Winter 1989-90

Volume 1 7

Number 2

165

Joseph

Cropsey

The Whole

as

Setting

for Man:

On Plato's Timaeus
193

Govert den Hartogh

Made

by

Contrivance

and and

the Consent of Men:

Abstract Principle Locke's Political

Historical Fact in

Philosophy

223

Richard Myers

Christianity
Rousseau

and

Politics in Montesquieu's Decline of the Romans

"Jean-Jacques": The

Greatness
Christopher
and

and

Kelly

on

Reading

Dialogues

Roger D. Masters

255 275

Mark S. Cladis Leslie Paul Thiele T. F. Morris

Emile Durkheim

and

Provinces

of

Ethics

Nietzsche's Politics
The Argument in the Protagoras that No One

Does What He Believes To Be Bad

Book Reviews 305

Robert R. Sullivan

Horst-Jiirgen Gerigk, Unterwegs Interpretation Hinweise

zur

zu einer

Theorie
mit

der Literatur in

Auseinandersetzung
und

Gadamers Warheit

Methode

309

Will

Morrisey

Catherine H. Zuckert, editor, Understanding the Political Spirit: Philosophical

Investigations from Socrates

313
Patrick

to

Nietzsche
Plato'

Coby, Socrates and the Sophistic Enlightenment: A Commentary on

Protagoras P. Nichols, Socrates
the

317

Mary

and

Political

Community: An Ancient Debate

Interpretation

Editor-in-Chief General Editors

Hilail Gildin

Seth G. Benardete Hilail Gildin

Charles E. Butterworth

Robert Horwitz (d. 1987) Howard B. White (d. 1974)

Consulting

Editors

Christopher Bruell Ernest L. Fortin

Joseph

Cropsey
Wilhelm Hennis Muhsin Mahdi
Momigliano

John Hallowell

Harry V Jaffa David Lowenthal Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. Arnaldo

(d. 1987) Michael Oakeshott Ellis Sandoz Leo Strauss (d. 1973) Kenneth W Thompson
Editors Wayne Ambler Maurice Auerbach Patrick

Fred Baumann
Christopher A.

Michael Blaustein

Coby

Colmo Mindle

Edward J. Erler

Maureen Feder-Marcus

Joseph E.

Goldberg

Pamela K. Jensen
-

Grant B.

James W. Morris

Will

Morrisey
Leslie G. Rubin

Gerald Proietti
Hossein Ziai

Charles T. Rubin

John A. Wettergreen (d.

1989) Bradford P. Wilson

Catherine Zuckert

Michael Zuckert

Manuscript Editors

Laurette G. Hupman

Lucia B. Prochnow

Subscriptions

Subscription rates per volume (3 issues): individuals $21

libraries
students

and all other

(five-year

institutions $34 limit) $12

Postage

outside

$4

extra

by

surface mail

U.S.: Canada $3.50 extra; elsewhere (8 weeks or longer) or

and payable

$7.50 by

air.

Payments: in U.S. dollars

by

the U.S.

Postal Service
within

or a

financial institution located

the U.S.

Single

copies available.

contributors should send three clear copies with

their name, affiliation of any

postal/ZIP
page

kind,

address with

full

code,

and

telephone

number on

the title

only; follow The Chicago Manual of Style,

or manuals

13th ed.,
the text
notes.

based

on

it;

and place notes style

in

or

follow

current

journal

in printing

Composition
Inquiries:

by

Eastern Graphics

Maddy Canestra,

Assistant to the Editor,

interpretation, Queens College, 11367-0904, U.S.A. (718)520-7099

Flushing, N.Y.

Interpretation
Winter 1989-90

Volume 17

Number 2

Joseph

Cropsey

The Whole
Timaeus

as

Setting

for Man: On Plato's

165
and and

Govert den Hartogh

Made

by Contrivance

the Consent of Men:

Abstract Principle Locke's Political Richard Myers

Historical Fact in
193

Philosophy
the

Christianity
and

and

Politics in Montesquieu's

Greatness Christopher

and

Decline of

Romans

223

Kelly

Rousseau

on

Reading
and

"Jean-Jacques": The

Roger D. Masters Mark S. Cladis Leslie Paul Thiele

T. F. Morris

Dialogues

239
Provinces
of

Emile Durkheim

Ethics

255

Nietzsche's Politics The Argument in the Protagoras that No One Does What He Believes To Be Bad

275

291

Book Reviews

Robert R. Sullivan

Horst- Jurgen

Gerigk, Unterwegs

zur

Interpretation Hinweise

zu einer

Theorie
mit

der Literatur in

Auseinandersetzung
und

Gadamers Warheit Will

Methode

305

Morrisey

Catherine H. Zuckert, editor, Understanding the Political Spirit: Philosophical

Investigations from Socrates to Nietzsche

309

Patrick

Coby, Socrates

and the

Sophistic
Plato'

Enlightenment: A

Commentary

on

Protagoras

313
and the

Mary

P. Nichols, Socrates

Political 317

Community: An Ancient Debate

Copyright 1990

interpretation

ISSN 0020-9635

The Whole

as

Setting

for Man: On Plato's Timaeus

Joseph Cropsey
The

University

of Chicago

Plato's Timaeus brings together Socrates and three of the four people who had requested, and received, on the preceding day, an account by him of his
views on

the

polity.

The

review that

Socrates

"today"

gives

of

the account that

he

"yesterday"

gave
of

presents the

barest

sketch of a portion of the

Republic:

division

to enemies

(acting on
of

labor resulting in a warrior class that is good to friends and harmful a definition of justice proposed and rejected in the Repub
for
such

lic);

gymnastic and music education

guardians; their

renunciation of

wealth

in favor

admission to all activities

community and virtue; masculinization of women and their in the city; dissolution of the family; a eugenic ar
put

rangement,

falsely

forth

as a

lottery, by
and

which

the authorities

will procure

the mating of good

promotion and

with

their kind

bad

with

theirs,

and

the continuing

demotion

of citizens

between the failure

as

classes of good and

of

bad (evi

dently
vice).

made

necessary

by

the

predictable
review

the predictive eugenic de therefore also

to the philoso

Notably

missing from the

such,

and perhaps reference

from the

account

being

recapitulated, is any thematic

pher-king, that
of reason

is,

to the sine qua non of good polity, namely, the conjunction that

and power

supposedly

would guarantee effectual

good

in the
might

polis as

it

would

do

also

in the

cosmos as a whole under god.

How far it

do

so

men

is hinted vaguely in the passage (19E) in which Socrates, alluding to the who would be at the same time philosophers and statesmen, doubts that
could rise to the subject of

Sophists

those

mens

doings in

verbal

and

literal

polemics.

The Timaeus,
thus
a sequel

which will prove

to be about the constitution of the whole, is

to the Republic

in

the triple sense that the bulk of Timaeus the

follows
the

directly

a sketch of a sketch of

Republic,

the action of Timaeus

follows the
and
Socrates'

action of

the Republic

as

the lesser Panathenaea

set

follows the Bendideia,

the

argument of

Timaeus is
the
good

in motion, if
good polis

somewhat of

desire to
proves cannot and

see

polis, presumably that

indirectly, by Republic, in action,

a whole

which

to

mean

in

strife.

The

is

situated

in

from

which strife

be banished, as will appear; the good polis must necessarily contemplate be fit for war, if only because for some reason there must always be defec
cities.

tive

From

Socrates'

desire to

see

the good polis

in

action

flows

not

am grateful to

Professor Eve Adler for

a close and

extremely helpful reading

of

this manu

script.

interpretation, Winter

1989-90, Vol. 17, No. 2

166

Interpretation

awkwardly the question, What is the nature of the Whole in which man, his good, and his politics are situated? How hospitable to man, his good, and his
politics

is that Whole?
desire to be told
way.

Socrates'

complicated

city in contention is to be gratified in After he has disqualified Sophists for the task, on the
about

"our"

ground

that

they

are rootless

wanderers, city less

and thus without

the interest

from
gift

which comprehension could

grow, and has rejected also the poets, whose

when

for imitation leaves them helpless

not

the task is to speak of

what

they
re of

have
and

experienced, Socrates turns to his companions,

neither proceed

Critias, Hermocrates,
to the

Timaeus,

Sophists

nor

poets,

who should prove equal

quest.

They

through the recounting

with

by

Critias
and

Athens that had Solon to

of

originated

Egyptian

priests

palaeology descended by way

"our"

of a

of

one of

Critias's

ancestors and

thus to

Critias himself. At the heart inquired

about

the tale is an apparent confusion: When Socrates

meant

city,
to primor

he

the

good

city

dial Athens,
earns praise

of course

his sketch, but Critias's tale also city, to which will be

of
"our" "our"

will refer

attributed much will

that

by

resemblance

to

city

of

the sketch.

Critias's tale

blur

the distinction between the good polity that could be considered simply good
and the

polity

of a polis

that might

have been the best to have been he is

to tell

experienced

by

men, and thus perhaps the best possible.

Critias begins the

history

of

the tale

about

with an encomium of

Solon,

the apparent

conductor of

wisest of

the seven sages,

the story into Greece from Egypt. Solon, the is described as an accomplished poet who might have

become

an

legislation,
corruption. with

outstanding one if he had not turned to statesmanship, or rather in the service of Athens at a time when the city had fallen into We are given to understand that Solon returned to Athens carrying

him

an

image

of

the ancient city in

its

excellence.

Nothing

within what

is

written

in the dialogue

reveals whether or

how far that image

guided or could

have

guided

croached on not

Solon's legislation, or whether Solon's poetic gift might have en his ability to project what he had never experienced and so could
praise of

imitate. The

Athens implicit in its

palaeological
of

identification

with

the good city seems to be diluted

by

the

invasion for
of

the

city's recent

historical

legislator
in

by

a poetical genius.
Socrates'

The thematic
action

response
with

to

request

discourse

on

the

good polis

begins

the recounting
which

by

Critias be

Solon's

story.

This

occurs

in

a Dassage

(21E-26D) in
that, according

Critias

adumbrates the account of the good presented

in

action

to the plan, would

of

fully

city in Critias, to be
that

followed
specified.

by

discourse

Hermocrates (Crit. 108)

on a related subject not

Critias

proceeds

to relate that

Solon, traveling in Egypt, learned

the Egyptians possessed written records of their thousand years, and a

history

reaching back
years older

eight

knowledge that Athens

whose

was a

thousand

than

that. It was that palaeo-Athens

war

that Athens won

extraordinary virtue came to a peak in the for Greece, defeating the hordes from western Atlantis

The Whole As
and

Setting for Man:

subjection.

On Plato's Timaeus
ignorance lacked
the
of

167
their

saving

all

in the East from

explained

The

Athenians'

noble origins entire

is

generations,

by inducing an

the

incidence

of natural

disasters that

obliterated
could

amnesia that the

literacy they
on

have

averted.
mankind
own

In Phaedrus {21 AC ff.), Socrates is elaborate for the Egyptian gift of letters, but Egypt here

price paid some of

by
its

gets

back
as

by

showing the Athenians that

of a writing. with

they do

not

know themselves,

they

might

have done in the face

themselves down in
replacement of
record

devastating
Plato's

cosmos, because

they
East

could and

not set
and

obvious

inversion

of

West,

Persia

Atlantis,

reminds

the Athenians that their

of

written

is

mirror as well as

ikon. The Socratic depreciation

writing

might

be

unqualifiedly defensible in a world to which overwhelming natural calamities were unknown; but the Socratic world is a cosmos of brutal blindness to the difference between nobility and barbarism, Athens and Atlantis. The full mean ing of the blatant substitution of Atlantis for Persia in this tale will not become
clearer until

in the Critias itself the

genuine merits of

Atlantis

are

disclosed institutions

wealth and power and no

temperately
afflicts and

used,

splendor combined with mild

lack

of

military

prowess

until a

decay

set

in that

we

know from the

that the
mind

Republic
can

inevitably

brings down the best

in fact

of regimes

discover. It is

notable that
of
palaeo-

Critias

contains a much more extensive and war. never more

descrip

tion of Atlantis than theme

Athens,
at

than reaches the

of palaeo-Athens

in

action

The intention

of Timaeus-Critias-

is silently interred. At any rate, an important element of what the Egyptian priests imparted to Solon was the precis of the Egyptian constitution, offered as the reproduction
of

"Hermocrates"

the

palaeo-

Athenian polity, itself the

caste system of

supposed regime of

of

the good city.

Cited first is the

sans,

division
and

labor:

segregation of

priests,

arti

herdsmen, hunters, farmers,

provides

warriors,

which

latter

were singular

in

using
all

shields and spears under the tutelage of

Athena. Further,

as

for

"wisdom"

the law

for the investigation

of

the cosmos with a view to

discovering

the ways in which the divine beings bear on human things, up to divination

and medicine.
palaeo-

Seen in
was

a certain

light,

the

"wisdom"

of

the Egyptians and of the

Athenians both do,

the

identical in its for the

principle

to modern natural science, aim

ing,

as

at the relief of

the human condition through the extortion of the

sake of

secrets of

visible world

disarming
burdened

and

exploiting the

cosmic

forces. The

"wisdom"

that

they

conjoined with

the power had the character of

with a sense

episteme, not sophia,

out

for their

minds were

that through

the

visible world

there blew a wind that bore the seeds of their destruction.

Athena,
nians

war-loving

and philosophic, out of

her

care

for them

planted

the Athe

in

a well-tempered climate suited of

to

bring

forth the

wisest of men.

The
of

philosophy

Athena herself

seems

to

have

consisted of effectual

knowledge

cosmic causes and their

human bearing.

Now Critias
the

presents a

palaeo-Athenians

perfunctory sketch of the war of the Atlantans and (24E-25D) in which nothing circumstantial is said about

168

Interpretation
merit of

the action, but the

the

Athenians

and the

historic importance

of their

victory are lauded. In ways that are almost obtrusive, Plato will suppress the description of the good city in action throughout the supposititious trilogy 77Hermocrates."

maeus-hemi-Critias-"

Whereas in the Republic (466E

ff.) Soc

rates

war-making as evident, so much so that he appeared on the point of passing over it in favor of the kingship of philosophy yet he then proceeds to discuss it in detail, here in Timaeus his chief
manner of the good city's or ostensible subject good

describes the

interest is in the
not arise either

manner of

the good city's war-making and the

sequel.

does

here

or

in the

One

wonders whether

the

city in its state of action, that is to say at war, must by the nature of things shed its goodness, which is its justice, because to make war means and
can

only

mean of

to do

good

to

friends

and allies and to

harm

enemies.

To

escape give

the force

this stricture

by

appealing to the conception that

it is just to

the unprovoked
other

aggressor what

he deserves,

or even

to reciprocate whatever the

has imposed

upon

one, is only to flee to

exploded as vulgar

yet another of

the definitions

of

justice that Socrates had

(442E) by
ship
the
erned

exposing them

early in the Republic, readmitting them reflections of true justice, which is a ruler

by the willingness of unwisdom to be gov by alliance made of good city is to be saved by an invocation of mind. If the justice the by formula that justice is doing one's own singular deed, but the good city in
is
at

"possible"

its

peculiar act

war, then even

without

foreknowledge

of what

is to follow
about
about

in Timaeus, one may be prompted to wonder about the human situation, the inescapeable imperfection of our organs of social life, and eventually
the

blindly destructive cosmos, capable of appearing as the monstrous over whelming or as the cleansing instrument of nous and good, nature or god, or perhaps both if they should be seen as one and the same. That the Republic should be by Timaeus, the grand cosmology, thus seems right, as it
"followed"

also seems right

that the

"problem"

of

the cosmos should

be brought to
where

sight or

through
good

humanity

as seen

through the prism of political

life

justice

has its

equivocal problematic existence. now given a preview of

Critias has
it

the story

of

the

Atlantans

and

the

palaeo-

Athenians, promising
accept
as

to tell the

tantamount to a

story in full, in due time, if Socrates will discourse on his good city in action. Socrates
the discussion that is to follow.
will

consenting, Critias

announces the plan of

First,
the
part

for

no reason on

that

begin with,
of

is stated, the eminent astronomer Timaeus the coming into being of the cosmos and then
(anthropon
physin).

speak to
on

finally

generation of man

Critias

will proceed with the

human

the account, assimilating the available those in turn to the citizens

of

human beings to

the palaeo-Athenians
omits

and

the good city. Critias pointedly

reintroduce

Her

prospective

Hermocrates as a leaving early in Critias, thereby furnishing the occasion for a somewhat sharp exchange between Critias and Hermocrates who speak in insin uations about each other's courage. That of Hermocrates is never tested.
mocrates speaker

from the plan,

it to Socrates to

The Whole As
The discourse begins
that he
call on of

Setting for Man:

occupies almost

On Plato's Timaeus
whole of

169

Timaeus
as

the

the dialogue. It

with a proemium

that is preceded

by

Socrates'

injunction to Timaeus

is customary, before beginning. Timaeus complies rather perfunctorily, revealing in the first speech of the subsequent dialogue, Critias, that the god to whom he prays is the one created long ago in deed and
the gods,
now

just

(in Timaeus)

apparent

by us in speech, i.e., the cosmos itself, as inaccessibility to our perfect understanding and as it
it
with which we are

it

exists

in its

exists

in the

likely

construction of

to content ourselves.

Timaeus begins his discourse

by distinguishing

the

Being

from the Becom

ing things,
reason
reason. and

correlating the former with Knowledge gained through thinking and the latter with Opinion gained through sense perception without
cause.
cause

Whatever Becomes does so necessarily as the effect of a Timaeus proceeds, he translates, for the immediate purpose only,
maker or artificer external

As

into
an

(demiourgos), contrasting
the same,
and

the

maker who contemplates

model,

always

the

maker whose envisioned paradigm was and will

is

itself something that came into Of course, what is fashioned

being

(and thus

be

other

than

it is).

after an

eternal

paradigm must

beautiful (kalon), that made after a produced one, not the language of Socratic orthodoxy, which is why we in the locution (28 A) that
bility"

so. are

necessarily be Timaeus is speaking especially interested

and capa

refers

to the

artificer's

producing the "idea

dynamis) of his object. The translation of idea as form or shape (Schleiermacher says Gestalt) is not satisfactory in view of other passages (cf. Philebus 25A; Statesman 258C) in which Plato speaks of ideas as being made
(idea kai

brought into being by men, in the teeth of the most widely accepted view of Platonic philosophy as insisting on the Ideas as the eternal and intelligible ar chetypes. It would seem that, whatever might be the eternal paradigm of the
or

whole that

is

copied

by

god, that

paradigm

does

not

have the into

the
to

name of

Idea.

The

cosmos

is

perceptible,

and

it therefore

came

being

and

is among father him

of

the things
cause.

accessible

to opinion and must be the effect of the operation of some

Timaeus

speaks of

the

difficulty

of

discovering
speak on

maker and
"all"

this whole, adding that it

would

be impossible to
able

about

even

if he
this

were

discovered. Yet Timaeus is

that

to go

to offer as an evidence on

crucial point

it is

clear

to

"all"

that the artificer was contemplating an

eternal paradigm

that have

come

into

in making this whole, for it is the most beautiful of the things being and its maker is the best of causes. The visible world
to
perception and opinion

or cosmos

is

subject

but the

paradigm of which

it is

the merely temporal copy is knowable and always it clear that the subject of his discourse will be the
not

Same. Timaeus
visible

now makes

whole, the copy and

will

the archetype, and therefore that

what

he

will

have to say
of

itself have intel

the character, which is to say the

lack

of

clarity,

certainty

and of

ligibility, belonging
what

to a copy rather than

having

the quality of

demonstrative
will maintain

truth. Throughout the

body

of

his

extended

statement, Timaeus
account of

he has

prepared

in this his proemium, that his

the whole is

170

Interpretation

only likely, as befits a likeness, and should be judged with the understanding that human beings can do no better. In view of the utter improbability or im-

plausibility of much of form of it, it is best to likeness to the truth

similitude.

what

Timaeus

will cover with

the

word eikos or some

"likely,"

understand

by it,

through

its

translation as

as a myth or even a
words

In the last

he

utters

in

benign falsehood that may be a veri Timaeus, Socrates concurs in the

comment on

Timaeus 's proemium, offering no that the necessarily good Father and Maker burden
of greatest eternal

the plain implication

of all

did is

not open certain

boon that human beings

could

enjoy,

which

up to man the knowledge of the

being
on

that is the truth of their existence.

It is

the point of the goodness of god that Timaeus

on

begins (29D) his

any thing like himself
of of as

immense lecture

the whole. Timaeus affirms the goodness of god, present

ing

as

the instance

of goodness

his

absolute

freedom from envy

any kind. All

possible. and

should

be

as good as

possible, that

is,

as much

We

need not suppose

that goodness means only

makes such a

indeed

what

follows

immediately
his

freedom from envy, supposition impossible, but

works

we cannot exclude

it from the

characteristics

implanted in his
as

by

the

good maker who seeks to make

men were made without

products

like himself

far

as possible.

If

envy,

by

how

much would contention and

the likeli

hood

of conflict of

be

reduced?

We do

not

know, any

more

than we know what

would come

the action
to

the good polis would consist of, or

not exist
men.

whether

the polis

be, if envy did

of

authority

the wise men

At any rate, Timaeus adduces the among (andron phronimon) for the assertion that the govern
the cosmos

ing

principle of generation and of

is this

of

the goodness of the

possi

his desire that everything resemble him in goodness as far as ble. But could a mere human being know this sovereign truth about a
maker and who

being

copy of anything but is both the artificer from paradigms and also, evidently, himself the self-imitating paradigm of freedom from envy, and of

is

not a

good

in any

other sense as well?

Timaeus

speaks

cautiously, twice (29A

and

30A)
fact
a

appealing to the criterion of the rightly suitable, themis, in

the making and

justifying

his

attribution of goodness to

desiring

of god.

His discourse is in

hymn to the

goodness of the god and

argument
must

that, have reason, thus

says

a rational a

entity
soul,

being

superior to an

his work, reaching a climax in the irrational one, the cosmos

(dei
a living thing, an animal. legein) according to the likely

and must

therefore be
said

This,

Timaeus, is

what ought to

be

account

(30B).
short passage

In the

that

follows, Timaeus

attempts to

cal characterization of animal of which

archetypal

the cosmos as an animal

justify that paradoxi by describing the paradigmatic

Instead of a description of the Timaeus recites the formal animal, property of the absolute intellig ible animal (noeta zoa) as being simply what includes within itself all the par
ticular intelligible animals,
animals.

the cosmic animal is a copy.

as

the cosmos contains all the particular visible this sparse

Shortly, Timaeus

will enlarge on

disclosure

and

in

so

doing

The Whole As
will suggest

Setting for Man:

of

On Plato's Timaeus
must

-171

that the cosmos, the animal

animals,

be

scrutinized with

limitless

attention

if the difference between it

and a machine

is to be detected

(cf. 77B).
wonders whether the heaven is one or many or infinitely many and decides that it must be one, for it is the animal that includes all the intelligible animals and must therefore be the ultimate singular of that kind. It

Now Timaeus

is

notable

that Timaeus approaches the question

as a

of

the unicity

of

the cosmos

through the quality of the whole

living
and

thing.

Turning

to the generated,

bodily

its palpability through its composi tion of fire and earth respectively, thus obliging himself to explain the union of two unlikes. This he does by recourse to proportion, and more specifically to
explains

cosmos, he

its visibility

the

mean

proportional.

For

reasons

mathematical,

the

three-dimensional

cosmos must consist of

four elements, thus

introducing

water and

air, in

order

to satisfy

a condition

arising

out of the nature of

proportion,

and

it is that

proportionality they are. It goes without saying that to speak of proportionality among fire, earth, air and water is to treat them as quantities, which Timaeus will do elaborately in a trigonometry that is to follow, for which he prepares by describing the
cosmic animal as a sphere

among the elements that makes a one out of the many that

including
can

all

the shapes

(schemata)

there are

while

it itself is

(33B). We
rectilinear

fectly

the

only wonder how a perfect sphere could contain per figures which will be the matter of Timaeus 's eventual

trigonometry,
uniter of quantity.

as we might

hope that he
be

will

let

us see soul

how proportionality, the reducing fashion.

soul

the unlike, binds together

body

and

without

to

The

question will soon

addressed

in

some

Now (33B-34A) Timaeus

mic

provides globe.

the details of the appearance of the cos

no eyes or with

animal, the

great

living
or
within

It has

ears, for there is nothing

to breathe or eat or

outside excrete

itself to be for
all air

seen

heard, nothing
it
and all matter

which

is simply recycled within it. Its sufferings and its doings originate as they must within itself. For hands and feet it could have no use. Its only motion is the rotation imparted to it by god. The

is

cosmic animal

is self-contained in every respect in which a recognizable animal is not, and it is utterly helpless, namely, with regard to locomotion, in an important respect in which recognizable animals are self-dependent. What
this description of the animal of animals from the
would
of

could save cosmic

imputation

of

perversity
with

be the

presence within

it

of a soul

that accords de
of

cisively

that

some

recognizable now

animal.

To the description

the

cosmic animal's soul

Timaeus

fortunately

turns (34B).

We learn first that the soul, whatever it proves to be, existed before the body. Since it will soon be called by the word Idea, we might suppose that it is
the pre-existing reason, rationality, or truth that

finds

a manifest perceptible
nature and

reality in The

matter.

What follows rationality

will

be

lesson in the

meaning

of

such a relation of soul of

and embodiment.

the cosmos

is

a compound constructed of the Indivisible/Al-

172

Interpretation
and

ways-the-Same

the

Corporeal/Generated/Divisible,
two mutually exclusive
were

together with a third

whatever about

that

is

a mean

between the first two. We know nothing "somewhat

divisible"

the

nature of a composite of

contradictories such as

divisi

ble

and

indivisible. If it
allows

it

ble. Timaeus
same, but
ever

that it is difficult to

mix such
of

be simply divisi immiscibles as other and

would

explains

the result as the effect

the

force

applied

by

god.

What

the difficulties that hinder mixing the

immiscible,

the reason for positing

of

such a mixture

becomes

evident when

Timaeus describes the distribution He had to

provide

the
of

improbable

mixture

itself into As he The

portions: marked

for the division

eternal

Indivisible/Same into
endless mutability.
proportion or ratio.

quantities

by

eternal

being,

order,

and

now makes

clear, his
that his

mind

is fixed
It is

on number and

sequel will show

mind conceives

the cosmos as to

the the

visible

that

embodies

the rational qua

soul of

mathematical.

given

Timaeus

astronomer

to describe the

the cosmic animal as the rationality or

mindedness that governs the motion of the great cosmic

beings. He

will eventu now

ally (47B)

speak of speaks

the revolutions of reason (tou the soul's participating

nou

periodous), as he

(36E-37A) harmony, leaving

showed

of

(metechousa)
he has
was

in reasoning

and

us to weigh

the import

of what

presented since

he

that the

motion of

the cosmic animal's

body

its

doing

as a whole

entity

the soul that suffuses that

embedded reason rather

being only body is the

an endless rotation.

simply imparted to it, Now we know that

rationality

of mathematics, a passive or

than thinking: again, a quality imparted to it.

Nothing
belief

that Timaeus has

that the cosmos

said

contributes, except
that
of

by

mere

asseveration, to

our

is
a

living,

is,

inference from
asseveration.

definition

self-moving life that we are

and

thinking being,
imparted

except

by
the

expected

to deduce from the

motions and

If life is

no more

than the execution of that

possession of a rational principle

is in fact the

mathematical

formula that

describes those motions, then the cosmos is a living thing with a soul that is indeed bonded to a body as a body and its state of motion or rest are insepara

bly
of

striking boldness (40AB), Timaeus, while speaking in the divine luminosities the sky, will identify their uniform motion in one
a passage of

bonded. In

place with

their

thinking

always

the

same

things

about

the

same things.

When Timaeus finishes his

verbal construction of eo

the

cosmic

orrery (36D),

he

considers

himself to have finished,

of

ipso,

the verbal construction of the

soul.
and

He has told

the soul's

composition out of

the

natures of

Same, Other
the unfail

Being (ousia),
adhesive,

the

ingredients

apportioned and

kept together
to
to declare

by

ing

proportion.

Now (37 A) Timaeus

sets out

explain

how

soul

works

to produce opinions and

knowledge, proceeding
something

that,
and

without

noise or

sound,
or

when soul seizes upon

whose substance

(ousia) is

distributed

is

indivisible,

(legei)
the

the truth about what

empirical and

declares it has encountered, generating true opinion about Other, and knowledge about the rational and Same. He gives

the soul is moved throughout

itself

the reader every reason to conclude that soul receives and conveys its intima-

The Whole As
tions

Setting for Man:

words;
and

On Plato's Timaeus
ends

173

by

way

of motions and without

he

by denying
after

that what
used

entertains opinion and

knowledge is anything but

mean substance qua wonder

soul.

This

he has

the

same

word, ousia, to

Being
was

and substance qua

thing-

that-is, And
like the
could

leaving

the reader to

how

or whether

he distinguishes them.
saw

god saw what

he had wrought,
animal,

and

he

pleased, but he

before

him the task be

of

of

making the cosmos, the

conjoined

body

and

soul,

even more made

paradigmatic eternal
eternal.

within

the constraint that nothing

mind

image
nal

eternity"

Thus the generating father took it in (eiko kineton tinos aionos) (37D),

to

make

"a

movable

a simulacrum of the eter

resting One in the temporal that moves according to number, the visible Many. Time and Heaven are coeval, which seems to compel us to conclude

that

Eternity
and

preceded

Time,

that

Eternity

"was"

before the

god

made

the
and

Heavens

brought into

being

the motions that divide Time into days

months and years.

But Timaeus denies

immediately
be

that one could say that

Eternity
eternal

"preceded"

Temporality, just
that it is. Time
and

as one must not

say
it

was or will

be, only
and

cannot

a portion of

is precisely One
one must
be,"

Indivisible,

which

is

"why"

Eternity that it Eternity because the is also simply Being

of

itself:

Eternity
"I
shall

Being

converge

in IS. If the Eternal

could

speak, it

would
am,"

say (and
never

defeat the temptation to say, "It would always say") "I but of course there is no way to conceive of the Eternal's implies before
and after

speaking, for

speech

in

utterance. obliges us when

Timaeus 's

account of

the eternal and the temporal

of

to interpret his

declaration that the latter is the image

contradiction of the

the
of

former

the latter is the

former. A
the

movable

image is

that the essence of which is to

be inaccessible to the
the
character of an

concept of motion

more

than merely paradoxical. It has

which

idol,

image false

of the

unimaginable, than

it is hard to
goes no as

conceive of

anything
allege

more

or more misleading. of

But Timaeus

further than to
possible"

that the temporal is the image

the eternal "as far

of

(38B). What is the intention behind the divine ordering

the

the visible

so

that it
are

might suggest

invisible,

the temporal to point toward the eternal?

with

We

told

(39B)
it

that god

lit the heavens

the sun so that the animals

who

were capable of
might call

might participate

the gift of
a

in number, through astronomy what one the heavens. We are given to believe that god formed the
of

heavens to be
road

light to the understanding to philosophy (cf. 47 AB).

god must

men, to

set

them in fact on the

Now but

fulfill the

cosmos

by installing
of

in it

not

only those

animals

which are also

the

heavenly

gods, mostly

fire,

the luminaries of

day

and

night,
that
go

those corresponding to the remaining three ideas of

animal

life

which moves on

through the air, that of the water, and the kind with
at the

feet that

land.

Marveling

intricacy

of

the

heavens,

Timaeus

observes

that the

enormous cannot

complexity of the divine movements aloft presents itself to those who calculate in the forms of signs and terrors. The very heavens that god
to be a
visible

constructed

image

of

the

intelligible

paradigm

become,

across

174
the

Interpretation
grain of

his desire, the

notices

ground of

fear

and superstition. we

Could

god

have

made men

proof against

unreason?

Before

are given the answer to that

question, Timaeus
popular gods of

in

brief
no

passage

(40D-41A)

the Olympian gods, the

the city,

leaving
pours

breath
metic

with

those frightened men who cannot see

doubt that his speaking of them in the same divinity in the heavenly arith
the poets, who claim a special

is

purposeful. with

He

his

sarcasm on

relationship
we

the gods

was revealed

to them
of

by

they confect, giving out what they make it appear kinsmen. Whether this speech gave pleasure to Critias

have

no

way

knowing. It is followed

immediately by

Timaeus 's distin

guishing the gods whose motions are evident and those that reveal themselves only so far as they elect to do so, thus making clear his own understanding of
the
mode of god's communication with mankind. speech

Timaeus's

is

likely likeness

of

truth,

as god's visible world

and

is

likeness

of eternity.
motion

Timaeus teaches that the Timeless

tured in the

inseparable from the

nature of the organs

unmoving is pic of Time. There is

apparently no way to reach

its imperfect likeness

or

truth, i.e., being, except through the mediation of incorporation. Arithmetic itself has to come to sight,
of

literally,
anything intervals
seem to
universe

on

the suggestion

the luminous bodies in the

heavens; but is
means

there

aloft and

that makes sensible the arithmetic and

harmonic

by

which

their innumerable subdivisions are brought into order

by

the active

mind of man?

If mankind is to any degree free from the hand of god, it would be through possessing the power of calculation, by use of which the ceases to be, in itself, in principle, mysterious, unintelligible, and

therefore frightening.

By

these reflections,

we can

help

ourselves to understand

Timaeus's

animadversions on

the poets, who seem to be

with

doing
Ge
and

something

not

completely different from Timaeus's own act: Kronos, Zeus and Hera, they were making an
phenomena of

their

Uranus,
of

their

account or

likeness

the same

Heaven Is it

and

Earth,

and

the same birth of

not

Time,

that struck the

eye and then the reflection of

poem

Timaeus. Is

Timaeus's

speech a cosmologic

in

prose?

not a poem
would

because it is

a myth, as

he himself

calls

it

only be compelled to look for the difference between them. Timaeus's account differs from that of the poets in that his god
and gods are some.

(59C, 68D, 69B)? We

incapable

of

misanthropy, and thus cannot

be thought

of as

fear

Not Timaeus

and not

any

other man could

deny

the occurrence of natural

catastrophes capable of

destroying

some or even all malign and

human

and other

life

on

earth, but for Timaeus there is nothing

the reason
who
of

therefore nothing frightful in

the whole, which is mathematics. Timaeus has discovered the god

and whose

is free from misanthropy, who so far as possible brings only good to man, beneficence does not consist in a mere harmlessness arising out of
origin.

irrelevance to human happiness, for god is the ground of philosophy. This is not to say that the life of man is without penalties of a divine
Timaeus
composes a tale

(41A-D)

of a conclave of

the gods, convoked

by

god

himself

whose purpose

is to

charge them with the

making

of man and all

the

The Whole As
other animals that are not

Setting for Man:

god

On Plato's Timaeus
delegates the birth

175
to

divine. Timaeus's

of man

beings

who

themselves came into

ator of subordinate animals

addressees, the "gods

gods,"

of

being, for if he himself were to be the gener would have to be immortal. He explains to his they that although they themselves came into being,
could

they

will not pass

away, for only he

of

bring

about

their dissolution and he

would not

putting explaining too why he may not generate mals, for the perfection of the whole demands that the every
possible

be guilty

asunder what

he had joined together, thereby man. Yet there must be mortal ani
perfect animal

include

kind

of

living

thing.

Timaeus's

god calls

for the

generation of makes
of

animals who must

be

mortal

it unmistakably The burden

clear

"lest they be equal to the but the tale that the interest being served is the completion

gods,"

the

visible manifestation of the

of god's speech

intelligible

whole rather refusal

than the aloofness of god.

to the gods is his

to

be the

culpable cause of

any ill that might befall man, including the rebirth in an inferior form that will follow man's foreseeable wickedness as its punishment. The gods whom he
charges with

the management
whom

of man

are

not

fallen

stars

luminaries to

he

engages

for

an undisturbed existence.

but exactly those Timaeus has con

respect,

trived a god the

unspoiled with

father
laws

to whom creation could

who

look

with affection and

fear but

demands

no testimonies of gratitude or subser

subjects'

vience and whose

are written

in their

composition where reasons

would

for transgression may

tional.

of

necessity lodge but temptation thereto

of

be irra

Now Timaeus begins his description

matter

the

interplay
and

of

the ceaseless

flux

of

that is the

somatic ground of animal

life
and

the revolutions of the soul

elaborates a

that is joined to the body. Between 42E

mechanics

46C, he

dynamic
and,

to

account

for is

nutrition and

perception, all

in terms flux

of motion

self-evidently,

of what

capable of motion.

In the

short

but weighty
of

passage

46C7-E6, Timaeus
of

relegates

these

causes

in terms
of

of

secondary
most

or subordinate

causes, speaking

them as
as

body to the class being among those

idea
of

that god makes use of "to serve him for perfecting

good."

far

as possible the

the

Here Timaeus disparages the

that not

mere physicists or corporealists soul can

for
the

failing
causes

to

understand

body

but only

think.

belonging

to

mindful nature

(emphronos physis)
then the

and those

Distinguishing belonging

to the

motion that arises out of mindless

necessity, he admonishes the lovers of

and

mind and

knowledge to

regard

the former first

latter. Timaeus has

distinguished

nature and

the visible world,

and

the respective studiers of the

where

two realms, as Socrates does in Philebus (59 A)

and cosmos and their

he differentiates
noted

nature

investigators
of

explicitly.

It is to be
scientist

Plato

puts

the

disparagement

the

mere

particularly that in the mouth of a

professional

astronomer who

order

to

reach

the

philosophic

evidently had no need to abjure the cosmos in insight into nature. Since everything said is being
the reader

said

in the

presence of

Socrates,

is

prompted

to wonder whether the the turn

latter's

silence

is the

acknowledgment of a

merited rebuke of

from

176

Interpretation
he
claims

science
or

to

have had to

make

for the
in

sake of wisdom

(Phaedo 96

ff.)

is his tacit

admission

of concurrence

a remark that expresses

his

own

profoundest

belief from the beginning.

on

In fact enlarging
contributed

this

thought,
and so

which grew out of

his

mechanical explana

tion of the power of sight, Timaeus asserts that the

thing

of greatest worth
opens

by

our

vision,

intended
"the

by

god, is that it

up to

us

the

spectacle of

the whole,

number and

nature of the

all,"

and

thus philoso

phy,

of which

he

says

that there can be no greater good for a

mortal.

Perhaps say that

strangely, Timaeus
greatest good

can go on

to refer to the good which we should

our own emulation of

itself promotes, namely,

the serene and

orderly reason of the heavenly geometry. Philosophy, the investigation of the inner nature of the outer cosmos, is the means to ihe perfection of human life, for it is the
means

by

which

that soul that

is

shared

by

all and

by

man

may be

brought,
tion
of
of

within

man, to the same tranquil

perfection of revolution

that governs

throughout heaven.

Similarly, hearing is

given

to us with a view to the

recep

music, thus to
within.

harmony
one

and

the enhancement of the orderly revolutions

the soul

It is hard to

conceive of a universe not us

in

appearance

from the

familiar to

in

which

the whole

grotesquely different would be more

benignly
the
effort

world more

hospitable to man, to his tranquility and his perfection, or the god of kindly affected to us. We must therefore make the necessary
that Timaeus's tale is

to

remind ourselves

being

told

in

response

to Soc

rates'

request

for

an account of

the good city in action, meaning

in

a state of

contention or war.

We

are assisted of

in that

effort

by

Timaeus's

announcement

(47E)

of a change main

in the direction
alludes to a
workings of

his

speech.

Hitherto he has

concentrated

in the

(he

brief exception, which might be 40D-41A, on the poets) on the mind; now he will speak on the things that come about through
must

necessity.

He

do

so

because the
a

generation of
must

this cosmos

was

by

way
of

of

a mixture of mind and

necessity,

dyad that

forever dominate the

the nature

whole.

In

order

to

investigate necessity, Timaeus

and air as

must consider

fire,
in

water, earth

those

ingredients,

always misunderstood as primordial

their perceived character, were before the

coming into

being

of

Heaven. If

Timaeus is speaking accurately, he is affirming the existence of the elements in some absolutely archaic form before the beginning of time, or before there was

before,
we

"during"

unimaginable eternity. Whatever that form might prove to be, know certainly that the elements in their verity cannot be likened to sylla bles or irreducibles. Timaeus knows that in essaying to describe the truth of the effectual universe, he must include the influence of the orbital (48B) cause as well as the eternal ments

static, and that his project for analyzing the so-called ele

is the

signal

for

a re-commencement of

the account of the whole. At the

outset of what

he repeatedly

asserts will

he invokes the The

protection of god

be only the likeliest of such accounts, the protector (of travelers? 48D).

second account of

the whole begins

(48E)

with a revision of

the schema

The Whole As
of

Setting for Man:

On Plato's Timaeus

177

forms (eide) that Timaeus has relied on hitherto. Besides the forms of Para digm and Imitation, a third must be brought out which will be the medium in

Becoming takes place. The study of fire and its congeners is the necessary beginning of the explanation of the requisite third fundamental. The beginning of Timaeus's new account reveals immediately his rejection
which all

and

the basis
supposed

of

his

rejection of

the popular understanding of the status of the

four

elementary

materials.

By

processes of rarefaction and condensa

tion,
into

the so-called elements are transformed

into

one another

(54B-C,

earth

alone will

be

shown as

remaining

uncommuted): what
air

is

now water

condensing

stones and earth or condenses

becoming
air

through rarefaction, air in turn

becoming
flux. The

fire that
issue

into

that turns into

moisture which again solidifies as

earth and stones. now

The standing
what

elements are replaced not

by

a ceaseless

becomes,

that is

in flux

supports

that fluctuation that

of

Timaeus

sees as

he deepens the investigation into the heart

nature"

that in

which

Becoming is, "the truly is, it is not the familiar

of

subsistent

by
each of sought as and

(52B). The

first,

negative answer

elements, for

these is already

formed

as a

kind be
the
the

something
Timaeus's

whereas what

is to be

the absolutely underlying must

none.

receptive of all

forms, itself precisely

the

therefore possessing
as a project

new account of

whole

begins

for

discovering
number:

most general categories of all things.

These

prove and

to be three in

thing itself;

the perceptible of the

"knows"

thing itself;
that

that in which all things are as,

that are. Timaeus

that there is such a

thing

ing
ion

fire itself because he

and

"knows"

Knowing

for example, unchang (nous) differs from True Opin

object, the
object of nous
unre-

it follows that

each must

have its

proper

being

the very form

or eidos of

fire itself. This

un generated,

unalterable,

priceptive, impenetrable, immiscible, imperceptible (definable apparently in vatives except for "intelligible") corresponds with what we expect to recognize

as

the Idea of

Fire,

the
as

answer

to the

question what

everyone perceives comes always

fire
and

and calls passes out

by
of

the

same name as
always

is fire. Next, there is what the first, but that in

some

into

existence

it

location (topos),

moving,

accessible

to

what

Timaeus

calls opinion

(doxa).

Third,
in

there

is everlasting Place, which comes to our that we draw from the fact that everything
location. Because every copy
suppose that

mind

through a confused inference

we perceive

sensibly

exists

some

of paradigmatic

being

is somewhere,

we

falsely

the all-inclusive, absolutely enfolding and thus

somehow support

is space, in some otherwise unoccupied portion of which each existent finds its locus. But Timaeus, in his depreciation of this instinctive or pre-scientific conception of space, implies that the encompassing, that in which we and all

ing

things

live

and move and

have

our

being, is

more

than the receptive as the

merely

void would

existence of

he

said

be receptive; it is the actively receptive that enters into the Timaeus had intimated its nature provisionally where every ignification of the everlasting Place, as water is its local the fire is that
entity.

hydrification (5 IB, 52D).

Besides

Being

and

Becoming,

the paradigmatic

178

Interpretation
the perceptible engendered, there is the underlying Wherein that the elements as of all the
manifest

whence and

stands as the matrix of

flux,

participating
mate

medium,

ubiquitous as aether

but endlessly

protean

in its potentiality for

gives

rializing

as objects of perception. plethora of potentialities

It is the very

that it contains that

this

Third

Fundamental,

the

Suckling

Nurse
as

of

the Generated

ing
full
in

the whole

while

serving

its host.
in

According

(52D), its efficacy in shap to Timaeus's story, Place is

thus

of potentialities which exist

a state of tension with one another and

a paradoxical condition of productive activity. as we might

friction,

say,

of

The activity produced by the dissimilar potentialities is explained by Timaeus's

the result of the presence of
or

construction

that

posits motion as

Other. He

attributes

motion, a shaking

being

shaken

heterogeneity, or (seisthai) (52E), to the

an

all-embracing
perhaps

and all-receptive of

Place,

a motion

that appears to be

example,

the only example,

the

doing
not

of a self-moved or unmoved mover.

It

is

notable

that the movement

within

Place is self-evidently
the effect of an

not movement

from

place to place and also that

it is

intelligent,
say
of

purposive

intention but is the

that
rates

mechanical result of

"mere

conditions,"

the necessity

heterogeneity
one

less

irenically

called

strife

by

the predecessors of

Soc

generate motion.

There is

feature

of

Timaeus's

account that should

be

noted

especially,

namely, his insistence

(50D-E)
as

that the recipient of

form

of

its own, just

at

the sculptor's clay must

as we

forms (morphas) have no be kneaded into perfect

the

smoothness,

the same

time,

potentialities within

it be

so real as to

have just seen, that have the power to

heterogeneity

of

generate motion.

To

put the
of

issue otherwise,
moved,

the great recipient of

forms, if

capable of motion and must

being

and as we shall see of

transmitting

motion,

be material,

but be simultaneously in
another sense

one sense

already

contain

only the possibility of being formed yet in the forms of heterogeneity within. It would seem be
of such a nature as not to violate unformed.

that the form contained

condition not

within must

the

that Place as a whole be

with

perfectly

What Timaeus

alleges

is

the presence within Place of the eternally existent possi bilities of all things that can come to be possibilities which qua archetypal
and eternal are

incompatible

indistinguishable from the Ideas. have to be

compatible with

Any
that

such speculation would

Timaeus's

notion

movement results

from the

relation of the potentialities within

or powers means

Place, indi
good or

cating ill

that

he

conceives

those potencies

(dynameis)
tension
or

as

being literally

energetic, as if the very existence of Other

without

strife, for

any inclination

of strife

itself toward entirety

good or evil.

action of the potencies so agitates the places

of

At any rate, the Place that Place in turn dis

forms, sending flying, at the same time sorting out the four in their rudimentary conditions so that each consorted with its own kind before the whole was made up out of them. Now Timaeus proceeds to the
the
all

elements

crucial

description

of the construction

by

god of

the four elements, constituted

The Whole As
as shapes

Setting for

Man: On Plato's Timaeus

179

(53C

(schema) by forms and numbers (eide and arithmoi). What follows ff.) is the detailed trigonometry by which Timaeus rationalizes atomism,
would render without

thus curing it of the mindlessness that

who could present at not represent

it

unacceptable to a thinker
as

the whole

good, somehow understood,

to

the

beginning. Thus Timaeus

are

sets out

describe the
a

nature of

the

smallest particles of
production.

the four elements, presenting it through solids, their bulk

must

tale of their first

Since they

be bounded

by

planes.

He

does

not

consider

the possibility

of spherical

atoms,
of

which would

have the

merit of

mimicing the
at

perfect whole
of

but which,

course,

could not abut one

another except
matter.

points

Timaeus's

physics rejects

tangency, leaving interstices void of elementary the hypothesis of void not only through the
undefended assertion of the

construct of

Place but through the

rectilinearity

of

the plane surfaces that

bounding
figures
which

the smallest particles (subject to the reservation

could

finite
fill

rectilinear a

not,

as

the curvilinear also could not per

fectly

sphere)

he

refrains

because,
element.

as we

know

and as we shall

from calling atoms, i.e., uncuttables, soon be told in a corrected version, the

small particles are

eminently frangible figures

and

largely

commutable

from

element to

Rectilinear

plane

conceived as composed of

must

(53E-54A) adopts Beauty discuss, Beauty somehow standing in

and

triangles, and all triangles can be right triangles, isosceles and scalene. Timaeus now as the criterion of the excellence of the entities he
are composites of place of or as most

in fact

being Good,

he declares the
to construct

which

(when

doubled)

of

beautiful thing out of the beautiful elements, for it is the immediate component the equilateral triangle. Timaeus says in passing (53E) that
scalene

right triangle to be the

his reasoning

will

disclose, if it
=

succeeds, the truth

not

only

about

the genera
en

tion of the elements but also

about

the mean proportional (ana

logon

meso),
relation

i.e.,
of

the expression a:b

segments of

b:c,

which

happens to be the formula for the

the

the Divided Line. What is the truth about the

mean propor

tional, and how can it be related to the isosceles right triangle? Perhaps as follows: The so-called Pythagorean theorem indicates that the relation between the hypotenuse and the legs of the isosceles right triangle involves an incalcul
able square root, what the

The is
as

proportion

between the

Greeks called, as we still call, an irrational number. leg and the hypotenuse of an isosceles right triangle
between the diameter
quantities cannot and

illusory
of a

or anomalous as the relation

the circum

ference

circle, notwithstanding that the

relation of mean

being
be

related are per

fectly
of an

finite. The isosceles formed

proportionality

applied

to the

sides

right triangle without

equal

maintaining the absurdity that the square

on the
square

hypotenuse is

to (rather than twice, cf.

Meno)

the area of the

by

the legs as sides; but the intrusion of the irrational

right

{2 in

the

arithmetic of

the isosceles
as

triangle points to the parallel

fact that

affects

the mean

proportional

tional is in

principle

it necessarily incorporates the power of 2: the irra inescapable by the perfection and beauty of number. The

180

Interpretation
at

irrational lies

the heart of the

beauty

of

the

most

beautiful

and most constitu

tive of forms. It might be worth mentioning further that the Greek word for the potentialities whose tension resulted in the basic, fruitful agitation of Place is

dynamis,
cles of

the

word

for

an exponential power.

Timaeus develops (54C

the four elements, the

ff.) fire,

in detail the
air,

construction of the smallest parti

and water out of scalene

right triangles

and

earth out of six sides

isosceles,
of

the latter element constituted as a cube

are not told

each of whose

is formed

four isosceles triangles. We

shown

why the square,

than scalene

the side of the cube,

is

to be constructed of
easily.

isosceles

rather

right triangles,

which can

be done

To have done

so would

have

gained

the advantage in elegance of reducing earth to the same mathematical element, the scalene right
reason

triangle,

as the rest of

the cosmos. Timaeus appears for some

to

make earth exceptional when with

he

constructs

it

of a

triangle that unites

of

the equality of two of its sides third. However this may

scalene triangle

the

irrationality

in the dimension

the

has

be, Timaeus stops to make explicit that the primary hypotenuse twice the length of the shorter leg, and that
therefore be
equal

the remaining
root of

side must

to or some multiple of the square

three,

of course

irrational. Out

of such anomalous material the entire

visible universe as

is to be constructed,

afflicted

by

<(2

and

J~3. Timaeus

remarks

if casually (55A) that the encompassing sphere of the whole will consist of equal and like parts, declining to consider that rectilinear solids cannot fill a
sphere

but

could at most

be

conceived as

approaching
of

infinitely
might

such a reple a as

tion,

on

the assumption of the

infinite

concept similar

to that on the basis of

which

divisibility ^ 2 and /3

the included particles,

be discussed

proper numbers.

Concluding
god used

his

account of

the ground of the four elements in

a

four polyhedrons, Timaeus

mained,
which

remarks

in passing that
the
whole

fifth

polyhedron

re

up for

depicting

(55C). We
strate of a

are not

told whether this means that a

nor

in life (diazographon) fifth polyhedron is the sub in any

other way.

soul-stuff,

does Timaeus clarify his

remark

Timaeus is ble in

confident

that the proportions of the agglomerations of the

all accomplished proportion

invisi

particles and

the motions of the visible bodies are

accord with

the nature of necessity and

as we remind

harmonious

(ana

by god logon)

(56C),

proportion,

ourselves,

being

the cosmic adhesive. We

receive the composites

impression that the proportionality or rationality and harmony of the is not destroyed by the irrationality that we have seen to be lodged
elements of
or

in the absolutely primary

physical, mathematical,
\[3

the elements. Stated

differently,
in the

the meta

theoretical

irrationality
of cohesion

of

the incalculable v 2 and

empirical

do

not seem

to cause a

failure

and order

cosmos.

Are

we entitled to surmise or

that the world appears to Timaeus as an

order, proportion,
orated?

What follows

harmony at whose birth disproportion or unreason collab immediately might be construed to favor that surmise, for
of

it

consists of

Timaeus's tale
air or

the

war of

the elements

how

earth

is broken

down

by fire,

water,

not to the point of the corruption of the

four-square

The Whole As
minuscules,
which

Setting for Man:

by
chance

On Plato's Timaeus

-181

are not earth

but proto-earth, but sufficiently to lose the

character of proper earth until

they

meet again

(xyntykhonta);
in

and

how the

particles of

water,

fire,

and air engage one another

where

a polemic chem
result

istry

conducted on a

field

of

battle

victory

and

defeat (56E-57C) happenings

in

the splitting
of elements

and recombination of

the molecules and consequent commutation

explains these
with

(earth

excepted). of the

Timaeus

by

recurring

to the

trigonometry

primary forms

their angularities of greater and

less acuteness, adding

tive
of submissiveness resistance

now

to the properties of the small particles the alterna

to

in defeat, with loss of identity as a result, and combative domination, resulting in lonely exile or defeat and assimilation.
composed an epic of war that could claim to

Timaeus has
whose

describe
war

a combat

duration,
and

scope,

and consequences exceed

those

of

the

between the

Greeks

the Trojans as the latter exceed those of the

war

between the frogs

epic

and the mice.

of

Plato has
the

made

Timaeus the

rational poet of

the everlasting

the

rational and

irrational,

of peace and war.

There is
tion
of

ceaseless restlessness

throughout the whole, brought on

by

the

ac

the cosmic sphere's centripetal compulsion which seeks to fill every

and

emptiness,
ture and

thus promotes the

themselves.
without

war of

the particles as

they

encounter, frac
of motion

reconstitute

Necessary
there

for the

origination

is

dissimilarity
moved,

or

Other,

which

is

no

distinction
source

of mover

and

and also

there is the primal impulse that

has its
In his

in the

sphere's

irresistible

compulsion to minimize

its

volume.

present account of

the

sphere's struggle against course consider

every
the

vestige of void within

it, Timaeus does

not of

the ubiquity of Place as synonymous

sphere of might
whole.

with

the a priori exclusion

of void

from the

At this point, it

be in

order

to observe that Timaeus's first major

of

argument, the one that

culminated

in the entity

Place,

was

dominated

by

the

goodness of god who suffused

the

whole with reason and ordered

the heavens

to

display

themselves and their secret arithmetic to man

for the

advancement of

Since the recommencement, Timaeus has scarcely noticed god but has confined himself to the elaboration of a mathematical physics that purports
philosophy.

to account for the ground of all matter

and

the

origin of motion.

The transition

from the

doing

of god

the

mindful sower of soul will

to the power of necessary truth

that marked the new

account of what with of

beginning

be

sustained as

Timaeus

passes

from his
there

is

perceptible

to his

account of perception perceptible.

(62C

ff.)

and

the causes of the perceptibility of the

acts on our

its particles, which are sharp, small, acutely angled and in rapid motion, thus apt for penetrating, di need to bridge viding and cutting our flesh. Timaeus seems to be aware of no sensation of warmth particles and the interaction of between the huge the gap related beyond the suggestion that the word for heat is etymologically to the Fire

body by

virtue of

the geometry of

word

would

for chopping up. Even if the etymological speculation be not fanciful, it bespeak nothing more useful than a tautology or a prescientific hunch.

182

Interpretation
goes on to account

As Timaeus
of

for

"cold,"

he

refers

to the

expected phenomena

motion,

compression and

density, but

adds the observation that whatever is

driven together
to
remove

contrary to nature will fight according to nature itself from its affliction. Of course the unnatural compression that
or compressed

underlies the

shivering

of

the uncomfortable

man might

have been

produced

by

his

exposure natural

to sleet, which

is

as natural as

is his

compression and

discomfort.

The

sleet and the natural mechanics of the man's particles are

relation

in the

paradoxical

opposing influences from their harmony. The boundary between

of

whose

strife

is indistinguishable

agitation and

become indistinct. Timaeus's discourse

continues
reference

on

the nature of

serenity begins to heavy and light (62C)

in

a similar vein.

to above and

Heavy and light seem to have to be understood by below, heavy meaning no more than seeking below and
reminds

light the opposite; but Timaeus

particles whose
motion

that the whole is a sphere composed of the centripetal thrust

is

governed

by

inherent in the

sphere

itself,

tantamount to abhorrence of void. The aggressive

the particles

does the rest,

and

Timaeus has thus

and outer.

shown

angularity of how there is no abso

philo

lute

above and

below, only inner

He has replaced, for the

sophic

mind, the naive image of a cosmic equatorial plane with a rational

schema of center and periphery.

is

"love"

not

gravity, attraction,

or

In general, the principle of Timaeus's but compression, struggle, or

physics

"war"

that

produces the effectual simulacrum of philia,

forcing

like to

associate with

like

by
so

sorting the particles according to their size and geometry. Timaeus must explain pleasure and pain (64 A). Suffice it to say that he does in terms of the motion of particles, the sensations of pain or pleasure de
on

pending

the resistance to their displacement or lack of it on the

part of

the

various particles.

In passing, he in the

refers

the pleasures and pains associated with

soul"

fillings

and emptyings

body

to

"the

mortal of

the

(65A)

which can

hardly
prising

be incorporeal. His
mechanical

account of

the senses of taste and smell runs in the

explanation of

familiar

channel, but his

hearing

produces the sur

without

assertion that the motion of the audible that comes

from

termi

nates at the

liver. Ridicule

would

be

premature

in

view of

the eventual identi

vision

fication

of

the liver as the organ of divination (71-72). His account of

and the perception of colors turns on the us and the

interaction

fire that

encounters that optic stream

fire emanating from without. from Timaeus refers to

of the

his

explanation as a

likely

myth

(68D)

(cf. 59C

"the idea

of the

likely

myth":

idea

as plausible construct).

Having

drawn this
so

part of

his tale to its conclusion, Timaeus declares that

are

his discourse has

far dealt in the things that

born

of

necessity,

which

the

generating Demiourgos is the architect of the good in everything being. Thus, two kinds of causes are to be

Demiourgos

took and used in

the autarkic, most perfect god. The that was to come into the

distinguished,
after

divine,
life
so

and

it is the divine that

necessary

and

the

must

be inquired

in

order

to gain a

far

happy
sake

as our nature permits.

The

inquiry

into the necessary is for the

The Whole As
of the

Setting for

Man: On Plato's Timaeus

without of

183

divine, for it is impossible Equally,

to reach the latter

purges

going through the

of

former. With this statement, Timaeus

a vulgar mechanist.

himself

the imputation

being

there is

no approach

to philosophy except through

of

knowledge
cosmos.

of

the polemic reason that lies in the heart

the perfect god

Timaeus
plete with ever

now

(69B)

proposes another re-commencement

in

order

to

com

his

myth.

He

repeats

briefly

the tale of god's

within and

infusing

the

original

disorder

commensurability (symmetria) possible, they should be in a

symmetra).

among the

parts so

that, how

state of proportion and

(analoga,
"however

We

are

in

a position to take attaches

commensurability seriously the qualification

of mathematics.

possible"

that Timaeus

to

those terms

delegation to his progeny of the task of constructing the mortal things within the one cosmic animal he had made, the tale relates how the lesser gods encased the immortal soul in a body in which they enclosed also

Dwelling

on god's

a mortal

soul that
pain

Timaeus describes

as

the seat of pleasure the tempter to

wickedness,

the evicter of good, rashness and

fear the

advisers

in

folly,

spiritedness obdurate gether with

before dissuasion,
sensation and

and

irrational

headlong

hope the seducer, lust. They did this

all mixed to
out of neces

sity
the

so much we are
worm

told and no more, although our minds are drawn back to

and

of

irrationality
in

incommensurability
We know

lodged in the
without

core of

the

apple of

ineluctable

mathematical reason.
power

being

told that that

necessity
of

was superior

to everything that could be called

by

the name
clean

god,

and

that the

highest

god

had

power

only to

keep

his hands

by
the

deputizing
able

others

to execute the demand of necessity that man be made punish

before he

merited

punishment, the bitterest hysteron

god

proteron

to

mar

work of a philanthropic

or the most

consoling

myth

to illuminate the

mind of a philanthropic man.

Making the best of an imperfect keep the mortal soul away from the

situation, the inferior gods take pains to

as well as they can, seating the further latter in the head, the former in the trunk, dividing the trunk with a diaphragm so that the better passions, courage and spiritedness, might be nearer

immortal

to reason and abler to collaborate with it

maeus

in restraining the base desires. Ti

on

has begun his

anatomical

psychology

the premise of the tripartition of

the soul that is familiar as a principle of the Platonic Socratic doctrine. We can

only surmise, helped by gratifying to Socrates. Timaeus according to the

well as organs.
ways

Socrates'

silence, how much of Timaeus's discourse is

goes on

to

describe the

organs of

the

body
as

in

which

their purely mechanical

of reason over

functioning
place

serves,

possible, the

hegemony

the passions lodged in those

put

Thus the lungs

provident gods

cool and protect

the

heart,

in

for that

purpose of

by

the

who, as Timaeus says,

planted

there "the

idea

the

lungs"

(70C). Soon (71 A) he

liver"

idea

of

the

and

will say that god, not the gods, contrived "the installed it in its place. Unchecked by Socrates, Timaeus

refers

easily to the idea

of

lungs

and

liver,

without

any

such

hesitations

as

184

Interpretation

perplexed

and mud

of the hair, nails, young Socrates over whether there could be ideas (Parmemides 130C-D). Installing an idea appears to mean fashioning is adapted. In the that has a function for which the concrete

body

body

present

case, the idea

of

the liver

is

set

in its

place so that the

mirror-like

organ over

might reflect awe

the monitory thoughts of the mind as

frightening
the

images to

the

organs

below the diaphragm. Timaeus

mind and

produces an

extraordinary ac
corporeal states

count of of

the interaction of

liver, showing in detail

organ

the organ as effects of a particular state of the mind, and the

of each of those states of

psychic equiva

lent

the

in

what might

be

seen as an exact

parallel of soul and

body. The astonishing doctrine of the liver comes to a head in Timaeus's disclosure of the liver's function in divination. The liver, partici
not

pating

in

reason and wisdom

(logos,

phronesis), lies asleep at night in a

tranquil state of equanimity and performs

its divination. Timaeus dreams

surprises

by

failing
fevers

to offer a single
or

hint
or

of an explanation of
or

as consequences of

chills, hunger

satiety

any

other condition of

the body. What he

stresses

instead is the
absence of us

functioning
when

of this

important

contributor to our psychic

life in the

any reasoning
some

within

it

whatsoever. either at

Dreaming,
or

or

divina

tion, arises in disease or

exactly

the mind

is
god

dormant

distracted

by
that

"enthusiasm,"

invasion
the

by

any

rate not

in

command of

itself. Since Timaeus distinguishes dreams

and

waking visions,
waking

we gather

dreams
prophet

belong
is

to the

dormancy
In
either

of

mind and

visions

to its distrac

tion and

enthusiasm.

case, the true interpreter of divination or the true

possession of

that man who

considered

is in full

his mind, for the frantic

and

only compound the in a state of vig intelligent man, Every voices. What Ti is his own the construer of visions and his ilance, prophet, maeus calls divination or prophecy is given to us in mitigation of our baseness,
possessed,
unreason

by

the vulgar to be prophetic, would

inherent in the

enthusiasm.

not of our

ignorance; it is

an

instrument is

of

conscience,

not of

revelation, as we to
reaffirm.

in

our

time might say, and as such as Spinoza would

mortal soul

find

reasons

For Timaeus, the sary badness,

party to the

struggle of good against neces

a struggle that

is

an episode of what appears as a cosmic

polemic,

evidence of which we

With
Timaeus
to be

a remark

have already seen. about the function of the

his discourse
of on

spleen as the cleanser of

the

liver,
and

concludes

the mortal and immortal soul

(72D),

proceeds to the
of

discussion

the rest of the

body,

more

exactly,

of

the coming

means man.

which he apparently explaining the form of an organ as instrumental to a moral good for The first explanation of Timaeus's that we will encounter is of the belly.

the rest of the

body,

"in the

fashion,"

same

by

The

central

fact is the

spectacular

length

of

the

intestines. For this Timaeus has

we would

a characteristic rationalization:

because
and

of our

grossness,

excess
retain would

in eating and food and drink be the

signal

drinking inordinately

if the intestines,
thus

by

their great

surely go to length, did not depletion that

in the
enlisted

delay

the sensation of

for further gormandizing. Even the

body

is

The Whole As
moral combat against

Setting for Man:

in any
of

On Plato's Timaeus
of

185

itself. Timaeus's inference

as

teleology is as evident here presents itself as epiphany.

In
the

the other

manifold places

morphology from moral in which it

the

an extraordinary passage bones and flesh and other

(73A-75D), Timaeus
such

recounts

generation of of

bodily

matter, but especially

the "mar

row"

which plays a crucial part

in the

constitution of

living

material.

We

are

told that god reverted to the pristine triangles, selecting the best of them and recombining them as the most precise specimens of the four eleme.nts. Out of these he
made

marrow, the all-seed for every

medium or substance

mortal

kind. This

marrow

is

said

by
he
(as

Timaeus to be the
which

is, in

life itself

comes
with

is bound to body, that to be. God divided the life-stuff into portions that
which soul

in

shaped

in conformity

the kind of soul each was to embody. The portion

that was

somehow

to contain the

divine

soul or mind was

formed

as a sphere

before [44D]) in the first story of the cosmogony. That the brain bears only vague resemblance to a sphere is a fact that may be passed over in the interest of the intended meaning of the passage, which seems to be that the
was said

morphology
united

of

the visible and generated organ is

and

inseparable from its

which

psychic are

nature, excellence,

function. This

marrow

in

body

and soul

is distributed in

various shapes and

then encased in suitable

bones, rigid

and

jointed, along

with

the apparatus of connecting tissue and flesh that make

all presented as

up the
most

body

as we

know it
the

for the
most

sake of

the

protection of

the seed within,

i.e.,

marrow.

The bones

inclusive

of

soul,

are

least

covered with of

flesh;
about

be-souled (empsychotata), those with least soul, with

the head would have made

most and

densest flesh: the gathering

unreceptive

flesh

the mind oblivious,

were emanations with

to the signals from without, as if those to

penetrate matter

latter

resembling

missiles obliged

by

parting it
things:

force.
reveals a

Now (75A-B) Timaeus

the

deep-lying

tension

in the

nature of

necessity between what

and

that

accompanies

our

existence

has

produced

disjunction

conduces

density
and

of

flesh,
about

to activity of the spirit and what, through abundance conduces to protection of the corporeal medium of that
not suffocate

activity.

The lungs do bone

the heart that

would

they
us

protect, but a

mass of

flesh

the brain-marrow
chose

stultify the mind

rather

within

it. Our

makers,

having deliberated,
as

intelligence for

than longevity.
choice was

That they decided

they did
the

was perhaps
whole

to be expected; that the

forced

upon

them,

or that

is

so constructed good of

that the good of intel

existence we see

ligence is

by

its

nature exclusive of

the

(indefinite)

is

sober

ing
out

and astonishing.

However the
of

antithesis

is to be explained,

it borne

in the

fragility

the good city of the

of

Republic;

and we see

its thought

affirmed

in the Garden

Eden.

Yet Plato The

sees what might

be the

exception

to this rule that tends to prove it.

mouth serves the end of

most good

by

necessity by admitting nourishment, and of the It can serve the two expelling speech, the instrument of mind.

186

Interpretation conflicting function is

ends
nature s own, violating the principle, said to be it is. function performed best by that agent whose only

otherwise

by

that each

This dictum is the basis for the division

the best polis, in
which

of

labor that inspired the

power,
of

structure

of

the

coincidence of mind and

intelligence and

force,
sity
to

of reason and coercion,

in the

person of

the philosopher-king represents

the same violation of the principle of division of

and

labor,

of

disjunction

of neces

good, as

comes of

to

sight

principle of rest on

division

labor,

in the physiology of the mouth. The natural necessary for the achievement of the good, seems

the conflict between the conditions of

durability
with

or existence and

the

conditions of

intelligence

or mind

or, to fall in

Timaeus's

assimilation to
well pre

each other of mind and pared

Being,

then of

Being

itself. We have been

and

for for

disjunction between
mind, but it

existence

in time

the timeless

being

of

unalterable pared

was not and

is surprising to find that what the mere disjunction but the active
At the
the
same
on

we

may have been pre opposition between the

the contrary

temporal

the eternal.
of

time, but in

direction,
idea
on

the supposed

the

other

antinomy seems to be
of

body

the one hand and both soul and

compromised
of

implanting
induce
us

the idea

in the physiology that encompasses the the lungs and the idea of the liver as well as the
the motions in those motions

animization of

the marrow and the motility of the soul. While nothing should
majestic orderliness of

to

forget the

heaven,
is
but

we are

reminded reason

that the order or

intelligibility
the

within

supplied

by

in the form

of a mathematics of

dominated

by

proportion

vexed with

the incommensurabilities

irrational
He

numbers.

Timaeus
count

explains

the genesis of skin and hair

purports

(76),

and

then comes to ac

for the

presence of the nails.

to describe the synthesis of then takes the occasion to

or subordinate

sinew,
remind

skin and
of

bone that

eventuates

in nail,

and

the difference between the

co-causes

causes

that

brought the thing into being and the superlatively dianoia) (76D) that intended its existence with a
What
our makers
with

causal
view

intelligence (aitiotate

to what was to come. the other animals,

foresaw

was

the descent from

man of all

beginning
flesh
tale
at of

woman, many to be in need of something harder than mere

the tips of their extremities. What Timaeus

the punishment of evil-doers

of

by demotion,
forms
of

after

is adumbrating here is the death and by reincarna

of this we shall

tion, through the ranks from man, not to be his

more when

the lower

life. Woman is indeed derived leam

companion

but to be his fate; but

it becomes Timaeus's theme. Still to be explained is the genesis of man's life in

with an apparent casualness

nourishment.

Timaeus

will not

undertake to explain the preservation of

man through nutrition without

remarking,

that belies the

of

that man's life consists,

by

necessity,

fire

and

the

gravity of the remark, breathed air (pneuma)

material elements reduces the aliment

(11 A). This bold affiliation of life to the two most rarefied will be amplified (80D) when Timaeus maintains that

fire

to particles of usable size and then rises with them after the

ascending breath

The Whole As

Setting for
and

Man: On Plato's Timaeus

our

187
to

itself, in
occur, if

a collaboration of with a

blood

breath that is in
what

day

too

understood

different bearing. In any event,

excessively.

feeds

us must resemble us

sufficiently but not human nature with

(11 A) to form the

Accordingly,
"ideas
and

the gods made a mixture of the

sensibilities"

certain other

(ideais,

aisthesesi)

vegetable

kind.

life may

the latter term justly rightly be the word also for animal. Aristotle (de Anima, 414ab) will speak (zoon) being of the vegetative soul as present in those living things that are without thought
and most

"Everything whatsoever that called a living (77B)

being,"

participates

in

or

locomotion. He

will not make

the astonishing assertion that

which

they know
in

sen

sation, pleasure and

pain,

and

desire,

Timaeus

affirms

an access of

dogmatic consistency with what he has described as lower belly. What characterizes, and impoverishes, the
shared with

characteristic of man's soul of

the souls

of

the

things,"

vegetable

"living
mental

is the

lower belly, incapacity for the

the

internal

motion

that is the condition for a

life

as also

for local
of

motion. with

Timaeus does
lows is itself
system, their
a

not retreat

from the

association of the

functions

life

the

motion of matter.

The detailed

account of

the physiology

of nutrition of of

that fol

preceded

by

what appears

to

be

description

the circulatory the

"veins"

description that
about the

rationalizes

the bilateral symmetry

and

turning
is

head

as

being

in the

service of

revealing the sensations

of nutrition and made consistent

from both
respiration
with

sides of

the

body

to the whole body. His

of

interest to

us

for the

vigor with which

anatomy it is

the universal principles of mechanical necessity,

i.e.,

motion of

body,

and

plenitude of

matter,
things

i.e.,

absence of void.

The life

of the cosmos and of all

the

lesser

living

belonging

to it is dominated

by

the contiguity of

irreducible

particles of matter that

motion

absolutely fill the

whole and

that are characterized

by

traceable to the
media of

trigonometry
cold, and

that becomes phenomenal through the

rarefaction

linked

heat

and

and condensation. whole

From the

remoteness of the able as

heavens to the

ventral offer

recesses, the
to elucidate

is

one and explain

one, enabling Timaeus to

motion of

(80A)
and

therapeutic cupping,

swallowing, the

bodies through the air,

the character of sound,

including
mimic

the pleasure given to the wise

by

their perceptions of the sounds that

the divine

harmony

in

mortal motion.

Many

other wonders are rendered no

intelligible
of motion

by

the power of the

insight that there is

void,

no

through

its dissipation into

clear

an emptiness.

We

are not

running down forbidden to

speak of
name.

nothing, but it is
grasped
upon

that we can do no more than say

its empty

Having

this and also the

ineluctability
we

of

the impulse

by

which

like is

obtruded

like,

the thinker will

cosmos the replica of the whole.

Lest
that

recognize in every part have forgotten it, Timaeus

of the refers

(81B-D)
like
and

to the

polemic

trigonometry
of

is

at

the root of the irenic

exhausted

attraction of

like. The triangles

the

body

become

in their

ceaseless

combat with the external, and

tary
no

material with a view

they become incapable of attacking the alimen to co-opting it to the animal. The inner triangles can

longer defeat but

are

defeated

by

the exoteric

world.

This is senescence,

and

188
when

Interpretation
the triangles have lost their efficacy, or as one
might

say

their spirited

ness, the soul departs pleasantly

cosmos

because
an

naturally: the essence of

death

in our

is

not rest

but defeat
conception

by

attack. externality that always lurks for

The

foregoing

of uneventful

death is

carried

forward and con

on

firmed in the immediate sequel, a long and detailed (81E-86A). What might be called basic disease occurs in the
cess,
or

passage

morbidity

presence of ex

deficiency,

or

displacement

of quantities of the
unsuitable variants

four

elements

in the

body,
which
as

the

alteration of

them to

form

perhaps

isotopes
only
so

disrupt

a physical equilibrium
added

that is maintained

in the

body

long

like is

to or taken

away from like

and

and the proportions of

of proportion are a

the whole are

unchanged.

Like to like

the

stability
the

formula for the

to oppose that

reconciliation of ceaseless motion and unbroken rest.

The

massive existence of

disease testifies to the

reconciliation.

power of

forces

whose

tendency is
a natural

Timaeus's
the the

advance

to the second order of

disease indicates
direction for the

something
ments: with

of

character of

those

forces. There is

generation of

derivative

materials of the

body

marrow,

the

incidence

bone, flesh, and sinew, as well as of disease, instead of flesh and

the terms used
of

from the primary four ele blood to begin with. Then,

sinew

being

formed from

blood, for
blood.
tions

example, flesh degenerates

and war are

and reverts to

the veins, attacking the

characterize the rela

Enmity

by

Timaeus to

among

the components

body

that have departed from the order of their

natural revolutions
ral nourishment
"opposite"

(83A). In sum, when blood is replenished not from its natu but by a reflux toward itself of its own product, the application
nature

of

to like is contrary to the laws of

great standard of nature
an

(para tous tes

physeos

nomous) (83E). The

to like is called, in

is

an order whose principle of

like
of

exceedingly

rare

use of

the expression, the laws

unchangeable which

nature; the
true
of a

standard
of

is

not called an

Idea,

the eternal

is the

being

every becoming. It is hard to conceive the efficacy or successful foe of the Idea; but disease compels Timaeus to

constitution conjure

the

successful

the

enemy of the laws of nature. He discovers a blind necessity, call it irresistible cosmos, in which strife and the irrational coexist in enduring
with reason and good personified as a god.

tension

We

are presented with

the

spectacle of the principle of

with a principle of

like to like,

which

is

a philia,

in

perpetual struggle

hostility. Since the

evident that the

struggle of concord with

of strife

discord is

struggle, it appears

dominance

is

assured not

by

its

victory but by the mere fact of everlasting engagement. Timaeus proceeds from the pathology of reversals of the natural order of construction in the body to what he calls the third kind of disease, traceable to disorders of the internal air, phlegm, and bile, in each case brought on by a blockage in the system of circulation that is such a massive phenomenon of
vitality.

Should

the

the marrow

itself

and

bodya

fiery bile press destroy by

its

attack overwhelmingly, it would reach to heat the bonds that fasten the soul to the

manner of speech that cannot

purely figurative.

be presupposed unconditionally to be

The Whole As

Setting for

Man: On Plato's Timaeus

diseases
of

189

Suitably
of

enough, Timaeus
of

passes on to the

the soul that arise out

the state

the

body

(86B). He has in

view such mental

disorders

as mad

ness

(mania) stupidity (amathia), insisting is sickness, immediately identifying the excess of pleasure and pain as that kind and as the greatest of the diseases of the soul. He traces the
and

that whatever partakes of these

being

of

venereal

frenzy

to a superabundance of

semen which

is in turn

produced

by

the bones. (He does not discuss nymphomania.) He leaves no

wicked are not so

porosity of doubt that the

a

voluntarily and that to blame them is not right. In this strik Timaeus has found means of arriving at the conclusion that no ing disquisition, man is voluntarily wicked. Wickedness is indeed inseparable from a failing of
mind

a proposition akin to the

Socratic formula that

virtue

is knowledge

but

the
of

wickedness and

ignorance
nurture

the

body
of

and

its

stupidity in the soul have their causes in defect (trophe) (86E). The unbroken silence of Socrates in
or
no one

the face

this confirmation of his doctrine that

is

wicked

voluntarily relating

leaves the

question of elaborates

his
his

reaction to such confirmation open to speculation.

referral of

Timaeus

the vices to states of the

body by

the states of the

body

to the

movements

(phora)
if

of the soul,

in

apparent appeal

to a

principle of

the parallel of

body

and soul of

not the reduction of

the latter to

the former.

Completing

his pathology
things

the soul, he asserts that the evils of

political regimes and of the

acted

spoken

in

public and

private, not

counter

by

any education, comprise

as was

a second cause of men's

wickedness, invol

untary just
ask,
could

the diseased

state of

the body. The true malefactors are the

ones who make men wicked, not their corrupted victims.

And whom,

we

may

he

regard as more culpable each

than the veritable corrupters of youth. He

closes

by

recommending to
after

that he

flee from

evil and pursue soul

its opposite,
closest prox

but only

he, Timaeus, has drawn

its
governance

man and

his

into the

imity
As

to the cosmos and

a physician of
well

by

necessity.

body

and

mind, he accepts the burden

edies as

restoration to nance of

as providing pathology and health is, understandably, the

proposing rem diagnosis (87C). The principle of

of

same as

the principle of the mainte

health,
or

namely, symmetry
and a

and proportion
proportion

between

body

and soul.

Symmetry
would

commensurability

between incommensurables for

close

be

unintelligible except as

figurative

suggestion not meant

inspection. But Timaeus is both

at some

body

and soul of

that we call

length in prescribing for the combination of living being, doing so in terms that make clear
vice and

the seriousness

his belief that in

which

disease,

virtue and

health,

are states

belonging

to a

whole

body

and soul are

locked in for

a relation of

recip domi

rocating motions he proposed it. A

such a

doctrine

as seemed novel

to Thomas Hobbes when

good or

powerful soul shakes

the

body

ill,

and a

will be home to a gross neering body joined with a mind that is small and weak ignorant. Lest and forgetful human being, stupid, body and soul fall into dis should both be cultivated to strength, and the means for proportion,

they

symmetry are gymnastic and music. This achieving brings public sharply to view the difference between the
such

evocation of repression of

the Re the de-

190

Interpretation
the

mands of

body

that

is

characteristic of

the Republic and the prominence of

the body's influence in its copartnership in motility with the soul that is as serted in the Timaeus, as if the latter dialogue is itself in a relation of corrective
counterpoise with

the

work

to which it

is the

sequel.

Music
of

and gymnastic are presented

motion

by

Timaeus

as

forms

of

exercise, modes

inducing

in

soul and

body

so

that both may imitate as far as possible

the eidos or form of the

motion can

Whole itself,
also

which

is in

ceaseless at

motion; for only in

or overcome and

the hostile to

influences,
the

motions,

be kept

bay

like be

allowed

consort with

like for the

part of

preservation of

health. The life

physic

of reciprocal automotion on

body

and soul together constitutes the

of a most accord

true or best

regimen

for the

composite

animal, the basis

ing

to reason (89D). It is notable

that, in the

passage of the

Republic

(444)

that

may be considered parallel to Timaeus's discussion of health and virtue, there is no reference to motion, although there is repeated reference to nature and to
natural

hierarchy. The Republic dwells

on

hegemony

(of the

best), Timaeus

stresses
other as

reciprocity between higher and lower, the two differing from one an hierarchy differs from equilibrium. As will appear presently, Timaeus
the account that
will constitute

has

almost completed

his

project

for

bringing
that

heaven down to

earth with

his

moral

kinetics.
the guiding soul
of

Now Timaeus turns to the

condition of

itself,

a subject

he

will

treat only cursorily.

Recurring
chest,
and

to his account

the three parts of the

adapts

soul as

located in the

head,

abdomen, Timaeus simply

proportional motions and

to this
must

configuration

the doctrine

of

balanced,
of
physic

(which

invigilate the

drowsy

reader)

the superiority of
of the

motion

to rest, that he has the composite of

already amply
and soul.

elaborated

in his

body

and of

body Having shown the origin of man, Timaeus prepares for the conclusion of his discourse by describing the generation of the rest of the animal kind, and in so that is, the male human doing reveals that his account refers literally to being. In a tale that, like so many before, he characterizes as likely (eikotos),
"man,"

he

will assert

that

men who were cowards and who

lived unjustly

were reborn

as women.

reproduction,

Surely

we

genesis of

necessary to bisexual in this way women and the whole female kind came to be. learn more from this about the meaning of than about the the female sex. That this tale conveys a moral judgment presented as
The
gods made the anatomical modifications
and
"likely"

the spirit
mere

of an event or course of events

in the

cosmos

is

truth that is

not a

likeness
of

of an unashamed

modality

truth, burlesque. What is indeed likely is that Plato has employed a myth, in which gods play a part by courtesy while the effective
although
appearance

of the

the content of this story has the

causes are those of the material cosmos

a civic

that alluded to in the Republic (607 A). The

poetry complementary burden of the myth,

although

with

"plausible"

if

the reader is amiably credulous, is that the cosmos collaborates in the

moral

judgments
simple

and
and

distinctions
down.

of

higher

and

lower,

it itself knows

no

up

The Whole As
But
male

Setting for
not

Man: On Plato's Timaeus

191

human beings

decay

only into females but also, if they

who reason

are of a

flighty,
suitable

"meteorologists"

atmospheric

mind,

about what of

is

aloft

simply from the

evidence of their

eyes, into

birds, denizens

the element

to their soul. These must be the cosmologists, as distinguished

from

physicists, of Philebus
of

59A. The plodding men who never look up, who know or the nature of the heavens but live the life of the chest philosophy nothing become the beasts who tread the earth with arms and heads pulled earthwards,
pulled closer and closer

to earth in proportion to the degree of their

kinship

to

base
earth

earth

until, in the extreme,

they become
to

the legless that squirm on the

itself. The utterly

stupid and wicked are sent to

inhabit the waters,

is best
with

com

pleting the tale the soul itself obeying the

the kinetic of the
closes

whose moral seems

be, like

to like throughout the cosmos,

represented

universal order whose character

in

four

elements.

This

"verisimilitude"

which

Timaeus

his discourse is cunning

and comprehensive

in its

protrayal of

the gener

ation of

living

things within the whole as a

alleged a reverse of

degeneration. It leaves
movement reason.

unexplained

and

incomprehensible the
the ocean

from, for

example, the
reversal of

molluscs of

floor to

life

higher

Would the

the

direction

of rotation of

the universe, and the resumption of

direct divine

rule of

the world (Statesman

and

273) be

the condition of progress among the

"down"

living

things,

in the visible primarily among men? There may be no simple whole, but as the Republic testifies in its way through the easy decay of the good city, and as Timaeus testifies in its way in its terminal myth, there appears
to be an
"down"

effectual

in the

moral

and political

life

of man.

How then

explain philosophy? of good and

Philosophy

seems

to be that gift for converting the struggle

of

evil,

or of upward and

downward,

folly

and

reason, into

reason

itself

by

the unending

contemplation of

the whole theater of that struggle, in

confidence

that the whole is somewhat, if

inertly, inclined

to good

by

permit

ting

that unending contemplation. Timaeus takes leave of his completed task

as

by

rapturously
mortal

describing
and

the

cosmos ones most

the

visible

living being

that envelopes the

of the

immortal

a perceptible god

in the likeness

beautiful,

most perfect

in its becoming, this

intelligible, greatest, best, and one heaven, unique of its

kind.

Made

by

Contrivance
and

and

the Consent of Men:

Abstract Principle
Locke's Political

Historical Fact in

Philosophy

Govert den Hartogh University

of Amsterdam

In the however

state prefer

of
to

nature no one person

leave

this state

because

holds authority over another. People of its inconveniences. They therefore

and

agree unanimously to decision delegate their

enter

into

a civil or political society,

by

majority

united powers

to particular officials, who

citizen.

henceforward histor
of

have the right to be ical fact, but

cal element
nate.

obeyed

by

every

How

are we

to absorb this story?

of presumed

Recent interpretation tends to

as a

accept

it,

not as a

description

theoretical justification of limited

government on

the

basis

abstract principles within the

framework

of a

hypothetical
or at

contract.

The histori

is

ornamental and

superfluous,

best

polemical and subordi

This reading is attractive, I suggest, mainly because the principal element in Locke's account which seems to require a historical interpretation, is identi
as

fied

individual consent,

and

this seems
one.

not

nor of course a

particularly convincing is fiction, it may be illuminating. In opposition to this exegetical trend I

1. That the
not principal

to play a major theoretical role, If it is history, it is bad history; if it

will argue:

historical

element

in Locke's

account

is

social

convention,

individual consent; 2. That it is of fundamental importance to Locke's concerns; 3. That it is the element which makes his theory philosophically

superior

to any

exclusively hypothetical contract theory Certainly, Locke looks at politics as

ables

of political obligation. a

field

of rational

action,
with

and

this en

him to

use

the kind

of a priori

contract theory.

But this is

supplemented

tion

of contingent

historical
of

conditions.

reasoning in an interesting way by the introduc As a political philosopher Locke is not Hume. (As
a

associated

hypothetical

so much a

follower

Hobbes

as a predecessor of

politician,

of

course, he is neither.)

But for the time

and

the facilities
and

made available at

the Netherlands

Institute For Advanced have been

writ

Study

in the Humanities

Social Sciences Frans Jacobs

at

Wassenaar,
very
useful

this article would not

ten. The critical

comments of

were

to

me.

>

interpretation, Winter

1989-90, Vol. 17, No. 2

194
1
.

Interpretation
THE STATE OF NATURE
the state of nature? Two alternative

How

should we conceive

interpretations

present themselves.

(a) In

opposition

to

Filmer, Locke

wants

to

outline another rise

of Government,
and

another

Original of Political Power,

enterprise

and another

way of designing
1).*

know

ing
be

the persons that

a

have it (Second Treatise [hereafter II],

remain

This

seems to

historical

(cf. the terms original, first erecting,

. .

fancy
95,
to

in: II, title,

a condition

104, 105, 106, 110, 111, 162;

passim).

beginning, in till, 11,15, are left,

state of nature

entring into society,

always,

So

perhaps

Locke believes the

be

everywhere and

that case it makes sense to ask

one state

which motives

necessarily preceding induced people to

this
question motives

civil society. exchange

In
the

for the

other.

But the

answer to
all

does

not seem

to

have
And

any
why

normative consequences.

Not

actual

are good reasons.

whatever

the explanation

for the introduction

of government

by

our

ancestors,
con

should we

feel bound

by

it? If this is Locke's intention, he clearly

with a genetical one.

fuses He

a question of

justification

(b) On

the other hand Locke

might

only
the
us

wish

to conduct a thought experiment.

sets

himself the task to laws

and authority.

justify
So let

existence of political a moment

society,

with

its

binding

imagine for

that law and au

thority do
they

not exist.

What

reasons could people

have

under such

hypothetical

circumstances to re-introduce them?

might

If

we could

think of any decisive reasons,

argument scheme of

suffice

as

justification. This is the basic If

people were rational and

hypothetical
cumstances,

contract theory:

in

such-and-such cir

they

would choose or agree

to certain rules; therefore, people actu

ally

living

under

those rules ought to obey them. If people objected against

advantage and

them, this would show that they want to exploit to their ences between the actual and the hypothetical situation,
situation

the differ

the hypothetical

precisely in order to identify such morally suspect biases. (Kavka 1986, 22, 398ff; cf. Grice 1967, 95ff; Rawls 1971, 12f, 18f; Richards 1971, 79-91; Harsanyi 1976, 4, 14, 38; Brandt 1979, ch. x, xi; Scanlon 1982; is
construed

Habermas 1983; Jacobs 1985, 246; Gauthier 1986, ch. viii.) By putting people into such conditions, albeit hypothetically, two things are done at the same time. We are assuming a situation of choice. In the first place then,
think
we of are

describing
is

one of the

alternatives, and asking

whether we can

any

superior ones.

The

alternative

described is the

condition of anar

chy,

and what we need

a realistic assessment of we are

its

advantages and

disadvan
the

tages. But in the second place

choice.

For

what

Locke

wants to

stating know is whether there is in

which criteria should govern

a moral

justification

for government's
thetical

claims to authority.

He has therefore to describe his hypo

which all moral obligations

state of nature as a condition

hold

which

*In this article, passages in italic

are

from

works of

John Locke

and of

David Hume.

Made
do
not

by

Contrivance

and

the

Consent of Men

195

depend for their validity

the state
of nature

on the existence of the state.

This is done in II,

4, in

which

is described in terms
in Dunn's

of

the rights, obligations

and powers which are valid

in it.
account

It is the fundamental

mistake

(Dunn
only.

identify

the state

of nature with a

this "jural
concept:

condition"

It then

1969, 101 ff), follows,

to
of

course, that it is

trans-historical

"no

portion of social even

history
.

could

serve as normative criterion

for any

other"

(103). But

the expression the

inconveniences of the state of nature What Locke on this interpretation

of

would
wishes

then make no sense at all

to do

with

the concept

of

the state
political

nature,

is to

present an order of

justification. The task is to

justify

society against the alternatives, on the basis of some more fundamental values. How should the choice be made between those interpretations? It cannot be denied that Locke's
examples
exposition

has

historical

aspect. and

He

presents

us

with

from the bible, from historical

cf.

ancient

history,
to

from

travellers'

tales
all the

to

his
was

mind

sources of equal

value, for In the

prove

beginning

World

America (11,49,

108)

in
of

order

the existence of situations

corresponding to his description

civil government
practice

the state of nature and of the institution of

by

mutual consent
. . .

(II, 14,102-104, 115). This has been

asks

the

of

the

World

(II, 116). He

himself the

question

why the
conspicu

distant

past should

bind

people

in the present,

and gives what

looks

ously like a historical answer: because each of them, at one moment or another, has himself consented to the existing arrangements. And he formulates (I, 83,

94)

a criterion of

"apostolic
ruler

succession"

for legitimacy:
way.

legitimate
of

ruler

has to

succeed a

legitimate

in

legitimate

Such

theory

lawful transfer

obviously has to be supplemented by a theory of lawful acquisition. But on the other hand, in 11,103 he interrupts a historical argument to distin
guish explicitly between a question of justification and one of origin: at best an Argument from what has been, to what should of right be, has no great force
.

And this insistence

. .

on

the

gap between is

and ought

is

not exceptional.

(II, 180:

the practice of the strong and powerful,

how

universal soever

it may be, is

seldom the rule

of Right,
their

179, 184, 186; First Treatise

Robert says, that Anciently, it
. . .

[hereafter

I], 106, 57,

for Men to

58, 59: Be it
sell and greater

then as sir

was usual

Add to it, if you please, for this is still their tables to fat and eat them: If this them for begat Power, they the same Argument, justifie Adultery, proves a right to do so, we may, by Incest and Sodomy At the same time he treats the historical issues he

Castrate

Children

that

.)

addresses

with

notorious of nature

casualness.

On the

question

of when the transition

remarks

from the

state

to

civil

society took place, he

that it

was

before remembrance, the state of nature being such an ill condition that men though that fact quickly driven to society (11,127, cf. 74,101,105, 1,145). As is asked when when he proof! And of burden the from could discharge him
are

exactly

you and

gave our consent

to the existing regime, his

answer seems so.

to

amount to the contention that we could

hardly

ever

fail to do

196

Interpretation
not accidental, or so recent

This is

interpretation

contends.

For the

alleged starts

historical facts have

no real weight at all

to bear in the

argument.

Locke

describing have for leaving

and not of

the state of nature in order to pay attention to the reasons men would that state and entering

into

civil society.

It is to those reasons,

to any actual

historical agreement, that he appeals for

his delimitation
to

the tasks of

government.

Historical evidence, scantily given, is strictly irrel

evant:

there is only one possible contract rational people could agree

to,

remedy the inconveniences of the state of nature. So, if the government is acting within the bounds of that agreement, it is lawful, and its citizens have to

obey it,
seems no

whether

the

agreement

was

to decide the matter, when Locke

actually made or not. Hence, and this discusses the right to resistance, he at
of consent.

time allows it to

depend

on

the maintaining or retracting

acquit not

Only

if

government

does

not

ity. If
appeal

people

resist,

properly they do
. . .

its job, is it divested of its author automatically have right on their side: they
of

itself

to

Heaven,
his
. .

and

he

that appeals to

Heaven,
the

must

be
and

sure

he has

Right

on
.

side; and a Right too that

is

worth

Trouble

Cost of the

Appeal in the

(II, 176,

cf.

wrong.

On the

21, 168, 241-242). Otherwise Heaven may put them other hand, if they slavishly continue to consent to a
government
ceases

despotical government, this goes no way to rendering that mate. The critical point is reached, not when government
consent of

legiti

to win the

its subjects, but

when

it

ceases

to earn it. then neither is the state of

But if
nature a

consent and contract are

only hypothetical,

be in, 100) is

historical condition; it is nothing more than the condition people would timelessly, if no Government existed. Significant (von Leyden 1982,
the present time
. . .

in II, 4 (what State

punish

all

Men

are

naturally in), 9
the

(every

Man hath

Power to

Offences). The
as

concept of

state of nature

and not as Members of Society (II, Dunn 1969, ch. ix; Rawls 1971, ff; 53-57; ch. 112; Steinberg 1978, 3; Parry 1978, 18-19; Pateman 1979, ch. 4; Book man 1984.)

summarizes what

belongs

to

Men,

Men,

14). (Pitkin 1972,

Seliger 1968, 82

It is

undeniable

that Locke relies

reasons

heavily

on a rational reconstruction of the

"agreement"

from the

answer the question what

have for making it. But this does not it is that he intends to reconstruct: an actual (conjec
people

tural)
on

or a

hypothetical

agreement.

The if it

second answer cannot were about

be the

complete

truth about Locke's this

intentions,

even

his

achievement.

For once,

interpretation Locke
as

tion without

131. But

simply define the state of nature as a condi authority, as indeed he seems to do in II, 19, 87, 89-91, 125, a matter of fact this is a proposition he wants not so much to
could

assume as to prove.

For it is the

point of

issue between him

and

Filmer. This

argument makes no sense at all

if it does

not concern a matter of

fact.

Locke's fundamental

conception of the original condition of mankind

one.

is, like

Filmer's,

theological

It is the

condition of man within the order of the

Made

by

Contrivance

and

the

Consent of Men
him with,
and

197

Creation, having
under

at

his disposal the faculties God God imposed

all

equipped

being
the

the commands

on

him. What is
manifest

controversial

is

whether

Lord If

and

Master of them

has

by

any

Declaration of his Will

set one

above another we

(II, 4).

take this theological conception as

no

basic,

the historical and the theo

retical

interpretation
a

longer

exclude each other.

The

state of nature on

the

one

hand is

trans-historical

reality: all men

sharing the same calling

nature and sub

ject to the ally

with

same

divine laws. That

reasons

nature and that

provide

them gener

decisive

for subjecting themselves to

purposes"

political authority.

This

essential part of

the argument

contains no genetic aspect:

beings in the teleology of divine is supposed to be a divine activity

with a

it simply "sets human (Dunn 1969, 103). But the Creation beginning; so immediately after hav
people

ing

been

created

(but

not

necessarily only then)

really lived in

a state of

nature.

God did not,

by

explicit

legislation,

give

any

of

them authority over all

proved on

the others (not even Adam over Eve!

and rational grounds against

I, 47). This has been

under

biblical
the

Filmer. But

nowadays most of

them

most of

time

don't live in

natural

freedom but

legitimate

authority.

Ergo this has

a position a

been instituted

at one time or another.

state

Locke believes he is in society

to

postulate the transition of the

of nature to civil

as

historical
rather

phenomenon,

not so much on

the strength of the historical evidence, but

by

theological argument a priori.

ch.

In II,

vii, he develops his definition types

of

of political

society,

as

distinguished into

from
law

other

society,

and concludes

(87)

that it can only come

existence

by individuals
In
ch. viii

of nature.

resigning their natural power of the execution of the he then treats this as a historical event (cf. the relation
genre

between II, 99, last sentence, and the argument of 102ff). The which Dugald Stewart called "conjectural or theoretical

is that

history"

(Aarsleff

1969, 104;
This burden
or ever

cf.

Laslett in Locke 1970, 97). why Locke can permit himself to be careless about the proof. Tis often asked as a mighty Objection, Where are,
such a

explains also of

(empirical)

were, there any Men in

State of Nature? (II,

14.) What is

played

down here, is the importance of the historical evidence, not of the historical truth. (The two are confused when it is argued that, because the terms of the original contract are fully determinable by reason, it does not matter whether it
Pitkin 1972, 57; Parry 1978, 102.) For similar reasons no evidence needs to be given for the thesis that the use of money derives from consent (II, 36, 47, 50). Locke's argument receives only additional support

is actually

made.

from the

evidence:

the

manifest footsteps

(II, 101;

the term

is

Filmer's)

which

the postulated

development has left in history.

being plain on our side, that Men are naturally free, and the Examples of History shewing, that the Governments of the World, that were begun in Peace, had their beginning laid on that foundation, and
But to conclude, Reason

198

Interpretation

were made

by

the Consent of the

People; There
has been
the
.

can

be little
or

room

for doubt,

either where

the Right

is,

or what

Opinion,

Practice of Man

kind,

first erecting of Governments (II, 104.) The First Treatise therefore accepts Filmer's use of the bible
about the reading.

as a

historical
to agree
and cf.

document, but disputes his

The

style of the argument

is

summarized

by

Locke's

remark

that

his (Filmer's)
Order

principles could not

be

made

with

that Constitution and

which

God had

settled and

in the World,

therefore must needs often clash with common

Sense

Experience^, 137',
evidence even

124,

153). Rational

argument

is decisive; the

appeal

to evidence serves only to

confirm

it. This is

not

II, 1 12: as far as we from Scripture, cannot

light
of

only a consequence of the relative lack of have any light from History). Historical data,
speak

(cf.

if taken

for themselves, they have to be interpreted in the Reason (Medick 1973, 121, with interesting references to the Essay).
no qualms about

Locke has

ing

the

patriarchal origins of political power

approving Filmer's historical speculations concern ( 74-76, 105-107): he does not

people

dispute the

alleged

data

so

much, as their interpretation. We indeed see

matter of course

subjecting themselves
without

as

to the authority of their

we

fathers
as

making any

explicit

reservations, but

have to interpret them

giving
same

their tacit consent on the conditions reason recommends.

with

Nothing

in the

evidence conflicts

this

interpretation,

and some

data

confirm

it. In the

way

observation

interpreted

by

reason shows

that the right to obedience,

cf.

created

by

procreation, is

temporary only (II, 80-81,

Laslett in Locke 1970,

not get us

93).
This insight into Locke's intentions, Few
commentators
"origins"

does,
time a

I concede,

very far.

struction of

really to be

want at

to

deny
same

that Locke

believed his

rational con

the

rational reconstruction of actual

historical fact. Pitkin only

concludes

that "the hypothetical consent imputed to

hypothetical, timeless, abstract, rational men", is the only relevant one (Pitkin 1972, 57). Parry accepts Locke's narrative as "conjectural history", but sees the
conjecture as a reminder of what might
ment

be

logically
the

possible without govern of conjectural

(Parry 1978, 57). Even Dunn,

analytical

who rejects of

idea

history

and

insists that the

function

the concept of the state of nature lies

precisely in its a-historicity (Dunn 1969, 103, 11 If), accepts that it can have instances and that this is important for Locke because it eliminates most of Filmer's
argumentation

1. That Locke's

confidence

(Dunn 1971, note 13). What these authors contend is: in his reconstruction of history is as vulnerable as do
all the

its

theological

foundations;
theoretical
work

2. That the
historical

rational construction can

Locke

wants

his

reconstruction

to

do;
rational construction

3. That
of

as a matter of
work.

fact Locke himself lets the

of course accept

do

most

the

(One may

and

2, but

reject

3,

cf.

Benn &

Peters 1959,

319, 326ff; Plamenatz 1963, 209 ff.)

position

This then is the

to be scrutinized.

Made

by

Contrivance

and

the

Consent of Men

1 99

2. THE IDYLLIC AND THE GRIM INTERPRETATION

Locke has
scriptions of

often

been
of

accused of

the state

nature,

an

commuting between two incompatible de idyllic and a grim one. Tracing their rela

tionship

we can

find

one

Life in the

state of

way in which history is relevant to his concerns. nature has so many disadvantages that Government is
Men that live
together

hardly
Locke

to

be

avoided amongst

(II, 105). Describing

them

Hobbes (II, 20-21, 123): festering feuds. But if natural men cannot help drifting into a state of enmity, misery and destruc tion when there is no coercive power to restrain them, what sense does it make
sometimes seems

to

echo

to appeal to their moral and social sentiments, to trust and trustfulness, for

requiring conformity to the law from citizens and from relations between people did not antedate the institution society self. Political
could not survive obligation

governors? of

If

moral

government, civil

the dissolution

of government without

dissolving

it

(or

at

least its

having

depend

on

the existence of a coercive

we could

power.

any motivating impact) (And in that case, as Locke

would

sees

very clearly,

have

no reason either

to trust the coercive power,

II,

13, 93, 137.) Therefore it is essential for Locke to emphasize the difference between the state of nature and the state of war (II, 19). He couldn't allow the
Law
of

Nature to be

dead letter in the

state of nature.

But if

natural man on

hand really resides in a tranquil and law-abiding community in which everybody is equally free, why will he part with his Freedom? Why will he give up This Empire, and subject himself to the Dominion and Controul of any other
the other

Power? (II, 123) Why indeed? It seems that Locke has to rely on contradictory images of the state of nature in different stages of his argument. The
semblance of a contradiction

however disappears

as soon as we make

the necessary distinction between the two logical

state of nature.

roles of

the concept of the

In the first

place and

it denotes the

normative context

between

political

which people

authority have the law

its alternatives;
to
govern

as such

it is the

for choosing condition in

In the

of nature

them and nothing more

second place

it

refers to the condition we,

as a matter of sober empirical

fact,

may
to

expect

to obtain in the

absence of political authority.

The

relevant question

ask about

this condition is in how far the law of nature in it is not only valid

but fulfilled.
only sketch the possibilities. They form a continuum. At find the ideal community, in which no disagreements exist concerning the interpretation of the law of nature, and everyone is always will ing to conform to it. So it is easy to choose between this state of anarchy and political society: there is nothing to commend the latter. If everyone used his In
advance we can one extreme we rational power optimally,

duct,

in gaining insight this ideal community could be realized.

decide human beings

as well as

in governing his

con

(Assuming

the law of nature to be

one of

clear enough to

all possible controversies.)

This is therefore

the

conditions within reach of

living

together without government.

200

Interpretation
what

And this, I submit, is

the
state of nature and

Locke is trying to say when he states, II, 19, that the state of war are as far distant, as a State of Peace,

Good Will, Mutual assistance, and Preservation, and a State of Enmity, Mal ice, Violence and mutual Destruction are one from another: He cannot mean
that the state of nature necessarily is a state of peace and not of war,

for he
. .

denies this

immediately

afterwards
. .

(II, 21: To

one great reason

of Mens

quitting the

that the state of nature is possibly a state

avoid this State of War is State of Nature.) So he must mean of peace. (Ashcraft 1968, 903-908,

Colman 1983, 182f. It is misleading to meaning two different

state

of

the concept of the state of

meanings

nature: state

identify the ideal realization Steinberg 1978, 59; or as

of nature, II, of nature,
state

as

the

one of

properly the

of nature, II, 87, vs. the ordinary 1969, 10 If; Medick 1973, 106f.)

19; or II, 97

the perfect
,

Aarsleff

On the

other end of might

the continuum

it is

between it
state.

be

a condition which

possibly a state of war. And in is in danger of degenerating into such a

also

By letting
to

people

deliberate

"in"

a state of

nature,

whether

to remain in

it

or

leave it for

political

roles of the concept.

society (e.g. II, 89), Locke combines the two logical Political theory therewith becomes, as it should, a moral Under ideal
conditions

theory for
performed

a non-ideal world.

the law

of nature would
were

be

universally in
should

a state of peaceful anarchy.

And

it not for the

corruption,

and vitiousness

sity that

Men

no neces of degenerate Men, there would be separate from this great and natural Community, and by
...

positive agreements combine

into

smaller and

divided

associations

(II,

128).'

pretation,

less than perfect conformity and biased inter is the alternative to be preferred. It promises (but does society not guarantee) a higher level of fulfilment of the law of nature. Political authority is possible, because people have the faculty of reason; it
Under the
non-ideal conditions of civil

is

needed

because they do

not always exercise

the law of nature seriously,

they

would

be

unable to

it. If they were unable to take honour the moral reasons

of

for the

acceptance

and, if necessary, for the rejecting

on

Locke 1970, 108ff,

case
no problems would

Locke's "doctrine

of natural political virtue").

authority (cf Laslett in In that

.

authority could not exist, coercion only. If, on the other hand, people had in living in accordance with the canons of the law of nature, they have
no need of

authority (nor
extremes.

of coercion either).

It is therefore

essen

tial to
where

Locke's
We

enterprise

and not unplausible

to assume them to be some

between those two

Our

state

here in

this world

is

a state

of

mediocrity.

are not capable

gether without

Nature, and to act in accordance it (II, 6, 12, 58, 61, 63). These capacities however have to be exercized actively; true knowledge is not something which is given to man, it has to be achieved. He can know the theological ordering of nature from observation, he
of
with

Men

as men are able

it (journal entry to know the Law

living together exactly by a rule, 20/3/1678, quoted by Ashcraft 1968,

of

nor alto

907).

Made
can conclude

by

Contrivance

and the

Consent of Men

201

that it must have been constructed by an omnipotent and wise he Maker, may surmise the ends of the Creator from his workmanship. Know ing himself to be a rational and free being, he may then conceive of himself as
a servant required to serve the ends of serves

his Master,
mean

while

the rest of nature

those ends of necessity. This doesn't

are caused

his
to

actions are without cause.

Normally they

by

present uneasiness

pursue some absent

good,

but the knowledge It

of some superior

happiness may

suffice

to

suspend

the

im

mediate prosecution of xxi). allows reason again:

desire. This

power of suspension

is his fact

liberty (Essay II,

to be

to govern

conduct

by

unbiased

judgment.
people tend

But
moved of

this is only
and

a capacity.

As

a matter of

by

passion,

to sacrifice their longterm

advantage

to the satisfaction

their strongest desires.

They

do

not assent

to the judgment with the greatest

probability, but

stick to the

party that

education or

interest has

engaged

them in
partic

(I, 58, II, 13, 124-125,

136). And these

shortcomings show

themselves

ularly in the execution of the law of nature. They tend to see other people's transgressions, but not their own; they may be expected to impose greater pun ishment on others than on themselves; they often attempt to fly from justice (II,

124-126.) From

these tendencies quarrels may arise and

develop

into feuds,
on

from whence, in the state of nature, a state of war may originate. Whether it will, and on what scale, does however not so much depend
the nature
of

man, as on contingent historical circumstances. (Seliger

1968, 83f,
Locke
man".

90f, 261,

avoids

introducing

historical

elements at

this point

by letting

consider the probable performance of

the law

of nature

by

the "normal

Ashcraft 1968 first demonstrated clearly the developments, cf. Medick 1973, 126ff, and
reports of

relevance of presumed cf.

historical
use of

Batz 1974 for Locke's

America,

esp.

Acosta's.)
people meet each other absence of

It is

not

impossible that is

in

a state of nature and

not

enjoy

some social

intercourse. The
of nature

authority does
Locke's

that the law

prove

not

honored

at all.

appeal

imply automatically to empirical data to

cf.

this point

(II, 14:
and

the relation between

sovereign

states,

145,

183of

184;

the

Swiss

the Indian in the

woods of

America;

the two

seamen

Garcilasso de la Vega,
some years together

who after shipwreck came ashore

together,

and

lived for

reasonably well, though sometimes parting for a time in disagreement, cf. Ashcraft 1968, 907) is entirely legitimate. The historical evidence, according to Locke, makes it possible to detect a universal developmental pattern in human history. The first stage is charac
terised

by

the

following

conditions:

few people, Men in danger

ness of the

of

plenty of natural provisions, much land and becoming lost in what was then the vast wilder
uncultivated

Earth,

most of

the land an

waste, no permanent set

or

tling,

people wandering with their flocks and their

herds,

dwelling

in forests
servants

gathering

and

hunting,

most of

them

living
small

in

extended

families (with

and perhaps with slaves),

directing

their economic activities almost exclusively properties, no fixed property on the

to the fulfilment

of their own

needs,

202
land

Interpretation
at

all, poverty

(I, 85-86, 136, II, 30-32, 35-38, 44-45, 51, 74-76,

equality of a simple poor way inhabitants little matter for covetousness
of

105-

111, 162).
In this little
golden age of virtue, the
wretched

living

gave

the needy and

and

and

ambition,
and

room

for

quarrels and contentions.

As there

were

few trespasses

few offenders, they were in no need of a multiplicity of laws or of officers. What little government was found necessary, was mainly provided by the patri
archal

heads

of

families,

accepted as

leaders

by

their adult sons (and servants?)

more or of

less

spontaneously.
was a

Family
was

and commonwealth coincided.

The settling
to have
no

internal disputes

less important task

of government than the provision

of external

defence. Hence it

also possible

for the

societies

kings but only captains: elected war-chiefs, chosen for their military prowess to for the duration of a campaign. In fact most early kingdoms show a
"govern"

mixture of

the

hereditary

and

the elective principle. (I.

118, 135, 158, II, 31, technology develops 11-12), cities are built,

36, 51, 74-76, 102,105-111, 162.)

In the
second stage population and production
and

multiply, xii,

(Invention

Arts, II, 44,

making
not

cf.

101;

cf.

Essay IV,

literacy begins,
development is
money.

possible

both

records and

historical knowledge. The

generated, but strongly trade is

others

accelerated

by

the

invention kind

of

The

scope of

thereby
for their

enlarged;

people

begin to

use materials

already omy

processed

by

productive

activities,

and this

of

cooperation
makes

greatly increases the productivity of labour. The subsistence-econ place for a market-economy. During this process there is an awak
and crav

ening of the desire to have more than one needs, evil concupiscence, ing for imaginary values like money and treasures. All this creates an
of

inequality
well

properties,

which enlarges

the temptations to break the law of nature, as

as the scope of
priation are no monwealths

controversy and dispute. As the original limitations on appro longer effective, land rapidly becomes scarce. Externally com define their boundaries by consent, internally they settle property
government

disputes

by

laws. Stronger

is

needed

to accomplish these things, rulers, tempted

but this in its turn

to follow personal

makes ample room

for the

vain ambition of

instead

of communal

interests. (II, 36-38, 45-51, 101, 107,

developments. He his
makes

111, 175, 184.)

It is
not quite clear

how Locke

evaluates these

free

use of adverse

judgments from
utmost,
not

the conventional stoic repertory; on the other

man

hand he is
the

certain

that God commands

to

use

mental

and physical

capacities to the

knowledge
life. (So

of men

had

not yet

only for survival but also for convenience. When found ways to shorten our labour, we had to

spend all our

able

waking hours in making a scanty provision for a poor and miser much for the golden age.) The world is given to the rational and

not to the poor and virtuous. The expanding outcome of productive labour is clearly appreciated (Ashcraft 1986, 266-280). But Locke does not oversee its by-products: avarice, ambition and and conflict, luxury,

industrious,

inequality

Made
abuse of power. progress

by
of

Contrivance

and the

Consent of Men

203

So Locke's Locke's

view of

history

appears

to be subtle and
a

complex:

takes its toll in loss

innocence (cf. I, 58). It is

blessing, but

not

an unmixed one.

appreciation recalls

The Embarrassment of Riches

stage.

Simon Schama in his

recent

According

to

Ashcraft

political

book finds in Dutch 17th century culture. society begins only with the second

(Ashcraft 1968, 912ff, cf, Medick 1973, 86f; Pateman 1979, 65; Beitz 1980, 498;

132; Batz 1974, 669; Anglim 1978, Tully 1980, 150f. According to Las
be
reckoned either

lett in Locke 1970, 106, the

state of nature or
provides

patriarchal stage cannot

to the

to civil society.) But already in the

first

stage government

the required "appeal on earth", and this implies (almost

that the state of nature

ment

is left. And Locke does

not

only talk

by definition) freely of govern

on

in the first stage, but

also of commonwealth and civil

society (II, 162; 74

quotation

Hooker;

and cf. the quotation

from the Third Letter

Toleration,

Laslett in Locke 1970, 358). It is true that he describes the development of property relations up to the invention of money as being (logically) independent
of political organization.

(Some

conclude

that civil
meant

society is
restore

created

to protect

inequality

of possession; others that

not warranted

it is

to

equality.) But the

inference is

that this development took place in a pre-political

not

state of nature:

it does certainly increase, but

necessarily

create

the need

for
of

government. absolute

Ashcraft

argues that primitive patriarchal government

is

form

monarchy,

and as such continues the state of nature.

states that patriarchal government craft

is based

on consent

As Locke clearly (II, 105-106, 112), Ash

on patriarchal power

has to

contend not

that Locke founds

even absolute government on consent position

(which does

legitimize it). But Locke's form

of political

is

that, precisely itly, limited.

So
the
civil

as a

authority, it is necessarily, if only implic

society has been present, at least somewhere and intermittently in first stage; but it becomes inevitable in the second. And the need is felt for

more complex arrangements of and executive powers.

legislation,

execution, and control of legislative

In

so

far

government

is the

product of

history.

3. THE ASSESSMENT OF LEGITIMACY

How

should we

decide

whether or not government acts within

its

powers:

by

appealing
or

to

natural

law,

or to

the

conditions of we

History? In the Second Treatise legitimate

consulting Reason, find three different kinds of constraints

consent,

by

on the

action of government.

(a) Nobody
take away

can give more power than own

he has himself,

and

he

that cannot
cf.

his

life

cannot give another power over

it (II, 23,

24, 135,
hu life

149,
man

168,172). The fundamental

duty

of

the Law of Nature to

is to

preserve

life (II, 6, 159). Everyone has a preserving it (II, 172, I, 42). But no

right one

life,

and to the

essential means of

has

a right to take

away his

own

204
when

Interpretation
he
pleases

his life to

away right to take away the life of another, so neither can anyone possibly transfer that right (II, 135, 179: the People having given to their Governours no Power to do an unjust
another.

(II, 6-7). Therefore he

And
of

cannot

transfer the right to take

a

course,

no one

originally has

thing,

such as
.

is to
.

make an unjust

themselves)

But

up to the mouth of a perish. How did he acquire that The right to life
serve what
mons

War, (for they never had such a Power in II, 139: a Serjeant may command a Souldier to march Cannon, or stand in a Breach, where he is almost sure to
cf. power?).

cannot

be

alienated:

they

will always

have

a right

to pre

some

they have not a Power to part with (II, 149). (According to Sim 1983 Locke does not recognize any inalienable rights, but only says that rights we cannot resign or transfer, because we don't have them. This is

true of a person's right to dispose of his

can the right to personal

life, but

not of

his right to

life.) Nor

liberty be alienated, for the life of a slave is within the absolute, arbitrary power of his master. We have no such control over our own life, and therefore we cannot give it away. So the only way one can lose the by some grave offence to the law of nature which makes one a noxious beast deserving to be destroyed (II, 23-24, 85, 172, 178ff If we cannot give to others the right to dispose of our life, personal liberty or bodily integrity, we cannot give it to civil society either. Hence civil society
right

is

by forfeiting

it

).:

cannot

delegate

such

right to the

government

it institutes. (So

Ashcraft'

suggestion that even absolute government

is based

on consent cannot

be true.)
ultra

Therefore any
vires.

government which claims

to have it

is necessarily acting

It

goes without

ing

to this criterion,

matter of natural

saying that whether or not a government is legitimate accord has nothing at all to do with consent. It is exclusively a law.

(b) Some
of course.

possible, but irrational.

is to say necessarily void. Others are for instance, are alienable as a matter Property rights, Locke therefore could not say that as they incorporate themselves
contracts are

impossible,

that

into

civil

Certainly they
have done

society it is impossible that people should give up their property. could. The only question is why should we suppose them to
so?

The terms
we

of

the

original

compact,

of which

we

have little had

of

documentary

evidence,

have to

reconstruct

from the

reasons people

entering into it. In doing so no rational Creature can be

to

we should use as a principle of supposed to change

interpretation that
intention

his

condition with an

be

worse

(II, 131,

political

authority;

(Tuck 1979, 80f), which was already fundamental to Grotius. According to Tuck (172f) Locke discovered that he could dispense with the principle because he could rely on the first kind
of of constraints exclusively.

up their natural This is the "principle

163, 164, 168). In this way we find new limits of they follow from the reasons we ascribe to people for giving power to government (II, 90, 137, 149, 171, 179).
cf.

interpretative

charity"

The

paragraphs quoted make clear that

Locke

retains

it.

Made
It is
posed

by

Contrivance

and

the

Consent of Men

205

not an egoistic

principle; it does

to change his condition to be exploited,

not

everybody can only be sup for the best. It implies that people want to be
not say:

sure not

that

they try, if
"Worse"

possible, to exploit

others.

So it

rules out unilateral

sacrifice, but

prescribes

accepting

a compromise

in bargain

ing
of

over

the surplus of cooperation.

is

appraised
and

by

the

moral measure

Natural

Law, prescribing
an

the preservation of Self

of Mankind.

this

foundation

agreement

is

possible which protects

everybody's

Only on "prop

erty".

Sometimes Locke

even

appeals to this principle

says

in

discussing

inalienable
that
people

rights. Against absolutism, he regularly

cannot give

in the

same section:

away

a power of absolute control over their own and

lives, because
should

they don't have it,

not

that

it

would

be foolish to do

so and

therefore

(11,137, 149, 168, 171-172). As if when Men quitting the State of Nature entered into Society, they agreed that all of them but one, should be under the restraint of Laws, but that he should retain all the Liberty of the State of Nature, increased with Power, and made licen
be
supposed

to have been done

tious

by Impunity.

This is

to think that

Men

are so foolish that

they

take care to

avoid what

Mischiefs may be done them by Pole-Cats, or Foxes, but are con tent, nay think it Safety, to be devoured by Lions (II, 93, cf. 13, 137; obviously against Hobbes and recalling the arguments used by Shaftesbury c.s. in the
about

discussion 377f).
But the
property:

Danby's Test Bill in 1675, Ashcraft 1986, 116;

Haley 1968,

most

important
enter

use of

the principle concerns the alienable right of

For the

preservation

of

Property being
they

the end of

Government,
to

and

that for which

Men

into Society, it necessarily

without which

supposes and requires the

People

should

have Property,

must

be

suppos'd

lose

that

entring into Society, which was the end for which they entered into it, too gross an absurdity for any Man to own (II, 138, cf. 222). In the same way Locke argues in the Epistola that when the law concerns

by

things, like
of the political
sion

the exercise of religious

who

faith,

which

do

not

magistrate, those
was

disagree

are not obliged

belong to the by that law,

province

because
posses

instituted only to preserve for each private man his society of the things of this life, and for no other purpose (Ed. Klibansky,
.

p.

129,

cf.

85. What if the Locke

magistrate

good?

answers:

sincerely believes his actions to be in the public The private judgment of the magistrate does not give
interpretation does only decide
which rights people state

him any new right.) Locke's principle

of

not

reserve, but also which ones they give up. Whosoever therefore out of a Nature unite into a Community, must be understood to give up all the
.

of

power,

(II, 99, cf. II, 83). necessary to the ends for which they unite into Society and But (t)he great and chief end of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, is the Preservation of their Property To putting themselves under Government, are there Nature many things wanting. (II, 127, cf. I, 93 in the state
. . .

which

of

etc.) So Locke

proceeds

to describe the defects of the

realization of

the Law

of

206

Interpretation
state of nature.

Nature in the
that

All

of these

derive from

a single source:

the

fact
is

in

the state of nature the power of the execution of the

law

of nature

given to
suppose

every

man.

It is

therefore

this,

and

that people resign when

they

unite

only this power, which we should into one political community (II,

87-90, 127, 136, 171). In

mum role of

this way not only the maximum,

but

also

the

mini

lawful

government

is derived from the

conflicting rights,

principle of

interpretation.3

The

essential

task and power of government

about

is judiciary: to decide
and to see

authori
en

tatively any controversy

forced. The transference
exercise of natural
not

its decision

of this power has, it is true, some consequences for the rights (II, 135: the Obligations of the Law of Nature, cease cf. 129, 130). in Society, but only in many cases are drawn closer
.

Natural

liberty

was always

limited

by

natural

duties, but

government now

has

the power to delineate those limits authoritatively. That the rights are

limited,

however, does not mean that they no longer exist; by law, does not mean that the rights themselves
government can tell us
what our

that the limits are specified

are

legal rights

only.

Only

rights are, but this does not mean that exactly it creates them (cf. II, 83). When the Legislative acts as Umpire (II, 87, 212, 227), its judgment is final, but not therefore infallible (Hart 1963, 138ff). God
is the only judge whose final judgment at the same time is a criterion of right. On entering civil society people should accept that the Majority have a Right
to act and conclude the

Rest

(II, 95,

cf.

96-99). For

forming

a political com

munity by compact means agreeing to a uniform decision-procedure: For the Essence and Union of the Society consisting in having one Will, the Legislative,
when once established

by

the

Majority, has
as the
of

the

declaring,

and as

it

were

keep
which

of that Will (II, 212). As long possibly it does only in the one act

ing

community acts as a whole, giving in trust the legislative and

execu

tive

the community, it may act on a rule of procedure explicitly agreed upon. But if it does not make an explicit decision, it must be understood (by the principle of interpretation) to have opted for the majoritarian rule. Ap
powers of

parently Locke
are

sees this

rule, to

use

the

language

of game

theory,

as a salient

coordination equilibrium.

(But his

arguments

for the

rule and against

unanimity

highly defective.)
protection of natural rights
also

The

is

not

the only end of political society Locke

recognizes; it is
ration

the expression

of shared political

(I,

144-146, II, 128,

contrast

destiny, of national aspi 115; Seliger 1969). Therefore the deliv

ery of the people into the subjection of a foreign power (the pope, for instance) is a forfeiture of trust which at once makes the government illegitimate. For the
end

why People
are given

entered

into Society,

independent Society,

to

be

governed

being to be preserved one intire, free, by its own Laws; this is lost, whenever
Locke's
end,
political the

they
ory.

up into the Power of another (II, 217).

the central core of
the
given with trust

This form
For
all

of argument represents

Power

for

attaining

an

being

limited

by

Made
that end, whenever that end

by

Contrivance

and the

Consent of Men

207

is manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must be and the Power devolve into the hands of those that forfeited, necessarily gave it (II, 147, cf. 161, 171, 199, 206, 222, 239, and the passage of 1667
. .

quoted

by

ing
will

the extent of political

Laslett in Locke 1970, 360, note). The whole enterprise of determin authority in this way assumes that the actual compact
rational one.

be the

Reason
as

requires us

to

retain as much of

the

positive

aspects of

the state of nature

possible, but to give up as

aspects.

much of them as

is

necessary to correct the negative

demands it; it But

principle of

also exists

Civil society in the forms reason demands.

We
are
not

exists

because

reason

reason alone

is

not enough.

bound to the terms Locke's

interpretation generates, because they are the pre-eminently reason able ones, but because they have been actually agreed upon. The principle of interpretation only makes it possible to reconstruct this actual agreement from for entering into it. This
rather with the task
at

the reasons
wants

least is

what

Locke

pretends

to do. He

to compare the performance of government not

tioning, but
whether the

it has actually been

ways of

given.

only with its ideal func It remains to be seen

difference between those two

putting it has any theoretical

importance. has (c) The great Question which in all Ages has disturbed Mankind, been, Not whether there be Power in the World, nor whence it came, but who should have it (I, 106, cf. 81, 94, 122; II, 198). This question cannot be an
. .

swered either

by

original compact: given

appealing to natural law, or it is a "pure coordination

by

rational reconstruction of

the

problem"

The

answer

has to be

by

a contingent

historical decision to be

made

by

the commonwealth as a

whole.

long
has
even

Once this decision is made, however arbitrarily, it cannot be altered as as the government is in being (II, 141, 157, 176, 212, 220, 242). For it

the

coordinating
"decision"

power of a precedent:

to make expectations

converge.

And

the

does

not

necessarily

consist

in

more

than the

convergence and almost

of expectations on a salient coordination equilibrium:

'twas easie,

by a tacit, and scarce avoidable consent to make way for the Father's Authority and Government (II, 75). This is not the only criterion of legitimacy derived from such historical deci
natural

for Children

sions.

In the

primitive times of patriarchal and elective government explicit

(II, 74-76,

94, 105-112, 162-166)

limitations

on
was

the exercise of
almost

political author

ity

were

rarely
this

made.

(T)he Government

all

Prerogative (162).
amongst the

(S)ome
rest,

one good and excellent

Man, having

got a

Preheminency
Vertue,
as

had

Deference

paid to

his Goodness

and

to a

kind of

Natural Authority, that the chief Rule, with Arbitration of their differences, by a tacit Consent devolved into his hands, without any other caution, but the
assurance

they had of his Uprightness

was not

and

Wisdom (94).

Yet,

this did not

mean of

that his authority

limited
existed.

at al!

(as Ashcraft 1968

suggests).

Limits

the first type necessarily

Limits

of the second type

must

have been
no

implicitly

understood

to exist

by

all concerned.

For

certain

it is that

body

208

Interpretation
intrusted
with

was ever

authority but for the

publick

Good

and

Safety

(1 10,
. . .

cf.
go

163, 166, 168). Only

about to
set

the need was not

felt to that the People

should

any Bounds to the Prerogative of those Kings or Rulers, themselves transgressed not the Bounds of the publick good (166).

who

This

happy

always most

another own

state would not persist. The Reigns of good Princes have been dangerous to the Liberties of their People (166). For Successors of Stamp (94) would come, apt to use their discretionary power in their
and not

interest,

in the interest

of

the

people.

The

people would

then

have

to struggle in order to
not to

recover their original which

Right,

and get that

to

be declared
Men found

be Prerogative,

truly

never was so

(166). In
and

such cases

it necessary to examine more carefully the Original and to find out ways to restrain the Exorbitances,
that

Rights of Government; and prevent the Abuses of

which they having intrusted in another's hands only for their own found was made use of to hurt them (111). This could be done by good, they making the bounds of lawful government explicit in the form of declared con

Power

stitutional
make sure

arrangements.

These have to be interpreted

of

by

their function: to the

that the exercise

authority

will remain within

limits

of

its

trust.

This
tion
of

process of

learning by
of reason

trial and error

fitting

Locke's
will

general

the exercise

(Medick 1973,

69-70)

concep be impelled by
population, of
and give

developments in the
production,
of

second stage of political

will

history. Growth So the

of

inequality,
to

tend to multiply conflicts of

need

rights,

much greater scope

governmental ambitions.

for

explicit consti

tutional

arrangements will

be

more

urgently felt.
are

As

constitutional

arrangements

the results of a

learning

process, it is

possible

to predict the development of some of them. If you can

solution

identify

the

problem, the

may be

more or

less

obvious.

Hence Locke

also uses a

certain amount of a priori

indicate

reasoning at this level. This should not be taken to belief that the idiosyncracies of the English constitution are universal

characteristics of all

legitimate far

political systems.

It indicates

a method of

inter

preting

actual

constitutional so
as

rules:

they have

no

authority from their

ancient

origins, but only in

they

are rational solutions

to problems people are

actually confronted with. (Cf. e.g. II, 213ff or 143.) The most obvious of the constitutional guarantees
the Rule
of

against

Law. In

some places

Locke derives this

principle
political of

arbitrary power is from the universal

end of government.

The

reason people unite

into

find they disagree important task of

about the application of government

the law

society is that they nature. Hence the most

whatever

is its legislative
the

one.

And therefore

Form the Common-wealth is under,

clared and received

Ruling

Power

ought to govern

by de

laws, not extemporary Dictates and undetermined Reso lutions (II, 137). (A) Government without Laws, is, I suppose, a Mystery in Politicks, unconceivable to humane Capacity, and inconsistent with humane

Society (II, 219,

cf.

87, 91

etc.).

But this

cannot

be timelessly true. Under the

Made
original

by

Contrivance

and the

Consent of Men

209

patriarchal
not

government
settled

function,

by having

judge to decide
tion should

controversies.

political society could perform its primary declared laws, but only by having a common The principle that all executive and judicial ac

be

authorized

by law,
rather

does

not

really derive from the primacy

experienced need

of

the arbitrating
of

function, but

from the

to

prevent abuse

ends, Tyranny begins (II, 202: if the Law arbitrating be transgressed to another's harm, it is added significantly). This is not so much a necessary truth as a lesson from history.
power.

Where-ever Law

So Locke's
Man in Civil
against the

attitude to positive

a sophisticated one.

On the
can

Society

say hand he strongly insists on the principle, No be exempted from the Laws of it (II, 94, cf. 206:
one

law is

an ambivalent, or perhaps

should

Laws

there can

be

no

Authority). But

municipal

law has its defects:

situations, and
on

it is too its

general

to do justice to the intricate detail of

unforeseen

requirements are not always as plain as

they

should

be (II, 12). Therefore

would

many Hence his fundamental doctrine

power of

occasions

insistence

on

the

letter

of

the Law

be

self-defeating. ch. xiv):

of prerogative

(II, 147, 156-158,

the

the

executive

to act where the law

power

the strict letter of the law. This

is silent, or even in deviation from may only be exercised in the public

of a

interest,

and when urgent needs prevent

the consultation of the legislative. (In a

report of

1672 Locke

stated

that the

issuing

Declaration

of

Indulgence

on

be unconstitutional, Ashcraft 1986, 11 If.) Here it appears clearly that Locke's concept of trust, with all its legal overtones, is not actually a legal one. Whether or not the government acts within the terms of its trust, cannot be decided by appeal to the letter of the law (or even of a written
royal prerogative would not

constitution.) The decisive test is

expectations of

whether

its

actions conform to

the legitimate

its

rational citizens.

For it

being
and

the

interest,

as well as
whoever

inten

tion of the
nearest to

People,
that, is

to

have

fair

and equal

Representative;

brings it

an undoubted

Friend, to,

and cannot miss the

Consent

and

Approbation of the
arrangements

Establisher of the Government, Community (II, 158).

are

If

legal,
be

or even

constitutional

counterproductive,

they

should

changed.

(The 79th

of

the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina that all

statute

which were
a

drafted

by Locke,

provided

laws

should

be

null after

century, Laslett in Locke 1970,

293.)

Locke, it is
as
such

well

known, had

no partic

ular reverence when show

for the

ancient constitution

(the

following

of Custom
will

Reason has left it, II, 157, cf. 158; I, 58). Historical its strengths as well as its weaknesses, particularly in changing
This
seems

experience

circum

stances.

to have been the

main point of

Locke's

publication of

the

Two Treatises
at

under circumstances so
conception

vastly different from the

ones

obtaining

the time of their

the

(Ashcraft

1986, 575-57, 591-593; den Hartogh

.
.

the People have a Right to act as forfeiture of their Rulers a new Form, or Supreme, and continue the Legislative in themselves, or erect good think (II, 243, last under the old form place it in new hands, as they to decide all free should feel the book). The Convention Parliament

[1]. (U)pon

sentence of

210
the

Interpretation
in dispute,
abuse.

constitutional questions

not

in

order

to return to an

ancient

form,
as

but in

order

to

eliminate

future

What happened in 1688

was

not,

the

Whigs insisted, a change of personnel, the government remaining but a dissolution of government, only political society remaining intact: intact, the ideal conditions for constitutional clarification or, if needs be, change
moderate

(which
ment).

otherwise would

only be
an

possible with offerd

the cooperation of the govern

to

(N)ow they have

that may

opportunity

finde remedy s

and set

up

constitution

be lasting. In the letter to Clarke from

recommends

which

this quota

tion comes
government

(8/2/1689) Locke admittedly

(as the Whigs thought it was,

no

doubt),

restoreing our ancient but he only does so be

to

cause

it is

the

best

that ever was.

Some

other constitutional arrangements which

Locke discusses,
of

are meant

strengthen

the preventive effects of the

requirement

the rule of law: the

separation of the

legislative in

and

the

executive

power, the investment of the

legislative

power

collective

bodies

of

men, assembling

temporarily

and re

turning
in

afterwards to the status of private men, to

with

be handled

by

the executive

accordance

the laws
are

they
the

gave

themselves

(II, 138, 143, 153-156,

not

160). Such
characterize
requirement

arrangements

product of

history, they do

necessarily
perhaps

every lawful government. II, 134 seems to that the Legislative should be an elected

stipulate as a universal

body

(but

the

phrase which the publick

had

chosen and appointed refers

to the original com

pact

only,

cf.

the

native right

in 176);

otherwise

laws

could not

have the

neces

sary

consent of

the society. Elsewhere however

(II, 132, 142) Locke

makes

it

clear that

this is only the

superior one of a number of alternative arrangements.

Such

rules are

contingent, but

they

are not accidental:

of a process of
seen as

demanded
order

learning by by reason,

trial and error. In this sense

even

they are the product they also have to be

if they

could

do. In

to use them as a test of

guarantees
of natural

necessarily the best reason legitimacy they should be interpreted

are not rights

for

what

they

are:

against the

encroachment

of

political power.

All
crete

such arrangements are the product of

"consent",

given

actually in

con

historical
of

circumstances.

They

are made

by

rational men

responding to the

demands

the situation.

4. THE MEANING OF CONSENT

So

what

does

"consent"

mean?

It is traditionally

assumed

to be the

answer

to

the question why the

question

obey apparently addressed in II, 119-122, and only there. The answer, whatever its correct interpretation, leaves no traces in Locke's account of legiti mate authority. In that context we found only references to the terms of the
original compact or agreement
act of

individual

should

the law of the state. This

is the

(II, 97, 243) underlying

civil

society,

and of the
recon-

delegation constituting

government.

These terms

could

partly be

Made
structed

by

Contrivance

and the

Consent of Men
constitutional

-211

by

the principle
as a

of

interpretation, partly found in

How
are we

history,

interpreted
The

learning

process.
which

to

conceive of

this first

contract?

main passages

in

very helpful in

determining

Locke discusses it, II, 87-89, 95-99, are not the meaning of the concept. I therefore propose to
connotations

take a more oblique approach, studying the the Treatises. with, to

of

the

concepts

of

consent, contract, compact, and agreement, as

they

appear

in

other places

in

(Other locutions: to

resign, to quit, to divest

oneself

of, to

part

give/lay up, to make/give way, to the dominion of, to incorporate, to

enter

to assent, to submit, to subject approve, to acquiesce

oneself

into;

promise, covenant, engagement,

of

in, to unite, institution.) Locke is rather fond

to
of

the figure
coupled?

hendiadys:

which are

the
use

expressions with which consent etc. are

Which

adjectives

does he

in

combination with

them? Which con

subject

cepts are given as their opposites?

How does he describe the

doing

the

consenting
viduals or

and contracting:

by

singular or plural expressions,

referring to indi
the

to

collectives?

Let

me start with one

fairly
but

typical passage. In

I, 88, Locke discusses

does
not return

question

why property,

upon

the

decease

of

the owner,

to the

common stock of mankind,

perhaps

rather

devolves

on the owner's offspring,

'twill

be

answered, that common

we see

dren. Common Practice,

that it

hath disposed of it, to the Chil indeed does so dispose of it but we cannot say,
consent

is the

common consent

actually

given: and

if

common tacit

of Mankind; for that hath Consent hath

never

been

asked, nor

establish'

d it, it

would make

but

Natural Right of Children: But where the Practice is Universal, 'tis reasonable to think the Cause is Natural. The passage shows
a positive and not of a common practice

that the existence

condition to
can no

is

necessary, but
a common

not

a sufficient

infer to

common consent.

If

we

find

practice, the cause

be

either consensual or natural. action or choice

That the

cause

is

natural

does

not mean that

human

is involved: the right

cause

of

inheritance is obviously
on the other

created

by

the

act of

begetting. That the

is consent,

hand,

does has

not

not

necessarily mean, that the right is been asked nor actually given, does
not

created

intentionally;

that

consent

settle the question of express, not

that of tacit consent. The differentia

effect

specifica seems
ordinance

to be that the

normative

tution

belongs to the action, (I, 140).

on

by. the

of God, but

by

Human Insti

In the Essays
refers

the Law of Nature (ed. von Leyden

contracts prompted

1954, 161-163) Locke

common

to "tacit contracts, i.e.

by
is

the

interests

and

conveniences of men, such as the

free

passage of

envoys,

free

trade and other

called and es

things

of

that kind". Thus the

vice

measure

of

what

everywhere

teemed virtue and

is this

approbation or

dislike,

praise or

blame,
come

which,

by

secret

[1]

and tacit

consent,

establishes

itself

in the

several

societies,

tribes, ions of

and clubs

of

men

in the world, whereby II. xxviii.10,

several actions

to

find

credit or

disgrace

amongst

them, according to the judgment,

cf.

maxims, or

fash

that place.

(Essay

I. iii. 22:

consent

of

neighbours as

212

Interpretation III. ii. 8:

common use,

common source of principles,

priates certain
sounds

by

a tacit consent, appro

to certain ideas in all

languages;

this

signification

is

perfectly arbitrary.)

So

common consent

is

a common

practice, evolving in

as a result of the contingent actions of rational men.

a convention.

It is

what

human community Hume would call

sense

Convention in this
use modern

sense

is

wider

than

in the

defined

by

Lewis 1969: it is, to

language,

a pattern of mutual expectations

assuring the possibility of of pure coordination, but This interpretation is

postulated right of

cooperation

by

mutual

adjustment,

not

also

in

all

kinds

of mixed motive games and so on).

only in games (Assurance

Game, Prisoner's Dilemma, Bargaining Game,

confirmed

in

several other places: whole no

I, 43 (from Adam's

world, authority over Persons ownership follows directly, but only by the consent of the poor Man, who preferr'd being his Subject to starving a consent Locke considers to be coerced and hence
of

the

void),

47, 94 (if
or

government

is

granted

by

Agreement

and consent

of Men, it

must also

determine the right

primogeniture),

of

succession; this cannot follow

pleads

directly

from

inheritance

113 (Filmer

for the

natural

power of

kings,

against all
and

compact), 126 (if

political power

derives from the Ordinance

of God

of the right-holder:

Divine Institution, this has to be sufficient for the identification This Paternal Regal Power, being by Divine Right only
no room

his, it leaves
else a
. .

for humane prudence,

or consent

to place it anywhere
of
.

.),

140 (If Noah did divide between his sons, the right

the heir is not

. .

and Men divine right, but only Human depending on the Will of Man and under what put Government into what form, hands, may they please.) II, 28 and 35 (common land common by compact, i.e. by the Law of the Land),

36, 46
from

and

50 (gold

and silver

derive their
political

value not

from

real

use, but from the

consent of
men

Men), 50 (outside
tacitly agreeing in

society

inequality

of possessions results

the use of money,

without

compact,

in

govern

ment the possession of

land is determined

by

positive

constitutions,
cannot

cf. rejected
without

reading, Laslett in Locke

1970, 75, 134 (positive laws

be laws

the consent of the society).

In these cases the consenting subject tends to be referred to as "Men", "Mankind", "People", "the Society"; Locke even uses the expression publick Will (II, 151, 212). In sections discussing the institution of government politi
cal obligation

is

often contrasted with

the

natural

freedom

of

the state

of nature

(e.g. II,

95, 97, 102-105, 112, 119,

(122),
not

173). The

adjective positive

is

sometimes

opposed to tacit

sometimes to natural
natural

(45, 128). Even voluntary may be

cf:

opposed,
and

to coerced, but to
points

(73,

141:

positive

voluntary Grant

Institution). All this

to the conventional
must

nature of political obliga again to the old

tion. If

Filmer's fabric falls, Governments

be left

way of

being
use

made

by

contrivance,
unite

and

the consent of Men (Antroopine

Ktisis)

making
alterna-

of their Reason to

together into

Society (I,

6).
will

Whenever

a conventional arrangement

is made, there

have been

Made
tives,
which might

by Contrivance
as good

and the

Consent of Men

-213

have been

from into

a rational point of view.

What is
connota

"chosen", is
comes

a matter of

contingent,

perhaps even
view

arbitrary fact. This

at

tion of contingent choice also

comes

several

points:

I, 94 (he
be
a

by Right of Succession, to be a Subject in another), 140, 148 (Election

nial arrangements

prince and

in

one

place, who would

and

Consent), II, 81

83 (matrimo

may be
up

differentially

specified

by

contract),

97,99, 106 (in

dividuals

might set

what

A right

given

by

"consent"

form of Government they thought fit), 192. in this sense can never be an unlimited one; it is
conditional upon some

given with some end

realization of
what

the

end.

in view, and therefore As soon as Compact

made with a
perform?

degree
. . .

of

enters,
not

Slavery

ceases

For Life?

Compact

can

be

Man that is

Master of his

own

(II. 172, cf. 24) The aspect of "contract", made visible here, is the reciprocity of rights and duties (Dunn 1969, 130). The contractual relation cannot be a completely asymmetrical one: I may only claim
What Condition
can

he

the fulfilment of

your obligations as

long

as

I fulfil

mine.

On entering

political

society

everyone
as the

is to

part with as much

of his

natural

himself,
is
not

good, prosperity, and safety of the

liberty Society shall

in providing for
require: which

only necessary,

but just;

since the other

Members of the

Society

do

the

like (II, 130; mutual consent, mutual agreement: II, 14, 47, 102, 171, cf. 78). On account of this relation between consent and reciprocity, Locke is able to infer from the very fact that a right is 43, 47, 67; II. 17, 23, 24, 82, 94).
given

by

consent that

it is limited (I, 10,

political obligation
embarrassed you give

Hume,
on when

as

is

well

known,
on

took Locke to task for

founding

contract

and

not

convention

it is asked.

Why

we are

answer

but

what would

immediately,

our obligation to allegiance.

any any circuit, have accounted for ("Of the Original Contract", Essays 11.12; cf. A
without when

directly. You find yourself bound to keep our word? Nor can

Treatise of Human Nature, III. ii. 8-9.) But Locke very sympathetically. For what Locke
ments are made

he did so, he did he

said

not read

meant when

that govern

by

contrivance, and the Consent of Men is really very close to

and allegiance as artificial virtues.

Hume's idea
tion

of

justice

On the

other

hand it

is true that Locke did

can at

"contract"

not realize

that speaking

about

in this

connec

best be

metaphor, because its

and not

obligations

derive from the

develop

from voluntary intentional acts of identi expectations, fiable individuals. (The connotation of voluntariness is present in I, 54
ment of mutual
and Will of the Begetter), 67, 131, xvi passim. But in I, 67, 131, II, ch. 173, 140, II, 50, 73, 78, 81, 102, 141, the absence of coercion as to the much to so refer not 73, 81, 141, 173, it may

(children

often

born

against the

Consent

absence of a natural convention

rather than

cause.) Hume certainly improved

to it.
passage

on

Locke

by

analysing
promise

explicitly

as a pattern of mutual expectations,

explaining

being
us

attributable

This brings
and

back to the

(II, 119-122)

about political obligation objection

individual

consent.

Locke is considering here the

that the original

214

Interpretation
citizens, because
parents cannot answer

compact cannot obligate present

bind their

off

spring (II, 73, 1 16, 118,

189). It may seem that the

to this question will

give us the one contingent

historical factor in Locke's

significance.

political

theory

which

has the

power

to deprive all others of their

For

would not

any

act

of submission

by

itself be

sufficient

to generate

political

obligation,

whatever

the antecedents of

political society?
unravel

It is

not

my intention here to

the

whole web of

the relations

between

express consent, tacit consent, full membership, the inheritance of property,

aliens.4

and the obligations of resident

position: political

will concentrate on

the most plausible

obligation, not only in patriarchal communities (II, is everywhere, usually a matter of tacit consent. Consent is a particular kind of promise. By consenting to the act of
person

75) but
another

I convey to him that I undertake an obligation, and hence he can rely on not to interfere in his action, not to attempt to undo its results, and some me, times to let him act on my authority or responsibility. My consent is tacit, if I

do something which primarily has another meaning than promising, but from which it may be inferred that I now also intend to assume an obligation. By

taking
is

a glass of wine

I may

consent

tacitly

to sharing in the payment of the

would want

bottle. It is
possible

not an act of express

consent, for nobody

to

deny

that

it

for

me

to take the wine because I

like it.

Locke

wants

to extend the range of tacit consent very widely indeed. Who

ever makes use of

facilities

created

by

the government as the agent of political

consent to the acts of

society,

by

the very act gives his tacit

that agent, and

becomes

obey his commands. This he does already by barely travell ing freely on the Highway The consequence is, as he notes, that merely staying within the territory of a government, is to be tacitly consenting to its exercise of
obliged to

authority (II, 119). The objections to this

view are obvious and well

known (for
a

a summary, see

Simmons 1979, ch. 4). There is no reason at all to ascribe to highway the intention to indicate consent. Can we freely say,
ant or artisan

traveller on the

that a poor peas

no foreign

has

free

choice to

leave his country;

when

he knows

languages
quires?

or

manners, and

lives from

day

to

day, by

the small wages

he

ac

We may as well assert that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean and perish, the moment he leaves her.

(Hume, "Of
fit
creates

the Original

Contract", Essays 11.12.)

not

obligations, it is

true that any

the

number

If enjoying a windfall bene of Men may unite into a

rest

Community, because
we concede

it injures

not

Freedom of the
of
of

that obligations go

with

the enjoyment

(II, 95). And even if benefits, why should the

enjoyment and,

obligations of a

traveller go beyond the regulation

his

from

the rules of
extend

to

all

traffic, the laws

the payment of tolls or the requirements of quarantine,

of

the country?
accept as a source of political
obli-

Yet

recent political

philosophy tends to

Made
gation

by

Contrivance
upon:

and

the Consent of Men "215

the very act Locke fastens

the use of communal

a of people

facilities. A
a

prin

ciple of

fairness is defended, stating that

erative enterprise of

the

enterprise

group coop may require contributions from all those who accept the gains (Rawls 1964, 9-11; Simmons 1979, ch. 5; Arneson 1982; is
allowed

involved in

Klosko 1987). For it

would

Nobody
a

to reserve

for himself

be

direct Contradiction, for any

and
. .

one, to enter into

free-riding position. Society with

suppose

others for the

. . .

should

securing be exempt

regulating of Property; And yet to (II, 120).

the acceptance of
required

his Land
If

It is
so,

controversial whether

benefits has to be

voluntary.

no contributions could

be

for the

production of so-called public

goods

(from the

enjoyment of which which calls

this kind of

enterprise

be excluded). Yet it is exactly nobody for cooperative action. I would therefore

can

defend these
ple of

cases

coming, in
condition

certain

conditions,

under

the reach of the princi

fairness. One

is that

all exit-options which are not excluded

by

the

nature of

the public good should the acceptance of

cient

to

make

be left open, whether or not that is suffi benefits really "voluntary". (E.g.: emigrating.)
aspect of

This

condition

I take to be
and

an

integral

Locke's
and

notion of

tacit consent.

So

living

quietly,

enjoying Priviledges

the laws of a country requires obedience

Protection (II, 122) under to those laws as a quid pro quo.

According
may
obedience another's

to a

journal entry (15/7/1678)

services,
and

even

illegitimate

political authorities

provide real

then their subjects owe them some duties of

in

return.

You

cannot excuse yourself

from taking the benefits of

to their
production.

Pains (II,

34) by saying
same point

that you did

not consent

Locke is making the

in saying that

after all you

have "consented",

could argue, reasonably, that this is a confusing way of patting it (cf. Simmons 1979, 89-95). For it suggests that the obligation you assume does derive from a principle, not of fairness but of promise-keeping. Let it be con ceded acts

tacitly, One

by

accepting the benefits.

that

one can

be bound to
should

obedience

to civil authority only

by

one's own

(II, 95, 119), why

and

those acts be acts of consent? After ali, people

decide to act, in such ways as to create rights and obligations, in themselves and in others: obligations of parenthood (I, 88, 98!), of reparation
may act,
31property (II, v) etc. (cf. Snare 1975, 32). These acts are not acts of consent, nor does Locke say they are. So why does he insist on classifying the acceptance of the benefits of a cooperative

(II, 10),

of

charity (I, 42), rights

of

venture as an act of consent?

The primary
one

effects of those

non-consenting
to them

acts are natural

ones,

and

the

normative consequences are

joined

by

the law of nature,

when

whether or not

intends those

consequences

to follow. But

select some apples

in the

greengrocer's shop,
no act

consent

(tacitly)

to pay for them.

doubt, is

not

to

undertake an obligation.

The

reason

My primary intention, why this is a consenting

does
not
'

nevertheless,

and procreation

is not, is

that the normative effect

follow

"by

the law of

nature"

directly

(and universally), but only because

of the

216

Interpretation

arrangements made
on

by

the greengrocer, acting

on

within

his rights. The

apples are

offer, but only conditionally so,

act are

terms.

So the

normative consequences of

my

joined to the is

non-normative ones

suggest, is the

real point of

Locke's

use of

human institution. And this, I the idiom of consent.

by

Tacit
tion
of

consent

given when a person

realizing
to the

a non-normative

does something with the primary inten effect, but at the same time intends, or may
an obligation.

be

supposed

intend,

to assume

To this definition

we should

add that

normative consequence should

be the

product of a conventional

arrangement.
as of

The

acceptance of

the benefits of a cooperative venture will count

on

tacit consent under this the cooperative venture,

definition, because it is dependent

the setting up

defining

the terms of sharing in the profit.

of

Implicit

conventions govern

the distribution

its benefits

and

burdens.

Government is legitimate if, on the whole, it acts within its powers. If so, the individual is left only with the choice to obey willingly or to emigrate. The
obligation of obedience
which

is based

on

the natural obligation to preserve mankind,

is the fundamental tie

binding

human beings into

one natural commu

nity, in

combination with the principle of

actual political associations.

No

resident

fair reciprocity which governs their individual is in a position to decide on

(though he is in
a position

the existence

or extent of

his

obligation

to judge).

legitimize an illegitimate government, nor can his withholding consent delegitimize a legitimate one either. To be sure, Locke sometimes seems to recognize an individual right of resis tance, II, 168, 208 (contrast however 149, 230, 242, 243; cf. von Leyden
consent cannot

His individual

1982, 157f, 185), but

ual

this does not rest

on

individual decision but

and

on

individ

judgment (cf.

also

II, 241, 209-210, 21,

the

other

Jephtha

places to

which

Laslett there refers), particularly

when

with reference

to

inalienable rights, II,

of

168.

Yet
which

someone

accepts

the fruits

of

the

labours
gives

the government,
tacit consent, and

he

can

hardly

avoid

is therefore is is

obligated.

doing, Locke What he conveys

as

will

say he

his

with

this unfortunate way of

an

speaking

not so much
a rather

that the act is voluntary

one

though there must be

a

exit-option, it
reciprocal

desperate

that it is

way

of

participating in the

arrangements of the political

"contract".

CONCLUSION

Political
of

obligation

in the Two Treatises is

not

really based

on

the

principle

promise-keeping, though it is based

ness and

ety,

trust, trustworthi fairness. (T)hose, who liked one another so well as to joyn into Soci cannot but be supposed to have some Acquaintance and to

on moral principles of

Friendship

gether, and some Trust in one another

.(II,

of

Faith, 19, 77, 101:

the

love

and want

107, cf. 14: Truth and keeping of Society, 110, 128; Societas
vin-

Made
culum

by Contrivance
of

and

the
von

Consent of Men

-217

Dunn 1984,
social

fides, Essays on the Laws 286ff.) These are the

dispositions
are

Nature,

ed.

Leyden 1954, 212. Cf.

to sustain the pattern

moral motives needed

of mutual expectations which

is the foundation

of political society.

The

natural of an

of

men,

and

their capacity to know and

"contract"

follow the law

at

nature,

the attitudinal presuppositions of the

(which is

least

apt metaphor).
mean

Political authority is consensual in nature; but this does not that everyone's obedience depends on his own consent. It means that the authority
requires a context of general

exercise of possible

by

a general attitude of

trust. (It is the

willing cooperation, made insight that legitimate political

society is categorically distinct from a regime of coercion which has, mis takenly, led political theorists like Tussman, Walzer, Plamenatz, Pateman and

Steinberg,
We
that

to retain a consent

theory

of political

obligation.)

should exclude

the notion of individual consent. But this

does

not

imply
On

we should strike out

historical fact

and retain

only

abstract principle.

the contrary. If we take the contractual

ventions,

terminology

to refer

basically

to con

it

appears

clearly that the historical interpretation is not a piece of

a confusion

mythology arising from

between

genetic explanation and normative enterprise.

justification,
to
contract

and

really beside the

as

point of

Locke's

It is

as essential

his intentions

to their continuing

relevance.

For

theory

of political

obligation, (or

of

any

other

purely hypothetical institutional arrangement

a not enough

with normative me

impact),

suffers

from

one obvious

defect. It is

for

to see clearly

what reason

dictates (either

as a personal or as a collective

strategy), it is not reason dictates is a

can

even enough
pattern of

to know that the others see it too. For what

plays

is necessary is that each of us may expect the others to do so, knows the others to expect, etc. And whether we have sufficient war rants for these mutual expectations can only be a matter of contingent historical
part.

only his

produce

mutually adjusted cooperative the results desired when everybody, or

behaviour,
almost

and

this

everybody,

So

what

actually arisen, the enumeration of its incompar to act. Abstract principle is not enough, it nobody any has to be embodied in real conventions. For were I never so fully perswaded,

fact. If the

convention

has

not

able merits gives

reason

that there ought to

at

be

Magistracy

and rule

in the World,

yet

am nevertheless

Liberty

still, till it appears who is the Person that Hath Right to my

Obe

dience (I, 81). But this can appear only from "consent". And yet it makes sense to ask the hypothetical question, What
rational and moral men agree to under the actual circumstances?

would alter

Or,

natively
stances
moral

and equivalently:

What

would rational

men

agree

to

under circum

differing

from the

actual ones

in

ways
useful

designed to

neutralize

any im

tendencies? The

answer

may be

in

order

to criticize existing

arrangements. citizens

Government
and

rests on a

continuing

mutual

("compact"),

between

governors and citizens we

understanding between ("trust"). By compar

what extent

ing

this actual understanding to an ideal one,

verify to

it has

firm foundation. Is the operating

system of rules one which no one could reject

218
as a

Interpretation

basis for informed,

unforced general agreement?

(Cf. Scanlon

1982, 110;
the

Jacobs 1985,

So what, tive) judgment that it in the

public

242ff.) finally, is decisive:

exists?

the existence of the

foundation,
seems

or

(collec

What is the
trusted to

ultimate criterion of

legitimacy: acting
to

good, or

being

do

so?

Locke
give

believe,

rather

sanguinely, that the two

criteria will not

easily

divergent

outcomes.

(Cf.

II, 158: the

of

satisfaction of criterion.

the first

seems

to be a base to infer to the satisfaction

the second

Perhaps the
either

same

is true

of

II, 192:

a conqueror

may be

legitimized afterwards,

by
do

the

consent of

the people, or

by

his introduc
be

ing

constitutional arrangements required

by

the ideal contract.)

outcomes?

But

what

if the two

criteria

give

divergent

The People

shall

Judge (II, 242); the recognition of legitimacy is a necessary condition of legit imacy. This does not mean, however, that the judgment of the people cannot be
mistaken; this is something
of which

God

will

be the Judge (ibid).

Even if

we

rejected out of

judge correctly that the existing arrangements would have been hand as the terms of a hypothetical agreement, this judgment
action

does

not

lead to

in any

straightforward way.

We may have

reason

to

refuse

to

follow

the convention whatever the consequences of refusing, or to

try

to mobilize an oppositional party to change

it,

or

to attempt to modify

it

by

starting to The

deviate,

or

to adhere to it in order to prevent unnecessary scandal

and perturbation.

answer to the

hypothetical

question

may be

useful

in

a second way: as a

means of

understanding the
often

implications

of

existing

arrangements.

Not every

convention exists

in the form

of an authoritative

formulation,
in

and even verbal

formulations
In
order to

have to be interpreted
or

or specified

actual circumstances.

interpret it is

specify the convention, it may

help

to consider what

cooperative end

supposed

to serve, what interaction problem it

is

meant

to

solve. Operating on such principles of interpretation is something which people routinely do in every cooperative venture they are involved in, from communi cating in a language to giving judgment in court.

These are, as I hope to have shown, the two ways in which John Locke in fact makes use of the thought experiment of the rationally reconstructed con
tract. Some
conflict with

beliefs,
of

"natural

terpretation
as a whole):

generally held, cannot be true, because they are in (to which, perhaps, we may give the secular rein the fundamental principles underlying the system of conventions
even
law"

People

cannot give

up

more power than

they have themselves,

and

every

requirement made of persons must constitutional

be

shown

to serve

some sensible end.

Existing
we

changed

provisions, from time to time, have to be criticized and for the better, in the light of recent experience. On the other hand, if want to know what we actually are committed to, we may usefully ask

ourselves what we
and others to

"may be

supposed

to have consented to",

taking

ourselves

be

within the reach of appeals of

rationality, trustworthiness,

and

fairness. Though

political obligation

is

a contingent

historical fact, it is

some-

Made

by

Contrivance

and

the

Consent of Men

219

thing
ings

which can obtain

-in

mutual

only under (partially) rational and (partially) moral be Rational Creatures entred into a Community for their Society of good (11,163, cf. 172). And this severely limits the possible forms it can
a

take.

ENDNOTES

1. Ashcraft 1968, 903f; Batz 1974, 668; Colman 1983, 184,

claim

that these vicious and

degenerate but to
Beasts
which

men are men who,

exceptionally, declare themselves to live

not

by

the

law

of nature,

make

force

and violence their rule of right.

and

These

are the noxious

Creatures

and

Savage

of

II, 1, 8, 10, 11, 16, 172, 181, 182,

a state of war.

defines

They

are

only they have the sedate, settled design, II, 16 to be distinguished from the ordinary well-meaning men

Observers of Equity and Justice, II, 123, because ill nature, passion and revenge often carry them too far(II, 13). Their hasty use of force would in itself not be enough to destroy the peaceful character of the state of nature. I hesitate to accept this subdivision of sin: the mistaken
who are no strict

judgments arising from

nature, which
are

passion and

interest
civil

suffice

to create the inconveniences of the state of

and

the reason for entering

create permanent and

escalating

conflict or

society (II, 124-126), the threat of it.

attitude

they may

also suffice

to

2. This theory
and

creates the problem of

was one of the

Locke's

to African slavery. (He invested in the

of

Royal African Company,

twice a
member of

Lords Proprietors

the slave-holding state of

Carolina,

the Board of Trade which regulated the slave trade and colonial exploita

tion.) The
really
slaves

problem

is

not

solved,

of

course,

by

aims at the political

slavery

of absolute monarchy.

recognizing that Locke's discussion of slavery The ridiculous theory that the African

(women,

children, cf.

instructions
3.
order

of the

Board
to

of

II, 183!) were really captives in a just war, is stated explicitly in the Trade to Governor Nicholson of Virginia, drafted by Locke in 1698.

According
look is
at the

to get back a

Tully 1980, 158ff, people give up to the government all their natural liberty in liberty legally defined. In specifying the bounds of this legal liberty government
of nature as

should

law

the whole

against this

interpretation,

providing a guide, not a plan. I believe the textual evidence on cf. Waldron 1984. But the decisive point is that it removes

the essential

difference between

the supporters of

divine

right and

Locke. For

even cf.

Parker

accepted

the proposition that there were obligations antecedent to those of human

laws,

Ashcraft 1986,

47. See den Hartogh (2).

4. The thesis that only Locke's

opposition

express consent gives

to the

"weak"

oath of allegiance of

full membership should be seen in the light of 1689: government should obtain the explicit
requisite moral

recognition of

its

legitimacy

from the
cf.

whole of the

people, for this would create the

bounds

of

trust.

Den Hartogh (1);

Fair & Roberts 1985.

REFERENCES

Aarsleff, Hans. "The

1969.

state of nature and the nature of man

in Locke", in: Yolton ed.,

Anglim, John. "On Locke's State of Nature", Political Studies 26, (1978), 78-90. Arneson, Richard J. "The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider problems". Ethics 92(1981/2), 616-633. Ashcraft, Richard. "Locke's state of nature: historical fact or moral fiction?", Amer.
Political Science Review 62,(1968), 898-915. Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government U.P., 1986.
.

Princeton

220

Interpretation

Batz, William G. "The Historical Anthropology of John Locke", Journal of the History of Ideas 35(1974), 663-670. 487Beitz, Charles R. "Tacit Consent and Property Rights", Political Theory^ (1980),
502. Benn & Peters, S.I./R.S. Social
principles and

the Democratic

State. Allen &

Unwin,

London, Bookman, John T.

Economics
and

1959.

"Locke's Contract: Would People Consent to

It?", Amer. Journal of

Sociology 43 (1984), 357-368. B. A Theory of the Good and the Right. Oxford U.P., 1979. Richard Brandt, Colman, John. John Locke's Moral Philosophy. Edinburgh U.P., 1983.
Den Hartogh, Govert. (1) "Express Consent (1990), 105-115.
.

and

Full Membership", Political Studies 38

(2)

"Tully's

Locke", Political Theory, August 1990.

Dunn,

John. The Political Thought of John Locke. Cambridge U.P., 1969. "Consent in the political theory of John Locke", in: Gordon J. Schochet ed.,
and

Life, Liberty,
Cal. (1971). "The

Property, Essays
"trust"

on

Locke's Political Ideas.

Wadsworth, Belmont

in the politics of John Locke", in: Richard Rorty, J.B. Schneewind, Quentin Skinner eds., Philosophy in History. Cambridge U.P., 1984. Fair & Roberts, James/Clayton. "John Locke on the Glorious Revolution: a Redis covered Document", The Historical Journal 28 (1985), 385-98. Gauthier, David. Morals by Agreement. Oxford U.P., 1986. Grice, G. Russell. The Grounds of Moral Judgment. Cambridge U.P., 1967. Habermas, Jurgen. "Diskursethik- Notizen zu einem Begrundungsprogramm", in: Moralbewusstsein und Kommunikatives Handeln, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1983. Haley, K.H.D. The First Earl of Shaftesbury Oxford U.P., 1968. Harsanyi, John C. Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1976. Hart, H.L.A. The Concept of Law. Oxford U.P.. 1963. Hume, David. Essays Moral, Political and Literary. Eds. T.H. Green & T.H. Grose, 2 vols., Longmans, Green, 1875. Jacobs, Frans. Ten Overstaan van Allen, Universalisering in de Ethiek. Amsterdam,
concept of
.

1985.

Kavka, Gregory S. Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton U.P., 1986. Ethics97 (1986/Klosko, George. "The Principle of Fairness and Political 87), 353-362. Lewis, David K. Convention, a philosophical study. Harvard U.P., Cambridge Mass.,
Obligation" ,

1969.

Locke, John. Epistola de Tolerantia, A Letter on Toleration. Ed. Raymond Klibansky, transl. J.W. Gough. Oxford U.P., 1968. Essays on the Law of Nature. Ed., transl., introd. W. von Leyden. Oxford U.P., 1954.
Two Treatises of Government. Critical ed., introd. Peter Laslett, Cambridge

U.P. 1970.

Medick, Hans. Naturzustand

und Naturgeschichte der burgerlichen Gesellschaft. Got tingen, Van den Hoeck & Ruprecht, 1973. Parry, Geraint. John Locke. (Political Thinkers.) Allen & Unwin, London, 1978. Pateman, Carole. The Problem of Political Obligation. Wiley, Chichester, 1979.

Made

by

Contrivance

and the

Consent of Men

221

Pitkin, Hanna. "Obligation and Consent", in: Peter Laslett, W.G. Runciman, Quentin Skinner eds. Philosophy, Politics and Society, 4th series. Blackwell, Oxford. (1972). Plamenatz, John. Man and Society, Vol. I. Longman, London, 1963. Rawls, John. "Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play", in: S. Hook ed. Law and Philosophy. New York U.P., 1964. Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Oxford U.P., 1971. Richards, David A.J. A Theory of Reasons for Action. Oxford U.P., 1971.

Scanlon, T.M. "Contractualism

and utilitarianism",

in: Amartya Sen & Bernard Wil

liams eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge U.P., 1982. Seliger, Martin. The Liberal Politics of John Locke. Allen & Unwin. London, 1968. "Locke, liberalism and nationalism", in: Yolton ed. 1969.

Simmons, A. John. Moral

principles and

Political Obligations. Princeton

U.P., 1979.

"Inalienable Rights

and

Locks 's

Treatises", Philosophy

and

Public Affairs 12

(1983), 175-204. Snare, Frank. "Consent and Conventional Acts in John Locke", Journal of the History of Philosophy 13 (1975), 27-36. Steinberg, Jules. Locke, Rousseau, and the Idea of Consent. Greenwood Press, Westport Conn., 1978. Tuck, Richard. Natural Rights Theories. Cambridge U.P., 1979. Tully, James. A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries. Cambridge U.P., 1980. Tussman, Joseph. Obligation and the Body Politic. Oxford U.P., 1960. Von Leyden, W. Hobbes and Locke, The Politics of Freedom and Obligation. Mac millan, London, 1982. Waldron, Jeremy. "Locke, Tully, and the Regulation of Property", Political Studies 32 (1984), 98-106. Yolton, John W. ed., John Locke: Problems and Perspectives. Cambridge U.P., 1969.

Christianity

and

Politics in Montesquieu's Greatness

and

Decline of the Romans

Richard Myers,
St. Thomas University, Fredericton

Recent

events

have

revived

discussion

of a political

issue

which most people

had probably thought long dead, that of the relationship between church and state. One of the most remarkable features of North American politics in the

1980s has been the issues

which

but, more business, such

its
wake a power

unprecedented involvement of various churches not only in have traditionally been of concern to them (abortion, for example) importantly, in issues that were formerly thought to be none of their as economics and of

foreign
debate

policy. about

This

new

trend has brought in

reopening liberal political order, and the questions that are being posed are not always easy to solve. If we are to achieve clarity about these difficult issues, one of our most important tasks will be to reexamine the thought of those men

the

old

the proper role of ecclesiastical

in

who stood at

the head

of our

liberal tradition, to

problem and on what grounds

they

proposed

how they understood this the solution they did. The purpose
see

of

this paper will be to contribute to such a reexamination

on the

by investigating

Montesquieu's presentation, in his Considerations

ness

of the Romans
might seem

and their

Decline,1

of

Christianity
of

Causes of the Great and its political effects. book to turn to in

It

that the Greatness

and

Decline is

an odd

this connection. Robert

Shackleton,

the dean

gued that one of the most remarkable

Montesquieu scholars, has ar features of the work is what he calls its

"memorable
A
writer

silence"

about

Christianity.
the

in the

vanguard of

Enlightenment, treating in 1734

have been
expected

the reasons to

for the

decline

of the

Roman

Empire,

might give

boldly

list

Christianity
activity
he in
and

among them, perhaps even to would lead one to expect this

it

pride of place.

Montesquieu's

past

of

him. In his discourse to the Bordeaux

Academy
kings

had treated

religion as an

important factor in Roman

history

under the

the early days of the republic. In the Lettres persanes, particularly

of the causes of

in his discussion

depopulation, he

treated religion as an

important factor in the

The Abbe him for his

development

of societies, and

included
on,

Christianity

itself in his investigation. In the

position.

Considerations, he does

not move most

but retreats, from this

in

Raynal,

spokesman of

the

doctrinaire

of the philosophes, reproves

relation

reticence; and the

examination of

Christianity
a

to Rome

is left to the

incisiveness 161).

and prejudice of

Gibbon half

century later (Robert Shackleton,

p.

Montesquieu: A Critical

Biography [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961],

interpretation, Winter

1989-90, Vol. 17, No. 2

224

Interpretation
suggests

Yet Shackleton
up this theme

that the main reason

or

for Montesquieu's failure to take

a

was not

ignorance

lack

of

interest but
on

kind

"timidity,"

of

fear that the him into

to

open publication of

his thoughts
p.

the

matter would would

have

gotten

serious
with

trouble

(Shackleton,

162). Though it
of

be very difficult
situation,
one

quarrel

Shackleton's

assessment
would

Montesquieu's

wonders

if this

"timidity"

sort of

tesquieu's caliber from expressing

leton is

right

to have

expected a

really stop his thoughts in one way or another. Shack discussion of the influence of Christianity on
expectations

a political thinker of

Mon

Rome, but
cause

perhaps

he finds himself disappointed in his

sensitive

only be
deal to

he is

insufficiently

to the subtlety of Montesquieu's manner of

writing.

It is

our suggestion and

that Montesquieu

does indeed have

a great

Christianity say his (understandable)

about

its

effects on politics

"timidity"

he

was

but that precisely because of forced to present his thoughts "between Montesquieu's

the

lines."

The devious

or ambiguous character of

lost
bert

on the best readers of his own age.

opinion

that the Greatness

and

art of writing was not for example, expressed the Voltaire, Decline is a work "full of while d'Alem
hints"

suggested

that "in allowing much to

be seen, he left

even more to

be
ro-

thought"

mains et

(Montesquieu, Considerations sur les causes de la grandeur des de leur decadence, ed. J. Ehrard [Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1968]
suspicion

p.

11). The
count of
of

that the

Greatness

Christianity is raised by Christianity of any length in the

xix
religion

Decline may contain a ac the following fact: the only explicit discussion
and

"secret"

work

is

"hidden"

one.

At the

beginning

of

Chapter
tian

Montesquieu takes up the question of the role played by the Chris in the collapse of the Roman empire. Yet the themes of the chap
were supposed
Barbarians,"

ter, according to its title, of the Settlement of the

pire

to be "Attila's

Greatness,"

"The Cause

and

"The Reason

Was the First to

Fall"

(p. 176). This discussion

Why the Western of Christianity is

and the reader

Em
thus

intentionally
wonder

kept

as quiet as possible

by

Montesquieu

is led to

whether, given this attempt to hide these particular thoughts about

the work might not contain others which are kept more carefully

Christianity,
hidden. Our
main goal

here
of

will

therefore be to

bring

to light what seem to

be the three its

features
of

Montesquieu's

presentation of and of

Christianity: his
effect on the

accounts of

rise,

its

effect on

the Roman empire,

its

"Greek"

empire.

I. THE RISE OF CHRISTIANITY

Montesquieu
ture
of such a and

never

explicitly discusses the

origins of

the great Christian in

fluence in Rome,

and

this is understandable, given the

theme.

Nevertheless, he does
us where

express
so

obviously sensitive na his thoughts on this sub

ject,

he indicates to

he is

doing

in

a most

ingenious

manner:

Montesquieu'

Greatness

and

Decline

of the

Romans

225

his

reflections on

Christianity's
in the

emergence

in Rome

are presented appearance

that passage

where

the Christian God

makes

His first

precisely in in the book.

God is first
grief

mentioned

discussion, in Chapter
upon

xiv,

of

the tremendous

that the Romans displayed

passage

the death of Germanicus. This that it

will somehow

is

very
the that

important
the

because

we are promised

"make known
us

genius of

the

Roman
"to

people"

(p. 146). Montesquieu informs

conscious of

that

by

time of Tiberius the Romans had become so

their

"impotence"

they had
between
despair"

come

make

their entire

happiness depend

on

the difference

masters":

thus,

at the

death

of

Germanicus, in

whom

they had "placed

their hopes and

(p. "no

they displayed a deep mourning and "fell into complete 146). Montesquieu concludes this passage with the following
fears
unhappiness so
them."

fears,"

maxim:

people

strongly

as

those the misery

of whose

condition should reassure

In

support of

this claim he then cites a con

temporary
There

example:

are

fifty

thousand

men

in Naples today

who

live

on

herbs

alone and

have

only, as their

entire

property, half a

cotton garment.

These people, the

most

unhappy on earth, fall into a terrible despondency at the slightest smoke from Vesuvius: they are foolish enough to fear becoming unhappy (p. 147).

Montesquieu
could

suggests

that this reaction

of

the Neapolitans is very

odd.

One

try

to persuade them of the

folly

of

their reaction

by

citing to them the

better
poet

words of a popular poet of

the 1960s to the effect that those who have nothing

cites a somewhat people ought

have nothing to lose. Montesquieu, in fact, make the same point. He notes that these

to

to say,

like An
were well

dromache, "May it
enough off

please

God that I

fear,"

should
for"

that

is, "if only I

striking.

have something to be afraid That this is the first mention of God in the
to
makes

(p. 147).

work

is truly

The Chris
of

tian God those

His first devoid

appearance of

in the

mouths of

the utterly

desperate,

who are so

normal,

reasonable

hopes that they

are reduced

to

hoping
point

in

some single

almightly

Being

who might overturn

the natural course

of events and make their situation

less intolerable. In

introducing

God

at

this

Romans'

in the work, then, Montesquieu hints to the reader that he thinks that the regime made them psychologically ripe for the advent of a religion
of

like Christianity. The tyranny

ate,
so

the emperors had made the Romans so desper their impotence that them great

fearful,

and so conscious of
which gave

they eagerly
not

absorbed a

new religious

teaching
next.

hope, if

at

least for the

success of
people.

the

In short, Montesquieu suggests that part of the Christianity was the fact that it served as the

for this world, then reason for

"opiate"

of

the

Roman This

sort of analysis of the emergence of

Christianity
peoples witnessed

crude to

be entirely
on

persuasive

for,

while

many

is clearly in itself too have been desperately

arrival of a religion

only one occasion has like Christianity. To give a plausible

unhappy,

history

the

psychological explanation of

the origins of

226

Interpretation
one would

only why the Romans turned to religion, but why they turned to that particular kind of religion. This is a demand that Montesquieu tries to meet in his presentation of Caligula.

Christianity,

have to be

able

to

explain not

In the dromache
Caligula

paragraph and

that

follows

immediately
writes:

after

his discussion

of

An

Germanicus, Montesquieu
Tiberius. It

succeeded

was said of

him that there had

are much

never

been

better
him

slave nor a nastier master.

These two things

disposition
(p. 147).

of mind that causes one to

very be impressed by the

linked: for the

same

unlimited power of

who commands causes one

to be

no

less

so when one comes

to command oneself

For Montesquieu, the

the harshest of

most servile slave

becomes the harshest

slave,
and

of masters and

masters

becomes the
Romans'

most servile of

in this

we

find

his

explanation

chological pears

unusual political experiences laid the psy for why the groundwork for the specifically Christian religion. Montesquieu ap
Romans'

to be suggesting that the

previous position as

supreme, univer
the to

sal,

and

uniquely harsh

rulers would account

for the

particular character of
universal rule

religion to which

they

turned:

having
of

passed

from absolute,

absolute,
which

universal

slavery,

they developed
and universal

an unprecedented spirit of

servility
of a

induced them to think

themselves as

being
as

under

the power

single, supremely mighty,

God. Just
as

Montesquieu

anticipates so too

the Marxian understanding of

Christianity

the "opiate of the

people,"

he

anticipates the

gion"

par excellence

Nietzschean understanding of Christianity as the "slave reli (Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Geneology of Morals, ed.

W. Kaufmann [New York: Vintage Books, 1969], 35). If the

universal

Essay I,

Section 8,

pp. 34-

Roman tyranny
accounts

contributed to the rise of

Christianity
in

in

psychological

way, it also

for the

success of that religion

a more

direct,
pire

more political manner. The first explicit mention of Christianity occurs in Chapter XVI. Here Montesquieu informs us that the universality of the em

"aided very

much

the establishment of the Christian

grown so

religion"

(p. 158).

Because the from

came about

empire

had

large, it became necessary

to

levy

troops
soon

all corners of

it. As the

emperors were almost all

former soldiers, it

that the majority of them were non-Romans, and even barbarians. manners, morals, and religions were

Gradually, foreign
Rome: "there

freely

introduced in
introduce"

was no

longer anything foreign in the empire,

and people were

prepared to accept all

the customs an emperor might wish to

(p.

Roman tyranny thus paved the way for Christianity not only by preparing men's souls for it but also by turning the entire world into a single free market of religions, the chance to reach thereby giving
universal

148). The

Christianity

those who would

now

be

susceptible to

its

appeal. alone suffice

Of course, it is doubtful that these two factors

tremendous influence that

to explain the

Christianity

gained over the

Western world, but, in

Montesquieu's Greatness

and

Decline

of the

Romans

227

Chapter XVII, Montesquieu hints at a third: Constantine's use of Christianity for his own political purposes. Much of this chapter is devoted to the reign of Constantine
is
and to

the very great impact he had

on

the

empire.

This discussion

somewhat perplexing.

The title

of

the chapter leads us to

believe that the

For the first

reader's attention

is to be focused

on some

"Change in the

State."

two pages, the change to which

perors'

security and anny (pp. 164-65). But then Montesquieu turns to a discussion of the great change implemented by Constantine, the division of the empire into East and

new-found

Montesquieu is referring seems to be the em the consequent change in the nature of the tyr

West,

and

the

issue becomes
state"

somewhat

confused

what,

exactly,

is the

"change in the

to

which

Montesquieu is up in the

referring? well

Is it the

new style of

tyranny? Is it the division of the empire? It may

be that Montesquieu

intentionally
him to

leaves the

reader

air on

this issue as a means of

leading
ulti

recognize

the existence of a third possibility, a change that was

mately of far greater significance than the other two: Constantine's adoption of Christianity. His remarks on Constantine's division of the empire could then be
understood
religion.

as

a covert

treatment

of

Constantine's

elevation of

the Christian

After reading his description of Constantine and his motives, it is easy to see why Montesquieu would have thought it essential to present his view of Con
stantine's as a great

relationship to

Christianity covertly.

emperor, primarily because of

Constantine is usually thought what he did for the establishment

of of

the new

religion.

tional view.

Montesquieu discreetly, but very firmly, rejects the conven After speaking of Constantine for ten paragraphs, he suddenly (and
makes

very

innocently)
brevity

the

following
have

general observation:

The

of reigns, the various political parties, the

caused

different religions, the

the emperors to

particular sects of these religions,

the

character of

come

down to

Alexander, so Gratian, so highly

169).

extremely distorted. I shall give only two examples. This cowardly in Herodian appears full of courage in Lampridius; this
us
praised

by Theodorus,

is

compared

by

Philostorgus to Nero (p.

Montesquieu

names

no names and gives no explicit

context makes

indication

of what

he is

referring to, but the praiseworthy figure.

his
of

point

very

clear:

Constantine

was not a

Only

because

the

power of

Christianity, from his

time

down to Montesquieu's own, is Constantine thought of as great. The Christians protect his reputation because their own is closely linked to it, and this makes it difficult for Montesquieu to express his true thoughts openly. What Montes
quieu

does

express

openly is

a criticism of

Constantine's

motives

in

dividing
new
East"

the

empire.

We are told that it

was personal

vanity, the desire to give a

city his name, that led Constantine to "carry the seat of the empire to the (p. 166) and there follows a lengthy discussion of the harm this did to the empire. This, of course, is a very strange claim. Montesquieu knows quite well

228

Interpretation
empire

that Constantine never intended to carry the seat of the

to the

East,
more

that
than

founding Constantinople, he was creating a new religious capital anything else. (See, for example, W. Sinnigen and A. Boak, A
in Rome to
tesquieu
what

History

of

a.d.

565 [New York: Macmillan,

this "slip"?

1977]

pp.

415-16.) Why does Mon

the reader to see that
more

make

Undoubtedly because he
political

wishes

he

says of

Constantine's

innovations

also

holds true for his

that

important
"founding"

religious

innovations:
was

Montesquieu

suggests

Constantine's
van was.

of

Christianity

ity, of the desire to Christianity became entrenched

spread

every bit as much the product of personal his name, as his founding of the new city

in the world,
the
private

not

because

of

its

own

merits, but

because its
perors.

entrenchment served

interests

of one of

the Roman em

Christianity
of

therefore

attained

its

position of preeminence

in the

world

not

only because
was

the servile disposition of the Roman people and the lack of

under

religious perors

orthodoxy

the empire, but also because the

power of

the em

so great that

they

were

able

to shape the

fortunes

of particular

religions

for very in

personal ends. suggestion

If

we accept

the

that Montesquieu's
at

discussion

of

Constantine's

motives motives of

founding

Constantinople is
a

the same time a discussion of

question arises.

his

in establishing Christianity,
the effects of

difficult

Is the discussion

the effects of that

opinion of

founding also meant to be a reflection of Montesquieu's Christianity on the empire? Does Montesquieu believe
the empire in the same way that

Christianity weakened founding of Constantinople

that
prepares

he

suggests

the
xvn

did? The discussion

of

Constantine in Chapter
at

the reader for the unannounced

discussion,
on

the

beginning

of

Chapter

xix,

of

the political effects of

Christianity

Rome.

II. THE EFFECTS OF CHRISTIANITY ON THE ROMAN EMPIRE

Montesquieu begins Chapter

emergence of

xix

by informing
pagans

us

that the simultaneity of the

Christianity

and

the weakening of the empire led to a vehement

dispute. The Christians blamed the

"each

for Rome's

problems. ruined

They

argued

that Diocletian's division of power (the

cause as

tetrarchy) had

the empire be

emperor wanted to spend as much and

alone"

to maintain as strong armies

claimed

if he

were
were

(p. 176). As
so

a result of this

tendency,

the Chris

tians,
ment. was

taxes

increased

drastically

that

much of

the empire's land was

simply

abandoned.

They

The pagans, on the other hand, did not accept this argu believed that it was the widespread acceptance of Christianity that

the

really to blame for Rome's troubles: "as previously, in a flourishing Rome, floodings of the Tiber and the other effects of nature were attributed to the
the gods, so now,

anger of

in

dying Rome,

misfortunes were

imputed to

the the

new cult and

to the overthrow of the old

and

altars"

(p. 176). As
of

an example of

"most

popular"

therefore "most

seductive"

these arguments, Montes

quieu paraphrases a

letter

of

the prefect

Symmachus:

Montesquieu'

Greatness

and

Decline

of

the Romans

229

"What

can

better lead

us

to knowledge of the
must remain

gods,"

he said, "than the

experience

of our past prosperity?

follow many centuries, our fathers who so successfully followed theirs. Imagine that Rome is speaking to you and is saying: Great princes, fathers of the country, respect my years, during
We

faithful to

so

and

which

I have

always observed the ceremonies of

my

ancestors.

This

cult

has
walls and we
we

subjected

the universe to my

laws; by it, Hannibal

not enter

was repulsed

from my

the
ask

Gauls from the Capitol. It is for the it for the

native gods.
not

gods of the

We do
blows"

country that we ask peace; into disputes fit only for idlers, and

wish

to offer prayers,

(p. 177).
then summarizes the responses of
or at

To

conclude

this

discussion, Montesquieu
to the
position of pagan religion

three Christian
unable, to

authors

Symmachus. Unwilling,

least

blame the

for Rome's problems, these

Orosius'

writers content with

themselves with absolving their own.

history
be

was

written

the

intention
of

of

demonstrating
evils since

that

Christianity

could not

regarded as

the

source

Rome's

Salvianus'

equally great evils had always existed in the world. book attempted to demonstrate that the cause of Rome's troubles

really the dissoluteness of the pagans themselves. Finally, in The City of God St. Augustine made the argument that "the city of heaven was different
was

from the city

As his
we

of earth where

the

ancient

Romans, for
(p. 177).
no

some

human virtues, had judgment

as

virtues"

received rewards as vain as

these

have noted, Montesquieu delivers

these competing claims.
certain
Symmachus'

explicit a us

to the

relative merits of view can

Nevertheless,
are

fairly

clear picture of
passage.

be derived from
rejects

hints that
position,

left

in this

Montesquieu
would

but

not

for the

reasons

one

first

suppose.

It

would

argument on

the grounds

be tempting to simply dismiss the Symmachean that the pagan religion it extols is absurd. Such a
Symmachus'

conclusion would

be

unwarranted.

argument

does

not presuppose

the truth of the Roman religion; his argument is actually an

attempt

to prove it.

Symmachus

offers a

truly

anthropocentric account of

the gods. He maintains

that one leams the truth

self

about

the gods

by looking
the

to what
past.

is

good

for

one

the success of the past

vindicates

the gods of the

For this reason,

Symmachus'

one cannot reject

with

political views on
"presuppositions."

grounds of

dissatisfaction be

his

religious religion

He has

no religious presuppositions

cause
or

he himself holds

to be determined

by

politics, that

is, by

success

failure in the

political world.
attack on

Montesquieu's
refute

Symmachus takes
a political

another route.

His

approach

is to for

Symmachus
political

by

offering

(that is, nonreligious)

seems

explanation

Rome's

circumstances.

The

pagan practice

to be to

look for

divine intentions in less fearsome. Men

in divine
will and

temporal matters as a means of making temporal

persuade

themselves that great calamities

not

suffering have their origins

this

is reassuring,
to this

calamities

but

also

because it
response

offers some

only because it gives meaning to those hope of controlling them in the fu

to be that appeals to

ture. Montesquieu's
explanations are not

practice seems

divine

necessary

when

temporal

explanations can

be found. It is

230

Interpretation
that the example of this
of the
pagan practice

significant

to

which

Montesquieu

refers

is the
the

flooding flooding of a

Tiber. In Chapter xiv, he had already

on that occasion,

made reference

to

river and,

the

flooding

was

to be understood

as a metaphor
pagan views

for the tyranny (p. 143). Montesquieu's equation here of the two that Christianity was responsible for Rome's ruin and that the gods
for the

were responsible

flooding

of

the Tiber

is

a clear

indication

of where

he

thinks the blame for Rome's

problems

really belongs
reason

with the tyranny. In

deed,

this

is the

position

Montesquieu developed

with great care

in Chapters loss

xin-xvm.

In Chapter is

xvm
was

it is
that

shown

that the

the Romans were unable

of

to stop the barbarians these

old maxims

they had lost

result of

their old maxims and the the

said

to be the

inability

of

the soldiers (who

had

by

this

point

become the

real masters of

the regime) to discipline them

selves was

(pp. 173-75). The rise

said

of

the army to a position of mastery

of

in the

regime

in turn

to be the result

destroyed any 52, 162).

that he simply

sense of moderation

the tyranny of the emperors, which had that the soldiers might have had (pp. 151-

Yet if Montesquieu in

rejects

the position taken

by Symmachus,
is
obvious that
were

it is he

not clear

endorses

those of the Christians. It taken

cannot

be
the

agreement with the stand always

by

Orosius. Even if it
world as

true that "there

had

been

as great evils

in the been

those complained of

by

pagans"

it is

by

no means evident that within one particular part of men

the

world

the Roman part

quieu's

had

always

so

badly

off.

book indicates just how impossible it

would

The very title of Montes be for him to accept the

arguments of

argument made vianus

by

Orosius. Montesquieu probably finds the

Sal

reasonable, but would undoubtedly ask whether Salvianus really gets to

disorder.2

the bottom of the issue. From Montesquieu's perspective, the moral disorder of the pagans was ultimately the result of their political
gustine's argument,

As for St. Au

Montesquieu's

position

is

one of

only

partial agreement. suggestion

To the

extent

that this argument

is

a response

to

Symmachus'

that

the truth about the gods is

determined

by

the

this-worldly

success of

those who

worship them, Montesquieu is certainly in agreement with Augustine. His own criticism of Symmachus seems to be founded on precisely this distinction between this world and the next. To the extent that Augustine is asserting the
relative unattractiveness of

this-worldly
his
position

greatness,

however, it is unlikely
as a suitable

that

Montesquieu
quieu's
study.

would endorse choice of

again, this is apparent from Montes

Romans"

very

the "greatness of the

theme of

In any event, the

common point on which all of

the

Christian

writers agree

is that

politics and religion are

two separate matters and it is in this respect that

while

they

and

Symmachus

are

in fundamental disagreement:
are at

Symmachus

ar

gues that religious

factors

the root of

Rome's

political problems

(and

hence,

that there must be a religious solution to the political problem), the

realms are

Christians insist that these two

quire political solutions.

separate, that

political problems re

Montesquieu
But
are

Greatness

and

Decline
as

of

the Romans
separate as
our minds.

231
the

the realms

of politics

and religion

Christian
note

authors

insist? Montesquieu
Symmachus'

raises certain

completely doubts in

We

that he describes

arguments as

the "most

popular"

and

"most

seductive"

objections to existence of other

Christianity

and

its

effects.

This clearly implies the

not as popular as
might which

objections,

objections

which,

although

those made

by Symmachus,

might, in

fact,

be

more powerful.

What in
to

be? A very these Montesquieu describes the

objections
machus'

clear

indication is
of

given

in the

paragraph writers

response

the three Christian

Sym

letter. We

reported above

that Montesquieu summarizes

of

Salvianus'

argument as a claim
cause of

that it

was

the

dissoluteness
not

the

pagans

that was the true

Rome's
and

Greatness

exactly what is written in the text of the Decline, however. Our presentation of the summary of Sal
weakness.

That is

vianus'

has been slightly Montesquieu's part. While

argument

emended

to

"obvious"

correct an

mistake on

book clearly focuses on the moral de crepitude of the pagans, Montesquieu actually describes it as an account of the moral decrepitude of the Christian: "Salvianus wrote his book, in which he
maintained ravages of

Salvianus'

that the

it

was

the dissoluteness of the

Christians that had

attracted

the

Now surely where Montesquieu says one ought to read not only because that is what Salvianus actually said, but also because Montesquieu's designation of Salvianus as a defender of
"pagans,"

barbarians."3

"Christians"

the Christian faith against the attacks

sense
at all.

of

Symmachus

would otherwise make no

"pagan"

Yet

even

if the

reader

has the right to

substitute

for

"Christian"

quieu make a mistake

in this context, and important question still remains: Did Montes here? Or to put the matter more precisely, is his mistake After all, the Greatness and Decline is not only a care; it is one that Montesquieu constantly reread

intentional book for

on unintentional?

written with extreme

and rethought.

Indeed, he

went so

far

as

to personally correct the entire book

a new edition

in 1748. In light

of

this

kind

of attention

to the

difficult to imagine that Montesquieu here.

The implications
nificant. of

was not aware of what

text, it is very he was saying

sig Sym

interpreting
statement

this

as an

intentional
that the

mistake are quite

which

Montesquieu's have

suggests

objection

machus could

made against

Christianity

but failed to is this: that the bar

of

barians had been

the

able to subjugate the

Romans because

the dissoluteness of

Christians, because the Christian religion had corrupted Rome's military virtue. This, of course, is the objection to Christianity first made by Ma
it
renders

chiavelli

(and later taken up its adherents

offers the

by Gibbon),

that it is a

pernicious religion

because

"effeminate."

In Book II, Chapter

n of

The Discourses
the original

Machiavelli
cult of

following

comparison of

Christianity

and

the Romans:

Our

religion

has

glorified

humble

and contemplative men more

than men of action.

It has

posited

the highest good in

the other
placed

humility,

abjection, and contempt

for human

things,

whereas

it in

greatness of the

soul, in strength of the

body

232
and

Interpretation
in
all the other things suitable

demands
to

that you

have

strength

for making men very bold. And if our religion in you, what it wants is that you should be suited do bold things. This way of loving, therefore, to have given it over as a prey to the

appears to

suffering rather than to be have rendered the

who are able

able to

world weak and

wicked,
to go to

to

run

heaven,

think more about

it securely seeing how the generality of men, in order how to bear their injuries than how to avenge in Opere, Vol. I [Verona:
translation is my own).

them (Discorsi Sopra La Prima Deca di Tito Livio

Arnoldo Mondadori, 1949], II, ii,

p.

238;

To the have

extent

that there is any truth in this Machiavellian critique, politics

and religion are not as separate as us

Montesquieu's three Christian

realize

authors would

think.

Indeed,
far
as

one

begins to

just why they

emphasized

the

independence

of

these two realms, and why one of

pelled to go so effect great

to

argue

that,

even

them, Augustus, felt com if Christianity did have a pernicious

question,

in worldly terms, this would be no argument against its validity. The of course, is where Montesquieu stands in this debate. Does his
at what we might call

discreet hint

"the Machiavellian

position"

amount

to an

endorsement of

that position?

Ultimately,
this paper, it

the answer to that question must be both yes and no. In Part I of
that Montesquieu ascribes much of the success of

was suggested

Christianity

to the peculiar political condition of the Roman empire and, in

existence of a universal tyranny.

particular, to the

And,

as shown
and

above,

careful examination of

Chapters

xm-xvin of the

Greatness be held

Decline

reveals

that Montesquieu believes the fall of the Roman empire to the

of

have been

caused

by

tyranny

of

the emperors.

Christianity
it, like
the tyranny.

can not

responsible

for the fall

the Roman empire because

was a

the loss of the ancient Roman military

virtue,
and not

by-product

of

the cause, of Rome's weakness.

sentence of

Christianity was ultimately an effect, Montesquieu clearly implies this in the

was established

very first

Chapter

xix:

Christianity

"in the time that

seems

the empire was

weakening"

(p. 176). At the

same

time, however, it

fair

to suggest that once Rome was

contributed to an acceleration

already in decline, Christianity may well have in her decrepitude. Indeed, it is probable that it is Montesquieu introduces the
whole

to make

precisely this

point that

issue in

such a guarded manner

had he thought

Christianity

to

less in this regard, there would have been no reason openly. In the final analysis, then, it appears that Montesquieu does believe
that
pire.

be completely blame not to address the issue

the Roman

Christianity

was

partially

responsible

for the

weakness of

em

III. THE EFFECTS OF CHRISTIANITY ON THE GREEK EMPIRE

In the final four

series of chapters

chapters of the

Greatness
or

and

devoted to the

"Eastern"

"Greek"

Decline of the Romans, a (that is, the Byzantine)

Montesquieu'

Greatness
a

and

Decline

of the

Romans

233

empire, Montesquieu develops

cism of the political effects of

second, and ultimately more damaging, criti Christianity. Here Christianity is presented not

force that accelerated the corruption of a very sick regime; on the in Chapters xx-xxm, the Christian religion (or to speak more pre contrary, cisely, a particular use of that religion) is singled out as the great cause of the
merely
as a
collapse of a political order.

The Eastern

core of
or

Montesquieu's
empire

argument about

the

effects of

Christianity

on

the

Greek

is

book. Toward the

as

end of

in Chapter XXII, one of the longest in the that chapter, Montesquieu summarizes his discussion
contained

follows:
The
most vicious source of all

the misfortunes of the

Greeks is that they

power,

never

knew the

nature or the

limits

of ecclesiastical and secular

which made them

fall,

on

both sides, into

great

continual aberrations.
which on

This

distinction,
not

is the base

on which

the

tranquility

of peoples

rests, is founded

only

religion, but

also on reason and nature, which ordain

that things that are really separate and can

confused

only

endure as separate should never

be

(p. 203).
of a proper separation of church and state that

It is the lack
the Eastern

lies

at

the heart of
chapter

empire's problems and

Montesquieu's

main

intention in this

is to

explain

In the

pages

how, precisely, that follow, we

this brought about the destruction of that empire.

shall

try

to summarize that argument as

briefly

as

possible.

The

key

to Montesquieu's account of the

manner

in

which

the

inadequate is his
pre

separation of spiritual and temporal power ruined the sentation of the

Greek

empire

priestly

soul.

sense of self-abnegation which

In the twenty-fifth paragraph, he suggests that the lies at the heart of the priestly spirit must ulti

mately turn
Here is
the first

against

itself:
the human
mind.

a strange contradiction of

The

ministers of religion

Romans,

not

being

excluded

from the

charges of civil society,

religion was

among involved

themselves little in its

affairs.

When the Christian

established, the

from worldly affairs, involved themselves in ecclesiastics, them with moderation. But when, in the decline of the empire, the monks were the sole clergy, these men, destined by more particular vows to flee and fear worldly
who were more removed

affairs, seized every

everywhere and

occasion

to take

agitating

that world

in them; they never had left (p. 199). they

part

stopped

making

a stir

Montesquieu's

suggestion

here is that, precisely because the

"worldly"

ecclesiastical when given

life
the

prohibits the satisfaction of certain natural chance priests will

desires,

demonstrate

power, simply
pressed.

as an outlet

The

more

unnaturally for those passions that have been unnaturally re removed from the temporal realm the priests find them
will

an

powerful

fixation

with political

selves, the

more

fiercely

they try
power."

to compensate for their condition

by

pursuing (and abusing)

political

234

Interpretation
peculiar

This

deformity

of the

have disastrous consequences,

as well.

not

can priestly soul, according to Montesquieu, political world but for religion for the only

Allowing
it for

the priests to get involved

manipulate and

in

politics

is dangerous to dogma in

religion order

because this tempts them to

exploit
political gain.

distort

religious

to

Montesquieu tells us, for example, that the

position
was

of the monks

in the

wars over

icons (a dispute that tore the

empire

apart)

determined
which

not

by

theological considerations

but

monks'

by

the

calculation of

dogmas

would maximize

their political power.

concern
politics.

What is

of greater

immediate

to us,

however, is
the

the temporal effect

of ecclesiastical

involvement in
empire was

Montesquieu

claims that the political

monks:

life

of

the Greek
affairs of

thoroughly dominated by
no

No

state, no peace, no war,

truce,

no

negotiation, nor marriage was

arranged except through the monks.

The

prince's councils were

full

of them and

the nation's assemblies almost wholly composed of them (p. 199).

He

goes on to argue

that "the

evil

this caused was beyond belief (p.

199),

and

the chapter gives

persuaded or

numerous examples.

The

emperors

Basil

and

Leo

were either

forced to

keep

their soldiers occupied with the construction of

churches aeologus so

while

barbarians

pillaged

the provinces (p.

199). Andronicus

Pal-

happy

disbanded his navy, having been assured by the monks that God was with his zeal for the peace of the Church that his enemies would not
him (p. 199). And lost
cities even

dare

attack

in battle,
procuring

generals were said

religious relics

to

have lifted

sieges and

for the

sake of

(p. 196).
mili

But the dangerous

monks'

effects of

the

power were not

limited to the harmful

tary
was

sphere.

Montesquieu He

monks'

argues

that one of the

most

practices

their habit of stirring

up doctrinal disputes
Herodotus'

as a means of

protecting their
presented at

privileged position.

compares the monks to the

Scythians

the

beginning order to keep laity to their

of attention

the fourth book of

work who

blinded

their slaves

in

them submissive. Like the

own political
over

Scythians,

the monks tried to blind the

powers and pretensions

and

by diverting
definition

the public's

to disputes

icons

dogma. This
are

was a sure means of preoc

cupying the laity because interminable:

In ordinary

religious quarrels

by

passionate and

disputes,

since each senses

that he can be wrong, stubbornness and

we have over religions, since, by the thing, each is sure that his opinion is true, we are indignant with those who, instead of changing themselves, obstinately insist on making us change (p. 201).

obstination are not

nature of the

extreme; but in those that

The for

religious

divisions that

were stirred

up

by

the monks tore the empire apart

centuries.

Indeed, Montesquieu indicates

that these quarrels were so intense

and self-preservation:

that the Greeks often forgot about their very freedom

The furor

of disputes became such a natural state to the Greeks that, when Cantacuzene took Constantinople, he found the Emperor John and the Empress Ann

Montesquieu'

Greatness

and

Decline

of

the Romans
when

235

occupied with a council against some enemies of the monks.

And

Mohammed II besieged the city, he

people were more occupied
of

could not suspend the theological

hatreds;

and

there

with

the Council of Florence than with the army

Turks (p. 201).

of

incidents like these that Montesquieu declares, at the end of the chapter, that the failure to separate ecclesiastical and secular power was the ultimate cause of the destruction of the Greek empire. In the very last para
graph of

It is because

the chapter,

however, Montesquieu
a

makes

it

clear that

this

problem

is

not unique to

the Greek empire; in

very devious way, he

suggests

that it is

also quite a serious problem

in his
a

own time.
peculiar presentation of

This is indicated to among the "ancient

tesquieu course,
argues

us

in

very
that

the status of religion

Romans,"

is,

the Romans

of

the republican age. Mon

"reasonable"

that the

Romans followed the

between

"natural"

and

rigorously distinguishing

ecclesiastical and secular power:

"al

though, with the ancient Romans, the clergy did not constitute a separate body, this distinction was as well known to them as it is among (p. 203). He then
us"

goes on to cite a

story

which

is

supposed to confirm

this claim:

Clodius had

consecrated

Cicero's house to
pontiffs

Liberty

and

Cicero, having

returned

from exile, demanded it back. The

without an express order of the

decided that if it had been

consecrated

people, it could be returned to him without

declared,"

offending

said Cicero, "that they had only validity of the consecration, and not the law made by the people; that they had judged the first matter as pontiffs and that they would judge the second as (p. 203). against religion.

"They

examined the

senators"

Oddly

enough, this story

seems to point to the absence rather than the presence

of a separation of church and state and pontiff

in

republican

Rome. The

offices of senator

may have been distinct in principle, but since they were always filled by the very same men, effect fused into one element? Because the Roman
tors wearing

who can

fail to

see

that

church and state were were

was no

in

"pontiffs"

different hats,

this

meant

that

there

real

merely distinction Clodius had Cicero

was

sena

between
used

secular and ecclesiastical power religious power to strike at

religious act

in the Roman

republic

his

his

political

enemy Cicero

and

only by victory (Plutarch, Life of Cicero, xxvm-xxxiv). The example thus establishes the very antithesis of the point Montesquieu was trying to make.
question overturned virtue of political

able to

have the

in

his later

But why does Montesquieu choose such an obviously problematic example here? Are we to attribute this to a kind of sloppiness or even obtuseness on his
part?

moment's reflection points claimed at

to a much more

likely

possibility.

As Mon
and the

tesquieu
modern

the outset of the paragraph that the ancient

perhaps

Romans

French (or
good

by

"us"

modern

equally
secular

understanding

of

the proper

Europeans in general) had an distinction between ecclesiastical and

power, his

presentation of

the Cicero story allows him to make, with

point:

the greatest of

delicacy,

very dangerous, but very important

the French

236
do

Interpretation
"natural"

"reasonable"

not

properly
things"

understand

the
and

and

principle

that

"really
subsist

separate

(spiritual
must

temporal power), things that "can

only

confused" separate,"

when

"never

by

(p. 203). Church

and state are as

badly

confused

in

modern

France

as

they

were

in

ancient

Rome.

pire"

At this point, Montesquieu's true intentions in discussing the "Greek em should be quite clear. David Lowenthal has pointed out that if the Great
Decline
were work of

merely a these final four chapters on "the

ness and

history,
be

history

of

"the

Romans,"

Greeks"

would

superfluous

(Lowenthal,

pp.

144-45). This

remark appears

to be just. Montesquieu does not append these

four
own

chapters

to the work because

so

he is interested in Byzantine
allow

history

for its

sake; he does

because they

him,

under

the

cover of a

discussion

of an ancient and

far-off land, to

predominant political

features

of

very harsh criticism of one of the his time, the interconnection of religious and
express a

political power.

Any
quieu

student of

French

history

can,
of

of

course, see

what

it is that Montes
and

is

worried about.

At the time

the composition of the Greatness

Decline,
ries. voked

religious conflict

As recently as the Edict of Nantes, effectively banning the practice of Protestantism in France and chasing many of the country's most valuable and most productive
citizens

had been tearing France apart for almost two centu 1685 Louis xiv, under pressure from the clergy, had re

abroad; and throughout Montesquieu's

and

lifetime,

the vicious stmggle

a

between Jansenists
active
part

Jesuits

a struggle

in

which

the monarchy took

very

continued

to disturb the peace of the land (Andre

Maurois, A

History
sian

Letters, letters XXIV

the

of France [London: Jonathan Cape, 1949], pp. 219-20; cf. The Per and LXXXV). To anyone even remotely acquainted

with

history

of

France in the

age of

Montesquieu, then,

the

irony

of

the

suggestion
ral"

that the French had achieved a perfect understanding of the "natu

ecclesiastical

distinction between

and secular power would

be painfully
"the
most

obvious.

If the failure to properly distinguish between

vicious source of all the misfortunes of
quieu

church and state was

Greeks,"

the

one wonders

if Montes

does
as a

not regard

the lack of an adequate distinction between the two in

France
expect

lishing
quieu

very grave threat to his own nation. At the very least, one would him to have some sort of strategy for improving the situation, for estab a better separation of ecclesiastical and secular power. As might be
contains several

expected, Chapter xxn itself

thought
are

indications

as

to how Montes

such an enterprise might within one of

be

carried out.

There

two passages

this

chapter

in

which

the theme is the

reform

of a corrupted church.

In

these passages, Montesquieu deals

with

the
at

situation
one

in the Greek

empire

itself. Paragraph 17

opens with the claim

that,

point,

[t]here nearly took place, in the East, much the same revolution that occurred about two centuries ago in the West when, with the revival of letters, people began to sense the abuses and irregularities into which had

they

fallen (p. 197).

Montesquieu'

Greatness

and

Decline

of the

Romans

237

Unfortunately,
completely
as

the potentially useful effects of this proto-Renaissance were

negated

by

the

impetuous
were
it"

actions of more

impatient

reformers.

Just

the revival of letters had led people to begin to seek

who

a reasonable solution

for
the

the problem, "men

church

bold, but insufficiently docile,

(p. 197). Montesquieu

shattered

reforming that the iconoclastic emperors

was counterproductive.

instead

of

claims that the open war

chose to wage against the monks and their abuses

The

explanation

for this

can

be found in
exists

paragraph

42

of this
general

chapter, spirit,

where

Montesquieu
itself
and

argues that

"there

in

each nation a

on which power

itself is based; necessarily

and when

it

[power]

shocks this

spirit, it

strikes against

comes to a

standstill"

(p. 203).

This is
reform

profoundly from within, not

conservative

doctrine,
from

one which counsels slow

but steady

revolution

outside.

The declaration

of war against

the icons (that

is,

against the
of

monks)

was a

failure because it

was

too radical.

As the "general

spirit"

the empire was still one of great piety, the open

attacks of their enemies gave the monks the

card, to fight back

by

making

an appeal

to the people

opportunity to play their trump for support:

The monks,
off track churches

accused of

idolatry by

the partisans of the new opinions, threw them

by

accusing them, in turn, of magic. And showing the people the stripped of icons and of all that had previously constituted their

veneration,

they did

not

let them imagine that

such churches could serve

any

purpose other than

sacrificing to devils (pp. 197-98).

If Montesquieu's

account of the attempt at reform

in the Greek

empire

is any
not on

indication, then,
an open

the

realization of of

his

own great enterprise will

depend

declaration
no

war, but

on a subtle campaign of propaganda.

Montes
with

quieu

is

Voltaire. He is
spirit"

wise enough

to see that an open confrontation

the "general therefore to

of attempt

his

own age would

be

counterproductive.
change without

to gradually and

imperceptibly
letters"

His strategy is that spirit from

preaching,
will

within, to spark a sort of "revival of

allow people

which,

"to begin to The best

Decline

sense

the abuses and irregularities into which this revival of letters

they

[have]
its

fallen."

example of

is,

of

course, the

Greatness

and

itself,

a work which always suggests not offend

but

never makes

point explicitly. not

Montesquieu does

the general spirit of his age

because he does
secular power.

openly

criticize

the French confusion of ecclesiastical and

read

But

what

Frenchman, having

the

long

tale of abuses

in the

Greek

empire sense

that were caused that there might

by

the political power of the monks, would not

with

begin to
cised

be something wrong
To
a certain

the great

power exer

by

the clergy in his

own age?

extent, then, the Greatness and

will

Decline itself (and, perhaps,

other works

like it)
and

be the

proper vehicle

for
the

gradually
and state

bringing

into

effect

the "natural

reasonable

separation of church not

that Montesquieu

seeks.

The book is thus

only
at

diagnosis

of

illness; it is also, in an odd way, the cure. The Greatness and Decline draws to a
Turks
are about to extinguish the

close

just

the point where the

paragraph

Greek

empire.

Montesquieu's final

is

worth

quoting in full:

238

Interpretation
not

I do

have the

courage

to speak of the

woes

that followed. I shall only

suburbs of

say that,

under

the last emperors, the empire,

reduced

to the
when

Constantinople,
ocean

ended

like the Rhine,

which

is only

brook

it loses itself in the

(p. 209).

As David Lowenthal has

enthal,
p.

pointed

out, this final

metaphor

is

rather odd

(Low The

164). Most

rivers are at

their widest when

reaches

they

reach

the

sea.

Rhine is

unusual

because just before it

a

the

ocean most of

its

waters are

diverted into the Waal, proper quite small. The

river that flows

this

off to the west,

leaving
be

the Rhine

significance of

imagery

should

obvious.

Mon

tesquieu is suggesting that while the Roman empire died out in the
essence

East, its

a very (let us say its spirit) is alive and vigorous different interpretation of this passage, see Lowenthal, pp. 164-65.) But this, of course, is to say that Rome's problems are alive and vigorous in Western

in the West. (For

Europe. The Rhine

"one

metaphor

is thus Montesquieu's

graceful

the reader that his book on the Romans

can never

is

"relevant"

way of reminding in the deepest sense, that

leave behind the

Romans"

(Spirit of the Laws,

modern world.

XI,

xiii,

p.

414)
best

because
guide

reflection on reflection on

the problems of the Romans continues to be the the problems of the

for

To the

extent

that the

question of
an

the relationship between

Christianity

and politics

issue

once

more, Montesquieu's claim

would seem

has today become to be no less true for our

time than it was for his own.

NOTES

1
the

All

citations of

the works of Montesquieu are to the second volume of the Pleiade edition of

Oeuvres

completes.

Translations

are

my

own.

2. Montesquieu implies that the

cause, namely the expansion
of

moral

disorders

of the

late

republic as well

had

a political of

the republic (pp. 121-22). Cf. David

Lowenthal, "The Design

Montesquieu's 3.

Considerations,"

"Christians"

appears

Interpretation (Fall 1970), 1.2. pp. 150-51. both in the Pleiade edition (p. 177) and in the 1734 "the first
ecclesiastics"

edition of Des-

bordes (Amsterdam).
were not is undoubtedly link between priestly asceticism and the priestly fixation with power is a favorite theme of Montesquieu. See the twisted autobiographical letter of the First Eunuch in The Persian Letters (vn). (The eunuchs in Usbek's harem may, to a certain extent, be
monks were celibates while

4. The fact that the

of some significance

here. The

curious

understood as stand-ins

for the clergy.) A

similar

thought is also expressed in Book v, Chapter ii

of

The Spirit of the Laws:

Why
Their

do

monks

love their

order so much?

It is precisely because ordinary

of what makes

it intolerable.

rule

deprives them

of all

the things the

passions aim at: there

remains,

therefore, only that passion for the rule itself which afflicts them. The more austere it is, the more it restrains their passions, the more power it gives to the only passion it leaves unrestrained (p. 274).

Rousseau

on

Reading

"Jean- Jacques":

The Dialogues

Christopher

Kelly
County

University
AND

of Maryland Baltimore

Roger D. Masters
Dartmouth College

Most

students of

Rousseau's

political

thought

have tended to ignore his in

which

au

tobiographical writings, or at most to cite passages

circumstances of

he

explains the

the composition of his

obviously
of

theoretical

works.

Those
to

who make greater use of

the autobiographical works usually

do

so

in

order

interpret Rousseau's thought in the light

proach entails sonal

discrediting

the theoretical works

students

derangement. Such

As a rule this ap exposing Rousseau's per follow the lead of Burke who denounced
personality.

his

by

Rousseau's "mad
principles of

confessions of

his

faults"

mad

as a part of
p.

his
a

attack on

the

the French Revolution

(Burke, 1835,
systematic

306).

Only

few

scholars

(Hartle, 1983)
nificance of

have

attempted

any

treatment of the theoretical sig

the

autobiographical works.

If this
all

characterization

is true for the

autobiographical works

in general, it is

the

more

true

of

Rousseau juge de Jean-Jaques. As Dialogues

a rule scholars refer to

Rousseau juge de Jean-Jaques

short title

by

the short title Dialogues. The

is convenient, but its absence from some of the manuscripts suggests that the longer version has the better claim to be Rousseau's own choice for a
title. The translation of the
cause

long

title into English

poses some

difficulties be

the

v/OT&juge can

be

either a noun or a verb scholars

cannot are

be

preserved

in English. The few

in French. This ambiguity who have translated this title

divided between Rousseau Judges Jean-Jacques (Hendel, 1934) and Rous seau, Judge of Jean-Jacques (France, 1987) An Italian translation, Rousseau
giudice

di Jean-Jacques, (Rousseau, 1972)

more common of
said

also uses

the

noun.

We have

elected

the latter (the

which could rendered as

the

two) for

a number of

reasons, none of

be

to

exclude

the

alternative which would

be

more

precisely

Rousseau Judges

about

Jean-Jacques.

until

This book has surely been the least read of Rousseau's important works; recently, most of those who did read it seemed primarily interested in the

This is a revised version of the Introduction to Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues in The Collected Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Vol. I, published by University Press of New England, 1989 and appears here by permission.
interpretation, Winter

1989-90, Vol. 17, No. 2

240

Interpretation
as a source

Dialogues

for

evidence of
sympathetic

the depth of Rousseau's paranoia.

Even

critic who attempts

ble

paranoid and

nightmare
insight"

lucidity

other major works

work by flashes of extraordinary by frequently p. 233). (Grimsley, 1969, Virtually all of Rousseau's almost translated were immediately upon their publication in

to be

describes the

saying, "The terri

is

illuminated

French. The Dialogues has only

now appeared

in English for the first time

(Rousseau,
One
of

1989).
the
reasons

for this

long

period of neglect

first,

or

any

subsequent

glance, the Dialogues is a

is very easy to see. At very peculiar book. It con

sists of

three dialogues between a character named Rousseau and an

interlocu
con

tor identified only as a Frenchman. The two

discuss the bad

reputation of a

famous author, his true character, ducted he

against

him,
and

and not

the substance of

virtually universal conspiracy his books. The Rousseau

being
of

the Dia

logues both is
as
would

is

be if he had

Jean-Jacques Rousseau himself; that is, he is Rousseau read but not written his books and had only recently books is
Jean-

arrived

in France. The

author of the

Jacques,

the character to be
of

judged The
and

by

Rousseau

and

the Frenchman. This preliminary splitting

Rousseau

into two is his

complicated

by

further

splits

that take

place within

the
as

discussion. he really is

major additional split

public

image

"monster."

as a

is between the author, Jean-Jacques This disproportion leads to

the suggestion
a

that there are two different people: one of

them, Jean-Jacques is
The

monster; the

other, the

real author of

the

books, is
Rousseau

not.

dizzying

sions reaches

its height

when

reports after a

quality of these divi visit to Jean-Jacques that

public reputation.

the latter is composing

a series of

dialogues

about

his false

In

effect, the
about

character meets his author at the very moment the author is writing him (Rousseau, 1989, p. 136). Both Rousseau's claim about the existence of a universal conspiracy against

him

and the procedure of

splitting himself into

numerous

characters, those

images,
to

and counter-images are cited as major pieces of evidence assert

by

who wish

Rousseau's insanity. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that such a procedure is not entirely unique to Rousseau or to presumed madmen. The

trilogy
named named

of

Platonic dialogues formed

among looks like

by

the

Theaetetus, Sophist,
a

and

Statesman
a

consists of conversations

a cast of characters

including Socrates,

boy

Theaetetus

who

Socrates,

Socrates,

and a somewhat mysterious

young friend of Theaetetus who is Eleatic stranger who questions his

interlocutors in
of

a manner

that partially (though not completely) resembles that

of the major

themes of the trilogy is the question of between images and their originals. Furthermore the trilogy is par tially framed by another dialogue about how Socratic dialogues came to be written and preserved. Thus Plato apparently thought that a sort of splitting of characters would be dramatically appropriate in the illustration of an important the relation
philosophic

Socrates himself. One

issue

between
ten.

a written

as well as the demonstration of the problematic relation text and the people or subject matter about which it is writ

Rousseau

on

Reading

"Jean-Jacques"

The Dialogues

241

The issues involved in the

sophic

communication or transmission of written philo

doctrines,

which

are of

immense importance throughout the Platonic

corpus,

are Rousseau's overriding concern in the Dialogues. This work is not overtly concerned with the general issue of the relation between original and image. It is, however, concerned with a narrow version of this issue: the rela

tions among Rousseau as he

ceived

is,

as

he

appears
work

by

others.

It

is,

above

all, the

in

which

in his books, and as he is per Rousseau undertakes his

as an

most comprehensive reflection on the relations

among himself
of

author, his

books,
books judged
The
another

and and

his
the

audience.
proper

Rousseau's

reflections on the misjudgments of

his
is
In

way to

judge them links the theme

the Dialogues to
and

Platonic dialogue, the

Apology

in

which

Socrates both judges

by

an audience that

does

not understand and the

him.
are worth noting.

parallels

between

the

Apology

Dialogues

both cases,
religious works

a philosopher

is

accused of

violating

society's

legal,

ethical, and

standards; in
a manner

both,

the

defense

in

that addresses

presenting the thinker's life and the difference between popular and philo
entails

sophic

judgment;

in both, the

claim of

the philosopher's moral concern

for the

city is

combined with an

implicit

condemnation of the political

life. Despite the is

written

autobiographical nature of the

an author who

Dialogues, it
action of with

like the

Apology

by
the

is

absent of

from the hopes to

the dialogue. As these parallels

of

suggest, the treatment

these issues

the Dialogues makes it worthy

attention of anyone who

understand the most serious themes within

Rousseau's thought.

I. THE PLACE OF THE DIALOGUES WITHIN ROUSSEAU'S

"SYSTEM"

The Dialogues has

tem"

an

important
one of

place within what most

Rousseau in

calls

his "sys
he
claims

in

part

because it is
a system.

the

important

contexts

which

that he has

Rousseau first

announced

the existence of a system

in

defense

of

the First

Discourse,

the preface to

"Narcisse"

which was written

in

1753-54 (Rousseau, 1958, Vol. II, p. 964). In the Dialogues, he has the Frenchman declare that the content of Jean-Jacques's books "were things that profoundly thought out and true, but which offered nothing
were

forming

a coherent system which might not

be

contradictory"

(Rousseau, 1989,
moment of

p.

209). This

insight
Thus
at
at

could almost

be

said to

be the culminating
consistent and

the Dialogues.

the end of his

that

literary

career, Rousseau reaffirms what he had asserted

the

beginning,

his thought is
all of
meant

furthermore that it has been

explained

consistently in That the Dialogues is

his
to

works.

bring

Rousseau's

literary
and

enterprise

to a sort

of completion

indicated
intelligor

by

by stressing the Rousseau's choice

(Here I
am

connection of of

his first

last

works

is

also

epigraph, "Barbarus hie

no

ego sum quia non

illis.'"

the

barbarian, because

one understands me).

This line from Ovid is

also the epigraph of the First Discourse.

Some

reflection

242
on

Interpretation
significance of

the

the

shared epigraph can

indicate the

similarities and

dif

the character, Rous ferences between the two works. In fact, in the Dialogues epigraphs for indicating the character of a seau insists on the importance of

book (Rousseau, 1989, Some scholars have

tain
complications

p.

218).

noted that
argument

in the Discourse the

that are not

epigraph points

to

cer

in the

immediately

apparent

(Masters,
that his

1968,

p.

208). In the first place, it indicates that Rousseau

will

anticipates

argument

be

misunderstood.

Second,
he his

the epigraph

identifies Rousseau
of the

himself

with one of

the very poets

condemns

in the text

Discourse. As his
attack on

Rousseau

was obliged

to point out to

critics

time and again,

the arts and sciences is not a blanket condemnation.

same title page
perspective of
Geneva"

As he

announces

in the

that contains the epigraph, Rousseau most openly adopts the

when writing the Discourse. His from Geneva (and his loss of citizenship)

the "Citizen of

epi and

graph calls attention

to his exile

his less
the

open adoption of

the perspective of the poet.

Along

with

its

attack on

effect of

the arts on

healthy
of

communities, the Discourse

contains a com

plaint against

the degradation

contemporary taste

which compels an

artist,

like Voltaire, to "lower his genius to the level of his (Rousseau, 1964, p. 53). In sum, even in his first work Rousseau was capable of splitting himself

time"

into

a number of personae

in his

effort

to present the complexities of an argu

ment.

He

can

be both the

citizen who objects

to the "crowd

authors"

of obscene

like Ovid, (Rousseau, 1964, p. 40) and also be a spokesman for Ovid himself. He can address himself to citizens, common people, and philosophers in the
same work.

The first

of

these implications of the

rather

epigraph

is

also reflected

in the Dia

logues,

although,

than predicting a lack of understanding, the remark

now complains about an

existing

one.

In

spite of

his

efforts

to expound his
of mis

system, Rousseau's thought

continues

to be

misunderstood.

This theme

understanding predominates over all others in the Dialogues. Here the focus on Rousseau's position as a writer is not subordinated to his position as a citizen. He
of no

longer identifies himself

that the

as

the "citizen
the

Geneva."

of

Rousseau's

analysis came to

Geneva in the Letters Written from

Mountain indicates that he

believe
the
reader.

Genevans

shared

the corruption of the French.

Accordingly, in
Rousseau the

Dialogues his

two personae are

Jean-Jacques,

the

writer and

Rousseau is Genevan, but he only very occasionally shows ardor for his homeland (Rousseau, 1989, p. 84). If the epigraph of the Dialogues is not entirely novel for Rousseau, neither is its form. Aside from the dialogue contained in his plays and operas, Rousseau
wrote one other

dialogue himself

with

himself
is

as a character.

This is the Rousseau

this

second preface

to

Julie. To his
not

interlocutor,

who

a man of

letters,

explains

does he is

identify

as a citizen on the title page of

work.

why he Once again

concerned with

misinterpretation of his

responses to the critics of the

intentions. Also, some of his First Discourse resort to a sort of dialogue form

"Jean-Jacques"

Rousseau
as

on

Reading
objections and

The Dialogues
his
responses.

243

Rousseau

quotes
uses

individual

then makes

Thus,
to

he regularly

something approaching
misunderstanding

dialogue form

when

he

seeks

answer critics or

to prevent

misunderstanding.

clearly link the Dia logues to one last work, the Confessions, the immediate predecessor of the Dialogues. In his introduction to the later work, "On the Subject and Form of

The themes

of

and self-explanation

Writing,"

this
clearly.1

Rousseau

explains

the

relation

between these two

works quite

He indicates that he

wrote

the Dialogues in

recognition of a

failure

of

the Confessions. He warns,

who want only some agreeable rapid reading, who sought and found in my Confessions, and who cannot tolerate a little fatigue or maintain only their attention in the interest of justice and truth, they will do well to spare

As for those
that

themselves the boredom of

from seeking to

please

reading this. It is not to them 1 wished to speak, and far them, I would at least avoid the ultimate indignity of seeing
an object of amusement

that the picture of the miseries of my life is

for

anyone

(Rousseau, 1989,
This

p.

7).
to the great difference in

statement points

form between these two

auto
char

biographical
acterization should

works and provides some

justification for Michel Foucault's

"anti-Confessions"

of the

Dialogues

as

the

(Foucault, 1962) It
is less for
a criticism

be kept in mind,

however,

that Rousseau's statement

of the substance of the

Confessions than it is

of some of that work's readers. pleasure

Rousseau
missed

claims

that those who read the Confessions only

extent

have

its

point.

To the

that this

is

a criticism of

the Confessions
readers

itself, it

implies only that Rousseau

rather

made

it too easy for his

to seek pleasure

than understanding.

The

deliberately
the

unpleasant

Dialogues, then, is
The
change

based

on an acknowledgment of

unreliable character of readers.

in focus from the title, Confessions to Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques indi cates this acknowledgment. By confessing to his readers, Rousseau made them

his judges
readers

as

well

as

his

confessors. not

In the Dialogues he has

will

removed

the

from their office, Jacques. This

the

they but he himself

failure
of

be the judge

of Jean-

acknowledgment of a

the Confessions and its

audience proper

is

not

a criticism of

substance of

the Confessions.

By

showing the

way to
manual
works.

judge Jean-Jacques, the Dialogues can be regarded as a sort of training for readers of the Confessions, or indeed for any of Rousseau's other Once they have learned from Rousseau how
to the other works and
read

to

judge,

readers can

turn

back

them properly.
cure

mii-Confessions, the Dialogues is the

simply the for its defects. Whatever defect the

Rather than book

being
be

Confessions may have

the
more

by being

too

agreeable

can

overcome

by

if

even

his Reveries of the Solitary Walker, fatiguing audience is simply uneducable. his decides that Rousseau that then,
Dialogues. It is
not until
sketch

This brief Rousseau's

of the

relation

between the Dialogues

two

and

several

of

other

works

has

revealed

different

aspects

of

this

baffling

244
work.

Interpretation

First,

the Dialogues brings Rousseau's

philosophic

system

to
of

a sort of

completion.

Rousseau's

reuse of

his first

epigraph and

his device
of work

splitting

himself into different

consistent and

characters affirm

that his entire

body

is

internally
focusses

guided

by

single

purpose.

Second,

the Dialogues

special attention on

judgments

made about

Jean-Jacques himself. Rousseau in

sists upon

the

goodness of

his

own character and on

its

being

misunderstood.

Perhaps the

key

to understanding the Dialogues

is to be

see

one theoretical and the other

personal,

should

contained and

why these two themes, in the same work.

of Jean-

What is the Jacques?

relation

between Rousseau's

system

the character

II. THE AUTHOR AND HIS SYSTEM

A preliminary description of the relation between Rousseau's system and the character of Jean-Jacques can come from a rephrasing of the question. While
the central part of the Dialogues

is

description

of

Jean-Jacques's character,
of Jeanreal

the necessity for this description is

provided

by

the

false descriptions

Jacques circulating in public opinion. From the beginning of the work the Jean-Jacques is placed in opposition to his reputation as "an abominable
"monster"

man"

or even a of

(Rousseau, 1989,
is
opposed read

pp.

and

12). Furthermore the

character

the monster

to the character of the

as

books

such as

Julie

and

Emile.
unac

Rousseau has

the

books, but

a recent arrival

from

abroad

is

quainted with the

bad

reputation of the supposed author.

The Frenchman knows

the reputation, but because of it

solved

he has

not read

the books. The mystery to be

by
and

these interlocutors is the mystery of the disproportion between the the

reputation of

books

the author. Are the books exemplars of virtue or of

and

hypocrisy? Are they filled with a subtle influential interpreters injected them with
If the books
of

corrupting

poison or

have their
before?

venom where there was none

are

filled

with

virtue,
p.

mire"

(Rousseau, 1989,
who

they have been written by "a soul 8)? Is the monster Jean-Jacques a plagiarist, and,
how
could

if so,

is the

real author of

these books?

Contained in this
today's critics he

series of questions

is

Rousseauian

account of readers.

the impor
some

tance of the relations among an author, his

of

book,

and

his

Unlike

insists that books do

or can contain

intelligible teachings

about matters such as virtue or nature such

that are in the world outside the texts. On

need no support

matters, in principle, the books

beyond the force

of their

arguments and their correspondence to experiences accessible to the readers.

spite of

In

his insistence

on

the truth of

Rousseau is
pretation of

also acutely aware of his books. The character

his reasoning, or perhaps because of it, the difficulties involved in the accurate inter
"Rousseau"

prejudices about their author.

books

were written

by

a single

read these books without any He knows, or thinks he knows, only that the author. He defends this unknown author against

Rousseau

on

Reading
to

"Jean-Jacques"

The Dialogues

245

charges of plagiarism and claims

be

able

to

by

Jean-Jacques from
arrived

ones

falsely

attributed to

distinguish books truly written him. Rousseau's position as a

This
was a

recently

foreigner
not

gives a

him

a privileged status as a reader. condition

necessary,

although

sufficient,

meaning

of

the books. Rousseau explains

for his ability to detect the the need to approach the books with
the

an open mind:

"Don't
or

even

think of the author as you read, and without any

your soul experience

bias

either

in favor
will

against, let

impressions it

will

receive.

You

thus assure yourself of the

p.

books"

these
position of

(Rousseau, 1989,

intention behind the writing of 31). For readers not in Rousseau's fortunate

ignorance,

unlucky majority, the

on a prior sets out the

successful understanding is a profound problem. For this interpretation of the books is dependent in decisive ways

interpretation

of the author.

Within the Dialogues, the first dialogue

the second

issues to be discussed
It is only
after

and

investigates Jean-Jacques's

true

character.

this investigation that the third dialogue can

describe the

content of

the books and the proper method for reading them.

Thus,
from

at

first,

the Dialogues is less concerned with the status of the author's

with

system than

it is

the way that system

will

be

approached

by

readers.

Far

being

concerned with a matter of

purely

personal

interest to Rousseau (or its

of professional concerned with

interest to

students of abnormal

psychology) the Dialogues is

the effective communication of a philosophic the author's name or

reputation. narrow

teaching

and

dependence

on

This issue

at the center of

the Dialogues has both a

significance.

scholarly impor
to the

tance and a broader political

Reference

was made above

long

tradition of Rousseau scholarship that

focuses

and regards

his books purely

and

as expressions of

Rousseau's personality that personality. In effect, the

on

Dialogues
sure,

predicts

attempts

to

preempt

such

a critical

response.

To be

modem scholars are more

likely
mental

to characterize Rousseau as a

madman

(or

as someone

suffering from

illness)

than as a monster. As a result

outright

adopt a condescending tone rather than Like the Frenchman of the Dialogues, these

they

hostility
are

to his

works.

critics

distracted from the

true. In Rousseau's
such

substance of the work

because their

view of

the author's personality makes it

profound or

inconceivable
account, the

to them that the work could their system can

character

be

works and

be

rescued

from

interpretations

only by the Rousseau

a made about

defense

of

his

(unless there
to the

are other

interpreters who, like

of the claims

of the

Dialogues,

come

works

in ignorance
openness

Jean-Jacques's

character or at

least

with

to alternative
on

claims).

The Dialogues is Rousseau's

attempt

to avoid

depending
project of

such a

lucky

occurrence. explanation of

One

the

political aspect of

Rousseau's

forcing
his

his
de

readers to
of

focus

on

his personality

can

be

seen

in

a consideration of

account

the importance
about

of nonrational persuasion

in

politics.

Although

one can

bate
it

cannot

Rousseau's revolutionary intentions and his prudential conservatism, be denied that Rousseau wished his books to have an influence outside

246

Interpretation
conference.

the academy or scholarly

seau wise
men"

From the

beginning
win

of

his

career

Rous few

distinguished between
and

what

is necessary to

"the

approval

of a

public"

"the

approval of

the

(Rousseau, 1964,

p.

33). Although

he

expresses a preference

latter. The importance

such as and

of

for the former, he is by no means indifferent to the this distinction led Rousseau to write in popular forms
tone even

novels, plays, and autobiography

to

adopt a

decidedly

unacademic must

normally shunned by philosophers in his most philosophic works. in

part as an attempt

Although the Dialogues

be

understood

to

defend

Rousseau's
cates that

character

his true

audience p.

before the public, his is "good

choice of a rather

less

popular

form indi

minds"

than seekers of pleasure

(Rousseau, 1989,
dramatization
of

the need

7). In sum, the Dialogues is a philosophic or unpopular for a way to influence unphilosophic readers.
philosophic audience and

In the Dialogues the distinction between the

popular audience

the

in the two characters, Rousseau, and the French as begin discussion. the From the beginning Rousseau declares man, they "About things I can judge by myself, I will never take the public's judgments
embodied as rules

is

for my
secret

own"

(Rousseau, 1989,
desires"

p.

19). He
"judge"

resolves

to

be

guided neither of

by

"the

of on

his heart

or

by

"the interpretations
of

others."

In

short, he insists

being

an

independent

Jean-Jacques

(Rousseau,

1989,
public

p.

85). The Frenchman, on the contrary, is completely dependent on opinion; his knowledge of Jean-Jacques and his books is the product of
responds

hearsay. He consistently

to Rousseau's arguments

by

making

appeals

to the number of people who are on the other side and to the good character of their authorities. In the end the Frenchman reads and understands the

books,

but he does

only after he hears the defense of Jean-Jacques's character given in the second dialogue. He may end as a philosophic reader, but he begins as an unphilosophic one. Unlike Rousseau, his openness to the books is dependent
so on

his

opinion of the character of

the author. He is the picture of

of

someone

enslaved to public opinion

because

his trust in the authority

character of

of

those who

direct it.
This
connection

between trust in the

the

the author of a

teaching
under

and acceptance of

teaching has

an

important

place

in Rousseau's

standing

of political

life.

Frequently
pp.

he

emphasizes

the near impotence of rea

son alone

to

have

an effect on more than a

few

people can

(Rousseau, 1958, Vol.

Ill,

p.

955

and

Vol. IV,

1 142-44). Others
of persuasion.

be influenced only
might even

by

variety of nonrational methods Rousseau the very possibility of humans to this isolation
appears
of

One

say that

for
the

social

life is

constituted

by

the susceptibility of

nonrational

persuasion,

the pure state of nature.

a susceptibility Perhaps Rousseau's

which

they lack in

clearest example of the

of the authority given by character (although far from his only one), in the Letters Written from the Mountain, in which he defends the Social Contract. In the course of this defense, he explains the success of Chris

importance

tianity. There he

distinguishes three different

"proofs"

of

Christian doctrine.

Rousseau
The least
significant are of coherent

on

Reading

"Jean-Jacques"

The Dialogues

247

miracles,

which can

inspire only those

p.

people who are

and slave of

"incapable
the senses

reasoning,

of slow and sure

observation,

in

everything"

(Rousseau, 1958, Vol. Ill,

729). Most

certain

is

the doctrine

itself, but

this "proof is understood only

widespread acceptance of the

by

few. The

most

important "proof for the

of

doctrine is the

character

those who preach it. Rousseau says that "their sanctity, their veracity, their their mores pure and without stain, their virtues

justice,

inaccessible to human
which, if

passions

are, along

with

the qualities of understanding, reason, mind, knowl

edge, prudence, as many respectable

men."

indices,

the combination

of

nothing belies them, form a complete proof in their favor, and say that they are As this passage makes clear, Rousseau was convinced that the more than
truth of a

teaching

was

insufficient to

give

it

a practical
people.

arena,

even or

especially among
character

good and

just

efficacy in the public Thus the defense of

practical

Jean-Jacques's
effect.

is indispensable if his
people will

system

is to have any

Even
a

fundamentally just
bad
reputation

simply

not give a

hearing

to those

who

have

(Kelly, 1987a).
Rousseau's
popular

Some

who

have

opposed

influence have his

a

agreed with

his

analysis of

the connection between opinions about

of

character and

that influ

ence.

Burke's treatment

Rousseau in his "Letter to

There Burke
the basis of

Member

of

the National
on personal

Assembly"

was mentioned above.

attacks

Rousseau

grounds much more than on

an analysis of

his thought. He justifies

this

approach

example

saying "Your assembly, knowing how much more powerful is found than precept, has chosen this man (by his own account with

by

out a single

virtue) for

model"

(Burke, 1835,
analysis.

p.

306). Burke's

remark

is in

complete accord with

Rousseau's

III. THE PLACE OF ROUSSEAU'S SYSTEM WITHIN THE DIALOGUES

To this
system

point

the Dialogues can

appear as a

necessary

prelude

to Rousseau's

with an open mind. precondition of of

that, if it is successful, predisposes the reader to approach the system As such the Dialogues is external to the system, it is the
or even advertisement

for

the system,
respects

it

would not

be

a part

the

system

represents the system.

itself. There are, however, two First, there is the description

and

in

which

the Dialogues

of

the system that

called

is

given

in the third dialogue

second, there

is

what could

be

the drama of the

Dialogues

which embodies or portrays crucial aspects of of

the system.

The description
one.

the system given in the third dialogue is a very simple the necessity of reading Jean-Jacques's
character

Having

been

convinced of

books
the

by

Rousseau's

account of undertaken

the

author's of

in the

second

dialogue,

Frenchman has

the task

deciphering

the system. He claims

that,

among

the books of this age, Jean-Jacques's are uniquely difficult to read.

paradoxi

They

are

filled

with

"ideas

and maxims

that are very

(Rousseau,

248

Interpretation
p.

1989,

211)

as

well

as

apparent

contradictions.

These

real

paradoxes

and

apparent contradictions can

be

clarified

the end of this effort,

on
one
main

however,
and a

one will
number

only by discover
of

a sustained effort of study. a clear system which principles

At

is based
the

principle

secondary

of which

Frenchman The ary

mentions

only

one.

main principle of

the system could be called Jean-Jacques's revolution

saw

principle.

The Frenchman says, "I

throughout [the
man

books]
and

the

develop
213). In

ment of

his

great principle

that nature

made

happy

good, but that

p.

society depraves him and makes him its insistence on natural happiness, this
or

miserable"

(Rousseau, 1989,
a rejection of

principle

is

the Hobbesian

liberal understanding of human life outside of society as insistence on untainted natural goodness and the social origin
a rejection of

miserable. of

In its

depravity, it is

the Christian understanding

of original sin.

The

second principle

cited

by

the Frenchman limits the revolutionary consequences that might be

principle.

drawn from the first

"But human

nature

does

not go and

backward,

and

it

is

never possible

to return to the times of

have been left

Jacques's
tion

behind."

prudential

equality they It is this secondary principle that accounts for Jeanconservatism. Because he has no hopes for the reinstituonce

innocence

of natural

goodness, he restricts

will mitigate or retard

himself to recommending measures that the inevitable corruption. In a work devoted to his public
silent about

reputation

Rousseau is

the possibility

of a radical change of

society it

which would cure corruption without a return

to nature.

The

account of the

basic

principles of

the author's system is useful, but

by
the

no means claims to other

be

a complete exposition.

One

would

like to

see a

list

of

secondary principles, for

one should

example.

One

should also

keep

in

mind

that this

characterization of the system

is

given about

by

the Frenchman. Rousseau warns ear

opinions ex

lier that
pressed

be

careful

by

characters

in his

works

attributing to Jean-Jacques (Rousseau, 1989, p. 70).

an

The Frenchman's
so

account of

his reading is
the results of

is Rousseau's

presentation of

extremely important one and this reading. The Frenchman does ideal
world portrayed

not experience

the

immediate

communication of the

in

the first dialogue. He understands Jean-Jacques's books only after he has read them numerous times with particular care. Furthermore, he more obviously
grasps the

basic

principles of even when

the writings than he

does their implications

makes

and

details. Finally,
sages.
reads.

he transcribes texts, he
to see exactly what

many

small errors

some of which could

be

attributed unable

to carelessness and others to

rewriting

pas

He

appears

to

be

is before his

eyes when

he

Thus Rousseau
even

reveals or suggests the practical

most sympathetic and

impossibility
reader.

of a perfect

reading
of a

from the

painstaking

Even though

suggesting

that both

immediate transparent
a

communciation and the

lesser

goal

reading of Frenchman does achieve

and their author.

perfect

text are

impossible, Rousseau indicates

that the

an essentially correct understanding of both the books Perfect transparency is impossible, but genuine understanding

Rousseau

on

Reading

"Jean-Jacques"

The Dialogues

249

is merely difficult. Nevertheless, this account can orient the potential reader who can begin to judge any one of Rousseau's books by seeing how the work in
question applies

these principles to a particular problem, such as an educa

tion that can preserve natural goodness or the options available within particular
corrupt societies.

Within the Dialogues, the

that of explaining

account of

the

system

has

an additional

function,

Jean-Jacques himself

and

his

relations with

the conspirators.

After all, if this system is a true account for those most unusual
those
who conspire

human nature, it should be able to individuals, the discoverer of the system and
account of

to make him miserable. In

false"

fact,

the Frenchman admits that

"his

system

thing

that

(Rousseau, 1989, p. 212), but insists that the one may be it unquestionably describes accurately is Jean-Jacques. Jeanhuman
goodness
of and

Jacques's
ability to
"A
man

account of natural reject

happiness depends
To
some

on or

his in

the social distortions

human
so

nature.

extent,

some sense

he

must

have

moved

backward

that he could rediscover nature.

this"

had to portray himself to show us primitive man like (Rousseau, 1989, p. 214). This assertion of Jean-Jacques's own naturalness is only the echo of what Rousseau has already asserted about him: "He is what nature
made

him. Education has

changed

him very

little"

(Rousseau, 1989,

p.

107). In

making this claim of an intimate relation between Jean-Jacques's personality and his system, Rousseau and the Frenchman seem to be defending the person ality
at

the expense of the system.

One its

might well

claim

that a systematic

explaination of nature

is

a reflection of and

author's character

if

one wished

to

dismiss the

system.

Rousseau
are

the Frenchman are not attacking the system,

pointing out that Jean-Jacques was able to discover the true principles of human nature only because he is the virtually unique example of someone who has "started by removing the (Rousseau, 1989,
rust"

however. Instead, they

p. on

214) from his

his

own nature.

Jean-Jacques's

discovery

of

his

system

depends

having

acquired some access

to primitive

nature.

For his books to be

true, he must be, in some sense, the man of his books. If Jean-Jacques is the incarnation of the great principle
appears to

of

his system, he
a natural some

be

the refutation of

the second principle; that

can go what

is, if he is
at

man, he

seems

to demonstrate that nature

some extent

backward

least in

individuals. To

this is precisely

Rousseau intends to teach.

possible

Emile's education, for example, is meant to show how it might be some individual to escape the corruption of a social upbringing.
While

for

all this is true, it must also be said that the Jean-Jacques of the Dia bears logues only a very limited resemblance to the natural humans described in the first part of the Second Discourse or to the young Emile. Like these natural humans he is good, but not virtuous (Rousseau, 1989, p. 126) and like them he

is free from the distinctive

ever, he is
a

social passion of amour propre.

knower,

discoverer

of a philosophic system

that

Unlike them, how is beyond their

natural attribute

comprehension.

In addition, he

possesses

the

most

important

250

Interpretation
a

only in
selves

very

qualified sense.

Purely
p.

natural

(Rousseau, 1958,

Vol.

IV,

249).

humans live completely in them Especially they lack imagination that

away from themselves (Rousseau, 1958, Vol. Ill, p. 144). As for Jean-Jacques, it is true that "he can truly say, in contrast to those people in the Gospel and those in our day, that where is heart is, there too is his but this reversal of the formulation from the Sermon on the Mount
could take their thoughts
treasure,"

means

who

only that he is free from the torments of foresight that plague Christians hope for salvation or the bourgeois who hope for wealth. Jean-Jacques's
exercises

"heart"

itself in constantly renewed flights of the imagination, one of which allowed him to rediscover nature, but others of which lead him to purely imaginary worlds. In the latter flights even his perception of nature, his "physi is radically altered by his imaginative "moral (see 112-128). He nature sees Rousseau, 1989, pp. very differently from those natural humans who seek only food and rest. Thus rather than being a natural
cal
sensitivity," sensitivity"

human,

Jean- Jacques

is

civilized

human

who

has

preserved

some

natural

characteristics represented

by

along Jean-Jacques is

with some

one of

radically developed

civilized ones.
civilized

The

manner of

being

imagination liberated
of

from the

corruption of amour propre and an example of what social nature

foresight. Instead humans

could

being

a natural even

human, he is
from
nature

be.

Thus,

in

"Jean-Jacques,"

has

not quite gone

backward;

the irreversible

departure

has been

given

direction that is both salutary

civilized

and somewhat

consistent with nature.

This
contrast
might

picture

of

quasi-natural picture of

human

must

be

understood

in

to the opposite

the conspirators. However implausible one

the very complicated plot against
"Jean-

find Rousseau's

presentation of

Jacques,"

one must also acknowledge that the conspirators are perfect extreme
versions of cal
works.

the corruption Rousseau attributes to social humans

in his

theoreti

While

"Jean-Jacques"

represents

civilized

imagination liberated

from foresight

and amour propre,

the conspirators represent civilized imagina

tion enslaved to foresight and

of

amour propre.

The

conspirators are the victims

the most extreme departure from nature just as much as

they

are

the vicious

perpetrators of a crime against an

innocent

man.

They

are

immensely powerful,
France
and

exercising
of

as

they do

a complete control over the government of

p.

the

public opinion of

Europe (Rousseau, 1989,

the

77). Nevertheless, the direction

a sign of

this power into a conspiracy against

Jean-Jacques is
when

their enslave

ment.

They

are obsessed with

future

they

take endless precautions to

control outside

Jean-Jacques's
themselves in

present

and

future

reputation.

Furthermore, they live

does
even

a much more radical sense

than Jean-Jacques

though

they
and

exercise power

in the

real world and

he flees to

imaginary

worlds.

"While he is himself

occupied with

himself, they

are occupied with

him too. He loves

they hate him. That is the occupation of both. He is everything to he is also everything to them. For as for them, they mean nothing himself; either to him or to (Rousseau, 1989, pp. 154-55). Thus the Diathemselves"

Rousseau
logues
presents two

"Jean-Jacques"

on

Reading
pictures of

The Dialogues
to

25 1
civi

different

the extreme

possibilities open

lized humans: seeking one's happiness in flights of imaginative reverie and withdrawal from public life, or seeking one's happiness in the distant future and the exercise of power over one's fellows. These are the opposing poles around which civilized humans, unable to go back to the forest and live with
the bears and unfortunate not to
must orient

live in the

healthy

communities of

antiquity,

their lives.
reveals much about

The Dialogues directed

against of

Rousseau's

obsession with a and

conspiracy
the active the French
attributed

him

by

his former friends Diderot like Voltaire

and

Grimm

with

complicity

both

philosophes

d'Alembert
attributed

and

government.

Surely

a part of

this obsession must

be

(and is

by

Rousseau

himself)
to

to his peculiar personality. For two reasons,

connect

however, it
from the

would

be

a mistake

the conspiracy solely to Jean-Jacques's psycho

experience persecution

logical

condition.

First, Rousseau did in fact

French government, the Genevan government (which apparently acted against him because of pressure from the French government) and other governments. Public demonstrations were in fact stirred up against him. Finally his former

friends

and associates

did in fact

make concerted efforts

to damage his reputa

will of

tion and financial position. Examples abound to

illustrate the ill

many

of

Rousseau's

contemporaries and of their efforts to act upon that

ill

will.

for paying attention to Rousseau's discussion of has even less to do with Jean-Jacques's personality or mental spiracy the Dialogues, he claims that he is only incidentally the object of the The
second reason

the con
state.

In

conspir

acy.

Its true

object

is to

destroy

the current foundation of society and to provide

a new one which would

tuals sharing the opinions of

rants serious attention
of

solidify the influence of a faction or sect of intellec Grimm, Diderot and the others. This charge war
so

because it

precisely

mirrors

these

men's

understanding

themselves. Who would want to

was united a

deny

that around the project of Diderot's

Encyclopedia

party

or sect

linked

ions

and

interests,

that these men

and women

both generally shared opin hoped to modify the traditional

by

basis

of public opinion which

they

regarded as

hoped

to gain influence over the public, and that to do so

infamous prejudices, that they they had to act in a

. . .

more or

less

conspiratorial way?

As Peter
troupe,

Gay

thought

of themselves as a petite

with

has said, "The philosophes common loyalties and a common

world view.

This
a

sense survived all

their high-spirited quarrels: the philosophes

party"

did

not

have

party line, but they

claim

were a

(Gay, 1966,

p.

Wilson, 1972, Starobinski, 1988,

1963). Rousseau's

and

for

comparable

case of

6; see also Hamburger,

is in

humanity"

is that the Enlightenment's

"party

fact essentially indistinguishable from other parties and that its effects will be pernicious. Thus the Dialogues present in a more radical form arguments against the Enlightenment project which Rousseau had already made in the
First Discourse, the Letter
opposition

to

d'Alembert

and elsewhere.

He

claims that

it is his

to this

project

that causes him to be

treated as a traitor.

252

Interpretation

CONCLUSION

One be

would

hardly

wish

to

deny

that the Dialogues contains expressions of

Jean-Jacques's

mental anguish at

the time of

its

composition.

Nevertheless,
of the

to

read properly, this work

must also

be

seen as a

dramatization

funda

mental principles of

Rousseau's

systematic

thought and

his deepest
to

reflections

on

the problem of making this

systematic

thought

accessible

an audience.

By

attempting to teach his readers how to judge not only to secure his own reputation, but also to
understanding
of

"Jean-Jacques,"

Rousseau hopes

open

the way to an accurate

his thought.
the Dialogues and, still more, the postscript called
Writing"

The

conclusion of

"His

tory

of

the

Preceding
of

indicate that Rousseau

was not optimistic about

the prospects for the success of

abandon

his

work.

In the latter Rousseau

understand

seems to

hope

finding

the sort of readers who can

converted

his

work.

Even only

in the Dialogues itself the

that

Frenchman

and

Rousseau

conclude

they
his

will offer consolation

to Jean-Jacques and work unobtrusively to pre

can

serve

works

for the

day they

be

appreciated as and

they deserve. Rousseau's

be
and

principle retarded

that

nature never goes

backward be

that at best corruption can

implies that

proper

judgments

about

Jean-Jacques humans

his

system will

be

rare

indeed: his

readers will all

more or

less denatured

and corrupt.

If it is
147-

true that the

denaturing

undergone

by

civilized

removes

them so far
pp.

from

primitive nature

that

they
In

cannot recognize

it (Rousseau, 1989,

48), it is hard
either

to see how Rousseau could expect any readers to understand

system.

him

or

his

fact,
after
will

near

the conclusion of the Dialogues Rous

seau suggests that people will recover

engraved

"those innate feelings that

nature

has

in

hearts"

all p.

(Rousseau, 1989,
popular success

only 242). It

the depth of corruption has been reached

at

only be

this point that a

general apprecia

tion of Jean-Jacques and his system could occur. In other words, the complete,
of

the Dialogues depends on changes in human nature that

Rousseau

considers

himself

powerless

to

bring

about.

If the

principles

of

Rousseau's
relations

true, he is constantly faced with the dilemma of the between the author and his failure to understand that is the
system are
readers'

theme

of

the Dialogues. The Dialogues itself can overcome that dilemma for
corruption.

only a few readers who have avoided the general can join Rousseau in judging Jean-Jacques.

Only

these few

NOTES

For

discussion

of

the

relation

between the Confessions

and

the Dialogues that repeats and

enlarges on some of

these points

see

Kelly, 1987b.

Rousseau
REFERENCES

on

Reading

"Jean-

Jacques"

The Dialogues

253

Burke, Edmund. 1835. "Letter

London:

to a Member of the

National

Assembly,"

in Works.

Henry

G. Bohn.
"Introduction"

Foucault, Michel. 1962.

to Rousseau Juge de Jean-Jacques: Dialogues.

Paris: Librairie Armand Colin.

France, Peter. 1987. Rousseau Gay, Peter. 1966. The Enlightenment:

New York: Knopf.

"Confessions"
.

Cambridge: Cambridge

University

Press.

an

Interpretation. The Rise of Modern Paganism.

Self- Awareness.

Grimsley, Ronald. 1969. Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Study in

Cardiff:

University University

of

Wales Press.
and the

Hamburger, Joseph. 1963. James Mill

Press.

Art of Revolution. New Haven: Yale

Hartle, Ann. 1983. The Modern Self in Rousseau's Confessions: A Reply to St. Au gustine. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. Hendel, Charles W. 1934. Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Moralist. New York: Bobbs-Mer
rill, 1934.

Kelly, Christopher.
Rousseau's 1987.

1987a.

'"To Persuade

Convincing:'

without

The Language

of

Legislator,"

American Journal of Political Science, Vol,

"Confessions"

37, 2, May

as Political Kelly, Christopher. 1987b. Rousseau's Exemplary Life: The Philosophy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Masters, Roger D. 1964. The Political Philosophy of Rousseau. Princeton: Princeton

University
Pleiade.

Press.
completes.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1958-1969. Oeuvres

Paris: Bibliotheque de la

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1964. The First

Masters Press.
and translated

and

Second Discourses,

edited

by

Roger D.

by

Roger D.

and

Judith R. Masters. New York: St. Martin's

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1972.

Rousseau

giudice

di Jean-Jacques, in Opere.

ed.

by

Paolo Rossi. Firenze: Sansoni.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1989. Rousseau,

Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues in The Collected Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Vol. I. ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly and trans. Judith R. Bush, Christopher Kelly, and Roger D. Mas
ters.

Hanover, N.H.: University Press

of

New England.
and

Starobinski, Jean. 1988. The

Chicago Press.

Transparence

the

Obstacle. Chicago:

University

of

Wilson, Arthur M. 1972.

Diderot. New York: Oxford

University

Press.

Emile Durkheim
Mark S. Cladis
Stanford

and

Provinces

of

Ethics

University

"It has been

morals

observed

by

Aristotle,"

vary according to the agents Durkheim continues, "on the

mark,"

Durkheim notes, "that, in some degree, who practice The observation is

them."1

and

"nowadays has

far

greater

field

of

application

than

Aristotle

could

have has its

imagined."

Durkheim describes four

spheres of social sal or

life

the

domestic,
sphere

the civil, the professional, and the univer

own moral

international. Each

This "moral in
no

particularism"

or

"moral

polymorphism,"

reasoning and vocabulary. as Durkheim calls it, is

way

surprising.

Moral beliefs
and

and practices

have developed
to hope
and or

historically
one says

under various

circumstances,

there

is

no reason

desire that

ethnography,"

ethical system could accommodate

them all.

"History
and

Durkheim,
Durkheim

are

the appropriate tools for studying the nature of

some ethicists would

morals and

rights

(f.5/t.l). What
calls

deplore

label

moral

fragmentation,

"provinces

ethics"

of

historically

fashioned

spheres of moral

ity. His reasoning here fits well with a central argument in his The Division of Labor and with much of his other work: the acceptance of diversity need not

imply

the rejection of morality. As a society spawns various social milieux,

each milieu

brings into play distinct moral practices and beliefs. Social goods, goals, values, levels of homogeneity, rules of membership, and a host of other considerations are peculiar to each milieu. This is not to

overlapping goals or shared values. It is to point out that a similarity between the arrangements, activities, and pursuits of each sphere cannot be assumed. Conflict within and between these provinces of ethics is not unusual

deny

or

necessarily regrettable; nor,

times destructive

on

the

other

hand, is it

systematically
sometimes

encour at

aged or praised.
other

Usually inevitable,
conflict

at times avoidable,

fruitful,

is

a general concept applied

conflict

to a

multitude of

situations.

According
resolved,
the

to

Durkheim,

is to be

understood

evaluated,

ignored

or

praised or

blamed

in the

context of all of

the

common good.

That, in fact, is
he writes, "is

proper context

for

interpreting

Durkheim's discussion "Social

life,"

on the spheres of social

life
to

and

the attending plurality

of

of morals.

above all a

harmonious community
work

endeavors, when minds

and wills come together

for the

end"

same

(f.22/t.l6).

would of

like to thank
article.

Jeffrey
article

Stout

of

Princeton

University

for his

acute comments on an earlier

working manuscript, Individuals in Community: Emile Durkheim's Communitarian Defense of Liberalism, to be published by Stanford University Press.

draft

this

The

is

part of a

interpretation, Winter 1989-90, Vol. 17, No. 2

256

Interpretation

For Durkheim there

goods, the

is, then,
That is

good not

which

supercedes

all

other

social
a clear com

common good.

to say,

however,

that there

is

hierarchy
mon good

of social

goods,

capped with

the weighty common good. time again out of the

society.

The

is

contextual.

It

emerges time and

deliberation
the com
individual."

and reflection and critical spirit of a

mon

democratic

Moreover,

good, in modern, democratic societies, is not opposed to "the Durkheim helps us get beyond the present impasse between some liberals
communitarians who

and

insist that

our allegiance must

be

with either

(the

liberals')
not with

"individual

rights"

both. We
choose

no

(the communitarians') "common longer need to remain in the uncomfortable

or

good,"

but

position of

having

to

between these two positions, because Durkheim gives us a way to cap ture the merits of both. He argues, for example, that the common good resists
authoritarian regimes

that threaten the autonomy

of

the

individual,

and

that it
ex

blocks secondary groups (unions, families, ample) from "swallowing up their

diate
domination"

professional

organizations, for

members,"

placing them under their "imme

common good and what

(t.60/f.73

and

76). If the

Durkheim

calls moral

individualism (the

rights and

dignity

of the

individual)
of moral

posed to each
guides

other, it is because the

nature and

force

are not op individualism

how

we establish

the nature and force of the common good.

This essay is about Emile Durkheim and a specific form of moral pluralism, what he calls "a plurality of the moral beliefs and practices peculiar to four spheres of social life. I concentrate as does Durkheim on the occu
morals"

pational

specifically that of industry and commerce. I argue that Durkheim's remedy for this debilitated sphere, the formation of occupational,
sphere,

the

secondary groups, needs to be understood in relation to the civic sphere, that is, democratic political community. And I highlight how Durkheim articulates
the plurality of morals in the
common goods.
of standard

idiom
other

of social

traditions and commitment to

He

fashions, in
and

words,

liberal

communitarian

values).

promises ways to maintain commitment

vocabulary (a mingling This vocabulary, I believe, to noble aspects of both liberal and
a mixed

communitarian ways of

thinking

about society.

The

provinces of ethics are moral ethos

relatively

autonomous.

We

should not

expect,

for example, the

that of the

civic sphere.

governing the domestic sphere to be the same as Children, for instance, are not granted the same rights
in the
civic.

in the domestic

sphere as

Yet the

spheres are

interrelated,

and edu

hence
cation

their

autonomy is

relative.

For example,

when

the state requires an

for

a child which

the child's parents consider morally offensive, there is

of parents and

a conflict

between the rights

those

of

the state. There is often

conflict within each sphere as well.

Take,

for

instance,

the sixteen-year-old

Emile Durkheim
who

and

Provinces of Ethics

257
His
and

desired

risky

medical operation

to alleviate his grand mal seizures.

parents,

fearing

the dangers involved in the difficult operation,

forbade it,

the issue
was

In this case, conflict within the domestic sphere transformed, in part, into conflict between the domestic and civic spheres.
was settled court.

in

The young man's operation was a success. Conflict between and within moral milieux is
ought not

not

necessarily grievous,

and

be taken

as a sign of moral anarchy.

of common sense:

The

moral ethos of each sphere

is

"special form

morality"

terous, in the literal

standing (the

Do

not

(f.50/t.39). This may sound prepos the special forms of morality combined
shared under
shaped

constitute a common morality?

Not according to Durkheim. A

collective

consciousness),

by

a common
and

language, his
which

tory,

and

culture,

provides

a store of moral practices

beliefs

are

applied

to special circumstances. No doubt via this application the collective

consciousness

consciousness

itself changes, however subtly; and no doubt the collective does not always unambiguously. Various readings can
"speak"

emerge
mon

from

a common even as

text.

Still,

plurality

of morals springs as

from

a com
con

source,

it

amends that source.

of all move

And insofar

the individual

sciousness

"the

morals"

seat

is fashioned
within not

by

"the"

collective con

sciousness, individuals

felicitously

and

between "the different

fields

life."

of collective

The point, again, is

of conflict.

that the collective conscious

ness excludes

the possibility

Only

that a plurality of morals and the

attending

conflict need not

necessarily
a common

alarm

us, for these

belong

to a common,

shared understanding.

Individuals

nurtured

in

morality, as manifested

in the

various

spheres of social

condition,
a

life, is a condition for a harmonious, moral pluralism. This however, is not entirely met in modern, industrial societies, and for
Durkheim its
concentrates
on

variety

of reasons.

this
a

reason:

the economic
of mo

sphere

governed

by

professional ethics existence make

has
passed

"only

faint impression

rality, the
ence"

greater part of

is

(t.l2/f. 18). And to

marked

matters

divorced from any moral influ worse, the immoral ethos of this
egoism, is

sphere,

by

individual

and corporate

threatening

to

dominate

other social spheres.

The

economic

sphere

is itself (the

quite pluralistic.

In

fact,
any

there

is

a greater

amount of moral

heterogeneity

in the economic sphere than in the

sphere

domestic,
grouping")
economic expected. pertain

civic,

and universal sphere

"independent
the source

of

social

(see t.5/f. 10). Diversity, however, is

realm.

not

of woe nations

in the

Diversity

in this

sphere of

modem, industrial
of professional

is to be

The trouble has to do

with a

dearth

ethics, specifically

ing

to

industry

and trade:
same trade are

No doubt individuals devoted to the

very fact of sharing touch. But there is nothing steady about meetings and they are strictly individual in
a similar occupation.

relating to one another by the Their very competition brings them in these connections: they depend on random
nature
. .

Moreover,

there is no

body

258

Interpretation
be

above all the members of a profession to maintain some unity, and which would

the repository

of

traditions,

of common no

practices, and to

make sure

they

are

observed at need

The group has

life in

common
.

In this

whole sphere

of social

life,

no professional ethic exists

(f. 1 4/t

9)

How does Durkheim

given their

account

for this "moral

"For two

vacuum"?

Social

centuries,

historical character,

change.

asserts

institutions, Durkheim,

"economic life has taken

"ethic"

on an expansion

it

never

knew

before"

(t. 11/f. 16). At

a new

the same time, while this sphere grew and

emerged

began to dominate society,

that sought to deliver society from the traditional regulation of

popes and monarchies and guilds.

These

old monitors were

to be replaced

by

new, impartial
to his last

one:

the

spontaneous market.

Durkheim, however, from his first

regulation

work

considered

this

spontaneous

as

no

regulation.

In

Suicide, for example, he states that "for has mainly consisted in freeing industrial
government, instead of regulating
vant"

a whole relations

century,

economic progress
.

from

all regulation

and

economic

(Emile Durkheim, Suicide, tr.

life, has become its tool and ser by Spaulding and Simson, Glencoe, 111:

Free Press, 1951, pp. 254-55). In his lectures on professional ethics Durkheim discusses this economic world which seems to lie "outside the sphere of
morals."

He

asks

rhetorically
It has had the
support of

Is this

state of affairs a normal one?

famous doctrines. To
free play

start with, there

is the

classical economic

theory according
and reach

to which the

of economic agreements should adjust without

itself

it

being

necessary

or even possible to submit

stability it to any restraining forces

automatically,

(t.lO/f. 16).

Stable

and

just

social

practice,

however,

"cannot follow

of

itself from

en

tirely

material a

be. It is
expect

causes, from any blind mechanism, however scientific it may moral (t. 12/f. 18). Why a moral task? Because we should not
task"

just

economic social practices

to emerge spontaneously
other

by

private con
will

tracts

or

by

supply

and

demand

or

by

the optimistic, social evolutionary

needs

any laws of the early Durkheim

task

liberal

market

devices. Nor

accomplish what

to be done. We cannot count on any natural or automatic mechanism to

create a moral equilibrium.

moral

is

at

hand because

people must

do

something to
required. nomic realm:
ger."

bring
"this

peace and

justice to the

economic sphere.

Human

effort

is

And there is

more at stake

here than just the life

condition of

the

eco

amoral character of economic refers

amounts to a public

dan
the

By
sphere

public

Durkheim

to life lived in common, across and

within

various spheres.

His fear is that, because of the prominence of the economic in modem societies, its amoral character will spread to other spheres.
classical economists studied economic
and

The in

themselves,"

hence "productive
economists

output seemed to

all

industrial

activity"

(t.l5/f.22). But this

functions "as if they were ends in be the sole primary aim is misguided. The perspective of

the

(classical) liberal

is shortsighted, for "if

industry

can

only

bring

Emile Durkheim
its
output

and

Provinces of Ethics

259

to a pitch

by keeping

up

chronic

state of warfare

and endless

dissatisfaction
does"

amongst the

producers, there is nothing to balance the evil it

(t.l6/f.22). These

economists

fail to

see

that "economic functions

are not

an end

organs of social

endeavors"

in themselves but only a means to an end; that they are one of the life and that social life is above all a harmonious community of (ibid). If this central social sphere is in disarray, all are. For in is
everything,"

stance, after noting that "output

not

Durkheim declares that

production."

"there

be alternating periods of over and under haphazard vacillation in the economic sphere, which brings to its
should not

This

workers either

slavishly The

long

hours

or sudden

layoffs, disrupts

the quality

of

life in the domes

tic sphere.
spontaneous mechanisms of

the market, then, are

not

fit to
who

regulate

the

economic a

sphere,

much

less

most of society.

Liberal theorists

believe that

flourishing

society

would

naturally

result

from disparate individuals

freely
the

pursuing economic means into an end,

self-interests are naive.

who sever

But liberal theorists

who make

the economic order from its proper social con

text,

are worse than

naive, for their economic theories lack reference to

larger,

has arrived, and Durkheim is no romantic wishing its parting. Nor, for that matter, does he, like Marx, place great hope in what could come of a socialized, modem industry. For better, for
social considerations. revolution

The industrial

worse, the

revolution

has occurred,

Durkheim,
ness of

that modem economic

moral aims.

directed toward happiness

Why

and it is therefore imperative, according to life be closely regulated, that is, that it be moral aims? Durkheim interprets the lawless

the economic realm in moral terms. It

of society.

is

a threat

to the moral health and

It is

"moral

vacuum"

and
"newly"

it

needs quite a

bit

of moral social

stuffing, that
practices.

is, just (and conceivably

developed)

economic

Durkheim's

solution

to this

moral

bankruptcy

is

a call

for the formation

of

occupational groups:

group about us to recall [a moral influence] again and again, A way of behaving, no matter what it be, becomes established repetition and practice. If we live amorally for a good part of the day, through only The true how could the springs of morality keep from going slack in us

There

must

be

without

ceasing

remedy for the

sickness

economic order a

[economic anomie] is to give the professional stability they do not possess (f. 18-1 9/t. 12-13).

groups

in the

Durkheim's
In the

proposal

for

occupational groups

deserves

some comment.

century, because of the social displacement brought on by prosperthe industrial revolution and the failed liberal promises of widespread
nineteenth

260

Interpretation

ity

and

happiness,
offering

there were many social theorists who

longed for

stable com

munities

members

security

and a

lively

sense of

involvement. Associa

tion, that is, active participation, could bring vital agreement on issues of importance to all members. Theorists as diverse as Joseph de Maistre and

Saint-Simon, Alexis de Tocqueville

communities

and

Antonio Libriola And these

envisioned

strong
only into a

engaging

an active citizenry.

associations were not

to provide a
corporate

psychological sense of

belonging; they

were

to knit members

body, thus curbing self-interest. This is the context, I want to say, for interpreting Durkheim's notion of occupational groups (a notion that, after 1897, is found throughout Durkheim's
writings).

Occupational
and

groups represent an

attempt

to situate

individuals in
are

morally nourishing
ever,
allegiance.

delightful

spheres of communion.

They

not, how
complete

discrete, self-sustaining

communities

demanding including
such as

an

individual's

They

are not a substitute

for the larger

political community.

That
It is

community here that Durkheim departs from theorists It is important to

contains all

secondary groups,
mind on a

occupational groups.
and

de Maistre

Saint-Simon.

keep

in

that Durkheim's concept of occupational groups

of social spheres attention

is found in his discussion

the
universal.

plurality

from the domestic to

to the occupational

If Durkheim
course, is

pays

considerable

sphere, it it because he

worries about an

it

more

than the others. the occupational groups.

Community,
I
note

of

important

attribute of

this

because it is the

nature of communities to shape the character of their

Moral education, in other words, naturally occurs in communal activites. And above all Durkheim views occupational groups as vital agencies of
members. moral education. circumstances
mented.

Within them,

shared understandings are

of a

specific occupation

pertaining to the specific focused and developed and aug

claims that

In his lectures
or

on professional

ethics, Durkheim

the "craft

union"

the

"corporation"

is

not no

enough, because it "is

ties one
of
with

nowadays

individuals

who

have

another"

lasting

only a collection of (t.l3/f. 18). And in his

"Preface to the Second that,

while

Edition"

The Division of Labor, Durkheim laments

necessary"

it is "both legitimate

and

that the unions of

each

employers

and those of employees are common organization which

rate

distinct from

other, "there does

. . .

not exist a

brings them together

where

they

could elabo

in

regulation."

common a

As it is now,

it is
war

always the

law

of the strongest which resolves the conflicts, and the state of

is completely in force

They

can make

between them

contracts.
.

But these

contracts represent cannot

bring

about

only the respective state of economic forces present a just state (Emile Durkheim, De la Division du travail

they
social,

Paris: Presses Universitaires de

France, 1978,

pp. vii-vii).

divide.

Occupational groups, then, attempt to unite what unions and corporations They attempt to draw into a common fellowship individuals sharing the

Emile Durkheim
same occupational and

and

Provinces of Ethics

261
peace

interests,

and

thereby

establish a moral ethos a man

lending

justice. "It is
on a war

good,"

not

writes

Durkheim, "for
his

to live [with endless

friction]
It is
not

footing
for

in the

companions"

sphere of

closest not

(f.32/t.24).

good, and, according to

wish

Durkheim, it is
a

inevitable.
what

Durkheim's

occupational groups

is laudable. But

is

more na

ive,

the classical liberal

hope for

harmonious
via

pluralism via a spontaneous

market

tions?

newly developed economic associa automatically arise from fellowship? I believe, in Durkheim's that premise that moral practices and beliefs naturally arise fact, is sound, for the most part. Morality is, more than anything from fellowship
mechanism,
or

Durkheim's

Does

a moral ethos

else,

a product of

human

association.

Yet

not all

associations,

of

course,

are

equal.

Some

are more

likely

than others to promote shared, moral practices.

That is why Durkheim mentions the unions. Without slighting the benefits which unions have brought to workers, Durkheim claims that they have not

been overwhelmingly successful in bringing justice and peace to the economic sphere. Yet what if associations are established with the view that they are to
channel a shared

understanding

call

it

a common

morality
all, the

toward issues of

common concern and moral ethos would

practical

pertaining

to a particular economic group? In principle, a

likely

emerge.

Morality is,

after

product of such

human involvement.

I say practical human involvement because Durkheim insists that the needed "moralization cannot be instituted by the scholar in his study nor by the states
man"

(f.39/t.31). This is

not

to

deny

the

role played

by

professional, critical

reflection.

It is

rather

to affirm that morality

is

more a product of common more

human

activities than of private speculation;

and,

specifically, to suggest
means

that "it is the work of the groups

appropriate moral are to enhance.

concerned."

By
not

this Durkheim

that the

forms

of

life

are

to emerge from the very spheres

which

they

And they

are

to emerge

by

fiat but

by

communal reasoning:

It is
so

not

simply to have it is
so

new codes superimposed on

those existing; it is above all

that economic activity be penetrated

and needs;

by

ideas

and needs other than

individual

ideas

that it be

socialized.

This is the

aim: that the professions

should

become

agencies of

many moral milieux, encompassing constantly the various industrial and commercial life, perpetually fostering their morality
so

(f.37/t.29).

How

can

these occupational groups be

moral milieux?

initially

established, in the

absence of

the essential
mon

morality that

can provide social

There already is, according to Durkheim, a com intuitions and sensibilities for the develop We
never start

ment of the moral milieux of occupational groups.

from

scratch.

We
ask

are surrounded
and

by

a shared understanding that guides the very questions we

we

the

answers

give. exist

Moreover, Durkheim
social practices are not adequate

concedes

that

some

professional ethics activities.

His

complaint

already is that they

governing for many

specific economic economic activ

ities, especially in

trade and

industry

(see t.29-30/f.38).

262

Interpretation
not

This is
sustaining

to say that Durkheim

is

sanguine about

the emergence of

morally
At
such

spheres of

justice. Durkheim

often writes as

if he fears that liberal

of a Hobbesian society is taking on the character moments he seems to doubt the strength of a

war of all against all.

shared

understanding
paralysis

and

its

capacity to
occasional

spawn a

plurality
to the

of morals

in the
not

context of common goods.

moral

This

pessimism,

however, does
moral

lead to

but to in

creased commitment

tasks at hand.
proposal of

Durkheim occasionally admits that his seems farfetched. Given the sad condition

for

occupational

groups

corporations, it is difficult to the

imagine, he
related
as

notes

in Suicide, "their

ever

being

elevated to

dignity

of moral who are

powers"

(p. 381).

Today

corporations

are composed of

individuals

only superficially,
and enemies

and who are even

"inclined to treat I
share

each other rather

rivals

cooperators."

than as

Durkheim's

assessment of

the difficulty. But I want to make it clear what this

heim is

not saying that money and Durkheim would not describe case,
justice"

status are

difficulty consists of. Durk intrinsically bad. If this were the

"distrib
be
noth

occupational groups as agencies of

utive

with

jurisdiction

over material goods.

The

groups would

ing

but

agencies of and status.

abstinence,

inculcating

in their

members a contempt

for

money
to the

Durkheim explicitly

rejects religious asceticism as a solution

external goods such as and

problem of egoism.

Denying

any importance to
concludes that

salaries and

titles is

futile, because they

are now perceived

rightly
no

so

as

'legitimate goods.
give appetites

In Suicide Durkheim

"while it is

remedy to
to
control

them. Though the

free rein, neither is it enough to suppress them in last defenders of the old economic theories
is
not

order

are mistaken

in

thinking

that

regulation

gists of the

institution

of religion are

necessary today wrong in believing that

as was
external goods are not

it

yesterday, the apolo

yesterday's regula

tion can be useful

today"

(p. 383).
not

The difficulty, then, is

and

that

in fact

genuine

goods,

hence

people shouldn't seek them.

The

problem

is

that the
calls a

dominant insti

tutions producing

external goods often exist

in

what

he

"moral

vacuu

Think

of

this vacuum as a condition in which social

practices.2

practices

are

crippled

by

the pursuit of goods external to those

The

goods

internal to

prac

tices (whether

they

concern

the practice of

law,

medicine, business

finance,

teaching, carpentry)

are vitiated

by

external goods such as of a

money

and power.

This, Durkheim
"newly"

argues, is

an outcome

want of moral a place

associations and grips

crafted
our

traditions in the

marketplace

that

increasingly
is to

lives

and shapes our

loves. The

role of occupational groups

provide a
economic

moral connection

between internal

and external

goods, thus checking

anomie.

From

one

perspective, then,

occupational groups are centers of moral

autonomous.

life
The

which, although bound up

groups

should,

as

together, are distinct and relatively Durkheim says, "develop original

another

characteristics."

Together

these groups form the economic sphere. From

perspective,

however,

Emile Durkheim
these groups are tributaries
mon projects and

and

Provinces of Ethics

263
com

fed

by

shared

traditions and

institutions, by

interests. It

would

be misleading to
of,

stress

this latter perspec

tive unduly. The social practices engendered

expected

to be shared,

even

if

approved

by by

occupational groups are not

the population at large. The

groups are an example of moral

Durkheim's

arguments against

geneity amounts to lest we lose sight of Durkheim's

such they represent one of Tonnies, for they implicitly deny that hetero immorality. Still, the latter perspective needs mentioning conviction

differentiation. As

that the

foundation for

all

morality

is,

ultimately, a society's shared

ideals, history,

and culture.

Improved

conditions of

labor

(including job

security,

safe and wholesome

working environments,
employees and and

and

just wages),

reduced

hostility

among

and

between
goods,

employers,

a moral nexus

between internal

and external

the

recaptured warmth and moral ethos of

features

of

Durkheim's

vision

for

occupational

community life: these are the groups. The vision may seem to

be nothing but fantasy, though it boasts the ancient and medieval guilds as its antecedent, and British guild socialism as its closest contemporary approxima
tion. In
critique of

any case, even if the age of occupational groups never arrives, the laissez-faire liberalism which motivates Durkheim's vision is perspi simply liberalism, because clearly Durkheim's portrait of occupational

cacious and relevant.

I say laissez-faire liberalism,

there is something very
groups.
"liberal"

and

not

about

It represents, inter alia, Durkheim's attempt to establish a harmonious pluralism in modem France. This pluralism embraces a variety of moral vocab
ularies operative

in

variety

of social spheres.

Furthermore, it
that
repressed

champions

the

relative

autonomy

of

the individual moving within and among the spheres (and the individual).

hence Durkheim's Occupational

condemnation of those guilds

groups

typify

one of

Durkheim's

strategies

for saving liberalism

from itself. There is, then, nothing illiberal about Durkheim's vision. And there it.3 Durkheim, as I soon show, carefully certainly is nothing fascist about
places the creative

state, secondary groups,

and

the individual
each.

in

an arena of what we

normative,

fascism,
over not

tension, protecting the integrity of Durkheim insists that in order "to

secondary
groups

Fearing

prevent

the state from

today call tyrannizing

must

individuals,"

including

occupational

groups

be

absorbed

by

the state.

Ill

There is
the
others.

a social

sphere, Durkheim tells us,

political community.

which

is

greater

in

scope

than

It is the

The

moral

understanding
nature of

which gov

erns this sphere

he

calls civic morals.

Inquiry

into the

this sphere and

its

relation

to the other social spheres

notion of a

Durkheim's

plurality

of

is necessary for an intelligent reading of morals. If, for example, the domestic or the

264

Interpretation entirely independent of the political one, or even domi suggest a precarious laissez-faire pluralism that could lead to

economic spheres are

nate a

it,

that

might

society's

domination

spheres are

dominated

by a by the

single

sphere.

On the

other

hand, if

the other

political now

community, that

might suggest an open

door for

nationalism or

fascism. I

the political community and

turn, then, to Durkheim's discussion the democratic state.

of

The
of

political

community, according to

Durkheim,

encompasses a

plurality

secondary groups without becoming dominated by any. Moreover, an essential feature

one

itself. It includes
within

all without

being
sub

this political

group "is
of a

the contrast between governing and governed, between

ject to
rather

it"

(f.52/t.42). The

political

authority and those is "the coming together community

large
"

ity

number of secondary social groups, subject to the same one author (t.45/f.55). In Durkheim's idiom, the political community and the

state are not the same.

ity,"

The

state refers

to "the agents of the sovereign author

while state

the

political

is the highest

organ."

community refers to "the complex group of which the A responsibility of the state is "to work out certain

representations which are good

for the

collectivity"

(f.62/t.50). Far from

being
. . .

in

radical opposition

to the

various

ical sphere, Durkheim

No secondary groups, legitimately be called These

contends

secondary that "the state

authority,

groups contained within presupposes at

the polit

their existence

no political

least

no

authority

which can

political"

(f.56/t.45).

definitions,

though

important,

provide

only

starting

place.

The

rela

tion between the state, the secondary groups, and the individual
clear.

is

still not

Some light is

shed

explores and rejects.

by examining two models of the state that Durkheim The first is individualistic in nature, the second nationalis

tic.

and

The individualistic model, according to Durkheim, is defended by Spencer the classical economists on the one hand, and by Kant and Rousseau on the This
model assumes

other. and

that "the purpose of society

is the individual
real

for the

sole reason that

will

he is

all

that there is that

allowed

is

in

society"

(t.5 1/

f.63). Individuals
science, the arts,

be happiest if

to be productive in the realms of

add

and

industry. The

state

"can

is to say, it can make no What is its role? "To ward

positive contribution off certain

That nothing to this to the life of the individual.

wealth.

The prem ise here, which Durkheim exposes, is that "the individual in himself has from birth certain rights, by the sole fact that he These "inborn [droits congenitaux], whether construed in a Spencerian or Kantian fashion, are
effects of the
exists."

ill

association."

rights"

threatened in associations, and therefore some agency is required to protect them. That agency is the state. The state does not need to establish, evaluate,

extend,

or

debate individual

rights.

The rights

are

a given.

Many
model,

thinkers,
maintain

therefore, subscribing
that

to some version of this

individualistic

Emile Durkheim

and

Provinces of Ethics

265

the province of the state should be limited to administering a wholly negative

justice. Its
one

role would

be

reduced more and more

individual

on another and to maintain

to preventing unlawful trespass intact in behalf of each one the sphere

of

to which he has a right solely because he is what he is (f.64/t.52).

Yet

by

Durkheim's

lights,

the state

has "other

aims and offices to

fulfil"

than administering a negative

want

justice. Before I discuss these "other lest Durkheim's

aims,"

to explore the second model of the state,

position

be

mistaken

for it.
that
them"

This
to be
works

other model assumes

ual aims and unrelated used

to

society has an aim superior to individ (t.54/f.66). The individual is but an instrument

"every

by

the state

for the

sake of

its

superior social aims.

The individual

for the glory, the greatness and the riches of society, finding some rec ompense for his labor "in the sole fact that as a member of the society he has
some sort of share

in the benefits he has helped to

or, if

win."

In sum, individual
to be in the nationalist

interests

are either underdeveloped

developed,

are considered

conflict with

the welfare of the

nation.

Durkheim

claims that

model was embodied and civic morals were

in many early societies, especially when public religion fused. In these societies there was an indifference toward
of the

the

rights and concerns

individual. Prized

above all were

beliefs

and

aims

held in

common.

Yet in

recent

history,

claims

Durkheim,
mass of

the

individual

more and more

has

ceased

to be

absorbed

into the

society, and has

become
This

an object of respect. second

model, Durkheim warns, is

not

of mere

speculative

or

an

tiquarian interest. He claims that his own country is

beginning

to welcome it.

Many
in

who are

dismayed

with classical
faith,"

liberalism have "thrown themselves in

to "revive the cult of the

despair back
a new

on

the opposite

trying

City

State
semi-

guise"

Fascist
groups

political are

groups

(t.54/f.67). No doubt Durkheim is referring here to Action Francaise. These such as Charles
Maurras'

unabashedly antiliberal, writing

about

anti-Republican.

They

are

nationalistic.

Durkheim,

this

model

during

the Dreyfus
and

Affair, is

self-con
wants

sciously trying to

make sense of

liberalism

its discontents. He
nor

to

develop
those

a model of

society

which

is

neither

individualistic

nationalistic; one
as well as

which combines

the social goods

associated with

individual rights

associated with a common good.

An
of

active state

is

not antithetical

to

moral

individualism. This is the

premise

Durkheim's

model

for the

state.

He

provides

historical

evidence

to support a

"relation

of cause and effect as

between the

progress of moral

individualism
that a mini

state"

and the advance of the

malist state

(t.57/f.71). The individualist

societies;
yet

claims

is

natural

for

modem

in

history

"we

see

the functions

of

the

state

multiplying
should

as

they increase in
absolute

importance."

The

nationalist claims

that the

state

become

in

modem

societies,

but,

again, "that

266
would

Interpretation
be to
go against all the

lessons in

of

history: for

as we read

on,

we

find the

human

person

tending

to gain

dignity."

Durkheim

anticipates an objection:
moral

Is there

not a contradiction

in

maintain

ing

that both the state and

apparent

individualism increase in

scope and rests on and

impor
the as
as a

tance? This
sumption result

contradiction, according to

Durkheim,

that the

rights of

the individual are natural and

state

inherent,

that

there

is

no need
when

for the

to establish them. The contradiction van

ishes, however,

that

assumption

is denied:

The only way of getting over the difficulty is to dispute the postulate that the rights of the individual are inherent, and to admit that the institution of these rights is in

fact precisely the task

of the state

of the state

We

can

[now]

understand that the

functions

may expand, without any diminishing of the individual. We can see too that the individual may develop without causing any decline of the state, since

he

would

be in

some respect the product

himself

of the

state, and since the activity

of the state would

in its

nature

be

liberating

to him (ibid).

Durkheim

asks us

to

reject

the idea that individual

rights

are

inscribed into

each

individual
role of

by

the state
and

"create

and that, given the self-evident status of these rights, the is merely to recognize and protect them. The state, rather, is to organize and make a of individual rights, and not merely

nature,

reality"

administer

"an entirely

prohibitive
and

justice,

as

the utilitarian or Kantian

individu

alism would

have

it"

(t.60

65/L74

and

79).

Durkheim's model, then, encompasses the public and the private yet without identifying the two. The state insures private space for the individual, though it

is

more

than a mere protector of that space. The state actively institutes their
scope.

rights,

and extends

On

several

that employment
model

is

likely

occasions, for example, Durkheim suggests to become a basic individual right. Durkheim's

has both liberal

without

and communitarian

features. It defends liberal rights,

metaphysical arguments so often

though

appealing to standard

liberal

thought necessary for shoring up

individual

rights.

Durkheim's

argument

for

rights is

distinctly
perhaps

communitarian: our moral

traditions have made us into the

kind
race

of people who

insist that there

are some

things (such

as

discrimination

by

in the future, unemployment) that individuals should not and, have to worry about. This characteristic of our moral traditions is part of what we call our "common goods which we (late twentieth-century members
good,"

of

Western in

gether

an

democracies) share in common. Durkheim, then, has brought interesting way the liberal's love of individual rights with
for
a common good. can

to the

communitarian's regard

In

what

ways, specifically,
pluralism?

the state support moral

individualism

and a
play"

harmonious

First, "individual diversities

forms
of

can more

when the state checks various

"collective

tyranny."

easily have (Collective tyr

espe

anny includes cially

vicious crazes and majoritarian about

furies,

though Durkheim is

concerned

secondary

groups

that threaten to

bring

individuals

Emile Durkheim
within needs

and

Provinces of Ethics

267

their "exclusive

domination."

The state, specifically its legal branch,

groups of

to

worry

about

"all those secondary

family,
. . .

trade

and

professional

association,

Church,

regional areas and so on

which

tend to

members"

absorb

the personality of their these "collective

forces"

(t.65/f.79). The

state's moral task

is

to

remind

that

they
from

are a part of a whole. patriarchal

This in
and

cludes, for example, rescuing "the

tyranny,"

child

domination

from

family
The

or

the

worker

from

corporate

tyranny.

active state seeks

to protect individuals

from

social

injustice. It falls to
ask,
can a

the state, then, to

racist or class

combat classism and racism.

How,

some might

society assail its own ugly features? The state, at least in theory, is distinguished from the political community and its secondary groups; the state, "more than any other collective body, is to take account of the general
needs of

life lived in

common."

Durkheim's answer, then, is that if

liberal,

democratic society
state

should

lose

sight of

its

own

ideals, it is

the moral task of the

to remind society of its highest ideals and to work toward advancing them.
relation

(The

between the

state and the moral, collective consciousness

should

is

ex

amined

shortly.) If the
then its

state

unjustly

champion
or

the

interests

of one

group

over another

(say, business
becomes

over

education,

the

upper class over

the

lower)

legitimacy

questionable.

The democratic state, then, far from assuming a purely negative or passive role, actively strives to foster the beliefs and practices of moral individualism. Yet
what of state

despotism? What is to
state scary?

prevent

the state from

tyrannizing
answers

the

individual? Isn't the idea that the

reality"

is to "create
There
are at

and organize and make a

of question.

individual

rights a

bit

least two
next a

to this

The first one,

which

I discuss in detail in the democratic

state.

section, involves

the

moral constraints placed on a not

Though

democratic

state

does

state's volves

merely decisions

reflect are

or

mirror

the diffuse collective consciousness,

the

informed

and constrained

by

it. The

second answer

in

secondary
collective

groups:

If that

force,
groups

the state, is to be the liberator of the

must

need of some

counter-balance; it
. . .

be

restrained

by

other collective

individual, it has itself forces, that

is, by secondary

(t.63/f. 77-78).
of

Durkheim, in
groups

fashion

reminiscent

Tocqueville,
he

champions

secondary

to stay secondary groups. The purpose of secondary groups, then, is not but also to "form one of only to tend to "the interests they are meant to
even while advocates a

to check state tyranny,

strong

state

oppressive

serve,"

the conditions essential to the

emancipation

of

the

individual."

Secondary
between

groups, accordingly, facilitate

moral

individualism.

Durkheim

makes

it

clear

that there is no fundamental antagonism

secondary health of the

the

groups and the state. other.

The one, in
groups

fact, is

a condition of

the moral
state and
and

Without secondary
would either

to mediate

between the

individual,

the state

be too distant from the individual

268
hence
ual's

Interpretation
cease

to be effective; or it would control too many aspects of the thus become autocratic.

individ

life,

and

require

the moral authority of the state to

Secondary groups, on the other hand, bring them harmony, lest they wage
state safeguards

civil war of potential

varying kinds. Moreover, the group despotism.

the

individual from its secondary The state, as a

There is, here, a complicated relation between the groups, and between the individual and the common
servant

state and

good.

to the
an

common

good, blocks secondary

of

groups

from

dominating
and of

the

individual,
ondary

important feature
the
state

the common good. On the other hand sec

groups prevent

from

becoming

Leviathan,
as

hence they,
the state and

too,
of

contribute

to the common good. Both social

are

forces
life."

those

secondary

groups

depicted

by

Durkheim

vehicles of moral

disci

pline,
moral

"calling

the individual to a moral way of

Both institutionalize

individualism.
"institutionalize"

I say it "is far from

this "the

moral

individualism, because Durkheim

roots

worries

that

having
in the

any

deep

in the

country."

He

cites as evidence

for

extreme ease with which we course of

have

accepted an authoritarian regime

principles

regimes which in reality rest on from (t.60/f.73). This is not to long way that in Durkheim's view moral individualism is say purely theoretical. It is not. It is an important aspect of the moral ethos of many modem democratic na

several times

this century

that are a

individualism"

tions. But

dent

nor

Durkheim, having argued that individual rights are inalienable, recognizes the frailty of individual rights
individualism
of moral more

neither self-evi and

the need to

entrench moral

deeply.
me

The

fragility

individualism brings

to one last feature of the

dialectic between the

state and

conditions under which

its secondary groups. I have discussed some individuals are likely to be oppressed by the state and
to

by

secondary

groups.

still need

discuss those

circumstances

in

which

indi

viduals could threaten the state.

the state and

individuals,

state

Without secondary groups mediating between tyranny is only one possibility. The other is

"individuals absorbing the (t. 106/f. 127). Without secondary groups, indi viduals lack secure moral homes: "nothing remains but the fluid mass of indi This situation may seem democratic. It may seem conducive to social But it is in fact dangerous, for in it individuals can be swept up by transient crazes and ideologies. In this case, individuals and the state are held
change.
cur.
viduals."

state"

hostage to vacillating rages, and little beneficial social change is likely to oc This can, however, invite an unhappy change: tumultuous, unanchored individuals
worthy
of can

unwittingly

place

absolute power

in the hands lie

on

of

those not

it. A

weak state and an absolute one often

the same, short

path.

Durkheim's
active roles.

model

for the state, authority is

which

is

neither

individualistic

nor nation you

alistic, assigns to the democratic

state

many important roles, At its best it

or, if

like,

The

state's

unique.

guards against

count-

Emile Durkheim
less forms
and
of

and

Provinces of Ethics
social

269

tyranny; it

works

for

social

justice, eradicating

inequalities;

it directs the

various spheres of

a political

community informed
should reach

by

society toward the common good, fostering moral individualism. The state's care, says

Durkheim,

educational requirements occupational

many social spheres: protecting children, instituting that forbid repression and discrimination, establishing
and

groups, regulating trade

various roles

commerce,

funding the

courts,

and so

on.

And in its

the democratic state

does

not attempt

to frustrate a

fluid plurality of morals. It recognizes the legitimacy of a variety of spheres, and it seeks to bring harmony and justice to them. It does this for the sake of a
common

good,

moral

individualism

being

a salient

feature

of

that good. The

democratic state, then, is

not opposed

to the

individual,

rather

it

contributes

to

the very existence of normative individualism.

IV

Durkheim's
priate

model of

the state is

not appropriate

for

all societies.

Its

appro

ate

setting is a democratic society. And this, setting for moral individualism. discussion
on

as

it turns out, is the

what

appropri

My
claims

Durkheim
not.

and

democracy
political

begins form

with

Durkheim
nation"

democracy
which

is

It is

not

"the

of a

society governing

itself, in
from the
other

the government is spread throughout the milieu of the

requires

(t.82/f.99). A

democracy democracy
of

that the state

rest of a

society, for "if the state

agency relatively distinct is everywhere, it is On the

an

be

nowhere."

hand,

is

not

that

political

form in

which

the state

is isolated

society (see t.84/f. 101). Between these two extremes lies Durkheim's understanding of the democratic society. The latter extreme, the

from the

rest

state removed
rkheim reject milieu of

the first one, in

nation"?

from society, is clearly not democratic; but why would Du which "the government is spread throughout the
the familiar belief that in a the

the

Durkheim
thought
zenry.
of

opposes

democracy
consist

will

and

the state, the governing agency, are identical to those of the citi
role of the state

Under these conditions, the

"would

in expressing
as

possible"

diffused throughout the collectivity] as adequately (t.91/f.H0). But this would reduce the state to "an instrument for
sentiments

[the

canal

The

state would not

maintains

be distinct from society, but

that in a

would

be

absorbed

by

it.

Durkheim direction

democracy
not

the

state must stand and

relatively inde

pendent of society.
of

It is in

contact with

society,

this contact affects the

the state, but it does

then, is

poised

necessarily determine it. A democracy, between two extremes. Neither a mirror nor a sieve, the state
citizenry,"

and ethically represents its citizenry. I mean the state, comprised of elected When I say "represent its common good. But the common good for the citizens, acts as an advocate

intelligently

270

Interpretation
majority."

Durkheim is necessarily be equated with "the Social The Rousseau's this. While discussing Contract, Durkheim
cannot

clear about states:

The individuals
the end

who collaborate

in the formation is

of

the general will

must strive

for

without which

it does

not

exist, namely, the general

sometimes

interest. Rousseau's
to

principle

differs from that

of majorities.

which

invoked in

an attempt

justify

the

If the community must be obeyed, it is not because it it commands the common good (Durkheim, Montesquieu but because commands, Forerunners Rousseau: and of Sociology, tr. by R. Manheim, Michigan: University

despotism

of

Michigan

Press, 1960,

p.

109).
at

Durkheim knows that there is

state and

times discord between the

decisions

of the

the sentiments of the

majority.

ernment or

parliamentary

vote

do

not square with

the state of

He says, "decisions taken by the gov be valid for the whole community and yet may social (t.49/f.60). Such discord occurs
opinion"

under various conditions.

immediate results,
worse,
a

could oppose an essential

For example, the majority, if overly preoccupied with feature of a long-term plan. Or

majority, if provoked

by

a crisis or

tragedy,
of

could seek

to scapegoat

innocents.
Durkheim is between
various also aware of another

kind

discord: that
state

which

occurs

interest

groups.

In this case, the

not

insures

that the relative

power of

the groups involved does

currents

determine the
are

outcome of

the conflict:

The different
opposition)

working

within

society

brought face to face, (in

the others, or
state

with one

another, and are submitted to a comparative evaluation; and

which should outweigh

then either a choice is made, if one emerges

else some new solution surfaces

from this

confrontation. will

This is because the

aiso

is

situated at the central point where

get a clear

everything

touch;

because it
elements
.

can
.

better

idea

(Durkheim,
Is the

"L'Etat,"

of the complexity of situations and all the Revue bleue, 1958:148, pp.434-35).

state not

despotic be

when

it imposes its
that all

will on society?

Not
and

necessarily.

First, it

should not

assumed

constraint

is coercive;

secondly,

democratic

state's power

moral constraints of a

arbitrary, but rather works within the internal, democracy. With respect to the first reason, Durkheim
not always

is

something coercive about collective life. is, however, nothing necessarily intolerable about this: "the individual does not feel it [social constraint] any more than we feel the atmosphere that

boldly
There

announces

that there is

shoulders"

weighs on our

(t.61/f.74). Individual autonomy is

the
physical and social
autonomous"

never absolute:

"The up

person

forms
if

part of

milieu; the person

is bound

with

it

and can

be only relatively
one could

out constraints

imagine

such an

(f.82/t.68). A society with would be monstrous. entity

Moreover, it is simply wrong to equate state power with vicious compulsion. Durkheim rebuffs the (vulgar) liberal position that government intervention into
economic and other social activities

constraints

imposed

by

is necessarily despotic. More likely, the just democratic state are the very conditions of free-

Emile Durkheim
dom. A
spawn
an active
tude,"

and

Provinces of Ethics

27 1

"spontaneous"

"free"

contracts which enslave workers

Spencerian society, for example, is more likely to than is a society equipped with
We
once allowed

democratic

state. we

slavery, that

is, "material
asks:

servi

Durkheim says;
man who

that a

actions?

say has nothing to live on governs himself, that he is master of his Which kinds of subordination, then, are legitimate and which unlaw
admits that

have

now abolished

it. He then

Can

we

ful? (t.68/f.82). Durkheim

lems."

"there is

no

final

answer

to these prob

Society

oppression and

continuously debate and try to define the conditions of those of freedom. But this much is clear: to insure freedom for
will

its citizens,
as

a state must do more than to prohibit what is commonly understood (that institution of buying and selling human beings). It must actively slavery and endlessly work for social justice. And justice involves constraints.

These constraints, however,

mately,

are

not

arbitrarily imposed
understanding, that

on

society.

Ulti

they

arise

from

a society's shared

is, from

common

traditions, ideals, and institutions. And this brings me to the second reason state intervention is not necessarily despotic. A democratic state's authority is not arbitrary. Durkheim claims that the more a state embodies a society's
shared

understanding, the

more

democratic it is. The democratic state, among

traditions
and goals of society.

other social

groups, helps to

articulate the moral

I say articulate, not fabricate. The state, in its deliberations concerning a host of issues and conflicts, no doubt adds new moral dimensions to a society's
traditions. Durkheim asks rhetorically, "Is it not inevitable that something new
must emerge

from

activity?"

all

this
state must

Traditions do

not remain stagnant.

None

theless, the democratic

while

be faithful to
The
state's

society's shared

seeking the

common good.

legitimacy

springs

understanding from its ac

countability to
ments such as
a state should

society's moral traditions and social and

practices, both formal

(say,

the constitution)

informal (say, the development of new social commit to gay rights). This in no way contradicts Durkheim's belief that remain relatively distinct from the rest of society. This critical
the state to resist

distance
win

enables

destmctive,

ephemeral

movements

which

threaten the

common

good,

and

it insures that the majority

not

or powerful

do

not

every debate. The

critical

distance, then, is
but to

to

remove

the state from a

"voice"

society's shared understanding,

allow society's most authentic

to

be heard. Insofar

as the state fails in this role, it lacks legitimacy. It is essential, Durkheim says, that the political community is able to follow the moral reasoning and deliberations of the state: "it is necessary that there

should social

be

as complete a

harmony

as possible

between both these

parts of

the

structure." citizens'

The

capacity to

participate

actively in the

state's

judgments is
This is
on

the hallmark of a democracy:

what gives

democracy

a moral superiority.

Because it is

a system

based

reflection, it
and

allows

the citizen to accept the laws of the country with more

passively.

intelligence

thus less

Because there is
and

a constant

flow

of no

communication

between themselves

the state, the state

is for individuals

272

Interpretation
an exterior

longer like

force that imparts life does

wholly
and

mechanical

impetus to them.

Owing
with

to

constant exchanges as

between them
with

the state,

its life becomes linked

theirs, just
this

their

that of the state (t.91/f.H0).

Again,
ety.

is

not

to

imply

that the state must

follow every

whim of soci a greater

It does

imply

that democracies place a premium on

debate"

"submitting

number of

things to collective

than do other

political stmctures.

The

democratic
itself."

political community strives to achieve a critical "consciousness of This involves scrutinizing its customs and traditions, debating current events, and participating actively in a variety of secondary groups. The more democratic a society, "the more that deliberation and reflection and a critical

spirit

play

a considerable part

in the

course of public affairs

(t.89/f.

107

08). This brings

state.
me

to one more

feature

of

Durkheim's

concept of a

democratic

The

critical spirit embodied

in democratic

societies promotes radical so

cial change.

I say

radical

because Durkheim

claims that the more a

society

can

freely
more

criticize and

debate the A

multifarious content of

its

social

traditions, the
policies

it

can probe

"uncharted customs, the

obscure sentiments and prejudices

that evade

investigation."

critical spirit roots out

undesirable.

those

longstanding
one

and portions of tradition

that are

The

work of reformation

has

no or

limits. It is

not a matter of attained

working

out

"a definite ideal which,

.

day

another, has to be

determinately
not mean

Rather

moral

minate"

(f.83/t.68). But this does

and

that no progress

activity is indeter is made. Progress

more

is made,
political customs.

this

is because democracies, Durkheim claims,

capable

than other
and

forms,

are

of change and of

shedding harmful beliefs

to
social change.

Debate

and a critical a

spirit, then, are

conducive
much

There

is,

however,

limit: too

much

debate,
but

too

division,
As
a

too much pluralism,

after

bring
so

not creative social change

stagnation.

ship,

having

been

tossed this way and that too "societies

by

raging storm, finds that it has

made no

headway,
pluralism,

which are so

stormy

on

the surface are often bound to

(t.94/f. 113). Yet

perhaps

it is

not a matter of

"too

much"

debate

or

but

not

the right kind. Debate and

and commitment

pluralism severed

from their

moral context

(shared traditions edifying

to

an

array

of common

goods) lead

not to

conversation

but to babble. The

active a

moral context state.

is

protected

ing

secondary groups and an Durkheim says, are subject to This is because secondary
moral

democratic

Societies

by lacking

flourish these,
foster

exhausti

"disjointed, halting
and

and

existence. and

groups

the state serve to preserve

traditions

and the concomitant social practices.

Without these, there is

"constant flux
If only this
call

and

instability":
led to any really profound changes. But those that do For great changes need time and reflection and
often

state of affairs

come about are often superficial.

for

sustained effort.

It

happens that

all these

day-to-day

modifications

cancel each other out and that

in the

end the state remains

utterly stationary (ibid).

Emile Durkheim
"Democracy,"

and

Provinces of Ethics
that conforms

273

Durkheim tells us, "is the

notion of

political system

best to

individual."

our

present-day

the

(t.90/f. 109). Moral individualism

requires a political

that

is informed by ism, in modem industrial

setting that honors the individual's relative autonomy, and the individual's situated moral reasoning. Moral individual

groups of

nations, also requires social spheres and secondary varying kinds in which the individual is in communion with others and is morally educated. These spheres and secondary groups, however, are in need of an active state to bring them into relative harmony. We have seen that

this

harmony
when

can allow

for

conflict.

Durkheim claims, in fact, that

conflict.

novel

ideas

and social practices can come

from

But

conflict and

debate

are most

fruitful

they

take place within the moral context of a society's shared

good

understanding and its common good. This moral individualism. Moral individualism
common;
moral

is in

no

way

antithetical to goods

presupposes

social

held in in

individualism is

a social good
role

held in

common.

want

to underscore the

important

the political community plays

and even

Durkheim's thought. While

some communitarians

liberal
as

pluralists

elevate the corporation or the church or the

social

local community

the ultimate

setting for satisfying the individual's communal and social needs, Durk heim insists that secondary groups cannot supplant the role of a vital political community. This is because the political community supports the common in
terests and
moral

traditions of a society. All

secondary

groups are

too particular

to usurp that role.

Notes

Routledge
sique refers

1. Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, tr. by C. Brookfield (London: and Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 4. The French edition is entitled, Legons de sociologie: phy

des

du droit (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950). From now on, precedes the translation is my own. to the translation. If to the French edition,
moeurs et
"t." "f."
"t."

"f."

2. This

account

is informed

by Jeffrey

Stout's

provocative elaboration of

Maclntyre's

account

See J. Stout, Ethics After Babel, Boston, pp. 267-76. 3. The charge of fascism and nationalism is what I take M. M. Mitchell to be making in his, Political Science Quarterly, XLVI, (1931): "Emile Durkheim and the Philosophy of
of social practices.
Nationalism,"

pp.87-

106;

and

William M. McGovern in his

chapter

From Luther to Hitler (London: Routledge

and

Kegan Paul, 1946),

9.

Nietzsche's Politics
Leslie Paul Thiele
Swarthmore College

matter how far a man may extend himself with his knowledge, no matter how objectively he may come to view himself, in the end it can yield him nothing but (HH 182). his own

"No

biography"

"The free

man

is

individuals"

a state and a

society

of

(Ml 1-230).

Nietzsche

was

by
His

admission antipolitical.
political

He

shunned and

disparaged
voiced

politi

cal engagement.

convictions,

when

voiced,

were

nega

tively, This is

as

barbs

and

broadsides. He intended his

political statements

to

provoke.

not to say that one should discount his harsher judgements as insincere hyperbole. Nietzsche carved out a political niche, even if it remained obscure and

undefended,

ist

must approach and

tions,

he may be held accountable for it. But the political theor Nietzsche warily. The quarry is not easily captured by defini he is never tamed by reasoned argument. Nietzsche refused to pro
and

vide unequivocal answers

to the most fundamental political questions. To say

politics

anything One might

about

Nietzsche's

is to

risk contradiction

by

the text.

attempt

to root out

of

Nietzsche's

writings

the mostly vague or

within

implicit

references

to concerns that are explicitly addressed

the tradition

of political

thought.

However, I believe

such

an effort would

inevitably

fall

flat, resulting in little

else but well-guarded statements about the ambiguity of Nietzsche's politics, and assertions that if he does not have at least one foot in the fascist camp, then he is culpable for having allowed himself to be so inter

preted.

These
of

the depths
above

may be well-founded, but they hardly shed light into Nietzsche's project. From this standpoint, Nietzsche hardly rises
assertions

the

status

of

an

unfocussed

polemicist.

For the

political

Nietzsche's importance is to be found in his

scribe what

use of political
politics:

theorist, discourse to de
the soul.

is typically

thought to

be beyond
ongoing

the

workings of

Nietzsche's

writings constitute an

experiment

in thought

and experi soul

ence wherein a political

vocabulary

was chosen

to explore and

describe the

This

article

Nietzsche
All

and the

University

on work which is more extensively developed in my book Friedrich Politics of the Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism to be published by Princeton Press by whose permission it is printed here.

is based

references

to Nietzsche's writings will

ated title and page number.

be given parenthetically References to the Musarionausgabe are

Nietzsche Briefwechsel
of references.

within

the text

by

abbrevi

given

by

abbreviated

title,

volume and page number; those to the

are given

by

abbreviated

title and

date. A

key

to their

abbreviations

is in the list

interpretation, Winter

1989-90, Vol. 17, No. 2

276
of

Interpretation
particular

man, and in

Nietzsche's

own

soul.

He

attempted

to sublimate
works read

politics, to internalize
as a

political stmggle within a pluralistic self. of

His

the

political

biography

his soul,

and

they

challenge

the

reader

to engage in
politics

similar

politics.

Nietzsche believed the

role

of

the

individual in
to

should

be

subservient

to the role of politics within the

individual. That is

Nietzsche's
gate

philosophic-political position.

Its

explanation requires us aimed

investi
poli

the

nature of a radical

individualism that

to establish

higher

tics beyond the social realm.

The

road

to

radical

individualism,

which

has its in

greatest ramifications

in the

realms of politics point

and

morality, finds it
of man's mind.

is

the

limitations

The starting Nietzsche's individualism is above all

origin

epistemology.

the extension of his skepticism.

Epistemology
of

for Nietzsche is the

unsuccessful attempt

to

separate

the organ

perception, the mind, from that

which

itself. Despite the

most strenuous efforts

is perceived, the supposed thing-inone is never assured of attaining a tme One knows only one's own percep is explored its substratum is never

representation of some

fundamental

reality. mind

tions.

Likewise, however
One becomes

deeply

the

reached.

only of its workings, its effects. "When we examine the mirror in itself we discover in the end nothing but things to try upon it. If we want to grasp the things we finally get hold of nothing but the
conscious

(D 141). terms, is the history of Nietzsche's point is not that the mind is a blank slate, as Locke would have it. (He explicitly repudiated Locke's theory [M16-250]). Nor is the mind consid
mirror.

This, in

the most general

knowledge"

ered

to be

an unblemished mirror which

out there. represent

The

passage

has

a skeptical thrust.

accurately reflects a reality somewhere The mirror metaphors often used to

a separate

the mind mislead us

us.

into positing
mind

by

or

in

Nietzsche
the

pictured man

reality
world

and

mirror of

his

standing with before him. An

reality which is reflected his back toward a supposed

uninhibited view man not see

into the He

is blocked
is

by

the

perceiver conceals

himself:
things"

"Why

does

things?

himself is in the
The
world

way:

he

(D 187).
conscious
a of

always

and

only the
world

mind

its

own

activity.

Nietzsche

refused upon

to bestow the

with

dependence
the

the stmcture of the mind.

higher status, maintaining its At the same time, man is not

pronouncement

congratulated

for his limitations. The Protagorean

things must not

that

man

is

measure of all

be

accepted without qualification.

Man

can

only know the Nietzsche does

world as

he

measures

it,

as

he

perceives and

interprets it. But in the

universe. not

not presume man to

occupy

a unique position

Man's

inability

to measure the

world without

mean that other scales

do

not exist.

One

must

using his own sacles does reserve judgment.

How far the

perspective character of existence extends or

indeed

whether existence

has any
"sense,"

other character than

does

not

this; become "nonsense"; whether,

whether existence without

on

the other

interpretation, without hand, all existence is

Nietzsche'

Politics

277

that cannot be decided even essentially actively engaged in interpretation the most industrious and most scrupulously conscientious analysis and selfnot
examination of

by

the

intellect; for in

the course of this analysis the

human intellect

cannot avoid around our

seeing itself in its own perspectives and only in these. We cannot look own corner: it is a hopeless curiosity that wants to know what other
and perspectives there might able to experience would

kinds

of

intellect be

beings

might

time

be; for example, whether some backward, or alternatively forward and

direction
of

backward (which
cause and effect). ridiculous

involve

another

life

and another concept of

But I

should think that

today
corner

we are at

least far from the

immodesty

that would be involved in

decreeing
(GS 336).

from

our corner

that

perspectives are permitted

only from this

Skepticism is another word for such modesty in the epistemological realm. Man's limited capacity for knowledge does not determine the boundaries of a particular species on a particular planet reality, but the boundaries of man in
a particular universe.
dreams,"

"We

are

figures in the dream

of

God

who are

how he

Nietzsche

suggested

(M3-319). Man may

speculate about

guessing his

dreamy existence, but he must acknowledge that being dreamt. The discovery of universal laws
preclude other

it may

not

that mle

be the only dream his world does not

laws

or other worlds. extension of

Nietzsche's individualism is the logical

tions. The

his its

skeptical

evalua

individual, like
a world of

the species, cannot see beyond

own.

own comer.

Each

is locked into
The habits

its

of our senses

have

woven us

into lies

and

deceptions
We

of sensations:

these again are the basis of

no

all our

judgments in it,

'knowledge'

and

there

is absolutely
that

escape,

no

backway

or

bypath into
may
catch

the real worldl

sit within our net, we

at all except

spiders,

and whatever we

we can catch our net

which allows

itself to be

caught

in precisely

nothing (D 73).

All knowledge is
pare our

experience, and all experience

experiences, but

not exchange them or equate them.

is individual. We may com The point is not

that

we subjectivize experiences which would otherwise

have

some objective a

status.

An 'objective in

experience,'

to use a favorite phrase of

adjective].

Nietzsche's, is

contradictio cannot

adjecto

[contradiction in the
out.

It is

an abstraction

that

be

even

clearly thought
people agree

The individual

remains

the ultimate inter

of words

preter of

his

cultural and social

inheritance, including
similar experiences

the meanings

(WP 403). That

to call

by

the same

name

and,
not

by

and

large,

succeed

in

communicating according to such schemes

does

retrieve the

of the species.

individual from its isolation. It simply demonstrates the ingenuity Perspectivism is the name Nietzsche gave to this radically indi

vidualistic epistemology.

Already
Greeks,
"Now in the

essay Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Nietzsche had outlined his understanding of radical individualism. in his
unpublished

philosophical systems are preface:

"Taken

as

he wrote wholly tme for their founders represent an ultimate ends, in any event, they error,

only,"

278
hence
cal

Interpretation

ality."

(PTG 23). Nonetheless, they provide a semiologia "slice of person study of the individuals who founded them, revealing One celebrates philosophic studies because they constitute intriguing and
are

to be

repudiated"

inspiring

outlooks on

the "human

scene."

However

much subsequent research

and events

may

refute elements of

to "what we

must ever

love

and

any philosophic system, it remains a tribute honor and what no subsequent enlightenment
beings"

can take away: great

individual human

(PTG 24).
about

Philosophy
What
who

for Nietzsche

was not about

tmth, but

living

without

tmth.

remains of

import in

philosophic works are

the portraits of

individuals
testimonies

have

struggled with

the contradictions of existence. Their writings never

provide resolutions

to these contradictions, but

they may
his

serve as

to battles

well

fought. Thus Nietzsche

are

remarked of

philosophic mentors: are more

"The

errors

of great men

fruitful than the truths

great men

of small

worthy of veneration, because they (Ml However one might

ones"

-393).

polemize

for their errors, their stature tracted schooling in their ways may one
nent.

remains undisputed. stand

Only

after a pro

up

as a peer and a

Indeed,

their greatness elicits confrontation just as it once

we are

worthy oppo demanded dis-

cipleship.

Thus

to understand Nietzsche's admission of the

kinship

he

bore to his fiercest

me

enemy:

"Socrates, just

to acknowledge
him"

it,

stands so close to
not

that I

am almost always

fighting

with

(M6-101). Such battles do

tmth, Nietzsche maintained, but they allow more fruitful errors. Their fruitfulness lies not in the facile discovery of the ubiquity of error, but in the arduous development of the passion for tmth, a passion which must remain,
produce

nonetheless, incredulous. What is

which

called

is discovered in the

retreat

tmth, Nietzsche charged, is only that from this insatiable passion. The story of
of

philosophy, in short, is the

useful

history

the errors and

lies found necessary

or

by

the titans

of thinking.

Nietzsche may generalize as to the erroneousness of all philosophic systems because any attempt to speak of tmth in a nonindividualistic manner must foun

der.

Philosophy
of

cannot exempt

itself from

perspectivism.

The task
pose

painting

the picture of

life, however

often poets and philosophers

painter-

may

it, is

nonetheless senseless: even under

the hands of the greatest

miniatures out

thinkers all that has ever eventuated is pictures and

of one

life,

namely their

own

and

nothing

else

is

even possible

(HH 218).

Of
as

course
much.

this

applies

to Nietzsche's painted thoughts as well, and

he

admitted and

His

oft-quoted

declaration, "This
interpreted
quite

world

is the

will to power

besides!"

nothing
physical

frequently

as a

doctrinaire
an

assertion of a meta

truth is

something

different. It is

implicit declaration

of the

truths. The will to power, as Nietzsche clearly stipulated impossibility in the passage, is only the he has given to the world. And this world is
of such
"name"

shown

to the reader the only way possible for

Nietzsche, namely in his

"own

mirror"

(WP 549,550). The

world as will

to power, and more specifically as a

Nietzsche's Politics
heightened
sense of will to

279

power, is

a miniature portrait of

Nietzsche's life. It

is described the only way he could describe it, namely as reflected in him. To the extent one's experiences parallel those of others, an understanding may be
approached.

Still,

the most that can

be

said about close relatives

in the

realm of

thought

is that they

bring

one

into

one's own company.

They

are spurs

to the soul, awakening forgotten

their
significance.

things,

including
rank, the

prompting More is impossible: "Ultimately, nobody books, than he already knows. For what have
ear"

experiences or

new assessments of

can get more out of one

lacks

access

to

from

experience one will

no

(EH 261). Moreover, the higher become. What is

one's com

spiritual

more

individualistic
herd."

one's experiences

mon always

belongs to "the

The thoroughly
Nietzsche
world admitted

self-referential

world

of

the

individual
at

was

prominent

theme throughout Nietzsche's that

most

writings.

he had

no

his career, 1874, right to claim to have penetrated into the

In
the start of

of even

from

believing
owe

influential mentor, Arthur Schopenhauer: "I am far that I have tmly understood Schopenhauer, rather it is only that

his

through Schopenhauer I have

learned to
debt

understand myself a
thanks"

little better; In his last

which

is why I

him the

greatest

of

(M7-140). Nietzsche's later

year of

works show

the concept of radical

wrote:

individuality
I
myself

unchanged.

productivity, he

"It is

plain what

misunderstood

read

into, Wagner
his
or

and

Schopenhauer
reread

in, equally plain what (NCW 669). Nietzsche would

Bayreuth"

challenge stitute

his

his early essay "Wagner in Zarathustra's name for Wagner's, claiming: "in
readers

to

and sub

decisive
ways.

places

discussed"

alone am
warned

Nietzsche

his

own

all psychologically (EH 274). Of course, the sword cuts both readers not to assume to have comprehended

him: "Whoever
me"

thought

he had

understood

something out of me after his own image (EH 261). In short, everyone pays and
The individual is in
shared, only their
simulacra.

of me, had made up uncommonly an antithesis to receives in his own coin.

something

not

a permanent state of

isolation. Experiences simply because the

are never written or

tmly

This is

not

spoken word

is

a poor reflection of

thought. Thought itself is a lame transmitter

an antiindividualistic attempt

of experience.

Consciousness is deemed
existence.

development,

the

effect of a
ual's

herd

It is the ultimately futile

to turn the individ

monopoly
idea is,

of experience

into common,

communicable

knowledge.

My

as you

see, that

consciousness

does

individual

existence

but

rather to

his

social or

not really belong to man's herd nature; that, as follows from

this, it has developed subtlety only insofar

utility.
.

as

this is required

unique,

and

Fundamentally, infinitely individual;

all our actions are altogether

by social or herd incomparably personal,

But
as soon as we

there

is
no

no

doubt

of that.

translate them into

consciousness

they

longer

seem

to

be.
/
understand

This is the

essence of phenomenalism and perspectivism as

them:

owing to the nature of animal conscious is only a surface-and-sign-world,

consciousness, the

world of which we can

become

a world

that

is

made common and

280

Interpretation
whatever

meaner;

becomes

conscious

becomes

by

the
all

same

token shallower,
conscious

low,
a

thin, relatively stupid, general, sign, herd signal;

great and thorough corruption,
generalization

becoming

involves

falsification,

reduction

to superficialities, and

(GS 299,300).

Communication,
involves
a

or

the making common of what

is

individually
For

experienced,
at

necessary falsification. We do

communicate our

experiences, but

the cost of robbing them of their essential uniqueness.

marks a three-fold corruption.

communication

Words

never

adequately

tray thought,
recipient can

and

thought

never

fully

corresponds

unequivocally por to experience. In turn, the

own pool of

or

only interpret the

communication

according to his

(unique)
The
mission

experiences.

self-enclosure of

the individual is complete. What applies to the trans

of

knowledge desires

also applies to the realm of

feelings:

"Ultimately

one

loves

one's or

and not

that which is

desired"

(BGE 88). The

objects of

desire

aversion,
a mirror.

no

less than the

attempt says

objects

of

thought or perception, are as

images in
(Z 173).

The

to

face. "In the final

analysis,"

grasp them yields only the reflecting sur Zarathustra, "one experiences only oneself
are

'Mankind'

and

herd,
world

all

that

exists are

misleading abstractions. Apart from the individuals, each enclosed in its own world, each soul a
was also

'humanity'

to

itself.
went a

Nietzsche

step further. The individual

and

deemed

an abstrac

tion. The assumption that there was

certain stepped

fixity,
beyond

continuity,
subjectivism

something called the individual that had a duration remained unacceptable. Nietzsche
If
the

to attack the idea of an enduring, unified subject.

we

The
the
yet

soul was conceived as a multiplicity.

may

speak of

uniqueness of

individual, it is because
pluralistic, internal
revocation

of

its

unique composition of

drives, its

particular,

regime.

The kind is

of the

individual's membership in
provides a

the

community

of man

accompanied

by

the constitution of the individual as a community in

itself. Perspectivism, then,

remedy for its

own philosophic

ills. The

impossibility
world of vidual of

of an

objective,

neutral vantage point

owing to the

self-enclosed

the individual is counteracted

capable of maintaining.

by

the multiple perspectives each indi

plurality of beings, a union Nietzsche many spheres, from which one may look back on the wrote (M7-395). It is misleading, therefore, to accuse Nietzsche of subjectiv
appears as a

is

"Man

other,"

ism, for
isolates

the subject
and

is

given no stable

identity. Nietzsche's

perspectivism

first

then

dissolves the individual.

Objectivity
The

is

understood

to be

noth

ing

more than a multiplication of the personal.

more perspectives one

maintain, the more

perspective

subjectivity

acquires a so-called objectivity:

may "There is only a

to

seeing, only

a perspective

'knowing';
will

and the more affects we al

we can use

low to
observe

speak about one

one

thing, the
more

more

eyes, different eyes,

'concept'

thing, the

complete

our

of

this thing,

our

Nietzsche's Politics
be"

281

'objectivity',

(GM 119). The

suppression of

the affects

or

the attempt to

neutralize perception was

insisted,
the

was not a of

held to be wholly undesirable. Knowledge, Nietzsche product of depersonalized observation and thought, but of
and

stimulation

the senses

passions,

of

their multiplication and ag

glomeration.

Even if

one were capable of

not

be

more

objectivity,

but,

to use

suspending passion, the result would Nietzsche's words, a castrated intellect.

web, but
we establish

Objectivity, Nietzsche had

subjectivity (Ml-280). We
numerous viewpoints upon

always

maintained, was nothing but an extension of

cannot escape our own

may

it.
the
appearance

In the spring works, Nietzsche

of

1868, before
"The
that we name

of

wrote:

concept of

the

whole

any of his philosophic does not lie in things, but There

in

us.

These

unities no

organisms are

but

again multiplicities.

are

in reality

individuals,

moreover

individuals

and organisms are

nothing

but

abstractions"

(Ml -4 14). This thesis

was maintained

throughout his life. The

was proposed as a

human being, the body, the soul, the subject, the individual multiplicity. A note written in 1885 reads:
The
assumption of one single subject

is

perhaps unnecessary; perhaps

whose

it is just

as

permissable

to assume a multiplicity of subjects,

interaction

and struggle

is

the basis of our thought and our consciousness in general?

subject as

My hypothesis: The

multiplicity (WP 270).

an

ignorable oddity reflecting Nietzsche's penchant for psychol ogy, this hypothesis constitutes a cornerstone of Nietzsche's philosophic-politi

Far from

being

cal edifice.

The

multiple

soul,

of

course,

was not

Nietzsche's invention. It is in
speech"

at

least

as

old as political philosophy. rocosmic

Plato's

"city

of

the Republic

is the

mac-

description

of what

Socrates discerns in the

souls of

his interlocutors.

Indeed the manifestly political aspect of the Republic, that is, the theorization of the city, is ostensibly proposed as the attempt better to discover the justice of
a man's soul. a

Political theory is the

means

for the discussant "to

see and

found
socio

city

within

himself (592b). One looked to the

order and strife of

the

political realm to explore and represent the tensioned

vidual.

Nietzsche's theorizing is

of

the same genre.

plurality within the indi He attempted creatively to

of

revitalize a mode of

theorizing
One

that had died with the Christian doctrine

"soul
a

atomism"

wherein the soul

as an

became identified

as

"eternal, indivisible,
soul,'

as

atomon."

monad,

should not get rid of

'the

Nietzsche insis "But the

and of the sub

ted, for it is "one of the oldest and road to new forms and refinements invites "such
ject'

hypotheses."

most venerable of of the soul-hypothesis

soul'

open"

stands

conceptions as

'mortal

and

'soul as multiplicity

emotions

and

'soul

as social stmcture of

the drives and

(BGE 25). Here

Nietzsche

revealed

the speculative core of

his

philosophic

enterprise.

Like

Plato, he

would clothe

his philosophy in

political attire.

For the language that

political.

best facilitates

the description and

analysis of

the soul is

The

world of

282

Interpretation for the "reader

of

politics serves as a conceptual and terminological resource

souls."

Nietzsche

observed

that organization, cooperation, and patterns of

allow pluralities

dom

ination, in

short, politics,

to bear the appearance of unities

no

(WP 303). This is tme for the human community

the self. The
soul writ

politics of statecraft and soulcraft are analogous.

less than the community of The city is the

large. drawn between Nietzsche's

with statecraft.

The
craft,

parallel

however, diverges
benefactor
State"

Plato's understanding of soulNietzsche showed little interest in de

and

scribing the patron city of philosophers. Nor did

sophic
of

he

choose to

portray the

philo

the city. Apart

from his early

the genius

unpublished

Greek

(cf.

M3-283-285)
own

wherein

is

portrayed

essay as he

on

"The

who uti

lizes the
of

state

for his

(mainly
His

cultural) ends, Nietzsche

relished

the divorce

philosophy

and politics.

estrangement

from Wagner

marked a conviction

that the attempt to place the state

genius

in the

service of genius

inevitably

leads to
to

paying

service

to the state.

To the

extent politics position:

is

equated with statecraft a

there can be no

doubt

as

Nietzsche's

the state is

threat to the individual and the

individual to is
considered
of

the state. In general, political engagement in the social realm

beneath the higher

man:

"Political

and economic affairs are not

worthy

being
the

the enforced concern of society's most gifted spirits: such a

all"

wasteful use of

(D 107). Included among spirit is at bottom worse than having none at Nietzsche's Ten Commandments for Free Spirits is the proscription, "You shall
politics"

not practice

(M9-365). Nietzsche himself followed this dictum,

nature

aver

ring

his

"anti-political"

(EH 225).

Still,

one

must

not

be

misled

by
or

Nietzsche's

antipolitical pronouncements.

The

politics
self.

Nietzsche disparaged Politics is

ignored in

a social context

is

celebrated

in the

not so much

abandoned as

internalized. The

pluralism of

the soul creates the space for a

stmggle of

spiritual political practice.

The

rule of

the self, the

competing

per

spectives and their

The
social

microcosm

coalitions, form its foundation. of the individual becomes a resource better to

understand

the

macrocosm. observed:

Writing

of

the

"microcosm

cultur

and

macrocosm

of

Nietzsche
there"

"The finest discoveries concerning culture are made by the individual man within himself when he finds two heterogeneous powers mling (HH 130). The obverse investigative exercise, however, was Nietzsche's
of politics should not might

primary concern. The history and status inner exploration. That freedom of spirit
anarchical

may serve become an

as a guide excuse

to
an

for

soul, for example, the individual

as

look to it

eighteenth

century

French politics, "so

then to continue the work of the Enlightenment in him

at

self, and to strangle the Revolution

birth,

happen"

to

make

not

(HH 367).

More importantly, Nietzsche

tions,
most

speculated that all

moral

and spiritual

designa

notably the

concepts of good and

evil,

were

the historical
of

develop

ments of political categories and

struggles, namely those

the aristocracy or

nobility

and

the plebeians or commoners (GM 24-3 Iff). Metaphysical concepts,

Nietzsche's Politics
such as

283

freedom

of

will,

also

have their

origins

in the "social-political

domain"

(HH 305).
process.

Indeed,

the soul

itself

was

held to be the

product of a political

Political

organization could not were

tolerate the uncontrolled discharge of

instincts.

Consequently, instincts
that
man

turned
than

inward, internalized. Man

them
called

pitted

his

passions against each other rather

loosing
later

in the his

public realm:

"thus it

was

first developed

'soul'"

what was

(GM 84).

For Nietzsche, the origin of the soul is political. And its dynamics, he found, are best described in the language of politics. This is not to say, however, that
political

language

and

thought cannot and do

not also obfuscate

the nature of

the soul.

Our

recognition of

how

political

hierarchies have

resolved

themselves
politi

souls, Nietzsche noted, has been retarded owing to a hierarchy (GM 28). cal, namely "democratic prejudice in the modem Hence Nietzsche distinguishes his individualism from what might be

into

of

world"

called of

democratic individualism. The latter holds the individual to be the bearer

rights and prerogatives viduals against and

the

due to all; the

particular

individual

represents all

indi

the totality. Nietzsche holds the individual to be unrepresentable

incapable

characteristic

of representing others, for incommensurability is its defining (cf. WP 162, 190,191, 411). Nietzsche's individualism thus undemocratic and apolitical.

shows

itself to be both

Yet Nietzsche
spawns

maintained a

certain ambivalence toward

democracy. For

democracy

both the free

character

dom that izes the for

allows

for the

cultivation of greatness and the

disorder that

soul of modem man

(BGE 153,154).
as

Democracy
ebb of

prepares the ground

radical

individualism, just
called

it describes the
possible.

that spiritual strength

which makes a tme

individualism himself
a

Nietzsche
in their

"nutcracker"

of souls who

subsequently

engaged

vivisection

(GM 113). The object,

psychological

however,
atoms of

was not to create a scien

tifically
remain

grounded,

theory. The substrata of the self are acknowl

edged to

be

ambiguous and undefined.

unknowable.

The

the

community-of-the-self

essentially
passions,

The

molecules

they form
emotions,

receive

various

names,
rate of

never used with complete consistency.

The

multiple soul

is

a conglome and

desires,

affects,

forces, feelings,

drives,

in

stincts.

to

In turn, these variously named molecules of human motivation coalesce form dispositions or character. Still, Nietzsche did not pretend to have dis human
was
soul.

covered or explained the atomic stmcture of the

He

claimed

only
the

to

have

observed

its

effects.

The

hypothesizing
accompanied

not propounded as

forestage to
skepticism sitions

theory; for there

suppositions

was no expectation of subsequent proofs.

Nietzsche's

were

by

profound

skepticism, a

deemed particularly

apposite when

treating
an

the

soul.

For the

suppo of

themselves, ex hypothesi, result from drives. Here observation is already the efflux lates.
cess.

indeterminate interaction

of that about which one specu

only the perceivable effect of an imperceivable pro Even the finest thought, Nietzsche wrote, corresponds to a network of

Thinking

represents

drives: "Thoughts

are signs of a

play

and stmggle of affects:

they

always are

284

Interpretation
their hidden
roots"

connected with

(Ml 6-60). The

opaqueness

of

the

human

soul

precludes

anything

more

than speculative

assertions.

Thought divorced

from its
the

affectual origins remains an abstraction.

Consciousness itself is already

organized

into

consciousness

unity of unseen, and unseeable is the last link of a chain.

affects:
. . .

"Everything

that comes

each will

is

a composite of

of our

Each thought, each feeling, constituent (M16-61). Seeing

drives"

into the labyrinth

the soul is just as

as

impossible,
We

to retrieve another of

Nietzsche's metaphors,
restricted,
as

seeing

around one's own comer.

Our

perception

is

it were, to the

surface of our souls.

are capable of

penetrating

neither ourselves nor others.

general

pattern, albeit one

of

never

within

the confusing array

the soul.

terms Nietzsche employed to

or

strictly maintained, may be observed describe the work

affects constitute an
we are

ings
their

of

Drives, instincts,

irreducible
of

sub

stratum

(which is only to say that

composite and

by

definition

incapable
next

probable components).

Feelings

or emotions

form the

level.

discerning They are

drives.

the products,

complex,

of conscious

and unconscious

Thought forms the third tier. It inner

conversation

is, by

and

large,

derivative
of

of

emotion, the
of

that tries

to make

sense

out

medley

feelings:
and sim

"Thoughts
pler"

are the shadows of our

feelings

always

darker,

emptier,

(GS 203). The simplicity of thought is not to be equated with its imme diacy. Thoughts are simpler because they are emptier. They are one-dimensio
nal representations of multidimensional emotions.

Systems
applies

of

thought, in turn,
philo sophisti

do

not gain

depth owing to their intricacy. This ostensibly

especially to

sophic

thought. Regardless of how

rational or

conceptually
as

cated one's

philosophy, it remains, nonetheless, merely the

relations.

schematic represen

tation of affectual

Music has

long

been

recognized

"a

sign-

language

emotions;"

of the
understood

it remains,
and cf.

wrote

Nietzsche, for philosophy

to be

similarly Despite Nietzsche's

(Ml 1-190

BGE 92).
the power of reason, in

repeated acknowledgements of

tellect and thought, their status is consistently depreciated in his writings. For

they

never

reason to

supply the impetus of human action. With Hume, Nietzsche held be passion's slave. The intellect merely justifies and defends one's
In the battle between the passions,
reason

affectual regime.

is

employed as a

tool and weapon. Nietzsche condemned the rationalistic degradation of passion

as

if it

were
.

motive

force.

only in unseemly cases, and not necessarily and always the The misunderstanding of passion and reason, as if the latter
and not rather a system of relations

were an

independent entity

between

various

passions and

desires;

and as

if every

passion

did

not possess

its

quantum of reason

(WP 208).

The Platonic
sition

opposition multiple

between
passions,

reason and passion

is fractured into the

oppo

between

each with

its

own

capacity for

reason and will

to

dominate. Reason does

not govern

passion,

as a charioteer steers

his horses.

Nietzsche's Politics

285
will

Self-overcoming is
to
several

not, therefore, the victory

of reason over passion:

"The

overcome an emotion
others"

is ultimately only the will of another emotion or of (BGE 79). The perception that reason tames the passions, that

intellect may have its way despite one's emotional urges, mistakes the weapons for the actual contestants of battle. What arises to consciousness is only the aftershock of an unnoticed inner turbulence, the post hoc paperwork that spells
out the settlement of a

dispute.
final accounting at the that intelligere
end of

Since only the last

this

scenes of reconciliation and the

long

process rise to our

consciousness,

we suppose

must be something conciliatory, just, and good something that essentially opposed to the instincts, while it is actually nothing but a certain behavior of the instincts toward one another. For the longest time, conscious thought was considered thought itself. Only now does the truth dawn on us that by

[understanding]

stands

far the

greatest part of our spirit's

activity

remains unconscious and unfelt

(GS

261,262).

In

typically Nietzschean
The tme
slave of

paradox, the freest thinker is he

the efflux of
passions

who realizes

that

his
and

thoughts are not

affects.

free, being
his

his

often

imperceivable instincts
not recognize

is he

who

does

his

slavery.

The

man

Zarathustra loves for his

heart"

honesty

is he

who

knows that "his head is

(Z 45). only the bowels of his Yet Nietzsche deepened the paradox in
where: spirit not

"If

one

binds
it"

one's

heart

firmly

and

striking way by remarking else imprisons it one can allow one's

one

liberties."

many

And this, Nietzsche claimed, "no

believes if he does

(BGE 75). already know With reason and intellect apparently

out of contention as motive

forces,

the

entire spectrum of

human
and

action and

thought must be accounted for in terms of

relations. will

instincts
petitors.

or

drives

their

(political)

This is

made possible

by

their

essentially

agonal character.

Each has its

to dominate and exploit its com

In turn, the mling

drive(s)

provides

its

own agenda and world view.

Nietzsche's understanding
tors
as subjectivist at a

of perspectivism, often

interpreted

by

his

commenta not

base, is actually
its

much more radical. a

The individual is
battleground

privy to

single, incommensurable perspective, but is

each with own perspective.

of com

peting drives,
or coalition of

The victory

of a particular

drive,

needs

drives, determines the political mle of the community: "It is our that interpret the world; our drives and their For and Against. Every drive
of

is
all

kind

lust to mle; drives to

each one

has its

perspective

that

it

would

like

to compel

norm"

the

other

accept as a

(WP 267). Nietzsche's primarily in

what

perspectivism come

has its
known

experiential roots not

only

or even

has

to be
of

as

the relativity

of

values, that

is,

the supposed

incommensurability

personal or cultural vicissitudes of

truths, but at the subindividual level of inner conflict, in the the soul itself. For Nietzsche, the multiple soul with its endless

internal

strife

is the

defining

characteristic of man.

Man is

an animal whose

286

Interpretation
multiplied and escaped a permanent ordering. mark of

instincts have
soul

The disorder

of

the

is both the
.

humanity

and

the

cause of

its

woes.

a single

individual

contains within

him

a vast confusion of

contradictory
expression of

valuations and

consequently

of

contradictory drives. This is the

to the animals in

the

diseased

condition

in man, in

contrast

which all

existing instincts

answer to quite

definite tasks (WP 149). said, is the

sick animal.

Man, Nietzsche

The disease
celebrated

of

the human soul and the

the means of

accompanying torments, however, knowledge, that is, knowledge garnered from

were profound ple

as

deeper
most

multiple perspectives.

The

thinkers are not those whose thoughts reflect

lame

passions and sim

order, but the multiple,

irregular,

and chaotic origin of

thought in strong, the

soul allowed sat

agonistic passions

(GS 254). In effect,

proper cultivation of

one

to live

multiple of

lives,

thus sating the passion for knowledge. To have

soul"

in

nook"

"every
my
and
greed! would

"the

modem

was

Nietzsche's

ambition an

(WP 532): "Oh

self

There is

like to
.

appropriate

hands for
or

in my soul but only individuals as so many many Oh that I might be reborn in a hundred
no selflessness

all-coveting

that

additional pairs of eyes

beings!"

(GS 215). The

greed

experience could

be

satisfied

in two

ways:

to be reborn again and

again,

to

live
as

one

life

as many.

Nietzsche
able

assumed

the latter charge: "Task:

Seeing
out of

things

they

are\

Means: to be

to see them out of a

alienation

persons"

many

(Ml 1-138). The individual's

hundred eyes, from community

own com

is

redressed

by

its

manifold

internal

relations.

His isolation bears its in

pensation

in

a spiritual plurality.
an unmistakable pride

Nietzsche displayed
tanism of the

having

achieved a

"cosmopoli

(HH 262). The ability to see from multiple perspectives and wear many masks is celebrated throughout his writings. In the Dithyrambs of Dionysus he poeticized: "My soul,/ its tongue insatiable,/ has licked at every
good and evil

spirit"

thing,/ dived down into every

depth"

(DD 71). The

prelude

to

The
and

Gay

Science

contains a similar self-congratulation: and

"Sharp

and

mild,

rough

fine,/ Strange
All this

familiar, impure
I
and wish

and clean,/

place where

fool

and sage

convene:/

am

to

mean,/

Dove

swine"

as well as snake and

(GS 45). Nietzsche

'an immortal
other

announced

that

he

was

"happy

to harbour

in himself,

not

soul,'

but many

souls"

mortal

(HH 218). The higher man, in

an altered

words,
are

wears

many

masks.

More important than Nietzsche

appearance,

however,
with

the changes in perspective, in

of

perception and claimed

the

donning

these masks.

thought, allowed to have regained that

its
own comer

which

is denied the individual

the capacity to

look

around

(EH

223). As the dramatist he can, as it were, scrutinize Hecuba, and as Hecuba he may look back upon the dramatist. The perspectives thus gained, however, are ultimately incommensurable.
yet a

They

can

be

compared

only from the

'objective'

position of

third perspective, a perspective itself no more

than those

it

evaluates, its competitors.

Nietzsche'

Politics

287

To be many people, to have many masks, is the precondition for knowledge and growth, the sign of a profound spirit. The contradictions of Nietzsche's
thought which are the

bane

of

his

commentators must

be

understood

in light

of

his

glorification of

the multiple soul.

Consistency

is

not considered a

virtue,

especially for
opment and

a philosopher whose not

Nietzsche
who

placed

primary conem should be his spiritual devel the continuity of his intellectual endeavors. In this regard himself with Plato, Spinoza, Pascal, Rousseau and Goethe
soul,"

displayed

"passionate

history

of a

and

thus were considered philo

excellence not
rather

sophically

superior

to Kant and
and

Schopenhauer (their intellectual

gave

withstanding).

Kant
a

Schopenhauer

biographies "of

head"

than

biographies "of He
The

soul"

(D 198). Their lack

of spiritual experience and

develop

ment, in short their consistency, was to their demerit.

who

is

concerned with growth overcomes

vicissitudes of

the philosopher's soul,

himself, becomes different. however, are particularly trouble

own protean char are

some

for those

who wish

to nail down his identity. That his

was

acter would cause much

misunderstanding by he wrote in The Gay Science, "because

we shed our old

foreseen

Nietzsche. "We
we

ourselves

keep

growing,

keep

changing,

we are no
thing"

particular

every spring longer free to do only one particular thing, to be only one (GS 331, 332). The philosopher with a passion for learning internal
regime a welcome occurrence.

bark,

we shed our skins

finds

a change of

The

new

leadership

of

drives brings
edge as

new perspectives and experiences.

the

stimulant of

further growth,

growth

The ensuing increase in knowl which inevitably will leave this

knowledge behind.
The

irony

consistency.

peting Nietzsche's

Nietzsche's philosophy is that its contradictions demonstrate its assertion that the philosopher is actually a puppet of his com instincts is effectively demonstrated by the contradictions within
of

The

own work

that

represent

the

temporary hegemony
charge of a plurality.

of

his

various was a

drives. In short, Nietzsche's defense against the reaffirmation of his understanding of the soul as
would

incoherence
"The

wisest man would

be the

one

richest in

contradictions,

Nietzsche claimed, for he

be

master of the greatest assortment of perspectives

from

which

he

might view

life

for example, was prefaced the book "seems to be written in the langauge of

(WP 150). The

Gay Science,

with

the admission that

contradic

Further

on

demonstrates the changeability of periodic changes of internal government. his to Nietzsche's philosophy owing Everything from culinary dishes to philosophic doctrines are held to be "brief
the
reader

discovers the

reason:

the

work

habits"

which are and should

be

frequently discarded,
authentic

like

skin"

"shedding

(GS 32, 237, 246). It follows that the

'identity'

search

for the

Nietzsche is

misdirected.

His

only be discovered through an analysis of his various personae and their interaction, of his masks and their recurring features. This is not to abandon the attempt to characterize Nietzsche's thought, but merely to
can

288

Interpretation
that any
such characterization must

emphasize

be

polyvalent.

be

approached as one would a musical composition of

point.

One

observes

dissonance

and

trary

motion

between the

melodic

many its resolution, with much oblique and con parts. Such works do not preclude interpreta

voices

His writing must in counter

tion, they invite it. But the

predicated on an appreciation single come and voice.

discovery of a harmonic theme, or themes, is of the desirability of the work having more than a
one

To

remain

faithful to Nietzsche's self-understanding

characters,
even at

must

to terms

with

his

multiple

the price of ambivalence

its susceptibility to abuse. The soul, then, is proposed

changes

as an agonistic political

community

which expe

The analogy to social also includes the desir government. Frequent regime changes should not be invita ability of strong tions to anarchy. Stmggle begets strength; but anarchy, in the soul and society,

riences

in

'units'

regime.

signifies

powerlessness, a

regression

to barbarism. In the soul, no

less than in

art, in ethics, and in politics, laisser aller is a mark of decadence and a recipe for dissipation (TI 95,96). A tensioned order is the goal, and to this end leader

ship is found indispensable.

Initially,
Nietzsche
no

this

leadership

is
and

supplied

by

one's

mentors.

Education, for
philoso
service of

less than Plato

Aristotle,

proved the

highest duty. All in the

phy, Nietzsche maintained, originated and

education youthful

was carried out

(M16-38). The

order of

the soul Socrates sought to instill among

his

interlocutors has its

attempted

parallel

in the

proper

hierarchy

of

instincts

Nietzsche

to stimulate

in his

readers.

A tmly

philosophical education

always entails the active manipulation of the soul.

The "essential
tracted
obedience

thing"

in

one

regarding this manipulation is that it produce "a pro direction: from out of that there always emerges and

has

always emerged

in the

long

run

something for the

effect, is

sake of which

it is

worthwhile

to

live

on

earth, for

example

virtue, art, music,

an extended and much

dance,

reason,

spirituality"

(BGE 93).

Education, in

discipline. It has

little to do

with the accumulation of

knowledge

to do with the learn

The understanding is that eventually the student will inter nalize its force, coming to discipline himself. He will, in effect, leam to be the master, or perhaps better said the coordinator, of his instincts. In sum, the

ing

of self-control.

educator trains

his

students
and

involves authority
for
a personalized

arranging the soul, and training always discipline. Thus Nietzsche's radical individualism is just
art of

in the

the opposite of unrestrained development. The uniqueness of each student calls

form

of

discipline; it is
But the

not

an

excuse

for intellectual

or

spiritual

self-management.
not

educator's

role,

as

Zarathustra demon

strates, is

that of

Procrustes. The

successful student

his teacher the

celebrates

paradigm of

how to become his

own master.

eventually discovers in The tme educator

pupil"

his victory when his students become worthy of demanding their independence, for "one repays a teacher very badly if one remains only a (Z103).

Nietzsche's Politics
The
soul

289

plurality which seeks unity, a chaos that must become a cosmos: "To become master of the chaos one is; to compel one's chaos to become form: to become logical, simple, unambiguous, mathematics, law
a

is

that

is the

here"

grand ambition

(WP 444). Nietzsche's

achievement of

writings are

the

self-

conscious attempts

to

demonstrate the
in

this ambition. His battles

and

with other philosophic giants evidence pendence.

both his tutelage

a

his

pursuit of

inde

Nietzsche

was engaged

lifelong

stmggle to gain statehood

for

the society of his soul. His personal motto might well

unum.

have been

e pluribus

And like the American

the
union was

founding fathers, Nietzsche

on

recognized

that the

strength of
competition

based

the

vigor achieved

through the ordered

among its

parts.

The

creation of

unity

out of

diversity
who are

is

given

the name of style. Style is the

whose

coordinated exploitation of powerful passions are

instincts. It is impossible for those

too weak or those

incapable

of

harnessing
by

strong

passions.

Stimulation
passions

and sublimation rather precondition.

than extirpation or anaesthetization of the

as

is its

Grand style,

demonstrated

classicism, is the
and

effect achieved

through the the

harnessing

of violent and varied

passions,

their

placement under

mle of a predominant

drive.
And for Nietzsche, the great "that strength which employs

Only

great passion can produce a great work. was

est of works

the

individual. He

extolled

genius not for works

but for

itself

as a

work; that

is, for its

own

constraint; for

the purification of the influx of

its imagination, for the imposition of order and choice upon tasks and (D 220). Style is that art of living which
impressions"

begets

greatness.

To
and

stylize

form,

coherence,

something is to give it an identity, to introduce strength, to lend the appearance of unity to a plurality.
misery,
of spiritual

Nietzsche's life
and social

was one of almost constant physical

suffering,
and
writ

alienation.

His

works

are

as explosions

strength, energy,

gaiety.

They

offer episodes of a seen as a

life

of radical

individualism. Nietzsche's
of style.

ings, then, may be

Nietzsche's writings,
soul,

stylized

analysis
of

In

other

words,

as the

descriptions

his

own stmggles

to arrange

his

are submitted as style conscious of am one of

itself in the

act of creation.

"I
tion

matter"

thing, my

writings are another entitled

Nietzsche began the

sec

his autobiography, Ecce Homo

It is
need of masks to achieve

'Why
use

I Write Such Good

Books.'

a statement typical of someone who wished to stylize

his

work and

knew the for

his

purpose.

To

the page as a shambles

of

one's cognitive or emotional

eyes.

dismemberment is the height Style is the is

to

decadence in
self-

Nietzsche's
overcoming.

It is the
point of

absence of style.
masks

exhibition of a

The

wearing is

not so much

deceive,

as to grow

into them. The imposition

within the self. govern a

of order upon always a

the page

limns the
will,
not
of

stmggle

for

order

In short,
soul.

style

display

of

the use of power to

fractious
drives:

The

mask of

Nike is worn,

but because
strongest

order was

ultimately

achieved

because Eris is absent, through the disciplined mle of the

290
. .

Interpretation
what

happens here is
the

what

commonwealth: commonwealth.

ruling
all

class

happens in every well-constructed identifies itself with the successes

and

happy

of the

obeying, on
'souls'

willing it is absolutely a question of commanding and the basis, as I have said already, of a social structure composed In (BGE 31).
the
will

of

many

Nietzsche's
pleasure of

glorification of

to power, often interpreted in terms of the

a

dominating
The

others, is essentially
to be witnessed

tribute to self-overcoming.
sociopolitical

The

greatest struggles are not

in the

arena, but in the

mle of the self.

greatest

Nietzsche

as one who

victory is a well-ordered soul. We must confront rejected a life within politics that he might explore this

life

of politics within

him.

REFERENCES TO NIETZSCHE'S WRITINGS in parentheses)

(Year

of publication of those works published

by

Nietzsche

given

The Birth of Tragedy (BT) (1872), trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1967. Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks (PTG), trans. Marianne Cowan. Washing
ton: Regency Gateway, 1962. Untimely Meditations (UM) (1873-76), University Press, 1983.

trans. R.J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge

Human All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits "Assorted Opinions
Maxims"

(HH) (1878, 1886

"The Wanderer

edition contains

and

[1879]

and

and

his

Shadow"

[1880]),

trans. R.J. Hollingdale.

on

Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press,
trans.

1986.

Daybreak: Thoughts The

Prejudices of Morality Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

the

(D) (1881),

R.J. Hollingdale.
New

Gay

York:

Science (GS) (1882, Vintage, 1974.

second edition

1887),
and

trans. Walter Kaufmann.

Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone

Hollingdale. New York:

No One

(Z) (1883-85),

trans.

R.J.

Penguin, 1969.
a

Beyond Good On

and

Evil: Prelude to

Philosophy

of the Future

(BGE) (1886),

trans. R.J.

Hollingdale. New York: Penguin, 1972.

the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic (GM) (1887), trans. Walter Kaufmann Hollingdale. New York: Vintage, 1967.
with a and

R.J.

Twilight of the Idols: or How to Philosophize lingdale. New York: Penguin, 1968.

Hammer (TI), trans. R.J. Hol

Nietzsche

Ecce Homo (EH), trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1967. contra Wagner: Out of the Files of a Psychologist (NCW), in The Portable

Nietzsche,

trans. Walter

Kaufmann. New York: Viking, 1968.

Dithyrambs of Dionysus (DD), trans. R.J. Hollingdale. N.p. Anvil Press Poetry, 1984. The Will to Power (WP), trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale. New York:

Vintage, 1968.
Gesammelte Werke, Musarionausgabe (M), 23 1929.
vols.

Munich: Musarion Verlaa.

1920

Nietzsche Briefwechsel, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, (NB) 15 vols. eds. Giorgio Colli Mazzino Montinari. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1975-1984.

and

The Argument in the Protagoras that No One

Does What He Believes To Be Bad
T. F Morris

Montgomery College,

Takoma Park, MD

Helena: You

go so much

backward

when you

fight.

Paroles: That's for

advantage.
when

Helena: So is running away

fear

proposes the safety.

All's Well That Ends Well

Act I, Scene ii

Helena's
that
as

point

is that

when a coward

he is

doing
good,

being

as

something bad being to his advantage, his is

good

flees from battle, he does he is actively seeking something he

safety.

not think

thinks of

The fear
as

causes

him to

change

his

opinion about what

by

proposing safety

the really good

thing.

In the Protagoras Socrates

actions:
good.

when

someone

Or, in

other

claims that this holds generally for all human does something he necessarily thinks of it as being words, no one does what he believes to be bad.
Socrates'

claim seems

counter-intuitive,

for

most people think

that

they

sometimes

do

things that

it

not

they know are wrong; we all the case that before we give in to

sometimes give
a temptation we

in to temptation. But is first play a little game the desired action

how it is

with

ourselves,

finding
claim

some point of view which

makes

seem good?
Socrates'

basic

is developed in the

context of a

discussion
given

of

possible

tion and

for someone, with knowledge be overcome by pleasure. The implies

and

of what claim

is good, to be

in to tempta

that no one does what he believes

explained

to be bad

that this phenomenon must

by

the individual

contrary belief. (Missing this possibility, Martha Nussbaum believes that Socrates is implying that the phenomenon

losing
never

his knowledge

taking
p.

on a

happens [Nussbaum,

115]). If it is impossible to lose knowledge (see

must not

Meno 98a), then the explanation is that the individual started out with knowledge that he must only have had is better to do.
In the first
part of us

really have

an opinion about what

this

article

will

argue that at

Protagoras

351b-358d,
criterion of

Plato

presents and

with

a valid
who

argument;

if

pleasure

is the

sole

goodness,
what

//'everyone

forsakes
so

belief

about what

is right

and

does

he had
no one

thought to

be wrong does

because he is

then

does

what

he believes to be bad. The

1989-90, Vol. 17, No. 2

by pleasure, interesting thing is that the

overcome

interpretation. Winter

292

Interpretation

conclusion

is

not

specifically dependent

upon pleasure

being
of

used

in the

prem

ises;

the

conclusion

follows

as

long

as that which overcomes

argument

is the

same as

the

criterion of goodness. conclusion

That is, Plato's

which

admits
person

the more general

same

that, if that

overcomes

such

is the

as

the

person's criterion of

goodness, then no one ever

does

what

he believes to be

bad. In the

second part of

the article I

will argue

that Plato is
will

trying

to establish

between the lines that this

really trying to

condition always

holds. I

argue that

Plato is

make a point about we

human

nature: whenever we are overcome and

by

some temptation

have

switched opinions

think of that which the

temptation promises us as

being

the

truly

good thing.

All these

points emerge

from the study

of

the details of

Plato's very

complicated argumentation.

351b-352a. Socrates begins this

section of

the dialogue

by

asking Pro

tagoras a series of questions concerning the relationship between goodness and

pleasure. agrees that living painfully implies not living well, implies the opposite, but then he qualifies this and living pleasantly that living pleasantly is good only if one finds pleasure in honorable

At first Protagoras

and that specifies

things (wis kalois).

(Larry Goldberg
'well'

raises

the possibility that Protagoras is

p.

distinguishing
ble to
support

between

'good'

and

[Goldberg,

38], but it is

not possi

this philologically.) At Charmides 163b Critias

mentions pros

titution

[among
sort of

has this

things] as pleasure in mind

other

dishonorable
he

profession; perhaps Protagoras

when

specifies that the pleasures which are

enjoyed must

be honorable.
asks

Socrates then
equates means

Protagoras two
asks

quite

different questions,
whether

which

Socrates

(351c). He first

Protagoras'

incredulously
with

qualification

that Protagoras agrees

the common opinion that some pleasant

things are

bad,

and some painful ones good. claims that

George Klosko
tagoras'

Socrates here 311). This is

misinterprets or misrepresents not tme.

Pro

objection

(Klosko,

p.

implication

Protagoras'

of

Socrates is objecting to an to find pleasure in for if it is possible question,

are

dishonorable things (and if dishonorable things

things are good.
out
Socrates'

bad),

then not all pleasant

good"

addition of

"some

painful

things are

rounds

the thought.
will

At 354a Socrates both

list

a number of activities which are

unproblematically

good and also painful.

Thus it

would seem

that Socrates also holds the

common opinion which make of put

his incredulity? He
on

he is asking Protagoras about. What, then, are we to seems to be aggressive with Protagoras, trying to
second question as
say"

him

the

defensive.'

Socrates introduces his first

if it

meant the same

thing

as

his

by

saying:

"I

mean

to

(ego

gar

lego). Nussbaum feels that Socrates is

The Argument in the Protagoras

contrasting his
personal view p.

293

(the

emphatic

use of

ego)

with

the view of the

Protagoras'

many (Nussbaum,
view

111). But Socrates is asking a question about (see 35 lei). It is not a rhetorical question, and therefore cannot be taken
to express
Socrates' Socrates'

as

being meant Contrary to

as the
and

view.
question

claim, the second

question.
as

does

not mean as

the same
are pleas conse

thing
ant,

first

He

asks:

"Are things

good

insofar any

they

bad insofar

they

are painful,

disregarding

other

future

cause?"

quences

they

might

An

affirmative answer to this second question

does

not mean pleasant

that no pleasant things are

are

thing

bad

enough then

bad, for if the future consequences of a it might still be bad. Thus Socrates explains
question;
an affirmative
well

the meaning of
answer

his first

question with a much weaker

to the second question could very the

be in

accord with

the

common on

view which

first

seems

to deny. In addition to to

trying

to

put

Protagoras

the

defensive, Socrates

seems

C. CW. Taylor's mistake,

be trying to confuse him. discussed in note 1, brings him into further diffi

culty here. He tries to defend Socrates from the contradiction of holding that everything that is pleasant is good and then explaining this view with a much weaker claim, a claim that is in accord with the common view he seems to be
attacking. extent

Taylor does this

by

that something is pleasant

Socrates'

pointing out that the Greek can mean that to the it must be considered good, that is, according
167). But this

to Taylor no other considerations can override its goodness (p.

cannot
extent

be

meaning, for he specifies that in calling something "to that

good"

he is

disregarding
[p. 167]).

any

other consequences

it

might

have. This

implies that
(as Taylor

those other consequences can change the evaluation of goodness

recognizes

A. E. Taylor mistakenly thinks that just insofar as they are (A. E. Taylor,

Socrates'

point p.

is "that things

are good

pleasant"

258). The Greek influence the

provides no

justification for the

word

'just'.

Moreover, in excluding
could
Socrates'

other consequences
calculation.

from the calculation, Socrates implies that they Protagoras answers only the first of
actions are

two questions: not all pleasant

good,

etc.

Socrates ignores his

answer and pursues

the

second ques

tion. He explains that question

good

insofar

as

it is
open

pleasant

is here

leaving
be

by saying that in asking whether something is he is asking whether pleasure is a good thing. He the possibility that there might be other good things; honbe
a good as

orableness might also

would also
good

thing,
are

and

it

would then

be the

case

that things
could

insofar

they

honorable. (Technically, Socrates

be saying that he is asking whether pleasure is the sense of the question he is explaining.)
Socrates'

the good. But this contradicts

explanation of

his

second question

is in

contradiction with

his first

question

(which the

second
no

seemed to

imply

that

is supposedly explaining), for the first question pleasant things can be bad or painful things good.
efforts

Socrates

seems

to be making further

to

confuse

Protagoras. Protagoras

refuses to answer,

saying that Socrates

should

lead

an

investigation; in

effect,

294

Interpretation
answers rather

he is asking Socrates to tell him the answer before he Protagoras does seem to be intimidated by Socrates.
B 352a-353b. The
next section of

than after.

the argument begins

with

a medical

analogy. of

In considering a man's health or some other bodily function by means appearances, one looks at many different parts of the body. Similarly Pro
offered a

tagoras has

description
Protagoras'

of

his

condition with respect

more of

to the good and

point

the pleasant, and Socrates would like to know

of

his thoughts. The

the analogy is that underlying them. The relationship between

which what

thoughts are

indicative indicate

of a general condition such appearances and will

judging by

the underlying reality

proof

those appearances

be the

key
at

to the
main

that no one does

he believes to be bad. Plato is

hinting

his

point without

telling

us

that he is

doing

so.

Socrates

goes on

to present the common view

not governed

that,

while a man often

has
or

knowledge in him, he is

by

it, but 196e,

by

passion,

or

pain,
says

or

love,

fear. This is in few

men will

contradiction with

Laches

where

Socrates

that only a

have knowledge have the

of what should

be

ventured and what should

be

feared;

thus

we

suggestion

that the

common view might

supposing that those men who are swayed by knowledge. If such swaying occurs often, then perhaps the men who are swayed do not have knowledge, but something else instead. Protagoras dis
agrees with the common

be wrong in passion, etc., really do have

view,

holding

that knowledge is mightier than pas

sion, pleasure,

etc.

Socrates
come

then discusses the experience which the world calls

"being

over

by

pleasure":

it

occurs when someone who not

knows

what

is best,

and

has

the

power

to do

it, does

do it because he is

overcome

by

pleasure or pain or
people

is

under

the mle of such things. Socrates does not dispute that

have

pleasure

some experience which

they

call

"being
of

overcome

by

but he hints

that their explanation of the experience

and

which

they

so name

is false. Protagoras

Socrates

set

themselves the task

explaining this

common phenomenon.

C
that

353c-355b. In

response

to a question from

Socrates,

Protagoras

agrees

most people would

overcome phasis on

by

pleasure

say that the badness of the actions of those who are is in the future ills which those actions cause. This em
to ignore
Protagoras'

future

results seems

criterion of

honorableness.

Is

cowardice

bad because it

might cause

the loss of a

battle,

or

because there is

something dishonorable about running away? Terence Irwin claims that Socrates here endorses hedonism (Irwin, p. 307). It is tme that Socrates sometimes uses interrogative sentences to endorse views,

here, for he is explicitly asking Protagoras what Protagoras thinks. Moreover, he is asking Protagoras what Protagoras thinks the many's position would be. Compare this with 330e-331a. Socrates goes on to treat the parallel case of pains which are considered to
cannot

but he

be

doing

that

The Argument in the Protagoras

295

be good; their goodness comes from their future results: future pleasures or the avoidance of future pains (354a-b). The examples cited of such future benefits
include deliverance
can result of

cities, dominion
we

over

others,

and

wealth;

all of which

from battle. Thus

have the

suggestion that

going to the
criterion of

dentist;

one accepts

the present
case

going into battle is like unpleasant state for the sake of a

no role

more pleasant

future. Again, in this

begins

there would seem to be

for the

honorableness.
next a series of questions

Socrates
to
mention

any

other criterion

for evaluating
see

good and

emphasizing the many's inability bad apart from pleasure/

pain.

Gerasimos Santas tends to

hedonism (the doctrine that
which people seek

Socrates

as

here

discussing
of pain are

psychological

pleasure and own

the absence

the only things

for their

sakes,
are

as opposed

to evaluative

hedonism,

the

doctrine that

worth seeking) (p. 10), 315), following Santas, assert that it is psychological hedonism. This is false, for the word oukoun (therefore) shows that 354c3-5 follows from what has gone before, that is, the people who can pleasure

and pain
and

the only things

Gregory

Vlastos (p.

85),

Klosko (p.

not come

up

with

any

other criterion

for

goodness are

forced to

agree

that

they

act

according to their criterion. Their

admission

does

not mle out the

possibility

that other people (for example, masochists) might act according to other crite

ria.
Socrates'

questions culminate vide another criterion

in the

assertion that either the

or

many

must pro

for

good and

bad

their

description

of what

they

call
next

pleasure"

"being

overcome

by
support

becomes ridiculous (355a-b). We

assertion.

shall

examine

Socrates

for this

355b-356c.

Socrates'

explanation of sets of substitutions

the ridiculousness of the many's

position

involves two

ing

good'

it to be bad, because one is overcome for 'pleasure'. A questioner is then introduced does bad,
out

into the formula, "doing bad, know First he substitutes 'the by

pleasure."

who asks

by

what one

is

overcome when one

knowing

We

are told

that if the

questioner were

it to be bad, because one is overcome. insolent, upon hearing the answer "the
this
statement of

good,"

he

would

burst

laughing

and call

ridiculous. The
the

questioner

is surely right. One is

under

the influence

that which overcomes

one were under

one; it is

absurd of

to think that one would

do bad because
people

influence
switches

the good. The good would

bad.2

influence

to

be in

accord with

it,

not with the

from 'the

good'

In restating to 'the

what

goods'

he finds to be absurd, the questioner (the good things). Because the absur
good
what

is to be the same, the point would be that if we are overcome by things then we should be under their good influence, and accordingly do

dity
is

good.

J. L. Stocks

sees

the demonstration of the absurdity of the

move

many's

formula is really

tion as a preliminary move, the next

being

to show us what

296

Interpretation
those situations to which the many mistakenly

happening in
clarification

formulation (p.
of

101). C. C. W. Taylor

sees

it

otherwise.

apply the absurd To his mind the

should

the formulation is already understood:

established principle of
pain,"

'pleasure'

be

taken as the previously

pleasure predominates over

(p. 180).

"contributing to a He rightly observes

There is

life in

which

that such an

understanding Stocks' from point

makes nonsense of

the

substitution.

no such

difficulty
of

of view.

Moreover

note

that at the end of the

overcome'

discussion

the first absurdity the critic says,

"by 'being
formulation.

mean"

you

(355e).
a need

Thus it is
to

most plausible

to see the thrust of the

absurdity

as

pointing to

reformulate

the

many's original

The

questioner asks prevail

whether

the good things are axios

(weighty

enough,
are not
,

worthy) to
worthy,

in

you over

the bad things. The answer is that

would not

they

otherwise the person

would not

have done bad. David

man

Gallop

have done wrong (examaptanein) feels that the wrongdoing is due to the
the
quite possible

fact that the lows from

is overcome; he does
bad (p. 124). But it is

not consider

doing

possibility that it fol for someone to abstain

from wrongdoing because he is

overcome entails

overcome

by

another person's argument.

Being
what

doing

wrong only if

one were

previously disposed to do
worthiness,

is right.
Plato is here
weighs

introducing

an objective measure of

a scale which

things,
to be

not

according to weight, but according to

overcame

some other quality.

If

the

good

things which supposedly

more

the person had been weighty

worthy than the bad things, then the person would not have done wrong in taking the action; the action would have been good. This scale different things that pertain to an action (different aspects of the ac
enough
'weighs'

tion) to determine if
to
pleasure and pain.

the action should be done. It would not weigh

we

with respect

pain, for

have

substituted good and

bad for
when

pleasure and

It

would thus weigh with respect to good and

bad;

the goodness of

an action outweighs the

badness

of

the action, then the

able

action should

be done.
(qual

Socrates

says

that

we would not

be

to find any

other nonquantitative

itative)

reason

for why the

"we"

good

would

would not be able why possibility is that, because Socrates is speaking in behalf of the many, the failure to find another reason might be due to the many's inability to name a

question of

be less weighty than the bad. The to do so is of crucial importance. One

criterion case at

for

goodness other

than pleasure. We

shall argue

that in the

parallel

inability to find another criterion for finding an alternative reason. But here that would not make sense, for it is not a question of finding another criterion for goodness (such as honorableness), but of finding a substitute for goodness as that which
many's
goodness

356c it is the

which prevents

them from

determines
more than

what course of action should

be taken. We
that we

cannot value

something

goodness, for this

"we,"

would mean

(more good) than goodness. Thus even the fact that many when he says

find something to be better though Socrates is speaking for the

can name no other reason

"we"

is

not

The Argument in the Protagoras

due to the
possible

297
is
not

many's anyone

inability

to name another criterion for goodness; it

for

to find another reason.

Because the bad things

what

good things about the action are not

worthy to

prevail over

the

about

the action, the questioner concludes that

overc

by 'being

is really meant is taking the greater evil as the price for the fewer goods (354e). Rather than the individual being overcome by some outside force, the
with

blame lies
evaluate
weigh

the

individual

who chooses

to pay too high a

price.

He does he does

not not a

the relative worthiness of the good and the bad correctly

and so

them together properly

he

makes a of

bad bargain. It is
a

not

question of

being

overpowered

by

goodness, but

being

bad

weigher.

Socrates
painful,
which

'painful'

next substitutes

for

'bad'

and gets:

a man

does

what

is

knowing

it

to

be painful, because he is

overcome

by

the pleasant,

is obviously unworthy to prevail (355e). (Note that the unworthiness of the pleasant comes from what has gone before through substitution; Socrates is
not
and

making the move of saying that, because the painful is equivalent to the bad the individual did what is painful, the individual must have done wrong

and therefore the pleasant

does be

not

deserve to

prevail.)

Again Socrates

claims

that

worthiness would

be

established quantitatively.

He

considers the possible

objection

that there

might

a significant qualitative

difference between the

the imme

immediately diately pleasant

(356a).

pleasant and

the subsequently pleasant:

"But, Socrates,
pleasant

differs widely from the subsequently

proposes another possible

painfu

or

C. C. W. Taylor
tioner.

way

of

understanding the

ques

He

envisions

the possibility that the questioner is proposing a psycho

logical

explanation of

why "we

often choose

things

we

know

or

believe to be

less

alternatives"

valuable than available

(p. 188). But the

standard of

context mles against

this, for

the objection

is to the idea that the

value, the degree of

worthiness, is determined quantitatively (greater or smaller, etc.). If the ques tioner is raising a psychological explanation of how we fail to act according to
our

views, then his

objection

is

not relevant

to

Socrates'

point.

Socrates'

pleasure and

reply to the questioner is to ask if they differ in anything but pain. Of course, they do differ in other respects (they differ in
and

being
tion

immediate
the

subsequent), but the

point

determine
which

worthiness

is

consideration of pleasure and pain.

is that the only thing that can The wide distinc

the immediate pleasure more
other qualities which could

objector

has in

mind would make

worthy. affect

Rather than saying that we can find no worthiness, Socrates says that the many can
another criterion

state no alternative

(356c). If

they
to
at

could state an alternative

finding

way of evaluating worthiness, this for good and bad. It was emphatically

would amount

established

354b-e that the many would not be able to think of any other criterion, and Socrates makes use of that fact now. (Michael C. Stokes sees this [pp.

404-5].)
Socrates
makes no reference

(doto the absurdity of the second substitution

298

Interpretation
what

ing

is

painful

because

we are overcome

by

the

pleasant).

He is simply

interested in showing that tive judgment. It is a little

the
many's original

worthiness would

be

established

through a quantita

strange

that

he

should

be

so concerned with

this, for

formulation has been everything else judgments.

shown to

be inadequate.
turns his attention to a

And then,

leaving

behind, Socrates

point about quantitative

356c-357e. Socrates
the

establishes

two types of

competing

quantitative

methods of evaluation:

power of appearances and

the art of measurement.

in reality or merely in appearance; the art of measurement would tell us what is greater in reality, and the power of ap pearances would tell us what merely appears to be greater. Measurement tells

One thing

can

be

greater than another

us, for example, the tme

appearances causes us
mas

relative

sizes of

two objects, size,

while

the power of
us (he-

to

change our evaluation of

leading

eplana) (356c-d). The art

of measurement can make

astray appearances ineffec

tive, taking away tmth (for no longer

their power, and

would we

be

bring us to rest, being led astray)

allowing us to abide in the (356d-e). Thus, while we

have two different competing quantitative standards, they are not independent, as, for example, honor and pleasure would be. If something is known to be

higher than
standard of

another

thing according

to the

standard of

honor, but lower

criterion

on

the
to

pleasure, then

we would need some

higher

in

order

But if something is known to be higher on a standard of measurement, then the fact that it appears lower on the correspond ing standard of appearances does not require the use of a higher criterion, for
establish which

is

most worthy.

knowledge
Socrates
and

of

the tmth dissipates the

that

power of appearances.

says

doing

of

measurement

(eu prattein) depended on right choosing then the salvation of our life would be in the art of large things, (356c). If there were some other basis for making judgments of

if

our welfare

size, then

employment of

the art of measurement

would not

necessarily

over

ride those
size, the

other considerations.

But, because there is

no other

way to judge
would

employment of

this art would cause one to choose rightly and

thus save one's life.

Socrates

next considers a case which seems to

be

parallel

to

pleasure/pain.

If

our salvation

depended both

on

the

choice of odd and even and also on

when

know
would

ing
be

when

to choose the greater and

the

required: that which

discerns

excess and

less, defect,
and

twofold knowledge that

which

and

discerns

odd
one

and even

(356e-357a).
whether

The parallel with pleasure/pain suggests that

odd or

first

determines
one to

something is less pain,

even,

then this knowledge

allows

know

when one should choose more and when

less (just
less

as one would

want more pleasure and would

or

one could want even and

odd or

odd).

Thus

one

first decide
can

whether

something is

even,

and

then what is

greater

less. We

think of such situations as

involving

a quantitative scale which

incorporates
Socrates

a qualitative next

distinction (positive

and negative).

makes the

specific application

to the case of our

salvation

The Argument in the Protagoras

299

depending

upon

the right choice

of pleasure and pain.

It is

agreed

it has been

established
which

that this is a quantitative question, it

one's

would again

that, because be
as

measurement equivalent

saves

life (357a-b). At 357d-e this is taken

when people

to the admission that

of

from defect is the

knowledge. And then this

appearances,

presupposes

do wrong (examaptanein) it is that their basis for action determined

power of

for if their
would

actions were

quantitative

standard, then there

be the possibility that

Socrates'

by any other this determining

the un

power could override

knowledge; only

the power of appearances would neces

argument rests on

sarily be

overriden

by

knowledge. Thus

stated premise

that when one makes a quantitative choice either one does so

from

basis

of

knowledge (measurement)

or one

is determined
in the

by

the

power of

appearances. salvation

(The

same assumption was employed

specific case of our

depending upon choosing large things [356c-e]. If we would judge largeness any other way, that argument would not have worked.) If there were invalid.3 argument would be (Thus any other basis for judgment, then
Socrates'

there

would

be only

one possible reason

greater

bad

as the price

why the individual at 355e for the lesser good; there is another standard in

got

the

compe

tition with the standard of worthiness, the

[shifting]

standard of

appearances.)
and

If the two competing

which

scales

(that

which

measures

pleasure/pain were not

that

judges

what appears were no

to have the

most

pleasure)

intrinsically
scales are
not

related, if

they

more related

than a scale of honor and a scale of

pleasure/pain, then related,

appear

no conclusion

could

be

attained.
more

But the two

because, if something is known

to someone
with

to be

valuable, then it could

that

knowledge to be less
but their

valuable.

The two competing

that being qualitatively distinct, known to rank higher on the one scale precludes the possibility of being ranked lower on the other scale. Hence wrong choice implies defect of knowledge.
scales of value are
qualities are such

W. K. C. Guthrie
that in the
presence

accuses of

Plato

of a

lack
or

of psychological

immediate

pain

danger

present

insight: "To say pleasure may be intellectual

weighed against

future

by

a simple and unemotional act of

insight"

ment

does

not seem to show much psychological

could recognize

(p. 235).
of not

analysis, Plato

the

difficulty

of

doing
(to

this

judg By our being mled

by

the standard of appearances. The point

would not

is simply that
use

if one had knowledge,

the many's inaccurate

then one

be

mled

by

present pleasure

formulation). While Socrates specifically bases his dependent

upon
argument upon our salvation's

being

the right choice of

pleasure

and

pain, any

other quantitative

scale will serve as well.

The

significance of pleasure/pain at

that it constitutes

such a scale.

Thus the implicit

upon right

position

357a-b is simply is that for any judg

then wrongdoing

ment, if

one's salvation
swayed

is dependent
the

judgment,

implies
F
should

being

by

power of appearances.

357e-358d.

Socrates finishes his

argument

by

claiming that
would

people

pay

money to the sophists, who, as teachers of

knowledge,

be the

300

Interpretation

ones who could

sophists

help

them avoid

being

ignorant. This,

no

doubt,

pleases

the
of

present, who go on to agree with the hedonistic premise at the

basis

the

original argument

(until this

point

the premise has merely been the position the

honorable"

of the

many) (358a-b).

"all

actions aimed at

They also accept without hesitation living painlessly and pleasantly are

corollary that (358b).

Note that running away from battle would seem to be such an action. (Roger Duncan observes that because going to battle is likely to cause death, "the of what should be done is courageous person's hardly a correct
'knowledge'

calculation

to

maximize long-

[or

pleasure"

short-]range

[p.

223].) Protagoras

has evidently forgotten his previous reservation about the possibility of deriving pleasure from dishonorable things. Socrates then turns around and treats hon
orableness as

being

the decisive criterion for goodness; he argues that pleasant

implies honorable, been treated

as the

and

honorable implies
criterion

good

(358b). While

pleasure/pain

has

decisive 359e [p.

agreed

here. (As C. J. Rowe

comes

points

for goodness, Plato elegantly casts that off out, honorableness 's role in determining goodness
pleasant

up At 358b-c it is
or

again at

94].)
that if the

is

good then no one who

has

knowledge
ones which

belief

(oiomenos)

that there are actions which are better than the

he has been
actions.

doing

will continue on

his

present course

if he is free to

do those better follows from

not

Socrates does

not

someone with such a

what we

belief
have

would not

indicate any ground for the claim that continue on his present course, but it

seen

in the

do

what

he believes to be better is

swayed

following by

way.

If

someone who
and

does is

pleasure,

if

pleasure

the

person's criterion

for goodness, then that

apart

person

has

made a mistaken quan

titative judgment. Because it has been

a quantitative

understood

that there is no way to make

judgement

from

measurement or

judging by

appearances,

necessarily be under the influence of the power of appearances, that is, the course he chooses would seem to him to be the more pleasant. Thus he really would believe that the course he
someone who makes such a mistake would
chooses

is better,

and we

have

a contradiction with not

the premise that that person

one who

believes that the

what

other path

is better. Thus

only does

knows

choose

be believes to be best (knowledge

merely believes will choose what Gregory Vlastos feels compelled to

means

implying belief), but he believes to be best.

conclude

even one who

that 'belief
when

(oiomenos) really
refers

'belief

when one

has
nor

knowledge'

(p. 72). but "no

Plato

to some
nor

one who neither

believes"

knows

believes believe.

(literally

one who neither

knows

oudeis oute eidos oute either

oiomenos), he is clearly excluding

all who

do

not

know

or

do

not

Norman

Gulley

argues that

ignorance here implies false belief. He feels that

this makes unproblematic the

move that excludes the possibility of someone acting contrary to his belief (pp. 120-21). But the fact that I have a false belief about what is best to do merely explains why I will not choose to do what is best. It does not in itself imply I will choose to do what I (falsely) believe to be best.

The Argument in the Protagoras

II

301

The

whole argument

turns upon the coincidence that the assumed criterion

which overcomes.

of goodness

is

also

that

If

someone could

be

overcome

by

something would fall

that.

which was not

that person's
too

criterion of

goodness, then the

wanted us

argument

apart.

It is

not

farfetched to think that Plato

next

to realize
someone

The

natural

thing

to think about

is

whether

it is

possible

for

to have a different criterion of goodness than that which overcomes him. Thus

it

seems natural

to think that Plato the

wanted us

to be concerned with this possi

bility. He
enough

establishes

identity

of what a person

thinks of as

being

weighty

(axios)

to prevail and that person's criterion of goodness in two inde

pendent ways.

After

we examine

those ways, we will then need to address the

issue
as

of whether an

being weighty follows that what overcomes

enough

individual necessarily thinks of that which overcomes him to prevail. If that can also be established, then it
one

is

one's real criterion of

goodness,

and

there

fore

no one ever

does

what

he believes to be bad. between

our

At 355b-356c
son

we saw a contrast

inability

to

find

another rea

why

the good would

be less worthy than the bad,

and the many's

inability

to find
chosen

another reason

why the

immediately
criterion

pleasant would

than the subsequently

pleasant.

son would constitute a

different

been

shown not

to possess. But

no

If the many could for goodness, which the many have one, whether he is a hedonist or not, would
more axios of

be less worthy to be do so, then that rea

be
the

able to
more

imagine
worthy
employ,

an alternative

to the

prevailing (the weightier,

two courses of
no matter what crite

of

prevailing)

being

the

better. If

you weigh

action and choose the one that seems

the weightier,

then,

rion

you

you

think

of

that course of

action as

being

better. That is

human nature; that is what it means to make a choice between possible actions. That is the reason for our inability to find another reason why the good would be less worthy than the bad. By juxtaposing our situation with the situation of the many, Plato subtly accentuates that our inability is due to something more fundamental Plato
than the many's

inability.
of

establishes
enough

the

identity

that

which

is better

and are

that

which

is
the

weighty first substitution into

to prevail in another way also. When the original

they
are

formula,

when

they

dealing dealing with someone

with

knowingly doing
questioner

what

is bad because he is fact

overcome

by

the good, the arrogant

what

is

able

to use the

that the person

did

is bad

and must

therefore have

acted

which overcomes as

wrongly (examartanein) in order to establish that that the person is not worthy to prevail. The unworthiness is seen

following directly

from

having

acted wrongly.

There

would

be

no such

di

prevailing"

relationship if "worthy (axios) of better. In the second substitution it is not

rect

were not equivalent

possible

to

being

to make this move,

for there

is no necessary connection between doing what is painful and doing what is less worthy to prevail. Socrates circumvents this difficulty by substituting into the formula "a man does what is bad, knowing it to be bad, because he is

302

Interpretation

overcome

by

the pleasant,
rather

which

is obviously
overcome
Socrates'

anaxios

prevail"

unworthy) to

than the shorter formula

"a

man

(not weighty enough, does what is bad, Plato has left it

to 'the

knowing

it to be bad, because he is for the careful reader to discover

pleasant."

by

the

need

to make this move;

again, pointing to the fact that 'the axios to Thus Plato establishes the identity of the
two different ways, both
two
substitutions.

prevail'

is

equivalent

thus, better'.

of which

In

order

to show

axios of prevailing and the good in involve contrasting the discussions of the that that which overcomes is thought by the

individual to be the better, we now is thought by the individual to be

apart

need

to

establish

that that which overcomes

axios of prevailing.

Plato does

not

do this

from the

specific example of

being
of

overcome

by

pleasure, but that exam

ple suffices to point to a

basic trait

human many

nature.

Modem literature
other than pleasure:

provides us with one's

examples of criteria of goodness

letting

inner

nature manifest

itself (which I take to be

Nietzsche's position); having genuine interaction with things (which I take to be D. H. Lawrence's position), or independence (which I take to be the posi
tion
who of

Dostoyevski's

underground man). sake of

Let

us

take the example of someone

someone

does things for the

being
of

perverse.

Could

fail to do

what

he thought to be better because he

person

wanted

to be perverse? Would not such a

as

really think be

of the

degree
If

perversity

determining

whether or not

he

should perform an action? would even more

we offered would

this person another alternative

which

perverse,

he

not weigh the original

tempting

perver

sity

against

this

new

perversity
so?

and choose

the

one

that seemed to him to be that overcame

more perverse?

Who

would not choose more of

the

thing

him, if
in
all

he had the

chance

to do

Even if

someone's goal were moderation

things,

that person would not choose to

limit the
more

amount of moderation

he

exercised:

he

would

always choose

the

moderate course.

It is human

nature; as
of

long

as one recognizes what one

desires to attain,

one wants as much

that

thing

as one can get. not make

Plato does
with respect

this specific claim. He merely suggests

to pleasure. I think

he

suggests

it in

another
what

point

he

needs

in

order

to establish that no one does the most we can get

of

showing it way also, for it is the he believes to be bad.

it

by

If in

we

necessarily desire
weigh

that

which overcomes

us, then

we

implicitly

things according to the amount

they

contain of

this quality

order to

decide

what course of action

is worthy to

prevail.

As

we

have seen, And

this implies that

we

think of this quality as

being

the

criterion of goodness.

then that implies that

when we are overcome we make a mistaken quantitative

judgement, for
one

as we saw

for the

specific case of pleasure

whenever some person

is

overcome

by

that which is also their criterion of goodness, that

makes a mistaken quantitative

judgement. Because there is

measurement or

no

way to

make a

quantitative
person who

judgement is

apart

from

judging by

appearances, a to him to be

best
what

what

necessarily he believes to be best. And thus it follows that

overcome

chooses to

do

what appears

no one ever

does

he believes to be bad.

The Argument in the Protagoras

NOTES

303

1. Plato's

reason

for

having

Socrates do

this goes

beyond the

scope of

this

article.

C. C. W. Taylor thinks that Socrates is here committing himself to the view that everything painful is bad and everything pleasant is good (p. 166). He does not consider the possibility that Socrates is merely employing a rhetorical device. Taylor also holds that Socrates is aware in the
next sentence

that some pleasant activities are bad (p. 167). The two positions are clearly incompat

ible. J. C. B. has
a

Gosling

and

C. C. W. Taylor
not

see a remark

thesis here and that it is

just

a question of
Socrates'

thinks:

"Protagoras
Socrates'

says at
not

35 le that if

by Protagoras as establishing that Socrates finding out what Protagoras or the ordinary man view proves to be supported by the arguments,
Plato
as
might perhaps make

they

will

agree, but if

they
p.

will

carry

on arguing.

Protagoras

mis-

identify
thesis"

thesis; he

would

hardly

represent

him

mistakenly

believing

that Socrates has a

regard

(Gosling

and

Taylor,

throughout the dialogue

most

50). But Socrates is playing notably at 330e-331a.: heard aright, but Protagoras here

games with

Protagoras in this

As to the
share

substance of statement.

it

you

you made a mistake

in thinking that I had any

in that

It

was

who made

the answer; I was only the

questioner.

It is clearly incorrect to think that Plato

mistake.

could not

possibly

represent

Protagoras

as

making

a similar

2. There has been

much

scholarly debate

the absurdity lies. Our view has been held

by
is

about what exactly is so funny, that is, about where J. L. Stocks (p. 101), M. Dyson, (p. 36), and James

J. Walsh (pp. 258-9). Dyson's

explanation

quite compelling:

"The

good'

substitution

'by

is held

back

what?'

so

that the sequence 'overcame answer,

when

by
an oath

is twice

stated

before the

and the restates

it

comes

has

to reinforce it. At once

a

is completed, the questioner laughs and

answer

the amended thesis, calling the

whole contention

ludicrous

business,'

355d. The

entire

sequence

is inexplicable
what

unless

the answer

is

immediately
we

felt to be

ridiculous."

Martha Nussbaum does

a

not get

it: "At first

do

not see what

the absurdity is:

for isn't this, in

exerts a special

way, just
of pull

happens in

akrasia

[intemperance]? This

other good over

here

kind

that draws us to

it,

so that we neglect our commitment

to the good that is better

seen as

overall?"

(p. 113). This is

not a natural as good what

reading; temptations are generally

bad things

when

temptations, not is overcome is said to do

viewed as which

things.

They
thing

are

clearly

viewed

that way

here, for

the one who

is bad. The

analysis of the temptation as

containing something only

after philo

is

of

itself good,

and

this

being

the

that attracts us,

today?"

can come about

sophic reflection.
Polly."

"I was overcome by the good, Aunt "Tom, why did you play hooky That is a punch line, even if we suppose Tom to be a young philosopher. Gallop's view (pp. 118-22), followed by C. C. W. Taylor (pp. 181-85), involves that the
355e,"

absurdity not be demonstrated before 357. Against this view Klosko points out, "The evidence of the dramatic context suggests that the absurdity is developed by for the arrogant questioner is not heard of again after 355e4 (Klosko, p. 314). Indeed, Gallop's claim that the critic's exposure absurdity is developed after 355e4 must be false. Klosko (p. 315) follows Santas (pp. 13-20) and Irwin (p. 105) in relying upon the previously established hedonism to establish the absurdity. But when one makes a substitution, and then introduces a critic to deal with the product of the substitution, it is understood that the critic is not
of the

into producing the product, that the critic is dealing with the product of the That is the natural way to read the passage. Note that the critic is not concerned with the fact that they can no longer say "pleasure'; that is a consideration only for the critic just deals with the substituted formula. Just as one cannot rely Socrates and Protagoras
aware of what

has

gone

substitution pure and simple.

upon what
upon what

is is

said after the critic

said

departs in

order

to

establish

the absurdity, one also cannot rely

before the

critic appears.

argument

3. C. C. W. Taylor (pp. 191-2), Gallop (pp. 127ff.), and Stokes (p. 418) recognize that the is invalid as it stands, but they do not recognize that Plato has prepared the ground for a

premise which would make the argument valid.

304

Interpretation
claims without

Nussbaum

further

support:

"Underlying

the

passage

is the implicit

agreement

that what we cannot live with

is

being

at the she

is

peace and quiet

(p. 109). And then

rather

mercy of what happens, and that what we badly want further claims that Socrates chooses hedonism "because

of the science

it offers,

than

for its

own

intrinsic

plausibility."

REFERENCES
Protagoras."

Dyson, M. "Knowledge

and

Hedonism in Plato's
Protagoras."

Journal of Hellenic

Studies 96 (1976): 32-45.

Duncan, Roger. "Courage in Plato's Gallop, David. "The Socratic Paradox in

129.

Phronesis 23 (1978): 216-228.

the

Protagoras."

Phronesis 9 (1964):

117-

Goldberg, Larry. A Commentary on Plato's Protagoras (New York: Peter Lang, 1983). Gosling, J. C. B. and Taylor, C. C. W. The Greeks on Pleasure (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982). Thesis at Protagoras Phoenix 25 (1971): 118Gulley, Norman.
"Socrates'

358b-c."

123.

Guthrie, W. K. C. A History of Greek Philosophy 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). Irwin, Terence. Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977). Phoenix 34 (1980): 307-322. Klosko, George. "On the Analysis of the Nussbaum, Martha. The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Protagoras."

Press, 1986). Rowe, C. J. Plato (Brighton: Sussex, 1984). Santas, Gerasimos. "Plato's Protagoras and Explanations
Review 75 (1966): 3-33.

Weakness."

of

Philosophical

Stocks, J. L. "The

Argument

of

Plato, Protagoras

352b-356c."

Classical

Quarterly

(1913): 100-104.

Stokes, Michael C. Plato's Socratic Conversations (London: The Athlone Press, 1986). Taylor, A. E. Plato: The Man and His Work (London: Methuen, 1937). Taylor, C. C. W., trans. Protagoras (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976). Phoenix 23 (1969): 71-88. Vlastos, Gregory. "Socrates on The Philosophy of Socrates, ed. Walsh, James J. "The Socratic Denial of Dame: Notre Dame Vlastos (Notre University Press, 1980). Gregory
Acrasia." Akrasia."

Book Reviews

Horst-Jiirgen

Gerigk, Unterwegs

zur

Interpretation Hinweise
mit

zu einer

Theorie Methode

der Literatur in

Auseinandersetzung

Gadamers Wahrheit

und

(Hiirtgenwald, West Germany: Guido Pressler Verlag, 1989) 228

pp., DM

69[$40],

no

paperback, no English translation.

Robert R. Sullivan

John

Jay College

I CUNY

Horst-Jiirgen Gerigk,

professor of comparative

literature

at

the

University

of

Heidelberg, former student of Rene Wellek, and a distinguished Dostoyevsky scholar, disavows an exegetical intent on the first page of his book. He rather
sets

himself the

more

difficult task

of

having
that it

an argument with

Gadamer. The

subtitle of

Gerigk's book

even claims

is

constructed as an Auseinanderwell

setsung, or argument, with

Gadamer's thinking. We do
with

to take Gerigk at

his

word and

try

to come to terms

the antagonists.
not of

Gerigk claims,

rightly

in my opinion, that Gadamer is

a

interested in

theory

constructing theory understanding (Verstehen). Gadamer's argument, according to Gerigk, is that understanding is
always

of

literature but

aims rather at

the product of the prejudices we

as each

bring

to play when reading a

text,

and

insofar

interpreter is

differently
of a text.

situated

historically,
is
a

there

is

no such

thing
river

as a correct which

interpretation
each

Understanding

constantly
in the

flowing
her
inter

differs

time we step into it. What then

is the

value of act of

meneutics, for Gerigk's Gadamer? pretation, each interpreter creates

By exposing
an

prejudices

object, "the
to

understood"

(das

Verstanreason

dene), thereby giving

represents

reason

something

reflect

on.

Presumably,

universality

over against the

historicity

of

this understanding and

much a rela

thereby is something
tivist, but
Now Gerigk's

of a corrective.

Gerigk's Gadamer is very

text
possesses

a rational one. own position:

the

literary

its

own understand

of

ing (Verstehen), fully capable of standing independently, over against the flux historically different interpretations. The poetic word, at its purest, is not
anything
extent other than

representative of

its

own content.

Indeed, it
and

precisely to the

that it is not representative,

not

takes on reality hence it has its own

not reducible to the of

understanding
are

which

is

reductive,

by

which

I mean,

prejudices of the reader or,

for that matter, the intentions

the author,

which

but

different form
even

of prejudice.

Gerigk
amer.

introduces

He

argues

vocabulary to carry on his argument with Gad that Gadamer is interested in centrifugal understanding, by
a

interpretation, Winter

1989-90, Vol. 17, No. 2

306
which

Interpretation Gerigk
means an

reaching

out to

grasp

and

understanding centered in our historical prejudices and devour texts. He, Gerigk, is interested in defending
understanding, that
of

the authenticity of a

centripetal

the

literary text,

which

holds its

own against

the

hungry

interpreters and, presumably, is

capable of

swallowing them up, whole. Gerigk's terminology is dynamic and compelling. It sets the stage for an argument in which no quarter will be given.

Gerigk

assigns

to Gadamer the Heideggerian position that science

and

is the
a mild

reality,"

"theory

of

this move functions to make

Gadamer into

relativist, like Thomas Kuhn. Here Gerigk loads the dice against

Gadamer, for

he is assigning Gadamer a position which is, in my opinion, more Heidegger's than Gadamer's. But no matter. It can stand because it does not really upset the
argument. of

The

notion

that science is the

"theory
is

saying that science is itself a culture and

of

not a

that stands outside of culture. This is a popular

is just another way founded way of knowing position in post-empiricist phi

of

reality"

losophy
erabend

science,

one

that is associated with the

thinking

of

Kuhn

and Fey-

in the Anglo-Saxon literature. I

to it in due time.
centripetal

shall put a place marker on

this claim

and return

Gerigk's theory of He dehistoricizes the

absolute:

understanding is
ein zu absoluter

theory

of

the work of art.

literary

text and gives it one

key feature, key

because

der literarische Text ist

text

Verstandlichkeit fdhiger Text

(the

literary

is

one capable of absolute understandability).

One hastens to

Yes, but only to an ahistorical or unsituated understanding! This in deed is the case, for Gerigk quickly defines understanding (Verstehen) in such a
respond:

way that it is historically unsituated. Absolute understandability (dem natiirlichen "the natural train of human
understanding"

corresponds

to

Zug

des

men-

schlichen

Verstehens). Whatever
not

else

the "natural

train"

of
a

human

understand a utopia

ing is,

it is

historical. Such Giddens

an

understanding is itself

literary
At

text,

of perfected existence variation on what

that cuts across

calls

history

for

all eternity.

work

here is

the double

hermeneutic. Gerigk

creates

the

vision of an absolute text and then creates a

dehistoricized understanding to his

response
with

grasp his creation. I believe I can

sit

in for Gadamer

and construct

to Gerigk's

claims and arguments over

by drawing

on

Gadamer's debate intent

read of

Jacques Derrida

the supposed

latent

metaphysical

Gadamer's dialectical thinking.

refer

Here the term

metaphysics should

be

to

to

all

ahistorical, totalizing,
rida was

the will-to-power, etc., etc. Gadamer's

wrong things: it is response to Der

was not at

to remind him that the outcome of

all metaphysical

in these

senses.

It

was rather what

his dialectical tendency Gadamer calls

which

a Verstan-

digung,
feel
of

term that

is

not

difficult to translate but

"consensus,"

is

nonetheless

usually
the
a

botched. If

one renders

it

as

then the term

Verstandigung has

being

a mere agreement

collectivized will-to-power and

arguments.

among is easily

conversation partners.

As such, it is

subject to refutation with off-the-shelf

Therefore, I

think it better

because

more

tme to Gadamer's in-

Book Reviews
tent to tender

307
"we

Verstandigung
which

"understanding,"

as

as

in the

sentence:

understanding."

reached an

In my view,

I believe is

also

Gadamer's,
the

Verstandigung is

an un

derstanding
varying
all

that can be reached

by

reasonable conversation partners contain

because Put

perspectives always

already

intention

of completion.

historicist vocabulary, when I see a ting yellow New York taxicab driving past my window, I automatically assume that it is yellow on the side I do not see. This is not merely habit, as Hume would
this in a cognitivist as opposed to

have

us

believe. It is

also

reasonable, as Husserl

made clear.

It is

also a

dialecti
Invisi

cal vision of perception, as

Merleau-Ponty
always a

argued

in The Visible

and the

ble. As less

a reasonable

being, I
in

impressions
'knowledge'

make sense

completed,

already intend that my fragmented sense perfected form. Knowledge is worth

makes

without such an

intention. Indeed, it

little

sense

to even speak of the way,

of or

unless one presupposes completeness.

This, by
a

Heidegger is information
vision of

correct when

he

says

that science

is

reality.'

'theory

is why Our

reality is reality, and hence

about

always smaller than our science must

completed,
of reality.

theoretical,
archeolo-

be

theory

Now

put

the same matter

in

an

historicist

vocabulary:

You

are an

gist on a

dig

into
us

some

in Egypt. You find pottery shards and attempt to construct them kind of meaningful whole. You intend them to be part of a vase, let
vision

say, but if that

does

not

work, then you may

are all

intend

them to

be

a part

of a

krater,
in

or maybe a water

jug. These

their possession implies that you, as

most

historical forms, theories, and archeologist, are an historical being, al

master

a technical sense.

They

are

merely

prejudices,

or master per

spectives. as such

But then

again

there is something that

makes

the master perspective

and now

really different. The vision of the whole, any vision, is have to utter the forbidden logocentric word necessary. How else
reach an

can anyone

mented
as

understanding sensory impressions? One

of the shards that raw

must

life

presents us with

in

our

frag
of

have

a vision of on

the whole, but insofar

paradoxical

it is both historical
a

and necessary,

it takes

the

quality
always

being
theory
vital

finite

universality.

Once again, this is why knowledge is

cognitivist and not

of reality. an aspect

There is

to these

historicist illustrations

which

is

to Gadamer's

position

but

brought

out

by

both cases, the isolated subject the ego cogitans producing knowledge. In both cases, the subject, to
cated

my rendering of them. In is inadequate to the task of

attain

adequacy, is impli

in the fabric

of

history, by
in
order

which

mean

that the

subject

is

compelled

to

fall back

on prejudices

to produce sensible,

communicable

knowledge.

The Renaissance
wayside
vist thinker

or enlightenment notion of an

absolute

subject

falls

by

the

in Gadamer's
but
as

thinking.

rather a real

Therefore, because Gadamer is dialectician, he has no temptation

it is

not a subjecti

to escape

into

objectivism,

does Gerigk.
of understanding, and

This is Gadamer's theory

fully

situated

in

a dia-

308

Interpretation
and necessary.

lectical format. It is both historical

to be what Gerigk
reaches out. corresponds

As such, it has

no choice

but

calls centrifugal

understanding, or an

understanding

which

Conversely, Gerigk's absolute understandability of the literary text understanding. Ger only to a dehistoricized, desituated,
"natural"

igk

and

Gadamer do

not talk

to

each other

in this Auseinandersetzung. The

or

entire affair
positions.

is, for

me, very

much an

It

reminds

me of the

conversation,

between the Azandi

witchdoctor and with

setting apart of by Peter Winch, Evans-Pritchard. Or better still, Gerigk's

made

Aus-einander-setzung,

famous

Auseinandersetzung
ural sciences.

Gadamer

resembles

Kuhn

s paradigm shift

in the

nat

There is

no algorithm

in terms

of which

this

Auseinandersetzung
term restored

can

be

resolved.

to circulation

Am I accusing Gerigk of idolatry, to by Nietzsche? Yes, I am

use a rather melodramatic close

to suggesting as much, for I am

made uncomfortable

by

the overwhelming sense of reality that Gerigk's

discus

sion of the

literary

text creates.

I think it
of

the objectively the

independent
which

literary

text

is

an

illusion. This positioning

literary text,

I believe is

Gerigk s, creates a metaphysics of art, decisive for this book. Gerigk knows better than most literary theorists that tme art is not representative of anything
outside of

it. But I

am

not own

certain

he

would

agree that tme

art

cannot

be

representative of even never says as

reality slipping into metaphysics. Gerigk but he does his cards when he creates a much, tip
without
'natural'

its

understanding
text.
succeeds or

capable of

grasping the

absolute

Therefore, I
for the

think that Gerigk's argument

understandability of the literary with Gadamer both fails and

reason

that Gerigk subscribes too

fully

to autonomous poetic,

artistic, being.

My

obscure

insistence in coming to terms with Gerigk's central argument should not the larger judgment that Gerigk has written an excellent book. Every is

sentence

lovingly

polished author

by

the author, and the text

make

surmise, because the

has tried to

every

sentence

has been kept brief, I tell. The logic of

author

the argumentation is unfailing, and therefore vulnerable, because the

knows
the

what

is

required

to redeem a claim and provides it. It is the kind of book

a

with which one can author

have

lively

conversation

because

one

has the This is

feeling
a

that

is

not

writing for

everyman

but is writing for

one

highly intelligent,
very
good

well

informed,

reader

Hans-Georg Gadamer,

obviously.

book.

Catherine H.

Zuckert,

editor,

Understanding

the

Political Spirit: Philosophical

Investigations from Socrates to Nietzsche. (New Haven: Yale

University Press,

1988.) 203

pp.,

$21.50.

Will Morrisey

With reason,

spiritedness makes man a political animal.

Classical

political

thought asks, What shall we

given measure?

do

with

the wrath of Achilles?

you

Can it be tamed,
of

Without thumos (spiritedness), have

civil war or marked

have

city

pigs;

with

too

much of

it,

you

tyranny

the self-destmction of the city. The

destmction
neither

of

Rome

the end of the classical efforts to moderate thumos;

Christianity

nor modem political

way.

philosophy have
troublesome part

'managed'

it in

an

entirely satisfactory
thumos seeks not to
or repellent,

Perhaps the

most

of

the human soul,

be

managed

but to

mle.

This

makes political

life

attractive

but

always necessary. collection of essays

Catherine H. Zuckert introduces this instmctive

serving that
private
'individualized'

by

ob

modems

"tend to take

politics,"

an

'rights'

that are really desires. This

economizing view of became possible

with

securing
after

Christianity

the human soul, replacing thumos

will;

in Christianity,
no nos

punishment

is

function

of

God,

or of

God's instmment, the

suffered.
of

pagan magistrate.

The tradition

of

impersonal

public

justice

Zuckert harbors

talgia for 'the ancients'; the Aristotelian triumverate

honors (distributive jus

and

tice), friendship,

and

family

requires small

communities,

these tend to fight

the

As soon as one community finally imperialism rises, declines, and falls. tary The book's first three essays explore the status of
amongst themselves. antiquity.

wins

fight,

a mili

spiritedness
of

in Greek

Arlene Saxonhouse

Achilles'

recounts
which

discovery

the limits im

posed on spiritedness

by death,

he had hoped to

overcome

by

everlasting fame. "Under the

tinctions are
spirit of
made

principles of universal
worth"

equality in equally
Achilles'

which no

achieving dis
"the

according to
not

each of us
killed."

must

die
of

Achilles is

only moderated, it is

love
and

Briseis,
recon

his

measured acts of public

ciliation with
gods and

Priam

all

honor for his dead friend Patroclus, reestablish a middle place for human
that "Plato joins Homer in
although

his

being
need

between

beasts.
writes

Mary

P. Nichols

teaching

the

for

man

to moderate his

spiritedness,"

Homer, Plato
but

sees

that spiritedness

rebels

very different way. As does against death. In doing so, it defends

in

also threatens the

itself for
yond the

the city's

city by sake. Spiritedness

man needs what

its

willingness

to

sacrifice comfort and even

life

also commits

the soul entirely to the city,

satisfaction

"against the tmth that

city, beyond

something for his

that goes

be

control."

he

can create and

Nichols

recapitulates

interpretation, Winter 1989-90, Vol.

17, No. 2

310
the

Interpretation
argument

of

her book, Socrates

the
contrast, "makes

and

the Political

Community,
and

that the

guardian-philosophers of

regime-in-speech are more guardians

than philoso

gentle,"

phers.

Socrates, by
of

spiritedness

takes account of

the

individuality

his interlocutors. This interlocutors for the

the

point should perhaps most part represent

be

qualified

by
not

Socrates'

noting that individuals in the

human types,

modem sense of

word.

Ann P.

Charney
of one's

relates courage

to pmdence, as understood
needed

by

Aristotle.
of

"Spiritedness

combined with

intellect is
about

to

philosophize

in the face

knowledge
natural

ignorance

gods."

the

Aristotle carefully
the
core

substitutes

Charney may ship in this enterprise. Friendship cannot be "the Aristotle explicitly teaches that friends do not treat
tice. But
she

right for divine justice.

overestimate

place of

friend
jus

of political

justice";

each other with strict

the Homeric
could.

heroes"

is surely right to say that Aristotle's great-souled man "replaces and thereby makes political life more stable than Achilles
essays

The final five

in the

volume and

discuss

modem political philosophers

Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke,

modem era

Nietzsche

and

the greatest statesmen in the

the American Founders. In a witty and sobering essay,

calls

Harvey C.
Mansfield

Mansfield, Jr.
'execute'

Machiavelli "the first

and

writer on politics modem

to use the word

frequently

thematically in its
executive
role of and
with

sense"

or,

as

soon

notes, its two

modem senses.

Mansfield

contrasts seven characteristics of

the

modem

Machiavellian

the classic Aristotelian statesman.

practical

Machiavelli downplays the

and praises political

deliberation,

reasoning, in politics,
concept of
fear"

the

use of

force

fraud. He

replaces

the Aristotelian

friendship

with

the concept

of political conspiracy. not natural

"Primal

be

comes

"the first

politics"

mover of

right

and most

divine
aim.

providence.

Spiritedness

mles

Machieavellian politics;

conquest

assuredly not is its

and John Locke progressively soften Machiavellian politics, abandoning it. Hobbes shares Machiavelli's cynicism about human na ture but, as Timothy Fuller shows in a characteristically thoughtful essay, he

Thomas Hobbes

without

finds the
mle of

mle of

law

better

means to attain spirited ends.

law

signifies

to Hobbes "that mankind

The very idea of the has been set free from divine

tutelage and supposes that freedom and reason are mediated

by

human [not

divine] high-toned)
'personal'

will."

Spiritedness Civil

now

and self-restraint

inheres in law-abidingness; honor (spiritedness combine to uphold law's mle, and to preclude

mle.

liberty

replaces natural

liberty

under

the

covenant or so
paradigm of

cial contract.
a

"The

covenant

is not, finally,
of

a unique event

but the

lifetime
in

of rational

willing, the test

the enduring capacity for the

self-overcom

ing

association."

civil

Thus Fuller

offers
we

reader a more austere view.

Hobbes

than the cynical materialist of morals

John Locke tames

for

spiritedness still
never

normally further. David Lowenthal

Locke's
state of nature

observes that
not so much

Locke, "conquest is

justified."

is

Book Reviews
a state of

31 1
man'

in Hobbes, but a state of scarcity. In Locke, 'economic begins to come into his own. "With this sweeping contradiction of Hobbes, Locke lays the basis for thought on war that became the common sense of
war,
as

twentieth-century liberal
Lowenthal
regime perish

societies,"

with

their "concepts

of aggressor

nations,

reparations, wars of national liberation and national self-determination.

cautions that

this project

can endanger

itself in two

ways.

If

liberal

becomes too narrowly commercial and forgets to defend itself, it will by attack from other regimes that have not forgotten the martial spirit.
a regime embraces

And if
without

the Lockean

concept of national self-determination

Locke's

constitutional safeguards

a commercial

economy,

representa

tive

government regime

it it

will

become

a worse

tyranny
and

than the

tarian'

overthrew. regimes.

Spiritlessness

excessive

traditional, 'authori spiritedness both

threaten the

liberal

Contemporary

intellectuals

decry

the undramatic,

'bourgeois'

virtues

and

In this they imitate some of the late- modem political philosophers, the greatest of these being G. W. F Hegel and Friedrich Nietzsche. Michael Gillespie contributes a substantial essay on Hegel's remedy
vices of commercial republics.

for

'bourgeoisification.'

"Hegel doubts
and

that homo economicus

mle."

can ever man will

free himself from his desires

only
sink
Socrates'

tmly

Left alone, bourgeois

serious,

deeper into decadence. Hegel playfully

constructed

proposes a

modem version of replaces

'republic'

The bourgeoisie bureaucrats

the artisan

class,

soldiers replace the

guardians,

and

replace

the

philosopher-

kings. War "is the only

degeneration,"

viable restraint upon

bourgeoisification
the state

and political

strengthening "the rationality community is more autonomous Gillespie

quite

of

by

citizenry."

general

will

and

spirit of the and rational

Right

evoking the latent makes might be

than its

cause the state that

is

stronger

less

advanced antagonists.

prudently judges Hegel

over-optimistic

about modem war and modem philosophic rationality.

Nietzsche does
"wild

not

marry

war and reason at shotgun-point.

He

celebrates

wisdom"

logic
treme

of

free from logic, even from that most ambitious Hegel. He dismisses moderation. Werner Dannhauser writes that
thought set
exalts spiritedness over

Nietzsche

the

other virtues

because only the

most ex

spiritedness can affirm

life

even while

"Courage is the quality

of mind most needed

embracing Nietzschean nihilism. by the mind as it faces the utter

meaninglessness must

and comprehensive meaninglessness of

life. That

be

af

firmed, lest
the better

the spirit of

revenge corrode us and we

face
and

hostile"

perhaps

word

is indifferent

"world

with

bitterness

Dann
Nietzsche's

hauser judges Nietzsche's

claim that man

project

humanly impossible,
own

and rejects

may

overcome

his

humanity. philosophy may prompt a reex Nathan Tarcov brings to this

The deficiencies
task a
enced

of

late-modem

political

amination of modernity's most successful regime.

profound

that influ understanding of the Lockean political philosophy the American Founders more than any other. Locke, he observes, is not

312
so claim own

Interpretation
as

'bourgeois'

his

critics contend.

To

assert

rights, one makes "a spirited

others'

that there are duties both to respect

rights

and

to

vindicate one's

rights."

Some Thoughts

Concerning
same

Education "leaves
of

room

for properly rationality

spiritedness."

educated

Pride in this

combination

liberty

and

forms the basis

pride

of

morality; at the

tyrants'

that

spurs

"Locke

attempts

to

control

time, love of dominion, that part of must be corrected and rechanneled. immorality, desire for the proud mastery over others by satisfy
oneself,"

ing
the

the proud desire for

esteem of one's

liberty

and

mastery

over

mastery that

wins

fellow
the

men and women.

Tarcov
with

compares

moral principles of

the Declaration of Independence

Lockean

morality.

There is

a major similarity:

Both teach that the

happiness."

spirited

but

rational

assertion of

liberty

"alone

secures

political

There is
to

also a

difference. To the Signers,

and relates to

spiritedness

is "part

of what entitles one

liberty,"

honor

that

is,

"gratitude to

ancestors and

to

future

generations."

This is why the Declaration

culminates

responsibility in a pledge of

honor among the people's representatives, not among the people them selves; this is how would-be mlers show the virtue that will enable them to mle well. As for the people, consent is the key concept. Lack of popular spirited
sacred ness yields mere

acquiescence; excess spiritedness

fuels fanaticism. Consent

between the
extremes and

moderately
ernity.

spirited and reasonable

hits the
rare

mean

provides a solid

foundation for that

thing,

a politics of moderation

in

mod

Understanding

the

Political Spirit

would

have been improved

by

the

inclu this,

sion of a more thorough

discussion

of thumos as a psychological concept

perhaps, in the introduction. A comparison and contrast of the Platonic the soul study,
with

view of

the Christian view

would

have

added a needed

dimension to the
modem political

as well.

The

collection

is

at

philosophers

have

come

full

circle

its best in showing how since Machiavelli liberated

the ethical respect

spiritedness

from

the

intellectual

apprehension

of,

and

for,

nature

how first

they

tamed spiritedness, then inflamed it again. The modems denied reason's

yet

capacity to mle, The results have

these results, and

not

overturning traditional customs and opinions. These studies clarify the reasons for thus invite further consideration of a perennial political prob
on

insisted
been

encouraging.

lem.

Patrick

Coby, Socrates

and the

Sophistic Enlightenment: A

Commentary

on

Plato's Protagoras. (Lewisburg: Bucknell

University Press, 1987) 214

pp.

$27.50
Will Morrisey

Intellectuals: What to do

with

them? With one

foot in the cave,

one

foot out,

they

urge

the citizens

within

to chain-breaking

liberation,

charge philosophers

beyond In

with

would rather

uncaring detachment. Neither lead than think, and thus risk

politics

fully
a

underground nor

above,

they

trampling
as

voila, historicism.
philoso

'synthesizing'

and
and

philosophy, historicism denies that place,

even

phers see
revelations

beyond their time

'progress'

it holds

out

the prospect of
of

will

bring. Patrick

Coby

demonstrates the falsehood

this

denial, showing that Socrates conceived something very like modem util itarianism, commending it lukewarmly to a sophist it might have tamed. Coby thus uses history to refute historicism, showing that Socrates both formulated and implicitly criticized a well-known philosophic doctrine, more than two
mil-

lenia before its

'time.'

Coby fits his commentary to beginning and working his way

Protagoras,
alone
or

the order of the through. The

dialogue, beginning
"a
war of

at

the

dialogue itself fits its topic

words."

the nature of sophistry

in

being
the

Perhaps

among commentators,
of

Coby

emphasizes

importance

of one silent au
man attracted

ditor

the conversation

Alcibiades, here
whom

a combative
wish

young

by

Socrates'

combativeness, in

Socrates may

to awaken an erotic

attraction to wisdom.

combative soul will want

to know how to conquer; it

know, but merely presume, the worth of conquest. "The difference knowing [a] doctrine itself and knowing its worth is the difference the wisdom Socrates may between techne [artistry] and sophia
may not between
[wisdom],"

want

ily

Alcibiades to love. The sophist, preeminent seduce a spirited young man. Socrates would
technique cannot
withstand

vendor of
convince

techne,

might eas so

Alcibiades that

phistic

the manly

assaults

of

philosophy, which

enables those possessed

by

it to

wield certain superior

techniques along with

their

superior understanding. apparent

Despite his he lieves. "It

and

spiritedness, Protagoras lacks the tme

conqueror's

soul;

seeks pleasant safety.

will

"Protagoras is both
purpose

famous"

safe and show

or so

he be

be

Socrates'

in the dialogue to for

him why safety

fame

incompatible."

are

contradiction
character of

mostly between the

Socrates does this

sophist's praise

initially by exposing the democracy and the undemocratic

than of

sophistry itself,

which offers a technique

technique that

finally

consists more of coercion

'teach'

for mling the many, persuasion. The

of political control.

'virtue'

Protagoras

professes

to

amounts

to a technique

interpretation, Winter

1989-90, Vol. 17, No. 2

314

Interpretation
what

"Justice to Protagoras is

human beings declare it to

conventionalism

be."

Socrates

un

dertakes to
level

pull

Protagoras away from this

nature, specifically
not

and toward a low-

appreciation of

of pleasure.

In

doing

so, Socrates

must

centrally
audience.

prove

by

words

but

by

action

that he can

walk

away from his

That

is, he

shows

his independence from his

of control-techniques,
accept short

listeners'

desires,

even

as

Protagoras, despite his boasts

declamation.
the

betrays his

own subser and

vience.

Socrates forces Protagoras to

speeches,

dialectic,

to

eschew rhetorical

Protagoras
of

accepts

philosophic

form, but

tries to escape into the thickets

literary

criticism

a move

that

should

amuse readers

today

who've

seen

In fairness, the sophistic, much the same strategy 'deconposturing Protagoras does have rather more nobility in him than our structionists'; he at least vaguely senses the appeal of tragedy, of heroic stmg
at work on college campuses.
gle.

Socrates

responds

by

citing the

example of

the

ple not

likely

to move many
relativism

academics

in the

Lacedaemonians, an exam 1980s, but effective in ancient

Greece. (Historical

are to the character of

does apply to rhetorical appeals, shaped as they the audience. Does historicism's desire to lead, which logic
'naturally'

necessitates the conflation of

and

rhetoric,

incline its devotees from the intellec

the Lac

to relativism? That tual's libido

is, does not historicism result dominandil) Socrates claims that those
partake of philosophy;

'logically'

admirable citizens seems

edaemonians

courage

secretly is in fact

"what

to the

world

like
ever

wisdom."

An

esotericism so effective none

but Socrates

suspected

it: This "elaborate

"intellectualize"

jest"

forms

Socrates'

one part of
most

thoroughgoing

effort
means vice

to

the

virtues.

In its

extreme

formulation,
what

this

that virtue is knowledge

resembles

(easy

to practice once you know notions,

it is),

ignorance. This

Protagoras'

with a significant

excep

tion: Protagoras only knows his

techniques,

not nature.

Perhaps this

accounts

for the deficiencies human beings being. Poetry, Protagoras

particular.
will

Protagorean technique; a tool designed for the mle of fail in the hands of one who does not understand human
of more

being imaginative,
misunderstands will

easily lends itself only in the

to manipulation

by

clever technicians than

does the logical

human

apprehension of nature.
abstract

nature not

but in the
the

He

student's nature.

teach, or claim to teach, Socrates would redirect

anyone who

pays,

regardless of

Protagoras'

attention

to an art

whose

primary purpose is perception, not better known to readers now as the The knowledge this
art

manipulation:

"The

measu

art of

utilitarian calculus of pleasures and pains.

not reach
'middling'

brings does

the

heights (or the depths)

instead
of

of

human nature; intellectuals, in their stretch so far. But the art does induce them to

circumstance of soul, measure man

cannot
unwar-

rantedly supposing man the measure. Knowledge, however narrow, and plea sures, however unrefined, will replace the will to power, and the susceptibility to worship power, so noticeable in sophists a will and a suscep generally tibility that finally issued in historicism.

Book Reviews
Socrates
deavors to
same

-315

prefers a
present

different

solution to the problems political

life

and

hetero
"en
the
po

dox thought

to each other.

By

esoteric

speech, the

philosopher

protect

the

body

politic of

from indiscriminate

rationalism while at can

time making
men

it tolerant

philosophy."

Socrates

indeed befriend for

litical
and

at one

extreme, the flamboyant

citizens

Alcibiades,

on

the other, Crito

a sophist

they him. Unfortunately,

him
poison

may

mistake the philosopher

and make

himself. The

prospect of

this inconvenience requires the to

philosopher

to "confront

his fellow in
some

intellectuals,"

help them

deplore the

clos

ing

of

the Athenian

mind

way

suited to their own capacities and

de

fects. Socrates may harbor some sympathy for the sophistic intellectual, in one The sophist, caught between cave and sunlit fields, in his own way imitates human being, with its "in-between, daemonic bestial and god
sense.
nature,"

like. Like Nietzsche, Socrates

sees

the

difficulty

of

tightrope-

walking;
at

unlike

Nietzsche, Socrates foresees

for any
other

no godlike

than the rarest of

overcoming of this activity, humans. (Too, Socrates conceives

least

not

of no cre

ativity in godliness, the creativity that intensifies Nietzschean ambition.) So crates and the Sophistic Enlightenment presents or suggests these issues with a
sober, thoughtful
problem of precision a

that enables readers to think more

clearly

about the

thinking in

democracy.

Mary

P. Nichols, Socrates

and the

Political Community: An Ancient Debate.

pp.:

(Albany: State

University

of

New York Press, 1987, 239

$14.95).

Will Morrisey

If the

'Socrates'

wisdom,'

name

means

'mle

of

small wonder

Athenians
put

finally
of

put

him to death. That he

writing.

survived so

long

attests to

his failure to

anything in

others, who

That his memory survives, however, attests to the writing portrayed him as the philosopher, the one whose way of life Theories may
or

raised the question of philosophy's relation to the polis. not

may

directly

affect political

they
act

will not act while

life, but theorizing does. If you make people think, they are thinking; after they finish (if they do) they may
have been known to find this infuriat
Aristophanes'

differently
Nichols'

than before. Good citizens

ing. book has three

main parts:

on

Clouds,

on

Plato's
might

Republic,

and on

the second book of Aristotle's Politics. Although many

believe these

works

thoroughly discussed
and

by

others, Nichols has

other

ideas.

Fortunately,
and

she

is right,
of

the conflicts between some of her interpretations

and

those of Allan

Bloom, Leo Strauss,

Paul Friedlander may do her

readers the
Nichols'

favor

returning them to the original text with renewed eyes.

account

careful and sensitive

verge

from

Strauss'

reading of the Clouds does not entirely di in Socrates and Aristophanes. Their emphases dif
about clouds:
.

fer. She is
considers

more

down-to-earth
.

Whereas

Strauss'

Aristophanes

"the

old-fashioned

newfangled,"

the
who sees the

Nichols

more

less laughable, no less unreasonable, than measuredly calls Aristophanes "a conservative
no

limitations
wants

of what

that

Aristophanes
not mistaken
and

to

be

he is trying to She never suggests god. She regards the Just Speech hypocritical
she as

conserve."

but

in his

words.

Rather,
to

crates,

Phidippides
of

(Strepsiades'

son)
unrelated

describes the Unjust Speech, So erroneously imagining nature to be

things in nature, and
uninfluenced

"composed

absolutes,

[other]

by

time."

The

attempt to

bring

convention

into line

with

this misconceived
are

young men fit for no action except father-beating. Nor for thought, and here she comes close to Strauss:
nature yields

they fit

Seeking

the

universal or

the

unlimited

nature and to man

only insofar

as

he

resembles nonhuman nature.

matter.
.

[she writes], Socrates turns to nonhuman Socrates loses

sight of the human, aware only of the movements of freedom in universality, discovers only that man is a in contradiction, Socrates is laughable.

Socrates, seeking
own

slave to

his

body. Caught

Nichols finds Aristophanes convincing up to

tions of his
conservatism.

point, but

she sees

the limita
can-

clever

defense

of

ordinary

life,

of

normalcy,

interpretation, Winter

1989-90, Vol. 17, No. 2

318

Interpretation for the fact

"it is in ordinary life that the desire for complete "How long can laughter check philosophic eros,
that
"arises."
tears?"

not account

ness,"

including

desire

and prevent

With this

question she

turns to the Republic.

This interpretation forms the bulk

takes issue
with

and

the core of the book. Here Nichols

Strauss She

and

especially
that

with

Bloom

on

the

significance of

the

philosopher-kings.

argues

they
not

represent

the culmination of a pro

foundly
sire

un-Socratic argument

led

by

Socrates but

energized

by

Glaucon's "de Whereas because his

of

for

perfection,"

desire that is

so much erotic as

spirited.

Bloom love
of

contends

that the spirited

man endangers

himself

and others

his

own closes

his

mind

to reason, Nichols

contends

that both love

one's own and

if they
con,

are

philosophy can bring ill-mixed. The philosopher-kings exemplify this.

the city orthodox, un-Socratic,
unquestioning.

the illusion of independence from the city,

creatures of

They are finally They attract Glau

who

"does

not pursue

knowledge

so

much

as

the certainty knowledge

affords."

"Ultimately,
for

the city offers knowledge of simple and eternal ideas as

a substitute
and

the uncertain understanding necessary

in

a world of complex

objects."

changing

communism;
trol. Reason

unnatural unity of Philosophy quest for changeless order and con politics does, in its anti-erotic is reduced to a merely disciplinary force that serves the

does

not

lead

men

to the

'ideally'

'manly'

self-sufficient

man.

Instead

of

"Socratic

philosophers,"

political

the

city in
youths

speech

is

mled

by

"mathematic
city,"

philosophy"

that prepares the brightest

within each of

"for tyranny

over

the

an enforced

homogeneity

the

three

classes.

"In

contrast to these
gains

philosophers, for
the city
. .

whom

the city is a cave

not."

they

escape,

Socrates

clarity

within

munity in

ways

the philosophers of the

transcending] his own political com cave image do The erotic Socrates
he
need to

does

not need

to be dragged from the cave. Nor does

needed

be dragged

back to it. "What is

offers of

is

not

the ridicule of philosophy that Aristophanes

but a philosophic understanding of the city's legitimate needs, as well as its dangerous tendencies. Philosophy must be political in order to avoid
politicized."

being

The tmly just

man

is "the lover

learning"

of

who

lives in the
Bloom

"dialogic

community."

Socrates'

regime

typology is

not

the kernel

of a political

science,

as

contends; there is

no room

imes decline inevitably, lic to which men can give their

offers

for choice, deliberation for statesmanship. Reg here. "Plato describes no decent politics in the Repub
attention and

loyalty.

Because the Republic

useful

knowledge

of

the perils of political action rather than knowledge

in guiding politics, Aristophanes would find it unsatisfactory. As long as knowledge yields no more fmit than the knowledge that one does not know and a consequent moderation in all things, including politics "he might
this"

ask, why is knowledge better for men than the forgetting that comedy is in tended to Nichols now turns not, as one might expect, to Plato's
encourage?"

Book Reviews

319
the

trilogy on knowledge and statesmanship, Statesman, but to Aristotle.

"Whereas Socrates founded
sophic

the

Theaetetus,

the

Sophist,

and

examination of

philosophy by undertaking a philo human affairs, Aristotle founded political science by

political
action"

directing

philosophy to
against

political

"constituting]
criticism
and

an

implicit defense
against

of

Aristophanes'

Plato's."

philosophy Against Aristophanes, Aristotle teaches that thought

against

of politics

should guide political

life;

Plato, Aristotle

teaches that politics can and must

other,"

"incorporate diver
and partic

sity."

Thus "thought

and action correct each

with

statesmen,

ularly lawgivers, providing "the bridge between thought and actual Unlike Socrates, Aristotle does not direct his political teachings to the

regimes."

young.

He is "the
the
tics
city's

philosophic teacher of

statesmen."

unity, the

philosopher can share

"Far from constituting a threat to in political For Aristotle, poli

life."

is

not

based

on a

lie.
Nichols'

There may be some problems with kings. For one thing, Socrates says so little
mathematical education

discussion
them as

of the

philosopher-

about

philosophers.

Their

does

not make

them un-Platonic; the

Academy

itself is

said

to have

warned

Socrates'

that
wrong: no one

account of

away love

unmathematical souls. as

Moreover, Nichols believes

wine-lover a

does
love

not

indiscriminate is obviously and deliberately love every kind of wine, as Socrates claims, as
city's communism could

loves

bad

wine.

"The
were

Socrates'

account of
class"

tme: only

if the
within

guardians

be successful, only if love all the members

confuses

of a with

and

therefore no

individuals

it. But Nichols

kinds

intensity, here. A tme wine lover loves all kinds of wine, but not poor specimens of those kinds; nor need he love all kinds equally. Socrates may be
more

kingly
a

than Nichols says. Plato

philosophic

also

teaches that a tyrannic soul may

have

been

potentially

soul,

now

spoiled; tyrants and philosophers are

Nichols'

opposites, but in

another sense

twins.
overall argument soul could

The

extent to which such reservations refute

may

be

questioned.

Only

an

exceptionally dogmatic

fail to leam from her

book,

and such souls are not the

intended

readership.

INTERPRETATION
A JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY Queens College, Flushing, NY 11367-0904 U.S.A. (718) 520-7099

Subscription

rates per volume

(3 issues): individuals $21 libraries and all other institutions $34 students (five-year limit) $12
elsewhere

Postage outside U.S.: Canada $3.50 extra; (8 weeks or longer) or $7.50 by air.
Payments: in U.S. dollars and payable institution located within the U.S. Please

$4

extra

by

surface mail

by

the U.S. Postal Service

type

or a

financial

print or

ORDER FORM FOR NEW SUBSCRIBERS

(NOT FOR
RENEWALSCURRENT

SUBSCRIBERS WILL BE BILLED)

wish

to subscribe to INTERPRETATION.
name address

?
?

bill me
payment enclosed

student

ZIP/postcode

airmail

country (if

outside

U.S.)

GIFT SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM

Please

enter a subscription

to INTERPRETATION for
?
student

address

ZIP/postcode

airmail

country (if
from:

outside

U.S.)

? bill me ?
payment enclosed

name

address

ZIP/postcode

INTERPRETATION

will send an announcement

to

the recipient and acknowledgment

to you

RECOMMENDATION TO YOUR LIBRARY

to: the

Librarian,
that
our

recommend

political philosophy

library subscribe to INTERPRETATION, [ISSN 0020-9635], at the institutional rate

signature

a journal of of

$34

per year

(three issues).

name

date

position

INTERPRETATION, Queens College, Flushing, New York 11367-0904, U.S.A.

Philosophy
\2> Affairs
"PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC was created to promote the discussion of matters of public concern, and to bridge the gap that exists between philosophers and those In other
disciplines who are working on questions that raise philosophical issues. The journal has maintained a high level of discussion from the Peter Singer, The New York Times Magazine
start."

AFFAIRS"

Articles from
Legal

recent

issues include:

Theory and the Claim of Authority By Philip Soper Killing, Letting Die, and Simple Conflicts By Heidi Malm
The Separation
of

Church
and

and

Obligations

of

Citizenship by

State and the Robert Audi

Justice, Health Care,

the

Elderly

by Dan W. Brock
Three Grades of Social Involvement by George Sher

Socrates
Enter
your

and

Athenian

Democracy by

T. H. Irwin

Subscription Now.

FfTfcsophy

Foreign

CS>Aflais
Subscriptions

and domestic subscription rates: Individuals. $18.00/yr. Institutions. $31.507yr. Foreign postage and handling rate: $7.00 PER YEAR.

The Johns Hopkins University Press Journals Publishing Division 701 W. 40th St., Suite 275 Baltimore, Md. 21211-2190
Name Address
Zip.

PUBLISHED BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

PUBLIUS:
THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM
Published by the Center for the Study
of

Federalism

University of North Texas Temple University

Editors: Daniel J. Elazar

and

and

John Kincaid

publication.

PUBLIUS is a quarterly journal now in its twentieth year of It is dedicated to the study of federal principles, in stitutions, and processes. PUBLIUS publishes articles, research notes, and book reviews on the theoretical and practical dimen sions of the American federal system and intergovernmental rela tions and other federal systems throughout the world.

Forthcoming topical issues will feature articles on federalism Constitution, federalism in West Germany, federalism and political culture, federalism in Australia, constitutional design and power sharing, federalism and military rule in Nigeria, and much
and the
more as
well

as

the PUBLIUS Annual Review of American

Federalism. EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD: Thomas J. Anton, Samuel H. Beer, Lewis A. Dexter, Max Frenkel, Robert B. Hawkins, Jr., A.E. Dick Howard, L. Adele Jinadu, Irving Kristol, E. Lester Levine, William S. Livingston, Donald S. Lutz, Alexandre Marc, Elinor Ostrom, Vincent Ostrom, Neal R. Peirce, William H. Riker, Stephen L. Schechter, Harry N. Scheiber, Ira Sharkansky, Donald V. Smiley, David B. Walker, Ronald L. Watts, Murray L. Weidenbaum, Frederick Wirt, Deil S. Wright. ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION RATES: Individual $35. (Add $5.00 for foreign postage.)

$25;

Institutional

Subscriptions

and manuscript submission should

be

sent

to:

PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM c/o Department of Political Science, University of North Texas Denton, Texas 76203-5338 (817) 565-2313

Canadian Journal of Philosophy:

Volume 19, Number 3, September 1989
Nicholas Asher Graciela De Pierris Paul

BELIEF, ACCEPTANCE AND BELIEF REPORTS

SUBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION

Gomberg

CONSEQUENTIALISM AND HISTORY

DO MOTIVES MATTER?

Robert E. Goodin

Charles W. Mills
Jordan Howard Sobel Andrew Lei'ine

DETERMINATION AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN MARX

KENT BACH ON GOOD ARGUMENTS

CRITICAL NOTICE OF FRANK CUNNINGHAM DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND SOCIALISM CRITICAL NOTICE OF ANDREW LEVINE THE END OF THE STATE CRITICAL NOTICE OF JOSEPH RAZ THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM CRITICAL NOTICE OF GREGORY S. KAVKA
HOBBESIAN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY

Frank Cunningham

W.J. Waluchow Cooper

Wesley

Canadian Journal
New Essays in the New Essays in the New Essays New Essays New Essays
on on

of

Philosophy Supplementary
New Essays in Ethics New Essays New Essays
on on

Volumes
Public

History Philosophy Philosophy of Mind

of and

and

Policy

Plato Aristotle
of

Plato

the Pre-Socratics

Contract

Theory
and

on

Rationalism

Empiricism
and

New Essays in Philosophy Ser. II

Mind,
and

New Essays on John Stuart Mill Utilitarianism New Essays in Marx

and

Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, Disarmament

Philosophy Morality

of

Language

Science, Morality & Feminist Theory Philosophy & Biology

erly, in

The Canadian journal of Philosophy is published quart March, June, September and December. In ad dition to these regular issues, the C.J.P. publishes
a

The The

University University
L_

of of

Calgary Calgary

Press

CALGARY, Alberta, Canada T2N 1N4

Individual

supplementary volume of original papers on a selected theme of contemporary philosophical in terest. This supplementary volume is free to individual annually
and student subscribers

Student
information

D
on

Please C.J.P. Name

send me

to the journal in that

year.

Supplementary

Volumes

L_

Supplementary
separately.

volumes

may

also

be

purchased

Correspondence regarding subscriptions, renewals, single issues and supplementary volume orders should be addressed to Canadian journal of Philosophy c/o The University of Calgary Press, University of Calgary, Cal
gary,

Address

City
Country
Visa
_Postal

Alberta, Canada T2N 1N4.

volume/four

Code_

1990

issues:

Canada

Foreign

Mastercard

__

Institutions Individuals

Cdn. $35.00 20.00

13.00

US $36.00 20.00
13.00 9.00

No. Signature

Expiry

Date

Students Single issues

9.00

fr

JOURNAL OF POLITICS
Cecil L. Eubanks and Ronald E. Weber, Editors Louisiana State University

The University of Texas publishes the Journal of Politics for the Southern Political Science Association. As the oldest regional politi cal science journal, the JOP offers a blend of various styles of politi cal science and maintains its representation of the broad scope of the discipline.

Recent

and

Forthcoming Articles include:

Plague: Thucydides on the Dissolution of Society by Clifford Orwin. Economic Conditions, Causal Attributions, and Political Evaluations in the 1984 Presidential Election by Alan I. Abramowitz, David J. Lanoue, and Subha Ramesh. The Policy Consequences of Political Intolerance: Political Repression During the Vietnam War Era by James L. Gibson. Religious Roots of Political Orientations: Variations Among American Catholic Parishioners by David C. Leege and Michael R. Welch. Realpolitik and the Bases ofMultistate System Endurance by Thomas R. Cusack and Uwe Zimmer.
and

Stasis

Persuasion, Manipulation, and Dimension by Scott C. Paine. Presidents, Governors, and Electoral Accountability by Dennis M. Simon. Generational Replacement, Ethnic Change, and Partisan Support in Israel

by Paul R. Abramson. Should Congress Listen to Economists?

by Peter VanDoren.

Individual

single

copy rate/$8; Institution

single

copy rate/$10

Foreign

add

$2 for

postage.

Subscription rates (one year): Individual/$20; Institution/$36 Foreign add $6/subsription for postage.

University of Texas Press Journals,

==-=

Box

7819, Austin, Texas 78713 A

Forthcoming
Scott R.

Hemmenway Sumberg

Philosophical

Apology

in the Theaetetus

Theodore A.
Robert Eden John C.

Reading

Vico Three Times

and

Tocqueville

the Problem of Natural Right

Koritansky

Civil Religion in Tocqueville's Democracy in

America

Peter A. Lawler Waller R. Newell

Discussion Werner J. Dannhauser Review

Was Tocqueville
Zarathustra's

Philosopher?

Dancing

Dialectic

Leo Strauss

as

Citizen

and

Jew

Essay
Burstein

Harvey

Henry M. Rosenthal, Philosophy

The Consolations of

ISSN 0020-9635

Interpretation, Inc.
Queens College

Flushing

N.Y. 11367-0904 U.S.A.

"0
CD

r
SB =3

C
00

DO

2
0
3

|
2
K>

c
r
*3

"TJ

13
o

~C no

>

ct

tn rrq