Interpretation

A JOURNAL
Winter 1997

A OF

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Number 2

Volume 24

135

Robert D. Sacks

The Book

of

Job: Translation

and

Commentary
171 Marc D. Guerra Aristotle
on

Pleasure

and

Political
of

Philosophy: A

Study

in Book VII

the

Nicomachean Ethics 183

Mark S. Cladis

Lessons from the Garden: Rousseau's Solitaires

and the

Limits

of

Liberalism

201

Thomas Heilke

Nietzsche's Impatience: The Spiritual

Necessities
of

Nietzsche's Politics

Book Reviews

233

Eduardo A. Velasquez

Profits, Priests,

and

Princes: Adam Smith 's

Emancipation of Economics from Politics and Religion, by Peter Minowitz

239 243

Charles E. Butterworth
Will

Something
Jerusalem

To Hide,

by

Peter Levine

Morrisey

and

Athens: Reason
the

and

Revelation in

Works of Leo Strauss,

by

Susan Orr

Interpretation
Editor-in-Chief Executive Editor Hilail Gildin, Dept. Leonard
of

Philosophy, Queens College

Grey

General Editors

Seth G. Benardete Charles E. Butterworth Hilail Gildin Robert Horwitz (d. 1987) Howard B. White (d. 1974) Christopher Bruell Joseph Cropsey Ernest L. Fortin John Hallowell (d. 1992) Harry V. Jaffa David Lowenthal Muhsin Mahdi Harvey C. Mansfield Arnaldo Momigliano (d. 1987) Michael Oakeshott Ellis Sandoz Leo Strauss (d. 1973) (d.

Consulting

Editors

1990)

Kenneth W. Thompson International Editors Editors Terence E. Marshall Heinrich Meier Wayne Ambler Maurice Auerbach Fred Baumann Michael Blaustein Amy Bonnette Patrick Coby Thomas S. Engeman Edward J. Erler Maureen Feder-Marcus Pamela K. Jensen Ken Masugi Will Morrisey Susan Orr Charles T. Rubin Leslie G. Rubin Susan Shell Richard Velkley Michael Zuckert Manuscript Editor Bradford P. Wilson Catherine Zuckert

Lucia B. Prochnow

Subscriptions

Subscription rates per volume (3 issues): individuals $29 libraries and all other institutions $48 students (four-year limit) $18 Single
copies available. outside

Postage
or

elsewhere

longer)

U.S.: Canada $4.50 extra; $5.40 extra by surface mail (8 or $11.00 by air.

weeks

Payments: in U.S. dollars and payable by a financial institution located within the U.S.A. (or the U.S. Postal Service).

The Journal Welcomes Manuscripts

in

in

Political Philosophy

as

Well

as

Those

Theology, Literature,

and

Jurisprudence.

follow The Chicago Manual of Style, 13th ed. or manuals based on it; double-space their manuscripts, including notes; place references in the text, in endnotes or follow current journal style in printing references. Words from languages not rooted in Latin should be transliterated to English. To ensure impartial judgment of their manuscripts, contributors should omit mention of their
contributors should
other with

work; put,

on

postal/zip
copies,

code

the title page only, their name, any affiliation desired, address in full, and telephone. Contributors using computers should, if

possible, provide a character count of the entire manuscript. Please send three
clear which will not

be

returned.

Composition

Binghamton, N.Y.

Eastern Composition, Inc., 13904 U.S.A. Printed and bound by Wickersham Printing Lancaster, PA 17603 U.S.A.

by

Co.,

Inquiries:

Susan Chiong, Assistant to the Editor interpretation, Queens College, Flushing, N.Y. 11367-1597, U.SA. (718)997-5542 Fax (718) 997-5565

(Ms.)

E Mail:

interpretation_joumal@qc.edu

Interpretation
Winter 1QQ7 Winter 1997
-JL. -1-

Vnlnmo Volume OA 24

Mnmhor 0 2 Number

Robert D. Sacks

The Book

of

Job: Translation

and

Commentary
Marc D. Guerra

135
and

Aristotle

on

Pleasure

Political
of

Philosophy: A

Study

in Book VII

the

Nicomachean Ethics

171

Mark S. Cladis

Lessons from the Garden: Rousseau's Solitaires

and the

Limits

of

Liberalism

183

Thomas Heilke

Nietzsche's Impatience: The Spiritual Necessities

Book Reviews
of

Nietzsche's Politics

201

Eduardo A. Velasquez

Profits, Priests,

and

Princes: Adam Smith 's

Emancipation of Economics from Politics and Religion, by Peter Minowitz

233

Charles E. Butterworth
Will

Something
Jerusalem

To Hide,
and

by

Peter Levine
and

239

Morrisey

Athens: Reason

Revelation

in the Works of Leo Strauss,

by

Susan Orr

243

Copyright 1997

interpretation

ISSN 0020-9635

Interpretation
Editor-in-Chief Executive Editor Hilail Gildin, Dept.
of

Philosophy, Queens College

Leonard

Grey

General Editors

Seth G. Benardete Charles E. Butterworth Hilail Gildin Robert Horwitz (d. 1987) Howard B. White (d. 1974)
Christopher Bruell

Consulting

Editors

Cropsey Emest John Hallowell (d. 1992) Harry V Jaffa David Lowenthal Muhsin Mahdi Harvey C.
Joseph

L. Fortin
Mansfield

Oakeshott Arnaldo Momigliano (d. 1987) Michael (d. 1990) Ellis Sandoz Leo Strauss (d. 1973) Kenneth W. Thompson International Editors Terence E. Marshall Heinrich Meier

Editors

Wayne Ambler

Fred Baumann Maurice Auerbach Michael Blaustein Amy Bonnette Patrick Coby Thomas S. Engeman Edward J. Erler
Maureen Feder-Marcus Pamela K. Jensen Susan Orr Ken Masugi Will Morrisey Charles T. Rubin Leslie G. Rubin Susan Shell Bradford P. Wilson Richard Velkley Michael Zuckert Catherine Zuckert

Manuscript Editor

Lucia B. Prochnow
Subscription
rates per volume

Subscriptions

(3 issues):

individuals $29 libraries

students and all other

institutions $48

(four-year

limit) $18

Single

copies available.
outside

U.S.: Canada $4.50 extra; $5.40 extra by surface mail (8 or longer) or $1 1.00 by air. Payments: in U.S. dollars and payable by
Postage
elsewhere

weeks

financial institution located (or the U.S. Postal Service).

within the

U.S.A.

The Journal Welcomes Manuscripts

in

in

Political Philosophy

as

Well

as

Those

Theology, Literature,

and

Jurisprudence.

should follow The Chicago Manual of Style, 13th ed. or manuals based on it; double-space their manuscripts, including notes; place references in the text, in endnotes or follow current journal style in printing references. Words from languages not rooted in Latin should be transliterated to English. To ensure

contributors

impartial judgment
other

of their

manuscripts, contributors should omit mention of their

work; put, on the title page only, their name, any affiliation desired, address with postal/zip code in full, and telephone. Contributors using computers should, if
clear

possible, provide a character count of the entire manuscript. \Please send three copies, which will not be returned.

Composition
Printed
and

by Eastern Composition, Inc., Binghamton, N.Y. 13904 U.S.A.

bound

by

Wickersham

Printing Co.,
Editor

Lancaster, PA 17603 U.S.A.

Inquiries:

(Ms.) Susan Chiong, Assistant

interpretation, Queens

to the

College, Flushing, N.Y. 1 1367-1597, U.S.A. (718)997-5542 Fax (718) 997-5565

E Mail:

interpretation_journal@qc.edu

The Book
Translation

of
and

Job

Commentary

Robert D. Sacks
St. John's

College, Santa Fe

INTRODUCTION

We
selves

of the

Western tradition have the

quite

blessing
life

and the curse of

finding

our

heir to two

different

ways of

and

hence to two

quite

different

ways of thought.

has formed
of our est

much of

Although they sit uneasily together, the struggle between them the life behind the growth of both our daily language and

highest

contemplations.

They

are, then, the foundation

of

both

our

deep

insights

and our

deepest

prejudices.

As
and

particular

horizon

within which we

live,

they have given rise to that beyond which we constantly strive

such

to peer. The problem to which I refer

is

often spoken of as

the problem of

Science
perhaps
or

versus

Religion,

or of we

Reason

versus

Faith. More

less prejudicially,

Greek

Philosophy
they
were

and the

may call it the Hebrew Bible.

question

fundamentally, and of Athens and Jerusalem,

roots of our civili

Any

attempt to understand the relation

between these two

zation as

that rarely can

before they met is doubly complicated by be caught addressing the same question in they clarity
of thought.

virtue of the ways

fact be

that

can

compared with tme

Such

considerations as these
of

the books

Bible, it

seemed to me to
philosophy.

eventually led me to the Book of Job since, of be most in contact with those problems

which gave

rise to Greek
of the

The language
agree.

text is strange and

picked

difficult,

and

translators often dis

In the notes, I have

what seem

to me the three most reliable

translations that I have read, and wherever I have felt it necessary to differ

each

greatly from my predecessors, I have tried to give the arguments in favor of translation, insofar as I was able to reconstruct them, in order that the have
some

reader might

basis for

forming

his

own

conclusions, and at times I

have

made reference to certain other translations made most use of are:

to

bring

out points of

interest.

The translations I have dard Version (RSV),

(JPS).'

King

James (KJ), Revised Stan

and

Moshe

Greenberg's, issued by The Jewish Publication

contain.

Society

I have

also

tried to make the notes intelligible even to those

readers who cannot

follow the Hebrew they

The balance

of this translation and

commentary

will appear

in Interpretation.

interpretation, Winter

1997, Vol. 24, No. 2

136
I

Interpretation
should also

like to

thank

both Mr. Hillail Fradkin

of

of

The

tion and Mr.

and more

Antony

Sullavan
on

The Earhart Foundation

Bradley Founda for having put beans

volume.

than

Thanks
was

as well

was scratching out this my table while I put up with me to Eve Adler and those in Vermont who

beans

while

eating those beans.

Note The Book of Job, trans. Moshe Greenberg (Phila delphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1980); The Book of Job, Robert trans. Stephen Mitchell (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1987); 1. The
references are:

Gordis, The Book of Job: Commentary, New Translation, and Special Study (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1978); and Saadia on Job, trans. L. E. Goodman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).

CHAPTER ONE
Job.2

1 A
simple3

man'

there was from the land of Uz and his name was

straightforward

He

was a

and

man

('ish),

GOD-FEARING4

man

who

turned

away from

evil.

2 He had

seven sons and

three

daughters.5

3 He

owned seven

thousand sheep, three thousand camels, ten thousand

head

of cattle,

five hun

dred she asses and was the head of a very large estate. He was the

richest man

( 'ish) in
with word

the East.

4 His

sons used

to

make

feasts in their homes, had

each one on a

different day,
them.6

and send word to

when

their three sisters to come and eat and drink

of

5 Now

the

days

feasting

gone would

full
get

circle,7

Job

sent

to them to sanctify
make

themselves.

He himself

morning to
said all

burnt

offerings

for

each

"my
his

children
days.9

have sinned,

and

cursed8

up early in the Job for of his children; Thus did Job GOD in their
"Perhaps,"

hearts."

of

6 One

day
the

the

Sons

of

GOD

came

to

themselves10

present

before THE 7
the
"Well,"

LORD,"

said

along with them. THE LORD to the Satan "where have you
and came

Satan12

been?"

"Oh,"

said

Satan to THE LORD,

a
walk."13
man14

"wandering

around

Earth, just

went
you

down

there to go
notice

for my

8 Then THE LORD

no one

said

to the Satan "Did

on

happen to

Job. There is

like him

Earth. He is

a simple and straightfor

evil."

ward man

('ish),

GOD-FEARING
answered

man and one who turns and said:

9 Then the Satan

THE LORD

away from "What, do you think that

Job FEARS GOD for

house,

nothing? 10 Haven't you been protecting him and his everything that he has. You have blessed all his labors, and every thing he owns is spreading out all over the land. 11 But just reach out your hand to take it away and he will curse you to your face for and
sure."

12 "Well

right,"

all
him."

said

THE LORD, "all that he has is in

went

your

just don't hurt LORD.

Then the Satan

out

from the

presence

hands now; of THE

The Book of Job

13 One

137
wine

day,
of

when

his

sons and

his daughters

were

eating

and

drinking
and

in the house
oxen were

their oldest

brother, 14

a messenger came to
alongside

Job

said; "The

when the plowing grazing Sabeans attacked, taking them all and putting the boys to the sword; and I alone have escaped to tell 16 While he was still talking, another one came in

and the asses were

them, 15

thee."

and and
still

said, "The fire

of

devoured them; talking,

poured

and

GOD fell from heaven. It burnt the sheep and shepherds I alone have escaped to tell 17 While he was
thee."

yet another one came

in

and said:

"The Chaldean

sent out three

companies,

down

on

the camels, carried them off and put the boys to

escaped to tell
thee."

the sword; and I alone

another one came

have

18 While he
daughters

was yet were

talking,
and
wind"

in

and

said; "Your sons

of

and your

eating

drinking
came

wine

in the house

their oldest

brother, 19
and

when a of

mighty

in from the
on the

wilderness and struck

people.

the four corners

the house. It
escaped

fell

down
thee."

young
rose

They

are

dead,

alone

have

to tell

20 Then Job
I

ground and worshiped. and naked shall

up and tore his cloak, shaved his head, and fell to the 21 He said; "Naked I came out of my mother's belly THE LORD gives, and THE LORD takes; return
there.'6

blessed be

the name of THE

LORD."

22 But throughout

all

that Job never

sinned or even charged

GOD

with

folly.

Comments
that the whole story begins with the word A
"man."

We

must remember

man.

In

fact,

there are

four

words used throughout

the text which might all roughly be gebher, speaks of man in his might,
"hero."

translated

by

the English word

One,
as

and perhaps should so

have been translated

I have
to

refrained

from

doing
is
in

only because

there

is

another word,
"hero,"

closely

related

it,

gibbor, which

more might

properly translated as

though our word

is

well on

the way. This

appears

be especially tme here, since the form gibbor never actually (gebher). the Book of Job I have used the form
"man"

Another

word

speaks of man

is enosh of which I will have more to say in in all his frailty. I have translated it as
"mortal."

later

note.

It

The third word, 'adam, tends to be sense, and at times I have translated it
mally,

used

by

our author or as

in

a more generic
man."

"mankind,"

as

"some

Nor

however, I have
word

used

the form

"man"

('adam).
comes

Our

'ish is

of unknown origin.

Some think that it

"weak."

from

a root

meaning "to be strong"; others take it to mean The Book of Job is about a man who for
"man."

It is the

common word

can raise to

the state of the

and

gibbor, a

hero,

and at

times be no more than an enosh, but

finally

fully, he
all

is

an

'ish,

a man.
once was a man

2. There
sounds

from
of

the

land of Uz,
wonderful

and

his

name was

Job. It

like the

beginning

some

fairy

tale, full

of noble

and

138

Interpretation
of the

wealthy men from the mysterious Land word for can also mean
"east"

East. In the Hebrew language the

"ancient,"

and conjures

up the dream

of a child's

notion of wisdom and valor.

Chapters 1, 2, and 42 differs markedly from that found in the central part of the book. Reading it is like turning from Dick and Jane to Shakespeare, and I have tried to reflect that difference in the translation. Most
The language
of

scholars

believe that it little

was written

by

another

hand,

and perhaps

it was; but it
other

is

not clear

to what extent one can have such

more can

historical knowledge. On the

effect.

hand,
of

be

said of

its

literary

The

childlike nature of

the text, both with regard to

of never-never

its diction

and to

the use

feeling, especially reality felt in the rest of the text. The banter between God and Satan only adds to this feeling. It is almost the classic comic situation in which bad things happen to good people and in the end everybody lives more than
when contrasted

repetition, gives it a kind

with the stark

happily

ever after. was an old

Whether it
or whether a

folk tale

which the author used to

introduce his work, last

chapter as the

later thinker felt

a need

for

some

kind

of comic relief after such

trials;

or even whether

it

was the author

himself

who saw the

is something we shall probably never know. In the course of these notes, however, I shall try to show that Job's final acceptance of the comic is part of the most serious intent of the book.
true culmination,

3. The

word tarn

is
it

central

to our understanding

of

the Book of Job. For an

account of the role

plays see the note to

31:40.

4. The

word yirah, which can

we

imply
as

respect

for the divine,

we

have trans

lated

as

FEAR. Pahad

have left

"fear."

5. Seven

sons and three

daughters: Whether it is because

are odd and somehow

of some perfection

felt in them,
but the

or

because they

unbalanced, I do not

know,
word

numbers seven and three next

have

always

had

a magic
parties.

ring

to them.

6. The
used

thing

we see

is

a round of word

family

Although the

for

"feasting"

comes

from the

"to

drink,"

and

implies that

wine was

served, the

fact that

the sisters were

invited We

would seem

to

imply

that

they

were

wholesome and goodnatured affairs.

all take

it

as part of the charm of the

notice of
granted

story that the sisters are invited and barely take any never host the parties themselves. We take it for
independent
would
wealth.

the fact that

that

they they have no

fact
we

It is

not

wrong

of us to

do

so at this
note

point, and in

lose the

spirit of

the

day

if

we

did. See the

these

to

42:15, however.

7. The Hebrew

makes

it

clear that while

year.

days

were ample and

full,
no

they
8.

marked a special time of the

From every
of

indication, they

were

in

sense religious

holidays, but simply full

"blessed,"

human goodnaturedness.

Literally

but it is

used euphemistically.

9. Job trusts his children, but only partly trusts goodnaturedness. He seems to have full trust in their actions, but supposes that no one is in full control of the thoughts that can flit into and out of a human mind.

The Book of Job

10. Mitchell's "came to
encounter.
testify"

139
the
still

fails

to capture the

friendly

nature of

While the
mind of

verb

does

imply

a certain

amount of

formality, it
have

keeps

us

in

the party mood of verses 4 and 5.

a

11. Here follows

translate them,
and

list

of the names of

God,

the words we

used

to

the places

they

occur:

YAHOVAH
elohim el
shaddai

THE LORD

GOD God
The

1:6-2:7, 38:1-42:11 1:6-2:10, 5:8, 28:23, 34:9, 38:7

3:3-40:1
5:17-40:2

Almighty

adonai

The Lord

28:28 discussion to the first two

For the moment, "THE

LORD"

we shall restrict our

chapters.

is, in the main, the one in whose presence the meeting oc curred (1:6, 2:1, 2:7) or the one speaking or directly spoken to (1:7, 1:8, 1:9, 1:12, 2:2, 2:3, 2:4, 2:6). There is, however, one important exception to this rule:
1:22 THE LORD gives, LORD.
"GOD,"

and

THE LORD takes; blessed be the

name of

THE

The

word

on of

the other

hand,

except

insofar

as

it is

used
of

in the

expression

"Sons
He

GOD"

consistently

refers

to man's awareness

God.

1:1

was a simple and straightforward man, a

GOD-fearing
happen to

man who

turned

2:3

away from evil. Then THE LORD said to

no one

the
on

Satan: "Did Earth. He is

turns

you

notice

my

man

Job. There is
man,
a

like him

a simple and straightforward

GOD-fearing

man and one who

away from

evil."

1:5

He himself
each of

would get

his children; for

their

"Perhaps,"

up early in the morning to make burnt offerings for Job said, "my children have sinned, and
came

cursed

GOD in

hearts."

1:6

One

day day
and

the

Sons Satan Sons

of

GOD

to

present

themselves

before THE

LORD,
2:1

and the

came

One

the the

of

along GOD came to

with

them.
present

themselves before THE

LORD,
1:9
1:22

Satan

came

Then the Satan

answered

along THE LORD

with

them.
and said:

"What, do

you

think that

Job FEARS GOD for But 2:9

2:10

nothing?

throughout all that

die!"

Job

never sinned or even charged

GOD

with

folly.

"Curse GOD
"If

and

we accept the good

from GOD,

evil?"

must we not also accept

the

12. The know

which

"satan"

word

has been

translated

in

so

many
are so

ways that

it's hard to in
mind

where to

begin.

Clearly
or

the author
with.

has

some

traditional usage

he is
a

either

using

toying

But there

many

of them.

We'd

best have

look.

140

Interpretation
comes

The term first

Num. 22:21

up in the story
rose

of

Balaam:

So Balaam

in

the morning, and

saddled

his ass,

and went

with the princes of

Moab. But God's

anger was

kindled because he

went; and the

angel of

the LORD took

was

his

stand

in

the

way

as

his

ADVERSARY. Now he
were with

riding

on the

ass, and his

two servants

him.
angel of the

Num. 22:32

And the
your ass

LORD

these three times?

said to him, "Why have you Behold, I have come forth to your

struck

WITHSTAND you, because

way is

perverse

before

me;"

It

would

be best if the

reader could reread

"Satan."

Numbers 21-24, 31. It is

satan"

not clear

that the angel

of

is

being

called

Rather, "being

seems
perform.

to be an

not

activity be easy to

the moment that any angel might be required to

give a

It

would
a

full

articulation of

that action, because Balaam

on

complicated character.

(See R. Sacks, A
pp.

[Lewiston, NY: Mellen, 1990], Here, the angel's job seems

act.

Commentary 200ff.)
prevent

the

very Book of Genesis,

is

to

be to is

Balaam from

doing

a wrongful

In the Book
seems to
out

of

Samuel,

the term

used

for

a man whose original

intention
turn

be directed toward

another's

good, but

whose actions nevertheless

to be otherwise.

ISam. 29:4

But the

commanders of the

Philistines

were

the commanders of the Philistines said to

that

him, "Send
the battle

he may

return

to the place to
with us

which you

him; and back, have assigned him; he

angry
with

the

man

shall not go

down

to

battle, lest in
could

he become here?

an

ADVERSARY to his lord? Would it

us.

For how

this

fellow

reconcile

himself to

not

be

with

the

heads

of the men not

2Sam. 19:21

Zeruiah answered, "Shall death for this, because he cursed the LORD'S
the son of

Abishai

Shimei be

put

to

anointed?"

But David

said, "What have I to

should

do

with

you, you sons of

Zeruiah,

that you

adversary to me? Shall any one be put to death in Israel this day? For do I not know that I am this day king
as an
Israel?"

this

day

be

over

In the Book

of

Kings,

who, unbeknownst to

for the leaders of the themselves, become God's way of chastening His
used

the term

"Satan"

is

nations
people:

1 Kings

5:4

But

now the

LORD my God has

given me rest on

side; there is neither adversary

nor misfortune.

every You know that

David my father could not build a house for the name of the LORD his God because of the warfare with which his enemies surrounded him, until the LORD put them under the soles of his feet.

The Book of Job

IKings 11:13-25 "However I for the
raised
will not tear

-141

give one tribe to your son, sake of

away for the

all the

kingdom; but I

will

sake of

Jerusalem

which

I have

chosen."

David my servant and And the LORD

up

an

was of the royal

adversary against Solomon, Hadad the Edomite; he house in Edom. but Hadad fled to Egypt.
.

And Hadad found

gave

great

favor in the

sight of own

Pharaoh,

so that

he

him in

marriage the sister of

his

wife, the sister of

Tahpenes the

queen.

And

the sister of

Tahpenes bore him

Genubath his son, whom Tahpenes weaned in Pharaoh's house; and Genubath was in Pharaoh's house among the sons of
Pharaoh. But
his fathers
when

Hadad heard in Egypt that David Joab the

commander of the me

slept with was

and that

Hadad
own

said to

Pharaoh, "Let
But Pharaoh

country."

said

dead, army depart, that I may go to my to him, "What have you lacked
go

with me that you are now

country?"

God also raised up as an adversary to him, Rezon the son of Eliada, who had fled from his master Hadadezer king of Zobah. And he gathered men
said about

And he

seeking to to him, "Only let me

to your own

go."

him

and

became leader
and

of a
went

marauding
to

slaughter

by David;
him days

they

band, after the Damascus, and dwelt

was an

there, Israel
and

and made all the

king

in Damascus. He

adversary

of

he

abhorred

Solomon, doing mischief as Hadad did; Israel, and reigned over Syria.
of

Strangely
mally

enough, it is only in the Book

of

Chronicles,

the

book that

nor

goes out of

its way

to avoid

anything that tends to appear close to the

mythic, such as the giants, that we see the Satan we know:

IChron. 21:1

Satan

stood

up

against

Israel,

and

incited David to

number

Israel.

Throughout the Book

of

Psalms,

the Satan

is

the

hated hater

who accuses:

Ps.

38:19

Those
those

who are

my foes

without cause are mighty, and

who

hate

me wrongfully.

Those

who render me evil

many are for good

are

my

adversaries

because I follow

after good.

Ps.

71:13

Ps. 109:4

May my accusers be put to shame and consumed; with scorn and disgrace may they be covered who seek my hurt. In return for my love they accuse me, even as I make prayer for
them.

So they

reward me evil

for good,

and

Appoint

a wicked man against

him; let
himself
oil

an accuser

hatred for my love. bring him to trial.

prayer

When he is tried, let him

counted as sin! soak

come

forth guilty; let his

with

be

He

clothed

into his

body
he

like water, like

wraps round

cursing as his coat, may it into his bones! May it be like a

a

garment which girds

him, like

belt

with which accusers

. . .

he

daily
the

himself!

May

this

be the

reward of

LORD,

of those who speak evil against

my my life!

from

But thou, O

142

Interpretation
GOD my Lord, deal on my behalf for thy name's sake; because thy steadfast love is good, deliver me! May my accusers be clothed their own shame as in a in wrapped be with dishonor; may they
mantle!

In Zecharaia there is the Satan

who rebukes

because he

cannot cleanse.

Zech. 3:1

Then he
of the

showed me

Joshua the high

at

priest

LORD,

and

Satan standing

his

right

standing before the angel hand to accuse him. And

you,

the LORD said to

who

Satan, "The LORD

was

rebuke

O Satan! The LORD

brand
plucked

has

chosen

Jerusalem

rebuke you!

Is

not

this a

from

fire?"

the
garments.

Now Joshua
And the

standing before the angel,

to those who were
him."

clothed with

filthy

angel said

"Remove the have taken

filthy garments from your iniquity away from

And to I

standing before him, him he said, "Behold, I

you, and

will clothe you with rich

apparel."

Our Satan is

all of

these,

and

he is

none of

them. As we shall see,

he is
For
of

convinced that man coat of

is radically incapable

of

being just. Deep

The
rest

underneath man's mere show.

decency lies
runs

a thick skin of self-interest. man are not well

is

him, God's high hopes for

skin which were ever show

founded. Through the

to
show

imagery

throughout the

book, Satan hopes

God that if

man

to

face the
a

unmediated nature of and vicious animal. we see a

the world

around

him, he

would

himself

bitter

We leave Satan because

richer

way, but he never arouses

our

hatred.
verb, which normally means "a walk direct external When the text says ing any of God that He is "going for a in the garden, there is a strong implication that He has not come there intentionally for the purpose of checking up on Adam. In the same way, when God says to Abram, "Walk before me and be He wants to look at Abram's general way of being rather than at any particular goal or accomplishment. Even when He invites him to "Walk through. the land which I shall give He means to enjoy it quietly without a sense of immediate possession.
uses the reflexive

13. He
about

form

of the

for its

goal."

own sake without

walk"

perfect,"

you,"

...

Here too, the

14.
"slave"

Adversary is claiming
"servant" "breath,"

a certain

innocence.
"spirit."

or word can mean perhaps almost

"wind,"

15. The

or

16. Job's

thoughtless

blurring
be

of

the

distinction between his

first
and naive glimpse was

own mother and

the great mother earth may

world of man

seen as a
which

into it

a world

larger than the its

into

he
a

born. Here
city
wall.

as

say, the thought is almost thoughtless. We see it as only

grow until

seed, yet we shall see

roots are

sturdy

enough to crack the strongest

The Book of Job

CHAPTER TWO

143

1 One
and

day

the

Sons

of

GOD
with

came

to

present

themselves before THE

LORD,

the

Satan

came

"Well,"

said
said the

along THE LORD to the Satan "where have Satan to THE LORD, for
walk."

them.

been?"

you

"Oh,"

"wandering

around

Earth, just

went

down there to There is

go

a said on

3 Then THE LORD

no one

to the Satan: "Did you happen to notice my man Job.

like him have

Earth. He is

a simple and straightforward man

evil.

( 'ish)

GOD-fearing
simplicity,

man and one who

turns away from

me

He is

still

holding

tight to

his

and you

beguiled1

into

destroying

him for

nothing.
under2
skin!'

4 Then the Satan

answered

THE LORD

and said:

"Well, 'Skin

Everything
and get to

a man

his bones
all

('ish) has he will give for his life. 5 But just reach out your hand and his flesh, and he will curse you to your face for
sure."

6 "Well
him."

right,"

said

THE LORD, "he is in

your

hands now; just don't kill

and struck and

7 Then the Satan

with

went out sole of

from the
he

presence of

THE LORD

Job
a

boils from the

his foot to the

as sat

crown of

his

head,3

he took
die!"

potsherd and scratched

himself

in the ashes, 9

and

his
If

wife said

to

him, "You
good

are still

holding

tight to your simplicity.

Curse GOD
woman.

and
we accept

10 But he

said to

her, "You
Job

talk like a worthless the

the

from GOD,
when

evil?"

must we not also accept

But throughout

all that

never sinned

in

speech.

11 Now

Job's three friends had heard

of all the evils that

had

come upon

him, they Shuhite, and Zophar the Naamatite. They

came each

from his

own place

Eliphaz the him

Temanite,4

Bildad the

conferred with one another and planned compassion.

to come together to console

raised5

him

and to show could

12 But

when

they

their eyes

from
Then

afar

they

hardly

recognize

voices and cried. ward.

each tore

his

robe and

They lifted up their threw dust over his head heaven

him
was

him.

13 Seven days

and seven nights

saw

they

sat with

on the ground and no one

great.6

spoke a word

because they

that

his suffering

very

Comments

1. The
root

root

Satan

sounds

like, but is

not

etymologically
from"

connected to the

Saltan.
word means
lattice."

2. Be'ad The Hebrew

phrase

"away

or

"out

through,"

as

in the

"to look

out through a

Judg. 5:28

Out

of the window she peered, the mother of

Sisera

gazed through

the lattice:

"Why
of

is his

chariot so

long

in

coming?

Why tany

the

hoofbeats

his

chariots?"

144
It

Interpretation
"beyond,"
"under,"

can also mean one seems to

and

hence "in

place

or

"on behalf

No

know
on

what the

Hebrew

expression means.

Most have trans

current

lated "Skin for

traders

skin,"

the

assumption

that it was a saying

among

in furs

and

hides,

although

it is

not clear what

may have been

meant

by

the expression or how

it may have I have taken the Satan to mean that

applied

to this

situation.

while

of a

God-fearing
of the

man, once that

surface

Job may have the superficial look has been scratched one will find an
on self-interest only. of skin gains throughout
author was

other protective

layer behind it is sorely

well,

one

based

In light

importance that the

one

imagery

the main

body
of at

of the

book,

tempted to

believe that its

the author

least this know.

phrase as

but,

of course, that

is

not

the

kind

of

thing

that

one can

3. It is
and

interesting
but

to note that Satan

did

not

his

flesh,"

attacked

Job's skin, the

surface of

in fact try to "get to his bones his being. Job had said
I
there."

"Naked I

came out of

my

mother's

belly

and naked

shall return

The

Adversary implied in
an

verse

5 that Job

was not as naked as

he

pretended

but had

inner thicker
4. In English,

coat of self-protection and

"Yemen."

is

now out

to prove

it.

5. This follows:

word will as one

be translated
can

"bear"

as

except as otherwise noted. of

6. So far

tell, the

genealogies

characters

seem

to be as

TERACH
I

I
.Abraham. .Katura

Sarah.

Haran

Shua
Nahor-

Lot

Milkah
Buz

Iskah

Bethual
_L

Uz

Isaak-

1
-Rebekah

Laban
Leah

Esau

Jakob-

Rachel

Eliphaz

Benjamin Na'aman

Taman

Eliphaz

Bildad

Zophar

Job

The Book of Job

As
the
we can

145

see, the Book

of

Job

presents

itself

as

being tangentially
of

aware of

book that tells the tale

the characters

of the genesis of the

all

Son

Israel. It

also presents
related

most of people.

involved,
book
it

but one,

as

being tangentially

to that

This

aspect of the although

will not change even when we meet the next

character,

Elihu,
as

will complicate

the matter somewhat. This

as

book,

then, insofar Job is

it

speaks of a

much wider world a

human world, has than the Torah.

of the

its

principal subject matter a

descendent
a

two nonchosen brothers of

of

Abraham, Nahor
the

and

Haran. Bildad is
attention of

descendent

Abraham

and the wife

he had taken

after our

had been drawn away from him and to Isaak. Eliphaz is from brother. Esau, All these men, however, come from Terach. Of him we read:
another nonchosen

line

Gen. 11:31 but

Terach took Abram his

when

son and

...

to go

into the land

of

Canaan;

they

came

to

Haran, they
was

settled there.

Terach,
grounds,

the

common

grandfather,

the

man

who,

on

purely human

saw or

felt in

need of

leaving

his father's house

and of

land

of

Canaan, but, because

of those

grounds, did

not go all the way.

going to the Three of

the men, then, seem to

be heirs to

such a tradition. either a son or perhaps a grandson

The last to join the discussion, Zophar, is

of

Benjamin.

CHAPTER THREE

1 Then, Job
3

opened of

his

spurned'

mouth and
lost2

his day. 2 Job 4

answered and said night

"May

the

day

my birth be

in

oblivion and with

conceived4.'

it that

in
be

which

it
of

was said 'A MAN (GEBHERf has been darkness. May God from on high not upon cloud

May

that

day

day

seek

it

out nor
Death6

any brightness
redeem7

radiate

it; 5 but let

dwell
above

darkness5

it.

consume that night

into the

number of

it, and may a it. 6 Let the murk day terrify May that it not be counted among the days of the year or enter its months. 7 Thus shall that night become hard and sterile
and

the Shadow of
warms8

that which

the

with no sound of

joy in it. 8
open

Those

who

despise the sea9,

curse"

and those who are

determined to

lay

the

Leviathan10

will

darken. Let it hope for the light, but let there be

of

none.

it. 9 Let its morning stars May it not see the eyelid
mother's

dawn open, 10 for it

closed not the

doors

of

my

belly

but hid my
perish?13

eyes

from

toil.12

Why did I not come out of the womb and die, exit the belly and 12 Why were there knees to receive me, and what were those breasts to
I I
should could

11

me that

have

have

slept and

rebuild ruins

13 Else would I have been at ease and had my quiet. 14 had my rest with kings and counselors of the earth, who for themselves, 15 or with princes who had silver and yet filled
sucked?'4

their

houses

with gold.

16

Why

was

not

like

a stillborn

hidden away

or as a

146

Interpretation
into the light? 17 There the guilty cast off their rage and at ease for power is spent. 18 There prisoners are wholly
voice.

scion that never came

there rest those whose

they do
20
bitter for it

not even

hear the driver's

of

19 Small

all15

and

great,

are

there,

and

the slave

is free
soul?16

his lord.
give

Why does
of

He

light to those
who wait

whom

toil

has consumed,

or

life to the

21 to those

for death 22

when there

is

none? or who reaches

dig

more than

for

subterranean treasure?

whose

delight

exaltation,

because they have found the grave? 23 or to a man (gebher) whose way has been lost and whom God has hedged about? 24 Sighs do as my bread and my roaring pours out as water. 25 I feared a fear and it came to pass 26 I was not at ease, I was not quiet, I and what I dreaded has come upon
and who rejoice
me.17

had

no rest,

but

came."

rage

Comments 1. The Hebrew "to

word

literally

means

make

light

of,"

and

does

not neces

sarily imply that the object is animate. 2. Throughout we have distinguished between:
ne'ebhad math

to be

lost

to die to perish

gawa'

"To be
is"

lost"

often

has the double

significance of

thing

(my

hat is lost, it is
of

not where

it

should

(1) "not being where every be) or (2) of "being where

thing"

nothing is, and hence (I am lost, I am in a

can

being

out of contact with

strange place where

every other person I should not be). This side

or of

things

best be

seen

by

remembering that our word ne'ebhad

is

related to the word

Abaddon,

the place of oblivion. This

ambiguity is
on

often critical

for

understand

ing

any

given passage.

"To

perish,"

the other

hand,

often comes close to

meaning "to vanish, to cease to 3. Others say or was tempted in that direction in order to
"male"

be."

"man-child."

"Hero"

may be

bit too strong, but I

bring out the great feeling of joy which the word implies must have been felt that day by all the members of Job's family. Such a translation would have better served to bring out the irony of the verse. The very being of a hero lies in his being remembered, but for Job, this day and everything in it is to be forgotten. Mitchell's "night that forced me
from the
on that
womb,"

loses

all the poignant contrast

between

the great

joy

felt

by

all

day

and the secret

horrors it

contained.

This

sentence will echo and re-echo

as we shall

see, is

a constant

can obscure a

darker

center

throughout the whole. The Book of Job, play between the way in which a lovely surface and the way in which our view of the deeper intent
their simple surface.

of things can obscure our view of

4. Sa'adiah, in his translation into

Arabic,

with some real

justification
can

trans

lates "bom is

and even cites some parallel

texts.

While there

be little

The Book of Job

147

doubt that Job is indeed thinking of the day of his birth, it may be important to retain the fact that he speaks of it in terms of its more hidden causes. 5. Seven times
"darkness"

during

the course of these

first ten
like

verses we read the words

"oblivion"

"night."

and others all

There

are

also

words

and a

host

of

saying

the same, as
should

if that have
own

day

had

contained a

thing

which no

eye,

human

or

divine,

ever

seen.

Job's first

reaction

is
up

to let
and

it be
gone

abandoned

in hopes that it, his

a compound

beginnings,

would shrivel

be

from

sight.

6. Salmaweth is
"death."

word, coming from the two

grammar case

"shadow"

roots

sal,

and moth,

Unlike English, Hebrew

except

does

not allow

for

the

possibility of abounds. This

a place.
speak of

compound nouns
would argue

in the

of proper nouns

where

it

for the

notion that salmaweth

is the

proper name of

On the "an

other

hand, it is
word

possible that the name reader can get a

Einstein."

Perhaps the

became generic, as we better feeling for the prob

of

lem

by

seeing how the

is

used outside the

Book

Job.

Ps.

23:4

Even though I

walk

through the valley of the

Shadow

of

Death,

I fear

no evil;

for

thou art with me;

thy

rod and

thy

staff,

they

comfort me.

Ps.

44:18

Our heart has

not

turned

back,

nor

have

our steps

departed from
of

thy
Ps. 107:10

way, that thou shouldst have broken us in the place

jackals,
in

and covered us with the

Shadow
and

of

Death.
of

Some

sat

in darkness

in the Shadow

Death,

prisoners

affliction and

in irons, for they had

with

rebelled against

the words of
were

God,

and spurned

the counsel of the

Most High. Their hearts

bowed down

Then they cried them from their distress; he brought Shadow

the
of

hard labor; they fell down, with none to help. to the LORD in their trouble, and he delivered
them out of
asunder.

darkness
Let

and

the

Death,

and

broke their bonds

them thank

LORD for his

steadfast

love, for his

wonderful works

to the

sons of men!

Isa.

9:1

But there

will

be

no gloom

for her that

was

in
of

anguish.

In the
and

former time he brought into land way The

who
of

contempt the

land

Zebulun

the

Naphtali, but in

the latter time

he

will make glorious

the

of the sea, the

land beyond the Jordan, Galilee in darkness have

Shadow
of

of the nations.

people who walked

seen a great on them

light;

those

dwelt in

land

of the

Death,

has light

shined.

Jer.

2:6

They
from
the

did

not say, of

"Where is the LORD

who

who

brought

us

land

Egypt,
a

led

us

in the wilderness, in
and
dwells?"

up land

of

deserts

and

pits, in

land

of

drought

the Shadow of Death

in

land that Jer. 13:16

none passes

through,

where no man

Give glory to the LORD your God before he brings darkness, before your feet stumble on the twilight mountains, and while you look for light he turns it into
gloom and makes

it

the

Shadow

of

148

Interpretation
Death. But if
your
you will not

listen, my

soul will and run

weep in down

secret

for

pride; my eyes
the

because
Amos

will weep bitterly Lord's flock has been taken

with

tears,

captive.

5:8 for

He

who made the

Pleiades

and

Orion,
the

and turns

the Shadow of
who calls

Death into

the morning, and

darkens

day

into night,

the waters of the sea,

and pours them out upon name.

the surface of

the earth, the LORD

is his

as

At any rate, if it is a place, it does we know it from verses like:

Ps. 6:5 For in death there is
thee
praise?

not seem

to be identical with Death

itself

no remembrance of

thee; in Sheol

who can give

Rather, it
man

seems to and

be

a place

here

on earth

full

of

desolation

and

fear

where no

dwells

death is

ever near.

Although Job

at one time will speak of

it

as a

land to

which

he is going

and

from

which

he

will

"not

return,"

Job 10:21

Well, I
Shadow
of

will

be going soon, going to a land of darkness and the Death and I will not return; to a land that glows in murk, Death
and without order

the Shadow of
murk.

land

whose radiation

is

At

other

times he thinks of
out

it

as a place which contains the

hidden things that

can

be brought

into the light.

Job 12:22

He

unveils

deep

things

from
the

out of the

darkness; He leads

the

Shadow

of

Death

out

into

light.
even to this rock of murk

Job 28:3

He
and

[man]

explores

the

Shadow

of

everything to its limit, Death.

"claim,"

7.

yig'alehu:

the Revised Standard

has

but

Although there is
variant normal

another word ga'al, which quite

King James has frequently appears

or

"stain."

in the
the

form ga'al,

and which

meaning Egypt. A man has

The Torah
was the

of the word ga'al a

normally is

means

"to

defile,"

"to

pollute,"

"redeem."

God
who

"redeemed"

Israel from
captive.

duty
to

to

"redeem"

his kinsman

has been taken

of the

seems to presuppose that prior to the

"redeem"

giving

Law

at

Sinai it

duty

of a man
would

the blood of a murdered kinsman.

Such

an

interpretation

imply

that in Job's mind there

is

still a place

for "the

day"

itself, but it is
Gersonides
cumstance
within

a place

suggests that come

far from any human habitation. both meanings are intended and that in fact in this

cir

they

to the same thing.

us.

By finding They

a place

for the discarded "let

day
of a

itself, darkness defiles it for

it"

At any rate, the

are the

words

salmaweth

and

darkness

redeem

are

very

curious.

first beginnings

The Book of Job

thought which will
grow and

149
book.

transform

itself

throughout the whole of the

They imply
have been,

that even at this

the gloom and the

darkness,
it

early stage, Job dreams of a place, perhaps only in where there is room for the day which should not
can

passing is quickly dropped. 8. It would be hard to find many works of which the Italian expression traduttore tratore is more tme than the Book of Job. It is obscure both in word
thought and
and

a place where

be itself; but for now, it is merely

in

grammatical

form.

Many

words

appear

once

and

never again

in the

whole of the

literature.
kimmerire

The

word

could come

from the

"bitter,"

root mrr or

but

that

is

blacken"

grammatically unlikely. The more likely root is kmr which can mean either "to or "to Usually it is taken in the former sense, like a cloud or
warm."

an eclipse.

But

since

many

men

fear

these things

it

would seem more

likely

that

Job is thinking of those and dead tree stumps.

9. Or
"day,"

creatures

that fear the sunlight and crawl

under rocks

but the

connection with the

which will

Leviathan

"sea"

makes

more

likely.

10. The
mentioned

Leviathan,
in three

be

more

fully

described in Chapter 40, is

other passages

in the Bible:

Isa.
Ps.

27:1
74:14

And

on that

day

the

Lord

shall punish

the Leviathan.
gave

You

crushed the

head

of

the Leviathan and

it

as

food to

the

people of

the

island.
the great and wide sea, wherein are creeping things
small and great

Ps.

104:25

So is this

innumerable, both
there goes the

beasts. There have

made

go the ships; and

Leviathan

whom you

to play with.

As

we can

see, there is a certain ambivalence within the biblical tradition

at

toward the
who

Leviathan,

least if

we are

to assume that

God is

not the

bad

child

breaks his toys,

and so at this point

it is

not yet clear whether we are to or whether we might not

admire those who would

"lay

open the
sort.

Leviathan"

develop feelings
The
bears,"

of quite a

different

question

is: Are the frightful things in nature, "the lions

one

and

tigers,

and

to

be destroyed

day by

the

hand

of

God

so that on that

day

the

world might

their own
man can

truly become a world for apart from all human need,

open and under which suggest that the

man? or

do they have a certain beauty of frightful beauty, and yet one to which
man?

be

he first leams to be
of

would

like to

Book

Job is
1

an account of a man's attempt

to face this ambivalence

in

order

to discover
verse

under which welkin

.

justice lies.

11

Not the

same word as

found in The

12. Mitchell's "from this Job

sorrow,"

loses

the all-pervasive character of toil as

sees the world at this point.

world

is full
he

of

blind Promethean hope

which

has been

stripped

away for Job,

and now

must

lead

life

which never

should

have been.

150

Interpretation
a certain

13. In
we see

way, the changes, or we

might even are

take place in Job throughout the book

that say the education, musings reflected in his own

set of musings

and those of others on the womb and the

belly. The first

is:

Job

1:21

"Naked I
there.
of

came out of

my
and

mother's

belly

and naked

shall return

THE LORD gives,

LORD."

THE LORD takes; blessed be the dawn open, for it

eyes

name

THE

Job

3:9
of

May
my

it

not see

the eyelid of

closed not

the gates
not come

mother's

belly

but hid my

from toil.

Why

did I

out of the womb and

die,

exit the

belly
the

and perish?

Job 10:18

Why
though

did You

bring

me out of

womb?

without ever an eye

to see me. I would

be

as though

Had I only perished I had not been,

as

I had been led from the

belly

to the grave.

The womb,

a quiet

place, seems almost contiguous

comic

with

death,

as

if nothing

ness were the norm.

one

To the

Job, life is
not to

gift,

almost a

flight

of

fancy,

yet

to be lived

dutifully

and then

left. To the troubled Job,

nothingness

is

comfortable nothingness.
aberration

To be is

be,

and not to

be is to be. Life is

an

in time full

of meaningless

distinctions.

Job 3:19

Small

and

great,

all are

there,

and the slave

is free

of

his lord.

Insofar
more

as

it

was the source of

his

own generative

power, it meant nothing

to him than the source of hatred and contention:

Job 19:17 I Job 24:20

My
am

breath is

repulsive to

my wife,

and to the sons of

my

own

belly

loathsome.
womb will

The

forget him

and the worms will

find him

sweet.

The others, too,

except

for Bildad,

saw

nothing there but empty

rage.

Eliphaz
Job 15:1 Then Eliphaz the Temanite
even answer such
wind?

answered and said:

Should

a wise man
with

blustery

thoughts and

fill his

own

belly

the

east

Job 15:35 Job 20:20

Their

belly brews

deceit.
Zophar

Since he knew
escape; there
will

no peace

be

no survivor to

from his belly, nothing dear to him shall enjoy it and thus nothing of his
will send out

merit shall endure.

Job 20:23

As he is
upon

about to

fill his belly, God

upon

His

burning

anger

him

and rain

down

him

even

to his very

bowels.

Elihu Job 32:18 I

am

full

of

words, and the

wind

in my

belly

presses upon me.

The Book of Job

In Job's
way.

-151

recollections and musings on the

past,

however,

things

were not

that

The

womb was the

beginning
He

of all that was warm and near:

Job 31:15 Job 31:18

Did Did He

not

who made me
us

in my

mother's

belly

make

him

as well?

not

form

in the

same womb?

From my

mother's

belly

was their mother's guide.

By

the end of the

book,

the womb or

belly has

become for Job

and perhaps

for the reader, that mighty, turbulent, and often ferocious source there has emerged a world full of life and living creatures, a
stranger, and more violent, but
at

out of which
world

larger,
man

times

curiously

more

tender, than any

had

ever seen.

But

at all times

it is

breathtakingly beautiful,

and we stand

in

awe of

that which does not know us.

Job 38:29 Job 40:15

From heaven?

what

belly

does ice emerge,

and who gave

birth

to the

frost

of

But look now, here is Behemoth

eats

whom at

made

fodder just like the cattle, but look

the strength

along with you. He in his loins. His

might

is in

the muscles of

his belly.

14. Mitchell's

fails

to capture

knees to hold me, breasts to keep me the fact that Job is blaming himself for his own participation in

"why

alive?"

were

there

the great lie of

false hope. His first his

mother's

act was to

cling to life

by

allowing himself
"all"

to be attracted to

breast.
warned about the use of the word

15. In

general the reader

more

is

in this

translation. Hebrew is

likely

to use "men are

X"

where

English

would use

"all

X."

men are

In these

cases we

have

often

decided to

go with the normal

English

usage.
a certain

16. Man has

unjust.

light,
can

an

innate

sense

of what

is just

and

what

is

For Job,
and yet events.

no

man

ignore that light

be better

as

long

as

he finds it God

within as seen

himself,
in

it is in

constant opposition to the manifest will of off without that

daily

Would

we not

light? The

world makes

too

much sense

to make no sense, and yet

it

makes no sense.

If Job had

no

reason, the world would no longer look unreasonable, and he could sleep more
soundly.

17. Here Job

seems to admit that

the

beguiling
him, he
as

character of the

day

of

his
and all

birth

was not total and absolute.

made

Even

when things were

going

well

for him

the surface of the world

sense

to

was

uneasy.

Perhaps it

looked too Hollywoodan to him. Good things happened to bad things happened to bad
ease.
people so

good
yet

people, and
was not at

far

he

could

tell,

he

Seeing
God

no reason

for perfection, he
to blows.

was

distrustful. He
could not

seemed to

have

known that if there

he
and

were no reason

behind it, it

last,

and that one

day

would come

152

Interpretation
come

These thoughts had

of unarticulated

to Job not in the form of thought, but in the

present

form
the

fear. Job's

discontent arises,

as

he

sees

it, from

sudden realization that the surface of the world as

out of

it

lay

before him has fallen

that realiza to the

harmony

with

the wisdom of the ages. But how

sudden was

tion? Job had always

felt, felt in

the

form

of

fear,
it

that

his

commitment

importance

of the simple world of appearance as

lay

before
world

man would one

day

come

into

conflict with

formed

by

the wisdom of

his understanding the fathers handed down from

of that

as

it had been

the ages.

CHAPTER FOUR

1 Then Eliphaz
be
more

the Temanite answered and said,

2 "How
words?

can one speak and

than

wearisome?'

But

who can refrain

from

3 It

was you who

always words

disciplined2

and strengthened so

many frail hands, 4

and

you who

had the
were

to pick up those that were stumbling and bolster the

knees that

about to

bend. 5 But

now

it has

come upon

you,

it is indeed

wearisome.

It

has found
surety,

you out and you are stunned.

6 But may

not that

FEAR itself be

your who

and your

hope,

the simplicity of your

ways?3

7 Think back now, been

annihilated?

being
far
as

innocent
I
can

was ever

lost? Where have the

upright

8 So

see,4

those who plow evil and sow tribulation reap them.

and

9 One

breath5

from God,
old

they

are

lost;

a puff of

his

nostrils6

and they're

finished.

10 An
spirited

lion

lion may roar and the savage lion give voice, but the teeth of that will be broken. 11 The lioness is lost for lack of prey, and the be
scattered.7

young
a

ones will

12 A

word stole upon me

trace, 13

as one gropes

in

a night vision when

deep

but my ear caught only sleep falls upon mortals.

14 Fear wisp

came upon me and a

of a

breath fluttered

over

trembling, making all my bones to quake. 15 A me fixing each hair upon my flesh. 16 It halted. I
a shape there

could not recognize

its form, just

was silence.

Then I heard

a voice saying: more pure

17 Shall

before my eyes, a mortal be

maker?8

and

then there

more

just

than

his God?

or a man

(gebher)

than his
and of

18 If He

put no trust

in His

servants9

to His angels lays charge of

whose

folly,

19
He

what of those who will crush

dwell in
a moth.

house

clay,

foundation is but dust?

evening. out

them like

20

They

are

Forever they
under
them10

are

lost

and no note

is taken. 21 Their tent

reason."

beaten from morning till rope is pulled

from

and

they die

without

Comments
1. It is

of utmost

importance to

note

the genuine good will with

which

Eliphaz begins
was that made

to speak.

loving

in that way can we catch friends turn against Job so brutally.

Only

a glimpse of what

it

The Book of Job

2. See
note

-153

to

33:15.
pull

3. Eliphaz first tries to has taken be

almost
"FEAR"

Job into

being

his

old

self.

From his way

simplicity.

of

understanding, Job's questioning indicates that he has forgotten his

He

(yirah), for

"fear"

(pachad). For him the two

actions seem to

identical. FEAR
words mean

of one who

is

no

longer trusted turns into fear. in Hebrew, but they by Gordis. He may be

4. The
normally

"ca'asher

ra'iti"

are and so

common enough

"when I

saw,"

they

are taken

right,

and

if so, the

rest of

my

majority of translators are iom. The words may imply that Eliphaz is
the world may

may be ignored. If, on the other hand, the right, Eliphaz is not simply using a thoughtless id
remark not

totally
tarn,

unaware of
"simple."

the fact that

look different to
"nose."

a man who
"wind,"

is
or

not

5. The 6.
such.

"breath,"

word can mean

"spirit."

Literally

Usually

used to

"anger,"

signify

and often translated as

7. At this

point we can

begin to

see

For Job's friends

of

and

for Job for

as well the

Eliphaz pulling away from his friend. only proper home for man is the home

man, the home of man as it has been defined

proper concern man

by

the wisdom of the fathers.

The only
we must

is his fellow

man.

Not to be

at

home

within

that world is to be an outcast and a man of sin. Throughout all of what

follows

constantly remind ourselves that our daily lives depend upon such a world. Only in that way can we begin to understand why good men might turn brutal when that world is suddenly found to be under attack. But for Job that
world

has begun to

crack.

Job

deeply

believes in

just God

and yet

he has

seen

the just in meaningless pain. The wise men have assured

out

him

that all will work

for the best, but it does

as we

not.
calm

This moment,

see, is not one of

doubt

and

curiosity, but

of

belief,

confusion,

and

indignation,
when

a rage more

like the

anger modem optome

trists tell us that men feel turns the world upside

they have been fitted

always

with a pair of glasses

that

down, leaving
they have

the world of perception at odds with their

understanding

of the world

known to
we shall

call see

home; but

this time

there are no glasses. Throughout the

book,

home, first in
world

one of these

worlds, the

wisdom of

the

fathers,

Job trying to find a then in the other, But

each

the world of the surface where the

innocent die in

pain and suffering.

keeps

blasting

into the other,

inverting

it

and

pulling it

out of

focus.

When

speech cannot come together with the

world, it gives way to anger, rage,

and madness.

8. Eliphaz has
even make sense?

posed the central question of the

book. But does the from the

question

Is there any

standard

for justice
just

apart

will of

God in is its

the light of which His actions can be inquired into? Even if there
relation to what we not to

is,

what

humans feel

as

being

be the same, what, then, is is

ready for it.

the status of

If they should prove those human feelings? Job knows

and unjust? one

that all this is a

terms? He

question which must

be faced

day, but how

and

in

what

not yet

154
9.

Interpretation
"slaves."

or verse

10. In

18 Eliphaz begins to face the

question

he has

implicitly
human

raised.

In itself the Human be

of

world

is totally indifferent, if
It is

not

hostile to human life. essentially

cannot

concerns

for justice

which remain within the plane of the all no more than a tent which
which

divine
much

concern.

by

its

outer surface

looks

like

solid

structure, but

at

the

mere

pull

of a

pin

can

crumple out

flat.
this phrase refers to the thoughtless way
without

11. It is

unclear whether

in

which
why.

the tent rope

is pulled,

or

to the fact that they died

understanding

CHAPTER FIVE

1
you

"Cry
turn

out!

Is there

anyone

to answer you? To which of the

can

holy

ones will
dunce.2

now?1

2 For indignation fool take

kill

fool

and

jealousy

murder a

3 I have
shrank

seen the

root and
were

back from help.

They

into his hut. 4 His sons suddenly beaten at the gate; and to save them there
entered3

was none.
under

5 All he has harvested the

hungry

shall

devour

even

taking

out

from

the thorns: and the

thirsty
nor

not come out of the man

dust

panting does tribulation sprout from the

upwards. and put

shall go

after their

wealth.4

6 Evil does
7 but
a

ground:

('adam) is born to tribulation sure as sparks fly 8 Nonetheless I would make my appeal to GOD
9
who accomplishes

my

matter

before
no

that5

deeds

great

beyond

inquiry,
of

marvels which

have

number.

10 He
fields,6

who gives out rain over the

face

the earth and sends water to the

into the

11 He

can raise the shattered the

despondent devices
of

on

high giving sanctuary

crafty
and their own

mournful.

12 He has

the

hands

cannot save

them. 13 He traps the wise in their own craftiness as the advice of

those contorted ones

grope

dashes headlong. 14
sun as

They

encounter

darkness

by day

and

in the noonday
will

if it

were night.

the cutting edge of the sword, and the poor

15 But the needy He saves from from the hand of the mighty. 16 The

downtrodden 17 Indeed,

have hope, is the

and the mouth of

injustice

will

be

stopped.
contempt

happy
of the

mortal whom

God

disciplines,
will

that has no

for

the

bonds

Almighty; 18 for He
From
six

causes pain,

wounds, but His hands heal. 19

seven no evil will touch you. war

troubles He

but He binds up, He deliver you, even in

will redeem you from death, and When tongues scourge, you will be secure and shall have no FEAR of violence when it comes; 22 but at violence and starvation you will laugh. Have no FEAR of the beasts of the earth, 23 for

20 In famine He

in

from the

power of

the sword. 21

you will

have

covenant7

with the rocks

in the

field,

and the

beasts8

of the

fields

bring

you peace.
flock9

24 You

will

be

certain of

harmony

in

your

tent. You shall

tend to your
seed will

and

nothing

be

great and your

shall come to your grave

25 You shall know that your offspring will be as the grass of the earth. 26 You in full vigor like a whole shock of wheat
will go

amiss.10

standing

tall

The Book of Job

in the time
you shall of

155
and

its harvest. 27 We have

yourself."

searched

it out,

and thus

it is. Listen

know for

Comments
1. It is

unclear

implication between 2.

seems

but the exactly what Eliphaz means by "the holy to be that nothing within the world as Job knows it can be
ones,"

holy. Within the limited

man and

world open

to human comprehension there is nothing

unfriendly
a

nature.

Job's

questions will go unanswered and

his is

cries unheard.

Normally

there is

distinction

made

between the 'awil (fool)

who

considered

morally guilty, and the peteh (dupe), but for Eliphaz the difference is irrelevant. Well intentioned or not, the frustration which must arise out of

daily
if
3.

defeat in the unfriendly

world

that lacks the

holy

must

lead

to

destructive

not self-destructive anger.

Literally

"pierced."

4. The text is very obscure. 5. "He will crush them like

appeal to phaz and

moth."

[4:19]/ "Nonetheless I
. .

God

and put

my

matter

before that God

would make my [5:8]. While both Eli

Job

accept these two

statements, for the one

other

they live

in the

same

world, but for the

they rip his

like

world

together snugly in two. To Eliphaz there

is

always time

for trust,

and so

for him

all things make

a moth

sense, but for

Job,

to

make an appeal

to one who can crush them

6. Nature is
standing.

not nature as

it

presents

itself

within

leads only to madness. the plane of human under

It is the

same

God

who

"gives be

out rain over the

face

of the earth and

sends water

into the

fields"

that "can raise the despondent on high giving sanc

can

mournful."

tuary
1
.

to the
upon as

But this

looked

simply

a part of given

only by those for whom nature, but as a marvel.

seen covenant with

rain

is

not

Berith,
fearful

the word used

world

for Abraham's

God;

peace

in this

is only achieved by a divine covenant with the rocks and the beasts. Threatening boulders are not held back in their places by any innate
most

forces
lished
But

to

be found
Job's

within the rock

itself, but by

divine
to

covenant

freely

estab

by

the God who answers those

who come

him.
way things ap
called the sur

all of

arguments presuppose the relevance of the

pear to naked man.

They imply taking

goes

seriously

what we and

have
that

face

of

things; that fire

seem

up,

that dogs

bark,

innocent
then

men

sometimes

to suffer.

If

arguments

presuppose

intelligibility,

Job's

arguments presuppose the relevance of the other words,

or

they

presuppose either

way things are in themselves. In something like natures in the ancient sense, in whatever vague way Eliphaz could It is clear, however, that he knows that

laws

of nature

in the

modem sense.
what extent or

It is hard to know to have been

aware of such an alternative.

156

Interpretation
beasts obey
a
covenant

the notion that the rocks and

words.

cuts

deeply

into

Job

8.

living

things
wife."

9. Greenberg: "When
10.
"sin."

you visit your

Literally

CHAPTER SIX

1 Then Job
weighed, my
even

answered and

said, 2 "Would that my indignation could

out together on a scale! speak without

truly be
raise

calamities all

laid

3 then

would

it

up

the sands of the

are

seas.1

And thus I

care, 4 for the arrows of

the

Almighty
bellow
at

in

me and

are arrayed against me. ox

The terrors of God my spirit drinks in their 5 Will the wild ass bray when there is grass? Does the
venom.2

his fodder? 6 Can egg

see white

what

is tasteless be
taste.3

eaten without salt or

does

the slime of an

They

are

like

a contagion

have any in my daily

My

soul refuses to touch them.

bread.4

8 Who

will

to

it that my

request comes

to

light;

that

God

grant

my

hopes? 9 Would that God

off!

were pleased to crush

me, loose his hand

and cut me

10 That
One.5

would

come

to me as compassion.

writhing though He spare me not;

for

never

Let me spring up in my have I disavowed the words of the

Holy

11 What I
should of

strength

my Do I have flesh
sourcefulness

end that

have I, that I should wait in expectations? What is prolong my life? 12 Is my strength the strength of a rock?
no

bronze? 13 No, I have

out.6

support within me and all re

has been driven

14 To those in despair, the kindness of friends is due but the FEAR of the Almighty has forsaken them all. 15 My brothers have betrayed me like a wadi,
a
black.8

running brook that has gone They hide themselves in

vanish

dry.7

16

snow.

17

they

from their

place.

18 Their

the vastness and are lost.

19 The

They crystal over with ice and invert to They thaw and disappear. In the heat beds twist and turn. They flow out into
Tema look to them; the band from
trusted.9

caravans of

Sheba hopes for them, 20 but find themselves lost because they
arrived and were
confounded.10

They

21 So

now you are as ever

nothing

and at sight of

terror,

you

have taken

FRIGHT."

22 But did I hands

say to you 'Give me'; 'Offer the bribe for me out 'Deliver 23 me from the hand of the foe"2 wealth'; or 'Redeem me
of the most

of your

from

the

terrifying'?

24 Teach

me and

will

hold my

peace.

Only

show me where

I have

erred

l3

25 How forceful honest

you!

words

are, but
a proof

what proofs are

26 Are

you

busy devising

in

words while

despairing

man

to be no more than the

an orphan or sell out a

27 Would you cast down friend? 28 Come, face me; I'll not lie to you

wind?'4

they that come from taking the testimony of a

even

The Book of Job

29 Stop, I
not

157
stand

beg
is

you!

Let there be

no
no

injustice. Give in! For injustice

on

yet

my

smacks of what

right.15

30 There is
of

my tongue,

and yet

does

my

palate

know the taste

ruination."

Comments
1. Job has

almost no answer

for Eliphaz. As

we

began to in

see

in the

note to

5:8,

the parts can be stated and agreed upon. But their relationships to one

another, whether
or even what

they lie
of not

together

in peace,

or contend

anguish and

in anger,
which

kinds

things can or cannot lie

Job

and

Eliphaz may
word

be

able to share.

together, Job's anguish, then,

and will

those are things

cannot

be laid in

out on a common scale.

2. The

for

"venom"

"fury,"

also means

play

an

important

role

the story. Job presents

himself

as

drinking

in the

venom-fury.

His thoughts

and

feelings
we

are complicated and even

give a

contraditory, but they

good

are still

intelligible.
about what
of

3. Verses 5 through 9

pretty

idea

of

how Job thinks

today,

after

the coming to be of philosophy, would call the relationship

cause and effect.

or the

It is

not so

far from the thought originally

of

lying
verse

sponsible"

Greek aitia, both or "to be

of which

meant

behind the Latin causa, something like "to be re 6 the

guilty,"

and one can see

in

immediacy

of the

concept

for Job. Through the in the

immediacy

the example of taste, one can see

the power that exists

pull

concept of cause and

effect, taken in that sense, to

com and

Job back into the

of

surface

plane, the world of growing

barking

dogs, temporary joys and undeserved pain. At this point in his understanding, coming to terms
him is to
experience

with

the world around

it

as

it

shows

itself to him,

as

deeply

as

he can,

and so

he

drinks in

the

fury.

Even if the others, Eliphaz and the rest, cannot see the world as Job sees it, they should be able to tell by looking at Job himself that something in the world
around

him has

gone

awry, but

of course

they

cannot.

But

perhaps the surface

is

right in pointing to a only deeper wisdom underlying it. Even then, thought Job, the surface should indi cate the way just as wisdom should give solidity to the surface. But here all
after all

the surface, and perhaps the others are

seems to

be

at odds. closest that

4. This is the

Job

can come to
not

telling

the others what

his

world

is
be

like,

this world whose parts

do

fit together. It is like food that

total. But

cannot

eaten.

The

rejection

is immediate

and

for Job it is

not

just

a single

dish; it is
filled
5 All

the mainstay of his life. For him there is no other world which is not

with the contagion of

we can gather

disparity.
remark

from this

is

that whatever
origins

it

was that native

Job

saw

that cleaved

his

world

in two, it did

not

have its

in any

antipathy

toward the holy.

158

Interpretation
can envisage a

6. Here Job, in his imagination,

to maintain itself in the
point
midst of a

being

with

the

inner strength

Job knows crumbling world, but

that at this

he is

no such man.
metaphor

7. At first the
soever.

seems to

be dead

and to

have

no

meaning

what

What

could

it

mean

for

a man to

be like

a wadi? and yet, once a

very
and

simple and straightforward

dry,"

definition

of a wadi,

"a running brook that has gone

has been

articulated

in speech, the

metaphor

begins to sing
not

with

life,

the

reader

is left

with a slight

feeling

of shame

for

having

understood what

Job

was saying.

Then,

one after

another, the many

disparate Soft

ways

in

which

the

metaphor

holds begin to flow

pour out.

8. Things known
which should

and trusted are not what

with

they

ease,

can

turn hard and

can

skipping waters, immobile. The surface of the

are.

and

ice,

which should all

be

crystal

clear,

Egypt's night,

depending
a

upon

suddenly turn black, dark as the sea or as how it is stmck by the light; it is called
wonders of and the

Newton's

rings.

9. Mitchell has done

simile.

When, in
with

verse

particularly poor job of catching the 19, he replaces "the caravans of Tema
we

this
of

band

Sheba,"

"pilgrims,"

lose the fact that these

were men who

knew the

desert well, its every rock and dune. If we, the readers, cannot feel their trust, we cannot feel their horror when they suddenly feel lost in a familiar land.

The
was

reader must remember that a

Eliphaz,

to whom this speech

is addressed,

Temanite. Job is trying to give Eliphaz some insight into his thoughts and feelings. He has the almost self-contradictory task of making con fusion intelligible for him.
10. The
moment we

himself

hear Job
once

pronounce

the word

"trusted,"

we cannot

help
a

remembering that
world

he, too,

had

a whole world

he thought he
the

could

trust,

he thought he knew

as well as the men of

sight of

Sheba knew
you

desert.

11.

By translating

"At the

misfortune,
words

take

fright,"

Greenberg
fear"

was able to catch the

most wonderful way.

play

on the

Hebrew

for "to

see,"

and

"to

in

The word itself has two quite meaning is "to be different meanings, both of which must always be kept in mind. On the one hand, it is an inner feeling of being cramped, or of within a and
12.
sar:

The

root

narrow."

Is it That Old Foe pressing Job down from above? Or is it Job straining to break out of a narrow and fixed confinement?
waverings
soul.

constricting horizon. On the other hand, it can mean guity in so many ways catches the ambivalence and

living

narrow

an outward

foe. This in Job's

ambi

Job, then, is also asking the from the hand of

13. The
sion, how
ever

question:
"

"But did I

ever

narrowness?'

say to

you

'Deliver

me

word used

implies

14. Job is

beginning
can

to see the

wrong done inadvertently double power of words.

Words

without vi
without

they

distort

a world of pain so.

into

a vision of

knowing
met

that

they have done

loveliness
the

It is

all so

Panerge

strangely like

Pantagruel.

first

time

The Book of Job

15. Job
seems to

159

know that

no matter

how

much a man

may

protest against

him,
is

there is in each of us the slight but uncomfortable

feeling

that perhaps

Job

right after all.

CHAPTER SEVEN

1 "Does

not a mortal

have
of a

a term of

duty

to serve here on earth and are not

his days like the days

shadows, and like a

hired

servant?

2 Like
wages.

slave

he

yearns

for the
allotted

hireling
Nights

he hopes for his

of toil

3 So have I been

months of emptiness.

say 'When

shall

arise?'

and

have they apportioned me. 4 I lie down and night drags on and I am sated with tossing till
earth.2

twilight.'

morning 5 My flesh is hard

and

clothed ooze.

in

maggots and clumps of

My

skin

has become

begins to

6 The days in
an

fly by

me swifter than

the weaver's shuttle,

and reach their culmination

wind and

that never will

empty hope. 7 Remember that life is but a the sight of happiness return to my eyes. 8 The eye

that sees me takes no note of me; your eye

cloud that reaches to arises no more. nize

is

upon

me, and I am

not.3

9 As

its fullness

and

10 He

will not return

is gone, so he who descends into The Pit home again, and no one there will recog
will speak out of

him any 11 No, I cannot

spirit.

longer."

restrain

speech, but

the

narrowness5

con sea

stricting my

will complain

in the bitterness
me?6

or some monster

my bed will show me compassion and my couch bear my complaint, 14 You frightened me with dreams and terrified me with visions 15 and I preferred strangulation and
that You set watch over
said that
contempt.7

my 13 When I

of

soul.

12 Am I the

death to my own substance. 16 I have be, for my days are but the mist of a breath. 17 What is
set thine
a mortal that thou shouldst

will not

live forever; Let

me

magnify him? And that thou

shouldst

heart
and

upon

him?

18 Yes,
will you

inspect him every morning and test him every minute. 19 When let me be? You'll not even let me alone to swallow my own spit. 20 I have sinned,
what

Supposing
burden
my but I

Man ('adam)T

Why

have

you set me on course against you so

have I done to you, Oh Thou Great Watcher Of that I become a

can you not pardon

even to myself?

21

Why
I

perversions?10

For

now

shall

lie down in the

dust."

my transgressions or bear You will seek for me,

am

not."12

Comments
1. There is
verses.

a strange and eerie almost

never mentioned

Kafka-like
and

feeling

to the

next set of

God is

in them,

nite third person plural or

in

the passive

everything is stated in the indefi voice. Job presents man as feeling a

160

Interpretation
and meaningless

horrible
and

but

absolute and almost sacred

duty

to

some nameless

totally

unknown power.

This

sense of

duty,

this sense that there

entire

alone a man must

devote his

is something to which, and to which life, Job feels these things, too. Some may
and

try

to name it or
no

endow

it

with

intent

love

and are at

home

with

it, but for

Job it has We

name; it has

no

intent.

moderns

moderns would

the name of compulsion. We may want to call this feeling by these feelings within man him begin to look for the causes of

that there self, but on all counts, the book suggests that Job has yet to see.

is something beyond

man

2. dust 3. The Hebrew has

able

singularly chilling

effect which reads

I have

not quite

been

to achieve in English. The original the simplicity of the

me).

Partly it lies in [actually "in"]

The

main

simply language: ,enechah (your eyes) bi (are upon force of the twist, however, is felt in the final
we'eneni.
"and,"

'enechah bi

word, we'eneni. While it three parts. The

what

is clearly felt as one simple word, it is composed of first part, we, when it first hits the ear, simply means but follows it can suddenly and retroactively twist it into a or a "none
"but,"

theless"

or even place an

"in

spite of

fact that

in front

of the

first

word.

Thoughts that
(For
a

are set

up to go together are suddenly seen not to go together.

of the

further discussion
second

problem, see the note to

"nought," "nothing,"

8:2.)
"nonbeing."

The

part, ain, means

"my."

or

or

The third part, ni, is a suffix formed from the first The literal meaning and, as a suffix, it means then,
"I
would

person singular

pronoun,

of the word as a whole,

Actually
as
stands

be "and my nonbeing the word is not all that

giving
you

(is)."

uncommon.

It

often occurs

in

such phrases

straw"

your but when it it suddenly dissolves the world into nothing. 4. A man caught between two worlds is a man who will wander into many worlds, or into none, looking for a home. Time, the liar, if time were not and he am not am not

and

"for I

in

midst,"

bare

and alone

were

not, then the turmoil

not

would not

be. If Job

could

only

convince

himself that

he did

exist, that

he

was a

thing

of

the surface, was

. .

only
(see

a superficial

being,
itself

then he could return to

Eliphaz
of

and the rest

and the rest note to

5. But then the

persuades

feeling

being

cramped and crushed

an

him

again that

he is. This is

6:23)

his last considerations, he knows that to take his own existence seriously will require a return to the surface. That superficial world which he had rejected for the sake of human companionship must be reconsidered 6. For Job the central idea to human society, that man is
ever under the care
and watchful eye of spirit.

important turning

point

for Job From

his maker, is crippling

and

ultimately fatal
and

to the human

7. This

feeling
in

of contempt which

he has for himself

which

understood

contrast to

the

"compassion"

for his life is

of

to

be
13

he had spoken

in

ve

The Book of Job

These two passions,
contempt and

161
as

compassion,
role till

which

are presented

here

polar opposites will continue to

opposition will

play that

Job's final
of

speech where their

lead Job to

a new and strange

kind

harmony. for
and

Bed

and

the pleasure of self-contained

which

Job,

three-dimensional world

is

all

sleep his

should carve out a world own and which reflects

supports

the surface world that Job has seen about

and

him, but it does

kind
world

not.

The
need

feeling of being watched of being watched has so

sense of

therefore of

being

some

of monster

in

completely in his dreams he is tortured by an amorphous

overwhelmed

Job's inner

that even

sense of guilt that arises out of the

being

watched.

Job's

need

to

contact

the outside world of

author of

his three

friends is

so great that

its watching God has become the

to

his dreams.

8. Verse 17 is
Job's ironic
see

meant

commentary.

ring as a psalm, while what follows in the text is For Job, one need only think the tradition through to

its horrors, but that ever done before so far

Ps. 8:4 What is

was a

thing

which no

thoughtful and caring man

had

as

he knew.
that you are always

man

that you are always

checking up

on

watching him, him?

and the son of man

9. Again, Job seems to have in mind must have been on everybody's lips, such
Ps. 121:3 He
will not

variety

of psalmlike verses

which

as:

let

your

foot be moved, he keeps Israel

the

who

keeps

you will not

slumber.

Behold, he
your

who

will neither slumber nor sleep. your shade on your

The LORD is

keeper;

LORD is from
all

right hand. life. The

The LORD LORD forth

will

will

keep

you

evil;

he

will

keep

your

keep

your

going

out and your

coming in from this time

and

for

evermore.

But for Job they take on the cast 10. See the note to Job 11:6.

of

ironic horror.

11. Verses 1 1 through 21 seem to be Job's great discourse on the relationship between privacy and human dignity. To be constantly watched, and hence never to be one's self for one's self alone is, for Job, to be less than human. Even the complaining is itself a subhuman act, and Job must exhort himself to actually do it. To be watched as a thing out of its place is already to be out of
act of

place,

or

like

thing
sea.

that cannot know

its

own place

but

must

be

watched and

kept in, like the

And
so

Job turns to his bed.

Sleep

is the

one place

that

he had

expected of a

to be
and

his place, but

terrible
night

even there the outside can enter

inside in the form

and

dreams

visions, making his

place not

his place,

for Job,

thing

with

out a place

is

a contemptible thing. one conscious act

perform

Perhaps the
man

that, because

thinks he can

in

total

its totally internal nature, a privacy, is the act of swallowing his own
of

162
spit

Interpretation

Job feels that if

hence

God the traditional understanding of

permeated

is

true

even

this

has

been denied him.

untrusted, and

Being
his

by

God both in

mind and in

body,

he teels

untrustworthy.

When Job
must

utters

psalmlike

how those words which quotation, we can see

have

meant so much

to him in the past have suddenly

become full

of an

ironical terror.

If there is anything to this understanding

"contempt,"

of the

passage,
of

then, in
13

contrast to
must mean

"compassion"

the

word room

the
or

spoken

in

verse

another."

"leaving

for

"recognizing

the place of
and

This is

of some

"contempt"

"compassion"

importance since the two words

will will never come

play

an

increasingly
again until

critical

role

in the text,

although

they

together

Job's final

speech.

Much

of the remainder of the

book

will

be devoted to
another.

an attempt

to

under

stand what

it

means

to have

compassion

for

The fundamental

problem

is to learn to

recognize

the full existence of the other as other, and

its

relation

to

the recognition of self as self.

12. Although the

to 7:8.

problem

is

nowhere near as

striking

as

it was,

still see note

CHAPTER EIGHT

1 Then Bildad
judgement?2

the Shuhite answered and said,

with1

2 "How

long

will you con per

tinue to recite these things

vert
against

words of such

Will the He
not

Almighty

pervert

mighty right? 4 If

wind?

3 Will God
have

your sons

sinned

Him
seek

will

drive them into the hands

of their transgression? and

5 But

if

you

God

out

and

implore The Almighty, 6

rouse

if

you

are pure and

make your

upright, surely then

righteous

Himself up for you. He will hut to flourish. 7 And though your beginnings be small,
will
indeed.3

He

your

legacy
their

will grow great

Only
days

ask

of

the first generations. Seat yourself out;

firmly

upon

what

fathers had
our

are

and speak pyrus

grow5

yesterday 10 Will they not teach you to you as the words come tumbling out of their heart? 11 Can pa where there is no marsh? or can reed flourish without water? 12

searched

9 for

we are

only

of a

and

know nothing,

but

a shadow

passing

over the

land.4

While

yet

in their

tender

days, they

wither

Such is the
vanish.6

course

for

all

those who

before any grass, still forget God, and for him

who

unpicked.

13

all

hope

will

The

profane man

is lost 14 for he

feels

loathing
will

for his

own

sense of

trust will come to rely upon a spider

will

web.7

15 He it

lean

upon

his house but it

will not

hold; he

hold fast to it but

will not stand.

16 It may
with roots

sit

fresh

under the sun and shoots

may spring up in his garden, 17

twining

round a

knoll

and

clinging to the

house

of stone.

18 Yet his

The Book of Job

own

163
19 20

habitat
are the

will

devour him
of

and

deny

Such

delights

his

ways;9

him saying T have never seen and out of the dust another will for
a simple
man12

you!'*

spring.10

But surely God will neither have the hand of the evildoer. 21 He will fill
with shouts of

contempt"

nor strengthen and your

and

your mouth with you will

laughter,

lips
the

joy. 22 Those
will

who

hate

be

clothed

in shame,

vanish."

tent of the

guilty

Comments
1. The Hebrew
we.

which

I translated

by

the word

This

particle

is

a general connective and of the problem

is simply the is usually translated as

mean you were

"with"

particle

"and."

To

have only
you

some
note

understanding
call"

facing

the translator, the reader need

that the word

"and"

in the

sentence

"You

in town It

and
can

didn't

is

by
. .

no

means

your simple

bread-and-butter

"and."

"but,"

"when"

mean

or

or a thousand

others,

including,

more

poignantly, "in

spite of the

fact that.
of

In the Book

Job the

problem

ments can so easily turn reader

into

is particularly acute. Well-connected argu bunch of sentences all lying in a heap. The
we

is

hereby

warned that

I have translated have

read:

in

a thousand

different

ways.

Otherwise the

sentence would

"How

long

will you continue

to recite

wind?"

these things and your words are such a mighty

2. MiSfpat: I
law"

was not able

to find a single English word to use as a consistent

"judgement,"

translation of this word.

eral
and

It

can mean

both in the
made

sense of a

"gen It

in the

sense of a

"specific judgement
"case"

judge."

by

a given

"trial"

can also mean a other.

wise

or the

argument or

prepared on one side or

the

Others,

with some

justification, have
"judgement"

translated
"case."

it

"Right."

Unless

other

noted, I shall

use either

or

3. Bildad
great

will start

his

argument proper

only in

verse

8,

and

it

will

have

deal to do

with

the relation of

fathers to

sons

and of sons

to fathers.
that
sin

Before

beginning

his argument, however, he

as

wanted

to

make

it

clear

he is

thought that as

far

any

actual punishment

for any

actual

individual

concerned,

each man must suffer argument seems

for his

own.

4. Bildad's
mind outside

to be that wisdom

is

not available

to the human

the context of a human and

span of a
single

hence

a political tradition
short

reaching

back to

the

fathers. The
the insight

lifetime is too

to gather the

experience or

which would an

be

needed even

to begin an approach to
surface of

way The

of

life dedicated to life

autonomous

inquiry

into the

things,

even such a

that someone
wisdom

like Socrates
the

might one

day

lead.

combined

planted our roots

by living

many ages, have slowly through life, is to be trusted beyond the inquiries of
of

fathers who,

over

a single man who must no matter

have held himself back from life in may have been.

order

to question

it,

how

thoughtful that attempt

164

Interpretation
roots can

Although these

become

obscured

or

lost
to

through

adversity

and

doubt, any
can

search

to discover wisdom must be a

confines of a

search

rediscover

it. Wisdom
home.

only be found within the 5. "show its majestic

6. Bildad
even seems to

long-established,

well-nurtured

pride."

have

compassion and a

kind

of

love for the tender

reed who goes

it alone, the

man who

does

not seat

himself

firmly

in the

ways

of

fathers

wisdom

himself in the waters of tradition, but tries to search out for himself. But much as he may love such a reed, he sees it as a thing
or nourish
stand without

that cannot last. Other plants may be out there that can

the marsh,

but

not

man, the tender reed. Such men have forgotten

confidence

God,
of

and are

lost. (Green

7. Others translate: "Whose

gossam

is

thread

berg). Or "Whose

confidence

breaks in

sunder"

(RSV). The heart

of the prob

lem is the
such roots. which

word

yaqut,

from

the root qut. The

difficulty
"to

is

that there are two

or

One is

an assumed variant

form

break"

of qtt,

"to

snap,"

appears nowhere else

suggestion.

in the Bible. This is

root qum

by

no

means,

however,

foolish

After all, the

is clearly

related to the root qmm,

and such
which

interchanges

often occur.

On the

other

hand,

there
a

is

another root qut

is

a rather common variant

form

of qus,

"to feel

loathing."

It

can

be

found in

this

form in Job 10:1

as well as three times

in the Book

of

Psalms,

and

four times in Ezra.

If this reading is correct, Bildad may have in mind something like the rather sycophantic way in which that arch-Machiavellian, Joab, fawns upon God's
altar at the end of

his life.
reed

8. Even
home
pose

lonely

like Job

needs a context within which

to

inquire

with a and are

grassy knoll. The language and in good part derived from the
and one on which

content of path

his questions presup he has disowned. It was a

which can no

comfortable

home,

he

still must

lean but

longer

bear his

weight.

his home to
no place

Ultimately, his rejection of the wisdom of his home will cause reject him, and for Bildad, a man without a home is a man who has
with an

to stand.

9. Intended
10. Bildad

irony

somewhere

between pity

and sarcasm.

seems to

know that Job's problem is

an eternal problem and that

there will always be men like Job.

11. It is important to
turn out to be so critical
to

note that

Bildad

uses the word

of

"contempt,"

which will as a whole.

for

our

understanding

the

book

Cf.

note

42:6.
12. Bildad's
alternative

to the man of

inquiry

is the

simple man, as

he

under

stands except

it. That

was the word used and the

for Job

so often

in the first
as a

chapters.

In fact,

for Zophar, Satan,

one

Voice in the

Tempest,

all the characters

in the

drama in

way

or another

think of

simplicity

high if

not

the highest

human virtue, though they do not all agree on what the simple is. For Bildad this is to be understood in contradistinction to the man of inquiry. As far as the others are concerned, see the note to 31:40.

The Book of Job

CHAPTER NINE

165

1 Then Job

answered and said,

2 "Yes,

all that

know, but

then

what can

make a mortal's with

justice

apparent

to God? 3 Even if
one

one wanted

to go to trial
of

Him, He

would not

answer, no not

in

thousand.'

4 Wise

heart

mighty in power,
who can
anger,2

who can stand

fast
and

against

Him

and remain unbroken?

5 He 7

transport the mountains

can cause the earth

they feel it
its

not;

or overturn them

in His

6 Who

to reel from

place till

its

quake!3

pillars

He
and

who says a word

to the sun, and it does not rise; Who seals up the stars,
spreads out the

Who

by

Himself

heavens
the

and tramples on the and the

tier of the
of

sea; 9 Who made Arcturus and

Orion,
great

Pleiades,

Chambers

the

South; 10 Who
wonders without

accomplishes
number.4

things, there is no
see

finding

them out

11 He

passes

by

me

but I

cannot

Him. He

moves

on, but I do not

comprehend

Him. 12 He

snatches

him, 'What is it
Under His

you are about

stop Him. Who can say to up do?' to 13 But God will not turn back His anger.
and who can
of

rule even

the ministers

Rahab bend

low.5

14 I

would answer

even though seems to me

am

him, choosing my words against Him with care, 15 but in the right still I cannot do it. Yet I must plead for what
to summon

just.6

16 Even if I do
not
believe7

were

Him

and

He

were

to answer me, even then I

one

that he would pay me any mind,

17 for He is the 18 He
will not

that can
me catch

crush me

for

hair

or multiplies

my

wounds gratis.

let

my breath, but

sates me with

bitterness. 19 If trial be

by

strength, He is the

mighty one, and if by court of law, who will plead my case? 20 Though I am just my own mouth would condemn me. I am simple but He will show me perverse. 21 I am simple but I no longer care and have only contempt for my
life.8

Therefore I say that simple or guilty He destroys all. 23 When the whip suddenly brings death, He mocks as the innocent despair. 24 The earth has been placed into the hands of the guilty. He has covered the eyes

22 It's

all one.

of

its judges. If it be 25

not

He,

then where

is that

one?9

good. upon

My days are 26 They pass

its
prey.

swifter

than a post.

They

through with the reed

should

flight for they have seen no boats; they swoop down like an eagle
take
me

27 Even if I

say 'Let
look,'

my
all

long

visage,

and put on a cheerful

28 I

forget my complaint, abandon would still feel the dread of

me pure.

my grief, found guilty.

since

I know that
then toil

you will never

find

29 I

will still

be

Why

waters and cleanse

even

my cloths 32 He is not

for an airy nothing? 30 If I were to wash in snowy with lye, 31 You would dip me in the muck till hands my would hold me in
abomination.10

a man

( 'ish)

as

I am, that I

can answer

Him,

that we can come

together under judgement.

33 There is

no arbitrator
rod

between

us who can

lay

his
me

hand

on us

both! 34 But let Him turn his

away from

me and not

frighten

166
with

Interpretation
His terror, 35 then I
these
would speak out without

FEAR

of

Him; for in

myself

am none of

things."

Comments
1. Job
right.

now

thinks that there may be a critical sense

in

which

Bildad may be

The distinction between

the thoughtful and the thoughtless

may

not

be
the

visible

from the highest

point of view.

He begins to fear

that at

that

level

may completely disappear. On the one hand, this conclusion leaves him confused and perhaps a bit frightened. On the other hand, this con
surface of things

fusion

will

ness of

ultimately force Job to his own native borders.

sake of

peer

into

a world well

beyond the
do his

narrow

2. For the
we

consistency,

and

to allow the reader to

although

own

reading,

have kept to the

at times:

following

convention,

it did

seem somewhat arbi

trary

'aph
"anger"

ka'as
"indignation"
"RAGE."

hamah
"fury"

gur
"terror"

hath
"dread"

3.
in the

4. From these
word

verses one can get a wonderful sense of the

duality

contained

In them Job is constantly pulled from terror to awe and back to terror. He is both drawn and repelled by a world that is too large to contain him. It is awesome, but he
surface can

"fear."

find

no place

in it for himself

or

his

simple

5. In

understanding verse 1 Job

of

human justice. he had

recognized also

showed that

Bildad's

good will

and

realizes the truth of what

addressed more

he had said, but he

knew that he had

in

not yet

himself to the

question raised

by Eliphaz
than

4:17,

"Shall

a man

be

just than his God?

moment at

or a mortal more pure

his

maker?"

For the
without

least he is

content to raise the question

in its enormity
above the cares

trying
in that

to answer it. God seems to

even

live in

a world so

far

of mortal
motions

justice that

to raise the question now seems meaningless. The

large that to him it seems unavoidable that the little things will be crushed and those who are small enough to see the things that fall through the cracks are too small to be heard.
world are so

6. Job
in them

must not

only be

come to

terms with two

as

well, and what each world commands the other

cannot

Actions
world,

performed

in

a world.

conflicting worlds, he must act has forbidden. They are forever performed in THE
throughout
all worlds.

and their consequences

reverberate
must

Job

cannot

do

what

he knows he

do.
problem of the

Either way

In these
caught unjust. a

verses

Job

presents the

fundamental

by divided duty. God is God, and Justice demands articulation, yet the
feels
perverse when

book Job is
cannot seem

yet what seems

act of

just

articulation points
of

back

to

the speaker who

he considers the enormity

the distinc-

The Book of Job

tion

167
he

between himself

and

his

notion of

again

becomes

aware of

his

own

God, and he falls silent. But innocence, and justice again begins

then

to raise
and

her demands. This constant,

confusion.

unresolvable cycle

leads him into bitterness

7. Or "I

trust."

cannot
need

8. Job's sociality, his

that when

for human

companions and

fellowship

is

so great
open to

they

condemn and reject

him, he

takes the only course

left

him. He
When

rejoins

society
out of

by joining

them in

his

own self-condemnation.

facing

the world around him and the conditions it

has

placed upon

his

being, Job feels

of no crime or

place, contorted,
of no

and

perverse,

and

yet, since he knows

even

guilt, he knows

guilty Divine 9. The

of the sin of

having

seen

his

own

way of expiation. He innocence.

each seems

begins to feel
the

wisdom and

everyday justice;
course,

to mock and jeer

at

other until the whole turns meaningless.

question

is,

of

intended to be

rhetorical.

For Job there

can

be

no second

God

who

is Lord

over

the surface, no one else who could

be

guilty.

If the tart is gone, some knave must have stolen it. 10. Even at this point Job could put a false face

over

the surface and go on

back to his friends; let it all rest in oblivion as he had once thought to do. Sometimes that old trick really works. Smile at the day, and the day smiles right back at you; but not this time. That ugly surface world and the feelings of dread
and guilt which come

from
be

having
unseen.

seen

it

will not go away.

Once the

surface

has been seen, it

11
.

cannot

This

seems to

be

somewhere near the out of and

heart

of things as

they have been

ever since the world

began to fall
ever

the only world that

he

knew,

focus. Job knows that he is guilty in yet he knows that he is not guilty.
a comfortable world with

Job had best.

grown

up

with

his friends in

its do's

and

its don'ts. It

all made so much

sense, and in the main, things turned out for the world, a
world which

By

all the standards of that a

he knows

and

lives by,
an

he, Job, is

guilty man;

and yet when

he

honestly

tries to

look into himself to

find something innocent man.

Words like be found only

that would make sense out of what

has happened, he finds

meaning.

"inside"

"outside"

and

begin to lose their

Is his inno Or is it to

cence out there on a surface that

within

deeper

wisdom cannot comprehend?

himself?

CHAPTER TEN

My

spirits

feel

loathing
of

towards life. I will unleash my complaint and

speak me

in the bitterness

my

soul.

2 To God I
contempt2

say:

'Do

not condemn

me, but let to You

know

the cause of this struggle against

me.1

3 Does it

seem good

that You oppress, that You

have

for the toil

of your own

hand, but

168

Interpretation
the counsel of the guilty 4 Have You
eyes of

radiate upon

flesh? Can You

man?3

see

as mortals see?
years pass

5 Can time

mean

to You

what time means

to

Do Your
track

by

as our years,

that You probe

back into my

perversions and

down my
none

sin?4

7 Somewhere in Your

mind

am not

guilty,

and yet

there

is

to save me

from Your hand.

over me

8 Your hands toiled

devour
me.

and

made

me

and

yet

from
You

all

about

they

9 Remember that You

made me as

clay

and that

will return me

to dust. 10 You poured me out like

skin and

milk and thickened me

like

cheese.

11 With 12

flesh You
with

clothed me and me
were

knit
of

me together with

bones

and sinews.

Your dealings
watched over

full

life

and

my spirit. 13 But You treasured I know what You have in mind; 14 if I sin You'll be watching and You'll not clear me from my perversion. 15 Well, if I have been guilty the grief is mine,

Your guardianship loving heart.5 all these things up in Your

care.

but
of

even when

am

innocent I have been

me and

so sated with reproach that no

feebleness.6

feeling

honor is left in 17

majestic pride of a your wonders?

only my lion in hunting me? Must You

see

16 You

must

feel the

you always use me to manifest

witnesses against me feeding Continually bring Your indignation against me. Army after army are upon me. 18 Why did You bring me out of the womb? Had I only perished without
new

ever an eye

to see me, 19 I

would

be

as though

I had

not

been,

as though

I had

been led from the

me a of

belly

to the grave.

20 So little time

remains.

Forbear! Leave

bit that I may be cheerful. 21 Well, I will be going soon, going to a land darkness and the Shadow of Death and I will not return; 22 to a land that in murk, the Shadow
of

glows

Death

and without order

A land

whose radia

tion

is

murk.'"

Comments

him, choosing my has begun, although he knows that there will be no court and no judge. Despite the bitterness and confusion in his soul, he begins his brief like an ordinary brief, asking for the
would answer
words against

1. Back in Chapter 4, Job had Him

with

said:

"I

care,"

and now

the process

grounds of

God's complaint, but

by

verse

4 he

sees more

deeply

why there
said

can

be

no court.

2. Job intends this

speech:

statement as an answer to what

Bildad had

in the last

8:20

strengthen

But surely God will neither have contempt for a simple man nor the hand of the evildoer. He will fill your mouth with

laughter,

and your

lips

with shouts of

joy.

On the

relation

between

contempt and

laughter

see also the note to

30:1.

The Book of Job

3. Literally, "Are Your days like the days
years of a man of a mortal or your years

169

like the

(gebher)T

Job

seems to of

rushing Hope and fear

cannot

be saying that if God can feel neither the dragging nor the time, He can understand neither punishment nor human suffering.
are

both

meaningless apart

from

the

human

sense of time.

If God

feel them He

cannot understand

His

own

judgements.

4. Job is saying that if, as Psalms say, a thousand years in His sight are as but yesterday when they are past, He cannot understand the sins of Job's youth
as

being

just that, the

sins of

his youth,

an act of a

long

ago

dead

past.

5. That's
make each and care.

what made

it

all so

hard for Job to

understand.

God had

seemed to

thing in
in this

nature,

including

Job himself,
seemed to

with such perfection, so

love,
and and

For the

most part case

life,

and yet

everything everything had

him to be It

full

of

love

gone so wrong.

was all so

crazy

mixed up.

6. This is, perhaps, Job's deepest insight into the

and thoughts.

nature of

his

own

feelings

Job knows that like

all men

his life,
one

and perhaps more than most

to suffer on account of them.

such reasonable

he has surely made some mistakes in he knows that he has always been the men, But the present situation is different and
the outside world, the

beyond

bounds.
to

Job feels that he is

world of order

beginning

lose his
as

struggle with

Eliphaz

and the rest of

them,

well as with the world of pain.

In

to come to terms with the noise of all of these accusations, and remain that outer world, his only source of human relationship, he to believe in his
own

part of

finds himself
not

beginning
guilty.
which

guilt even though

he knows that he is his

mind

He lives

with this contradiction

only

by taking

away from that

is best in him

and

seeing only his

own

frailties.

Aristotle
A

on

Pleasure
of

and

Political Philosophy:

Study

in Book VII

the

Nicomachean Ethics

Marc D. Guerra
Boston College

The
author

speeches on moral and political science

in the Nicomachean Ethics, its

to young
men.'

reports,

will

be "pointless

unprofitable"

and

The

reason of

for this is that the teaching practical science. The form

offered

in the Ethics belongs to

for

a specific

kind

of reflection called

by

this science requires one

to have experience of the types of actions that human life entails as well as to

have mastery over one's passions so as not to chase slavishly after pleasures. These are two qualities which the young necessarily lack. Young men therefore are capable of listening to the finest speeches on these matters and yet remain
unaffected, since the end of this study is not

knowledge but

action

(1095a6).

According

to

Aristotle,
be

the correct audience to hear speeches on moral and

comprised of men who

political science would

bringing cradle by
and

in

moral

conduct"(1095b6). parents and

These

men

"have received a proper up have been trained from the

both their

their political community to shun what

is base
just.

to act in accordance
men

with what

is generally

considered to

be

right and

Such

readily

accept

the

"facts"

that support the moral and political life.

cultivated men runs so act as

Indeed,
do

the

training

possessed

by

morally

deep

that

they

not need

to hear speeches on why

they

they do(1095b8).

Aristotle thus
who will

appears to provide a

benefit from studying

the

reasonably sound account of the reader Ethics. Or does he? On the one hand, Aris

presented a compelling case for the reason why the young will be impervious to the teaching he here sets forth. On the other hand, Aristotle has effectively admitted that the man who is ripe for this teaching would find it

totle

has

superfluous.

Given these circumstances, there

seems to

be

no need

for

book

like the Ethics.

Why

then

Aristotle

would write a

lengthy

treatise on moral and

on

The seed for this essay was first planted during a reading of St. Thomas Aquinas's Commentary Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics under the direction of Ernest L. Fortin at Boston College. The
meetings and to
Controversies,"

following essay is deeply indebted to those Theory of Education in the Light of Recent
no.

Fortin's "The Paradoxes

et

of

Aristotle's

Laval Theologique

2 (1957): 248-60. The limitations

of the present study,

however,

are

Philosophique 13, to be attributed to its

author.

interpretation,

Winter 1997, Vol. 24, No. 2

172

Interpretation
is
written

political science and who this work

for

are

something of a

puzzle.

It

is

with

this question in mind that we here turn to Aristotle's

seventh

teaching

on plea

sure

in the

book

of the

Ethics.

The discussion

of pleasure

in the

seventh

book

of the

Nicomachean Ethics is The

directly
It thus

preceded

by

a comparison of the continent and the obstinate man.

consideration of pleasure occurs without

immediate warning
to the
reader.2

and

begins

abruptly.

comes as

preface

something of a this discussion with the

role of

surprise

Aristotle does,

however,

following

remark:

It is the

the political philosopher to contemplate pleasure and pain.

For he is

the mastercraftsman of the end to which we

look

when we call one particular

thing

bad

and another good

in

the unqualified

sense(1152bl-3).3

Aristotle's
while

politike"

words here are striking for a number of reasons. To begin with, Aristotle previously described his inquiry in the Ethics as "a kind of (1094a27), here, for the first time, he speaks of things that are contem

plated

by
a

political philosophy.

The

reader

is therefore led to

wonder whether and political phi

there

is

difference between Aristotelian "political

question

science"

losophy. This
of the

is

sharpened once

it is

recalled that

in the
a

second

book
of

Ethics Aristotle had

suggested that one should

politike(l

dismiss

discussion

pleasure

from

an exercise

in

109M1-12).

Related to this

problem

is the

question raised

the political philosopher

a

is the

architect of the end

by Aristotle's statement that by which men judge whether

Ethics Aristotle book that
asserted

thing is

either good or
think"

bad. In the first book

that politike

of the

that "one should

is the "most
stated

sovereign and architectonic

sixth
men com

science"(1094a26-27), and

Aristotle had

in the

monly
since

assume

that statesmen are the practitioners of this architectonic science,

"only

those who make

decrees

are said

to engage in politics"(1141b28). that it is the political philoso

Yet, here, Aristotle

but
this
who articulates

makes the unqualified claim

pher and not the statesman who not

the various

only contemplates what is good and bad, possibilities for others. While the reader is at

loss as to what these new considerations may ulti he has been informed that the discussion that is to follow mately mean, belongs
point at somewhat of a

to the province of political philosophy.

Ill

Aristotle book
of the

commences

his formal consideration

of pleasure

in the

seventh

Ethics

with a

discussion
must

of some

of the

pleasure.

The first task he

undertake entails

prevailing opinions of answering objections that

Aristotle
would

on

Pleasure

173

deny

the possibility of

pleasure

that

"good"

is

an equivocal term.

being a Something is said

good.5

Aristotle here

explains

to

be

a good

in

one of two
a

ways: either we call a good

thing

good

in

an unconditional sense or we

say that it is

for
that

a particular man.

Aristotle further

states that

it is

possible

that some

thing
in

is generally

called

certain

circumstances

bad may not only not be bad for a given man but "even desirable for him"(1152b30). Aristotle's brief in
which

treatment of the two ways

something
of the

can

be

a good prods the reader

to recall the caveat given at the

of things that

opening

Ethics,

namely, that in speaking

hold

good

only

as a general

rule, but not always, the conclusions

reached are of

the same order(1094b21-23).

proceeds

Aristotle
pleasures,

immediately
are

to draw a distinction between

restorative

merely incidentally pleasant, and unqualified pleasures. This distinction turns on his observation that the good "is both an activity and a
which

state"(1152b34-35).

(Ostwald translates hexis

as

"characteristic") Aristotle
they
return a

here
man

reports

that restorative pleasures are pleasant only insofar as

to his natural condition. Aristotle thus links restorative pleasures to an

process

ongoing

that replenishes a

man

to his natural state. That these to be

manifested

pleasures

are not pleasant

which give us

unconditionally is

said

in the fact that "things

the same

joy

while our natural state

is

being

replenished are not

as those which give us

joy

once

it has been

restored"(1153a2-3).

To illustrate
process of
or

this point, Aristotle offers the example

of eating: men who are

in the

being
foods,
sure

restored

to their natural state may take pleasure in

either

sharp

bitter

neither of which are pleasant unconditionally.

Aristotle

states that
aspect of

in

contrast

to restorative pleasures an unqualified plea

lacks the

taking

part

in

some

form

of a

rejuvenating

process.

Nor

are unqualified pleasures accompanied experiences unqualified pleasure gives

by

either pain or appetite.

Rather,

a man
natural

"when nothing is

deficient in his

state"(1153al-3).

Aristotle

but

one example of an unqualified pleasure:

the

activity

of

contemplation(1153al).6

This

marks

the second time in the pre the activity of contempla

reference

sent consideration of pleasure that

Aristotle

mentions with

tion, for he
contemplated

prefaced

the entire discussion

to

the objects to the

by

the political philosopher.

When these two

references

intimating activity to his reader that in contemplating pleasure and pain a political philosopher takes part in an activity that is in itself an unqualified source of pleasure.
of contemplation are viewed appears

together, Aristotle

to be

The

movement of

Aristotle's ensuing

argument shifts

from

an explicit

dis

cussion of unqualified pleasures

sure can

to an account of how

it is

possible that plea

be

a good that

opinion that all pleasures take part

has the quality of an end. Distancing himself from the in a process and as such are incapable of
that "there

being
exists

ends, he

once again asserts

is

no need to

believe that there

now of

something better than

pleasure"(1153a8-9).

Aristotle, however,
that some

makes explicit what

he previously had left implicit, namely,

activity
chosen

forms

pleasure are activities

that have no "end other than themselves"(l 153al2).

Aris

totle ends this account of pleasure as an

for its

own sake with a

174

Interpretation
of pleasure that makes no reference to
called an

definition

any form

of a process.

"Plea
that

sure,"

Aristotle announces, "should be

activity

of our natural state

is

not

perceived, but

unimpeded"

(1153al4-15).7

Given both its

seems at pleasure

placement

and

first

glance to

be simply
seventh

its tone, Aristotle's definition of pleasure the summation of all that has been said about
book. If the definition is
allows

thus far in the

examined

closely,
of

however,
present

the reader discovers that it

him to

gain a

better grasp

the to

discussion bear

of pleasure as well as what was said about pleasure prior

the seventh book.

of pleasure to

Indeed, it is only
on

after the

reader

has brought this definition

to which dif

both

of these

discussions that he detects that Aristotle is

range

affording him the opportunity to glimpse something of the ferent types of men are capable of living pleasurable lives.

By defining

pleasure as the unimpeded

activity

of a man's natural

condition,

Aristotle tacitly invites his reader to ent pleasures can be obstructed. The
pleasures.

reflect on the various ways answer

in

which

differ

is

most visible

in the

case of

bodily

Aristotle previously had informed the

reader that the pleasures most

commonly associated with the body, eating and drinking, are restorative plea sures. Such pleasures contain within themselves a restriction that limits the degree
of pleasure that a man can

derive from them.

Simply

stated, there comes

and the

a point when the wines ceases

further intake
pleasurable.

of the most

delectable foods

finest

of

to be

In

a somewhat similar

vein, even the intense

pleasure a man experiences

in

sexual

intercourse is limited
be impeded becomes

by

his body's ability difficult to

see

to take part in the

deed.8

The do

manner

in

which pleasure can attention

more

once one

turns

his

to the pleasures of the soul.

These types

of pleasure as

not appear

to be subject to the same

kind

of

internal limitations
as

do the

bodily

pleasures.

The

question

remains,

however,

to whether the

pleasures of

the soul can

be

restricted

by

In the third book

shed

of the

external limitations. Ethics, Aristotle draws

distinction

that helps to

light

on

this question.

We

must

first differentiate between the

pleasures of the soul and the pleasures of

the body. Take, for example, the

pleasures of the attained

love

of

honor

and the

love

of

learning:

when

the man who

has

his honor

and the man who

loves

learning

in the thing he loves it is not his body but his thought that is affected(1117b27-31). (Ostwald translates time as "ambition.")

finds

joy

It is

curious

that Aristotle the

here
of

sets a condition on the

of

love

of

honor

that he

does

not place on

love

learning. The lover

attained

honor is

said to experience

pleasure

"when

[he]

...

has

his

honor,"

whereas the

lover

of

simply "finds
the man who
of

in the thing he loves learning, the lover

joy

loves."

learning
outside

Aristotle honor

seems to suggest that unlike

of

needs to secure

things

his immediate

control

in

order

to experience pleasure.

Aristotle
A
that
partial appreciation of what these things

on

Pleasure

175

Aristotle

the political

may be is gained once it is recalled ambiguously identifies the life devoted to honor with life in the first book of the Ethics (1095b22-23). Aristotle there
somewhat

twice remarks that to participate

in this kind

of

life

one must possess certain

"external

goods,"

namely,

a sizable amount of wealth and a

relatively high birth

observes
or at

(1099a31-1099b3;
who

1101al4-16).
equipment

lack the necessary to excel in political life Aristotle's large

Aristotle subsequently will find it "impossible

learning,"

that
not

men
easy"

least

(1099a31-32).9

words about the

"love

of

however, do
inhibits the

not

imply

that

the absence of a

number of external goods

pleasure

derived
of the

from this kind

Ethics that the

of activity. philosophic

Moreover, he later
life
It

reveals

in the tenth book

only import

requires what at

best

amounts to

a modest of

sum of external

goods(1178b33-1179a32).
of pleasure would suggest most satisfies

seems

that the

Aris

totle's

definition

that the activity mentioned in the

Nicomachean Ethics that

its

requirements

is

contemplation.

IV

The book

central

section

of

Aristotle's

consideration of pleasure of pleasure as will

in the

seventh

of the

Ethics

contains a

defense here

the supreme good. The

evidence that
supreme

arguments presented to the reader

can

inform him that the

be is

marshalled against the not compelling.

good

possibility Aristotle acknowledges that

of pleasure

constituting the
not mean

regardless of whether most

pleasures are
good cannot

bad in be

an unqualified

sense, this "does

that the highest

some sort of

pleasure"(1153b8).10

In

an attempt to

bolster this
activity,

statement, Aristotle
either the
would

asserts that

"if

each state

has its

own unimpeded

activity

of all of them or of the one of them that constitutes

happiness

be the

most

desirable(1153b9-12). Aristotle's

use of

the word "if

here

would suggest that state

he is trying to distance himself from the

equated unimpeded

position that each

has its

unobstructed activity.

Aristotle, however, already has

the

activity

with pleasure

in

definition

of pleasure

he

gave earlier.

The

significance

of this

statement

would

then seem to lie in the fact that Aristotle presently associates happiness

with some

kind

of pleasure.

This interpretation is further

suggested

by

Aris

totle's

subsequent claim

that happiness

is something

complete or perfect and

that obstructed activities

of pleasure as the explicit arguments

do

153bl5 not possess this quality(l

17). The defense

highest

good

Aristotle here

offers thus rests not so much on

for

the

supremacy

of pleasure as

it does

on

its implicit iden

tification of happiness with some sort of uninhibited pleasure.

Aristotle
a certain

proceeds

to present an explanation of how it

is

possible

that only

form

of pleasure constitutes the supreme

good,

given that all men seek

pleasure and

that many

do this in different

ways.

Aristotle

prefaces this

expla-

176
nation

Interpretation
with

the

curious

remark

that

possible

indication

that

pleasure

is

the supreme good is that both

rational

and

irrational

animals

seek

pleasure

(1153b25-26). This

remark

is

immediately

followed

by

the

pronouncement

that

although all men seek sure

pleasure, many do
pursue."

not

actually

pursue

the kind of plea

they believe they

The
that

enigmatic character of

this

statement

is heightened
to

by

the announcement

directly

follows it. Here, in

what appears

be

the explanation of
nature

why

all

men seek

pleasure, Aristotle

states

that "all have

them"(1153b32-33).

(Ostwald translates this

by something divine in as "everything has by nature

closes

something divine about how pleasure can be the Equipped only

what

it.")

With this

remark

Aristotle

his

account of

supreme good.

The final

words of this

discussion hint divine.

wonder

that the universal pursuit of pleasure is in some way connected to the

with

this cryptic remark,

Aristotle's

reader

is left to

this connection

is

and

why it has been brought to his

attention.

The Ethics
that

consideration

of pleasure

in the

seventh

book

of the

Nicomachean bad
and

concludes with a response to the charge that most pleasures are

pleasures are good.

few

Responding
only

to the opinion that most pleasures are

bad Aristotle

asserts that noble as well as

bodily

pleasures are good

but

that

physical pleasures are good

"up

to a certain point"(1154al3).

In

contrast

to other pleasures, which Aristotle

admit of an excess of the good that
support

leaves unnamed, the

pleasures of the

body

they

enjoy.'2

Common

experience seems to

this position. Aristotle observes that men who seek necessary

bodily

pleasures are not said to

be base;

rather

it is the

man who pursues an excess of

such pleasures that other men regard as

base.

Aristotle

proceeds to provide

the idea that totle's

with

bodily

pleasures are

two explanations why most men readily accept the most desirable kinds of pleasure. Aris
this to the

first

explanation attributes

fact

that the pleasures associated

of their

the

body

are capable of

driving

out pain.

Accordingly, because

intensity,

physical pleasures are

thus wont to pursue

sures will purge

bodily
bodies

widely viewed as remedies for pain. Men are pleasures in the hope that an excess of such plea
of an excess of pain.

their

Aristotle's enjoying

second explanation

maintains

that

many

men

are

incapable

of

pleasures other than

those associated with the

body. The

sures therefore

have been

bodily

plea

catapulted to a place of prominence

due to the

major

ity

of

men's

account

science"

experience noncorporeal forms of pleasure. To for this phenomenon, Aristotle enlists the aid of "the students of natural who have discovered that all animals by their very nature are subjected

incapacity

to

to a constant state of strain and

fatigued 154b7-8). Aristotle's

second

explana-

Aristotle
tion appears to suggest that the bulk of men seek the pain that

on

Pleasure

177

bodily

pleasures to alleviate

is

a natural part of their

shed on

lives.

Some light is

this somewhat

biological

explanation

by

Aristotle's
pursue an

subsequent remark that excess of

there are two types of men most

inclined to

bodily

pleasures: the

young

and

those with excitable

natures.13

Aris

totle states that the reason why youths are preoccupied with the pursuit of
excessive physical pleasures enced

in the

growth process(1154bl0-ll).

is because they seek to counter the pain experi Aristotle reports that in contrast to in
possession
of excitable

the passing afflictions associated with youth, men

(melancholikos)
are

natures suffer

from

a state of perpetual aggravation.

Such

men

naturally disposed

to

immoderation due to "an

excess of

black bile in their

desire"

constitution"

that subjects them to a continuous state of "vehement

(1154M3).'4

The

melancholikoi

thus require constant pleasure to provide them

with a

remedy for their

affliction(1154bl3).
service.

Aristotle fails to
of

state what

kind

of of

pleasure could perform this

restorative

Yet, in light

his

earlier

discussion

pleasures, it would seem that the remedy for

an excess of the pleasures of the

melancholikos could

not

be found in

body.

Aristotle's

reflection on the plight of the melancholikoi

in

some ways resem

bles his

words on

the afflictions of the tyrant in the Politics(l261 a.2-16). Aris

totle there remarks that

perpetrated

injustices that

are practiced on a grand scale

for the

sake of enjoyment as well as

for the

satisfaction of

may be desire.
sate a

Aristotle

observes that a tyrant might perform a great

unaccompanied

injustice merely to

desire to enjoy "pleasures

claims that

the one possible remedy for the

by pains"(1267a7). Aristotle there infirmity of the tyrant can be found

human beings"(1267al2-13). It
of

in philosophy, "for the

seems that
cholikoi.

other pleasures require

philosophy could provide a similar kind These men, like Aristotle's tyrant, desire to

remedy for the

melan

experience a pleasure that

is

not accompanied

by

pain.

Whereas the tyrants

the

cured

by

philosophy

would

still

have

cities

to rule,

however,

melancholikoi

who

turn to philosophy

would men.

be free from the

great external could

demands that the

political

life

places on

Melancholikos therefore

be something

of a mixed

blessing. On the
tormented with

one

hand,

nature afflicts the melancholikoi with a soul that

is

vehement

desires;

on the other

hand,

the activity that may cure this malady

with

is

the only activity that Aristotle has identified

both

unqualified pleasure and

happiness. The Ethics

consideration

of pleasure

in the

seventh

book
a

of

the Nicomachean
activity.

concludes with an account of pleasure as

divine

Aristotle's

reflection on the

relationship between

pleasure and

divinity

here

confronts the

reader with the most

compelling case for leading a life in pursuit of pleasure. Yet it simultaneously informs the reader of the limitations that human nature
on such

places

life. The discussion

not

commences

with

Aristotle's

observa
forever"

tion "that there

is

single object

that continues to

be

pleasant

(1154b20-21). That such

a cessation must

inevitably

occur can

be

attributed

to

178

Interpretation
is
a

the nature of man himself. Man

part of which

being

in

possession of

a composite

nature,

is

subject to

decay. Human

nature therefore promotes a

kind

of

inner

motion that causes an

nature

internal imbalance in man,

since as one element of

human

other"(1154b23). Given acts, "it runs counter to the nature of the that Aristotle has defined pleasure as a state of unimpeded enjoyment, the mo tion inherent in a composite human nature prevents man from deriving contin

ual pleasure

from

one activity.

To highlight the

restrictions that a composite nature places on man's

ability
expe

to enjoy a single pleasure perpetually, Aristotle describes what the

rience of pleasure would

divine

be.

If there is

being

with a simple nature, the same action will always

be the

most

pleasant to

him. That is why the divinity always enjoys one single and simple pleasure: for there is not only an activity of motion but also an activity of immobility, and pleasure consists in rest rather than motion(1154b24-28).

This description in the

be

of

divinity

recalls

Aristotle's depiction But

of the unmoved mover

Metaphysics(l212bl3-29).15

such a conception of argument

divinity

appears to

alien to much of

Aristotle's preceding

in the Ethics. For example,

was a gift given a god that
of god

Aristotle

earlier spoke of the

possibility that happiness

to men
en

by

the gods(1099b8-14).
one single and
seventh

joys

Here, however, he describes In fact, the image simple

pleasure."

"always is

that

presented

in the

book

of the

Nicomachean Ethics does

other than

not suggest that the

divin

ity

engages

in any activity striking

given

the endless enjoyment of pleasure. This is

all the more

that Aristotle

ostensibly

offers this picture of

divin

ity deriving

in

order to explain
pleasure

why from a single

man as a composite

being

is incapable
that the
might

of

constantly

object. reader
characteristic

Aristotle activity light on his

nevertheless

here candidly informs his

of the

divinity

is the

enjoyment of pleasure.

This

previous

enigmatic

statement that all men

man

seek

possibly shed pleasure due to

pursue

something divine in them. The divine thing in

pleasure

that propels him to

may be that

not

subject

in him that, like the divine, is simple and hence to decay, namely, his reason. That reason constitutes one part of
element
nature

may further explain why it is that men seek many pleasures but that only one activity is said to most approximate an unimpeded pleasure for man: man's composite nature is natural in the sense that man pos
man's
composite

sesses

both

a soul and a

body,
pp.

yet

inasmuch
way

as reason

is

not

composite,

man's Thom-

composite nature

is in

some strange

not natural to

him. (See Jaffa, limits

ism

and

Aristotelianism,
with

148, 166.)
further
observation that the
of an

Connected

this point is the

on man's

that a

composite nature

imposes

of contemplation need not

ability to partake necessarily be viewed as

the perpetual pleasure

unconditional

defect.

Indeed,

the very argument of the

Nicomachean Ethics

would seem to suggest

Aristotle
that

on

Pleasure

179

precisely the opposite is tme. While man's composite nature prohibits him from enjoying a purely contemplative life that is "divorced from all external (Politics, 1324a28), it concurrently opens up a realm of considerations
things"

that can

be

contemplated that would not otherwise

claim at the
role of

be

available.

In this regard,
pain"

Aristotle's
that

beginning

of

the seventh book's treatment of pleasure

"it is the

the political philosopher to contemplate pleasure and

takes on greater significance. If man did not possess a composite nature,

nature capable of
impossible.16

i.e.,

experiencing both

pleasure and

pain,

such studies would

be

VI

The

question
a

remains,

however,
of

as

to why in the seventh

book Aristotle
of

introduces

reconsideration

pleasure

into the

overall

discussion

the

Nicomachean Ethics. It is here

to
sight once one reflects

suggested that the answer to this question comes

on

the

nature

of

the

Nicomachean Ethics. The philosophy

most
with polit

Nicomachean Ethics
ical life. This
one

presents the

dialectical

encounter of

means that on one

level the Ethics offers,

visibly in books

through six, a

philosophic reflection on and partial correction of

political

life that is

addressed to men who are

in this

sense that the reader of

existing actively engaged in politics. It is the Nicomachean Ethics must place sufficient
positions

weight on

the

fact that Aristotle life

the political life at the center of his

enumeration of the ways of

available to man(1095bl7-18). of the

To

acknowledge this

dimension

Ethics is to book is

appreciate

that Aristotle's
gen

reconsideration of pleasure

in the

seventh

of some

benefit to his

tlemanly
pleasure

readers.

The

correction of

the earlier dismissal of a consideration of that occurs

from

an exercise

in

moral science

here

permits the man

noble activities

who understands
are accompanied
of

his life in terms

of the political

to admit that

by

degree

of pleasure.

Having
six

given such readers an account argument

the type of virtue

they

admire

in the first
for the

books, Aristotle's

has

thus sufficiently developed to

pleasure.17

allow

present rehabilitation of

Yet it simultaneously must not be overlooked that Aristotle the teaching contained in the Nicomachean Ethics as "a kind
not as politike simply. an

freely
of

describes
and

politik

In this

regard

the Nicomachean Ethics is seen to present

introduction to philosophy that takes the form of a kind of political reflec tion. This type of introduction makes use of the generally admitted opinions that lie at the foundation of political life, e.g., the discussion of moral virtue
offered

in

the

first

six

books

of the

Nicomachean Ethics, in
an

order to cast

light

on their partial claim to truth.

Such

introduction is

addressed neither to men

actively
who
reason

engaged

in

politics nor

to fellow philosophers, but to attentive readers

things.18

posses

the potential to philosophize about political

start"

This is the
of the
sev-

why the "fresh

(1145al5)

announced at the

beginning

180
enth

Interpretation
book
of the

Ethics is followed

by
is

reconsideration

of pleasure.

The dis

cussion of pleasure submitted there who was

presented

for the benefit

of the

of the reader

intrigued

by

Aristotle's
"an

report at the

beginning

book that

certain
god"

unnamed men teach that

(1145a23-24).19

excess of virtue can change a man of pleasure proffered

perform

into

a of the

The treatment

in the

seventh

book

Nicomachean Ethics is designed to

two services

for life

such a reader:

its

argument affords him the opportunity to

glimpse

the unqualified, yet not

and

wholly

unproblematic, pleasures associated

with the philosophic part

its

action al

lows him,

albeit

most pleasant of

only partially, to take lives.

in the activity that

renders this the

NOTES

1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Martin Ostwald (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), 1095a5; hereafter cited in the text parenthetically by the page and line numbering of the

Bekker
the

edition. I have modified Ostwald's translation only where I believe he has failed to capture literal meaning of Aristotle's words. In such cases, Ostwald's translation is also supplied. 2. A provocative analysis of the overall argument of the seventh book of the Nicomachean
Akrasia,"

in David Schaefer, "Wisdom & Morality: Aristotle's Account of Polity, 21 (Winter, 1988): 221-51. A close textual reading and interesting commentary on the relation of the presentations of pleasure in Books VII and X of the Nicomachean Ethics is offered in Aristide

Ethics is

given

Tessitore, "A Political Reading of Aristotle's Treatment Political Theory, 17 (May, 1989): 247-65.
I say
surprise"

of

Pleasure in the Nicomachean

Ethics,"

"something

of a
remark.

because in the
entire

second

book

of the

Ethics Aristotle

makes

the

following

little-noticed

"[T]his

study is necessarily
study"

concerned

with pleasure and

pain"(1105a5-6).

3. Ostwald here translates 4. Two different

"political

theoresai as

"to

and architekton as

"the

crafts

supreme
"politike"

and somewhat are advanced

philosophy"

to opposing views of the relationship of Aristotelian in Carnes Lord, Education and Culture in the Political Thought

of Aristotle (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), and Mary P. Nichols, Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle's Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992). An approach to this
matter

that navigates something of a middle course

can

between the

positions

taken

by

Lord

and

C. Mansfield, Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); in particular, see pages 27Nichols

be found in

Harvey

28, 39,
the

and

44-46.
one example of of the

This is but

the tension that exists

and

between Aristotle's treatment

of moral virtue

in

first

six

books

Ethics

his discussion

of moral virtue

in the last four books

of the work.

Commenting on what he takes to be Thomas Aquinas's insufficient appreciation of this tension, Harry Jaffa makes the following remark, "He does not take full cognizance of the fact that Aristotle says, at the beginning of Book VII, that he is now making a 'fresh and that he does, in
beginning,'

fact,

proceed

to re-discuss the whole subject of moral virtue, although

from

different

point of

view,

everything that has preceded is, in some way or other, a Harry V Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotelianism (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), p. 53. 5. Aristotle there enumerates three common views men have about pleasure: some claim that no pleasure is a good, others say that most pleasures are bad but that some pleasures are good, and,
a point of view
which

for

prep

finally,
ated

some

hold that it is impossible for discussion

which

pleasure to

be the

supreme good.

This list
the

concludes with

the statement that the

is to follow "will is
not a

show that the arguments we

have

enumer
good"

do

not

lead to

the conclusion that pleasure

words

good,

or that

it is

not

highest

(1152b25-27). Aristotle's

namely, that some pleasures are

here curiously omit the second and central position he mentioned, good but that most pleasures are bad. The statement and its omis-

Aristotle
sion arc striking.
expect

on

Pleasure

181

Having

read

the first six books of the

Ethics,

the reader would

be inclined to
To

Aristotle to defend the

position that

some,

rare pleasures are

good, e.g.,

see 1099al2 13.

read,

however,
is

that the author of the Nicomachean

not

Ethics intends to

show that one need not readers as

think
of a

that pleasure
surprise and

the highest

good could come

to some of Aristotle's

something

to others as something of a shock.

this endeavor

Curiously, in
responded

it

would

seem that one

of the objectors

that would need to

be

sure

is Aristotle himself. Aristotle had significantly depreciated the life devoted to plea in the first book of the Ef/iicy(1095bl7-23), where he identifies the life of pleasure with the
to
of

kind

of men

life sought after by "the common run of men"(1095bl9). It is further said that these types "betray their utter slavishness in their preference for a life suitable to cattle"( 1095b 19-20). 6. Shortly after the example of contemplation is given, Aristotle remarks that "both pleasant

and wholesome things are

bad in the

relative sense mentioned,

but that does

not make them

bad in
that

themselves:
while the
even

even

contemplation

is occasionally harmful to health"(l

153al7 21).

It

seems can

"occasionally"

activity

of contemplation offers an unqualified

pleasure, a man

find

this activity to be injurious to his well-being, particularly his physical well-being. 7. Ostwald here significantly adds to Aristotle's words presumably to make his definition pleasure less cryptic. Ostwald's translation reads: '"an activity of our characteristic condition

of

as

determined

state,'

by

our natural
seems

and

instead

'perceived'

of

we should call

it

'unobstructed.'"

8. Aristotle
need

to

be

well aware that the

intense

pleasures associated with sexual

intercourse

to be addressed when one

possible

9. A further
reflects on

is giving a defense of pleasure. See 1 152bl6 18. impediment to the pleasure derived from honor comes to
of the magnanimous

sight when one presents the

Aristotle's treatment

man, the lover

of

honor. Aristotle

magnanimous man as the embodiment of all the moral virtues.

virtue

The

magnanimous man's particular

is

said

to

be "the crown,

as

it were,

of the virtues"(1124al-2).

The

magnanimous

man's

stature rests

nanimous

in his ability to perform great deeds. Aristotle curiously notes, however, that the mag man is "slow to act and procrastinates, except when some great honor is at stake; his

actions are

few, but they

are great and

distinguished"(1124b24-26). In light

of

Aristotle's

observa

tion about the actions of the magnanimous man, perhaps one

external

impediment to
times.

the pleasure that can

is justified in saying that the greatest be derived from honor is the failure of a man to live in be
some sort of

interesting

10. The remaining

portion of

this sentence reads: "just as the highest good may

bad."

Three observations should be made knowledge, even though some kinds of knowledge are here. First, when stating that either pleasure or knowledge may be the supreme good, Aristotle only of these may be the supreme good. Second, it is striking defends the possibility that "some
sort"

that when

defending

the possibility of pleasure

sort"

being

the supreme good Aristotle shows how some

thing

else, namely,
sort"

some sort of

"some

of pleasure with
related.

knowledge, may be the supreme good. Third, the juxtaposition of "some of knowledge raises the question of whether and how
Aristotle's
remark at

these two things are

11. This

observation reminds one of

the

opening

of the

Ethics that "the

unlike

good, therefore, has been well defined as that

seventh

at which all things aim"(1094a3).

Yet

in the

book, Aristotle here

observation about men

chooses

to

remain silent about

the relationship of the good at which all

things aim to the pleasant.

The
could

the pursuit of pleasure

mistake a

is

expressed rather ambiguously.

Aristotle merely

pleasure that secondary Yet Aristotle here may also be suggesting that all men, whether or not they are aware of it, pursue the same pleasure. Whatever the case may be, Aristotle presently invites his reader to question whether he is certain of the pleasure he pursues.

be stating that
to a

frequently

or peripheral pleasure

for the

is

essential

given activity.

12. It is
of an of

interesting

that Aristotle
since

here

withholds

the name of those pleasures that do not admit

noble and

excess, particularly

he has

mentioned

both

bodily

pleasures at

the

this discussion. Given the

unnamed

argument of

the preceding section, the reader is inclined to

beginning identify

these

pleasures

with

those of contemplation.

This curiously

raises

the question of the

relation of the

noble pleasures

to the pleasures of contemplation.

13. These two types

of men

bear

a close resemblance

to the two classes of men that were said

182
to

Interpretation
incapable

be

of

benefiting
fail to

from

discourse

on moral virtue at the

opening

of the

Ethics. See

1095a2-13.

14. One
reason

cannot

notice

biological and not a moral that Aristotle's words here offer a

inclined to be base. Aristotle presently announces that the very natures of why explanation might sound the melancholikoi seem to prod them to perform base actions. While this that the gentleman who has just plausible to some of the readers of the Ethics, it is more than likely read an account of his virtue would consider such an argument to be specious.
some men are

15. Despite this similarity,

one must not

ignore

the puzzling

fact

that

Aristotle here begins this

description

"if."

with the word part of what

16. Perhaps this is

the Nicomachean
of

Aristotle intends to
the good
and

express

in his

remark at the

beginning

of

Ethics

that

"the

attainment of

for
a

one man alone

is,

to be sure, a source

satisfaction;

yet

to secure it for a race of men

for

these are the aims of our

investigation,

which

is in

a sense an
should

city is nobler and more divine. In short, investigation of political

matters"

(1094b7-12, italics
regimes contemplate

added).

Along
in

similar

lines, it
of

be

observed that the

natural

cycle of

that Aristotle describes

the

fifth book

the Politics would provide the opportunity to

something eternal. 17. Of the developmental character

observes that

of a

Aristotle's

argument

in the Nicomachean Ethics, Robert

Faulkner
tive"

growing to adulthood, earlier stages of discussion can be understood with greater clarity only in light of the final and developed perspec in Nomos ("Spontaneity, Justice, and Coercion: On Nicomachean Ethics, Books III and
organism
V,"

"somewhat like

living

14: Coercion, 85n.).

ed.

J. Roland Pennock

and

John W. Chapman [Chicago: Aldine/Atherton, 1972],

p.

Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, in What is Political Philosophy? (Chicago: Uni 36; "On Classical Political versity of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 93-94; Fortin, pp. 256-57. Along similar lines, Tessitore
18. See Leo
p.
Philosophy,"

1988),

comments:

"[T]he

completion of

Aristotle's

unfinished treatment of pleasure

in Book VII is in large

not

to

be found in Book X
who are

nor

in the Ethics

as a whole.

It is

offered rather works

to those students of the Ethics

perhaps political
measure

cause of the p.

willing to study Aristotle's explicitly way in which he has presented the

agree with the thrust of

philosophic philosophic

be

life in his

treatises"

(Tessitore,
insofar
as

254). While I

his

observation suggests

here, I believe
Aristotle's
and

that Tessitore errs

the movement of the argument of

his essay

that

philosopher

ultimately

aban

dons

serious reflections on political name of

life;

see pages

258

261-63. Tessitore's position, ostensibly

the
political sphere

in the

Aristotle,

seems to reduce the philosopher's concern with

to the

"practice
the

[of]

continence or moral virtue with respect

to those pleasures that draw

[him] away from

best

activity."

Yet this does

not appear to

the significance of man's composite nature nor

phy.

follow necessarily from either Aristotle's teaching on from the many-layered meaning of political philoso

Leo
of

See Aristotle, Politics 1263b29-1264al, 1279M1-15, and, most importantly, 1282bl4-24; in Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy (Chicago: University Strauss, "On the Chicago Press, 1986); "On Classical Political pp. 93-94.
Euthydemus,"

Philosophy,'

19. This

remark

appears

amid a

discussion

of

brutishness, i.e.,

subhuman

condition, and

divine virtue, i.e.,

a superhuman condition.

Lessons from the Garden:

Rousseau's Solitaires
Mark S. Cladis
Vassar College and the

Limits

of

Liberalism

The

narrative of

recapture

deposed humans attempting to break the gates of Hell and the Garden was employed by Rousseau even as he sabotaged it. In his
not sudden

account, the Garden was never complete, the Fall was

and restoration

but gradual, fall is

not

is

neither certain nor

final. Human hands

history

after the

linear but

cyclical: the wheel of

more or

life turns from bad to

secular
of

worse

to

bad to
in

worse.

The narrative, in the distant

past

less

Rousseau, is
and sorrow allowed

not about a
solitude and

but

about the present possibilities

for joy

in

community.

The Garden

if

not

God's then

nature's

Rousseau to

portray humans in radical isolation. Social life creeps onto the stage with a fall that unfolds in several phases. Each step away from the Garden takes us further into the social and psychological complexity of the tension between life alone
and

life together;

and

with

each

step

we

sink

deeper into the labyrinths

moral progress.

of

modern sorrow as well as the possibilities of

(ambiguous)
of

In this essay, I
the drama of

argue that an

investigation

Rousseau's

preoccupation with

decline

and ascent casts considerable

light

on the relation

between

I focus primarily on life in the for its Rousseau's Garden, inhabitants, Solitaires, have as much to tell us about
the public and private

life in liberal

society.

association as about solitude.

Rousseau

attributed and

liberal

characteristics

to the

Solitaires, specifically freedom from receiving

Yet Rousseau
protected
came

inflicting

unnecessary harm.
although we are nor moral.

to realize that alone, as radical

Solitaires,

from

much

pain,

we can

be

neither

truly happy

In the

company of others, however, even as we seek to do good, we risk inflicting harm. I will argue that this dilemma and Rousseau's response to it illuminate a
salient

feature

of modern

liberal

society: the more we seek to

do good, the

more

we risk

doing

evil; or, conversely, the

more we avoid such risk, the more we

dodge

our moral commitments.

In

order

to

understand

this dilemma better I

employ
a

the Solitaire as a
precise

(roughly Weberian)
exemplar.

ideal type

of

liberalism,

that

is,

as

conceptually

liberal

ates some

everyday

aspects of moral

ideal type, the Solitaire life in liberal society.

As
an

accentu

writing this essay, I would like to express my American Fulbright Agency, the National Endowment for the Humanities,

For

their support while

gratitude to the Francoand the

Vassar Research

Committee.

interpretation,

Winter 1997, Vol. 24, No. 2

184

Interpretation
of this

Think

essay

not as a

historical

inquiry
misery

but

as a socio-psychological

journey, mapping
eager to

some contours of modem

with ourselves and

and

joy. Rousseau
social

was more

present us

our

self-inflicted

wounds

than

existence.1

with a primitive species and

its

painless asocial actors are and such

call this a psycho

logical
clivities

voyage as

because the

principal

human

powers and pro

love,

esteem, compassion,

the

drive for

perfection.

call

it

sociological

because
almost

social circumstances move

these principal players

in

often

predictable,

scripted, directions. Rousseau described himself as "the

heart,"

his

torian of the human

and this

chological and sociological

perfectly brilliance on a single

captures

his ability to focus psy point: an illumination of the light

of the
private.2

private

life in light

of

the public, and the public in

I. THE GARDEN'S SOLITAIRES

The Garden is

a place abundant with

not

wildlife,

forests,

and

streams;

a region

sparsely populated,
and private:

colonized,

by

primitive

humans. Their

needs are

basic

they

pertain

to the individual alone. Even sex is solitary. Those

involved
"the two

are

detached
with the

and

disinterested. Such

physical social

intercourse

"having
act

nothing to
uncoupled

do

heart"

is

void of

sexes

knew

more."

each other no not

any Even

intercourse. After the

should a child result

from this
mother."3

willing to introduce a meaningful social tie into his Garden. Once weaned, "the offspring was nothing to its There are, then, no tethers between these solitary creatures, and therefore no lashes. Their
can
not

coupling, Rousseau was

needs are as simple as their

language,

private

grunts;

easily satisfy their needs,

they have

no need of each other.

and as they Nomadic, but

homeless, for there are many trees under which to sleep; alone, but not lonely, for it has no need of others; speechless, but not muffled, for there are none to silence it; propertyless, but not poor, for all its needs are satisfied;
slothful, but
not

neglectful, for it has no duties: such are the broad

the

strokes of

Rousseau's in terms

portrait of

Garden's Solitaire. "people's behavior former

can

lohn Harsanyi has

of two

claimed that

largely

be

explained

dominant interests:

economic and social

acceptance."4

Rousseau
can

would agree

(although he

often subsumed the nature's

under the

latter). We

think of
question:

Rousseau's Solitaire in What

would a

Garden, however,
without

as an answer to the
or social

human look like

either economic

interests? In

the absence of these

interests,

the

Solitaire is

a stranger to such

deference, pride, and envy, and to such conflicts as quarrels, property disputes, injustice, and war. There is no jealousy, for example, because there is no love; there are no quarrels, because there is no pride; there is no war,
traits as vanity,

because there is
out of a

no property.

(See

Inequality,
Solitaire

pp.

77-79; O.c, 3:157-60.) With

laments
the past nor dreams
no

financial

or social

worries, the

neither

future. "His imagination

paints no

pictures; his heart makes

demands

on

Lessons from the Garden

him."

185

There is

as

little

to regret as there

present, not even the thought of

entail

entirely in the death disturbs the Solitaire, for that would

is to hope for.

Living

missing the

past and

fearing

the

future. (See Inequality,

pp.

61-62; O.c,
depend

3:143-44.)
Such present-mindedness
on promises renders

impossible

common projects that

in the

past and shared goals

for the future. Public

obligations are as

meaningless as private

dreams

when one

itaire, simply
the Garden

put,

is incapable

of cooperation.

lives entirely in the present. The Sol Hence agriculture, an occupation

that requires memory,

foresight, and dependence on others, cannot be found in (Inequality, p. 63; O.c. 3:144-45). Rousseau detected a correlation
future. The de continually
reflects on

between

reliance on others and preoccupation with the past or

pendent creature

its

history

of assurances received and

assurances

given, its

The life
namely,

of

debts, and on how to exploit these in the future. Rousseau's Solitaire, in contrast, manifests the converse correlation,
assets and

correlation

between self-sufficiency
without

and

present-mindedness.

The
an

Solitaire

enjoys

its nap

worrying

whether

it

ought

to be

fulfilling
and

obligation; it eats the entire kill without worrying whether it

and

ought

to share it

thereby

procure a

future favor. The Solitaire

needs no

favors

hence it

has

no obligations.

Dwelling

Except for

such physical

entirely in the present, it dwells there alone. trials as occasional hunger or contending with

ferocious
occasions

animal, Rousseau

for unnecessary

pain.

has systematically excluded from his Garden all This is why there can be no social ties: rela

tionships are painful. to

its basic needs,

Moreover, if the Solitaire could imagine wants in addition that is, conceive of new desires as basic needs, then the
itself. It
could

Solitaire

could abuse

burden its back

with excessive travail and

its

mind with

dissatisfaction. But Rousseau

protected

his Solitaire from this

source of pain

by

Minimal

needs

permitting the Solitaire to feel "only his actual allow the Solitaire to be self-sufficient, and self-sufficiency, in
all

necessitie

Rousseau's view, is
the Solitaire.

important, for it

alone can protect one need of

from association,

that cardinal source of injury. Without

anyone,

Moreover, immunity

to others protects

really hurt the Solitaire from the

no one can
or

desire to injure others, for

resentful

there are no occasions

for it to become angry

creatures

fellowof another. The Solitaire, then, "neither standing in need of his hence free is free from them, and nor having any desire to hurt
them,"

from heartache

and grief
not

(Inequality,

p.

79; O.c, 3:160).

animals are

The Garden is

free

of natural

inequalities. Some
same can

swifter,

some are stronger, some are smarter.

The

be

said of

the Solitaires. Yet

because

there are so few occasions for making

are almost always relative
extracted

comparisons

among them, their

inequalities
seau

to other animals, not to each other. Rous

has thereby

scorning the

weak.

In the

inequality as envying the strong or Garden, inequality is not evil. The Solitaire knows
such stings of

only two evils, hunger

and pain

(Inequality,
that,

p.

61; O.c, 3:143). Without belit

considered, the Solitaire is

tling these, it

should

be kept in

mind

all things

186
a

Interpretation
excellent

truly

"human

machine"

"the

most

advantageously organized of

any"

of the animals.

Most

of

the time, therefore, the Solitaire is capable of

match its limited needs, and protecting itself from the two evils. Its powers hence evil remains restricted. There is a relation between minimal needs, suffi

cient

powers, and confined

will experience

evil.

Should the
physical

powers

diminish,

as with

age, the
the

Solitaire

more

evil.

Should the

needs

increase,

powers must

be

augmented

if the Solitaire is to
minimal needs

avoid evil. can

Needs
more

can require

expanded powers

in two

ways:

become

difficult to

meet, or new needs can

be

added

to the

original ones.

By definition, however,
between
minimal

increased

needs cannot occur

in

the Garden. The equilibrium

what makes

needs and sufficient powers

is

largely

the Garden a garden.

Tragically,
he
called the

this

balance
endowed

must

be disturbed if the Solitaire is to become

fully

human. Rousseau

the Solitaire with a

faculty

for

development,

or what

faculty

of

perfectibility (la faculte de

se perfectionner).

As this

faculty is exercised, new evils are felt. In

into the
soul of

new needs are

order

created, sociability becomes required, and unpack these claims, I need to lead us still deeper to
the

the

Solitaire, into

heart

of

Rousseau's

moral psychology.

II. A MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

The

second

Discours features four human

and compassion.

properties:

perfectibility
are

and

free
re

dom, lated,

self-love and

Perfectibility
and

and

freedom

intimately
pp.

it is these two faculties that distinguish humans from beasts. (For

of

Rousseau's discussion

freedom
other

perfectibility, see

Inequality,

59-60;
Perfect

O.c, 3:141-42.)
themselves

Unlike the
In

animals, the Solitaires are

are

free to improve

variously.

fact, they

driven toward

self-improvement.

ibility

could

inspire

one to climb the

lofty

heights

of

virtue, or, conversely, to

venture

the depths of vice (as did Milton's antihero, Satan). When Rousseau
moral

described the
with the moral

flexibility

of

perfectibility, its potential to aid or

side. would

collide

life, he usually highlighted its darker

like Rousseau
characteristic.

At first blush, it may

seem odd that an antiprogress theorist as a salient

human

But the oddity looks

avenues to

catalog perfectibilite more like irony once we

realize that this

faculty

leads humans to

adopt multifarious and complex ways of

life that
sorrow.

pave

some

imaginative
are

While the Solitaires

human joy, but mostly to human free to improve themselves innocuously, those

outside the

by freedom and perfectibility injure themselves, others, and nature. It would seem, then, that a cause of the fall is located in the soul of the Solitaire, for Rousseau placed at the heart of his philosophical anthropology a proclivity for expanded powers, and these, by Rousseau's lights, are the gifts of misfortune. This is a rather surprising conclusion. Rousseau is often celebrated or cursed
contrast, are empowered
to

Garden, in

diversely

and

creatively

as an exemplar

Enlightenment

philosophe who

declared that

although

humans

Lessons from the Garden

are

187

naturally good, society tampers with us and thereby corrupts us. Although Rousseau's complex and even contradictory writings engender disagreement among his
original

interpreters,

all seem

to agree that Rousseau spumed any notion of

sin, of innate corruption, and that he blamed corrupt, irrational social

our miseries.
view

institutions for
that

lean Starobinski, for example,

not

states
social

categorically
structures."5

in Rousseau's

"evil is

in human
and the

nature

but in

In Rousseau's
springs
within

account of the

Garden

Fall, however, human

wickedness

solely from social structures but from the human breast. Lodged the human heart are the faculties of freedom and perfectibility, rendering
not
necessary.

our

argue that

failures empirically inevitable, yet not ontologically Rousseau positioned himself at the crossroads
Augustinian pessimism,
a and that

Elsewhere I
opti

of

Enlightenment

mism and

from that

awkward position

Rous

seau

developed

vocabulary designed to
want to

remind us of

both

our

for

ourselves and our powerlessness

to radically transform
that

ourselves.6

responsibility For our

natu

purposes

here, I simply

highlight

in Rousseau's

view

humans

rally

gather and court

harm.
within the expanded

There is, then, located

panded

heart

of

the Solitaire a proclivity for ex

come
such

powers,

and with

powers

sources

of

misery

as

imagination,

memory, knowledge of good and evil, complexity, frivolous

wants

masquerading as needs, technology, property, and inequality. In spite of this baneful ledger, the journey out of the Garden ought to be interpreted as a

"blessed

fall."

Blessed, because had

the Solitaires not left the

Garden,

the world
commu

never would nity.

have known the

warmth and moral achievement of

human

The fall is the necessary price to unleash the splendor of humanity, bran dishing all its virtue and vice, its genius and stupidity, its works of art and war,
and destructive associations. Outside the Garden, then, like fire and ice, cannot be simply loved or hated. In freedom, perfectibility the Garden, however, they function as innocently as the Solitaires themselves

its

gentle

sociability
and

are

innocent. This is because in the Garden freedom

and therefore primitively.
more complex

cised

privately ibility lead to

perfectibility are exer Once primitive freedom and perfect

and

of life, they, by definition, forfeit their become guilty of steering the Solitaire faculties innocence. Initially naive, both out of uncomplicated solitude into tangled associations. Although the chains of

forms

the society bring a measure of happiness and morality, their weight disfigures injure aversion to love itself and its even bent to its Solitaire's natural frame,
others.

This brings
namely,

us to the two other elements

in Rousseau's

moral

psychology,
a
pre-

self-love ardent

(amour de soi)

and compassion

(pitie). The former is

reflective,

interest in the
at
death"

self's

"welfare

and

preservation"; the latter

is

"natural
to us,

repugnance

seeing any

sentient

being,

and

suffer pain or

(O.c, 3:126; Inequality,

to self.

p.

particularly those similar 47). Self-love and com From

self-

are unambiguously good. passion, unlike freedom and perfectibility,

love

springs our primal

duty

Avoiding

pain and

injury, seeking food

and

188

Interpretation
love
ourselves.

shelter: these are some of the ways that we

of our

Self-love is the basis

. . .

"passions primitives,

all of which

lead to

our

happiness

and which

are

entirely sweet and loving in their O.c, 1:669). Whereas the reformation hate ourselves, "even
creatures

essence"

(Rousseau juge de Jean

Jacques,
that

theologian

Martin Luther because

charged

we are to

our own

we are we are and

essentially essentially lose sight

self-

disgraceful

worthy
of

of

hate,

Rousseau insisted that

we can

graceful creatures
of our original

worthy

love. That

effectively

bury

loveliness

goes without saying.

In the Garden, however,

love is the
If

principal

mandate

in the life
modified amour

of

the Solitaire.

Principal, but

not

exclusive, for it is occasionally

by

compassion

(pitie).
to others emanates
a

duty
pitie.

to self emanates

from

de soi, then

duty

from

Compassion,
prevents the

that "innate

repugnance at

seeing suffering in
to any sentient

fellow he is

creature,"

Solitaire from causing

case when

injury

being, "ex

cept

in the legitimate

his

own

preservation

is

at

stake and

obliged to give preference to

Pitie is
anguish

"pure impulse

nature,"

of

himself (O.c, 3:154, 126; Inequality, pp. 73, 47). prior to any kind of reflection. It produces
suffering in
of
others.

in

us when we observe

Causing

us

to share, indi

rectly be sure,

yet

decidedly,

the

suffering

others,

pitie connects us

to others. It

is,

to

a painful tie, one that we would rather not have, yet therein lies its ability to deter us from causing unnecessary harm. In the Garden, identification occurs through observed suffering. In the suf sees

ferer the Solitaire

pain. scope.

itself,
via

or at

least is
a

an aspect of primitive

itself, its

own experience of of wide

Shared suffering, The

scope of

pitie,

social

phenomenon

identification is is

as wide as the number of creatures that with sentient

suffer, because compassion

not

only

with rational ones.

by identification No doubt, identification, and

prompted of

beings,

hence compassion, is
observer and

proportionate

to the number of shared characteristics

between the

the sufferer: the more

lines for

identification,
of creatures

the more

compassion.

Solitaires,

then, feel
placed the

greater pitie what

other

Solitaires than for lower worthy

of

animals.

Still,

when

articulating

is

definatory

compassion, Rousseau

capacity to suffer above the ability to reason. Although animals "are liberty," destitute of intelligence and Rousseau insisted that they have rights
that humans are obliged to recognize.

both to

men and

beasts,

ought to entitle the

former"

The capacity to suffer, "being common latter at least to the privilege of not

being

wantonly ill-treated by the (Inequality, p. 47; O.c, 3:126). The recognition of animal rights, then, is related to minimizing the distinc tion between animals and humans, that is, to maximizing the identity between

the two.

This line
of

of

thought reveals not only

nature.

Rousseau's

conception of animal

rights, but
sufferers.

human

Insofar

as we view ourselves
we can

chiefly

as

suffering

creatures rather than rational

creatures,

identify
loved.
A

with animals as mutual

And for

Rousseau, suffering is
is to be

the worst thing. It

is

to

be

avoided and

hated

more

than pleasure

sought and

Suffering

in the Garden,

therefore, is to be kept to

an absolute minimum.

greater premium

is

placed

Lessons from the Garden

on the absence of
much
which

189

suffering than
much

on the presence of pleasure.

To

understand as

is to

understand

of

Rousseau. This lone

not

"social"

faculty,

pitie,

curtail

itself is painful, functions cruel interaction.

to enhance

charitable

communion, but to

Compassion
compassion, as

itself, then,

tends to

keep

the

Solitaire

private.

The

scope of

I have said, is

broad, but its

consequences are

limited. It does

not, for example, motivate acts of altruism. It merely prevents the Solitaire

from

inflicting

self-love.

profit

unwarranted harm as it pursues the prompting of amour de soi, It thereby fortifies the Solitaire's isolation, for without the desire to from another's misery, the Solitaire is protected from a conspicuous form

of social

interaction. It is
assist a

an open question whether pitie would

direct the Sol

itaire to

fellow

creature that

it found in

need.

Outside the Garden, in

while

contrast, the range of compassion's activities tends to

narrows. such yet

increase,
and
not

its

scope

By

this I mean that Rousseau

understood compassion as a source of

social virtues as also

generosity, clemency,

benevolence,

friendship,
only
with

and

he

held that humans

increasingly
but
with

fail to

identify

lower

animals

Again,
more

worthy this is

of compassion,
pure

fellow humans

as well.

tragedy. In order

for

compassion

to

deepen,

to become

profound, its scope, it

there

would seem, almost

and

by

necessity,

narrows.

In the
self-

Garden,
love

is

an

easy "agreement
to self and
agreement

combination"

between

pitie and

which establishes a peaceful environment

for the Solitaires to

pursue their

private existence. and self-love.

Duty

duty

to others are naturally governed

and the

by pitie
they
es

Yet the

between them

harmony

that

tablish are as simple as the Solitaires are primitive. Self-love and compassion,

in the Garden, are cautious faculties. Amour de soi, for example, ensures that the Solitaire feeds itself, but it will not direct the Solitaire, say, to forfeit some meals in order to scale a summit and enjoy the beauty and grace that it offers.
Pitie
the
ensures that the

Solitaire inflicts

no

unnecessary harm, but it

will not

lead If

Solitaire,

say, to jeopardize its

own

life in

an attempt

to save

another.

self-love and compassion are

to become complex and profound, the Solitaire's

simplicity Rousseau
which,

and

innocence

must

be

sacrificed.

wrote

that "love

of self

[amour de soi] is

a natural

guided

in

man

by

reason

and modified

by

pitie, creates

feeling humanity
is
"Do

and

virtue"

(Inequality,
with as

p.

73; O.c, 3:219). In

simple

the

Garden, however,

there

neither good

humanity
yourself

nor virtue,

only little harm

which

Solitaires

and the natural maxim,

others"

to
p.

as possible to

(O.c, 3:156; Inequality,

is
not as sublime as

76). This maxim,

quires

perfectly
to

combines self-love and pitie, and which re

neither education

nor virtue

won

by

reason,

that

maxim of rational

justice, "Do

others as you would

have

them
.

do
.

you."

unto
perhaps

Yet if
more

the maxim of the Solitaires

is "indeed

much

less perfect,

it is

Some
represents

might even claim

that this primitive maxim of the natural

Solitaires
societies

the crowning

achievement of modem

liberalism,

namely,

dedicated to

doing

minimal

harm.

190

Interpretation
was quite

Rousseau himself Yet in

spite of

infatuated
natural

with the

Solitaires

and their maxim.

his

allegiance

to the

maxim, he

wanted more.

He

wanted

such virtues as

courage, wisdom, generosity, and

justice; he

wanted a robust

duty humanity duty to others to mean more than doing knew that flourishing public and private
that understood

to self to mean more than self-preservation, and

no

harm. He

wanted more

because he

lives

take root not

in

cautious soils or
embrace risk and

in isolated gardens, but in individuals

cooperation.

and societies

willing to

He

wanted

more,

and yet

he

well

understood

that this would re that would rush

quire that the

Solitaires

develop
both least is

capacities

and relationships

them out of the

vate

Garden, because
corrupts
risk at

the development of complex public and pri

compassion and self-love.

lives

virtue

and

invariably joy must

Public

and private

as

much

vice and pain.

To

move

from

the

simple maxim to the

virtues, from the Solitaires to

humanity, from

the

Garden

to the

City,

requires that one

committed to things outside the

self,

and such

commitment

necessarily

entails

jeopardy

and vulnerability.

III. SOLITAIRES AND LIBERALISM: A QUESTION OF MORAL STATUS

Alone,

as radical
nor

Solitaires,

we are sheltered

from pain,
of

yet we can

be

neither

truly happy
These
and are

moral; together,

in

the

ambiguous moral progress and precarious

company human joy,

others, we can
yet we

experience each other.

hurt

the twin horns of Rousseau's

response

depiction

of our

dilemma. This dilemma

of

Rousseau's

to it highlight a

perplexing feature

liberal

society:

the more we seek to

do good,

the more we risk

inflicting harm;

or, conversely,
commit

the more we seek to avoid such

ments.

risk,

the more we dodge our moral

To

explore

this

dilemma, I

suggest that we use the

Solitaire

as a

liberal

ideal type,
everyday
extremes

as

aspects of moral

conceptually life in liberal

precise

liberal

exemplar that accentuates some

societies.

This technique,

investigating
credentials. religious

to better understand more moderate cases,

associate

has impressive

We

can

it, for

example,

with

William James's forms

pragmatic

investigations,
scenarios with

or with

Wittgenstein's

practice of

developing imaginary,
of

fanciful

for

the sake of
of the

illuminating

actual

life. In

a similar

fashion,
return

the

help

Solitaires be truly

we can push

liberalism to

the limit and then

to everyday liberalism to view

its features
or

more perspicuously.
we suffer and

Alone,
corrupt.
"evils."

we can't

happy

moral; together,

become
of two
re

One

response to this

dilemma is to
the

attempt to choose the

lesser

Rousseau's

preoccupation with
we shall

sponse, and there

is,

see,

family

Solitaires is precisely such a resemblance between opting for forms

of society.

the

Solitaires

and

favoring

liberal

over communitarian

Ultimately,
liberalism

however, Rousseau
that

was not satisfied with the

Solitaires

or with the

they

characterize.

To

support this

claim, I

must show

that the Garden's

nor

Solitaires, in Rousseau's

view, were neither

genuinely

happy

virtuous; that

Lessons from

the

Garden

-191

is, I

must argue that

alone,

we can't

be truly

happy

or moral.

Rousseau himself
"men in the
pp.

categorically

asserted
. . .

both that "man is naturally

be
either good or

good"

and that

state of nature

could not

bad"

(Inequality,
as

118, 71;
amoral,
as

O.c, 3:202, 152). I

tion,
and creatures. moral

want to see

if I

can make sense of the apparent contradic

to that end I will examine the

Solitaires first
we can

moral, then
the

as

We begin

by

exploring the ways

to account
all things

describe

Solitaires

beings, for

we need

for Rousseau's

attraction to

however, by concluding that,

stood as

considered, the

them; we end, Solitaires are best under

fundamentally
begin, then,

amoral

beings.

Let We

us

with the moral status of the

Solitaires. Are they

moral?

can approach

this issue

by

asking, Moral compared to whom? The inhabit

ants of

that populate

Rousseau's Garden certainly look moral when compared to the creatures Hobbes's Wilderness. Rousseau endowed his Solitaires with gen

tle self-love (amour de soi) and uncomplicated compassion

(pitie) precisely

to

distinguish them from Hobbes's

possession and not

beastly

egoists

driven
not

by

the anomie pursuit of

domination. Rousseau's Garden is

one not

the war against all; it

is

nearly that social. Here, then, is "man is naturally good": Humans are

way to take Rousseau's claim that naturally rapacious, but pacific. The

Solitaire is driven "is the least itaire's lent is This

not

by

innate egoism, but

others."

by

gentle

self-love,

and this power

prejudicial

to that of

am

suggesting, then, that the Sol

peaceful existence

looks

moral when compared to the

stormy it does
more

and vio

existence of
negative

Hobbes's

natural

humans.
moral

argument, that the Solitaire is

more general

insofar
vice

as

no

harm,

supported

by Rousseau's
good.

belief that

does

harm than

virtue

does

cause natural

he is
take

vicious

Rousseau explicitly criticized Hobbes for implying that be no idea of goodness, he must be naturally wicked; that because he does not know Here, then, is another way to
"man has
virtue."

Rousseau's

claim that

"man is naturally
of

good":

Humans,

although not nat

urally

equipped with

knowledge

given that vice

does

more

virtue, naturally ignorant of vice; and, harm than virtue does good, ignorance of vice can be
are

considered

3:154.)

morally advantageous condition. (See Inequality, p. 72; O.c, This claim is supported by Rousseau's account of evil, for that account
a

Rousseau hated the cruelty of moral creatures more than he loved their virtuous deeds. Earlier I claimed that in Rousseau's view suffering is the
suggests that worst thing. worst

would now

like to

revise

that to read, unnecessary suffering is the

thing. With

respect

to physical evil, unavoidable

harm, Rousseau's
moral

stance

was always rather stoic: the

happy

and virtuous soul recognizes and accepts that

life

entails natural

limits

and misfortunes.

In contrast,

harm, is

to

be despised

and avoided

in every

circumstance.

evil, unnecessary The inevitable suf

nature's

fering

of the

Garden,

we

saw, was restricted, bounded

by

limits;

the

avoidable

suffering

of the

City, in

contrast, is unlimited, fueled

desires. As humans become social, their capacity for

in

proportion

to their chance of encountering and

by boundless joy and morality increases inflicting moral evil. We can

192

Interpretation
yourself with as

take the natural maxim, "Do good to

others,"

little

evil as possible

to

as a minimal test of our choices.

We fail

the test rather miserably,

and

in

Rousseau's view, for

neglect

we

injure

others

unnecessarily,

in the

process we

to be good to ourselves.
want

Although ultimately I
minimal notions of

to argue that Rousseau was not satisfied with

worth

morality, it is

noting that

when

he

surveyed

the cor

ruption and natural are

human

exploitation of

his day,

minimal

decency,

embodied

in the

maxim, do no unnecessary

harm,

looked

quite appealing.

His Solitaires
citizenry.7

remarkably similar to what some would consider the ideal liberal Although they do little good, they commit no cruelty. Although they do not meaningfully associate with each other, they do not disturb each other. The
peaceful, morally shallow
existence of

the

Solitaires

would

be destroyed should,

let

us

imagine,

missionary

inculcate

virtue and shared

or an emissary from a distant culture attempt to loves in the Solitaires. The simple emotions associ

ated with self-love and placed

pity,

loving

survival and

hating

cruelty,

would

be

re

by

a passion

mediocre citizen. exchanged

for the morally flourishing community and a hatred of the Freedom (here, the absence of constraints) would have to be
since moral
often

for

"virtue,"

repression, outfitting citizens

with a stan once a

dard

moral

uniform, is
placed

the cost of moral perfection.

Moreover,
appear

premium
achieved

was

on

virtue,

individuals invites

would a

have to
of

to have
personal

it. Such

pretense

inevitably

host

vices,

from

hypocrisy
must

to public tyranny. Both the Solitaire and the

liberal citizen, then,

private exis

be

protected

from

missionaries of

virtue, lest their peaceful,

tence be shattered

by fierce,

public crusades.

Such protection, however, is

costly.

Alone,

for

moral

evil;

yet as

Solitaires

we are not

Solitaires, there is no occasion truly human. Together, in association

as
a tangle of predictable per emerge and catch us

with

others,

psychological and social

complexities,

sonal and public actions and

reactions,
evil.

inevitably
Social is

in the
may

latticework

of moral

and physical

and personal reformation

spare us some

harm. Yet the

snare of evil rooted

fundamentally
become
Here

inescapable

and

is

therefore radical:

it becomes

in

us as we

social creatures.

We

cannot escape moral

evil, then, unless we

our

cast off our social nature.

This, how
again con

ever,

would

entail

forsaking
of

humanity

as

well.

we

are
of

fronted
that

with the

tragedy

Rousseau's thought

and the

horns

the dilemma

faces liberal society, namely, how to achieve a robust morality while escap ing seemingly inevitable harm that flows from associations. If Rousseau highlighted the moral implications of the ignorance of vice, it was to compare
the the

benefits

of amoral creatures who

know

no virtue to the

liabilities
is

of moral

creatures who practice vice.

The

Solitaires'

ignorance

of vice

what won them

the appellation,

"naturally

good."

Now, however, I

want to argue that the

Gar

den, in
or

spite of all

its advantages,

was no paradise on earth.

All things

consid

ered, it was

not a suitable place pace

brutish,

Hobbes, but
happiness
nor

for humans to dwell. To be sure, it wasn't nasty neither was it ideal or even adequate, because
could take root there.

neither genuine

morality

Lessons from the Garden

In
a gloss on

193
only
what

Rousseau, Judith Shklar has

others."8

written,

"morality is born

with an awareness of

Awareness

of

others,

however, is precisely

the

Solitaires lack

and what

gives

them their well-deserved name. Are they,

then, immoral? Perhaps they are, according to some accounts of immorality. The Christian tradition, for example, counts as immoral sins of commission and

The Solitaires may do little harm, but they also neglect to do good. From this view, then, it might appear that the Solitaires are immoral. This view
omission.

is

not

limited to Christianity:

other religious

and secular traditions condemn

moral

inactivity, for example, the

state.

passive acceptance of

the brutal practices of

applies

the

German Nazi

Yet it is

not clear that

"sins

omission

of

to the
none.

Solitaires, because they have Hence Rousseau, for good

amoral.

not neglected their obligations

they have
are

reason,

contended

that
no

they

fundamentally
relation

The Solitaires,

"having
be

between them

kind

of moral

or

known obligations,
virtues"

could

neither good nor p.

bad,

could

have

neither vices nor

(O.c, 3:152; Inequality-,

71).
years

Although for the last two hundred

Rousseau has been

accused of

ideal

izing
claim

the that

Solitaires,
they
were

the noble savages,

he himself

lovely

moral creatures.

was usually careful not to Against Hobbes, for example, he

but only that they were not wicked and vicious (Inequality, pp. 71-72; O.c, 3:153). The Solitaires were neither mean-spirited egoists nor well-intended altruists. Nor did they occupy
argued not

that the Solitaires were good and virtuous,

some moral
vance a

location between
of

egoism

and

altruism.

Not

desiring

here to
as

ad

definition

morality, I think

we can nevertheless

Rousseau,
gations.

any tion, the Solitaire cannot be said to have occupied even a pedestrian location. It inhabited no moral position, because the Garden permitted no

that morality entails, among other Insofar as the Solitaire did not owe its

safely assume, things, some set of duties or

"neighbor"

did

obli

moral considera moral mean

ingful "awareness

others."

"meaningful,"

of

realize that

the qualification,

is

I have playing a large role here in my argument. It is required because, as Solitaire's shown, there are in fact at least two relations in the Garden: first, the
relation

to

itself,

which

is

prompted

by

self-love

(amour de soi);

and

second,

the Solitaire's
passion. others.

relation

to other sentient creatures, which

some

is

prompted

The Garden did allow, then,

we

type

of

duty

to self and

by com duty to
pity

As

have seen, however, the

are slight.

moral consequences of self-love and correspond

in the Garden

They

roughly

to

what might without

be

our moral
others

praise of one who manages to care gratuitous pain.

for

him- or

herself

causing

Most

animals would merit such praise.

We

can

appreciate

why Rousseau arnorality to

and some

tempted to prefer

passive

active meanness. protection of

modem-day liberals would be The Solitaires personify individual

pursuits above all

the

vision of a

else as

long
is

society that places the as the individual commits

interested in

no gratuitous

harm. Such

a society, of

course,

not

sins of omission.
sister's

The

age-old question about our

"keeper"

obligation

to act as our brother's or

extreme

is

addressed

in the

nega
en-

tive

by

the

liberalism

exemplified

by

Rousseau's Solitaires. If

we

194
force

Interpretation
moral care
we as

for

our

neighbor, if

we as a

society worry

about sins of omis

sion, then
vision

a people chance sins of commission against our own.

those whose moral

differs from
entraps

We risk

becoming

the wrong

kind

of

keeper,

the

kind that
ian

"the

and causes needless pain.

The line between

guard

and warden

is fine,

and this

frail

boundary

prompts

fears

that attract

liberals
not

to the

Solitaires.9

Still,

the

Solitaires, in
vision

spite of their natural

gentleness, do

even approximate

Rousseau's

for individuals in

modern societies.

As I

have said, he set his sights higher man minimal decency. The stillness of the Solitaire's amoral lives approaches the stillness of death, for in death we escape
relationships, obligations, and concerns,
moral and

otherwise,

and we attain

the

ultimate stillness of the passions: the release appointment and

from both fear

still

and

joy, from dis

portrait of

hope. The Garden is green, but its morality is a by the French

life is the

death, because
existence. nature

the absence of
captured

mortal wound expression

to genuine

human

(This is

for

still-life paintings.

morte.) This is why I have said that the Garden is

not a place

for humans

to

dwell.10

IV. SOLITAIRES, PRISONERS, AND INTERDEPENDENCY BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

Lessons from the Garden

When Rousseau

pushed to

the

limit the idea

of

human

existence

entirely

detached from he
created the

life, Solitaires, one

a public

that
of

is, radically
his
most

self-sufficient and

isolated beings,
In
a

instructive Garden
its

thought experiments.

Weberian fashion,
construct,

we can think of nature's

as an

ideal place,
the

a pristine

from

which to view

the private
some of

life, because

Solitaires, in
from

their

simplicity know

and extremity,

illustrate
were

most notable positive and nega

what we

tive aspects. The

Solitaires

in

a perpetual state of retreat onerous

as the anxieties of public

life, its

responsibilities, commitments,
and

and concerns and past

regarding
not

status and

reputation, money

career, future
and

goals
wars.

promises,

to mention
enjoyed

crushing bureaucracies
many

infernal

The

calm the

Solitaires

is

what

seek on vacations to the

side or on visits a

to museums or parks, in the music of a concert or

respite of a coffee

country the leisure of

long

walk, in the brief

break

or a short nap. of the

More desper
with

ately, our society attempts to attain the

of

tranquility

Solitaires

the aid

self-help books,

New Age videos, sensory deprivation tanks, gravity

boots,

or even a generous

dose

of gin or valium at the end of a

long

day.
a retreat that

The Solitaires, then, keeps them from

tures.

dwelling in a perpetual state of retreat, inflicting gratuitous harm, appear to us as rather

permanence of their withdrawal that

alluring

crea

Yet it is the

illuminates

some troub

ling

aspects of the private

life

and some

hazards

connected with

liberalism. The

Lessons from
Solitaires
were

the

Garden

195

alone, radically

and perpetually.

Tme, they
if they

were not

lonely, for
gregari-

they knew
ousness.

no social

life,

and

hence loneliness

was as meaningless as

Still,

we can note what

they lacked,

even

were not aware of

it.

This is

particularly liberal task, namely, to suggest that some could experi ence a more joyful, moral, or meaningful life if they were willing, for example, to abandon their present quietude and embrace certain risks. Yet we do this all
not a

the

time,

and often

justifiably. If
whose

we are
of

courageous,
appears

we

do

not

hesitate to tell
re yet

the truth to a miss, and

friend

lacking joy.

they address not What, then, were

life way This is essentially friends but society.

the

to be

increasingly lifeless,
do,

what social critics and prophets

Solitaires lacking? The joys friend fete

who

and risks of
with a

association,
which

laughing
Solitaires
ments
'n'

or

crying

with a

is dying,

dining

family

is

struggling, enjoying
also

a public

or religious service that

is

controversial.

The

lacked the

satisfaction

and meaningfulness
such

of public as

commit

and

responsibilities, participating in
shelters

institutions
and

the

PTA,

the

Kids

Cancer program,

for
the

the

homeless

battered women, local

which enlivens

and national elections.

Moreover,

Solitaires lacked that

the
can

young

and sustains the

old, dreams and memories.

These,

we

have seen,

bring
ries

pain, but the hope of a future can also

provide moral

stamina,

and memo

of the past can enrich the present and

help

guide us

into the future. The

stories and memories which

bring joy

to the old, for example, are

typically

not

those of private achievement, but of personal relationships and public activities.

Such memories, here,

are a measure of the

fullness

of one's

life.

By

this mea

sure, the existence of the Solitaires

they lack
a

memories of others.

is empty, because by avoiding association, If the Solitaires lack dreams and memories, then

society of Solitaires, an oxymoron only in its extremity, lacks plans for the future and a treasury of traditions from the past. Without traditions, this society,
this group of disparate

individuals, has
such as of

no

identity

as a people, no celebrated

historical
lessons
this

achievements

the abolishment of slavery, and no acquired

wars.

such as the

horrors

impossible

Without

a vision of the

future,

society has

no shared projects such as universal

health care,

no public goals

such as the eradication of

racism,

no

hope

of a

better future. highlight the

poten

The

conceptual

purity

of the

Solitaires

allowed them to

tial serenity and emptiness of the private life. That same purity,

however,

also

imposes
private private

limit
and

on the

efficacy

of

life life

its

relation

to public. The limit to a public

employing the Solitaires to illuminate the is this: insofar as the

Solitaires'

cannot

be

contrasted

clear that

they

can

have

a genuine private

life, for they have none, it is life. Ironically, by confronting

lesson. The
absence of a replete public

un

this

limit

we

learn from the Solitaires their

most valuable

public and

private life mutually define each other. In the there can be no robust private life. We cannot

life,
the

make sense of perpetual retreat.

For

example, without the

pressing

commitments of

the public

life,

one of

chief goods of the private

life,

that of

temporary

escape, becomes hollow.

With-

196
out

Interpretation
the associations of the public that of

life,

one of the chief pleasures of

the private
con

life,

being
be

alone, quickly
counted as

turns into the pain of loneliness.

and unusual
social creatures, public

Solitary

finement

could

"cruel

because the
that

joy

of solitude

becomes bitter

grief

for

is, for humans,

a

when

solitude ceases to

be

a retreat

from

life, but becomes

way

of

life."

Lessons from Prison

the Solitaires have taught us about the necessity of a public

Unexpectedly,
life.

By

reflecting

briefly

now on

the life of

inmates in contemporary

maximum

security prisons, public life in order to have sity

of a private

we can see

that as the Solitaires revealed the

a private

life,

prisoners can

necessity of a demonstrate the neces

we will see a

life in

order

to have a public life.

Ultimately
for

that in
private

the prison, as
nor public

in the Garden, there life.

evident

are conditions neither

genuinely

It is
against

rather

that the modern

prison

system

works

the development of the

prisoners'

private

life. The

essence of prison

systematically life
lan
the

is

regimentation:

when and where

to wake, work, eat, walk, and recreate are

determined

by

prison administrators and enforced

by

guards.

complex

guage and structure of prisoner's private

milieu of

lines

and

bells,

of orders and regulations ensure that

life is

absorbed

the prison. Insofar as

seem

effectively by life in the prison is the

the

institutional, bureaucratic
paradigm of

institutional

life, it may

to exemplify public

the prisoner's private

organized without

life. Yet it does not, and exactly insofar as life is impeded. Since prison life is rigidly and entirely
consultation with

any

the prisoners, prisoners have no oppor

make no

tunity issues,
their
shape

to fashion their
shoulder no

daily life. They

and

decisions, deliberate

on

no

responsibilities,

lives have been defined

their public

because every aspect and consideration of furnished. In the absence of opportunities to internal
resources are not exercised.

life,

the

prisoners'

Au

tonomy, the
of

prize of the
with all

Solitaires, is utterly
its
similarities to

pared

in

prison.

Rousseau's

notion

inwardness,
cannot

Kant's

notion of

liberty,

namely, to

obey the reasonable law that one prescribes One

for oneself, has

no

no place

in

prison.

be "true to

oneself when there are no opportunities to

be

oneself.

When

enforced routine

determines all, there is

a

autonomy,

and

hence there is

no genuine private

life.12

Likewise, solitary confinement,

enhance

human

sentenced to the

Garden,

cannot

the private
on

life

as

long

as

such solitude each of us

is imposed

externally.

If it

borders
place

being

cruel, it is

because

to

visit

voluntarily,

not a condition to

already knows that solitude is a be enforced. The difference be

the most pleasant unions and
and coerced most painful

tween

voluntary

and coerced sex

is that

of one of

one of

the most violent crimes; the

solitude

is that

of one of the most

difference between voluntary satisfying retreats and one of the

Lessons from
punishments.

the

Garden
of

197
a

It is

often reported that a

loss

of

self, that

is,

loss

identity, is

common outcome of radical seclusion.

Evidently,

to know ourselves we need to

know

others.

Without

a public

context, the

private

life

suffers.

The converse,

however, is equally
private

the

tme. Without the opportunity to develop and exercise one's internal resources, the public life suffers. Prisoners, then, like Solitaires, illustrate the intricate and interdependent relation between the

life

and

public and private.

We

used

the Garden as an ideal type to highlight features of the private

that we celebrate; can we not use the prisons to

life,

including
laudable

features

illuminate

aspects of

the public life? Perhaps only this: prisons

reveal our capac

ity

to escape ourselves, our private worries and concerns, in the throes of public
noted that

life. We have
worries of

in

solitude we can

the public

affairs chronic

of

the private
the

illness,
life
as

life; there are life, to evade, for death of a friend, or a

venture

temporarily elude the anxieties and times, however, when we want to escape the
example, our preoccupation
marital problem.
with

routinized public

life

can

facilitate

such a retreat.

private

we

On occasion, then, we wish to leave behind our into the public, and it is this abandonment that
Blaise
temptation of averting
attention

prisons effect

methodically,

with or without the consent of the prisoner.

Pascal

cautioned us against the

from

oneself

by

dwelling
his

in the distractions

of the public world.

want to

suggest,

however,

that

warnings about

side themselves.

divertissement apply only to those who regularly exist out Achieving temporary relief from pressing personal concerns in
public activities should not

by immersing
We
can
us

oneself

be

dogmatically
can retreats

shunned.

describe

such relief as a retreat

into

public

life. Prisons

highlight

for

this

form

of

retreat, but

they do
be

not provide

it, for

into
a

the public,
of

like those into the private,

cease to

retreats once

they become

way

life,

especially a coerced way of life. We can, then, make no more

sense of a permanent retreat

into the

private

life,

as

illustrated Lack

by

the

Garden,

than

into the

prison.

of a public

life thwarts the

public prison

life, as Solitaire's private life; lack

public

illustrated

by

the

of a private of the past,

life impedes the

today's

prisoner's

life. Like Rousseau's Garden is

no place

maximum

security

for

human to dwell. Prisons

have
serve

exemplified

for

us the worst aspects of public

life,

and

they
and

can

thereby
us.

to highlight those

features

of public

life that frighten

disturb

bureaucratic society that insidiously Minimally, they strips from its citizens their autonomy, their capacity for public involvement, and the satisfaction that attends such commitment. In the extreme, they incar
elucidate the specter of a nate

Orwellian

nightmares of a totalitarian state

in

which

there is no privacy
and

(not is

even at the toilet can one

be

alone with one's

thoughts)
to
vote

in

which there

no public ethic of social concern

complete

(not

being

able
an

prisoner's ment).

helplessness to influence find

In

either scenario, we

neither personal

simply reflects the environ intractable utterly fulfillment nor public moral
of others.

ity, but

loneliness

and alienation, even amid the

company

198

Interpretation
COMMUNITARIANISM:

V. BETWEEN LIBERALISM AND

COMMON GROUND AND INEVITABLE TENSION

These

reflective

exercises,

excursions

into solitary

gardens

and

totalitarian

prisons, have the

mon ground.

merit of

placing liberals
extreme

and communitarians on some com

By

exploring

cases, liberals (champions of the politics of

of the politics of the common

rights)
can

and communitarians appreciate each

(champions

good)

better

liberals

the

dangers

of a

fulfillment;
the

our reflections

fears. Our study of the Garden presents to society excessively dedicated to quests for private on the prison, in contrast, present to communitarians
others' citizens'

dangers

of a totalized public existence that

truncates
rights

private

lives. from
citi

Moreover,
icance

we

learned from the Solitaires that individual life in

which

lose their

signif

without a robust public

to exercise those rights; and

the prisoners we discovered that a public life

zens are

loses its distinctive

merits

if

denied liberties

required

to pursue that

We have seen, in fact, that the

on each other.

public and

life according to private mutually define

other.

conscience. and

depend
private

The

one

enhances, or conversely, threatens the

The

life
rary
not

provides not
retreats

only from public anxieties; the

renewal, energy,

negative goods vis-a-vis

the public, for example, tempo

private

life

also enriches the public

life life

with a sense of

and vision.

Likewise,

the public
sustains

life

provides

only distractions from

purpose,
suspect

our private

concerns, but

the private

with a sense of

identity,

and animation.

I
our

that the current profusion of liberal and communitarian debate in that we, as a people, are grappling with the often conflict the public and private. It
and

society

suggests

ing

values and practices associated with polarization

is tempting to

lament the
share of

between liberals
perhaps

bewailing.13

Yet

the current

communitarians; I have done my debate is not a sign of a paralyzing

impasse, but
and private

of our society's

desire to

remain committed to

both

public projects

fulfillment. If the debate

no

seems

intransigent,

perhaps that

is because

there can
capture

victory here without some loss: no settlement can perfectly the merits of both sides. And perhaps this is one debate that ought not

be

to cease, but should continue, albeit

contexts with

in

various

forms,
to

as we struggle

in different
commu when

how to

express

our

commitment

both liberal
things,

and

nitarian goods.

This

struggle would one case

entail, among

other

deciding

and

how to compromise, in

favoring

the private,

in

another the public,

but generally allowing the creative, though private fulfillment and social cooperation to In this
struggle

sometimes
remain.

tragic, friction between bears both

commu

I have found Rousseau helpful. His

of

work

nitarian and

notably in The The Government of Poland; and a private track found most notably in The New Eloise and Reveries of the Solitary Walker. Yet even within these works one can find still another path, one that navigates between the
a public

liberal lines
and

thought:

track

found

most

Social Contract

public and private without

attempting

to

fuse them. Of

the

three, this

path

is

the

Lessons from
most

the

Garden

199
un
self-

stressful,

yet

it

pervades

Rousseau's

work.

In his characteristically
this tensive path:

systematic

fashion, Rousseau depicted

renunciation,

various aspects of

assertion versus

private perfection versus public versus

compromise, fi

delity
tion

to one's own

spirituality
versus

loyalty
he

to a provincial civil religion,

personal

insouciance

social seriousness.

Rousseau

recognized the

fric

between the he

public and

private,
them

yet

refused to surrender either side of

the conflict, this

was

preferring to
usually

keep

satisfied.

together, precariously and in tension. With Ultimately, his refusal to evade the tension be
rather

tween the public and private,

contributions

but

to wrestle with

it, is

one of

his is

greatest a

to modern social thought. For to tolerate such tension

hall

mark of

modern, democratic societies.

societies
such

Although contemporary liberal

possess at

as

that of the United States

both liberal

and communitarian

characteristics,

they

seem

increasingly,
Like Rous
For
alluring.

least for the last two hundred years, to follow the

we are captivated

private path.

seau,

by

the

Solitaires, for they

are

deservedly

this reason it

behooves us to be especially attentive to their lessons. Should we follow the way of the Solitaires too nearly, we risk losing not only a vital public but private existence, for we have seen that the two mutually define each other.
Like Aristotle
self alone and

Montaigne, Rousseau

came

to understand that to love

outside oneself and
self-

one

leads to

being

unable

to love anything

eventually

even one's own self. and

The

self that

is

whole

is both

and

other-regarding,

is willing to cope with this awkward vision. Likewise, the democratic soci ety that is sound both safeguards private pursuits and encourages public proj ects. The individual, civic minded and free spirited, was Rousseau's cherished

ideal,
In

and

he

wrestled with

how this
with

complex

ideal

could

be

realized. was never en

spite of

his infatuation

the

Solitaires, then, Rousseau

tirely
love

satisfied with the

safe and
and

life they represented. Too much was missing from their innocent existence. Although they committed no cruelty, they failed to
to be committed to things outside of themselves.

They failed

as

human

beings. This failure is

proved to

by

no means an

indictment

of

liberalism. Liberalism has

rights and cur

be

an

impressive
pushed

social

order, establishing individual

far, however, if divorced from its opposing com munitarian counterpart, the goods of liberalism become threatened. Liberalism would cease to be genuinely human if, like the Solitaires, the safety of the
tailing brutality. If
too

individual

were to

become

not a

continue as a
must remain

promising

social
wed

primary but the sole goal. For liberalism to order, it must hazard the risks of association: it
communitarianism.

awkwardly

to

NOTES
1. Are
humans in Nature's Garden
we

we

to

understand

the state of nature

as a

bygone age,
natural

an

eternal possibility, or a

heuristic device? Can

ties?

make

any

sense of

Rousseau's

humans
meta-

divorced from

all

social

Must

we

discard

this notion as

bad

epistemology,

fallacious

200

Interpretation
we

physics, or can
ety?

learn something from it

about

the

problems and promises of solitude and soci

I do

not

deal

directly

with these questions

in this essay, because I

am not

presently

concerned

Rousseau actually thought that he successfully described a prelinguistic, Rather, I use his descriptions of the state of nature to tell us something about his
with whether

asocial

being.

philosophical

anthropology, especially as this

relates

to the

relation

between the

public and private.

2. Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques, in Oeuvres completes (henceforth, O.c), edited by Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Pldiade, 1959-69), 1:728. In the following citations, I provide reference to a translation whenever possible. When the French reference comes first, the

is my own. 3. The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, translated by G. D. H. Cole, revised by J. H. Brumfitt and John C. Hall (London: Dent, Everyman's Library, 1988), p. 84; O.c, 3: 164.
translation

4. John Harsanyi, "Rational Choice Models

Theories,"

of

Behavior

versus

Functionalist

and

Conformist

World Politics 22 (1969): 524.

Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago:

5. Jean Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction, translated University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 295.

by

6. See Chapter 6,

"Overcoming

Moral Evil: Rousseau

Rousseau, Religion,

and

the Relation between the Public

7. Richard Rorty, for example, celebrates is not a common language but just susceptibility to to that special sort of pain which the brutes do not share with the humans
with the rest of the species

Politics of the Heart: Private Life, in progress. ironist" the "liberal who "thinks that what unites her
at

the

Crossroads,''

and

pain and

in

particular

humiliation. On her but

of

conception, human solidarity is

not a matter of

sharing

a common

truth or a common goal

which one
and

sharing a common selfish hope, the hope that into one's final vocabulary will not be bridge: Cambridge

one's world

the

little things

has

woven

destroyed"

(Contingency, Irony,

Solidarity

[Cam

University Press, 1989],

p.

92).

9. Rousseau's
unnecessary
and

8. Judith Shklar, Men and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 48. own infatuation with the Solitaires is not merely an expression of liberal fear
and painful coercion.
others

of

The Solitaires

also represent the

fear

of

hurting
such

needlessly, seeks to escape social

obligations as

individual who, out of involvement insofar as that is

self-love
possible.

Hence

"private"

even

those that come with

friendship,

marriage, parenting,

religious and political associations are to

be dodged.
a

10. Support for this

conscience

claim

is found in Rousseau's "Lettre

man who

Christophe de Beaumont": "The has

seen no relationships.

is

non-existent

in the

has
.

made no comparisons and

.

In this

state the man

physical

Inequality"

knows only himself. He neither hates nor loves anything; limited to instinct alone, he is no one, he is animal; it is this that I showed in my Discourse on (O.c, 4:936).
solitude as one

synonymous with
and the same.

11. In general, we should think of it. For the Solitaires,

write

form

of the private

life,

and not as

being

however,

the two

solitude and the private

life

are one

12. I
what

here

of

how

maximum

security

prisons are

designed to

affect

prisoners, and
prison reform

not of

individual

prisoners

have

managed

to accomplish in prisons.

Moreover,

in

the

United States, especially in the

aftermath of the

tunities to enhance their public and private

Attica riots, has brought lives. New religious freedoms

prisoners some oppor

granted to

Muslim in
to enjoy

mates, for example, have allowed them to observe

places

dietary

"restrictions"

and

holy days,

designated for

public and private

prayer,

and to

form links

with religious communities out

side the prison.

rary Social

13. Mark S. Cladis, A Communitarian Defense of Liberalism: Emile Durkheim Theory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 3-5.

and

Contempo

Nietzsche's Impatience:
The Spiritual Necessities
Thomas Heilke
of

Nietzsche's Politics

University of Kansas

The everyday
problems

stories of our time

have

come to

include

not

merely the typical

and even

of political

mle, but large-scale alienation,

displacement,

genocide on a grand scale.

And

so we

look for salutary

principles or redescriptions

for the invigoration

of

post-foundationalist,

pluralist-agonistic

democracies, in
in this

which peaceful coexistence

even when confrontational peaceful

remains the order of

the day. John

context as

Rawls has described the in

liberal

pluralism we seek

"an overlapping

consensus of reasonable comprehensive one

doctrines in
above

which peaceful toleration other universal claims to

form

or another carries

the

day

any

truth"

(1993,

pp.

xvi, 134ff). Friedrich Nietzsche has

been favored among some draw principles for such a

to create a kind of

political theorists as a thinker peaceful coexistence.

from

whom one

The intent

of such readings

may is

"Nietzschean"

"polite

agonism"

for liberal democracy. indicates

a problem

But in late
poses
or

1888, Nietzsche

erased a text.

This

erasure

he

for politely agonistic enterprises of any kind, whether based on his texts not. He had just completed The Antichrist, which was to be the first volume

of a planned
all
Values.1

four-volume
The last

work

that

he provisionally

entitled was

section

of

this

"Transvaluation"

Transvaluation of Decree Against

Christianity,
sures

a table of seven and

laws

banning Christianity, instituting

punishments

legal

mea

for its destruction, The

priests

prescribing

for

recalcitrant practi

(who teach anti-nature) would be imprisoned or banished. shrines would be eradicated and Christian vocabulary transfigured. Nietzsche expunged this Decree from his text as he was about to send the final
tioners.

Christian

manuscript to the publisher.

Having

written the

first late

notes

for The Antichrist in

that year

the spring of

1888, he declared it
page of

completed

by

autumn of

(1986a,

8:492). The last

and

his

manuscript

had

rough notes scribbled on

its back,

he did

not want them to

distract the

publisher.

Accordingly, he

glued the

page on which the

thereby covering up the notes, and making the Decree the last page instead. He repealed his legislation by gluing a further blank sheet over this sheet, so that only the first sheet, containing the last part of the last aphorism (62) of The Antichrist,
was written

Decree

to the back of this final page,

was

actually

used

by

the eventual

publisher.2

My

thanks to Paul

D'Anieri, Michael Gillespie,

and

Jan Opperman for their helpful

comments

on earlier

drafts.

interpretation, Winter

1997, Vol. 24, No. 2

202

Interpretation
argument of the present
and Nietzsche's essay is that this Decree larger project, which he seems to

The first

subsequent revocation are emblematic of a

inception of The Birth of variety of forms since the Tragedy. The tone of the Decree is generally consistent with his wider, strident diatribe against Christianity in The Antichrist and elsewhere, but it goes a step

have had in

mind

in

further

by

proposing to
echoed

abolish

the

anticipated a new era

its

public

by force. The Decree declaration being "the day of

religion

seems to

have
that

salvation"

Nietzsche

in his

subscript

to the Preface of Twilight of the

Idols,

and also

much earlier. problem that

Nietzsche's
he

revocation of the

Decree is equally

emblematic of a or

recognized
and

in the kind
which

of political

founding

transformation

for

which

he hoped

to

ond argument of

the present

in his
also

revocation

imposes

ostensibly directed. The sec the problem that Nietzsche recognized that is essay caveat not significant only for his own project, but

his Decree

was

for

post-Nietzschean

appropriations

of

his thought for

projects

(such

as

polite, democratic agonism) that he did

not

directly

support or even excoriated.

promulgation and re

It is the dual implication

peal

of

Nietzsche's double

move

that I explore here. The Decree is an admittedly minor incident in a larger corpus; I employ it here principally as an illustrative but significant entree into a politically crucial problem in this larger Nietzschean corpus and its
much current appropriations.
of the

Accordingly,

the considerations of
projects

Nietzschean texts
proceed

and

implications for

"post-Nietzschean"

will

on parallel

tracks.

But Nietzsche is
work

thinker of moments and a writer of multiple voices. His

is

perhaps

more

than that of any other philosopher.

self-consciously susceptible to Richard Rorty has

multiple

interpretations his
most

suggested that

important

voice

is the
of

universalization of a

local,

narcissistic

project,

and that

the political though

import

his thought for liberal

politics

is, therefore,
useful

nil.

Even

Rorty finds

aspects of

Nietzsche's philosophizing

for

redescrip-

tion of liberal
pluralism to

tion

democracy, there are no salutary political principles for liberal be found in Nietzsche's corpus, only a program for private perfec that should, in Rorty's view, remain private (1989, pp. 44-45, 83, 95, 99on the other

100, 118-21). William Connolly,

thought
ern

hand,

suggests that

Nietzsche's
of mod

has important

potential as a

therapeutic for the

"homesickness"

political

thought. Nietzsche teaches us to abandon the drive for

and conclusive resolution

finality,

absolute us

identity,

in

our political

thinking. He teaches

how to live

pluralist age

argument

the violence it breeds in a late-modem 137-75). Bonnie Honig extends Connolly's (Connolly [1993a], by taking up Rorty's evaluation (rearticulated by Dana Villa) and
without resentment and pp. which politi

causes
cal

suggesting that Nietzsche's aesthetic preparation or self-fashioning, Rorty to disregard Nietzsche as having any contribution to current

his politics, but a necessary condition of Nehamas' a possible politics in modernity. In this way, Alexander seemingly apolitical interpretation of Nietzsche's self-constitution becomes politicized,
not a crucial of

debate, is

limitation

Nietzsche's Impatience
which

203

is to say, it becomes important for our life together with others, and not merely in our private sphere (Honig [1993b], pp. 531-32; Nehamas [1985]).
Still others, denial for
of the

most prominent

among them Bruce Detwiler

own apparent

and

Bernhard

Tau-

reck, suggest that such a pluralistic

post-Nietzschean politics seems

to include a
politics

importance
his
on

of

Nietzsche's

(and abhorrent)

interpreting

overall thought.

Such interpretations then

deploy

portions of

Nietzsche's thought
rejected

behalf

of projects

that Nietzsche himself seems to have

pp.

(Detwiler [1990],
and

pp.

1-16; Taureck [1989],

17-73, 193-205).
or
proto-

Both Detwiler fascist

political

Taureck find in Nietzsche

and agenda

a radical-aristocratic

theory

that are closely consistent with and cannot be

divorced from the

critique

other aspects of as

his thought. Rorty's interpretation joins this

a

when, insofar

he does discern
in
a

politics

in Nietzsche's projects,
polity.

he

excludes

it from

consideration

liberal-pluralistic

For liberals,

Nietzsche (like

political conversation

the madness on
engage

Loyola) is a madman whom we must banish as a partner in (Rorty [1988], pp. 268-69). Taureck and Detwiler engage a different key, tracing its trajectory as though we do have to
we engage

Nietzsche politically if
on

him

at all. even

Continuing

this register, it may

be that

though proponents of a

democratic agonism, a polite perspectivalism, or a new, post-Nietzschean plu ralism have generally considered Nietzsche's psychology carefully as part of their own projects, they are prone to dismiss too readily Nietzsche's caveats for
the enterprises
rate or

they base, in
democratic
to reconsider
nobility.

part, on

readings of

his texts. As

we seek to

invigo

re-form
well

would

do

instead for

a new

partially Nietzschean grounds, we closely why Nietzsche rejected such moves, calling As Connolly notes, however, "[n]o political thepluralism on

matization of

Nietzschean
The

sentiments can

dispense

with

selecting

a context
of the

for

its
ism in

presentation.

point

then, is

not

to offer the true account

tme

Nietzsche
one

hiding

behind

a series of

masks, but to construct a

enact"

post-Nietzschean-

echoes

is willing to endorse and (Connolly [1991], p. 197). Foucault's assertion that to make Nietzsche "groan and
itself
vitiate an

Connolly
does
not

protest"

and of

interpretation, especially if
we
tribute"

the

insights

and strategies

hold dear. Indeed, to deform and use to it, and faithfulness or un Nietzsche's thought is the only "valid (Foucault [1980], pp. 53, faithfulness to Nietzsche is of "absolutely no
promote

it delivers

the projects

interest"

54).3

But this

move

may overly

privilege

the Nietzsche of our choice. The

of

present paper offers a

tizes

reading relatively Nietzschean-based respectful, democratic

circle

pedestrian

Nietzsche that

problema-

agonism

from

within

the
a

Nietzschean

helpful
quotes;

partner

way that may continue to make in liberal discussion. It does not haul forth threadbare

itself, but in

Nietzsche

"fascist"

instead, it

recounts one of

Nietzsche's stories, the

plot of which

itself

embodies the spiritual and psychological obstacles that nism

problematize polite ago

for him. While it

acknowledges

the
of

pluralist-agonistic

possibilities

in

Nietzsche's texts

amidst the

multiplicity

Nietzschean voices, it

emphasizes a

204

Interpretation
problematic

discordant
consider

in this

particular chorus.

Thus,

while

it is important to
vision,

Nietzsche's image

of the

best regime, his

aristocratic political

and certain of ested

his

political reflections

in these

as the context

for

one

regarding human excellence, I am inter specific spiritual indicator that he explicitly

of

recognized as a problem

for the instantiation

any

of these

images,

even as

they

are

incorporated into the

pluralist appropriation of

Nietzsche's thought. To

be clear, then, this essay does not offer a comprehensive critique of Nietzsche's politics per se, but a Nietzschean caveat, delivered out of his own texts, for the
possible

instantiation is
not

of a particular political
cannot

image derived from his

writings.

This
work

also

to claim that we

draw inspirations from Nietzsche's

that arrive at conclusions at odds with Nietzsche's own. It

is only to
I

reflect on

Nietzsche's
Detwiler

likely
and

attenuation of one of them.

Following
preserve the

Taureck (supported in

an

ironic fashion
more

by Rorty),
on

possibility that Nietzsche's position

is both

defensible

his

own grounds and more critical of

liberal

appropriations of
not a

his thought than is

frequently
which are as an

acknowledged.

This

move

is

defense

of

Nietzsche's politics,
elitism

repugnant, but an insistence that

"underdetermined"

taking Nietzsche's
his
project

integral

and not

part of

seriously

as well the

difficulties

this project raises

for

seriously implies taking quite Nietzschean defense of

this
particular

agonistic yet tolerant pluralism.

The

difficulty

for Nietzsche, in
we

instance, is
spiritual.

not so much a

conceptual, philosophical,

or theoretical one as

it is

Pursuing

this interpretation

implies that its

address, even if
of

often

obliquely, the
offered

provocative and

intelligent interpretation
of estimable

Nietzsche's

politics

by

Mark Warren, both because

so

characteristics, and be

cause

it is

decisively

at odds with the present

interpretation.

To
central

argue that

psychology (into which he folded concerns of the spirit) is to Nietzsche's thought is to state a seemingly obvious point on which all
agreement.

are

agreed, but this formal consensus produces little substantive

suggests

Warren
politics

that the

close
on

holds

together

only

relationship between Nietzsche's psychology and the basis of a number of weak, "philosophically

underdetermined,"

assumptions within

Nietzsche's
nature.

thought concerning contem

argues

porary that Nietzsche

most

social organizations and

not

human

More forcefully, Warren

only

misunderstands modern societies

(thereby
pp.

missing the
on mat

important

sources of modern

nihilism), but that his own thought

ters of the political

characterizes

is

internally

inconsistent (Warren [1988],

209-10). He
conservative. critique of

Nietzsche's

elitism or aristocratism as

(situationally)
Taureck

This

ascription

alone, if it were accurate, would provide a strong

or

indeterminism

inconsistency

in Nietzsche's

work.

and or

Detwiler,
proto-fas-

however, have both shown that Nietzsche's aristocratism, elitism, cism is, perhaps, mildly conservative in a situational way, but
Nietzsche
wishes not to return or whereas

also

radical.

Moreover,

preserve, but to dismantle and rebuild anew. Warren discovers a sketchy and fragmented account of poli

tics in Nietzsche's writings, Detwiler and

Taureck discover considerably

more

Nietzsche's Impatience
substantive continuity. a consistent of

205

Accordingly,

this continuity is not underdetermined, but

thread in
as

Nietzsche's

overall thought.

Tracing
in

one particular strand

this

thread,

in this essay,

problematizes

both Nietzsche's

politics and os

tensibly

un-Nietzschean appropriations of that thought

provocative ways.

Contra Warren, then, it

seems that

Nietzsche's

political assumptions are

only

distantly
society:

related to

the specific

institutional

constellations of power

in

modem

they

assessment of eties that

psychology of aesthetics. As Warren considers Nietzsche's liberal democracy, he suggests rightly that for Nietzsche, "soci sustain individual powers are intrinsically more desirable than those
rest on a
state."

displace self-identity onto supra-individual institutions such as the Nietzsche's sentiment appears to be that "all politically sustained hierarchies
that

are

inconsistent

with

the

intersubjective

individuation."

"Why,"

space

of
political

Warren logic
of

asks, "does Nietzsche fail to follow through on the immanent

his

philosophy?"

rather

is to say, why does he take the route of than egalitarianism and intersubjective pluralism? Warren
which

aristocratism

suggests that

the answer lies

in Nietzsche's inadequate

characterization

of

modernity (pp.

225, 223). It
tique of

may,

however, lie in
the

disregards. If

we reconsider

Nietzsche's psychology that Warren the psychological dimensions of Nietzsche's cri

aspects of and

Romanticism,

Enlightenment, Christianity,
specific episodes underdetermined nihilism

democratic

notions

of equal and universal

rights, then the

will consider

be

philosophically Collaterally for Nietzsche,

more than

dreams

and

here may declarations.

is in its
not

ultimate

origins, manifestations,

and consequences a

spiritual-psychological,

first

and

foremost

a political or

philosophical problem.

(On Nietsche's

"immanentist"

spiritual

sensitivity, see

Voegelin,
no

pp.

8ff.) Certainly,
medieval

the sum total of politics

is

not

one, not even

thinkers, has

ever

thought so.

simply spiritual, and For Nietzsche, even

with

the

Genealogy of Morals,

that most spiritual of

his analyses, begins

But important in
a

concrete, historical instance that

or spiritualized aspirations were

then produces spiritual outcomes.

spiritual

for Nietzsche
best

an

aspect of

politics,

and one that problematized

of

life together
seem the

with others

way that

made a

kind
over

"aristocratic

radicalism"

choice of regimes.

Accordingly,

pace Warren is not primarily a social enterprise, but a spir coming nihilism itual one that has corresponding social connotations. It requires discipline.

Nietzsche's

point

everyone, is

needed

here is nearly Christian: hard work, perhaps not attainable for to overcome the nihilism that hounds our age. Nietzsche
Roman Catholicism to because
of

repeats a traditional move of

which of

kind

elitism,4

of spiritual

Warren

perhaps overlooks

his

antagonistic mischaracterizations

Christianity

and a prior commitment to egalitarianism.

Nietzsche certainly

offers a repugnant proto-fascist elitism, of the spiritual necessities

agonism. a

but
a

also a thoughtful problematization

postmodern

demanded

by

politics

of pluralistic

explore

Nietzsche's

own politics within this problematic not order

to offer

full-blown
problem.

account of

them, but in

to

contextualize

his

own treatment of

the

206

Interpretation

THE DECREE AGAINST CHRISTIANITY

From the
was

emblematic episode of the

Decree, let
and what

us pose this question:

actions

What

Nietzsche

doing
of

with the

Decree,

do his

teach us about
summarizes

his
the

ultimate view of politics?

Like Detwiler,

who admits and

pp.

ably

indeterminacy

Nietzsche's texts ([1990],

9-13), I

make a

determina

tion, however indeterminative. In contradistinction to Detwiler and Taureck, let us focus more directly on what Nietzsche actually does with his texts than on
what

those texts alone may or may not in themselves imply. The point, then,

is

not what the

text of

Decree substantively adds to Nietzsche's text, which, in the con Antichrist, is not much, but what Nietzsche's activities surrounding this

text add to our understanding of what

about what

he

was

trying

to

do,

and what

he thought
refraction

he

was

trying

to do. Let us attempt, then, a

biographical

of the textual and philosophical claims of

Detwiler

and

Taureck. This method, I

think, is consistent with Nietzsche's advice to his readers that they read texts as indicators of deeper processes and motives than the surface of these texts might
suggest

([1974a],

pp.

3, 7, 8, 9). It is
he had

also consistent with a suggestion

he

made

in 1886 that his

published works were travel surmounted

books
writing

(Wanderbiicher)
each of them.

about ex

periences or problems

by

These jour

nals of exploration and

overcoming
them

are means

by

which

his
p.

probe and overcome what ails

([1986b], II: Preface,

may also 6). It is this auto

readers

biographical
politics
part of

may strategically deploy here. The of the postmodemity Nietzsche was hoping to foretell and that was one his lifelong project of writing, required a constant self-overcoming. As
aspect of work that we

his

we shall

see, deep-rooted
and a

impatience, born
of other
of

of

resentment, along

with

weariness,
at

self-delusion,

host

vices,

must

be continually overcome,
which more

least

in the

soul of the

donator

horizons (about

later),

to make any

postmodern politics possible.

Acknowledging
reading
of

the

indeterminacy

of

Nietzsche's

texts, let

us consider

instead

an act attached

consistent with one particular

epitomizing text and Nietzsche's texts generally. It is an act meaning

a must

to a particular,

concerning

text,

and

therefore an

act whose

ultimately be dis

cerned with reference to a

act of writing.

Thus,

what

does,

as well as writes.

text, merely merely a textual is rendered by the story of what he What did Nietzsche do? He erased a text. It was an
nor

text, but it is

not

Nietzsche

means

erasure of

Nietzsche he

against
of

himself.
promulgation and erasure come to mind.

Four interpretations

Nietzsche's
a

First,
a

perhaps

was

having

tasteless attempt at
was a serious

irony. Third, it is
response to what

bad day. Second, he may have made a bad joke, possible that he really meant it; the he
understood to

decree

be

a serious crisis.
a

Finally,
collapse

perhaps

it is the

product of a moment of madness months

at

situation that ended

less than two

later,

on

in the Piazza Carlo Alberto

Nietzsche
was

Turin. I

deteriorating January 3, 1889, with his propose the following inter

meant what

in

pretation:

having

bad day, but he really

he

wrote.

Nietzsche's Impatience
The
extremism of this

207

decree is
It

an

indicator

of previous sentiments and not a

display

of clinical madness.

was not meant as a

work

joke,

and

it is

consistent with

important
writings.

elements of

his life

that extend much further than to

his last

Although the "Decree

voice

Christianity"

against

echoes a consistent

Nietzschean

that extends

from The Birth

to Ecce Homo and that can

be

tapped

for its for

articulation of a problematic

extending beyond his

part of

own politics to appropria

tions of

his thought for

other sorts of political and moral enterprises,

it

was

him

publicly inadmissible
could not

his

own

enduring

project.

To indicate the

project's

Decree

continuity be he

and precise made

including why Nietzsche believed the I propose first to focus briefly on the prob public,
character,

lems

at which

appears to

have directed the Decree and, second, to

Decree is
not

several

episodes

only enduring thread in his thought, but, more importantly, that its brief existence itself underscores a persistent Nietzschean problematic that extends beyond his

in his

work to show that the

consistent with one

immediate
tions of
about

political
project.

his

intentions into the postmodern, liberal-agonistic A turn to these questions includes a few brief his texts.

appropria
comments

Nietzsche's

use of narratives and various readings of

LIFE AND NIHILISM: NARRATIVES, HORIZONS, AND

NIETZSCHEAN PSYCHOLOGY

Nietzsche declared
one was about to

a new era with

his Decree:

an age

had

ended and a new

begin. This

tion

is

a common motif

tian apocalyptic and the

schema of historical progress, decay, and redemp in Western thought, originating in the Jewish and Chris millennialist literature of the two centuries on either side of
pp.

life

of

Jesus

of

Nazareth (Benz [1966],

the French

1-48).

Having

passed through

the speculation of Joachim of Fiore in the thirteenth century into the modem

era, this schema,

beginning

with

gious and secular

forms in

the writings

of

Enlightenment, has taken both reli the likes of Hegel, Marx, Saint-

Simon, Comte,
moreover, is
ments.

and

Maritain. The

creation of new calendars and of modem

dating

systems,
move

a common

feature

revolutionary
glance

and

Utopian

Yet Nietzsche does

not seem at

first

to

belong

in this illustrious from his writings,

and

company.

Seeking

to banish any notion of historical

reviled

progress

he

seems

to have equally

liberalism,
optimism.

progressivism,

socialism,
seek

which all share a

form

of

historical

On the

other

hand, he did
revealing

the transformation of European

culture and current practices,

rescinded edict.

part of

the shape of this transformation in his

One may delimit to speak, in essence,

"age"

an

by

its

narratives.

To

speak of an

historical

age

is

of a set of stories that

limn for

us the contours of that age.

What is

(and what is not) to an age morally, socially, and politically important

or a political

founding

is indicated

by

what

is included (and

what

is not) in

208

Interpretation
of the

narrative

life

and

times of those who inhabit the age or become

its

legendary

founders

and who shape

it

with their actions and their evaluations of

phenomenon.

those actions. Nietzsche did not ignore this

As

Gary Shapiro

shows, Nietzsche turned

on several and

occasions

from forensic

essays or aphor

isms

to narrative to

describe

deconstruct the
age

values of the present age and

to present the values of

his hoped-for
own

to

come.

These

narratives

include the

story
of

of

Zarathustra, his

tive should not be

ignored),
from

autobiography (whose title from a biblical narra and The Birth, which "offers a continuous picture

Western

history
pp.

earliest

Greece to the

1870"

cultural politics of

(Sha

piro

[1989],

2-3

and passim).
of an end and a new

Nietzsche's declaration define

beginning

(the

great noon of

his

transvaluation) is, therefore, only

edict to
an end and

one of
a new

his

narrative schemata.

His

use of an

initiate
The

beginning,
seems

a new

story, is not, how

ever, what we might

expect

from the foremost

schema

composer of the aphorism and

the genealogist of morals.

psychological agonist or a
nihilism.

too grand for a political and

exegete of

self-creating literatus, too hopeful for the it is

an

Nietzsche's decree is not, of course, a narrative nouncement. It must be understood, however, within
which

imperial

pro

a narrative as

framework,

is the story

of

the

rise

and

decline

of
we

Christianity
consider

he tells it. Space

retelling this story, but when Nietzsche's decree, to declare a new age,
precludes
political

the immediate aim of

we are pointed to a

long-considered

intention,

to establish in a concrete way such a new age, that emerges

in his

writings not merely in his final active years, but from the beginning, from The Birth. From here (and more centrally to my concerns), we are directed to

the spiritual
pluralism.

difficulties that inform Nietzsche's disdain

a contest

and

dislike for liberal

Nietzsche intends

between stories, between

Christianity

and

its offspring
of the

(including liberal pluralism) on the one hand, and his new account present world and the one for which he hopes and toward which he
He declares it
a spiritual
nihilism"

labors

on the other.

battle.
as

Nietzsche
untenability
of things

characterized

"radical it

"the

conviction of an absolute

of existence when

comes

to the highest values one recognizes;

right

plus the realization that we

lack the least

or

to posit a beyond or an in-itself

that might

be divine

incarnate."

morality

"This

realization,

he

continued, "is

a consequence

of

the cultivation of truthfulness

thus itself

consequence of the

faith in

morality"

([1967b], 8). Radical

no possible

nihilism

implies

for him that there

which we can

are no

"objective"

"foundations"

standards,

by

know

right and

wrong, good and evil, true and false. Nietzsche

thought, moreover, that this conclusion about the lack of absolutes in human life was a direct result of a philosophical project, concerning truthfulness itself,
that he

linked

directly

to

Christianity:

Christians

must

believe in

the truthfuless of

God

they may
of the

not

in any

case

admit to a relative truth.

Christianity

breaks up because

necessary

character

Nietzsche's Impatience
of

209

its

morality.
and

Science has

awakened

doubt in

the truthfulness of the

absconditus).5

Christian

God:

by

this

doubt, Christianity

dies (Pascal's deus

foundationalist epistemology, God proof of his existence. But with the death
In
a

"dies,"

because

we

have

no absolute

of

God, Nietzsche

suggests, every

thing

that

is

supported

by

belief in

an absolute

Being

comes

into doubt. This

includes: the

notion of an

tific method that claims

ordered, knowable cosmos; the veracity of the scien to give us knowledge of that cosmos; the usefulness of

the generalizations of political

and

ideologies

that

imitate
of

such

knowledge;

and the

language, veracity tenability Heideggerian terms, we become disillusioned with metaphysics,

of a conceptual

truth-claims in

general.

In

and this

disil
we

lusionment, according
make

to

Nietzsche, has

significant consequences

for how

sense,

as

it were,

of the world.

But why
suggested of

without absolute

be a problem? Why can we not get along perfectly well truth-claims, deterministic categories, objective truths? Nietzsche that perhaps we could, but that we would have to acquire a new set
should this

habits for
the

looking

at the world

in

order to quite

do

so.

This acquisition,

about

"post-Nietzschean"

which

Rorty is

optimistic

([1989],

pp.

85ff),
for

seemed

for Nietzsche

more problematic.

Nihilism

marked the end of an age

him, but this

madman

simply be celebrated. His well-known parable of the in the marketplace is not only a celebration; it also contains a cry of
end could not
was

despair. While he may have celebrated what the pain of childbirth, as it were, that would 125). The
question

to come, he also anticipated

attend the new

coming ([1974b],

for Nietzsche

was

how humankind

might survive the catas

trophe of nihilism, the dissolution of an entire, albeit unhealthy, form of

and go on to celebrate a

life,

new, transformed world. Nietzsche could celebrate the

demise

of the

otherwordly,

life-denying

progenitors of

nihilism, Socratic

meta

physics and

Christianity,
not

at the same time that

he

anticipated with

foreboding
under

the backwash of their destruction

([1969a],
would

pp.

270-75).

Nietzsche did

believe it

possible

for human beings to flourish be necessary for the

conditions of universal nihilism.

post-Socratic within which

It

post-Christian or

to create a new set of conceptual, cultural, aesthetic horizons

human

endeavors could

be intelligible

and meaningful.

Regard

(hu its ultimately indeterminate ground, man) life, Nietzsche thought, required such determinative horizons. A peculiar and nihilism, linked to Nietzsche's spiritual necessities, led conception of

less

of

conscious and self-conscious

"life"

him to think that the only be

accomplished

task of

taming

the nihilistic ocean-river of chaos could

by

those with noble or aristocratic souls, because

only

they

could navigate
ourselves

its

treacherous paths of nihilism

for the

sake of a coherent

life for

and together with others.

established

The horizons for life

are created,

promulgated, and
excellence:

by

one or another of

Nietzsche's types for human

the

the overman, genius,

seems

free spirit,

philosopher of

future,

artist, or
through

saint.

Although Nietzsche

to celebrate the
and

(solitary) individual

these types, their activity of shaping

making aesthetically

persuasive

for

the

210

Interpretation
the horizons

rest of us

by

which all

live is the

epicenter of

the political

theory

Nietzsche sparsely articulates in his writings. This specific activity of the highest type is the link for Nietzsche between nihilism, politics, culture, and the
that
general activities of the

solitary,

excellent men

([1986b

I, 480; [1983],
of

pp.

66,

67-68, 5-6; [1980], 7: 34[37]). It is also a basic premise Christianity, in which the weakest and lowest, rather than

his

critique of

the strongest and

highest ultimately come to cultural, and hence political, predominance ([1969a], I, 12-16). And he had hopes for what a spiritual opposition to Christianity
would achieve: perhaps

his

sustained counteraction would overcome

this pre

dominance
It is
of this

and reestablish the

possibility

of a noble politics.

possible to sublimate the political elitism that emerges

battle.6

for Nietzsche

out

The tendency to do
of the mind as

so

may

reside

in the scholarly
practical

enterprise

itself. The life

who engage
of

is

not an

immediately

activity, and those

in it may,

Nietzsche thought,

neglect the practical

implications

their

have

welcomed

ideals ([1974a], 204). Anticipating such sublimation, Nietzsche may it, since it would keep hidden until an appropriate time the
he eventually decided to reserve for the few. But any radical trans as Nietzsche reminds us in Homer's Contest, implies winners and

wisdom that

formation,
losers. And
and

losing

entails
will

its

ugliness.

God-fearers

and champions of

democracy

human rights

be the losers in his hoped-for world, because Nietzsche

concluded

that their genealogically related perspectives are worthless or, in

deed, harmful.
Kant's epistemology,
modern realization

which was

for Nietzsche
pp.

of nihilism

([1968b],
life

along the road to the him as one of 485-86),

well served

several conceptual means

for

linking

and nihilism.

According

to

Kant,

all

reality is an appearance to us. We cannot know what things really are like, but only how they appear to us through the medium of the senses. Kant postulates a thing-in-itself that is behind the appearances, their foundation as it
empirical

were, but which

appearance, namely the empirical world,

pp.

is entirely inaccessible to us. Without becomes "mere

this argument

such a
illusion"

thing-in-itself, (Kant [1979],

72, 78, 82-91 [B 44, 52, 59-73]). To

of the

for the

epistemological

necessity
given of

thing-in-itself, Nietzsche

replied with the question that

is

now a

late

modern existence:

Why

should the

thing-in-itself or,

more partic of the

ularly, synthetic

judgements

a priori

(for

which the

as

the thing-in-itself

transcendental unity of apperception

is the necessary ground) be necessary at all? For Nietzsche, to say that they are necessary is to claim that the human intellect is constituted in such a way that it requires such constructs. It is to say
that

human beings in

require

intellectual
fail.7

foundations,

that

they

cannot

live in

situation

which concepts

To

make

Kant's things-in-themselves

a neces

sity

of the

speak

intellect, however, is ontologically to say nothing about them: it is to only of their psychological (or, perhaps, physiological) status. Epistemol
with
we

ogy becomes psychology. Left illusion and constant change,

only the
set

realm of
on

phenomena,
sea of

a world of
meta-

are

adrift

mobile

Nietzsche's Impatience
morphosing
that we can
phenomena that

-211

have

no permanent

foundation,

no

real

essence

know. Nietzsche

suggested that such a conception of

human know

ing

poses three problems.

First, despite
nence and

this epistemological conclusion, Nietzsche insisted that

act are

perma

freedom to

fundamental

and concomitant needs of

human life

and

flourishing. All
which

living

things require for their

metaphorical

flourishing
p.

to

be bounded

by

"horizons,"

is Nietzsche's

term

for the limits, boundaries, 63). These

provide the and change to give

or

intellectual

stmctures that shape our world

([1983],
death

necessary

permanence required

in the face be

of

life the Alone

order and structure

it

requires to

meaningful and

intelligible to

us.

among

all

the animals,

perspectives

however, human beings have no eternal horizons and ([1974b], 143). Human horizons are necessary, but not instinc
horizons
within which we act.

tual: we must choose the

zons

Politically,

such

hori

implied for Nietzsche

a set of pp.

institutions

within which

human creativity

takes shape

(Honig [1993a],

69ff; Nietzsche [1980], 1:770-72; [1986b],

choices of horizons may not be equivalent. Like the conditions for growing a crop, some intellectual or aesthetic horizons may be more conducive to a Nietzschean ideal of human flourishing than others. This human condition of

462, 480). Second, all

indeterminate

determinacy

means

that the question of

horizons becomes in

paramount

for human thriving. But

what

kinds

of

horizons

are available to us

the world of nihilism, in which there are either no constants or absolutes at all,
or

in

which

we

are all

too consciously aware that our

what

horizons

are

willful

constructions, and not reflections of

is beyond

our will?

merely Radical

nihilism confronts we must

human flourishing:
or

we cannot

discover

invent satisfactorily

know anything absolutely, yet binding horizons to make human life

possible.

Third,
are given

as

I have already suggested, Nietzsche believed that these horizons by great individuals who, by their donation, also enact a cultural
with political overtones.

transformation
called
we

Nietzsche's
are

aesthetics: political

And this is the meaning of what I have and cultural truth, the horizons by which
or

live,

made persuasive

aesthetically created and aesthetically (not by reason for those who live within them. But how is this
responded with an set of
aesthetic

revelation)

possible?

Nietzsche
sisted that
need

(and Romantic) judgement. He in

consistent, unique, and robust

any

horizons

we moderns might accept as authoritative would

to

display

in

themselves and

force

upon us a

unity health
of

of style and expression such that at all times our aesthetic could express

unity in

cultural matters,

itself in "act[s] of he thought,

desire"

will and
would extirpate

unitary life of ([1983], p. 63). A lack

to

life, because it leads

dissipation

of effort and tends to

destroy

the determinative boundaries of the

intellectual horizons
western

that are necessary for human thriving. It would simply be a

reinstallment of nihilism.

He

complained

that this dissipation

described

modern

European

civilization.

212

Interpretation
nihilistic

This

dissipation is the product, for Nietzsche,

of a revulsion against

the abyss with which our existence confronts us.

It

manifests

itself in
which

one mode an ances a rejec

in the

self-contradictions of

Christian

communal

asceticism,

is

tor for Nietzsche of

liberalism. The

ascetic

ideal,

Nietzsche suggests, is

tion, in the face

It is
of

of nihilism and

meaninglessness, of the

bounty
of a

that

life

offers.

an expression of the resentment against

the contingencies and

instabilities

human existence, seeking to

eradicate the

possibility

noble, affirmative,

unitary horizon by wreaking revenge on the noble in spirit who can live in creative gaiety despite the abyssal truth of nihilism ([1969b], I, 11). The ascetic

ideal is self-contradictory,
protective

since

its denial
life It is "an

of

instinct

of a

degenerating
it

which

ironically "springs from the tries by all means to sustain itself

life

and to

fight for its

existence."

artifice

for the

life"

preservation of

([1969b], III, 13),

redirecting the

and

accomplishes this end

vengefulness and

by

life-negating

hatred

resentfully but powerfully of the majority of human

beings (Nietzsche's "herd") either into the interior of the self, which is not to be creatively ordered, but persistently scrutinized, and overcome ([1969b], III, 16]),
or onto external

enemies,

who are not

engaged, but

must

be destroyed ([1969b], I,

10, 11; III, 15]). Such resentfulness is a constant possibility in every soul, a pervasive feature of humankind, and the essence of Nietzsche's characterization of liberalism, including its disciplinary, pluralistic-democratic forms; Determinative horizons, however, do not imply the strict identity politics of,
say, fascism. Nietzsche could experiment within

his Dionysian horizons

with a

self-disciplinary regimes, which he describes in detail in Ecce Homo ([1969a], pp. 223-35). Thus, Nietzsche is suspicious of his own truths ([1974a], variety
of

296),
his

perhaps prefers

enemies as

brief habits ([1974b], 295), and sometimes speaks of his closest friends ([1974b], 279; [1969a], pp. 231-33). What in this self-creation, is
manifested

remains constant

however, is

a refusal to succumb to that

resentment.

despair

of nihilism that

this refusal requires spiritual

oneself and

in the many varieties of strength, a kind of will-to-power,

will-to-power of the

But
over

as

it were,

for

oneself.

It is the

Dionysian dance that

seeks not

merely to dominate, but to give away ([1969a], pp. 304-6). Accordingly, part of Nietzsche's lifelong project was to overcome rejecting its form along this
of asceticism and

nihilism

by

creation and affirmation of a new moments

reaffirming life, by which he meant the kind of horizon. By way of examining several
make

register vision

in Nietzsche's work, I

three claims.

First, he
necessi program

had

clear, enduring

tated a transformation of

for accomplishing this affirmation, which European culture. Second, as he developed a

for this affirmation-transformation, his strategy for accomplishing it changed, elitist or aristocratic and esoteric. This change and becoming increasingly Nietzsche's reasons for it are reflected in what became of the Decree. His re
vocation

directs

our attention to project.

mation as an

enduring

his shifting strategies for initiating the transfor His politicization of this project is told in his

story, because his aphoristic works do not reveal it so much as

they

presuppose

Nietzsche's Impatience

-213

it. Third, the form, content, and motivations of Nietzsche's agenda present a caveat for the seductively recontextualized reading of his works as useful tools
for

invigorating
focus

pluralist or agonistic

democratic Nietzsche

enterprises.

In particular, involved.

we

must

on the spiritual exigencies

thought were

To repeat, this
at

argument

has two

parallel tracks.

On the

one

hand,

we

take "a

glance"

Nietzsche's

politics.

On the other, it

seeks

to expand the horizon of

concerns.

this glance to

include implications beyond Nietzsche's immediate for the latter.

The

former is

the context

PREMONITIONS OF THE DECREE: NIETZSCHE'S EMBLEM ANTICIPATED

Decree properly begins with The Birth of Tragedy, Greek tragic drama. It is also, however, a study which is, study of the use of tragedy for living well. Space prohibits a thorough rehearsal of Nietzsche's view of tragedy or the future awakening or transformation of Ger
Nietzsche's
on

journey

to the

its face,

of

man culture

that

he

sought at

the time. But two

brief

points are

in

order.

First,
it. It

to accept the tragic perspective

is to

anticipate

his later doctrine

of eternal

recurrence, to take upon oneself the weight of the abyss and to say yes to

is to
come

accept conceptual nihilism as a given of

human existence,

and

to over

it through

a vision of the aesthetic

unity

of the whole of that

conceptually

ungrounded existence.

It is the

antithesis and rejection of resentment against the

indeterminism
render us

of the nihil that subtends the world of appearances and that can powerless

seemingly

([1969a],

pp.

270-75). Second, the tragic thea

ter,

which presents

the aesthetic vision of tragedy, was

could

for Nietzsche
Even

a political as

enterprise, because it
treated from
aspect of

lead to

communal transformation. and

he

re

his immediate
and

communal

institutional efforts, this

political

tragedy
political culture

his

own attempted

recovery from European

nihilism re

tained its group

complexion.

These European

dimensions
became

of

Nietzsche's hope for

a restoration of Germangave at

clearer

in

a set of

lectures that he

the Univer

Institutions."

sity in Basel in the spring of 1872, entitled "On the Future of our Educational Their contents constituted the pedagogical agenda for the total
culture

transformation of European

that

he foresaw in The Birth. The lectures

people

Birth)

regularly in attendance, and for some time Nietzsche enthusiastically thought to publish them as his next book.8 In his proposal for publication to E. W. Fritzsch (who had published The he linked the lectures to two important events. They would have to be
were well received, with over three

hundred

on this date the cornerstone of ready for distribution by May 22, 1872, because and because the interna in would be laid Festspieltheater Bayreuth, Wagner's educators was to begin in Leipzig and philologists tional German conference of
essence"

on the same

day. The "intentions

conferees

and

of the

lectures, he

wrote, was to

deliver to the

in

Leipzig

the meaning of the events

in Bayreuth,

214

Interpretation

cultural significance of the particularly to impress on the teachers there the He had earlier linked this 300). 3: Bayreuth musical movement in ([1986a], movement to the German recovery of Greek tragedy ([1967a], 19). Thus, the

lectures

were

consciously linked both to the

political and cultural concerns of

the Bayreuth enterprise to which Nietzsche was personally attached, and to

pedagogical concerns

his his

for

the cultural

transformation of

Europe,
about.

which

he

at that

time believed Bayreuth implied and might mentor,

cal

help bring

He

wrote

to

Ritschl,

that the lectures were intended as an expression of the

of

"practi

consequences"

The

Birth.9

Yet how

much practical political

activity Nietzsche actually intended to initi

ate through these

lectures

remains somewhat unclear.

"Future"

They

were

delivered

pub

licly,

and

he

claimed

that the word

in the title

was meant at

the least to

console

for the

present

those who lamented the demise of a true education in

aesthetics and politics:

"The future I

wish

to predict only in the sense of the

with

Auspices,
to pass, I

who

prophecy from intestines, but know: but it is

sufficient

the precondition that eternal

nature will at some

time once again prove correct. When this

future

will come

do
of

not

in the

present

to persuade a few of the

future, in case one does not wish despairingly to lay one's necessity hands in one's ([1980], 7: 8[60]; cf. [1980], 1: 645-46). Nietzsche's gaze into the future, however, did not mean that "the purpose of humankind [is to ([1980], 7: 11[1]). He hoped, rather, to be] sought in the future of
this
lap"

humankind"

act purposefully in the present in at least small ways, so that the not too distant future might be an overcoming of its immediate, nihilistic past. On the other hand, his letters began to reveal an uneasiness with the public

ity

of the

lectures, pointing both

and

to an

incipient elitism, if

not esotericism

in his

thinking,
these

to a

feeling

that his treatment of the subjects of The Birth and

lectures

were not yet

to his own standards. This

elitism

developed

as

he
he

began to doubt Wagner's himself had

expressed

quasi-populist notions of aesthetic regeneration as

in The Birth. Nietzsche's transforming education was intended for the few, and his prescriptions for such an education were likewise to be read by the few, as he stated in the lectures themselves. (On the
them

[non-Nietzschean]
As he
wrote prepared an

sources of this

elitism,

see

Schneider [1992],

pp.

introduction for the

wished

possible publication of the

308-25.) lectures, he
book."

that

like Aristotle he

"to

publish and yet not publish this

Nietzsche found himself in

self-conflict, self-contradiction.

The truth is for the

few,

the grand lie for the many;

but

to reach the

few he

must risk

tipping

off the

many.

His

writings are

difficult, intended for

few "good
and

those few who understand as he

does, but
education

what

if the many be

understand too much?

Perhaps it
to

would

be better to

send private copies

to those

readers"

worthy
publish

to whom the new

the

might

directed.10

Fritzsch

agreed

lectures, but
re

Nietzsche's doubts

about

both his
to

selected

audience,

whose

membership

mained elusive perhaps even

to this audience increased. As

ability his hesitation continued, he decided in February,

him,

and about

his

own

to communicate

Nietzsche's Impatience

-215

1873,
a

not

to publish them at all, but to

wait until

he

was

more mature and

adequate

to the task
when

for

which

they

were

intended,

and to write a new

book "in

ready ([1986a], 4:125-29). Nietzsche's self-critique might well be taken as the opening up of a space for multiple self-individuation, pluralism, or postmodern liberalism. Accordingly,
was
near

few

years"

he

the end of

his

critical examination and

suggests

summary freedom

of

Nietzsche

as a political most
self-

thinker, Keith Ansell-Pearson

reflective

that as

Nietzsche, "in his

of

moments,"

"allows his

readers the of

ically becomes
Nietzsche's

the most

democratic

philosophers"

interpretation, he iron ([1994], p. 205). But

growing
and

notion of a spiritual

inequality
is to
do

complicates such an egalitarian read

ing

of

his text. Nietzsche's

elitism.

self-critique and one

ironism do

not contradict a

radical

After all, if

communicate

with an

aesthetically

spiritually

sensitive

few,

one must

so with

corresponding care, sensitivity,

communicate with

and precision.

One's
two

audience and one's of

ability to
coin.

it are, in
of

this reading,

sides

the

same

elitist

Nietzsche's

conception

Erziehung

and

Bildung

within the

lectures themselves

seems to encourage this

interpretation. Both terms

are rendered
out,"

in English

"education."

as

Erziehung
out."

means

ety-

mologically "to
most

pull

as

a midwife

does

a child at

birth, corresponding
The
creation of

"educate,"

closely determinative

with

from the Latin "to lead boundaries is the

cultural-intellectual

work of a select

few,

who

come to their positions of cultural preeminence

by

means of a

disciplined

and

thorough education.

They

must

be led

out through a selective

education,

which

is

open to

all, but accessible to only a few

([1980], 1:665). These few

his books. Once
images
one

are the

objects-subjects of

Nietzsche's later "fish

hooks,"

has been

liberated in this something nihilism, beyond

akin

educational

process, one is ready for Nietzsche's

creation of new

Bildung,
beyond
pp.

to edification, the
good and passim). and

and thoughts

evil, for the

enactment of new

deeds ([1980],

716-17; [1969a],
his
gradual turn

With Wagner in Bayreuth

Human, Ail-too Human, Nietzsche

of of

completed prohibits a

consideration

of

away from the cultural politics Nietzsche's detailed critique

The Birth. Space Wagner's

we

ethnocentric

and

even racist enterprise of cultural

transformation, but

may

note one specific

disappointment for Nietzsche, namely Wagner's apparent return to a "Germanic in operas such as Parsifal. In response, Nietzsche came to reject
Christianity"

possibility of an overtly political and programmatic transformation of Euro pean or German culture in the way Wagner foresaw it in his activities in
the

Bayreuth. The guiding

European
cultural

thread of Nietzsche's

implicit

critique was that

Wagner

was a poor educator, which

is to say,

an

unlikely

and undesirable transformer of

horizons. The
mind

unlikelihood of such a transformation was re

inforced in Nietzsche's
The Germans
silence or
greeted

by

the response Wagner evoked

in his

audience.

Wagner's

attempts at aesthetic transformation with polite

surmised

laughter

([1980, 7:32[25, 28]). Nietzsche

that

he, like

Wag-

216

Interpretation
overestimated

ner, had

his

audience.

Like Zarathustra's later

no

audience

in the

is Motley Cow, the Germans blink, stare, or laugh, but forthcoming ([1968a], pp. 128-31). Zarathustra's adventure at the Motley Cow, however, is not one sided. The town's name recalls Plato's description of democracy as a "many-colored ([1968], 557c), and an early liberal-pluralist democracy seems to be precisely what the Motley Cow represents. Zarathustra's experience of rejection
further
response
cloak"

and

his turn to
of

a chosen

few is, first,

through

an autobiographical reflection of

Nietzsche's
other

rejection

Wagner,

and

him,

of

the German

people.

On the

hand, Plato's
which

many-colored cloak

is

also the physical and

intellectual

context

in

his (or Socrates')

one of

philosophical

activity takes place, philosophy itself

being

the stripes

in the

garment.

Similarly, Zarathustra-Nietzsche's
seems

turn

from the

people

may

not

be final: it
not

to rest in part on Zarathustra-

Nietzsche's insufficiencies, Although Nietzsche's

ambiguities

weight

tence

of

may attenuate Zarathustra's disciples (which Nietzsche

pp.

merely the receptive incompetence of the people. is decisively on the side of a growing elitism, his it, and it does not turn him to apoliticism. The exis
also

desired for himself

[Kaufmann (1974),

46-48, 369]), Nietzsche's

hope for institutions to study his work in the 259-62) are concrete (even if multilayered) acts
time.
cause

books, and his future (Nietzsche [1969a], pp.

publication of

and appearances

in

space and

They

have

public

significance and their

designs intrude politically, be

there

Nietzsche does His books

not

simply

retreat

to a private (or

with them.

remain politicized and politicizable:

transcendent) sphere is neither priva

form.

tion nor privatization of politics

elitism of

here,

even

though the growing, if ambiguous,

recurs now

On Our Educational Institutions

in

stronger

UTOPIANISM, ELITISM, AND PATIENCE

The direction that Nietzsche's
of political transformation would method

rejection of

Wagner's

and

his

own enterprise

take,

and the scope of

his

rejection of
on

his

own

for

forming

the

horizons

of our

being

in The Birth

the political side

become clearly visible in the first volume of Human, Ail-too Human. In aphor ism 462, Nietzsche reiterates the hierarchical structure of an ideal society, which he calls his "Utopia":

My
will

utopia

In

be

apportioned to most

better ordering of society the heavy work and exigencies of life him who suffers least as a consequence of them, that is to
and

say to the
the most
when

insensible,

thus step

by

step up to him
and who

who

is

most sensitive to

highly

sublimated species of

life is

alleviated to the greatest

suffering degree possible.

therefore suffers even

Nietzsche

claims

that, in

contrast to the
will not

ideal
an

of most Utopian of
happiness,"

dreamers, his
for that is
not

ideal

political

community

bring

"age

Nietzsche's Impatience
possible

-217

([1986b], I, 471). Human beings

moments.

are constituted

in

they
they

can

would

enjoy happy Happy ages, however, begin to "downright pray for misery and

would

such a way that bore them, so that and seek

disquietude,"

to

bring

into being. Accordingly, the "perfect of the "happy of the socialists, for example, is not merely impossible, but also undesirable. In
them
state" age"

such a and

state, "there
so

would no

longer

exist

any

motive whatever

fiction,"

that only "the

would yearn

retarded"

would still

for poetry have "a desire for poetical

times
of

unreality."

They

for the "half

life"

barbaric"

the

imperfect
the soil

present.

Thus,

the "comfortable

of the perfect state would

"destroy

out of which great

which

intellect

and the powerful

individual in

general grows:
possible

by
to

energy"

mean great

([1986b], I, 234, 235). Perhaps it is

for Nietzsche's
of

substitute various consumerisms correct

yearning.

Or

perhaps

Rorty is

to suggest that the flatter culture

liberalism

will

adequately satisfy

longings previously satisfied by metaphysical or ([1989], p. 85). Perhaps such a society would
ever,
was unconvinced. and

essentialist accounts of existence remain stable.

Nietzsche, how

Our

spiritual or

yearnings, he thought, would eventually

incite activity,

Marxist

laboring

Like Francis Fukuyama,

we would

liberal consuming would be insufficient. become bored (Fukuyama [1992], pp. 18,
"enfeeblement"

300-312, 328-39). Nietzsche sought to avoid such dom, envisioning instead a new kind of aesthetic state.
Nietzsche's
most of aesthetic Utopia

and

bore

is based

upon a

hierarchy

of suffering.

What is

beautiful

and sensed most new

suffering"

in this

acutely in the "most highly sublimated species community is not merely the Dionysian-Apollonian

tragic unity of The

Birth, but knowledge itself:

. . .

The barbarians

our passion for knowledge has of every age were happier become too strong for us to be able to want happiness without knowledge or the happiness of a strong, firmly rooted delusion; even to imagine such a state of things

is

painful to us!
grown as

Restless

discovering
us as

and

divining
the

has

such an attraction
unrequited

for us,

and

has

indispensable to

is to

lover his

would at no price relinquish

unrequited

for

a state of

indifference

perhaps,

love, which he indeed, we too

are

lovers! ([1986b], I, 429).

of

This

new

fellowship
earlier

"unrequited

lovers"

will resemble

the aesthetic state of

an

Nietzsche's

writings,

but the

aesthetics

tend toward

aesthetics

of

knowledge,
"utopia."

while

the idea of the aesthetic political community has become a

Nietzsche's growing
to discipline his
own

vituperation

against

Christianity
Christianity
here

and

his

perceived need

hostile

sentiment

are clarified

in the does

contrast
seek
a

between

Christianity

and the new

aesthetic

state.

If

knowledge,
truth
not

then, according to Nietzsche, it is the knowledge

the knowledge of
nihilism

of absolutes

that Nietzsche suggests

we should seek

instead
It

(as but

a means of
since

overcoming it). A knowledge of absolute truth is love requited,

cannot

Nietzsche

believe in

such

knowledge, his longing

remains.

218
must

Interpretation
be
sufficient

for

such

lovers to draw bear

around themselves their own

hori
of

zons of their existence and to nihilism's

the pain of such self-creation

of

in the face

abyss, resisting the comfortable boredom Nietzsche's turn to a new aesthetics, the creation
sociopolitical revolution

liberal democracy.

of self-willed

horizons, is

turn away from the overt,

that we

find in The Birth

and

a more private, interior conversion among an is already foreshadowed in the latter work, but not yet developed in the direction Nietzsche takes it in Human. This new combination

in Our Educational Institutions, to

elite

few. This

elitism

of political change and

tion,

which the

continuity in Nietzsche's thought suggests that immediate establishment of Nietzsche's ideal state in
would

revolu

liberal-

democratic Europe
results.

certainly be,
preclude

would

not

bring

about

the

desired

It is better to be
spirit.

patient and

moderate; such qualities befit the nature of

the

the

free

They

also

"merely

half-usefulness

or

the total

changes"

uselessness and perilousness of all sudden

([1986b], I, 463, 464).

for
an

Nietzsche begins to

call

less for

European

revolution and more

inner

transformation of a select
cultural effects.

few that may eventually lead to

new political

wider political and

In this way, Nietzsche's

personal

vision, his

"utopia,"

is

not

merely

perspective, but remains, as Bonnie

Honig

for
that

and elucidation of a political order that corresponds to

partially suggests, a plea his perspective and

fosters the

perspective and

activity

of

the spiritually sensitive genius of

Nietzsche's

new conception.

The

new utopia also remains consistent with

his

earlier critique of

Wagner's
writes

grand politics.

He

returns and no at

to the individual and to

one,"

his
as

education.

He

books for "everyone

nature

i.e., "for

each man

man, insofar

as

his
.

essential
. .

becomes

any

given

time an object

worthy of his thought that in from

new curriculum

everywhere,"

[but] for none of the idle curious who come drifting is, not for the many (Heidegger [1985], p. 64). The
hopes
of

that replaces the questionable

The Birth

and the

lec

tures on Our Educational Institutions has now been revealed:

it is Nietzsche's
schol

books themselves,
arly
examinations

beginning
of old

with

Human. His books

are not

merely the

philosophical problems

with

the attendant new an

a means to teach us a new way of seeing, thinking, and being. in Our Educational Institutions, Nietzsche anticipated the laughter and Already hatred of his detractors that is echoed in Zarathustra ([1980], 1:696; [1968a], pp.

swers, but

130-31). It taught him that

than

including books,
"nothing
but

experience one will

"ultimately, nobody can get more out of things, he already knows. For what one lacks access to from have no Books like those of Nietzsche that speak of
ear."

events that
. .

lie
.

altogether

even rare experience

ences"

[are]

the

beyond the possibility of any frequent or first language for a new series of experi
may be
small
need

([1969a],
as

p.

261). The

audience that comprehends them

and

select, but
careful

yet, it remains unknown even to Nietzsche. Hence the

which will attract

for

publicity,

those

few, like the

secret agent's code

in

a classified advertisement.

Nietzsche's Impatience
The
size and

-219

rarity

of

his

audience returns us to the spiritual-political prob

lem. These features

were

givens

for

Nietzsche, based

on

two observations.

First, it

was

empirically the case for him that the great majority of

always

human

beings have

been

a resentful

herd. Such

resentment was

for Nietzsche

not an ontological
constant

fact, yet less a contingent human possibility than a human (Nietzsche [1969b], I, 7; III, 13, 14)." It can be controlled and
but it
arises not out of
pp.

channelled, tion
gle

historical contingency, but

where

the

human

condi

itself

(Rorty [1989],
those

87-88),
would

it induces the
to it

greatest sort of
pp.

within

few

who

not

succumb

([1969a],

strug 222-35).

Second, he had
decadence
an and

in himself the exceeding difficulty of overcoming resentment. The physical, mental, and spiritual discipline such
observed

overcoming
surmised

required

for the be is

purpose of

he

that

it

might

circumscribed again:

reaffirming life was a rarity. Indeed, by a certain fatedness. "I took my

the condition for this

self

in hand, I

made myself

healthy

ologist would admit moribund

that

that one must

be

healthy
less

at

every physi bottom. A typically

being
pp.

cannot

become

healthy,

much

make of

itself

healthy"

([1969a],
ascent

224-25). His

experience of

resentment,

both decadence
a

and

within

himself,

and

his

journey

upward

led him to

spiritual-elitist

conclusion.

Connolly
seeks
ual

suggests

that Nietzsche's aristocratism

modes

is self-defeating,

since

it

will perpetuate

in

new

to

overcome.

Accepting

the very resentment Nietzsche's "noble Nietzsche's suspicion that resentment is a

ethics"

contin animal

human potential, he

goes on to suggest that

struggle

"perhaps the human

and

cannot

be delivered from this interior

between civility

resentment,

self-containment and

revenge, but only from those doctrines

over
struggle"

which

magnify

cruelty to the self,

hegemony

otherness, and danger to the species

pretending to transcend the Nietzsche thought that the emergence

resentment and

(Connolly [1993a],
the priest as the

p.

160).

by Certainly

of

prime articulator of

leader

of

the ignoble masses greatly enhanced the power of the

resentment.

power

many to focus and express their (in the form of doctrines

Accordingly,
would

diminution

of their cul

and

disciplines)

likely

diminish the

tural power of resentment. But for

Nietzsche, liberal-democratic
this power, and
of

politicians and

intellectuals
resentment.

are the

inheritors
a new

of

Moreover,

form

they extend the agenda of (non-Christian) slavery is consistent with

be spiritually slack, and that if the few at the expense
for Nietzsche the
Left to their
creators of

his
we

view

that the masses, the

a renewal of

herd,

will always

desire

culture,

we must concentrate on after

of the

many ([1969b], I, 9). These,

within which we all

all,

are

the horizons

have

our existence.

own

devices,
mind

the many could, for Nietzsche, only be their resentful destroyers. In Zarathustra, Nietzsche makes clear that any new politics he has in
will not warrant a new
new political order cial activities,

idolatry
in

of political

institutions
of

or

the

state as such.

His

may

require some

form

legislative,

executive, and

judi

be

these

an aristocratic or other

mode, and thus it may use or

220

Interpretation
the use of institutions. None of these,

imply

however,

will

be for their

own
are

sake, whereby
a means

they

would produce a new

idolatry

of the modem state.

They

to

further aesthetic, creative,

or self-expressive ends of the great

men,

the creative genius, artist, saint, philosopher, and so on

([1968a],
on

pp.

163-64;
and the whatever

[1969a],
they may

pp.

259-69; [1974a], 61). Nietzsche's

his
works
which

remarks

politics

political are consistent throughout mean

in this

specific regard:

for the many, politics,

for Nietzsche is the

organization

and maintenance of some set of and cultural

institutions for the

preservation of communal

life ([1980], 1:767-68; [1986], 472; [1982], 179;

as this work

[1968a],
goes

pp.

163-64),
work.

are a means

for the highest types to be left free to do their has any

effect on

creative

Insofar

the many,

it

likely

largely

unnoticed and conceptual

ways

disregarded,
pp.

even though

its

effects of

shaping

our cultural and

horizons

([1968a],

or habits of mind may form our existence in fundamental 163-64). In Nietzsche's best regime, these individuals are

the

beneficiaries

of

hierarchical
regime,

arrangements of power and material will at

distribu

tion; in the

they 462, 480; [1968a], pp. 163-66; [1980], 1:725). Thus, Nietzsche's philosophical and psychological elitism do not merely have political implications; he had specific political plans that he hoped would live on in his writings themselves. Whereas Rorty, joined by Warren, Connolly,
second-best and

least be left

undisturbed

([1986b], 1,

others, may be right that

we can

disregard the

specifics of these

plans,

we

might

do

well

to reflect on their underlying motivations. These should be as

sessed within the context of

Nietzsche's

evaluation of

liberal democracy,
none

which

he

called the

"heir

of the

Christian

movement"

([1974a, 202). Of the

and

multiple

links that he important for

product of the rule.

ascertained

between

Christianity
soul,
now

democracy,
into

is

more

our purposes than

the notion of equality, which, he claimed, turned

is

Christian idea

of the

a principle of political as a result,

"With this idea, the individual is

senseless

made

transcendent;

he

can

attribute

importance to

himself."

Consequently, Christianity invites

"the individual to play the judge of everything and everyone from a transcen dent or eternal ([1967b], 765). Democrats inherit the secular ves
perspective"

tiges of this

doctrine, namely

the notion of universal suffrage

of

([1967b], 130).

From the

added

Christian doctrine

the equality of all souls before

man.12

God, they

inherit the doctrine

It is these

of the universal rights of

universality and equality that Nietzsche finds most for he believes not only that they lead to dissipation, stultifica objectionable, tion, and mediocrity ([1967b], 130), but that, in a world without a determina
principles of

tive metaphysics to support

them, they
pp.

are

inherently

unstable

in noncreative,
movement,

uninteresting he suggests, "is

value"

ways not

(Rorty [1989],
only
a

73-95, 96ff). The democratic

of political

organization, but a form of the decay, namely the diminution, of man, him mediocre and lowering making his ([1974a, 203). It threatens Europe with the worst sort of nihilism, a
"new
Buddhism,"

form

of

decay

that preaches resignation, quiescence, pessimism, and the

Nietzsche's Impatience
consolation of

221
of

pity (for

self and

others),

rather

than a nihilism of the

new

heroic,

overcoming,

of

strength,

which was

Nietzsche's

logical

instability
and

may lead to

explosive conflict

hope. Moreover, its ideo ([1969a], pp. 319-21).

"sickness"

Nietzsche's

vision of

health,13

in

contradistinction to the
require and

of

Chris
in

tianity

democracy, may eventually

live
a and

be

able

to sustain the institu

tions adequate
which men

for its fulfillment: "Some few be

teach as I conceived of
chairs
will

day institutions will living and teaching;

aside

be it

needed

might even of

happen that
Zarathustra."

then

set

for the interpretation

so

That

day

has

not yet

come,

however,

he

must wait:

"but it

would contradict

my

character one

truths today: that

today

entirely if I expected ears and hands for my doesn't hear me and doesn't accept my ideas is not right to
me"

only understandable, it
conception of

even seems

([1969a],

p.

259). (On Nietzsche's

to

the role of

institutions,

see also

[1982], 542.) Corresponding

His

his

new

curriculum, Nietzsche offered a

new utopianism.

new psychologi

cal perspectives would produce a new account of what counts and

for knowledge foreseen in The

they

would usher

in

a new

politics, but

not

in the

manner

Birth.

PLATO AND IMPATIENCE

In

response to the and to

liberal-democratic,
wishful

egalitarian

forms

of

nihilism, the "new

Buddhism,"

Christian
art of

thinking, Nietzsche

suggested that

his

se

lect

readers

categorize pearances

this-worldly discrete phenomena into categories is

a coherent world so

"learn the

comfort"

([1967a], Preface, 7). To

ap

to order the chaos of the

into

that,

nihilism

notwithstanding, we may live

in it; to
sal
we

appeal to transcendent or eternal categories

(whether

"God"

or

"univer

life-denying only thing human existence, the appearances themselves. In a note from and declared, "It is 1888, he evaluated the moralism linked to the "true of cardinal importance that we abolish the true world. It is the great skeptic and
rights"),
to exchange
a chimera the

however, is
of

for

have left

world"

value-diminisher of the world, which

life"

is

us:

It

was until now our most

dangerous

assassination attempt against

This

murderous

attempt,

([1980], 13: 14[103]). however, is the product of a natural impulse

in the
case of and

toward

permanence and certainty, which,

generally
nence,

useful

entire culture.
we

for maintaining the health But in the face of death and

act

creating language symbols, is life of an individual or of an for horizons

of and perma

our need

may

in haste to

overcome

our condition

transience. In an

unpublished note

from the

summer of

496, 542,
lesson is
not:

Nietzsche

saw

1880 that has strong echoes in Daybreak, in Plato's life and writings an example of such
perhaps

haste. His interpretation

of

Plato is

dubious, but

the wider political

222

Interpretation
wanted

Plato became impatient, he

power, that strong
political

to

be

at the end.

And

why?

drive,

wanted

to

be

satisfied.

The

feeling of brevity of our life

is
reached:

His

requires that the peak

(Hohe)

enters at some point and

the goal

otherwise we remain suspended

forever,

and of

that one cannot tolerate

because

of

impatience. The

appearance

(Anschein)

truth

[is] individually

necessary.

([1980],

9: 4[286]).

Nietzsche does
understood,
opt or

not

think that
as

living is
"a
life."

totality

that can

deciphered

To do

so would

be completely known, be tc deny tragedy and

that to give

for

superficial comedy.

Paradoxically, however, he

understands

meaning to
give our

ourselves we seem to require a

living
our a

deny. But
practices

such a

precisely such a terminus that will foundation. This terminus Nietzsche must and does patiently terminus includes a realm in which we are assured that our
our

intentions,

actions, our

words

ingness. It is

realm, as Nietzsche suggests

and that a

have meaning and lastin Daybreak and Ecce Homo, that

will

implies institutions

is therefore

[1969a],
Decree.

p.

259). It is

realm

politically ([1982], 542; that Nietzsche impatiently demanded in his

constituted
a ex

Nietzsche's
pression
courage.

evaluation of

Plato in this fragment finds

criticizes

supplementary

in Twilight,

where

he

Plato's

Thucydides'

cowardice over against

Bernard Williams has

understood a world

suggested that
Thucydides'

Nietzsche's
there

praise of

Thucydides

must

be

in light

"Sophoclean"

of

conception of the some

world.

It is

without gods

in

which

is nothing, "beyond
. .

things that human beings have themselves shaped

shaped

that

is

intrinsically
interests"

to human
p.

([1993],

interests, in 163). It is, Williams

world

particular goes on

to

human beings

ethical much

to suggest, a world very to

like the

"post-Christian"

Nietzsche

purports of

inhabit,
is

and

in this world, Plato's

cowardice,
a coward

impatient desire for the "appearance born

of resentment.

truth"

a manifestation of

Nietzsche therefore

concludes that

"Plato is

be

fore reality, consequently he flees into the ideal; Thucydides has control of himself, consequently he also maintains control of ([1968b], pp. 558-59).
things"

Nietzsche's impatience It is

encapsulates an essential

ingredient

of

his

psychol of

ogy, namely the existential tension human beings confront in the face
mortality. one's orientation

their

to death that

determines

one's

orientation to

life. Is death

be resented, resisted, accepted, or acknowledged, an end toward which one proceeds, from which one is repulsed, which one greets, fears, or denies? Our mortality may lead us to demand certainty of life, but it is
an end to

certainty that, for Nietzsche, never comes. Death is a limit, and for beings cling to life, it is a limit that raises questions and the concomitant possi bilities of anxious impatience, resentment, and nihilism.
a

who

Under the
sought to oneself

restrictions

his

notion of a noble nihilism placed on

him, Nietzsche
resigning
void that

discover how

one can affirm the appearances so as to avoid

and all

(as did Schopenhauer

Romantic pessimists)

to the

dark

Nietzsche's Impatience
up in consequence of post-Kantian nihilism, but without curing for oneself or others what he took to be the fraudulence
opens soul

223
se

impatiently

of a comforted

that comes from resting on a misbegotten faith in the transcendent (as

who

Christians

believed in God

and

liberal democrats

who

believed in

universal

rights or universal critique

equality tended to do). One

can circumvent

this Nietzschean
one's liberal-

any transcendent or democratic sentiments. Insofar as laws

conduct even

by denying
in
a

contractual

universality to

and police enforce certain standards of

society established on such sentiments, however, one cannot escape the imposition of a set of boundaries that Nietzsche specifically entirely questions, at the same time that he seeks to establish new ones (Rorty [1989],
pp.

73-95; Connolly [1993b],

become
of epistemological
whatever

p.

157

n.35).

The

epistemological

problems

of nihilism would vations

psychological questions

ones,

and these psychological moti

would

and

constructs and

remain

close

to

Nietzsche. For

ineluctable reason, horizons

whatever

their actual epis

existence

temological or ontological status,

and

were

necessary for human

a campaign of

thriving. Thus, Nietzsche

would engage of

in

pearances against the

darkness

Romantic be to live

pessimistic

saving the ap resignation, but without

or a

offering cratic kind. The

were not

a universalist

foundationalism
would

of either a

Christian

liberal-demo
one

difficulty

within the

horizons that

knew

absolute, that

were

The

political conditions under which

only foreground, perspective, and these horizons would

shadow. once again

be

come tenable
were not

in

way that was not possible

available

in the

cultural corruption of

Europe

immediately

to Nietzsche. In Human Nietzsche suggested

city in speech, although with much less detail than Plato had, but not realize it on earth ([1986b], I, 462, 471, 480). Like Plato, he would have to wait. Unlike Plato, Nietzsche hoped for an
that

he, like Plato,

could create a perfect

immanent

appearance of this

city, but

failing

"saving

tale"

that would serve as a curriculum

that, he, like Plato, could tell a for those who had ears and

hearts to hear it (Plato [1968], 621b, 352d; Plato [1987], 522eff; Aristotle [1962], 1095a7-14). Nietzsche's books, like Plato's dialogues before him,
would

be the basis for his

made

new curriculum.

Nietzsche's

audience would

be

an

indeterminate group
309).

up

of those whose

experience,
words

hopes,

passions,
pp.

and

strengths would give them an ear

for Nietzsche's

([1969a],

261,

295-

NIETZSCHE AND LIBERAL-PLURALIST AGONISM

I have

argued that

Nietzsche's

philosophical enterprise

is

constituted at

least his find

in

part

in is

the

form

of a narrative.

At its conclusion, let

us

ask

whether

narrative

sufficient

to sustain pluralist enterprises that are ostensibly extracted

from it,

or even

to

accomplish

his

self-ordained

task. What story shall

we

that teaches or displays

patience

in the face

of

impulses toward

completion?

224

Interpretation
project reflect on

Concomitantly, how does Nietzsche's

interpretation in One
a might suggest that

its

own

suitability for

pluralist, liberal-democratic mode?

enough.

rescinded

Nietzsche's story is, in fact, the legislation. That is a story of self-control,

of the

After all, he

self-regulation

in the

best tradition

heroic

virtue of

the Greek aristocrats and later

tried to sustain

Stoics that
p.

Nietzsche and,

following him, Foucault,

(Milbank [1990],

290). But this self-control was, in Nietzsche's understanding, elitist. And this elitism, while it may degenerate into a kind of dandyism (Hadot [1992], p.

229),

originates

in Nietzsche's belief that the kind

and resentment that
spawns

of self-control required responses pp.

to

overcome the

anxiety

like his Decree

requires a strength of spirit that spiritual Utopia of

is very rare Human ([1986b], I, 462).

of

([1969a],

249-53). Hence the

But what, then,

political

"the

many,"

whose resentment
cannot

initiates its

own powerful own

forces ([1969a], I, 10)? One

simply leave them to their

powerful

devices, lest
Nietzsche
spiritual

the violence of their resentment and

take the aesthetic practices of the

could complain that

spiritually European culture

anxiety toward nihilism over few. For this reason,

made the pp.

aristocracy) nearly impossible

of resentment

([1983],

training of genius (a 137-38; [1980], 1: 725).

abusive politics and

This psychology
ethics

is the

source of

Nietzsche's

also the essential reason

why both the fascism

and the pluralistic postmodern

(which tries to

overcome what
p.

Connolly

egoism"

tal
are subject

[(1993b),
how to

1391])

that seem

has aptly called a "transcenden to emerge from Nietzsche's thought ills

of

to

his wide-ranging
cure them.

analysis of the

European

political

psy

chology To repeat, Nietzsche's texts for

and

a postmodern ethic that emerge

and resentment

ongoing ambivalence in the projects from it. Specifically, Nietzsche's own hatred displayed in his Decree (but elsewhere as well) and in his at
point to an
a new narrative

tempt to

initiate

lurk in the

shadows of

every

ethical attempt

like his own,

and the need to restrain this

and theoretical

sense,

an emancipation

that

menacing beast vitiates, in a practical denies a concomitant set of restric This

a
new set of restrictions

tions in opposition to the set

a cheerful
self.

it

supersedes.14

is

given

face

by interiorizing

its

effects

into

kind

of noble cultivation of the

For Nietzsche,

however, its Honig, for

denial

outward,

political manifestations are not neces

sarily as edifying. But Connolly and

example, do
of

recognize the ethics

ism

and

its

concomitant

foundational

possibility that nihil may lead to resentment,

violence,

and

proper cultivation of

possibly tyranny. Both seem hopeful, in different degrees, that a human passions can be universally or nearly universally
sensibilities"

instituted

everyone, or nearly everyone, can be part of "the quest to incorporate generosity into one's corporeal (Connolly [1993b], p. 151; Honig [1993a], pp. 209-11). Nietzsche was much less optimistic, at least in part because he weighed more heavily the spiritual strength required for the
struggle against resentment and

so that

impatience.

Nietzsche's Impatience
CONCLUSION: THE MEANING OF PATIENCE

225

In late 1888, Nietzsche

But

the rejection of a rough note.

publisher.

whither

erasure was not merely a discard, in final form, about to be sent to the this Decree? It echoes, in crude form, Nietzsche's inten

erased a text.

The

The text

was

tions

for

a thorough

transformation of Western civilization, which included the

annihilation
of

rejection progeny.

and,

indeed,

Christianity
can

along

with

its democratic in light

of

His intentions

of transformation

be

understood

his

analysis of the nature and causes of

European

nihilism and

the nature and con

ditions

of

human flourishing,
and of
not

which

I have be

outlined

explicitly

anti-Christian stance must

be

understood

in the

in cursory fashion. His same light. The mean

in this light, but this

ing

of

his Decree

its

revocation can most

understood

con may interesting liberal discourse. There two ways to make are, echoing Foucault, temporary Nietzsche groan and protest. The first is forgetfully and uncritically to take portions of his thought, excise them from the whole, and do with them as we
perspective

be the

for Nietzsche's inclusion in

see

fit. The

second

is

to remain sensitive to Nietzsche's concerns even as we

or reject or

respectfully move beyond concerns led Nietzsche.

modify the

conclusions to which these

In the first instance, then, believed to be the

saw,
which

we must consider

Nietzsche's

analysis of what

he

political possibilities of

is

to say: Nietzsche moved

ing

for the

revitalization of a

effecting from an openly public agenda of work European culture that had gone bad to the more

the transformation

he fore

difficult, but presumably more likely successful one of using his own writings as such a vehicle for a transformation in the future. In a moment of what I have
"impatience"

called

(by

which

I follow his

characterization of

Plato's

political

idealism),
ble ings had

Nietzsche

wrote a

decree,

which could about

after the silent revolution occurred.

brought

by

only become politically feasi his own transformational writ

My

examination of

this Decree has considered only a small

attempt at a radical transformation of

part of what

is involved in Nietzsche's

European
to

culture
or

Power We

(i.e., it has said nothing at all about the doctrines of the Will Eternal Recurrence, nor about the substantive aspects of his trans
art, the state, the genius,
or philosophy).
writings

formation

such as the role of

cannot suspend an entire

interpretation

of

Nietzsche's

from this

one

a second ger

disputed peg that is the Decree. But this text brings us to lesson in Nietzsche's work, because it is an important part of a lar picture: along with emblemizing in a stark way the political intentions
slender and
entertained revealed

Nietzsche

in his work, it
to

also

points

to the dangers of resentful

impatience he
priation of a cated

be inherent both in
ethic

those

intentions

postmodern

based

on

his

writings.

and in any appro These dangers are indi

against

in the

acts of

writing

and

rescinding this legislation

consistent

Christianity,

even as the

first

of these

two acts is

with the tenor of Antichrist as a

whole,

and as the second act points

to the

potential

danger

of resentment inher-

226
ent

Interpretation
sentiments of this text and

in the

in the

political

instantiation

of our

ideals in liber
at

general.
alism

Such dangers may

imply

that even the politeness of postmodern

constraints. and even

ultimately
what such

presupposes

necessary

Foucault has

shown

may entail, blind him to their seeming necessity ([1993b], p. 157 n.35). The question therefore becomes not whether we require boundaries, but what kind they
not

length

constraints

Connolly's

optimism

does

should

be,

and what

Curiously
argument

authority they should command. enough, Nietzsche appears to offer us an instantiation of, if
of a certain

kind

not an

for,

kind

of moderation.

Perhaps this image is

which

at odds with

the

prevailing image
writings that and often

of

his irresponsibility, is
evident

is usually
of

admitted even

by

friendly
in his ranging

commentators and which

in

several of

the political episodes

I have

considered

here. Indeed, in light

Nietzsche's
the

wide-

lofty

goals, the policy specifics of his

"Decree"

and other

passages seem vindictive and

nearly tawdry. Let us recall, for

however,

importance
It is

of ritual and concrete memorials

drawing
of

the

horizons
Science:

of our existence.

these that sustain the story, reminding us

call

its truth

and significance.

We may

to mind here a

central aphorism of

The

Gay

New

struggles. a

After Buddha

was

dead, his

shadow was still shown

for

centuries

in

tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown. And we we still have to vanquish his shadow, too. ([1974b], 108)
a cave

Nietzsche's decree

points

to the

importance

of

banishing

Christianity's

"cave,"

both metaphorically and in its concrete manifestations in the shrines at Jerusa lem and elsewhere, in everyday Christian perspectives, in the visible Christian
organizations,
and even

in

our current calendar.

infamy"

taire's rallying cry, cannot "crush the

Nietzsche, following Vol ("Ecrasez [1969a], p.

I'infdme!"

If

335),
ject

then two problems remain.

of nostalgia and

yearning for

First, Christianity will some. Second, its

must

remain at

least

an ob

"shadows,"

including
every

lib
If

eral-democratic pluralism, will remain a concrete political

possibility for
"shadows,"

all.

Nietzsche
of

seeks to reclaim the

earth, he

ultimately

annihilate

vestige

Christianity that reminds us of its practice or its various includ ing liberal-democratic or religious sentiments. He must erase its story. Leaving aside this primary necessity of Nietzsche's politics, we consider the secondary one; the demise of Christianity is hardly the crucial point, rumors of its imminence may be greatly exaggerated, and debating those rumors belongs, in any case, elsewhere for another time. But leaving Nietzsche behind on the
secondary score is another matter. His impatience and the vituperation it calls forth are important caveats for who find in his writings a discourse of emancipation from the ethics of resentment and transcendental egoism that si silently usher in a moral sadism that seeks not peacefully to but to engage, crush, regulate, and control its opponents. Nietzsche, after all,
and not so

lently

Nietzsche's Impatience
displays
a similar

227

impetus in

the

face

of

his

own

produces.

To
not

overcome

it, he thought, is

rare and noble.

mortality and the anxiety it Such overcoming may,

spiritual requirements pa

therefore,

be

available to the many:

its

heavy

tience against resentment

of a
tize"

liberal-pluralist Nietzsche's

polity.

may render doubtful its display in the wider circles In this secondary way, we need not entirely "priva
politics,

repugnant

leaving

only

deconstructive
and

remainder.

Instead,

we can render their problems and

lessons publicly

ful,

regardless of our evaluation of

their primary

characteristics.

politically use Such doubts

about

liberal

democracy

are not

novel;

deep

suspicions that a stable rule of the

many is possible, let alone desirable, permeates the tradition of political philos ophy from Plato to Machiavelli, to Bodin and Hobbes, and to the founders of
the American polity. Alexander

Hamilton

and

James Madison
rule of

attenuated their

institutional
cation

solution

for the

insufficiency
pp.

of

the

the many with an

impli
of

that the

bad

character of the populace could overcome even the

best

such arrangements

([1937],
reverse

54, 337). Nietzsche

for
a (post- or

reminds us

along
of

a similar

register of the
patience.

fundamental
to

need

pre-Nietzschean)
necessities

nonresentful

Hence,

our

title, the

political

Nietzsche's

spirituality.

APPENDIX

Decree Against Proclaimed

on the on

Christianity
first

day

of salvation, on the
of

day

of the year one

September 30, 1888

against

the

false reckoning)
the

War to the death

depravity:

depravity
most
not

is
First
proposition.

Christianity
is depraved. The
depraved have
reasons

Every
is the has

kind

of anti-nature

kind

of

human

being

priest:

he

teaches anti-nature.

One does

against the priest, one

prison. participation

Second

proposition

Any
be

in

public morality.

One

shall

more severe against

worship service is Protestants than

an attack on against

Catholics The

and more severe against

liberal Protestants

than against the strict believers.

proportion

criminality
science.

of

being

Christian increases in

to one's proximity to
philosopher.

The

criminal of criminals

is consequently
in

the

Third basilisk

proposition

The

accursed place

which

Christianity
there.

has hatched its

eggs shall

be

razed to the ground and, as the vile place of the earth,

be the

terror of all

posterity.

Poisonous

snakes shall

be bred

Fourth

proposition

Preaching
life, any

chastity is

a public

incitement to
means of

anti-nature. concept

Any

contempt of sexual

contamination of

it

by

the

"impure"

is

the

actual sin against

the

holy

spirit of

life.

Fifth

proposition

Eating

with a priest at

the same table

society.

is forbidden:
is
our

one

thereby

excommunicates

oneself

from honest

The

priest

chandala,

he is to be

condemned, starved, and

driven into every kind

of

desert.

228

Interpretation
Sixth
"Sacred"

proposition

history

shall

be

called

by

the

name

that

it deserves, be
used as

"God,"

"Savior,"

"Redeemer."

"saint"

accursed

history;

the words

shall

invectives,
Seventh

as criminal
proposition

insignia. The
remainder

follows from the

preceding.

The Antichrist

NOTES
Nov. 26, 1888, he

1. In

letter to Paul Deussen

on

went so

far

as to call

The Antichrist his

Values."

(entire) "Transvaluation of all 2. My English translation

it is
treated nowhere
of the

of

this table of laws is included in the Appendix. To my

concerned with

in the interpretive literature

Gary

purely philological treatment of Colli and Shapiro's brief analysis in Shapiro (1989),
account of

knowledge, Nietzsche, with the sole exceptions Montinari in Nietzsche (1980), 14: 448-53, and
pp.

144-49. Shapiro integrates the Decree into

Nietzsche's

his

own

life in Ecce Homo,

and of

his

self-stated and

importance

as a pivotal

figure in the coming

history

of the post-Christian world.

Colli

Montinari,

who offer the

best

and most extensive philological treatments of

both the Decree

and of

The Antichrist

as a whole,

conclude their careful philological consideration of this text and their with the observation that we cannot with

certainty determine
point

what

justification for publishing it Nietzsche's intentions were in

writing the

edict and

then

hiding

it.

They

out,

however,

that the sentiments

and

it

expresses are

consistent with certain of

Nietzsche's

apparent

intentions in both Ecce Homo

The Antichrist.

This consistency along with Nietzsche's use of a sentence of the Decree in Ecce Homo, fragments in his Nachlass, and fragments in letters indicate the Decree is not merely a passing whim (Nietzsche [1980], 14: 450-53). 3.

Connolly
noted

is

perhaps

He has

the
a

difficulty
popular

sentiments

for

contemporary sympathetic interpreters of Nietzsche. conjoining Nietzsche's own apparent elitism with an interpreter's ethics. At the same time, he recalls Nietzsche's own admission that
the most nuanced of
of
human."

"[s]ome 'whole

folly
does

keeps persuading
not

marvelous

Connolly prise of (re-)invigorating

"antagonistic
well as

me that every human being has this feeling [of awe toward the uncertainty and rich ambiguity of existence'] simply because he is find sufficient resources in Nietzsche's work alone to carry through this enter a

liberal-democratic
toward

ethic.

He

suggests

instead that
reach of

we take a stance of as

indebtedness"

Nietzsche, appreciating "the

Nietzschean thought

its sensitivity to the complex relations between resentment and the production of but turning "the genealogist of resentment on his head by exploring democratic politics dium through
outcome which

other

as a me
political
univer-

to expose resentment and to encourage the struggle against

liberalism"

it."

The

is

"radical

in

which the modernist

impetus toward

normalization and

salization of the subject pp.

is

contested on

Nietzsche's
p.

own genealogical grounds similar

158, 169, 175; Nietzsche, [1974a],

genealogical

2). In

manner, Bonnie

(Connolly [1993a], Honig supplements

Nietzsche's

investigations

with resources

Arendt,
tions"

and

Kant, among
69-75).

others, even as

she points to

critically obtained in the writings of Sandel, Nietzsche's "reverence of agonistic institu

politics

as an aid

for stabilizing his

State,"

"wild-eyed"

otherwise

(Honig [1993b],

p.

529; Honig

[1993a],
need

pp.

Nietzsche points to the Christian approval until the modern era of a for slavery and subordination to maintain a healthy political-cultural order (1980, I: 769). 5. Nietzsche (1980), 12:2(123); cf. Nietzsche (1974b), 357; (1969b), vol. 3, 27. Here again, I depart from Warren's interpretation that Nietzsche's notion of nihilism is the product of social or
powerlessness. That may be one original impetus toward nihilism, but nihilism is for Nietzsche ultimately a conceptual-aesthetic complex that does have socio-political overtones and implications, but that does not correlate directly with these latter occasions.
political

4. In "The Greek

6. I
ples.

would point

to the work of Thiele

(1990a)

and again,

Nehamas (1985)

as pertinent exam cf.

Thiele
pp.

points to a similar sublimation

in Foucault's 584-91.

work

(1990b),

pp.

907-25;

Johnson

(1991),

581-84,

with

Thiele's reply,

pp.

Nietzsche 's Impatience

7. "Or, to
at speak more
ble'

229

clearly and coarsely: synthetic judgments a priori should not 'be possi to them; in our mouths they are nothing but false judgments. Only, of course, the belief in their truth is necessary, as a foreground belief and visual evidence belonging to
all;
we

have

no right

the perspective optics of

life"

(1974a, 11).
also

8. Nietzsche (1986a), 3: 242-44, 296-97, 300. See 277, 292, 255-56, 279-80, 288-89, 258-59; Rohde and
and encouraged

Nietzsche (1986a), 3: 250-51, 262,

Gersdorff both
shared

von

his

enthusiasm

lectures; Gersdorff even copied out the lectures by hand for his own personal use (Nietzsche [1986a], 4: 132-34, 138-40, 141-43). 9. Nietzsche (1986a), 3: 281-82, 302-4. In his notes from this time, we find the lectures listed
continue work on the

him to

together with
whole

"Philosophy

in

the

Tragic

Age"

and

The Birth

as part of a conceptual and thematic

([1980], 7: 3[22]). 10. Nietzsche (1980), 7: 8(83, 84). The

11. On the

reference

to Aristotle seems to be

directed to his

men

tion of esoteric and exoteric studies

in his Politics
of such

and elsewhere.

binding

intricacies

resentment, see
not

Cf. Aristotle (1984), pp. 9-10. Brown (1993), pp. 390-410. Brown

suggests that even makes

though people could be free

to will resentfully, their historical rootedness

them incapable of envisioning such possibilities.

"Christianization,"

12. Nietzsche (1967b), 765. A kind of may, therefore, be observed in Connolly's description
prises:

as
of

it were,

of

Nietzsche's thought

his

and

"This

model

implicitly
and shifts

suggested

[of the interiorization, spiritualization, and by Foucault when he eschews the term
Alex/Alexina
and

Foucault's universalizing enter universal ization of the overman] is (as

well as

'overman'

'will to power')
tragic

the center of gravity of Nietzschean

misfits such as

discourse from heroes

ordinary life
a

and classical moves

figures to
part of

everyday
a

Pierre Riviere. These textual

of

are, I think,

strategy to fold Nietzschean agonism

latter"

into the fabric

(Connolly [1991], p. 187; cf. nary character of the 13. Nietzsche claimed that he presented to his readers
19, 236-40). That he
of continued

by Connolly [1993b],

attending to the extraordi

p.

138).

vision, not an ideal

([1969a],

pp. 217

to take seriously the physiological component of the so-called life

and recreational recommendations

the mind may be seen

in his many dietary, geographical,

in

the second section of Ecce Homo.

14.

This is

not

the only way to come to my conclusions.

Milbank's

critique of

the metanarra
pp. 278-

tive and metaethics behind Nietzsche-inspired deconstruction is another (Milbank

[1990],

325). I have merely

allowed

Nietzsche

more

clearly to speak, as it were,

for himself.

REFERENCES

Ansell-Pearson, Keith. 1994. An

bridge: Cambridge

Introduction to Nietzsche

as

Political Theorist. Cam

University

Press. Chicago Press.

Aristotle. 1962. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Martin Ostwald. Indianapolis: Bobb-Merrill. 1984. The Politics. Trans. Carnes Lord. Chicago:

University

of

Benz, Ernst. 1966. Evolution

Early

Christian Hope: Man's Concept of the Future from the Trans. Heinz G. Frank. Garden City: Doublede Chardin. Fathers to Teilhard
and
Attachments,"

day and Company, Inc. Political Theory 21(August): 390-410. Brown, Wendy. 1993. "Wounded Cornell University Press. Ithaca: Identity\Difference. Connolly, William. 1991. Cornell University Press. Ithaca: Modernity. and 1993a. Political Theory
1993b. The Augustinian Imperative: A Reflection
on

the

Politics of Morality.

Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. Radicalism. Chicago: Detwiler, Bruce. 1990. Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic
University
of

Chicago Press.

230

Interpretation

Foucault, Michel. 1980. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. Ed. Colin Gordon. Trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham,
and

Kate Soper. New York: Pantheon Books.

the

Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and Hadot, Pierre. 1992. "Reflections on the Notion
Michel Foucault: Philosopher. Ed.
Routledge.
and

Last Man. New York: Avon.

'Cultivation
of the

of the

Self

"

in

trans.

Timothy

J. Armstrong. New York:

Hamilton, Alexander, John Jay,

Random House.

and

James Madison. 1937. The Federalist. New York:

Zarathustra?"

Heidegger Martin. 1985. "Who Is Nietzsche's

Trans. Bernard Magnus. In

The New Nietzsche. Ed. David B. Allison. Cambridge: The MIT Press. Pp. 64-79.

Honig Bonnie. 1993a. University Press.

Political

Theory
of

and the

Displacement of Politics. Ithaca: Cornell

1993b. "The Politics Evil: Arendt, Nietzsche,

Villa."

Agonism: A Critical Response to 'Beyond Good

the Aestheticization of

and

and

Political

Action'

by

Dana R.

Political

Theory

21 (August): 528-33.
and

Johnson, J. Scott. 1991. "Reading Nietzsche

cion?"

Foucault: A Hermeneutics

of

Suspi

American Political Science Review 85 (June): 581-84.

Kant, Immanuel. 1979. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Norman Kemp Smith. New
York: St. Martin's.

Kaufmann, Walter. 1974. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 4th

ton:

ed.

Prince

Princeton

University

Press.
and

Milbank, John. 1990. Theology

Blackwell.

Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason. Oxford:

Nehamas, Alexander. 1985. Nietzsche: Life As Literature. Cambridge: Harvard Univer

sity Press.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1967a. The Birth of Tragedy. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York:
Random House.

1967b. The Will York: Random House.

to

Power. Trans. Walter Kaufmann

and

R. J. Hollingdale. New

[1954] 1968a.
Viking.

Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York:

1 968b. The Twilight of the Idols; or, How to Philosophize with a Hammer. In The Portable Nietzsche. Ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Viking.

1969a. Ecce Homo. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House. 1969b. On Random House.
1974a. Beyond Good
and

the

Genealogy

of

Morals., Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York:

Evil. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random

House.

Gay Science. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House. 1980. Friedrich Nietzsche: Samtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bdnden. Ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. Berlin: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag de Gruyter.
1982. Daybreak: Thoughts lingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge

1974b. The

Prejudices of Morality. Trans. R. J. Hol University Press.

on

the

1983.

Untimely Meditations.

Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge

University

Press.

Nietzsche's Impatience

231

Banden. Ed. Giorgio Colli

1986a. Friedrich Nietzsche: Samtliche Briefe, Kritische Studienausgabe in 8 and Mazzino Montinari. Berlin: Deutscher Taschenbuch de Gruyter. Verlag
1986b. Human, Ail-Too Human. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cam

bridge

University

Press.

Plato. 1968. The Republic. Trans. Allan Bloom. New York: Basic Books. 1987. Gorgias. Trans. Donald J. Zeyl. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Rawls, John. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia Rorty, Richard. 1988. "The Priority
and

University

Press.

of

Democracy

to

Philosophy."

In Merrill Peterson

Robert C.

Vaughn,

eds.

The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom. Cambridge:

Cambridge
1989.

University

Press.
and

Contingency, Irony

Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge

University
Bil-

Press.

Schneider, Jdrg. 1992. "Nietzsche's Basler Vortrage, 'Ueber die Zukunft

dungsanstalten'

unserer

im Lichte

seiner

Lektiire Padagogischer

Schriften."

In

Nietzsche-

Studien. 21: 308-25. New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Shapiro, Gary. 1989. Nietzschean Narratives. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Taureck, Bernhard H.F. 1989. Nietzsche und der Faschismus: Eine Studie iiber Nietzsches
politische

Philosophie

und

ihre Folgen. Hamburg: Junius Verlag.

and the

Thiele, Leslie Paul. 1990a. Friedrich Nietzsche

Heroic Individualism. Princeton: Princeton

University

Politics of Press.
of

the

Soul: A

Study

of

1990b. "The

Agony

of

Politics: The Nietzschean Roots

Pascal."

Foucault's

Thought."

American Political Science Review 84 (1990): 907-25. Unpublished manuscript. Voegelin, Eric. n.d. "Nietzsche and Warren, Mark. 1988. Nietzsche and Political Thought. Cambridge: MIT Press. Williams, Bernard. 1993. Shame and Necessity. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Book Reviews

Peter

Minowitz, Profits, Priests,

and

and

Economics from Politics

Religion (Stanford, CA:

Princes: Adam Smith's Emancipation of Stanford University

Press, 1993),

xv

+ 345 pp.

$45.00.

Eduardo A. Velasquez Washington

and

Lee

University
to vanquish
our

In
of

spite of numerous attempts

liberal modernity in the hope

aspirations, the philo
proves resilient.

fulfilling

premodern and postmodern communitarian

sophical and political project ushered

in

by

the

Enlightenment

Not least among those peoples who have not had the benefits of a centuries-old tradition of free institutions, there persists the awkward and contentious strug
gle

to shake off

tyranny

and embrace

the

benefits

and perils of

free

govern

ments and

free

Marx

and

But in removing the chains to which the doctrines of Lenin had fastened them, not a few intelligent men and women
markets.

can be adequately supported by our Our continuing ambivalence toward and the persistence of liberal modernity invites us to repeated reflections about the character of a way of life that is increasingly taking hold around the world. Peter Minowitz's Profits, Priests, and Princes: Adam Smith 's Emancipation wonder whether a renewed call to

freedom

fragile human

and natural ecology.

of Economics from Politics

engages the reader modem

and

Religion is just

such an

invitation. Minowitz

in

a comprehensive reconsideration of the

foundations

of

source,

liberalism, both as an economic and as a moral project. He goes to the to Adam Smith, that is, whose architecture for modem, liberal, commer
be found in Smith's two
and

Moral Sentiments

principal works, The Theory of The Wealth of Nations. That Smith provides the vision for the kind of society the United States was to become and that is increasingly taking hold around the world may not by itself justify a journey across such familiar territory. Minowitz's analysis of Smith stands as an amendment to and cial republicanism can a critique of arguably the two most influential interpretations Joseph Cropsey's Polity and Economy: An Interpretation of
of

Smith to date:

Adam Smith

(1957)

and

Principles of Donald Winch's Adam Smith's Politics: An Essay in

the

Historiographic Revision (1978). In going beyond the accomplishments of his predecessors, Minowitz's book is likely to become one of the benchmarks of Smith
scholarship.

He has

given us an excellent

book.

Minowitz is one with Cropsey's view that Smith's political philosophy is indebted to the modernity of Thomas Hobbes, not to classical Greek or Stoic while alluding to the sources, as is often suggested. Cropsey's book, however,

interpretation,

Winter 1997, Vol.

24, No. 2

234

Interpretation
cannot

fact that Smith's modernity

views on

be properly

understood without regard

to his

religion, "pays

scant attention

to most of Smith's
omission

discussions

of reli

gion"

(p. 9).

According

to

Minowitz. this

is further

complicated

by

another, namely, Cropsey's insufficient "attention to Smith's

rhetoric"

(ibid.).

The two

omissions are

directly

related, for Minowitz argues that religious mat

"esoterically"

ters in Smith's writings are treated

(p. 7). "There is

doubt,"

no what

he is

writes, "that Smith acknowledges the potential true and what

suades

discrepancy between

is

persuasive:

the truth may not always persuade, and what per

may not always be As for Winch's attempt to

pioneered

true"

(p. 6).
ground

methodology it from the "'liberal little doubt that the

by

Quentin Skinner

Smith's teaching in the "contextualist and John and thus to save

Pocock"

perspective'"

capitalist

(p. 10), Minowitz

shows

beyond

contextualist approach misses

the most important aspect of

Smith's
ular

overall

intention. Smith's is
or problem.

not

merely
was,
of

teaching
and

confined to a partic
provided a

time, place,

Instead, he

understood

himself to have

view of nature and

human nature,

of what

is,
"

is to

come.

Despite "his

numerous
speaks

and

profound

acknowledgments

historical

change

Smith

freely

about the experiences of

'all

ages'

(ibid.). So

at the end of the

day

Minowitz

sides with

Cropsey's interpretation,
"historicist"

with what we are while

tempted to
our atten

"philosophical"

call a

over an

approach,

calling to
the

tion the "theological-political

problem"

hitherto ignored

by

scholarship

on

Smith (pp. 165-87). If this is

of
an adequate

rendering

of

Minowitz's before

amendments to and critiques

his predecessors, then the

question

us would seem to

be this: What is fresh insight

moder

it exactly about the "theological-political into (1) the writings of Adam Smith and (2) the
nity "Adam Smith
"sympathy"

problem"

that provides
character of our

liberal

as a whole?

Students

of

Smith

are no

doubt familiar

with

the so-called to

Problem,"

the

discrepancy

between the

prominent place given

"self-interest"

in The

Theory

of Moral Sentiments

and to

in The
.

we should not

Wealth of Nations; but given Smith's "professed caution regarding religion be surprised that scholarly interest in his treatment of religion
and that the

has been minimal,

almost much
and

'Adam Smith
matters"

Problem'

has been
other

uncovered

exclusively in non-religious more at stake in the "Adam Smith

(p. 8). In
than

words, there is

Problem"

previously recognized,

this problematic

has to do

with

the pervasive yet

largely
its

concealed pres

ence of religion

in The

Theory

of Moral Sentiments
Problem,"

and

absence or

dispar
to

agement
provide

in The Wealth of Nations. Profits, Priests, a solution to the "Adam Smith

and

Princes is
at a

an attempt

but

level thus far

not

reached

by

Smithian

scholarship.
as

This is

good as

far

it

goes.

But

what

exactly does

an

investigation

of

the

"theological-political
Attention to the title

problem"

reveal of

about the character of our modernity? provides an answer.

Minowitz's book

The founders

of

Book Reviews
modern commercial republicanism

235

took

hard

and sustained

look

at the practi

cal, political, and philosophical alternatives to

which peoples around the world a considerable risk of oversim

had (for the

plification,

most

part) been

confined.

With

we might

say that the

alternatives

lay

either

in

a political program

intended to

elevate the aristocratic

few to the heights intended for them

or

by

the

teachings of classical antiquity

(princes),

in the

religious

few

who sought to

before the altar, its supposedly rightful and final arbiter (priests). These alternatives, steeped in aristocratic presumptuousness and bloody reli

bring

politics

gious zealotry, proved

in

practice

to be contentious, misanthropic, and, lest

"priests" "princes"

we

forget,

expensive.

Paradoxically,

the regime of

or

cultivated

a passive or

fanatical citizenry,
to
use

corrupted

by

the extremes of "superstition and

a third alternative awaited

David Hume's
less
.

phrase.

But

hu

mankind

that

if implemented
. . .

would

"augment individual but

liberty by

state and
.

society

promote

exalted

more attainable ends

separating for politics

combat war and

faction
and

[and] discourage

the pretensions of elites (for

rule
. .

'gentlemen'

example,
alternative

priests) claiming

a title to

(p. 21). This

lay

in

the prospects
where

for

among liberal
civilized
rather

republics

a newly emancipated commerce within and human beings would be moderated and thus of

by

their concern

for

host

important

and not so

important wants,

than inflamed

by

grandiose schemes aimed at tyrannical

dreams

of per

fection. The
sons

modern project

for

which

Smith is

one of the principal spokesper over

of

amounts

to

the

elevation

of

commerce

and

above
and

politics
"priests"

and on

"profits"

religion, of

over and above

the claim

"princes"

behalf

"humanity."

of a new

understanding
to which

of

This is the

end

Smith's

efforts

are

directed. But
of Moral

we are still

left

with the problem of moral

accommodating The
religious of

Theory
with

Sentiments'

tone, the

implicitly
is

core,

the

explicitly hard-nosed economic, self-

centered, and atheistic

teaching

"Adam Smith

Problem"

raised

to new

The Wealth of Nations. It is here that the heights, where the supposed limita

tions of Cropsey's reading come to the

reveals

fore,

and where

Minowitz's forms

solution

important truths

about the character of our modernity.

To tease from The

of

Wealth of Nations
activity, the

an endorsement of commerce above other

human

ubiquitous and

interest

over

selfsalutary desire for gain, and the primacy of benevolence does not require uncommon exegetical powers. After

all, Minowitz writes, "The Wealth of Nations is an atheistic and anti-Christian (p. 139). To find a teaching in The Theory of Moral Sentiments that is
work"

compatible with

The Wealth of Nations does. It

works exist

could of course

be

argued that

discrepancies between the two

because "Smith

changed

his

mind

during

the

seventeen years

between the

publication of

his first two

books"

(p.

188). But this

because The
throughout

proves unsatisfactory,

for Minowitz

and others as

well,

not

least

Theory of Moral Sentiments went through a variety of editions Smith's lifetime up to his death in 1790. If Smith wanted to infuse

236
the

Interpretation
with the same atheistic spirit that animates

book

had

ample

opportunity to do

so and

did

not.

And
that

so

The Wealth of Nations, he Minowitz draws the fol

philosophy
encom

lowing

conclusion:

"Because Smith
,

suggests

moral

passes political

economy among the premises and the conclusions of the two disciplines. One may there fore hypothesize that the broader scope of the parent discipline requires a loftier
rhetoric

there should not

be any

simple contradiction

to sustain

it,

whereas the system of natural

liberty

tions] can be adequately defined in Wealth of Nations are so much more

worldly terms.

Since the
God"

[The Wealth of Na concerns of The

modest that those of

The

Sentiments, they
return

can

be

promoted without recourse

"esoteric"

to

Theory of Moral (p. 189). We thus

not permit us

to Smith's rhetorical or

teaching.

Space does

to

consider

carefully the

manner

in

which

the allusions to God and the Bible

are made to seem compatible with

throughout The the

Theory

of Moral Sentiments

teaching
in The

of

fices
even

to point

The Wealth of Nations (pp. 188-234). In this instance, it suf to Minowitz's conclusions. "On close inspection it is clear that
of Moral Sentiments the biblical
religions are

rejecte

188). In The

Theory Theory

(p.

of Moral Sentiments "Smith leaves little

of

or no room

for the

biblical

phenomena

revelation, convenant, miracles, prayer,

and particular

Providence"

on the passionate
rationalism.

provides an entirely secular moral teaching based psychology derived from Hobbes's radical critique of ancient Minowitz's claim is that Smith expands, reformulates, and recali

(p. 190). Smith

brates the Hobbesian

garb

mechanistic

teaching, but

cloaks

it in

pseudo-religious
project

necessary to
"self-love,"

give

it

thus
"sympathy."

moderated

legitimacy and force. The basis of by yet wholly compatible with by

noting that in

Smith's

is

the operations of

Minowitz

concludes

his book

spite of their obvious

differ

ences, Smith and Marx may be united when it comes to explaining the place of
religion

in

political

life.

They
of

are separated

by

the moderate and immoderate

stripped of all of

exercise of political speech

(pp. 235-58). When

its illusions
as

and

brought to the full light

as

day,

our version of

modernity may be

God
and

less, empty, or soulless individualism, the decay

meaning, may
all

Marx's. Perhaps the

excesses

of materialism

of communitarian

ties that provide us with place and

in

some measure

have
us

their root

in

modernity. at

Perhaps the heart

of our

failure
version

of

Marxian

communism

alerts

to the

diseases

the

of modernity.

Minowitz invites

us

to consider whether the modem,

liberal

project of which we are part

is born

with a genetic

defect. So

we

rightly

wonder:

Where do

we go

from here?
not entertain

It is

quite clear that

Minowitz does

hopes
reader

ancient polis

(p. 257). Nevertheless, he leaves the

attempt to
or

returning us to the with few alternatives

of

but to turn to the contemporary

ceptions of virtue and

community,

infuse modernity with ancient con to transform it in the direction prescribed

does
not rest so much with the

by

postmodern critics.

Yet

perhaps the problem

Book Reviews
modem project

237

itself

as

it does

with the manner

in

which we persist

in

under

standing it, and the expectations we continue to place upon it. To put the issue in a manner that returns us to Minowitz's important book: Does the use of the
"esoteric"

mode of analysis
nity's

Godless

core?

necessarily reveal to us the The viability of Minowitz's thesis

Are
we required

"truth"

about moder rests upon the use of

this

heuristic device

and the conclusions that

he draws from Smith's silences,

to go down the
road

omissions, and circumspection.

Minowitz

invites
One

us

to travel?

By

way

of

conclusion, I

suggest we need not.

could argue

that the

fear

of persecution compelled

Smith to

write as

he

did. After all, the

tion
also

scorn

heaped

on

his

good

friend David Hume for immodera for

anyone

in

religious matters should

be lesson

enough
a

(p. 8). One

could

argue, as Minowitz
and

does,

that there is

difference between the

require

ments of persuasion still and

the requirements of truth. One could

venture and

farther
hence

plausibly
requires

argue that not all truths are

politically salutary,

decency
which

tact. Yet there is another reading worthy of consideration here

is

acknowledged

by

Minowitz but

unexplored.

One important

question

repeatedly intrudes itself

upon the

to wonder about such vexed

an afterlife. wonder:

issues

thinking as God,

mind, especially when it

is inclined
and

religion, soul, morality, reason,

After

considerable

labor

we come

up

against our

limitations
exceed the

and

Is the human

being

constituted

for the

ends which

may

full

comprehension and exercise of

his

natural

faculties? I

suggest that this

is

one of

the

central

questions

animating Smith's
am

inquiry

throughout

The

Theory

of

Moral Sentiments. If I
cised when cealed matters of
"truth."

correct, then great caution would have to be exer

method"

to supposedly arrive at the con employing the "esoteric For it may be the case that Smith's circumspection on religious

is
"

not motivated

by

the

desire to

conceal

his

"

'Machiavellianism
that

come

age'

(p.

257), but,
not suffer

rather, is the proper

posture of a mind

knows itself.
could tell
us

Smith does

from the

misguided presumption

that

he

conclusively He understands
within

what we need to
what

know

about spiritual matters

broadly

considered.

is

accessible

to a

thinking

mind and circumscribes politics

its

natural

limitations. The
of what can

modem project

is

an attempt

to secure poli

tics on the

basis

be known

without considerable

dispute, however

limited,
whole.

about

and for this very reason politics cannot make claims to encompass the We know only too well how this proves tyrannical. For all of the talk the we seem to forget that we moderns are the of "modem
"hubris"
man,"

product of philosophic reflection

intended to

bring

us to a

better

appreciation of

ourselves,

and

thus of our limitations. Unlike those who took their bearings

classical

from
are

the teachings of

antiquity

and medieval

Christianity,

the moderns

remarkably

sober about their politics. and

Yet in

bringing

the

heavens, Smith
reach

his fellow

moderns

never

philosophy down from thought that the low was

intelligible let
tempt to

alone practicable without

the necessary
reason

but

inherently

feeble

at

for the high. It is for this

that

Smith's

writings are

satu-

238

Interpretation
Politics is
a curious admixture of

rated with tensions and riddles.

incompatible

needs, and it cannot survive without that admixture. Smith's project

should

is (and

ours

be)

characterized

by
us

the

agonizing

attempt

to hold together a delicate

middle, the human being's tenuous place between beasts and gods, not
"emancipate"

by

the

attempt to

in this

counsel

from the compelling for moderation that one finds the

claims of

body

and soul.

It is

essence of our modernity.

r
Peter
pp.,

-i
Levine, Something To Hide (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996) 278
$22.95.

Charles E. Butterworth

University

of Maryland

at

College Park

The dust jacket labels this

that

academic roman a

clef "a

mystery,"

then explains

it is "based

on

the

work of a real philosopher and some of of

disciples."

Presenting

themselves as staunch supporters

his modem-day the democratic sys

tem,

secretly espousing nihilistic relativism derived from Nietzsche, they scruple at nothing in their quest to thwart popular sovereignty and egalitarian policy. Recourse to cryptic writing most notably, placing their key message at
while

the exact center of the

document

allows

them to communicate dark thoughts

to one another and entice new

scended

followers

without

being

detected. Although de best

private

from

financially

comfortable

families

and schooled at the

institutions,

their clandestine nihilism overrides all sense of

duty

or obligation.

The story begins with the disappearance of Zach Blumberg's dissertation on Joseph de Maistre. A Yale graduate student in philosophy, Zach returns to his Manhattan
apartment one

August evening In the

next

and

discovers that

all the

files

of

his

dissertation his

chapters

have been
stolen.

irreversibly

obliterated

from his

computer and

backup

diskettes

few days, he learns that the

well as

same

has

happened to every existing hard copy of the dissertation as notes. Zach's efforts to determine who has done this to him
nefarious politics of philosopher

his

research

and

why

expose the

Otto Stern

and

his disciples;

prevent

Yale Law

School
dell

graduate and noted proponent of natural-law

theory Circuit Judge Wen

and solve the mysterious

Fry from being

of

confirmed to the a

Supreme Court;

death

Charles Wilson,

Princeton

graduate student whose academics

dissertation

was and

Not only does the tale portray how his disciples undermine popular government, it
also stolen.

like Otto Stem

also provides a tour of the

Ivy

League

Zach's sleuthing takes him from Yale to Princeton to Cornell and back again. Such institutions, most notably Princeton and Yale, contrast starkly
as with the

desultory

state college where

Zach teaches
all too

a summer course.

A
sided.

grim world

this,

yet one that

is
In

So, too,

are

the characters.

addition

patently movie-set thin and one to Zach and Judge Wendell

Frye (the

no stand-in

quotation occurring, of
a personal

for Robert Bork, for he has published an article citing Bork there is Charles, who dies course, in the middle)
appearance; his former girlfriend,
who soon takes and
with

before making Alice Webster,

the best
history;'

Kate,

Princeton

graduate student

in Art

a paradigm of

of academic
and the

Zach; up scholarly devotion who represents life despite her ignorance of eighteenth-century French

History

emerita professor

learning

impossibly
Winter

pompous

Hannibal Davies,

proudly

logical-positi-

interpretation,

1997, Vol. 24, No. 2

240

Interpretation
of per philosophy at Yale who so unremittingly allows his sense use for reflection on virtue and vice. he has no him that guide to dignity

vist chair of

sonal

Numerous

other characters

flit in

and out of

the story,

but

apart at

from Andrew,
Cornell
as a

Zach's

classmate
assistant

from

college

now

comfortably

ensconced

in philosophy, only Cornell philosophy professor Jules Hausteaching man is noteworthy. A Stem student who has based his career on explicating the
master's

teaching
he

yet

fails to discern its

cryptic

nihilism

until

alerted

by

Charles, Hausman
whose surname

seems modelled on a
shares a syllable.

former Cornell Nietzsche

recognizes the
disciples'

scholar with

Once Hausman

Stem's deception, he
himself.

strives

to right his fellow

enormity of wrongs, then hangs

Of the duplicitous Otto Stem,

precious

little is

said.

Zach finds him "an him

as

interesting figure,
pretty

actually,"

even though

"a lot

of academics think of

marginal."

He notes, moreover, that Stem

the greatest postwar European

had

close

intellectual

relationships with some of

philosophers.

He founded
two

a school that most people consider eccentric

today, but it

has

a member or

on most of

the

best faculties in

the country.

(P.

49)

After perusing

several

books

by Stem,

Zach
or

allows that
footnotes"

"Stern

wrote well and

with a complete

lack

of technical

jargon

(p. 53). Although it is

to Nietzsche

Charles
and

who

first discovers that Stern for

cryptic

owes

his

nihilistic relativism

his

penchant

writing to the

discovery

that previous philosophers

wrote so as to conceal their thoughts

iarity
these

with

from ordinary readers, it is Zach's famil Joseph de Maistre that facilitates his grasping the significance of
reveals

insights.2

Zach's

research

that

de Maistre

was

an

anti-Masonic

Mason

who

detested the it
prudent

notion of popular

sovereignty

and a cultural relativist who thought

to conceal his beliefs. From Charles's dissertation Zach

learns

that

in

addition

to

having

no

faith in the ability

of the people

to govern themselves

wisely, Otto Stern was also a cultural relativist who concealed

his thoughts

from

all

but his

closest

highly
fax

regarded

by

disciples. Judge Wendell Frye, it turns out, was so Stern as to be entrusted with his most private papers. No Senate
office

manuscript

is

thrown over a

transom, but Zach does

manage to

damning material to a senator opposed to Frye's confirmation. Nothing in the story serves to qualify it as a tract against cultural relativism. To the contrary, Zach Blumberg and his associates accept without flinching that there are no grounds for distinguishing between good and bad, just and unjust.
But they believe in the beliefs of Stern Nor does the
good and and

bad, just
of

and unjust, nonetheless.

In

other words,

his followers
or

are not at

issue. ringing defense

of

novel

any

its

characters present a

democracy. The Sternians

uninterested

are never

faulted for

deeming
and

the mass of citizens

in

questions of good and

bad, justice

injustice,

or, worse yet,

Book Reviews
incompetent judges
opinions
goals.

241

of such questions.

Their sin,

rather

is trying to

conceal such

engaging in other acts of deceit as they pursue their political Zach's jejune defense of the people's right to know things they care little
and

about is summarily dismissed by Jules Hausman, as well it should be. Not some blind faith in the ability of the people to govern themselves well despite their shortcomings, but Hausman's sense of the need to preserve due process leads

him to
he

Zach Charles's missing dissertation, ians. In the end, Alice Webster confesses that she
give was

an act that

derails

the Stern-

opposed

Frye mainly because

whose

"a liar

hypocrite,"

and

even more meant a

"a lunatic

right-winger"

"ap

pointment

ment"

step back for women, the poor, the environ (p. 274). Here Zach, but not Kate, has the grace to protest weakly.
would

have

The
these

novel's

final

scene

illustrates
the

all

too vividly the minor

of an

place accorded

larger issues.
solicitous each

Observing
is
of the

interactions

older couple,

especially

how
cates

other, Zach

somehow

finds their

conduct vindi no such

Alice Webster's judgment that it does everything is

not matter

if "there is

thing

permitted."

as truth and

He continues,

It isn't that Maistre

and

Stem

and the rest of them are wrong;

it's just

that their
compared

ideas don't
to the

seem all

that important anymore.

of

In fact, they

seem a

bit silly,

grown-up business

living.

"With that
permitted

thought,"

the narrator concludes,

of

"he

settled

back in his

seat and

himself to daydream
that Zach and
content

Kate

happiness."

and
men.

It is

not

his fellows consciously imitate Nietzsche's last

pleasures

No, merely
unable to

to enjoy the simple

of

life,

though

admittedly
can.

justify

their actions,

they blithely

think the thoughts

erotic

they

The

novel

is flat

and unappealing.

Zach's

attachment

to Kate

is

so

poorly described that he appears to be as he is a teacher. The Stemians, evil

as unprepared and unimaginative a as

lover
no

they may be, have

no character

face

or soul.

dressed,

and that and

We learn only that they are young, Waspishly handsome, well they drive expensive cars. Mysteriously able to break into
offices,
manipulate

apartments

computers,

infiltrate

secure

government

buildings,
narration

and pull strings

is

marred a

according to

covering on 14), Zach makes

late

by daily agenda, days Tuesday that the last

a

from afar, they exist mainly as shadows. And the numerous foolish errors. Even though the tale unfolds
evaporate without mention.

Thus,

after

dis

copy

of

his dissertation has disappeared (p.

notes that

long,

tedious

trip

to Yale to look for his

very

day

only to find that they, too,

are missing.

When he

returns

to New York on the

asks

train that evening and runs

there on a

into Alice Webster,

she

him

what

he is
and

doing

Friday

night

(p.

21);

similar slips occur

in Chapters 2-3

heavy
place

loses his 8-9. Similarly, Zach's dissertation advisor, Professor Mollendorf, pp. 140-41); the with (compare p. 9 weeks of matter in a accent German
Charles
meets

his death

changes

from

Virginia to

Washington-area

242
motel

Interpretation
(compare
p.

124

with pp.

171-72);

and

the Memorial Bridge entrance to

Arlington

Cemetery
than

is

graced with a traffic

light (p. 175). difficult. It is far

arouse easier

To be sure, Peter Levine's task

about when

was quite

to write

actions

ideas

and

more

difficult to

reader's

excitement

discussing

the implications of a

philosophical argument

than those of a
who want

lawyer's

plea or a gangster's threats.

Perchance amusing to those

to

think the worst of people

who consider

themselves

they imagine to be Stemians and maybe even putative Stemians, the novel nonetheless
recourse whether

to those
raises

in no way answered by Zach's final Alice Webster's judgment that it does not matter
question

to daydreams. Nor

can

truth exists and that

everything is
talent as a

therefore permitted pass without challenge,

and general

her

personal

charm,
mat

teacher,

human
Davies'

decency

notwithstanding.

To leave

ters at such an impasse serves no more to vindicate Jules Hausman's noble

death than to

rebuke

Hannibal

self-centered complacency.

NOTES

1. Her

poignant recollection that

"when Louis the Fourteenth

was

executed, someone shouted,

'Jacques de
executed

Molay,
or

avenged'"

you are

(pp.

31-32)

suggests confusion with

Louis

XVI,

who was

in 1793

dyslexia; Louis

XIV died

of natural causes

in 1715.

2. The
novel.

narrator misses a unique

opportunity here to

Since he has
not

no compunctions about

why he did

allude

to the

current

sharpen the contemporary focus of the citing names of actual academic figures, one wonders debate surrounding the Nietzschean leanings of the "real

philosopher"

Stern is

modelled on

Maistre, Levine

might

by evoking Shadia Drury. Again, as part of Zach's research on de have had him consult Stephen Holmes's The Anatomy of Antiliberalism
1993). Holmes
adorns

(Cambridge: Harvard

University Press,

his book

with the apothegms of that sums

revolutionary enigma and devotes a whole chapter to the Stern model, then against him by complaining about how difficult he is to read. Perhaps Levine is
it
of

up his

grievances

avoided the

reading

accurately.

"that the
would

ancients could

ploy because examination reveals how singularly incapable Holmes For example, when blaming this scholar for the "bold claim have invented modern science, but refused to do so because they knew
. .

counter

be 'destructive

humanity'"

of

(p. 83

and n.

57), Holmes

asserts:

"but

even though such

positions are essential to

deftly
ning
ate

wedged

his position, they are never openly discussed or defended. Indeed, they are between paragraphs of dense textual The claim, found at the begin
commentary."

of the author's

reply to two

critics

(Kojeve

and

sequel; see On

Tyranny,

p.

178, Holmes's

reference

Voegelin), is fully documented in the immedi to What Is Political Philosophy?, p. 37,

being

blind.

r
$59.00,
paper

n
$23.95.

Susan Orr, Jerusalem and Athens: Reason and Revelation in the Works of Leo Strauss (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995), ix + 245 pp., cloth

Will Morrisey

The

political

philosophizing

of

Leo Strauss first

comes to

sight, for many

or perhaps

students, in the opposition between natural right and

the opposition to

historicism,

in

his

account

But for Strauss himself, according in the Preface to the English translation of Spinoza 's Critique of
ancient and modern.

between

Religion,
raised

political

in

Germany,"

philosophy came to sight when, as "a young Jew born and he "found himself in the grip of the theologico-political
p.

predicament"

(New York: Schocken Books, 1965,

than the

1). Understood in light

of
or

the

high

rather

low,

this predicament resolves into the opposition

revelation and reason.

apparent opposition

between

his

account of the results of

his investigation

by

Strauss very nearly begins admitting that unassisted hu

cannot

man reason refute

thought governed
of the

by

the principle of noncontradiction

of the political

the

testimony
become

Bible. Aware

dangers

of this admis
'secularized,'

sion,

which

even more acute

when

Biblical

motifs are

Strauss, famously,

turns to an

investigation

of premodern political ever

philosophy,

wandering far from Jerusalem, but stands for.

without

forgetting

what

Jerusalem

Susan Orr has

that
phy.

written a

is in

some sense

an essay commentary on "Jerusalem and central to Strauss's Studies in Platonic Political Philoso

Athens,"

Concerned that

some of

Strauss's

students

have

wandered altogether

too
of

far from Jerusalem, Orr seeks to remind them, and what Jerusalem stands for in the political philosophy
of

all students of of

Strauss,

Leo Strauss. At the

end

her introduction
or

she

frames the

question

this

way:

Leo Strauss, "cautious Straussian fashion,

she

nihilist"

"reluctant

believer"

(p. 18)? Thus, in

good

compels us to ask

if Strauss

might

have been

a reluctant nihilist or a cautious

believer,

or perhaps even neither a nihilist nor a a

believer, but something

In Chapter 2,
represent

else

(for example,
Reflections,"

Platonic

political philosopher).

Orr's introduction is
traditions

the

first

of seven chapters.

"Preliminary
great

she observes that

of

Athens

and

Jerusalem

"the two

philosophy

and

templation,
return.

and progress as

(p. 22), of human guidance, freedom, con distinguished from divine guidance, obedience, and
to consider
traditions.
whether

faith"

She thereby

compels us

philosophy

and

faith

are

equally traditions, devoted to "Greek

or

if both

are

She

goes on to present an elegant

and accurate outline of

counterparts"

Strauss's essay, commenting that the central section is of the Biblical account of genesis, and that the
essay "deals
with the curse of

central paragraph of the

Canaan,

the excellence

interpretation,

Winter

1997, Vol. 24, No. 2

244
of

Interpretation
the
the

Nimrod, and Strauss, contains

animal"

Tower

Babel"

of

paragraph

which,

"according

to

biblical understanding

of the

beginning

of man as a politi

cal

(p. 32). This

most

observation compels

us

to consider that the phrase

political

"political

animal"

immediately
ingenious

calls

to mind the

thought of Aris

totle,

a student of

Plato.
an
argument

Chapter 3
theme of the Lord
wisdom

contains

concerning
that for

one

aspect

of the

beginning or genesis. Strauss is the beginning of wisdom,

wonder.

"Jerusalem"

observes
whereas

the
the

fear

of

for

"Athens"

beginning

of

is

thus draws our

akin

Orr asks, Is not Biblical awe akin to Greek wonder'1. (She attention to Strauss's own denial, in another place, that awe is

to wonder.) Orr continues:

conceals

"lulling
be

by emphasizing fear, not awe, Strauss artfully "the compelling rationality of Jerusalem"; he does this because he is (p. 49). Why would Strauss sing this lullaby of the atheists to
sleep"

Broadway? Because, in his time

a man of

and place, the

reigning

opinion

is

atheistic.

To

faith today is to blaspheme

against a militant and powerful athe

ism,

an atheism that will confine the scholar of religious

faith to

some academic

ghetto.

Athens, Orr
be for them

In singing this song, Strauss partakes of an art common to Jerusalem argues. Strauss prepares dogmatic atheists to awaken to what
"Jerusalem"

and will

new,

reasoned consideration of
'scientific'

(p. 56). In the essay

with on

itself,

of

course, Strauss contrasts

Biblical

criticism not

the

Bible itself but

surface of the

with natural theology.

Strauss

remarks that

he

will

begin

the

Bible,

where

both

orthodox

believers

'scientific'

and

historians
Islamic

begin.

In her
revelation

central as

chapter, Orr writes that Strauss describes Jewish

and

perfect

law,

not

dogma,
or

as

rational

systems, even if
silent on

revealed

through a mere
scription of the

human being,
"loyal

a prophet.

She is artfully
rather

Strauss's de Orr
observes
of

philosophers"

falasifa

as nonorthodox.

that

Strauss's

emphasis on the

coherence,

than the divine

inspiration,

the Biblical account of genesis once again softens the dogmatism of atheists,
who will now admire that coherence without

tion of

its

source.

Neither Strauss,
source.

nor

Orr

bristling prematurely at following Strauss, shirks

man
ways"

the ques
the ques

tion of the
God"

Bible's

Orr

writes that

Strauss "says that

shares with

not so much reason as an

"unpredictable,"

"ability

to change his

(p. 69). If God is

then philosophy, governed

by

the principle of noncontradic

tion, "cannot

touch"

him (p. 69). It

might

be

added that philosophy,

then,

can

not touch man

either, that political philosophy is impossible and that Heidegger

is right. If the

"seeming

contradictions"

of

God in

the

Bible demonstrate the

ability of God to change His ways, this does admit "the possibility that the inspired" Bible is (p. 73), but it leaves open whether the Bible was inspired by

God

or

by (equally
God"

changeable)

men.

scrutability

of

(p. 86),

one might suspect that

In pointing to "the fundamental in Strauss invites us to wonder

Book Reviews
rather than to either

245
in

fear. But if
to the

one wonders rather than or

fears,

one need not engage

passivity.

early-Heideggerian assertiveness

late-Heideggerian
not

According
man was not

Bible, human life is

to be an apolitical

being

of childlike

God intended originally innocence governed by God. Man

political.

know the good, morally or intellectually. "The difference between the Bible's first discussion of politics and, for instance, Aristotle's
to
assertion

intended

that man

is

political

by

nature

is

astonishing"

comments.

Strauss's

central paragraph

describes "political life

attempt

(p. 83), Orr rightly as we know

.

it

now"

(p. 90): the

human,

Nimrodian

to unite mankind

by

force fails
inhabit

when

God destroys the tower (p. 90). One

of Babel and confuses the tongues of the

of

ants, scattering them to the ends

dom"

the earth. This prevents "a worldwide

account that

king

might add

to

Orr's

in this

paragraph

Strauss

sides with

the Biblical

teaching

against not

mediately)

Kojeve,
the

and all who would

only Nimrod but Hegel, (most im commit the sin against the Holy Spirit

by replacing
not

Holy

Spirit

with the

Absolute Spirit.

By doing

so, Strauss does

necessarily lenges us to see why

commit

himself

fully

to Biblical conviction, but rather chal

'universalizing'

reason

does

not commit us

to

universal or

worldwide government.

God, including his wonderings about God's justice in the story of Abraham and Isaac, lead Strauss to shift his attention from Genesis to Exodus, specifically, the teaching on God's name. Here Strauss
wonderings about
says

Perhaps these

"I

believe,"

not

"I

know,"

and

translates the Tetragrammaton not as "I am

that I

am"

but

as

"I

shall

be

what

be."

shall

This

reemphasizes the change

promises of

ability
enants

of

God,

even as

it

emphasizes the
might

covenants, the
note.

God. Cov

require

predictability, one
am

Following Strauss, Orr rightly

fit Biblical thought, too
that

observes that

"I

that I

am"

is too

metaphysical to and
'is,'

Being-oriented. "[Ojne
speak

further"

can even go

"say
so

it is difficult

even

to

abstractly in

Hebrew"

(p. 93). God

a

to speak, pure willing, not

'it.'

pure thought

thinking itself; God is

centrally, the

person,

not an account of

In her fifth chapter, Orr discusses Strauss's

parts"

the "Greek counter

admits that the

of

Genesis,
not a
rather

account of

Hesiod. Strauss here

Torah is

coherent

whole, but a compilation, now that he has atheists

prefers

thinking

than merely disbelieving. Strauss uncompromisingly

the

Biblical God,

who

is wise,

and whose
us"

jealousy

of man's

love

stems

"not

out of of

(p. 103), to Hesiod's Zeus, who is jealous that Zeus lacks. Aristotle reflects wisdom has because Metis Metis
need, but out of
concern

for

"Greek"

presuppositions

in asking "whether it is
effect
questions

prudent

to call a man
gods"

happy

until after

he is dead

so as not to provoke the

envy

of the

(p. 103). (Elsewhere,

we

Aristotle, by noticing that the know, classical political philosophers, including Aristotle, exhibit the ancient city 240-41]. This may more as a natural than as a holy city [The City and Man, pp.
Strauss in
the piety of
mean

that the Philosopher feared human envy more than

divine.)

At any rate,

246

Interpretation
Greece
are

the gods of

ruled

by fate, by

force;

the ultimate power

in the
to be

Greek

universe

is impersonal, 'beyond
and

evil.'

good and

Aristotle's god,

not

confused with

fate, is

of course pure thought

ing

itself transcends justice Be that

of the as

thinking itself. Pure thought think injustice, although it does not transcend good
god

ness.

it may, Aristotle's

is

not a

God

Bible is

an envious one.

To

reflect upon

jealous god, any more than the the differences and sim
jealous
gods

ilarities between envious, jealous,

reflect upon

and neither envious nor

Athens'

is to

the theme
god

of

'Jerusalem

and

though not, to be sure, to

than

exhaust

it. Plato's

is

closer

to the Biblical
of

God

is Aristotle's. Orr
closest

notes

that

Plato's theology,
to the

with

its talk

providence,

is both the be
a noble

"Greek"

thing
essay.

Biblical

account of

God

and

likely

to

lie (p. 114).

In the Bible

sixth

chapter, Orr turns to the second,

and the sets
Prophets"

much

shorter, part of Strauss's

In "On Socrates
and

Strauss

shows

how

not

to

bring

the

Plato together. He

up

a contrast

between himself
the

and the

Kantian

philosopher

Hermann Cohen.

They

diverge

on

issue

of

historicism.

"By

combining
world of

the social ideals of Plato and the prophets,

[Cohen]

envisioned a

the future in which there would

be

no

suffering, and no distinctions

men"

among is that

(p. 128). Orr thereby

points us to the reflection that

historicism
provi

part of philosophic

thought that most closely

imitates Biblical

dence. Has philosophy corrupted religion, or vice-versa? (Or has each corrupted the other?) Perhaps this is one reason why Strauss distinguishes reason from
revelation, even
when

he takes

pains

to

defend

revelation

from

charges

of

irrationality.
The
problem of

historicism,
In

and of the politics

historicism spawns,

raises

the

problem of

false

prophets.

one of

her

most

insightful passages, Orr for

remarks

that

Strauss does

not

"make the traditional

arguments

distinguishing

false

from tme

prophets": that

false

prophets are those who contradict

Mosaic law;
miracles"

that true prophets "demonstrate the veracity of their

(p. 136). Rather, in Strauss's words, "false

prophets

calling through trust in flesh, even if that

flesh is the temple in Jerusalem, the promised land, nay, the chosen people itself, nay, God's promise to the chosen people if that promise is taken to be an
unconditional promise and not as part of a materialism
Covenant"

(p. 136). This

opposition

attack on
proph-

is indeed

kind

of

Platonism

and stands

in

to all

ecy-of-the-flesh,

whether

it be dialectical Spirit. This

materialism or the

dialectical

immaopinion

terialism of the Absolute that

stance comports with

man"

Strauss's
one

Socrates is

"by Strauss's definition,

and

a pious

(p. 140),

"who inves

tigates the

human things
purpose"

leaves divine things

alone"

(p. 141). Moreover,

prophets

"[f]rom Socrates

and therefore philosophy's

perspective, the
teeth"

have

beneficial

(p. 143); philosophy "lacks orators, do not, and (one might add) philosophers
of prophets.

(p. 144), but prophets,

as

might

influence

the thought

That it is
seen

not a good

thing for

prophets'

impulses to

rule philoso

phers

may be

in the

history

of

historicism.

Book Reviews

247

does

In her concluding chapter, Orr accurately asserts that Socrates, unlike Nietzsche, not hold it possible to unite Jerusalem and Athens, to synthesize reason
Strauss thereby establishes himself as "the than Nietzsche for perplexed modems (p. 148).
guide"

and revelation. guide

new

better

gentle

but firm

guide

to the perplexed

reader of

Strauss, Orr
his

proceeds with

careful get

judgment, slowing down impatient

point.'

souls who want

the philosopher 'to

to the

She knows that

a philosopher wants

student to

be the
point

one

who gets

to the point, and none too hastily. The impulse to get to the

too

hastily

yields an undue agitation

for

eschatological relief.

INTERPRETATION
A JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY Queens College, Flushing, NY 11367-1597 U.S.A. (718) 997-5542 Subscription
rates per volume

(3 issues): individuals $29 libraries and all

students

other

institutions $48

(four-year

U.S.: Canada $4.50 extra; elsewhere longer) or $1 1 by air. Payments: in U.S. dollars and payable by a financial institution located U.S. or the U.S. Postal Service. Postage
outside mail

limit) $18 $5.40 extra by

surface

(8

weeks or

.00

within

the

Please

print or

type

ORDER FORM FOR NEW SUBSCRIBERS

(NOT
I
wish

FOR RENEWALS

CURRENT SUBSCRIBERS WILL BE

BILLED)

to

subscribe

to INTERPRETATION.
name
address

?
?

bill

me

student

payment enclosed

ZIP/postcode

air mail

country (if

outside

U.S.)

GIFT SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM Please

enter a subscription

to INTERPRETATION for
.

name address
.

student

ZIP/postcode

? G ?

air mail

country (if outside

from:
name

U.S.)

bill

me

payment enclosed

address
.

ZIP/postcode

RECOMMENDATION TO YOUR LIBRARY

to: the

Librarian,
that our

recommend

library

subscribe at

to

INTERPRETATION,
of

a journal of polit per year

ical philosophy

[ISSN 0020-9635],
signature

the institutional rate

$48

(three

issues).

name

_____

date

position

INTERPRETATION, Queens College, Flushing, New York 11367-1597, U.S.A.

ISSN 0020-9635

Interpretation, Inc.
Queens College

Flushing

N.Y. 11367-1597
U.S.A.

tj
CO

r
O

a.

z
o
3
i

3
r*

a
r
TJ
o

p^
go ra

TJ
1

Z
o

Si

"0
MD

rro
CO

o
1

>