle,

coeval with

human thought

as

The distinction between

practice and

If "all human thought is

public

historical,"

philosophy
wherein

theory, then, as described in Plato's Re

also

blurs.

the ascent

from the

cave where mere opinion rules

sent some all of

'absolute

moment'

truth

becomes

accessible.

may not exist, For most if

'

ab not

history the philosopher differs

tyrannies

from

other

thinkers only 'in degree.

Modern

philosophy tends to democratize

our

thoughts about thought and thinkers. Hav

'Left,'

ing
lic

'Right'

observed modern

and

Strauss

warns of a

"perpetual

tyranny"

and universal

based

on

the

"collectivization"

of thought.

In the Repub

democracy

leads to tyranny;

modern

tyranny

enforces

the democratization of
most

thought that historicism depicts as characteristic of all or

thought.

Many contemporary intellectuals recognize the inconveniences of tyranny. Some see that certain kinds of historicism encourage tyranny. This does not
cause

them to

abandon

historicism

altogether.

It

rather

intensifies

efforts

to for

mulate what might ect exemplifies more radical

humane historicism. Richard J. Bernstein's proj this trend. Bernstein would jettison historicism, at least in its

be

called a

forms,

while

retaining historicity,

a sense of reason's

limits

or

horizons. Bernstein
of
criticizes

the

"intellectually imperialistic
a

claims made

in the

name

[modern scientific]
as

Method."

He describes "the Cartesian foundations

"spectator theory
of

of mod

philosophy"

ern

involving

knowledge": objectivism,
some

defined ical

as

"the basic

conviction

that there is or

must

be

permanent, ahistor

matrix or

framework to

which we can

ultimately

appeal

in

determining

the

lightne

nature of rationality, same

we

knowledge, truth,
wishes

reality, goodness, or

At the

time, Bernstein
fundamental

to

avoid

relativism, "the basic conviction that when

turn to the
most

examination of
...

those concepts that philosophers

have taken to be
analysis all

the

we are

forced to

recognize

that

in the final

such concepts must

be

understood as relative

to a specific scheme, theoretical

of which a

framework,
ducible
sions

paradigm, form
exists.
word

of

life,

society, or
regards

"nonre

plurality"

Thus Bernstein
often

modern philosophy's preten

to truth (a

he

encloses

in

quotation

marks) a remnant
truth need

of

premodern

illusions. But he denies that the

abandonment of

bring
claim

chaos,

conceptual or moral.

Reporting

that

he has "been
Geist,"

attracted

to,

and at the

same time skeptical

of, Hegel's
while

concept of

he disbelieves Hegel's
direction to

"insight"

to

scientific

knowledge
. .

endorsing Hegel's

that "dynamic move

life."

ments of

thinking

pervade,

inform,

and give

cultural

270

Interpretation
would retain reason

Bernstein
certainty.

but

'liberate'

it from
rule,

expectations of precision and

Reason may then

"paradigms"

govern

but

not

much

less tyrannize.
of

Bernstein
scientific
tics."

concentrates much of and on some

his

attention on

Thomas Kuhn's treatment

of

Hans-Georg

Gadamer's treatment

"hermeneu

After

adjustments, he finds their doctrines complementary. As re

scientific

gards

science, Bernstein insists that

disputes involve
and

"validity

claims,"

not mere

likes

and

dislikes. (For example, Newton

Einstein disagree

about

nature,
agree

not about

their own

inclinations.) But

rational men

rationally digm theories are

one

without

logically

arriving incompatible (and, therefore, really in

at a rational resolution.

may nonetheless dis "[F]or Kuhn, rival para

conflict with

another); incommensurable

(and, therefore, they

and comparable

cannot always of

be

measured

against each other

with each other must

point-by-point);

(capable

being

compared

in

multiple ways without

requiring the

assumption

that there is or
not alto

be

common, fixed grid

by

progress)."

which we measure

If it is

gether clear

exactly

what

this

leaves,

that may be part of the point. Crystalline

clarity is
cites the

more than we are entitled

to expect. Bernstein quotes a scholar who

Nicomachean Ethics i, 3

on this.

Bernstein
not

would adapt

Aristotelian

practical wisdom wherein

for

use

in

scientific

theorizing
of

in

scientific research

itself,
in

theses

must still

be tested experimentally, but in the

science.'

more comprehen

sive

domain

now called

'philosophy

Bernstein finds

an analogue

Gadamer's

attempt

to rehabilitate practical wisdom.

use as

Gadamer takes hermeneutics beyond its traditional standing texts. As "beings 'who understand and
itself"

the means of under

interpret"

we must

"understand

if we would understand ourselves; understanding, the com understanding bination of interpretation and application, "may properly be said to underlie and
activities"

pervade all

of or

human beings

as such.

Interpretation

consists of

the

"dynamic interaction
between'

between, for example, a work of art and the spectator; neither entirely of the object nor of the subject, interpretation exists 'in them. Interpretation is an infinite process, not a fixed achievement.
contention suggests that

transaction"

This

the

infinity of the
the

process owes more

to the

subject

than to the object. "[Wjhat the 'things

themselves'

say

will

be different in the
ask."

light

of our

changing horizons
"horizons,"

and

different

questions

that we learn to

The metaphor,

reminds

Bernstein

mensurable, but

nonetheless comparable
"horizons"

Kuhn's incompatible, incom "paradigm theories"; we learn, in both

of a of a

cases,

by

"fusing"

our

with

those of another. "The appeal to truth

truth that enables us to go

beyond

our

historical horizons through

distinguish
"truth"

fusion

horizons
tics from
of truth
a

is absolutely essential in historicist form of

revealed

order to

philosophic

hermeneu
version

relativism."

This

resembles

Hegel's

in that it is

in the

process of experience and emerges

version of truth

in the dia in that it is

over

logic
never

encounter with tradition.

It differs from Hegel's

final;

there is no absolute

knowledge/wisdom
experience.

that completes and

and

comes

experience

only

more

If this is historicism

both

Book Reviews
Gadamer
modesty.

27 1

and

Bernstein
as

deny

that it

is

it is

historicism

made

humane

by
,

its

But,

Strauss in
und

effect asks

Gadamer (see the "Correspondence Con

cerning Wahrheit
ume
posit

Methode,"

II,

1978,

p.

7),

can such

The Independent Journal of Philosophy Vol historicism remain modest about itself, or does it
moment"

(or assume) an "absolute of covered? If it does not posit an "absolute from

relativism?

self-consciousness wherein

it is dis

is it really distinguishable If it is distinguishable from relativism simply because it ac

moment,"

knowledges human
"horizons"

natural,

fallibility, can it be redeemed from trivality? In short, are our historical, or both? If both, what's the ratio of nature to
Gadamer for is
valid

history? Bernstein
criticizes

failing
. .

to produce "a form of argumentation

practical wisdom needs some
not

that seeks to warrant what

solid

in

tradition";

very precise) understanding of how power "[PJhronesis

niques of without techne

(if

not

content. as

Further,

Gadamer "does
operates

include

detailed

domination
empty,"

in the

world

modern

is

"contemporary

knowledge."

social

particularly phronesis without the tech In search of these, Bernstein turns

primarily to Jurgen Habermas, secondarily to Hannah Arendt. Habermas calls for "a genuine dialectical synthesis of the ancients and the moderns, not turning
one's

back

mas and
ness

modernity as many Bernstein object to, among

on
conservative

neo-

Aristotelians

do."

are

tempted to

(Haber

other

things,

neo-Aristotelianism's useful

to "bourgeois

thought"

thereby failing

to fuse their "hori

zons"

with one alien

form

of

life.) The

"norms"

to be followed in making this

discourse,"

synthesis course

"can only be validated by the participants in a practical "grounded in the very character of our linguistic
Bernstein
quite

dis

intersubjectivity"

and of
would

purposive action.

understandably
can

wishes

that Habermas

firm this up
"autonomy"

bit. But Bernstein

action

only say that the "telos immanent in our

to
mutual

communicative

that is

understan

oriented

requires

both

"solidarity,"

and

a combination that would

much

be

a synthesis

indeed.

Arendt does

not offer

Bernstein

help

in his

project

because "the

criticism of

earlier"

Gadamer that I
not come

suggested

also applies

to her: "the danger for praxis does

techne can

from techne, but from be separated from domination

"beyond
task."

domination."

Bernstein does

not show

how

of some sort.

Moving
but
ties"

objectivism and relativism

is

not

just

a theoretical problem

a practical
egalitarian

In

practice

it

means

political

orders animated
mutual

developing "dialogical communi by "solidarity, public freedom, a

and a commitment
much of

willingness

to talk

and

listen,

debate,

to

rational per

suasion."

Such

communities appear

prominently in

thought, as for example in the writings of Alasdair Maclntyre. Consistent with this orientation, Bernstein ends by referring called that, is a hu readers to Marx. Just as Bernstein's historicism, if it can be

ist

political

contemporary Left Benjamin Barber and

mane

historicism,

so

his Marxism is
or

dilute Marxism. "We

can no

longer

share

Marx's

theoretical certainty,

revolutionary

Bernstein denies

272

Interpretation
necessitarian

Marx's

historical dialectic. But he does insist, only if

practice supplements theory.

with

Marx,

that

theoretical movement, such as the one "beyond objectivism and

power"

relativism,"

can

gain

"reality

and

It is difficult to

avoid

the suspicion that Bernstein's project thought as

does

not so much

synthesize classical

leaving
stuff,

both

even

uneasy compromise, To clarify the issues involved, one looks for stronger if it has proven more dangerous. For a truly magisterial attempt to
weaker.1

and modern

it

effects

an

synthesize classic and

modern, only Hegel

will

do.

Stanley Rosen

has

written an

indispensable "[F]irst

guide to

Hegel's "science
logician,"

wisdom."

of conception of phi
whole."

and

foremost

Hegel "accepts the Greek

or

losophy
Hegel

as the attempt

to give a logos

discursive

account of the
"philosophy,"

But

goes

merely to love

beyond the literal meaning of the word wisdom but to possess it. A modern who

claiming
attempts

not

to possess

wis

dom concerning the whole faces an obstacle the classics perhaps underestimated: subjectivity. If the intellect "is itself a resident in the spatio-temporal world, it,
together with

its products,
may

must

be historical

temporal."

rather than

Alterna

tively, dualism in
tuates

a modern
which

regard

intellect

as separate

the subject is deemed

poetry.

obtaining a Rousseauan imagination even 'creative';

these
antiphilosophic phi which we acquire wisdom as
man"

from 'this

world,'

in Heideggerian

Hegel

would overcome

losophies
with

by "defin[ing] history

the process

by

identical
of ac

the historical experience of Western

of rational

not so much
of philosophy.

the

history

tions as the
ence of

thoughts,

Hegel intends his "sci Western

philos

wisdom"

to be "the logical

conclusion or culmination of

whole."

ophy taken as a Hegel

would understand

history's

significance

by

'recapturing'

"the logical

pattern of

"dialectically,"

that

[history's] is, by a series

so

development,"

which proceeds not

conceptually linearly but

of contradictions a

whereby

pairs of contradic
development."

tory
This

elements are occurs

"assimilated into

third and higher level of

Spirit,"

by the grace,

to speak, of the "Absolute

the source of

spir

itual activity
be both
itual"

and not a static

form

or

idea. History, "the

spirit,"

gradual

unfolding

of the

universal significance of

the human

is

politic

"fundamentally
theory
and

It

can

spiritual and political

because Hegel

unites

practice; the "spir

is in 'this does

world.'

When

fully

manifest

(as it

is, for

the

first time, in the

new events

thought of
tory'

Hegel),

the Absolute Spirit brings

history

to a stop. The 'end of his

not mean

that no more events occur but that no radically

of essential satisfaction
future"

occur.

"[N]o degree

torical or transcendent

[is] still to be obtained in some his Christian, Marxist, or even Bernsteinian. Un

no egalitarian.

like the latter two thinkers, Hegel is

I.
effects

His theory,

while united with

"Syntheses
the

effect miracles.

Kojeve's

or

Hegel's

synthesis of classical and

Biblical morality
of which made

miracle of

producing

an

very

strict

demands

self-restraint"

on

amazingly lax morality out of two moralities both (Leo Strauss: "Restatement on Xenophon's
1963,
p. 205).

Hiero,"

in On Tyr

anny,

Ithaca: Cornell

University Press,

Book Reviews

273

practice, remains superior to practice.

Reality, truth,
events.

or

being

is

not contingent.

Absolute Spirit
not
and

"God"

or

exhibits

its

essential nature

derive its

essential nature

from those

in historical events; it does "God reveals himself to himself

understands exhibit

through the medium

himself."

(or audience)

of man.

Man

God

by

under

standing in human

Still, because Absolute Spirit does

its

essential nature possess

history, Hegel insists

that a few if not most human beings can

wisdom and not

merely admire it from afar. Wisdom is knowledge of a particular kind, knowledge

formed."

of

"the

rule

by

which

classes are
classes"

This

rule

is

not

itself

a class

(the

attempt

to find a "class of
class.

all

leads to infinite regress); the

the

rule expresses

the essence of any

Hegel

would overcome

subject/object

is

given

to us

within

the knowing-process
what

dichotomy by teaching that "the object by the activity of the Absolute, or the
To be
and to
and

process

by

which

everything is

it

is."

know

are co-extensive.

Politically,
we are

this

means

that the state is the image

logic"

content of essential

history dealing with a logic of activity and not a logic that articulates static forms Speaking metaphorically, one can say that "God actualizes within the thinking of Speaking less metaphorically, one can say that "the Absolute [Spirit]
and
.
man."

is "the

same"

actuality of reason. "The (emphasis added) because

manifests

itself in individual form"; it

"individuates."

Hegelian logic
thinking."

arises as a response

to a

difficulty in

"analytic

or scientific

contradiction."

Such thinking is "regulated

this
ego cogitans examines

by

the principle of

There

can ple.

be

no analytical reflection upon

principle

that does not assume the princi

subject and

If the

itself, it becomes both

object,

it."

thereby "violating]
leads

the

principle of contradiction

by

the act of asserting

This

non-Hegelians

to posit the existence of intellectual intuition. Hegel at

tempts to avoid this exigency

by

asserting the
'completes'

essential

identity

of

being
logic

and

thinking,
out

subject and object.

This

or explains

traditional

with

provocative suggestion that Plato under annihilating it. Rosen makes the for understanding this, near the be grounds provides the stands this, or at least "As soon as we analyze the Platonic conception ginning of philosophy's history. with one major of Being, it transforms itself into the Hegelian qualification.

conceptio

Platonic

Being is
Spirit,

not self-conscious, whereas or

"Hegel's One
life."

...

is

self-conscious

Absolute

the Parmenidean One brought to

(We

are

therefore

entitled and

to think that Rosen's two subsequent

books,

titled The Limits of

Analysis
Rosen

Plato's Sophist, follow from his G. W. F. Hegel.)

that

observes

for Aristotle the

most stable science of

principle of contradiction

is

finally

not a

principle so much as

"a

Hegel
the

boldly

transforms this opin

comports

sciences."

ion into dialectic, "the

with

This transformation

his

claim

to possess, and not merely

of contradiction
concept

love,

wisdom.

Problem: How to de

duce the

principle

Here Hegel introduces the

center"

from itself, thus avoiding infinite regress? which Rosen calls "the center of
"reflection,"

of

the

of

Hegel's logic. The

ego can posited

tion if it

somehow

is both

what

is

only think the principle of contradic and what is not posited, both P and

274
non-P

Interpretation
The One

Absolute Spirit

"God"

The

in

a manner analogous and

to Aristotle's formless "pure thought

Whole) differentiates itself thinking by

itself"
'P'

both positing

negating, self-consciously and

simultaneously.

non-P.

simultaneously distinguish P from all non-P and Hegelian reflection perceives that the Whole "is itself
changes

To say is to therefore to think both P and

'sophist,'"

which

"continuously
cation

its

shape or pretends

to be

what

it is

not,"

by

nondialectical, non-Hegelian logicians. In a sense, the

eluding Whole is

classifi
self-

contradiction, generating or positing the conflicting thoughts and things of this

world.

There is

an order

to

this, but it is

an order of

(dialectical) development
wisdom

and not a stable

framework. [the

Philosophy
of of

is transformed into

"by

the pro

'principle'

self-reflective."

cess which renders

contradiction]
and everywhere

The formation
same."

process

Absolute Spirit is "always

the

Its

consequences are not.

Phenomenon-ology,
that
phenomena

the logos of the phenom

within

ena,

reflects

Hegel's

conviction

have (Hegelian) logic

animal

them. For example, the simple act of eating shows contradiction that results in an
object's assimilation

into

higher

order:

hungry
within

+ food (destroyed 'in

itself)
itself
ical

satisfaction.

The Hegelian logic historical

the phenomena
which

finally
.

reveals
. .

after

"a

stages"

given number of

categories

is

revealed."

(Those

lacking

"the totality of Hegelian wisdom or "perfect

of

in

log

satis

faction"

find life tragic, So

while

"slaughterbench"

thoughts).

The

Phenomenology
it

of Spirit in

contradictory persons and one sense introduces The

Science of Logic, in
the

another sense

could not

be

written until after completion of

Logic,

after

the end of history.

Reason is
objects.

"cunning."

It

works

through objects, and through our desires for

We

consume and produce until all objects

man

have been

produced and as world as

similated, "until the

God."

has

satisfied

his desire

by

producing the objective

and of

complete actualization of

his

subjectivity"

own

"thereby identifies

him

self with

"[M]orality

and

freedom [the making

the self in the activity of

producing the world] depend upon the production of this world of intersubjectiv but as eventuating, finally, in ity, as initiated in the war of each against
each"

peace made possible when

I "recognize

myself

in the

other

because
political

we are

both
this

instances has

of the self-consciousness of

Absolute

Spirit."

In

history

ends

replacing the active, noble silence of the Spartan aristocrat, which in death, with the emphasis on rhetoric and self-preservation. "[I]f the best men die in silence, the state will fall into the hands of the worst
meant
moderns' men."

The

good must
must

become

'bad'

in

order to provide a

foundation for
the
low"

political

virtue; the high

"learn the

ways and the weapons of

another ex

ample of reason's cunning.

Even

nihilism

is

dialectically necessary.

The

worst must

be

overcome

in

order

to yield the best. (Here Rosen permits himself one of several jabs at Nietzsche: the will-to-power is merely "Hegel's Absolute Spirit suffering from a loss of

consciousness.")

Book Reviews

275
and therefore

Nihilism is intelligible,
an obstacle

it may be

overcome.

Indeed, it

must

be

over

come; the mind responds

inevitably

to the intelligible

by

grasping it. The

presence of

is

'food'

for the

engine of

desire in its

pursuit of total satisfaction.

Nihilism takes

numerous

forms, from
man

the terror of the

French Revolution to the

esthete's refined

hedonism. All find themselves

in

superseded

by

the revelation of
a metaphorical

"Hegel's heresy": "God becomes way to

truth
express

order to

become

God,"

the self-revelation
truth,'

is to be 'in the

or still

Absolute Spirit. "For Hegel, more sharply, to be the The

of
truth."

to think the
soul and the calls

concept are
completion
Whole."

finally identical,
of analysis and

both

aspects of

Absolute Spirit. Hegel

the

"speculation"

synthesis

The Hegelian

sage

pletes

it,
but

and so can never

"remembers the totality of it but must rather begin to think it step

'beyond'

"the thinking of the his wisdom as he com infinite

again."

Wisdom/speculation is
an

circular.

Hegelian logic
now

yields not an
and so

re

gress

infinite

revolution.
' "

"Spirit is
regards

complete,

'resting in

itself,'

although
problem

it is 'excited.
of

Hegel

this as the solution to "the fundamental

as presented
rest and

the entire philosophic

or

tradition,"

in Plato's Sophist:

"How

can

Being

the Whole be both at

in

motion?"

Rosen

offers several criticisms of

Hegel's

doctrine; among these,

recourse
occur

several are

noteworthy for our purposes. First, Rosen suspects that intuition is not avoidable. Even Hegelian discourse "can
tual
itself."

to intellectual

presents presented

Without intellectual intuition, how do

be."

we

only after the ac know the actual

has

Hegel "fail[s] to
'How'

such

itself? Second, while attempting to explain the formation process Hegel's vulnerability to explain how any thing comes to questions perhaps tempted Marx to formulate his materialist neotheoretical problems, Rosen

Hegelianism.

In
cal

addition

to these

and other

identifies

a practi

dilemma. Plato
'this
that

commends a sort of alienation

whereby the

philosopher tran

world.'

scends
solute:

Hegel

would overcome alienation are reconciled

by

is,

spirit and

body

by

the grace

rendering practice ab of the Absolute Spirit,

incarnated in the living,

the
mind of
political-historical

self-conscious process of who

thought

thinking itself
'above,'

within

the Hegelian sage,

is

satisfied

within,
sage

not

concrete
most radical ev

idence
ence,

of

life. But "the very existence of the the difference between the few and the
resented, can

is the

many."

when

lead to "the is
made

condemnation name of

In modernity this differ to death of philosophy it

self."

This

condemnation

in the

the many, said

by their putative
sage.

spokesmen

to embody

wisdom.

There is little

satisfaction

in that for the

Politics

remains as problematic

for the

sage as

for the

philosopher.

In his depends
cannot

exchange with upon

Strauss, Alexandre Kojeve insists

for
a
philosophic necessity.

that the philosopher the philosopher

the many

By himself,

know if his "first

are

truly

evident and not

the result of some

276

Interpretation
In isolation
one can never

madness.
tion"

know.

will

do,

absent

the god[s] a philosopher

sole

Only "social and historical likely rejects. "[T]he

criterion of

verifica of

'success'

his

philosophical

pedagogy is the
and

'objective'

the truth of the phi

losopher's
elite.

doctrine,"

that pedagogy

must not

Kojeve thus

assumes that madness will

not

ther

assumes

that the many are

mad, and

be restricted permanently to an find the many therapeutic; he fur even educable. This egalitarian or
that contradiction can only be

'Left'

Hegelianism "to the

also requires

the

assumption

extent"

resolved

it is "played
acts of

out on

the historical terrain of active social

life

where one argues

by

Labor (against

Nature)
be

and

Struggle (against in
action

men)."

To Kojeve's Hegel,
can

political givens must

negated

before

new

reality

universal and
man."

be philosophically understood. The tyrant "who will realize the is the precondition of "the coming of the wise homogeneous
State"

In his reply, Strauss leged

state. philosophic

expresses a philosophic skepticism of

necessity

the many and the

of

the universal and

concerning the al homogeneous (One

Throughout, he

questions

contention

that mixing the philosophic with

the

subphilosophic can yield

that

which

transcends

both,

wisdom.

might

think that the addition of the subphilosophic the intellectual. But Hegelians
would

would yield

something in between:

find this thought in

a

lamentably undialectical.)

Strauss does

not

deny

that the many can,

serve the philosopher.

other people

"The

philosopher cannot

limited way and inadvertently, devote his life to his own work if
body."

do

not

take care of the needs of his

But Strauss denies that

the philosopher
and of

is

much

instructed

by

those who take such care. The universal

final tyrant does

claim

to take care of the body. He also pretends to take care

the soul, even the philosopher's soul. But there

is

no reason

to suppose that he

can

do any such thing. That such criticisms

the very attempts to

stein's project cause
which

Hegelianism may be seen in Hegelianism that Bern modest, humane, typifies. One must doubt that these efforts can succeed, if only be

irreparably
a

damage

'Left'

formulate

'Left'

they

exaggerate, sentimentalize, the egalitarianism

exaggerate

'Left'

of

Hegelianism,
'low'

in turn

the egalitarian aspect

of

Hegelianism itself. But the lat

classicism with
mod

ter egalitarianism
ernism

the attempt to synthesize

serve

'high'

is intended to
makes

sagacity,

which

is

not egalitarian.

gacity
Tow'

far

more

immodest

claims than

philosophy does. Yet

If anything, sa so do the

moderns

themselves: from Machiavelli on, almost every one of them

claims

or help men achieve, godlike mastery over In this, Hegel clearly sides with the moderns. Can this combination of low means with high pretensions cohere rationally? In modernity the problem of

to know enough to achieve,

nature.

historicity

and reason

takes the form of this question.

Book Reviews

277

How to Think
The Artist
as

about

Art
By George Anastaplo. $32.95, paper $14.95.)

Thinker: From Shakespeare to Joyce.

1983.

(Athens, Ohio: Swallow Press,

Larry Arnhart
Northern Illinois

499

pp.: cloth

University

In his first two books (1 97 1)

mon

The Constitutionalist: Notes

and

on

the First Amendment

and

and

Human

Being

Citizen: Essays
argues

on

Virtue, Freedom

the

Com

Good

(1975)

George Anastaplo
that through reason
order

that nature provides standards for

law

and politics and

we can

discover these standards, though

tantalizes readers
with

prudence stances.

is necessary in In the extensive

to

to apply universal principles to particular circum these

notes of

books, Anastaplo
be
as

suggestions as

how his

argument could

extended to works of

literature.
liter

Those

readers will welcome

The Artist

Thinker

as an elaboration on this

ary criticism. As in his previous books, Anastaplo weaves a colorful variety of topics into intricate patterns of thought. Thus, he shows us how the philosophic study of art
can

itself become

a work of art.

He devotes thirteen

chapters to thirteen English-

language

authors:

Austen, Mary Lewis Carroll, Mark Twain, William S. Gilbert (as collaborator with Arthur Sullivan), Robert Louis Stevenson, and James Joyce. In his epilogue, appen dices, and notes, he comments on artists and artistic thinkers such as Homer, Callimachus, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Edwin Muir, Leo Strauss, George Seferis, Pablo Picasso, Woody Allen, and Harry Jaffa. Anastaplo also describes
his
work

William Shakespeare, John Milton, John Bunyan, Jane Shelley, Charles Dickens, Herman Melville, Matthew Arnold,

in

helping

to design
at the

and construct

the

stained-glass windows

in Rocke

feller Memorial Chapel Some

readers

University
it

of

Chicago.
to include such a
captivated wide range of

may

consider

self-indulgent

topics in one book. But

careful readers will

be

by

the

rich

and

lei

surely thoughtfulness of the book. To Anastaplo's general argument and then reflect
to his
reasoning.

support that

claim, I

will

summarize

on some of the possible objections

Regrettably, I

cannot even touch upon

the many points of

inter

pretation

that fill his work,

which perhaps constitute

the most valuable part of the

book.

The
argues

literary artist shows us human beings making moral choices. Anastaplo that to fully understand what the artist is doing we must judge whether his
And
we should expect

characters make the right choices.

mistakes will

that those who make

be

punished

by

the

bad

consequences of

their mistakes.

Anastaplo
the

goes on

to

say that

although

there are many reasons

for

moral

error,

ultimate reason

in

most cases

is that

people are not as careful

in thinking

278
about

Interpretation

their choices as

they
be

should

be. From this human

point of

view, knowledge is

vir

tue. To be

happy

one must

know

what a

being

must

Therefore,
practical

one must

prudent.

That

is,

one must

do to be truly happy. cultivate the capacity for

who are

judgment to

achieve a good

human life. Those

imprudent
impor For

those who act without understanding the probable consequences of their actions
or

the goal of human life

of prudence

are

likely

to suffer.
artist

Moreover,
must

to portray the

tance

for human life, the

himself

be

a prudent man.

this reason, Anastaplo argues, great artists are also great thinkers.

Anastaplo's
peare. erned who

paramount example of

the union of art and thought is Shakes

a rational world gov

The

moral universe of

Shakespeare's tragedies is

by a sense of what prudence demands of human act imprudently those inclined to misjudgments
to their mistakes.
a character

beings. Those
receive

characters

the punishment

appropriate

And in

most cases, serious misjudgments suffers a premature

lead to

death. When Anastaplo

in Shakespeare's tragedies

death,

suggests

that we examine that character's actions to understand how

artistic representations of

he

went wrong.

Shakespeare's

human

action

convey
explain while

moral

lessons

on

the nature of the good

as an example.

life.

Consider Hamlet

Most

literary
revenge

critics

have tried to

Prince Hamlet's indecisiveness in executing the

commands of the

Ghost

taking for

granted that

it

was

his

duty

to

his father's death

by killing
Godchal

King

Claudius. (I know
"Hamlet,"

of one exception

to this point of view

Harold C.

dard's essay,

in The

Meaning

of Shakespeare

.)

But Anastaplo

lenges
Once

this assumption.

He

questions whether

Hamlet

was wise

ther's desire for revenge,

we ask such

or whether

his hesitation

manifested a we are

in serving his fa healthy instinct.

to conclude that

questions, Anastaplo suggests,

was

likely

Hamlet deserved to die because he

long

as

King

Claudius
would

posed no

imprudent in trying to kill the King. As immediate threat to Hamlet or to the welfare of for Hamlet to have
Claudius
as
waited until

Denmark, it
when

have been

prudent

the time

he
a

would

have

legally

succeeded

king. The

consequences of
alternative

killing

king

are so

disastrous that it is usually

agree

reasonable

to consider

courses of action.

One does
ognize

not

have to

its

sensibleness.

completely with this sort of interpretation to rec In fact, the most impressive feature of Anastaplo's book

is the

commonsense critics

literary

practicality of his reasoning. At a time when most academic devote themselves to theoretical constructions or should I say
comprehensible

"deconstructions"?

satisfying to moral issues

read a

book that

shows

only to other academic literary critics, it is how literary art can help one think about the

of

life.
merit of

In many cases, the

their

Anastaplo's

literary

observations

depends less

on

ing

novelty than on their clarity. Anastaplo notices, for example, that in mov from Shakespeare to Joyce, there is a shift from political matters to private

matters, from
negans

community to individuality. Therefore, Joyce's Ulxsses and FinWake can be regarded as the conclusion "of the more or less steady re-

Book Reviews
treat
all

279
Shakespeare into the intense, intimate, the
that private world
nor

from the

grand public world of

too often disturbed private world of the modern artist

nor genuine

in

which neither old-fashioned

ety can be taken Frye (Anatomy of

mode of mode.

seriously"

the deepest pi nobility philosophy (p. 233). A contemporary literary critic like Northrop Criticism) would describe this as a move from the "high mi
mimetic"

fiction to the "low

mode and

finally

to the

"ironic"

But in his freedom from

pedantic

terminology

of this

sort, Anastaplo's

writing is rare in its precision, rigor, and manly toughness. Rather than developing a formal theory of literary criticism, Anastaplo tries to
consider each

literary
But

work on

its

own

terms. And
points to

yet

his interpretations do de
as

pend upon certain general principles.

He

Leo Strauss

the source of

those principles.
not

since of

Strauss

pointed

back to Plato

and

Aristotle, it is
forth

surprising that many Aristotle in the Poetics. I believe it

Artist
as would

Anastaplo's

arguments resemble those set

by

be instructive to

consider

the various

ways

in

which

The

Thinker

parallels

the Poetics. For

instance, Aristotle
a

maintains

that a

tragic plot

is

most apt

to arouse fear and pity if it contains

unexpected

discovery leading

to

a reversal of

fortune that is

but inevitable: the tragic hero is

surprised re

to discover a causal
sult.

chain of events of which

his suffering is the ineluctable

The best

sort of reversal

is

one

in

which a superior man of great reputation

and good

fortune falls to bad fortune

"error"

not

through egregious vice or

the

depravity

but

through some

(&uagxia). And in

best tragedies
"error"

like his

Sophocles'

Oedipus Tyrannus
the

the hero falls because he is in

about

identity
fear

or

identities

of those closest to

him.
of

Tragedy

stirs the greatest

of

pity

and

by

portraying

a person

who, because

his ignorance

himself, unexpectedly but

greatest suffering. a man

inevitably
most

brings

upon

himself

and those

he loves the.
Anastaplo

The

fearful punishments, Aristotle

seems to

say, are those that

seems

inflicts

upon

himself because

of

his

self-ignorance.

to offer us a varia

tion of this Aristotelian

ror"

view of

tragedy, according to

which

the tragic

hero's "er

is imprudence

In any case, Anastaplo surely agrees with Aristotle that art should be a thoughtful imitation of nature, so that the pleasing stories of the artist will in struct us in how to live according to nature's dictates. But as many critics of

Aristotle's Poetics have losophy: the job

charm that multitude of

noted, this view of art puts poetry

in the

service of phi
poetic

of the artist

is to convey people who lack

critic

philosophic

lessons in

form to

Consequently,
tent
mance.

an

Aristotelian

the capacity for philosophic thought. like Anastaplo stresses the intellectual con
emotional power of

of art while

neglecting the instinctive,

the

artistic perfor

One
stand

say in Anastaplo's defense, however, that not only does he under this criticism, he even concedes that it contains an element of truth. (See,
can
pp.

for example,
41

16, 32, 138, 164-65, 200-1, 224, 247, 316, 362-63, 381,

1.) (Could

not the same

be

said about

both Plato

and

Aristotle?) But

on some

280

Interpretation
seem almost artists

points, his concessions stance,

while

to contradict

his

general argument.

For in

maintaining that
as

help

us

to

understand nature

by

their pre

sentation of universals suggests

they

manifest

themselves

that the

artistic emphasis on particulars

in particulars, Anastaplo may distort the reality of the

the particulars?

universals:

"Are they
of

not

radically dependent
thinker?"

upon

Is

not all

this

still another

doing

that

way he cannot be

saying that the artist, as artist, may not

fully

a not

(p.

412).

truly know what he is "Poets have long been sus

(p.
349).

pected of

saying things

which

they do
am

Does this

mean

thinker"

that considering the "artist as

"artist

as artist"?

If so, then I

diverges necessarily from considering the not sure how this can be reconciled with

Anastaplo's insistence that

artists

are

"obviously

thoughtful
167).

beings

and

the

thoughtful"

better the artist, generally, the

similar

more on

(p.

(I have

confronted a
on

difficulty
pp.
problem

in Aristotle
has

Political Reasoning: A Commentary

the

"Rhetoric"

13-16, 24-35, 55~56, 163-65, 172-76, 190.)

ramifications

This

for Anastaplo's intense

as or a

argument.

For if

great art

de

pends upon
movement

a thoughtful
modern art

grasp

of

the enduring standards of nature, then the

concentration on the personal expe claims a

in

towards an

riences of the artist would

artistic excellence of an

indicate

Anastaplo

decline from the

artist"

Aeschylus

Shakespeare. But if the "artist

as and appe and

appeals

to the irrational side of human life

by probing human emotions

"self-expression"

tites, then the contemporary celebration of artistic could be seen as the perfection of the true purpose
ativity"

"cre

of art.
warns

There is

an even

deeper

point at

issue here. When Anastaplo

obstruct

that the

artist's concern

for

particulars

may

his

access

to universals, he implies

that to
of

fully

understand

'ideas'

the

in the

things, one Platonic dialogues and of the

(p.
412).

the nature of

must consider
'self-evident'

"the

significance

in Aristotle's dis

reasoning"

cussions of reliance

upon,

man's rational

poses the classical

presupposes

grasp of rationalism of Plato

Anastaplo's understanding of, and his confident nature as a guide to human life presup
and

Aristotle. That is to say, Anastaplo

and

that the universe

is intelligible
means that

that the human

mind can

dis
of

cover that

intelligibility. This

there are certain ultimate principles

"ideas,"

rationality governing the universe and the mind. Plato called them

while of all

Aristotle
thought.

spoke

about

the

self-evident

first

principles

the

axioms

Obviously
from pursuing

this

leads

us

into the

most

difficult

and

fundamental

questions that
refrains

human beings

can ask.

It is understandable, therefore, that Anastaplo

such questions

of this particular

very far lest he push his readers beyond the horizon book. For his purposes, reliance upon commonsense judgments
yet

is

sufficient.

And

Anastaplo does

give

his

most curious readers suggestions as

begin to they telligibility of the universe.

might

to how

think about this ultimate question

concerning the in

One way that art makes things intelligible is by minimizing the role of chance. The poet, unlike the historian, does not record particular events as they occur in

Book Reviews

281
world must

life, because
that is rarely,
edies so

the poet's fictional

have

logical unity

and wholeness

if ever, found in life. Shakespeare

premature

can control the action

in his trag

that

death
that

comes
way.

life does
in

not always work

only Anastaplo

to those who
notes

deserve it, but everyday that this feature of art helps

human beings to

understand

the nature of things: "Art brings reason to bear

sense

novel ways on concrete of what

situations, making

(or,

at

least, seeming
(p.

to

make

sense) "Chance does

may

otherwise appear to
. .

be

chance"

governed

by
are not point

164).

not make sense.

Chance developments

tive, morally or otherwise, except to the extent that they may (pp. 142-43). ity and limitations of human
life"

truly instruc up the fragil

human
life"

But

should not our awareness of

"the

fragility

and

limitations
If the

of

draw

attention to the

inadequacy

of

Greek

rationalism?

universe

is

contin
ancient

gent, then the unassisted human

mind cannot

fully

make sense of

it. The

Greek

conception of nature assumes comprehensible on

that the cosmos is a self-contained

order

that

is rationally
ally
account

its

own

terms. But this gives us no way to ration

uniqueness of ev

for irregularities

the accidental events and the

erything that exists. Saint Augustine

could

saw this as the critical

appeal

defect in

pagan

rationalism,

which

be

nature

only by indicates the dependence

repaired made

to the Biblical revelation. The contingency of the supernatural Creator. Since na

of nature on

ture cannot be

intelligible

as a self-contained

whole,

we can make sense of

it only by transcending it through faith. We must believe in order to understand. (I have worked through this Augustinian reasoning in Political Questions: Politi
cal

Philosophy from

Plato to Rawls,

chapter

3,

sections

1-3.)
concedes

What does Anastaplo think

all

about such matters?

"faith"

He

that ultimately
and

premises,"

knowledge may depend upon a kind of but he apparently considers this

484).

in

certain

"impressions

consistent with

(p.

And

although poetry.

he

sees religion as
whom
'poets'

important for

certain

Socratic philosophy purposes, he

"prophets,'

tends to link it to the equally

"Those
called

the ancient Israelites called

"

ancient

Greeks

(p.

11).

"A

useful

divine"

nature once was

to talk about the

to say that the Biblical

(p. 416;

see also

way of talking p. 68).

"divine"

about

But is it
"poetic"

correct of

presentation of

the

is simply

way
not

of Biblical religion

speaking about in affirming that

"nature"? Or does this

all

overlook the uniqueness

has been

created

"out

of nothing"?

Should

"creationism"

Biblical Leo Strauss

be

understood as a

fundamental

alternative to

Socratic

"naturalism"? With
tion taken
challenges

respect

to this
and

by

issue, I suppose that I am inclined to the posi Harry Jaffa, a position that Anastaplo implicitly
would want

(see

pp. 268-71).

But

at this point

religion nor

surely some readers Socratic philosophy gives

superseded

to object that neither

Biblical

us a proper
natural

have

not

both been

by

modern

understanding of nature, for science? Anastaplo insists,

however,

that modern science actually obscures our view of nature as

415-16).

is (pp. 296,

Yet

at the same

time, he certainly

recognizes

it truly as did

282
Strauss

Interpretation
"that
modern science
truth"

has kept in

alive a

tradition of

inquiry,
stress

a respect

for

reason and

for the

(p.

253).

It is prudent, I think, to

contrary to
the premod

popular assumptions

the ways

which modern science supports

ern

understanding of nature. Most of Anastaplo's criticisms

of science are

directed
cf.

against mathematical

physics pp.

(pp. 252-53, 268, 296, 339-41, 415-16; but

yet

The Constitutionalist,

806-8). And
on

am reminded of an observation

by

Werner

Heisenberg, in

commenting
think that
on

scientific

theories of the behavior of elementary particles: "I

this point

modern physics

has

definitely
in Plato's
of

decided for Plato. For the

smallest units of matter are

in fact

not physical objects

in the ordinary

sense of

the word;

they

are

forms,

structures or

sense

Ideas,

which can

be unambiguously

spoken of

only in the language

show

mathema

(Across the

Frontiers,
for
what

p. 1 16).

Does this
calls

that some thoughtful physicists

are

searching (in the

Anastaplo

"ultron"

the

(pp.

252-53)?

But

perhaps modern

biology

gives us an even clearer view of nature

old-fashioned sense of that word).

dent

manifestations of nature are

fact, Anastaplo suggests that the most evi biological: birth and death, the growth of plants
In

and animals

to maturity, sexuality,

family life,
(pp.

and the

ranking

of animals ac

cording to their cognitive

capacities

8,

20-25,

67, 84,

91, 96-98, 112,

to ignore the pre

122, 127-29, 156, 175, 178, 204, 221, 267, 305, 320, 357-63< 446, 483-85)-

Anastaplo may be
suppositions of

right about the

tendency

of modern scientists

their work,

presuppositions

that are grounded in our prescien

tific, commonsense experience of the nature of things. But is not this more likely to be true for the physical sciences than for the biological sciences? Is not the bi
ologist

forced to

confront

the

natural purposefulness of

things (see p. 484)?

I do

not presume

to know enough about modern

assessments.

Yet I have the impression that Darwinian

an

biology to offer authoritative biology can reasonably be

of nature.

interpreted
prominent

as supporting biologists have

Aristotelian

conception

Indeed,

some

made such a claim.

sustain

In particular, there is

evidence that

Darwinian
argument

biology

could

the fundamental assumption of Anastaplo's the distinctive feature of human

chapter
nature.

the supremacy

of reason as

(I have
chapter

explored these

ideas in Political Questions,

might even

2,

sections

2-3; and

8,

section

1.)
confirm, in
some as we

Evolutionary biology
of art as a

manner, Anastaplo's

view

way And

of

thinking

about nature.

As far

know, from
first

studies of the about 30,000

prehistoric cave paintings

in France

and

Spain,

art appeared evidence

years ago.

one plausible

inference from the

is that this Stone Age

them to ex
symbolized

art served the

evolutionary

adaptation of

human beings

by helping
world.

press and preserve and

their accumulated knowledge of their

practical

Art

knowledge necessary for life in human communi ties. (John Pfeiffer has argued for this conclusion in The Creative Explosion.)
We
could think about as

dramatized the

the

history

of art

from

the

Stone Age to the Space

Age

reflecting the changing

forms

of

human knowledge. Pagan religion,

Book Reviews
Socratic philosophy, Do I have book.

283
and

the Biblical tradition have all found poetic

of

expression.

we now need a new

kind

commented on

This

is

only a book that one

poetry few of the issues brought to

cannot
read

perhaps

Shakespearean
mind

science

fiction?

by

Anastaplo's pondering

seriously

without

important
which

questions

is

what a

concerning human good book should do.

nature and

the nature of the universe,

MANUSCRITO
An international journal EDITORS: Campinas.
Marcelo
of

Philosophy
Universidade

Dascal,

Michel

Ghins.

Estadual

de

October 1983 Volume VII No. 1 La Denis L. Rosenfield

-

chose

en soi et

philosophe

(a

propos

le "reste de Kant

par

le
de

et

Hegel)
Franklin Leopoldo Mario Luiz Possas
Joseph Margolis
e

Silva

Bergson Seducao

e a e

Luiz Roberto Monzani

historia da filosofia fantasia

fundamentos

Marx

os

da

dinamica

economica capitalista

Scientific
issue

Realism

as

transcendental

Volume VII No. 2 Jose A. Giannotti

Francis Wolff

April 1984
Sistemas filosoficos
e razao pratica ce
qu'il

Peut-on distinguer
et ce
qu'il

de

mort

de

vivant

dans

une

philosophie?

Paulo Eduardo Arantes

Roberto de A. Martins

Ongens

do

espirito

de

contradicao

organizado

Measurement Marx
A

and

the

mathematical

role

of scientific magnitudes

Jean-Luc Petit Jacob Joshua Ross

e a semantica

do discurso

pratico

multiple-truth

theory

of science

MANUSCRITO is published twice yearly by the Centro de L6gica, Epistemologia e Historia da Ciencia. Universidade Estadual de Campinas. CP. 6133. 13100 Campinas, SP, Brazil. Annual subscription is US$ 10.00 (USS 5.00 for Latin American Countries).

Short Notices

Eighty Years
and
pp.:

of

Locke Scholarship: A Bibliographical Guide.

By

Roland Hall
+ 215

Roger Woolhouse. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh

University Press,

1983. x

$20.00.)

John Locke's Moral Philosophy.

By

John Colman. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh

University Press,

1983. viii + 282 pp.:

$27.50.)

J. E. Parsons, Jr.

The first

and

by

far best

volume of

these two

works

is

Eighty Years

of Locke

Scholarship. It

German authorities), (generally and includes not only literature in the usual European languages, but also in Pol ish, Romanian, Arabic and Japanese. Indeed, there exists a considerable Locke industry in Japan, which may one day even overtake the local British Locke in
contains omissions of the

few

dustry. To be
oneered

noted as well are

main

the beginnings of a Canadian Locke

industry,

pi

in the

by

the Canadian Journal of Philosophy, but without visible

connection

to the most distinguished Canadian Locke scholar, C. B. Macpher

industry, opening up the Klondike, as it were, of Locke scholarship in Oceania? South Africa, I be lieve, is immune to this disease, since its quasi-totalitarian, tribalistic regime is
son.

May

we

look forward to

burgeoning

Australian Locke

opposed on principle

to the

natural right

to the

freedom

of

conscience,
or

which

is

one of the mainstays of the seem

Lockean teaching. As for India

to be

no contributions whatsoever

there,

not to mention

Pakistan, there Bangladesh, Sri

Lanka, Burma

or

Malaysia.
appear much

In Europe, the French while the Spanish tend to Over time,

cern (1950well a

less interested in Locke than the Italians,

1900-

lag

behind the French.

that the earlier years, especially

one can

just

perceive

1920,
con

are more concerned with Locke the educator and epistemologist than a

later

1980)

with

Locke the

political scientist and economist.

There is
of

as

corresponding

shift

(though less equal) away from the

history

ideas in
acrid,

terms of a study of
over

sources and

influences toward

debate,
ends

sometime quite
with an

interpretive

method.

On this theme, the book in Interpretation.

properly

entry

for Michael P. Zuckert,

published

As for the omissions, they occur, as 1 have noted, generally in the area of Ger man scholarship and thought. Not only are Karl Marx, Max Weber and Heinrich
Rommen noticably absent, but
even

for the British,

name

Henry
is

Sidgwick's

name

is

not entered.

Surprisingly

enough, Husserl's

recorded

for Logische

286

Interpretation

Untersuchungen.
Lockean

Fortunately
and

or

not, Heidegger is left out

century.

perhaps

the least

philosopher of

the twentieth

Moving
gaps

to the second
we

Moral Philosophy,
even

vastly inferior volume, Colman's John Locke's find curious omissions in his scholarship, reflected by
sole

abysses

in the bibliography. The

and

Straussian

works

to be

mentioned are

Natural Right
i960).

History

and

Richard H. Cox's Locke

can

on

War
with

and

Peace (Oxford,

What is more, Colman thinks he

dispense

the Straussian view

in

footnote

by

stating

blandly
least,

and

falsely: "The (p.

247).
and

evidence

for the least

concealment

hypothesis

meagre"

is,

to say the

Anyone the Nat. Book

the con
was not

acquainted with and

Maurice Cranston's Locke (Br. Council

League, Writers
trary.
candid

their

Work,
. . .

Cranston there
in

notes that

London, 1969) would know Locke was a Socinian, but that Locke
no.

135,

denying

"he had

read

the

leading
copied

notebooks contain excerpts

he had already

Socinian authors, though his from their (Crans

writing

ton, p. 13). If this does not convey concealment, I don't know what does! And he used all kinds Cranston continues: "He [Locke] was never a candid man.
.

of

ment,
crets

little cyphers, he modified a shorthand system for the purposes of conceal He kept se and at least on one occasion he employed invisible ink.
.

from

people who were supposed

to

be his

friends."

closest

And Cranston
a good reason

concludes quite rightly:

"

"... Locke

was sometimes secretive

for

(Cranston,

p.

13).
mention of

Oddly
as

enough, Colman omits all

Cranston from his bibliography,

he does C. B. Macpherson, Carlo Viano, Walter Euchner, Robert A. Goldwin, and Michael P. Zuckert. Colman does not even mention Geraint Parry's
John Locke (London: Allen &
proverbial performance of

Unwin,

1978).

Truly, Colman's book is like

altogether.

the

Hamlet

acted without

the Prince of Denmark. Inciden

tally, his index fails to list the term, Therefore, Colman's book is hardly

"Socinian,"

worth

that,
a

as

Geraint

Parry

once suggested:

"A

profound

striking gap in the helped close that gap book leaves the gap
"

literature"

(Parry,

p. 28).

except to say Locke's theology is study I, for one, believe myself to have of
God"

discussing further,

in Essays "Locke, Civil Religion and in Political Philosophy (Washington, D.C., 1982, pp. 155-186). Colman's
with

my essay,

as wide as

ever, despite the book jacket's vain

moral

statement

that

we should regard

Locke's law

theory

as consistent with the

[Thomistic

and

Hookerian]

tradition."

natural

Short Notices
Rhetoric
Wallin.

287

American Statesmanship. Edited by Glen Thurow and Jeffrey D. (Jointly published by Carolina Academic Press and The Claremont Insti
and

tute for the

Study

of

Statesmanship

and

Political Philosophy, Durham, North

Carolina,

and

Claremont, California,

1984. 151 pp.: paper,

$7.95.)

Will Morrisey

The
day."

senior editor

intends "to
for

recapture and examine the older

tradition of re

publican rhetoric and

to contrast it with the rhetoric

so not

He

would

do

purposes of

dominating our public life to historiography but for purposes of

government, the
upon

statesmanship.

As

citizens

forget the

principles of republican

republican statesman's

task

becomes,

obviously, progressively dependent

mere

fortune. That

statesman's task

involves understanding those

principles and

making them understood or, at least, sufficiently understood to withstand chal lenge. Understanding political principles requires speech private speech,
which

is

philosophic at

its

best,

and public or rhetorical speech.

But if

we con

ceive of rhetoric as
'communication,'

the use

of words as

weapons,

and

if

we replace speech with

we ness and animality.

lose the distinctions between freedom

eight essayists

and

slavery,

human-

The

in this

volume

insist

on

these

distinctions.
Ameri
of

Eva T. H. Brann
can

and

Forrest McDonald
and
Remonstrance"

examine the rhetoric of two

gives a careful

founders,

Madison

Hamilton. Brann

interpretation

Madison's "Memorial
against

and

to the Virginia
a provision

Assembly,

a petition

Patrick Henry's bill establishing

for teachers
the

of religion.

Madison's politically
gious

successful argument emphasized

individuality
for

of reli

convictions, that

is,

the absolute

duty

of each person

to God and the alleg

religious

edly

consequent right to

erty does if not

not presuppose a

privacy of conscience. This doctrine of "mental

might

argument

lib

liberty,"

for Madison believed

opinions and

beliefs involuntary. One based

a contradiction of much modern thought: and economic

say that Madison reflects a paradox its enthusiasm for religious, polit
of mental

ical,
in

liberty

on a

doctrine

determinism. Indeed,

private correspondence

Madison

advocated

the encouragement of numerous

small religious congregations

ration) in

an argument

he

would reiterate

(at times citing Voltaire as his source for this inspi in political terms during his famous
rhetoric of

treatment of, and

and sober

for, faction. Madison's Humean

advanced a

"measured

passion and

ardor"

"harmonizing of the
added).

spirit of

the

Enlightenment

Christianity"

the

claims of

(emphasis

McDonald ion

recovers

Hamilton's distinction between

vulgar, the latter
opinion

popular and public opin

the former

being

associated with

the status and responsi

bility

of manhood. goes

Popular

is democratic;

public opinion

is

republican.

McDonald

further,

writing that in the 1780s Hamilton

"learned from study

was a more stable

of the principles of natural

law

that morality,

in the

long

run,

foundation for

self-interest."

government

than was economic

Hamilton, then,

288
was an

Interpretation
Aristotelian. McDonald
notwithstanding the somewhat dubious law in Aristotle's thought. McDonald acknowledges that in
claims,
geometric and moral

standing of natural Federalist No. 31 Hamilton treats

'Englightenment'

a more

than Aristotelian

thing

to

truths as equally certain, but he insists that Hamil do,

ton did this only

for

rhetorical effect.
and

McDonald

also acknowledges

Hamilton's

intellectual debts to Smith

Aristotelianism.

Hume, but does

not

here

explore

their relation to

The rarity

of traditional rhetoric one

in this century may be

seen

in the fact that the

supplemented

editors select

only Winston Churchill. Thomas B. Silver finds Coolidge's

altation of greed rejects

American, Calvin Coolidge,

to

who

is

by

central

theme "not the ex

ideals."

but the

virtue,"

exhortation

more, to "classical

Silver

the characterization of our founders as

modern

Lockeans, insisting

that

democracy

does

not arise out of the

licentious impulses in the human

soul.

It

arises as a response

to arbitrary or

artificial rule.

poses

Far from rejecting human excellence or virtue, modern democracy presup the individual's self-government, Silver argues. This edifying interpreta
founders'

tion of the
what

thought must of course withstand a careful examination of

those great men meant

.

by

the arbitrary or artificial

and

its opposite, the

natural

Larry P Arnn presents a subtle argument concerning Churchill's rhetoric. Ex amining two early Churchillian writings (an essay on rhetoric and a political novel), Arnn discovers a much more complex mind than most detractors or ad
mirers

have

suspected.

In the essay, Churchill

writes

that rhetoric
and

manipulates

human beings

by

exploiting both human ignorance

the human desire to

know; by

the use of analogy, connecting the known to the unknown, the concrete
issue."

finite to the infinite, the rhetorician wields what Churchill calls a weapon, one that can, in Arnn's words, "dominate a political Churchill appears to redeem the rhetorician by claiming that he must be open and
to the abstract, the
sympathetic a

to the people,

sentimental and earnest.

He is

manipulator, but
a tyrant.

not

"detached

manipulator."

A detached

manipulator would

be

In Savrola, Churchill's only novel, we find a somewhat different teaching. The rhetorician is "responsible for the actions of the crowd he there

addresses,"

fore

not

completely of the
upon an

people.

"Savrola's

democracy
that standard

is

democracy

founded

unchanging standard,
superiority.
. .

a standard that

determines

what consti

tutes excellence or

Discovering
rhetorician

requires private

thought,
so, this

not public speech or sympathy.

means

Although Arnn does is something

not

that the Churchillian

no tyrant.

of a

explicitly say detached ma

nipulator.

Still, he is

He is

perhaps not quite a

philosopher, either; he

is

an

"independent

statesman."

Rhetoric "unites the two

more to

aspects

in [the indepen
of

dent statesman], the

and the aspect

aspect
more

having
to

do

with

the urgencies

the moment,

having

do

with

the

politi

enduring

questions posed

by
rhetoricians

With the

exception of

Silver's Coolidge,

each of

the

"traditional"

Short Notices

289
thought in
some way.

combines classical and modern

none of modern. called

Given limitations

of

space,

the writers except Brann precisely measures the ratio of classical to

The

volume's other
or mass

four

writers

"popular

rhetoric"

discuss contemporary (Jeffrey Tulis), "liberal democratic

'rhetoric,'

better

rheto

(John

(Har Zvesper), Holmesian rhetoric (Walter Berns), or vey C. Mansfield, Jr.). Whatever it is called, there is no doubt concerning its
modernity.

"communication"

Tulis

remarks

that the

founders

and almost all of the

dents
ples.

spoke

to the people through

Congress,

nineteenth-century presi appealing to Constitutional princi

The only one who did not was Andrew Johnson, and the tenth Article of Impeachment against him cited "intemperate, inflammatory, and scandalous ha
a

rangues, delivered in

loud

voice."

By

contrast, Woodrow Wilson

spoke

to

Congress through the people, anticipating the now-customary practice of at of the future out of undisciplined vulgarizations of tempting "to build
'visions'
thought."

leading
nal
people

strands of

contemporary
presidential

As

result, Tulis notes, Congressio

deliberation atrophies,

thought declines to crowd

level,

and

the

lose

respect

for their

putative

leaders.

Zvesper describes the

Roosevelt.

problem

faced

by

Wilson's

political

Rightly pointing to
sees

the anti-rhetorical character of modern

heir, Franklin liberalism,

claims as

which associates rhetoric with

power,"

"passionate

controversy"

and

"illiberal

to

Zvesper

that liberals

must seek a

way to

"say

something

strong
not en

claims"

as

these

without

becoming
too

themselves illiberal. Liberals must learn to

daring."

progress,"

combine

"finality
in

and

"moderation

and

Roosevelt did

tirely

succeed

this.

He

'conservative'

was

in the

sense that

he wrongly

as

sumed

U.S. industrialization had ended, that the

a

political task was to more captains

justly

manage

permanently limited

economy.

Administrators,

of social

industry. In attempting to effect this replace ment, Roosevelt not only neglected entrepreneurial daring but occasionally ne glected rhetorical moderation, as in his complaints against the "new
work,
would replace captains of

despotism"

of

"economic
opponents

Zvesper

encourages

"righteous

anger"

against a

individ

ual

but deplores "passionate

forerunner

hatred"

aroused against

social/eco

nomic class.

Walter Berns finds

of

Wilson
part

not

in the

partisan political arena

but

on

the Supreme Court.

of
.

Holmes, "instead

Owing defending constitutional

.

in

to the

influence from

of

Oliver Wendell
majorities,

principle

popular

the Supreme Court

has

come

to see its
not

function

as that of

imposing
with

'modern

authority'

on a population

that

is

disposed to

accept."

As

the office of

the presidency, this high trendiness causes the people to "lose

respect"

for the

Constitution.

Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr.,

ity'

agrees with

Berns that the

now called

phrase

'modern

author as

constitutes a near-oxymoron.

What is

'communication,'

dis

tinguished
and

from rhetoric, levels distinctions among

citizens of

different

countries

in

that sense

is

apolitical.

Communication

stresses

novelty

as against tradi-

290

Interpretation
'rule'

'intellectuals'

tion and custom, the

"feelings"

of

as against political compassion and

rule,

and

the ex

citation of with

(particularly
mortality)
of

indignation,

those associated
calls

insecurity,

as against religion or philosophy.

Mansfield

this

deliberation but decision, tending toward the arbitrary, issues from this peculiar idealism. Among philosophers, Kant insisted on the moral importance of decision, but he was no simple materi
"an idealism

Not

speech or

alist.

"Today

we might regard

Kant's

confidence

in

knowing evil

and good as na

ive, but to

make

norance of

up for this, we assume good and evil do not

with greater
"we"

matter."

By

complacency than he that ig Mansfield means democrats

Such complacency tends to

generally but democratic intellectuals undercut intellectuality itself:

How
placed can

preeminently.

intellectuals

maintain

their status

deliberation

and no

longer

assert that the

if they admit that information has re intellect elevates them above others?

To

reflect on

that question, a philosopher

is

needed.

The
the

philosopher might

begin

by

considering Madison's

mental

determinism

and

extent

to which it might weaken the deliberative capacity.

should strengthen as

This book fore deserves

the

large

readership

as can

deliberative capacity of its readers and there be reconciled with deliberativeness.

Problems

of

Modern Liberalism

Will Morrisey

Power, State, and Freedom: An Interpretation of Spinoza's Political Philoso phy. By Douglas J. Den Uyl. (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1983. xii
+ 172
pp.:

paper,

$14.00.)
to political issues is

"Spinoza's Uyl
are

approach or

decidedly

modern,"

by

which

Den

means

"scientific

positivistic."

That

is, Spinoza's "fundamental

his This foundation
presents a

conce

"devoid

content"

of normative

although some of
content."

other, nonfundamental

"principles"

do have "normative

difficulty.

Modern

science at

least

appears to
same

begin

with

the "normative": an invitation to

'realism,'

conquer nature.

At the

time, its proponents insist

on

by

which

they

mean, among other things, the rejection of teleology. What is the

'norm'

relation of

the modern

to the modern

'freedom'

from 'values'?
explores the

In five

chapters and two appendices

modernity.

Den Uyl

dual

character of

Spinozist
right.

In the first

chapter as

he discusses Spinoza's
and nature as
terms."

version of natural
'normative.'

Spinoza

regards

human law

'normative'

non-

He

regards right and power as

"co-extensive

"[0]ne has the

right to

do

Short Notices
whatever one can said

291
do."

Den Uyl

claims

that according to Spinoza "it cannot be

more

that the

man who acts

according to reason is acting exclusively from

in

accord with nat

appetit

ural right also sees man.

than the man who acts that

passion or

but he

Spinoza
not

considers rational men more powerful than

impassioned

Den Uyl does

explicitly draw the

men are

conclusion: most

if

right and power are co who acts

extensive

terms and rational

finally the

powerful, then he

according to reason does act more in accord with right. Den Uyl claims that Spinoza differs from Hobbes in that Hobbes does not equate right with power but
with

"right reason"; thus Hobbes

was

"clearly
perhaps

tied to the older normative tradi

not

tions."

But if

right reason

does

yield

power, then those ties do

the
most novel

bind. "Spi
of

noza's equation of right and power

theory."

is

feature

his

poli

tical

Perhaps

but

one might consider not

only Hobbes but Bacon,

human law
a tenuous

Descartes,

and

Machiavelli.
"normative"

Making
state, the

right and power co-extensive gives

moral status.

In

subsequent chapters

Den Uyl

explores

Spinoza's

version of

the

nature and

foundations
somewhat

of political

authority, and the

that

relation of power

any teaching not found be Spinoza's final teaching, even if it is found in the Theologico-Political Treatise. He makes this assumption because Spinoza
to liberty. Den Uyl

incautiously

assumes

in the Political Treatise

cannot

tells

readers

that "he will discuss what

is

relevant

to his task

in the [Political

Treatise]

without

requiring the

reader

to consult his other

works."

Fortunately,

Den Uyl sees that the two books share similarity in their theoreti cal Nonetheless, some readers may wish for a more careful consid eration of Spinoza's literary devices. Although Den Uyl reads Spinoza with intel
"a
remarkable
foundations."

ligence, it is difficult for him

Uyl is
prejudices

to

perhaps even more right

his usually stimulating interpretations. Den than he realizes when he suggests that "casting off
prove

is

perhaps

the most difficult task

facing

the

reader of

Spinoza; for it is
terms."

not uncommon
understand

for Spinoza to

attach unfamiliar meanings

to

familiar

To

those meanings, their context must context, namely, Spinoza's

book

by Spinoza, its
passions

be considered; to books, must be considered.

the authority of
man,"

understand a

Den Uyl's interpretations include the

two basic

suggestion

that "fear and love are the

by

which one

may fall

under

Thus "the
own

government

has

no

authority

over

the reasonable

who

is "his

master, his

own

Thus,

the distinction between citizen and slave

philosopher

is

rendered

problematic

by

the

political

sometimes

regarded

as

authority

the founder of modern liberalism. Spinozist "political

ing"

is "norm-giv

but "determined

by
can

Spinoza's "is

the extent that

liberty

be

equated or shown

philosophy of liberty only to to be consistent with a theory of

a

Spinoza

reconciles power and

liberty by

passion and superstition

is

the

source of power.

contending that reason liberated from The civitas is most powerful

the elimination
of con

acting tradictions (Den Uyl does

when

rationally.

Perhaps because
not

reason requires

say),

peace

"is the

political expression of reason or

292
rational

Interpretation
Because true
power aims

at,

even

yields, peace, the

power

Spinozist
it
of

state allows
self with

fairly

substantial

individual liberty. True

does

not concern

regulating
obedience

private vices.

Tyranny

depends too

much on

fear instead

"willing

to the

law"; it is inefficient
of

largely

because

of

its irrational de

ployment of power.

In Spinoza
now well

one sees

many

the

elements of modern

liberalism. Difficulties
character of rea

known to

us. most

particularly those concerning the

this conspicuously the best
a
means of

son, come to light in the

reason seems son

writings of

daring

philosopher.

If

is
to

a means of action

instead

of

be

reconciled with politics

'active,'

in it

way

rejected

by

the

contemplating truth, it ancients. But if rea

not service

is essentially

what can

serve

but the body? And does

to the

body

eventually

corrupt reason and empower

the passions? Will such cor

ruption and empowerment

eventually

yield

the destruction of the

liberal order,

then despotism?

John Stuart Mill

Yale

and

the Pursuit
1984. xi

of

Virtue.
pp.:

University Press,

+ 212

By Bernard Semmel. cloth, $17.50.)

(New Haven:

John Stuart Mill may

better than any

understand
.

the

problematic character of modern reason and

subsequent

liberal He faults both Bentham

reason

Comte for inclin lesson

ing

toward

despotism, for misusing

reports

in

ways

that undermine liberty.

Semmel

that Mill's father impressed upon

his

son the

from Xenophon's Memorabilia. The Sophist Prodicus

cules met vances of preferred
"Happiness"

relates that the

story young Her

of a

two beautiful young women at a crossroads. Hercules rejected the ad

one,

called

by

her

"Vice"

admirers,

by

her detractors. He
par

"Virtue,"

who taught that exertions at

true happiness comes from exertion,

ticularly

in the

service of others.

According
Mill

to

Semmel,

this lesson

"shape[d]
"Hercules

the

root

the character of John Stuart

of

Mill's

liberalism."

Far from
"spirit"

choosing the easy way

and sometimes without
of

false

"Happiness,"

was animated

by

the

of

the Christian-Stoics of the

Renaissance."

"We live
writes.

by
.

myths,
choice
. .

being fully
seen as

aware

that

do,"

we

Semmel
a myth

"The

Hercules may be

Mill's

myth,"

personal
good

he "translated

into

a public myth as

the necessary basis of a

a myth
as a

society."

aware
myth.

To say that Mill lived by of it Mill's status

Semmel

is to

question

perhaps without

being fully

philosopher, as one capable of

"middle"

transcending

never suggests that a

third,

and public phon's mark

virtue might

have been

available

way between private vice to Mill. (See Leo Strauss: Xeno

pp.

Socrates, Cornell University Press, 1972,

man who

35-38).

He does

not re

that the

tells the story

of

the philosopher,
not

Socrates. This
. .

confirms

Prodicus telling the story of Hercules is Semmel's own observation that he does
and

"adopt the

approach"

of

"political theorists

but

rather

Short Notices
that of "the

293
ideas."

historian

of

One

might question whether this

"approach"

can

bring

anyone

to historical accuracy.
provide a good

This notwithstanding, Semmel does

principal concerns and

introduction to Mill's
Perhaps
without

to the ethos

in

which

Mill

operated.

be
but

ing fully
an

aware of

it, Semmel
retells

shows that the

young Mill
point,
of

was no philosopher

intellectual

who could

sympathize, up to

with

the antics of the Saint-

Simonians. Semmel
of

the amusing story

B.-P. Enfantin, the "Pere Su

messiah"

preme"

the group, who called for a "female

to save women
other.

from

marriage on

the one hand and from prostitution on the

retired

"Enfantin

and

forty

of

his disciples

to a

monastic retreat at
life"

his Paris

estate of

Menilmontant,
redeemer's ar active one.

where
rival.

they

took

up

a celibate

in

anticipation of

this feminist

Understandably
on

enough, the

strategy

soon gave

way to a more
a

"[Convinced that this

new messiah would

be found in

Turkish

harem,"

they
libre."

departed

a pilgrimage

to Constantinople "pour
other side of

chercher

la femme

Viewing

these incidents from the

the English

Channel, "Mill's
of

pa

exhausted."

tience was
sequence of a good
men."

He "could

suggest of

only that such was the inevitable con French

idea
was case

[equality

the sexes] fallen into the hands

Sober Virtue his

better loved in England. for Mill's

"Stoicism,"

To

strengthen

Semmel

quotes remarks

praising

the Stoics and criticizing the Epicureans. He omits remarks praising the Epicure
ans and make
post1840 writings, Mill never hesitated to criticizing the Stoics. In his as he did, for example, in Utilitarianism, wherein the use of divers allies

young Socrates, Epicurus, Bentham, and Jesus are of utilitarian ethics. "Mill's mind was essentially
Benthamite W. S. Jevons
a philosopher who
charged.

all commended as exemplars

illogical,"

the unreconstructed

Alternatively,

one might wonder

if Mill

was
on

had

mastered rhetoric.

(See Paul Eidelberg: A Discourse

pp. 402-3).

Statesmanship, University

of

Illinois Press, 1974, Mill. It deserves

The latter

possi

bility

implies

an

interesting

more extended

investigation

by

someone who understands the

issues.
which says

Meanwhile,
Mill
opposed

we

have Semmel's essay, Mill. Semmel

neglected aspect of

the

practice

opposed

the

abolition

of

worth saying about a of several facts: liberals contemporary of paying government debts with inflated currency; he capital punishment; he endorsed a wartime govern

things

reminds

ment's right

to seize enemy goods

in
".

neutral

ships; he
saw

praised

the Swiss practice

of universal

military

conscription.

Mill

cies of a weak-willed, commercial, modern

one."

himself countering the tenden democratic society and providing a

spiritedness

basis for
without

a virtuous

Semmel traces this

the

to

Machiavelli,

perhaps

being fully
regards

aware of all

issues involved.
Mill's
writings as

Semmel
not

the

unsystematic nature of

deliberate, but

rhetorically deliberate.
liberticide"

System-building
and

toward

seen

in Bentham

"would merely confirm the tendency Comte. As noted previously, Semmel

does

not

sufficiently

reflect upon possible additional motives

for apparently

un-

294

Interpretation

systematic presentation.

However,

the

avoidance of

intellectual despotism

and

the

consequent

insistence that the

about.

reader

think for

himself surely
guard against

explain some

of what

Mill is

Intellectual

and moral

activity

tyranny. Pas

sivity does not. "Like the ancient philosophers whom he admired, and their Christian-Stoic disciples of the Renaissance, as well as the moral philosophers of
the Scottish Enlightenment and the
understood sen

humanists Carlyle

and

Matthew Arnold, Mill

that a good society could not

long

survive

the eclipse of a

freely cho
wiser

virtue."

On the basis

of

that sentence, Semmel may be said to be

than

he is learned.

Essays in Political Philosophy.

Mansfield, Jr. (Washington, D.C.:

pp.: cloth

By J. E. Parsons, Jr. Preface by Harvey C. University Press of America, 1982. x + 359

$26.25,

paper

$14.25.)
and

Parsons
cism.

sees that

liberalism both tends toward

is threatened

by

histori

He

suspects

it. Nine
the

chapters contain

Mill has this tendency and he identifies Dewey as a victim of interpretations of writings by eight political thinkers; discussion
of

final

chapter contains a

liberalism's

severest

problem, belief as

reflected

by

the problem of consent. As Mansfield

all

writes

in the book's informa

author's reflections on

tive preface,
liberalism."

the chapters "take their

bearing

from the

The first two

chapters concern a pair of thoughtful statesmen who advanced

'modern'

liberalism in Britain. A
1688
cient

"regarded

shaper"

as a prime mover and

of

the

settlement, Lord Halifax

espoused a restrained

Machiavellianism. An "an

in temperament
shared

philosophy"

and
preference

who espoused

Epicureanism, Sir William

Both

Temple England diers

Halifax's

for

mixed regimes over monarchies.

men also shared an of

interest in

diluting

the religious passions that wracked the

books'

their time. In practice, the 'battle of the

featured

some sol

on opposite sides who nonetheless collaborated next

for the

sake of civil peace.

The

two chapters concern La Rochefoucauld and Hobbes. La Roche

foucauld
while

views

human

nature with

"Christian (even

'pessimism'

Augustinian)

"

espousing
.
.

a restrained

Machiavellianism in

politics.

his

evident

this

sense

he is

liberal,

partiality to private virtues a lover of privacy.

exceeds

his

concern

for

public ones.

In

Hobbes,
doctrine

who viewed

human
ones.

'pessimistically'

nature

if

not

religiously,

prefers

public matters

to private

He, too,

served

liberalism, however, by using

religiously based sovereignty

of political

sovereignty to
the

attack the

of

ecclesiastics.

John Locke is
as such

perhaps

first liberal
to

political philosopher

today. Parsons

devotes his two

central chapters

easily recognizable to Locke's teachings. He

exorcise the still

shows the

importance

of economics

Locke,

who

"attempts to

Short Notices

295

lingering
in
almost

phantom of

theology in
else.

matters"

economic

and,

one

is tempted to say,

everything

tion of the right

"[C]ivil society must provide for the institutionaliza to property in such a way as to make nature, not theological
survival."

But nature guides Lockean men only so teachings, the guide to it takes to overthrow religion. Civil rights in the civil society replace the
rights of

long as
natural

the state of nature. Locke confesses that nature has little instrinsic
value and

value, that human desire imposes

human labor

realizes

that value.

"Locke's homo
strength of

faber does

not seem to

his

mind and

the force of
reason

be indebted to any other power but the his As Parsons observes, Locke fol
labor."

lows Spinoza. Locke believes

"an adding, subtracting

as consciousness

and

ulty
to

...

the organization

of

consciousness,

calculating fac is but the organiza

"relativism
as

tion of sense
ultimate

experience."

This "nominalist

reductionism"

yields

truth,"

leaving
next

doctrine whereby only

rules out

materialism can

be

certain.

Obviously, thoroughgoing materialism

cism,
and

Parsons

any epistemology but empiri turns to Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
more
generated."

"The

rational principle

eration than

the cause

subsisting in things is itself of things being

probably the product of gen The telling phrase, "more But

empiricism

probably,"

suggests that radical empiricism yields scepticism.

always aims

doubt

more

toward ideals than toward itself.

wished price.

Indeed, "the Humean

no scepticism
more

deity
there.

tends to resemble Hume as he

to think of

himself"

Still,

materialism exacts

its

Hume believes that instinct is The Humean

god
'conservative'

powerful

than reason even

in the

philosopher.

cannot

be

thought

thinking itself but only

to liberalism's
own rationale.

sense

sensing itself. The

Hume

contributes

anti-religious enterprise even as

he

calls

into

question

liberalism's
Mill
and

Dewey,
regime

the subjects of the

next

two chapters, both attempt to rescue

the liberal

by
"not

recasting that
stability,

rationale.

According
"for

to

Mill, industrial
and

society
petition

moves toward

liberating

citizens

moral

intellectual
of com

productiveness"

an abatement of competition perhaps moral

but the transference

to a higher social and

plane."

He turns Hume's
transcendence."

scepticism

on entirely es "the ultimacy of truth, but not on its completeness or Dewey pouses a full-bodied historicism. He believes all human thought "provisional or on relativism
cannot
action." circumstantial,"

itself. But he

overcome relativism.

Mill insists

all

ideas "plans

of

He

replaces

liberalism

with a central

ized democratism
growth

or socialism

dedicated to that

vague notion, growth.

But

even

is

a mere

hypothesis:
none of which regression

postulating hypothetical values,

is choiceworthy in any in
regard

definitive sense,
ness of

any

one

only lead to of them. The fact

can

an

infinite

to the

choiceworthi-

of this infinite

regression precludes

the

possibility

of rational

decision.
rationale

The very
questionable

of modern

science,

the 'conquest of

nature,'

becomes

in the

writings of

the

philosopher who praises science as

unreserv-

296

Interpretation

edly as any philosopher of modernity. Modern liberalism ends in, of all things, faith. The "attempt to rationalize matters which are not amenable to rationaliza
tion"

"irrationalism."

yields

Given all this, why obey the demi-authorities of the liberal order? Liberals find it difficult to say. In his final chapter Parsons offers "reasons for civil obedi
ence."

Distinguishing
recalls

moral, civil, and

political obligation as

pertaining to fam

ily,

non-constitutional

law

and

legal procedures,

and constitutional

law,

respec

tively, Parsons
refusing
ity."

political

liberalism's sturdy political root; Americans could justify obedience only if "the American government could no longer

protect most citizens

by transforming
"the

their right of self-defense

as

into

public secur
license,"

Liberty

should

therefore be "understood
search

forbearance,

not as

and

freedom

should

be

understood as

for

excellence."

But if in modernity

the "measure of

differentiation"

tue, freedom

understood as

wealth, not vir among men has "tended to the search for excellence points beyond modern lib

be"

eralism as understood

by

almost all of

its

proponents.

Mill

without

historicism

begins to

resemble a student of

Aristotle.

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