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Underground facilities for storage in the

z -f--inter ior, -by _M aj- G. A. OraI

This Document
IS A HOLDING OF THE

ARCHIVES SECTION
LIBRARY SERVICES FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

DOCUMENT NO. R-2128.216


CGSCMForm 160 13 Mar 51

COPY NO.

Army-CGSC-P2-1798-7

Mar 52-5M

toa~~i

COINAND AND GENERA.L STAFF COLLEGE FORT LFAVEMYORTH..KA.NSAS

COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS

3 1695 00513 8649

ARCHAVES

Logistics Specialized Course


Regular Cla ss 1948-1949

CGSC FT Lh AVL~N WORTH KAN

DEC 111952
ACCESSION NO_
-U LLGlSTR Y_________

___

UnDERGROUND FACILITIES FOR STORA~GE INTHEl ZONIE OF INTERIOR

GUY A. ORSIhO Major., Ordnance

-Date submnitted -

24 1Vhy 1949

OCTION RTR SE PAPHLET


~.iaMYC&$C,

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A P~

COM~NlD AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE Department of Logistics Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

6021

19

(Date)
STUDENT RESEARCH DIRECTIVE FOR SUBJECT NUMBER .1-16

STUDENT (Name) FACULTY ADVISOR (Rank) (ASN)

(Name)
SUBJECT

(Room No.)

(Tele. No.)

Underground Facilities for Storage in the Zone of Interior.

PURPOSE: To present the problem of underground facilities for storage in the Z/I and develop principles which should govern the development and use of such facilities in peace and -war.

SCOPE:

(Brief outline of subject coverage)

Brief survey of the employment of underground storage in 1. World War II and of developments since World War II. Evaluate the following factors relating to underground 2. under present plans and concepts. a, b. c. d. e. f. g. h. 3. Necessity for underground storage facilities. Protection afforded. Available facilities and their suitability for use. Additional facilities required or planned. Cost of development. Impact on supply system. Impact on transportation system. Availability of labor. storage

Project this evaluation into the future, also considerings a. b. c. d. e. Potential effects of mass destruction weapons. Overall effectiveness of underground storage facilities. Dispersed versus undergroul, storage versus concentrated storaqgp ements for labor, gtion r Impact , on coonoic;mbbil faoilities. and other trasportation, materials, facilities. storage df uider'eiid Overall economy

4. Develop policies and principles governing development and use of facilities for underground storage in the Z/I. 5. NIke specific recommendations concerning development and use of facilities for underground storage in the Z/I.

NOTE TO STUDENTS:
The scope suggested above is intended as a guide only and 1. not to be construed as a limitation on the students persual of the

is

(over)

subject. The student is encouraged to modify the above scope as he may find necessary to outline and define the specific problem he visualizes and proposes to develop in his research study. 2. The references below are furnished to give the student enough material with which to begin his research. It is anticipated that the student will make use of other available sources in order to give adequate scope to his subject, and to include latest developments pertaining to the subject. REFERENCES: Pan Sec Nos. 85 and 86.........The Depot System and its operation in Future Warfare. (Dept of Log. Student Analytical Studies 1947-48) N-15083D .............. *Source Material on the National Security Program Vi Jan 1947. Cavalry Journal - p. 2, Industry Underground.

M406 0.73 B6...........Armored C-11896 ...............

Program of Installations, WD Progress Report, 51 Iay 1947. R-15628................Depot Operations, WND Progress Report, 31 May 1947. 0-15632................Post War Installation Study (For Planning Purposes only) 28 September 1945. of Storage Operations, Army Service Forces, December 1941 to December 1945.

N-15257 A & B....,.....History

Military Review Article prepared by Lt. Col. Goshorn.

COORDINATION:

(Confer with the authors of these subjects for pertinent information and coordination)

1-17

REMARKSs

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE


ii|

i 1IDepartment Ei ....

of Logistics Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

File No.
SUBJECTs TOs 1.

1-16

24 May 1949

Underground Facilities for Storage in the Zone of Interior. Director, Department of Logistics, PROBLEM. -C&GSC.

To present the problem of underground facilities

for storage in

the Zone of Interior, and develop principles which

should govern the development and use of such facilities in peace and war. 2. ASSUMPTIONS. -a. That the United States will become an

active participant in the next World War.


b. That the industrial potential of the United States will

be a high priority target in the next World War.


3. DISCUSSION. -- a. Germany and Japan experienced the need Both countries

for underground installations during World War II.

gained little advantage from use of such facilities because they were constructed too late. Repeated attacks on the lines of com-

munication also contributed to the reduction of effectiveness of underground facilities. b. (Annex 4)

The majority of the Army's depots are located in cen-

ters of industry and in highly populated areas. (Annex 5) o. A sudden attack, using absolute weapons, could destroy Un-

a significant portion of this country's industrial potential.

protected Army depots would be included among the facilities destroyed. Such destruction would render the nation helpless for

equipment with which to begin mobilization of its forces. (Annex 6) d. Active defensive operations alone cannot be expected Passive measures

to give complete protection against attack.

needed are dispersion of depots and underground storage installa-

tions.

(Annex 7)
e. Underground storage facilities are feasible from an Properly planned and constructed, they

engineering standpoint. will afforda

nigh degree of protection for vital military stores.

Maejor disadvantage is

the high initial

cost. (Annex 8).

4. CONCLUSIONS. -

a.

Protection for depots in the Zone of

Interior is necessary to safeguard vital military materiel from


destruction during an unannounced attack. b. A balanced program of dispersed, underground, and

above-ground depots will give the maximum protection at minimum cost. 5. ACTION RECOMENDED. -a. That the Director of Logistics,

GSUSA, take appropriate

steps to establish a program, having as its

objective the development and use of underground storage facilities

in the Zone of Interior.


b. That the Chief of Staff, United States Army, be re-

quested to approve and publish, for the guidance of staff planners concerned, the recommended principles and policies attached. (Annex 3). c. That this study be approved and forwarded to the

Director of Logistics, GSUSA, for consideration. (Annexes 1 and 2).

SGpU'ORS INO r, Ord

ANNEXES: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Draft Memorandum to the Commandant, C&GSC. Draft Letter of transmittal to Director of Logistics, Recommended Principles and Policies. Historical Background. Present U. S. Storage System. Necessity for Protection. Protective Measures. Underground Storage Installations. Bibliography.

C&GSC.

Concurrence. -- Omitted. Nonconourrences. -- Omitted. Consideration of nonconcurrences. Annexes added. -- Omitted. APPROVED:

--

Omitted

My 1949

i':.>.

^I..ii

.Colonel,

F. A. HENNING FA Director

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS


SUBJECT:
TO

Underground Facilities For Storage in the Zone of Interi4 or.


(IDENTIFY THIS MEMORANDUM SLIP WITH PAPERS TO WHICH ATTACHEE
FRO M ililfiliA DATE AN D SUBJECT MATTER

C(

xndant uedGSC

1.

I concur in study.

the recommendations of the attached research

2.

Request that this study be transmitted to the Director of Logistics, GSUSA, by means of a letter, (Annex 2) which has been prepared for your signature.

F. A. BENNING Colone l, FA Director Dept of Logistics

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ANNEX 1
P9-1328-C&GSC-15 Feb 49-20M P9-1328--C&GSC-15 Feb 49-20M

NECESSARY) IF NECESSARY) REVERSE SICE (USE REVERSE (USE SIDE IF

DRAFT

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE


FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

SUBJECT: TO:

Underground Facilities for Storage in The Director, Logistic Division, GSUSA The Pentagon, Washington 25, D. C.

the Zone of Interior.

1.

The attached staff study, Underground Facilities for transmitted to you for consid-

Storage in the Zone of Interior, is eration and appropriate action. 2.

The research study was prepared by a student in this by the Director, Department of Logistics,

College and concurred in

The reconmendations made for the development and use of underground storage facilities in considerable merit. the Zone of Interior appear to have

M. S. EDDY Lt General, USA Commandant

. . .

glr~llplpr~

ANNEX 2

AINEX 3

IIE

1i

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RECOMMEMDED PRINCIPLES AN)

POLICIES

The principles and policies listed below are believed applicable to a general program for development and use of underground storage installations in 1. Planning. -the zone of the interior.

Planning for adequate protection of the Army The long span of

storage system must be started without delay.

time between planning and actual construction and use makes this policy mandatory. 2. Economy. -A depot program must be developed that strikes underground, and above-ground

.c4 i~

a practical balance of dispersed, storage facilities. tion at minimum cost. 3. Development --

Such a program will give the maximum protec-

The required facilities must be developed objective, namely, the

during peacetime in

order to achieve its

protection of vital materiel from destruction during a sudden attack. 4. Integration. -Army requirements for underground storage

must be fully integrated with requirements of other elements of the National Military Establishment. This policy is intended to include

joint development and use of underground storage facilities to prevent competition for space, labor, transportation, and materials depart-

in critical areas essential to the operation of any or all ments of the Armed Forces. 5. Use. -Underground

storage installations should be re-

stricted to storage of materiel essential to meet mobilization requirements. This is intended to include: machine tools, dies,

gages, and strategic stockpiles of raw materials. 6. Transportation. -Plans for a protected storage system

must include provisions for alternate means of transportation to insure uninterrupted flow of supplies where and when needed. 7. Co#ntrol . O ontr"o, tC he planning for the protected Army

"T"

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~I~

ANNEX 3

storage system and its expansion to meet wartime requirements must be retained at the General Staff, U. S. Army, level to insure that it meets over-all Army requirements.

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AMNEX 4

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.

Summary

Underground depots, as such, were not conBoth Germany and Japan resorted to hasty

structed by any nation.

dispersal and underground installations programs in the last stages of World War II. program of each country. Lack of proper planning is evident in the

Bombing attacks on Germany's transporta-

tion net prevented more effective use of dispersed and underground installations. The U. S. storage facility at Atchison, Kansas, demonstrates i!S

the feasibility of converting existing mines into usable space. 2. Conclusions. -Although consideration of storage faciliof foreign underground instal-

ties was not an outstanding feature lations programs, it is

believed that the following general con-

clusions are applicable to any underground program: a. There must be early and comprehensive planning for any

system of underground installations. b. Underground installations must be built before, and

not during a war. o. 3. Alternate systems of transportation must be provided. -As far as can be determined, there is no re-

General.

corded instance of any country constructing underground storage depots, in the full sense of the word. / However, various counstorage

tries did use subterranean space for active and inactive of material. The discussion below, therefore,

covers the wider

field of underground installations, underground storage installations. 4. Germany. a. -1940,

rather than the more specific

Early in

the German high command received sugThe

gestions to move the oil and gasoline factories underground.

common feeling among Germans in authority, at that time, was that the war would be won before the program could be completed. By

LA

ANNEX 4

te successful Allied bombings of the V weapons plants, caused a change in the thinking of the German authorities and The continued bombings left

these plants were moved underground. Germany no recourse,

and by 1944 a large scale program was under-

way to place vital production underground.

This program contained

provisions for the excavation and construction of military storage and supply depots, but the need for protecting industrial installations was greater. 2/ As a result, German wartime storage was an

improvised use of abandoned tunnels, brewery vaults, and beer cellars. _/

b.

Germany generated approximately 83 percent of the 279

verified foreign underground installations. i/ o. The German program was hastily conceived and impleLack of space, poor lay-

mented; its results were not satisfactory.

out, lack of ventilation and sanitation were contributing factors. 3/


d. Germany tried most types of protective measures, in-

oluding dispersal and underground factories.

Underground installabut

tions were not damaged directly and dispersal was helpful,

transportation difficulties reduced the effectiveness of both. 4/

The attack on transportation was the decisive blow


It rethat completely disorganized the German economy. duced war production in all categories and made it difficult to move what was produced to the front. 4/(page 12) e. German construction costs for underground installations Conversion of

ran as high as ten times that of above-ground plants.

space in mines was the least expensive, while new tailor-made tunnels were the most expensive. Operation costs compared favorably

with above-ground installations. 3/ f. A cover of 30 to 40 meters thickness was considered Some German engineers con-

minimum necessary against medium bombs.

sidered the only safe protection to be a cover of 60 to 80 meters of rock (about 250 feet). 5. Other Countries. a. The Scandinavian countries have six underground plants 3/

111
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built since 1940.


the program. b.

Power plants and light industry are included in

The plants are small, well-planned and well-engineered. Japan started underground dispersal in the early

months of 1945.

Work was started on at least 23 installations, and

at the end of the war about 2.9 million square feet had been completed. The outstanding part of the Japanese program is that it
of inadequately planned and hastily impleFor the most part, these

emphasizes the futility

mented underground dispersal programs. featured crude, ties.

substandard working conditions and lack of facili_/

In some eases, even roads and railroads were lacking.

o.

United States. --

The United States, under control of


operates the U. S. Natural Cooler Kansas. This underground facility is

the Department of Agriculture, Storage facility at Atchison,

a limestone mine used to store surplus agricultural products purchased by the government, I/ It demonstrates the feasibility of storage

converting existing mine space into useable underground space.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1/

R-16487-E

Underground Installations Report , Foreign InstallaPrepared for Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, tions. under contract W-49-129-Eng-59 by Guy B. Panero -

Engineers, New York 17, N. Y.


2 R-16487-A

October 31, 1948.

Prepared for Underground Installations Summary. Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, under contract W-49-129-19Eng-59 by Guy B. Panero - Engineers, New October 31, 1948. York 17, N. Y. Major General C. F., "Geriman Underground InstallaVolume 39, Page 469 tions," Military Engineer.

Robinson,

(November 1947T* 4/ N-13375 B Over-all Reort (Euroan War).


Strategic Bombing Survey. The United States September 30, 1945.

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ANEX 5

PRESENT U. S. STORAGE SYSTEM

1.

Summary. --

Depots perform the vital function of storing, the

distributing, and providing base maintenance for the Army in Zone of Interior.

In general, the peacetime depot system forms A close relationship

the nucleus for needed wartime expansion. exists between depots,

centers of population and industry, as well

as the transportation system of the nation. 2. Conclusions. a. Depots are a vital step in furnishing supplies and

equipment to the Army. b. is Location of storage facilities near industrial centers transit and lower transportation costs. the artery

desirable to save time in c.

The transportation system of the nation is

that moves Army supplies to the point and at the time needed. d. The peacetime depot system is generally expanded to

meet increased wartime storage needs. 3. Definition of Storage. In the military sense, storage is

defined as follows: Storage, in its ordinary meaning, is passive: supplies lying idle in a warehouse. Storage, in its military meaning is active: supplies moving through a vital stage in their journey from factory to the fighting front. It comprises the receipt of the many varieties of products which flow from the nation's manufacturing plants, their arrangement into logically related groups, storing in specific locations, safeguarding, and finally, timely shipment to the ultimate consumer. !/(page iii) 4. Depots. a. In the Zone of Interior, the vital link in the Army the depot. Depots

distribution system for supplies and equipment is are assigned certain supply missions to perform.

Among these ares

(1) Distribution of items to certain areas, and/or ports of embarkation. (2) Stocking certain categories of items for specified

areas and/or ports of embarkation.

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(3) As reserve depots to store materiel for:


depots, war reserve, poses.

other

special operational projects, and other pur-

(4) Additional functions may be assigned depots, ass assembly of end items, maintenance operations, and many others. 2/

such

salvage func-

tions, procurement, b. It is

readily apparent from the above that, based on

its mission, the scope of activity ut each installation may be very broad, and the facilities required will be varied in nature. o. With perhaps a few exceptions, the facilities, includ-

ing some manufacturing arsenals,

for base maintenance of the many

thousands of items used by the Army are closely integrated with the depot system. 5. Expansion durin World War II. -At a cost of over one

billion dollars the Army's storage and shipping facilities were expanded from thirty-two depots to over one hundred and fifty during World War II. Depot expansion was developed individually by each

Technical Service and lacked the integration necessary to meet overall Army storage space requirements. is 3/ The expanded Army depot

system, as of VJ day, 6. Industr

shown on Map A. -From the military definiit appears that there

- Depot Relationshi. quoted in

tion of storage,

paragraph 1 above,

exists a very close relationship between industrial areas of the nation and the depot system. This is quite properly so, since the

sooner produced items are received from manufacturers and arranged "into logically related groups", the sooner they are available for Nearness to industrial

"timely shipment to the ultimate consumer". or manufacturing centers is and transportation costs.

important because of the savings in time It is especially important during wartime overburdened with both civilian

when the transportation system is and military requirements. of 1 January 1949. It

Map B shows the location of depots as a fairly large reduc-

will beo,,bserved tht

tion in numbers

depot
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t tenplace

since VJ day.

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study of this map reveals that nearly 50 percent of present depots are located in the northeastern industrial region of the United States. This area is roughly represented by a rectangle, whose

long axis extends from St. Louis, Missouri, to Boston, lassachusetts; short axis from Detroit, Michigan, to Baltimore, Maryland. Minor

concentrations are located around the San Francisco, Seattle, Washington, 7. and Salt Lake City, Utah, areas. --

California,

Depot-Population Relationship. manpower,

One resource a depot Therefore, it is IndusA

must have is

skilled and unskilled.

essential that depots be located near centers of population. trial areas generally coincide with areas of dense population.

glance at Map B shows that no less than fifteen depots are concentrated in the relatively small, Washington, D. C., but highly populated, area between

and New York, New York, a distance of approxiOther smaller concentrations exist in the ChicagoLouis, Missouri, around San Location

mately 200 miles. Toledo area, Francisco, in

the vicinity of St.

California,

and close to Salt Lake City, Utah.

of ammunition storage facilities is

an exception to general practice.

These facilities are generally located in remote areas because of

the hazardous nature of the commodity handled and need for large
areas to comply with specialized safety requirements for storage. 8. T ransportstion-De t Stystem ReLation.hi -The transpor-

tation system of the country is life blood of the Army flows.

the arterial net along which the Supplies and equipment may as well

not exist without an adequate transportation system to ensure prompt and proper distribution. completely dependent on rail The Army depot system is almost supplies.

transportation for moving its

Although highways are important for short hauls, and air may be used where great speed is desired, rail still ranks as the principal

carrier of Army materiel; it will probably remain so for a long time. Map B also shows the rail net of the United States. it Since

the depot locations are superimposed on this map,

serves to em-

phasize the relationship between depots and the transportation sys-

S.'

tern.

The greatest density of railroads is The rail

observed to be east of

the Mississippi.

net has great directional flexibility in It thins out to three major trans-

the eastern part of the country.

continental lines west of the Mississippi, where considerably less flexibility of direction exists. it almost rigidly north-south. Along the west coast, the system

BIBLIOGRAPHY

y/ TM 38-420, 1946. 2/ DA. SB 38-3, Part I, 1948. N-16266 Logistics in World War II. Department, July 1947. Army Service Forces, War

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ANNEX 6
p 1,42

NECESSITY FOR PROTECIPbIP

--

1.

Summary.

--

The likelihood of war is

such that its

dismis-

sal would not be realistic. consider are:

The important new means of warfare to

faster long range aircraft; the atomic bomb; and The airplane can now reach any part of the world. one of the great destructive forces to be conGuided missiles development is reaching

guided missiles. The atomic bomb is sidered in

future warfare.

the point where they, too, will become a major threat.

Any major

potential enemy must be extended the capability of possessing now, or being capable of developing within the immediate future, combination of the important means of warfare. any

The major targets population

envisaged for these weapons will be industrial centers, centers, portance. 2. Conclusions. a. --

large ports, and military concentrations of decisive im-

The enemy capabilities now, or in the near future, the latest developments in means of

i: I" -s i

will include the use of all warfare b.

Many of the depots in the Army storage system are vulor near decisive targets.

nerable due to their location in c.

Steps must be taken to safeguard vital military sup-

plies and equipment from destruction or loss during any sudden attack. 3. Major Factors to Consider. -The major factors that must

be evaluated to determine the necessity for protection of the depot system are: the likelihood of war, the characteristics of impor-

tant new means of warfare, 4.

and the enemy capabilities. An assumption as to the possi-

The Likelihood of War.

bility of another major war with the United States as a participant has been made. Although our civil leaders are exerting great effort Under such

to avert such a possibility, this danger does exist.

ANnEX 6

circumstances,

it

is the duty of responsible military and civil

leaders of the nation to make plans that will ensure the security of the country on the one hand, while working diligently to ward off disaster on the other.
I

5.

Characteristics of the Important New Means of Warfare.

--

The important new means of warfare that affect this problem are: the airplane, the atomic bomb, guided missiles, and bacteriological
and chemical warfare. a. The airlane. World War II made it quite clear that

air power increased the sphere of active hostilities to include the source of a nation's strength, civil population. i.e., its industrial potential and

Our present planes are faster and have greater The recent non-stop,

load-carrying capacities and greater ranges.

around-the-world flight by a United States Air Force bomber emphasizes this fact. The implication of all this, of course, is that

if the United States can fly non-stop around the world,


other nation. now, It follows, then,

so can any

that any part of this country can be reached by the Air Force of any

or in the very near future,

potential enemy power. b. The atomic bomb. (1) -

The atomic bomb was perhaps the most outstanding

development of World War II. two atomic On 6 August and 9 August 1945, the first bombs to be used for military purposes were dropped on One hundred thousand Hiroshima and Nagaski respectively. people were killed, 6 square miles, or over 50 percent of / the built-up areas of the two cities were destroyed. (page 22)

(2) At present, manufacture of atomic bombs requires


great consumption of electrical energy and huge industrial plants; highly technical equipment; and uranium, which as yet has not been located in large quantities. All this, together with highly tech-

nical skills, restrict the supply of atomic bombs for the immediate future. Therefore, any country intending the use of atomic weapons

must pick targets or target systemwj


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?re, 'etraiie commensurate


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with their cost in national resources.

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strategic planners cannot waste this type weapon on targets that will not have a decisive effect on the course of a war. / The

range of targets considered decisive are included in the following, but are not necessarily limited to, nor in, (a) Industrial centers (b) Population centers (c) Large ports and inland transportation centers the priority listed:

(d) Atomic weapons plants (e) (f)


(3) It

Seats of government Military concentrations of decisive importance


is doubtful if any one depot could ever be con-

sidered decisive by itself to warrant an attack using atomic bombs. It has been pointed out, however, that a large portion of our depots

are located in the industrial heart of the nation, as well as being in populated areas. Some are located near our large ports. On at

least three counts, then, will the depot system stand an excellent chance of being within targets of decisive importance. This is

especially true if another Pearl Harbor-type attack is made in an attempt to strike the nation a severely crippling blow. c.
Guided missiles. (1)
--

The V-1 and V-2 attacks on London in

1944 and 1945 B/ Im-

offer testimony to the potentialities of this type weapon.

provements in method of guidance to obtain greater aoouracy and the possibilities of attaining greater ranges will make this a formidable weapon. (2) than most think. The realization of longer ranges is It is perhaps nearer negoti-

no secret that the United States is

ating with Australia for a 3,000 mile test range for its guided
missile program. The capacity of using this weapon cannot be de-

nied to any determined,

potential enemy.

It

is believed that tar-

gets for guided missiles will range within the same decisive categories as those given for the atomic bomb. Here again the vulnera-

bility o

the depot system is directly reJ.&Ti6ba

ia$so

iation

w ith iadustrial areas and centers of population. do Bateriological a and Chemioal Warfare.
-

This type of

warfare would affect the storage system inasmuch as it would strike at the labor force, or contaminate areas in the vieinity of the depots. This would have the effect of slowing down cargo movement. is not a force in the destructive sense.

As yet, it 6. cerned,

Enemy Capabilities.

Insofar as the atomia bomib is con1-

indications are that it will be several years before any There are no known

potential enemy will succeed in producing it,

reasons why fast, long range planes and the development of guided missiles should be out of reach of a determined nation. The real-

istic approach demands the extension to a potential enemy of every practical capability involving new developments in -warfare.

B3 BLIOGRA.PHY

Nl13766

Summary Report (Pacific War). The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Washington, D. C. 1 July 1946.

Robinson, , Mjor General C. Fe "Industrial Vulnerability to Bombing, " Militar Engineer, Volume 61, Page 1 (Jan-Feb 1949 R-13429-P V Weaons in London. Physical Damage ivision. January The United States Srategic Bomnbing~ Survey. 31947.

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ANNEX 7

PROTECTIVE MEASURES

1.

Summar.

--

The United States, traditionally, a preventive war.

does not

take the initiative in

Active defense alone such as

cannot protect the Army depot system..

Passive measures,

dispersion and underground storage facilities, are necessary to protect vital military stores. 2. is Conclusions. -Practical protection of the depot system

possible through active defensive measures, augmented by a

planned program of limited dispersion and underground storage facilities. 3. Offensive Operations. -By offensive operations is meant

taking the initiative and attacking immediately any potential enemy that threatens the national interests. practical for several important reasons: a. pose is A large or, at least, a suitable force for this purThis course is not

not economical to maintain. b. It is traditional that the United States does not
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strike an aggressive blow nor take the initiative in a preventive war. c. Keeping a large force under arms reduces the industrial

:-i: ::::

- :-I:::::: :; ';::'::: ';I::i:::ji:'i::::::" '':iiii:ii'i:':' ::: ;,:lii;,i'i:: ::::::13,;':: :iiiir:;; ;;:I:Ei':::::;::::::

potential of the nation by lowering the total number of workers. 4. Defensive Operations. -This includes all measures of it is pointed

active and passive defense. out that:

Regarding active defense,

***it would be rash, however, to predict an increase in the effectiveness of defensive control to insure that not a single enemy plane or guided missile will be able to penetrate. ]L/ (page 29) The necessity for passive defense measures is made clear when it is considered that: The experience of both the Pacific and European war emphasizes the extent to which civilian and other forms of passive defense can reduce a country's vulnerability Similarly, economic vulnerability to air attack***. can be enormously decreased by a well worked out program

-rn-I-

ANIEX 7

L of stook-piles, dispersal, a S co o particularly significant segments of industry. Such a program in the economic field can also be worked out sat-

isfactorily only in peacetime.

1/ (page 30)

An adequate active defense system, backed up by properly planned and timely executed passive measures, gives the greatest

assurance that the vital war reserves will be intact and ready to support the nation's military strength when needed. 5. Dispersion. -- Dispersion, practiced within limits, is

practical and reduces the total cost involved in purchasing protection for the depot system. However, it is important to remember

the vivid lesson from World War II concerning the vulnerability of transportation systems: The most serious weakness in the underground and dispersal program was the reliance on the railroads for transportation. Most of the plants depended on railroads both for their raw materials and distribution of their products. This contributed to the overloading of the railroads, which were already severely damaged by aerial attacks. The condition was further aggravated by the general lack of storage space for either materials or finished products at the plants. / (page 473)
It is not realistic to disregard the vulnerability of the railroad

system in planning for the protective dispersion of the depot system. It may be concluded, therefore, that dispersion is practical It does have a place in any

and even desirable in a limited way.

over-all protective plan for the depot system.


6. Underground Facilities. -Relatively little in general, damage was

done to underground installations, war. 3/

during the last it

In connection with vulnerability to atomic bombings,

may be pointed out that: Some 400 persons were in the tunnel shelters in NAGASKI at the time of the explosion (atomic bomb). The shelters consisted of rough tunnels dug horizontally into the sides of hills with crude, earth-filled blast walls protecting the entrances. The blast walls were

blown in but all the occupants back from the entrance survived even in those tunnels almost directly under the explosion. Those not in a direct line with the entrance were uninjured. /' (page 22) The capacity of the above tunnels was roughly 100,000. The

alarm was not properly given, hence the tunnels were not filled to

u'~'"liO$ininumm

ii___

oapacity at the This is an indication that well planned and properly locadli underground storage facilities will give ample protection to the Army depot system.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

j7
/'

N-13766

iummayReprt (PacifeliWar). The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Washington, D. C. 1 July 1946.

"German Underground InstallaRobinson, Major General C. F. militar Engineer, Volume 39, Page 469 tios". (November- -1947) R-16487-E Underground Installations Report - Foreign Installations. Prepared for Chief of Engineers, U. 8. Army under contract W-49-129-Eng-59 by Guy B. Panero Engineers, New York 17, N. Y. October 31, 1948.

ANNEX 8

UND2ERGROUND~ STORAGE I11%,~


i. Summary. --

TIN$

Sites are available and construction of underIt has been

ground storage depots should present no difficulties.

estimated that construction of depots in existing mines will cost about 22 percent less, while depots in new sites will be about 51 percent more, than a comparable above-ground depot. It is pre-

dicted that yearly operational costs will be slightly higher for depots in existing mines, while depots in new sites should be cheaper to operate than an above-ground depot. Only minimum use due to the nec-

should be made of underground storage installations, large construction costs involved.

Peacetime construction is

essary to achieve the greatest economy.

Only by having underground

storage facilities before an attack can the objective of protection be achieved. 2. Conclusions. a. b. c. Underground storage facilities appear to be feasible. Sites are available. Any program planned will require a careful balancing

of minimum underground needs in mines and new sites, plus dispersion, in order to obtain maximum protection at minimum cost. d. Underground storage space should be used only for machinery, tools and dies, that are necii

vital supplies, equipment,

essary to support field forces until production can meet requirements. e. made. f. Underground facilities must be planned and constructed Tests to determine minimum protective cover must be

before and not during a war. 3. General. -The most comprehensive report on feasibility the Panero U. S. Army,by

of underground installations in the United States is Report. It was prepared for the Chief of Engineers,

ummmmirn...i

ANNEX 8

Guy B. Panero - Engineers,

New York, N this annex.

of this report are summarized in 4. Availability of Sites. a.

The report considered seventeen industrial regions in the northeastern section

the nation, the most important of which is of the United States.

Areas considered are shown in Appendix 1,

which was extracted from the report. 1/ b. Existing mines. -Limestone, salt, and lead-zinc

mines are considered practical sources of subterranean space for conversion. This type material is believed to require the least In the

amount of construction effort to give protective cover.

regions studied, there exists a potential total of 327 million square feet of space, composed of 106 million square feet in driftshaft-entry

entry limestone mines and 221 million square feet in lead-zinc and salt mines. and rail

Drift-entry mines permit running highway for this reason,

facilities into the underground site, and,

are favored over shaft-entry mines which would require installation of elevators. Mine locations studies are included in Appendix 1.

Distribution of space for each industrial region is detailed in

Appendix 2. 1/
a. New sites. -Sites for new excavation considered were limestone, sandstone, and granite. The

geological formations in

105 sites surveyed are shown in Appendix i. ble is 761.5 million square feet. 1/ d. Caves. --

Potential space availa-

Caves are not considered suitable for underThey are generally formed by natural phenomean uncertain state of soundness. The

ground installations.

na that leaves the cover in irregular chambers, walls,

floors, and ceilings would make normal /

construction procedures costly and difficult. 5. Underground Storage Depots. a. Prototype depot. --

Physical and operational character-

istics for a general depot-type underground installation were developed by the Quartermaster General, U. S. Army, based on storage

2---V

llij~

-.

11

S'i

'

capacity and supply handling facilities of the Atlanta General Supply Depot. In general, it was specified that the depot volume
should

should have 24,750,000 cubic feet net usable storage volume,

be capable of moving 6,000 tons per day, and should have a working force of approximately 7,500 people on three shifts. are summarized in Appendix 3. b. 2 -In order to develop comparative Other details

Above-ground depot.

cost data for construction and operation of typical depot installations, the Panero engineers made a proposed above-ground layout to The estimated

meet specifications of the prototype general depot.

constructional and operational costs of this project were used as a basis for comparing costs of proposed under-ground storage installations. Factors considered are summarized in Appendix 4.

Estimated cost for this hypothetical depot was placed at $38,988,800. Detailed cost breakdown will be found in Appendix 7. c. Depot in an existing mine. -2

The mine selected is

located in Wampum, Pennsylvania.

There appears to be no difficulty


this mine. Summary of factors

in meeting prototype requirements in

considered are included in Appendix 5.

Estimated cost for this

development is predicted at $30,388,400, or 22 percent lower than the above-ground depot.


dix 7.

Detail cost breakdown is included in Appen-

Estimated yearly operational costs range 5 percent greater This is attributed to higher wage the proposed location of this instaldue to reduced requirements and maintenance. in

than the above-ground depot. rates prevalent in lation. the North,

Less personnel is

required,

for guards,

transportation, repairs and utilities,

Operational costs and personnel requirements are tabulated Appendix 8.

The advantage of using existing mines for underground the lower construction cost due to reduced reThe major disadvantages are that nec-

storage depots is

quirements for excavation.

essary depth of cover may be insufficient to insure protection;

this is especially true in mines requiring long drift entrances. d. Depot in a new site. -- The area selected is located

;i:unrn

li~

near Chattanooga,

Tennessee.

There appears to be no difficulty in Summary of factors

meeting prototype requirements in this area. considered are listed in Appendix 6.


opment is placed at $58,879,100,

Estimated cost for this devel-

or 51 percent greater than the

above-ground depot. Appendix 7.

Detailed breakdown of costs will be found in

Estimated yearly operational costs are 1.2 percent Operating costs and personnel The major advantages the greater flexi-

less than the above-ground depot.

requirements are tabulated in Appendix 8. 2

of a depot placed in a newly excavated site are:

bility of design that permits more compact storage areas for more efficient depot operation; the depth of cover that can be provided for protection is generally greater than that provided by mines. is the higher construction costs, although

The major disadvantage this is 6.

partially offset by lower predicted yearly operating costs. Other Planning Considerations. a. Space. -The potential available underground space is Whether this amount is suf-

approximately one billion square feet.

ficient to meet requirements for essential industry, other civil needs, together with essential Armed Forces requirements, is a de-

cision that must be made at high-government level. b. Allocation. -The National Security Resources Board order to permit sound planning and for reallocation

should allocate available space in

within industry, for civil defense purposes, among the Armed Forces. c. Costs. --

The cost of a large scale underground instalA program to place

lations program for the Army will be enormous.

forty of the most vulnerable depots underground in newly excavated sites would cost approximately 2.3 billion dollars, based on costs shown in Appendix 6. A modified program, involving the use of

twenty depots in existing mines and twenty in newly excavated sites,


would cost slightly less than 1.2 billion dollars. It is apparent

that careful planning must be done to achieve a program balancing the necessity for obtaining the most protection at the minimum .est

~"PO~~OO~~P$)-Irki

y"S

STime required.

The Panero engineers estimate plan-

ning and construction time for underground installations as followrs: in an existing mine, months (Appendix 7). 12 to 20 months; in a new site, 24 to 30 / Add to this the planning time required in

high government and military echelonis, and it becomes apparent that any program for procurig underground installations may take as long as four to five years. This emphasizes the necessity for

early planning and decisions in order to- have underground storage facilities in being before a war. e. Depth of Protective Cover. - Estimates of protective

cover necessary for maximum protection of underground installaftions. vary from 250 feet of rock to 1,000-1500 feet of overburden.

This

indicates the need for a test program to determine minimnum protection required for the anticipated maximum destructive force such installations must withstand. f. Economy of Peacetime Construction.
--

Construction of

underground storage installations during peacetime permitscareful planning and integration; selection and use of economical sites; lower peacetime costs, less strain on labor and material resources.

---I--

------I

BIBLIOGRAPHY J R-16487-G Underground Installations Report m Sites and (eoPrepared for Chief of Engineers, lo~calFormaaMons.
U. S. Army, under contract W-49129-Eng-"59, by Guy B. Panero - Engineers, New York 17, N. Y. Ootober 3-1, 1948. R-16487-D Underground Installations Report - Storage Depot. Prepared for Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, under

contract W-49-129-Eng59,
neers, New York 17, N. Y.

by Guy B. Panero - EngiOctober 31, 1948.

./

R-16487-A& Underground Installations Summay.

Prepared for Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, under contract W-49-129-Eng-59, by Guy B.Panero - Engineers, New York 17, N. Y. October 31, 1948. :i::
.J ;i: ;i I:;

:ilt .I;. ~'

51: i:
j

?" i1'2s ~::

I' ' ~i

uIEIErrill

~v4 ~

I
Z

444
44

00

4;

i~*j
4 4 4 4

.00

0.

I" % U)

tol
hi 0

U)

ww

w z

-0

z w0 -- j
w >

- >O1 zU4

w w~ maVs

S
'Ii

U) -J
Z0

z~a
in8

It i' IZO

o~2

~
0. 2 4

-J

-IL

0-

'Extracted from:

R-16487-G Undergcround Installations Report - Sites and GelgclFrtos Prepared for Chief of Engineers, U. S. .rmy, under contract W-49-129-&g59, by Guy B. Panero - Engineers, New York 17, N.Y. October 031, 1948. (follows page 11)
~i
t

APPEND IX

-mm
APPENDIX 2

COMPARATIVE DISTRIBUt

'

'III

INDUSTRY AND UNDERGROUND SITES

Region New England New York-Philadelphia Buffalo-Roche ster Pittsburgh Birmingham-Chattanooga Detroit-Cleve land Cincinnati Chicago St. Louis Minneapolis Kansas City Dallas-Fort Worth Butte Denver Seattle San Francisco Los Angeles

*Distribution of Workers 1,067,000 2,441,000

Distribution of Space In Millions of Square Feet Existing Nines New Sites

iliiii::iiiii;i:li!i::iiilit :ji; :;: --i::' ~;:'~a:iiiii. ::_-iiii:;iiii ; W iii;iili:ii-li:iliiia:liiiiijbl' :::.;1--1.:;--: 1:F'i?-ii:i : ;-;''": : : ~ -:-i;:ii::-:rj!,l:i 1-j i:::::;: I :: I*:i.:~;~:i i::'ij-riiiiii r~ -p;t i'i::;-i;;-l;iii'.iiiii :ii';-:i: -:. -:: i::-:~~:;;_;,. .... ;;::::;:::::;~; ::.. i:;:i.::::::I:. :;.---:;,. :

0.7
10.7 58.0 62.0 2.6 7.0 8.7 6.6 10.0 1.0 66.5 62.5
94.5 98.8

135.0 8.0 36.9 204.0

404,000 479,000 291,000 988,000 457,000 1,173,000 252,000 127,000 256,000 226,000

8.5 79.3

29,000 133,000 143,000 356,000 8,822,000

29.4 67.0 0.7 1.2 327.2 16.5 13.0 761.5

Total

*Figures are based on the records of the Bureau of Old Age and Survivors Insurance, March 1946, for manufacturing wage earners in These figures cover 55 percent of all manufacindustrial areas. turing vwage earners. ;Extracted from R-16487-G Underground Installations Repo j- Sites Prepared for Chief of Engineers, U. S. and Geological Formations. Army, under contract W-49-129-Eng-59 by Guy B. Panero - Engineers, October 31, 1948. (page 11A) New York 17, N. Y.

!P

t~I

i~r

2 APPENDIX APNI

IN
O

8' JEX lI>111%*\8

RX

^1

SUMARY OF FACTORS FOR PRT0OYE'Dh

1.

Functions. a. To provide storage facilities for the following technical and administrative services: Quartermaster, Engineers,

Signal, Ordnance, Medical, Chemical, Transportation, and Adjutant General. b. Be capable of handling a total moving storage volume of
"I-; -

6,000 tons per day. o. Facilities shall be provided to handle this volume by a combination of rail and truck transportation, but either method must be adequate to handle the entire load. 2. Storage Volume.--Total net usable storage space of 24,750,000 cubic feet, exclusive of aisles and docks. 3. Traffic Volume.--To handle an estimated total of 156,000 tons per month--78,000 tons incoming and 78,000 tons outgoing. 4. Railway car requirements.--Total out). 5. Equivalent truck requirements.--Total of 800 trucks per day of 170 cars per day (in and

(in and out).


6. Other requirements.--Specific offices, cafeterias, 7. provisions are included for shops, and fuel storage. personnel distribution for

packing facilities,

Personnel deployment.--Approximate

three shifts, with an allowance of 14 percent reduction to cover absences for sickness and annual leave.

1st Shift Administrative Shops


Warehouses

Total 3 shifts 1,500 1,500


4,500

900 750
2,250

Totals
#Summarized from:

3,900

7,500

R-16487-D Underground Installations Report Storage Depot. Prepared for Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, under contract W-49-129-Eng-59, by Guy B. Panero - Engineers, New York 17, N. Y. October 31, 1948. (page 1)

~--f"riD~L~

APPENDIX 3

APPENDIX 4 SU1MARY OF FACTORS - ABOVE GROUNDIA

I, t A

CHOICE OF SITE 1. For comparison, a hypothetical site representing a portion of Area required:

the present Atlanta General Depot was selected. 738 acres. SITE FACTORS 2. Availability of transportation, sewage disposal, Depot, in

labor, power, water supply,

identical to those now used by Atlanta General favorable. Site is level and easily de-

general, all

veloped.

Strategic location is less favorable than underground since it is nearer the Atlantic coast.

installations, CONSTRUCTION 3. Utilities,

roads, railroads, electric power,

and water supply

included to meet standard requirements. 4. Construction of required buildings will follow current standard practice. 5. Warehouse layout will follow pattern of the Atlanta Supply Depot. No hard-standing or other open storage is 6. The usual mechanical installations, provided.

fire alarm system, lightning

protection, heating, ventilation, and communication system are included. MILITARY FACTORS 7. No provision is made for protection against bombing, gas, or

other toxic agents. OTHER FACTORS 8. Housing. No additional housing required, since adequate labor

available in Atlanta area.

#Summarized

from;

R-16487-D Underground Installations Report Prepared for Chief of Engineers, Storage Depot. U. S. Army, under contract W-49-129-Eng-59, by Guy B. Panero - Engineers, New York 17, N. Y. October 31, 1948. (Page 9)

li

ltg

APPENDKIX

APPENDIX 5

SUNAIRY OF FACTORS - DEPOT IN EXISTING MINE

CHOICE OF SITE 1. Mine selected is Pennsylvania. SITE FACTORS 2. The major factors governing selection of a potential underground site for this purpose are: a. Strategic location for safety, protection from bombing, structural soundness, b. c. Space dimensions; Accessibility, approaches. d. Labor, housing, sources of supply, transportation, power, height above flood levels. the inactive Medusa limestone mine at Wampum,

layout; floor grade and drainage.

geographical, as well as mine entry and


i''"';"':": ':i ;:ii.ii .: :-i:::::_; ' ::.- ~ ' Y;s::ii:~iiil:j:it:i :iiiii(;:

W F3-

and water. MINIMUM STANDARDS 3. The following minimum standards were used in existing mine to be developed: a. b. c. d. Location, away from east coast of U. S. selecting the

!L:;;::g:-.-:::::,iiiil-..:, ::; :,:: i::::: :-:ii-: -:_ F~a -'iiii~iil.f i:ii-ii:i:i;'iil :~:; s.;;i-::i.-ii i i~i:iiii-I ;: ~

Minimum cover - 50 feet. Adequate drift entries or possibilities for construction.

Useable space of 4,000,000 to 6,000,000 square feet with ceiling height of 14 to 18 feet.

e. f. g. h. i. SAFETY 4.

Strong roof and pillars. Rooms not less than 55 feet wide. Floor reasonably level. Located above flood level and reasonably dry. Close to good rail transportation and highway.

Overburden ranges from 50 to 100 feet over the depot area. This consists of varying thicknesses of lime, shale, and coal. the

5.

As to structural soundness,

apparently no faults exist in

ghdigi

APPENDIX 5

mine area.

Surface inspections only have been made.

A de-

tailed structural examination by mining experts is a prerequisite to development of this site.

required as

6.

Mine floor is well above high water level and there is no record
of flood interference with mining operations.

SURFACE DEVELOPNE NT 7. Roads.--A network of two-lane paved roads is projected to con-

nect with existing highways and extended to connect with roads entering the mine on three sides.

8.

Railroads.--A spur is planned that will extend through the mine.


Connection will be possible to the two railroads serving the area. No classification yards are planned in the immediate

depot area. MINE ENTRANCES AND EXITS 9. Seven portals are planned: 2 railroad, 1 combination railroad six emergency

and truck, 3 truck, and 1 personnel. portals will be provided. portals, DEPOT LAYOUT These,

In addition,

as well as the normal access

could be used by trucks and personnel in an emergency.

10. No major difficulties are indicated in meeting requirements specified in the prototype depot. Depot layout is such as to

take advantage of a minimum cover of 650 feet.

All railroad and

truck roads are depressed approximately four feet to bring car floors and tail gates level with warehouse floors. No gas-

driven nor steam-driven vehicles will be permitted to operate in depot proper. stituted in Electric locomotives' nd tractors will be sub-

three motor conversion areas to be provided.

CONSTRUCTION
11. The regular pattern of the existing mine pillars will enable its development with a minimum of construction. Main construction

features will be cutting to provide railroad and truck circulation, and such structural work as may be necessary to provide
for the security of the ceiling.
^ Ni iS N

In areas of personnel concent^ ^ '*i^ ^ f^VA

llst~fcri^^^^

**V

trations, heavy reinforced concrete slabs will be installed directly under the rock ceiling. This slab is designed to pro-

tect against falling rook that might be dislodged by bombs or


through natural causes. OTHER FACILITIES 12. Power requirements can be met from outside sources. Alarm and

communication systems, fire-fighting protection, water supply, heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning are planned. No Vari-

difficulties are apparent in providing these services.

ous types of decontamination equipment are provided to insure fresh air in necessary areas. PROTECTION FACTORS

13. Overhead cover is estimated to be a minimum of 50 feet.


believed that this amount of cover will insure protection against a direct hit by a 2,000-pound bomb.

It is

This protection

is increased where personnel concentration is heavy by construction of a heavy reinforced concrete slab at the ceiling. lateral protection will be provided by means of 12-inch brick walls and reinforced concrete walls at danger points. 14. Protection of exits will be based on providing a multiplicity of openings, rather than protective doors. 15. Protection against gas and other toxic agents is provided for Active

by filtered, decontaminated air into protected areas. operations will cease during a gas attack.

#Summarized

from:

R-16487-D Underground Installations Report Prepared for Chief of Engineers, Storage Depo U. S. Army, under contract W-49-129-Eng-59, by Guy B. Panero - Engineers,New York 17, N. Y. October 31, 1948. (page 15)

"~-I~eusI
16

.LV'

iJ6-" W!:' 4; -- -ARz

APPENDIX 6

SUTMARY OF FACTORS FOR DEPOT IN NEWLY EXCAVATED SITE#

CHOICE OF SITE 1. Site selected in one near Lookout Mountain at Chattanooga, Tennessee. SITE FACTORS 2. A number of sites throughout the country meet these requirements: a. Relief over the proposed area of not less than 200 feet, providing cover of not less than 150 feet. b. Area of not less than 3,500,000 to 6,000,000 square feet, with 200 feet of relief. c. Steep cliff permitting not less than six to eight widely spaced entries without long approach passage ways. d. Good, heavily bedded rook formation of not less than fifty feet thickness of valley floor level.
~ia

e.

Possibility of access to existing highway and railroad.

il:r

SURFACE DEVELOPMENT 3. Access roads from portals to existing highway will be built, as well as railroad spurs necessary to connect the three railroad portals with the two nearby railroads. obtained from existing sources. Electric power will be Addi-

i-: :;-; e

- ::~li-i:iiiii;ii

Water is also available.

tional housing facilities are not required. 4. Six normal access portals and three emergency portals, all widely spaced, are planned. All portals can be used by person-

nel and trucks in emergencies. DEPOT LAYOUT 5. The depot layout is a compact reproduction of the above-ground depot. Advantages accrue due to the fact that greater design

flexibility is possible in the newly excavated site, as compared to the existing mine development. Better utilization of

area is possible, since warehouses are not as far apart as they are required to be in the above-ground depot. Important fea-

lAPPENDIX

tures ares
feet, depressed rail CONSTRUCTION 6.

0e

d .iling

heights of 17

and truck roads.

Concrete floors, as well as concrete slabs under ceilings, area of heavy personnel concentration.

in

PROTECT ION FACTORS

7.

Cover ranges from 150 to 1,000 feet, which will protect depot
from heaviest bombs used during last war. In some oases, over

passages and roads, cover will range from 50 to 150 feet* eral protection is no problem since mined-out areas do not exist. 8.

Lat-

Entrance and exit protection is based on multiplicity of portals; however, there is inherently more protection due to the

greater cover over the portals. 9. Protection against gas and other toxic gases is provided by the same mechanical methods as for the existing mine site. Provisions are made for protecting the entire depot area by gas doors in the passageways. Under gas attack, normal inside

depot operations would continue.

Summarized from:

R-16487-D Underground Installations Report Storage Depot. Prepared for Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, under contract W-49-129-Eng-59, by Guy B. Panero - Engineers, New York 17, N.Y. October 31, 1948. (page 45)

.i. i-~I '' . ~ 'C1; II ~10 -' i ~i. ,:.;.? ?;I ;~;I~ ;I;i CLir 'ic~ ''':.:: i ~~ :I r ?i .;.:; 1:'':r 6 ~~: i i :~., I: i:'r 7":

:;~ .b, 4 Y'

i!: :~

ill'

2 1

rlrrr~li.

-I-=7-7
APPENDIX 7 SUMMAIRY OF COMPARATIVE CONSTRUdION COSTS

Above Ground Areas, Land Site Improvements Utilities Access & Approach Work Buildings and Platforms Building Equipment Total Land & Construction Operating Equipment Total Land, Const. & Equip Square Feet (3,830,300) $735,000 717,000 4,801,600

Existing Mine

Newly Excavated Site (5,467,200) $267,500 101,400 5,672,000 13,821,000 23,111,120 7,481,590 $50,454,610 2,402,000 $52,856,610 6,022,490

(3,1530,800)
$441,500 156,000 4,440,125

4,113,150 21,077,700
5,135,650 $32,466,950 2,714,000 $35,180,950 8,176,890 6,970,905 $24,298,570 3,227,000 $27,525,570

Overhead-Engineering & Inspection (On Const Only) TOTAL PROJECT COST

3,807,850 $38,988,800

2,862,830 $30,388,400

100%
TIME ESTIMATES SITE INVESTIGATION, PLANNING, 78%

$58,879,100 151%

#**
& CONSTRUCTION
":

:i

ABOVE GROUND:

Site investigation and planning, 2 to 4 months; 10 to 12 months. Total time: 12 to 16 months.

-: -: C

actual construction, EXISTING MINE: construction,

Site investigation and planning, 12 months. Total time:

6 to 8 months;

18 to 20 months.

NEWLY EXCAVATED SITE:

Site investigation and planning, 4 to 6 months;

preliminary construction period required to install construction equipment and establish sufficient entries and working faces to permit full scale operation, 20 months. Total time: 4 months; full scale construction, 24 to 30 months. 16 to

Extracted from: R-16487-D Underground Installations Report Storage Depot. Prepared for Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, under contract W-49-129-Eng-59, by Guy B. Panero - Engineers, New York 17, N. Y. October 31, 1948. (* page 57) (** page 55).

L -,

Alf-FEND IX 7
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___

. ..

COMPARATIVE OPERATING COSTS

1/

(Based on yearly volume of 1,872,000 tons)

Above Ground
labor **Supplies, Parts, Contractors #Fixed charges Total All Costs Cost per ton Percentage

Existing Mine #$27,256,000

Newly Excavated Site *$24,175,000

*$25,594,000 4,856,000 2,044,000 $32,494,000 $17.35 100

4,930,000 2,051,000 $34,237,000

4,755,000 3,120,000 $32,050,000 $17.15 98.8

$18.29
105.6

Notes:

*Based on $1.18 wage rate in Atlanta and Chattanooga areas. #Based on $1.29 wage rate in Wampum area. **General costs for maintenance and operation to include water, fuel power, spare parts, and other items furnished by contract. +Depreciation and interest on capital with suitable adjustments for variables among three types of installations. Interest based on 1 3/4 percent current rate for long term government loans.

SUMRY OF PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS/


Adminis-

/
**Actual

trative
*Above ground - Total Maximum Shift Existing Mine - Total Maximum Shift New Site - Total laximum shift

Whse 1737 5248 868 ' 2624 1511 756 1560 780 5448 2724 5148 2574

Total 8690 4556 8459 4425 8208 4299

Population
7473 3918
:k. : wAiq

1705 1064 1500 945 1500 945

7274 4005 7059 3697

Notes:

*Figures from Dept Army, Quartermaster General **Aotual population in payroll personnel, less 14% to cover annual and sick leaves.

Extracted from:

R-16487-D Underground Installations Report Prepared for Chief of Engineers, Storage Depot. U. S. Army, under contract W-49-129-Eng-59, by Guy B. Panero - Engineers, New York 17, N. Y. October 31, 1948. (1/ page 64) (2/ page 65)

i i ,iiiai iwiiiii

iiii

,--i

APPENDIX 8

~ -bslssli~8~g~i~WliP~~BBi~~

ANNEX 9

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Jt

'

1.

TM 38-420,

1946.

2. DA. 5. 4.
5.

SB 38-3, Part I, 1948.

"German Underground InstallaRobinson, Major General C. F. tions", Military Engineer, Volume 39, Page 469 (November 1947). Robinson,
Bombing", N-16266

akjor General C. F.
Military Engineer,

"Industrial Vulnerability to
Volume 61, Page 1 (Jan-Feb 1949). Army Services Forces, War C. -July 1947.

Logistics in World War II. Department, Washington, D.

6.

N-13766

The United States StraSummary Report (Pacific War). 1 July 1946. tegic Bombing Survey, Washington, D. C. Physical Damage Division, The V Weapons in London. United States Strategic Bombing Survey January 1947.

7.

R-15429P

8.

The United States N-13375 B Over-all Report (European War). September 30, 1945. Strategic Bombing Survey. R-16487-A Prepared for Underground Installations Summary. Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, under contract W-49129-Eng-59, by Guy B. Panero - Engineers, New York October 31, 1948. 17, N. Y. Underground Installations Report - Storage Depot. Prepared for Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, under contract W-49-129-Eng-59, by Guy B. Panero - Engineers, October 31, 1948. New York 17, N. Y. Underground Installations Report - Foreign InstalPrepared for Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, lations. under contract W-49-129-Eng-59, by Guy B. Panero October 31, 1948. Engineers, New York 17, N. Y. Underground Installations Report - Sites and GeoPrepared for Chief of Engineers, logical Formations. U. S. Army, under contract W-49-129-Eng-59, by Guy B. October 31, Panero - Engineers, New York 17, N. Y.

9.

10.

R-16487-D

11.

R-16487-E

12.

R-16487-G

1948.

7777T

ANNEX 9

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eicl"ter Adjutant General Ordnance

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Engineers Chemical Quartermaster


Adjutant General

________________

-Quartermaster

Note: The above includes locations at which depots have been allocated auxiliary storage space.

Setin scheduled for early inactivation.