Pretexts: literary and cultural studies, Vol. 10, No.

1, 2001

When Does a Settler Become a Native? Citizenship and Identity in a Settler Society
PAL AHLUWALIA
Settlers are made by conquest, not just immigration. Settlers are kept by a form of the state that makes a distinctionparticularly juridicalbetween conquerers and conquered, settlers and natives, and makes it the basis of other distinctions that tend to buttress the conquerers and isolate the conquered, politically. However ctitious these distinctions may appear historically, they become real political facts for they are embodied in real political institutions (Mahmood Mamdani). today we take pride in an identity open to all, whatever their colour, religion or ethnic background. We celebrate our diversity, we recognise it brings us strength and teaches us a patriotism that enriches and unites our nation rather than divides it (Tony Blair). As Australia embarks upon another new century, it is once again enveloped by the very concerns of identity and national character which were its focus at the turn of the twentieth century.1 At the time of its founding, Australia as a settler colony inevitably looked towards its imperial master to provide its de ning characteristics. Currently, Australians are attempting to come to terms with their post-colonial identity. Central to this task are notions of citizenship and subjectivity. In the lead up to the ftieth anniversary of Australian citizenship in 1999, there were renewed calls to make citizenship a meaningful and important part of Australian political life. There were recommendations to deny access to certain rights to non-citizens (Fitzgerald, 1988). In addition, there was and remains a growing sense of Australian nationalism which has resulted in the demand for the promulgation of a Republic. The desire to break away from Britain formally, however, is not simply an assertion of Australian nationalism but a crisis of citizenship, culturally and politically, which has arisen from a multicultural society that even its architects had not envisioned. In short, this is a crisis similar to that which Stuart Hall (1992) termed a contestation over what it means to be British. The contestation over what it means to be Australian is a result of the exclusionary practices and minimalist notions of citizenship which have operated in Australia. The exclusion of Aboriginal people, women, people of colour, gay people and recent migrants has rendered a crisis of citizenship which remains entrapped within certain white settler notions of identity in which others can only be constituted as hyphenated Australians.2 This process is analogous to Salman Rushdies experience: I have constantly been asked whether I am British, or Indian. The formulation Indian-born British writer has been invented to explain me.
ISSN 1015549X print/ISSN 14701022 online/01/010063-11 DOI: 10.1080/10155490120069043 2001 Taylor & Francis Ltd

64 P. Ahluwalia But my new book deals with Pakistan. So what now? British-residentIndo-Pakistani writer? You see the folly of trying to contain writers [people?] inside passports (cited in Welsh, 1997: 56). In the following pages, it is precisely these tensions of citizenship and identity which are explored within the Australian context. Settlers and Natives In his widely acclaimed analysis of Africa, Mahmood Mamdani makes an interesting distinction between settlers and natives and asks the question: when does a settler become a native? (Mamdani, 1998). In Africa, the colonial state governed by racism established the distinction between settler and native by demarcating different rights for a minority white settler and majority black native population. On the one hand, it functioned on the rule of law and rights when it came to settlers who were de ned as citizens and, on the other hand, it was a state that ruled over subjects who were not entitled to any rights associated with the settler population. It was only at the moment of decolonisation that the boundaries of civil society were extended to create an indigenous civil society. However, Mamdani points out that this was of limited signi cance because independence merely de-racialised the state without doing the same in civil society (Mamdani, 1996). The post-colonial Australian state, like the African colonial state, remained racialised and civic rights only became universal once the indigenous population was allowed formally the full minimalist rights of citizenship when, in 1967, racial discriminatory clauses were removed from the constitution (Hanks, 1984: 2324; Chesterman and Galligan, 1997; Peterson and Sanders, 1998). It is not intended to suggest that the African case be seen as analogous to that of Australia. The distinction between settler and native in the Australian context holds little relevance because, unlike Africa, Australia is unquestionably a continent of settler independence. The category of native is not one that is appropriate to the Aboriginal peoples not only because of its obvious racist connotations but more importantly because of the exclusionary practices of the white settlers who stripped the rights of Aboriginal peoples through the establishment of the category aboriginal native. By deploying this category, the Commonwealth was able to deny them not only the franchise but also any nancial bene ts that were available to the white settler population. As Chesterman and Galligan point out, this exclusionary regime was meticulously enforced to keep Aboriginal people as non-citizens for more than half a century (1997: 12). It was this exclusionary category of aboriginal native which was extended through legislation to refer not only to Australias indigenous population but also to people from Asia, Africa and the Paci c Islands.3 This category was developed against the backdrop of British imperial culture which referred to indigenous populations in the colonies as natives. Within Australia, the term had an additional different connotation. In 1873, the visiting Anthony Trollope noted that the government of cially called the indigenous population Aboriginals whilst the word native is almost universally applied to white colonists born in Australia (cited in Chesterman and Galligan, 1997: 87). The idea that white colonists born in Australia were natives whilst the indigenous population were not was an

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important one. It was an idea that went to the heart of the manner in which the continent was settled. The myth of terra nullius was dependent upon the non-recognition of the local population and the indigenisation of their white conquerors. Settler colonies were forged out of the very idea of the elimination of the indigenous population. As Patrick Wolfe has noted, the colonizers came to stayinvasion is a structure not an event (1999: 2). In the triumphant settler independent continent of Australia, the diminished signi cance of the indigenous population is indicated by the importance of the question of when it is that a settler becomes a native. In a formal sense, the question can be answered by examining citizenship laws and clauses which ascribe citizenship after ful lling certain criteria such as place of birth or the ful lment of residency requirements. But these only entail gaining minimal formal civic rights and obligations. What is more important is how you gain the legitimacy of being transformed from a settler to a native. For those who sought to construct a particular Australian identitythrough the white Australia policy and assimilationist ideologythe transformation was one that was limited exclusively to those of Anglo-European origin. It is a legacy that continues to be manifested through exclusionary practices whereby the entitlements of certain citizens, including Aboriginal peoples, women and people of colour are denied.4 The Australian Way of Life The transformation of a settler to a native in the Australian context can be discerned in the way in which settlers chose to portray themselves. These self-images initially were cast as a distinct Australian-type which drew inspiration from social Darwinism and race theory of the nineteenth century. Richard White has pointed out that this type was, British, modi ed only by unique climatic conditions, or, of more interest, a unique racial type that was thought to be developing from a stock which remained, proudly, 98% British (1979: 529). By the 1950s, however, notions of the Australian type gave way to the idea of a unique Australian way of life. This change in the post-war period was necessitated by the large in ux of European migrants and the need to ensure that they conformed to a particular Anglo-Australia. It was in this context that the government pursued a policy of assimilation for both migrants and Aboriginal people. Although there was no precise de nition of the Australian way of life, it nevertheless was characterised by assimilation and the view that homogeneity was vital for Australias future success as a society. Migrants who were expected to conform were at a loss as to what this way of life entailed. One questioned: What is this Way of Life? No one yet tells me what this is! Yet always they tell me I must adopt it! perhaps I begin to behave like you behave in pubs. I drink beer until I am stupid. Or learn to put in the boot and bash the other fellow with a bottle Is this the way of life I must learn? Thank you. No. I stay a bloody Reffo! (cited in White, 1979: 536). It was precisely this lack of de nition of the Australian way of life which was vital to maintaining the power and hegemony of the white Anglo-settler population which remained committed to maintaining Australias connection with Britain. The settler subject was thus constructed from exclusionary premises which were altered over time to be able to include those of Celtic and European origins.

66 P. Ahluwalia Australia as a continent of settler independence can be seen as a society that was, and remains, Anglo-European in origin. It is in this context that Louis Hartzs notion of fragmented societies is important despite its limitations. From this perspective, Australia can be seen as an Anglo-fragment society whose institutions and practices re ect the colonial heritage which existed at the point of detachment from Britain (Hartz, 1964). It is this legacy which characterises the manner in which English cultural values and the avowed policy of Anglo-conformity de ned the Australian nation through exclusionary and racist policies of the nineteenth century which continue to the present. The rationale for such conformity, which came to be embodied in the policy of assimilation, was captured by Mary Willards (1967) defence of the White Australia policy as a requirement for the preservation of British Australian nationality. It was in this way that the white race and nation became linked inextricably with Australian national identity. It may well appear that adapting Mamdanis analysis of Africa with settlers as citizens and Aboriginal people and non-whites as subjects holds true for Australia. So when does a settler become a native? For the white settler class, this occurred when white colonists were locally-born. But as the needs of the economy forced migration to the country and as formal citizenship laws were promulgated, other white settlers were able to become natives when they ful lled certain minimum requirements after which citizenship was granted. The task of determining who is a citizen is decided through legislation and altered from time to time. In Australia, while the boundaries of citizenship have been extended in order to accommodate waves of migration, it does not mean that citizenship is equal. As Mamdani points out in the epigraph, settlers are made by conquest and not just immigration. It is in this context that we need to problematise the binary between citizen as settler and subject as native in order to understand how to transcend this distinction so that a single conception of post-colonial citizenship can be forged. This is not a process that can be decreed formally by legislation but is one that is tied integrally to the imagination. It is a process that has to recognise that becoming an Australian is not about conquering but about belonging to a political community of equal and consenting citizens. It is against this backdrop that we need to examine the complexities of citizenship and subjectivity. The Complexities of Citizenship and Subjectivity One might well begin by questioning what makes or who is a citizen and who is a subject? In Western political thought, subjects are individuals who have consented to a sovereigns rule and who, by according that consent, have certain rights and obligations. It is on the basis of the relationship between the sovereign and the subject that a polity functions. The consent of the subject is thought to provide the sovereign with the right to govern, the attendant obligations of those subjects are supposed to provide the sovereign with the capacity to do so (Hindess, 1996: 13; Ahluwalia, 2001). In response to the problematic of who comes after the subject, Etienne Balibar has responded forcefully, the citizen. The citizen, he notes, is that nonsubject who comes after the subject, and whose constitution and recognition put an end (in principle) to the subjection of the subject (Balibar, 1991: 3839). The claim that citizens succeed subjects is one that Balibar develops by question-

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ing who is the subject of the prince? And who is the citizen who comes after the subject (40). While a sovereigns power traditionally was based on divine right with the implication that subjects essentially were obeying God, the modern notion is grounded in the idea that all people are born free and equal in rights. This rupture arises as a result of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 which evokes the sovereignty of the revolutionary citizen. This entails the process whereby the citizen becomes a subject, the citizen is the subject, the citizen is always a supposed subject (legal subject, psychological subject, transcendental subject) (45). In this way, the citizen is neither the individual nor the collective neither an exclusionary being nor a private being (51). For Balibar, citizenship is a kind of freedom which is rooted in natural rights. Such a perspective shifts the debate that arises in questions of nationality and immigration which are based on who are citizens to one which fundamentally asks who is the citizen. The modern notion of citizenship is therefore based upon the idea that a community of autonomous persons has consented to being ruled. It is a perception, however, that is considered to be something of a ction (Hindess, 1996: 156158). In her empirical study of citizenship, Pamela Johnston Conover points out that citizen identities are the de ning elements which shape the character of communities. Such identities can be socially cohesive. However, when they are found to be lacking, legitimacy itself becomes problematic. She points out that there are three key components to citizenship. The rst is membership in a political community signi ed by some legal notion. Although in the modern world citizenship is embedded strongly in the nation-state, individuals are also members of other political communities and thus citizens experience multiple levels of citizenship nested within each other (Conover, 1995: 134). It is important to recognise that despite the association of nation-states with citizenship, it is at the local level and in the local contexts that people experience being and express themselves as citizens. The second component is a sense of citizenship. This sense is based on the affective signi cance that people give their membership in a particular political community (134). Finally, there is the practice of citizenship, which entails both political participation as well as civic activity. The pluralist position on citizenship is one that postulates that citizens are those in a body politic who share in the allocation of power (Laswell and Kaplan, 1952: 217). Such a conception entails the most common perception of citizenshipthat it allows one to engage in the political sphere. This is epitomised by being permitted to stand for public of ce or by voting for those who seek public of ce. Citizenship evokes also feelings of patriotism with strong allegiance to the ag and institutions which are analogous with the nation. Citizenship, as opposed to residency, in contemporary societies means that one is allowed access to state resources as well as being allowed to participate in the political process. In his lectures on governmentality, Michel Foucault maintained that, despite the different manner in which the term is utilised, there is, nevertheless, continuity between the government of the self, the government of a household as well as the government of a community or state. The importance of Foucaults views lies in his different conception of government. The work of government, for Foucault, is performed by both state and non-state agencies which are more involved in moulding the public and private behaviourand even the personalitiesof individ-

68 P. Ahluwalia uals than any conception of those individuals as citizens would allow (Hindess, 1996: 131). For Foucault, the relationship between ruler and ruled is more complex and nuanced than simply one which operates on the basis of consent. It is as citizensubjects that individuals are able to be governed. This conception rests on the acknowledgement that there is a great deal of power that lies beyond the state. As Hindess points out: Far from being restricted to the actions of the government the government of societies takes place in a variety of state and non-state contexts. The family, for example, can be seen not only as a potential object of government policy, but also as a means of governing the behaviour of its own members (134135). In short, Foucaults argument rests on a notion of power that is pervasive and one that operates at different levels in order to carry out its function. Toby Miller has divided citizenship into four moods. First, there is the right to association which was decreed by classical political theory. Second, liberal political theory extended this right by adding the doctrine of the civil right to relative freedom. Third, there exists the social right to a minimum standard of living guaranteed by the welfare state. The nal mood is the postmodern guarantee of access to technologies of communication which are central to ones identity and polity. Miller argues that there is a perceptible shift between the modern and the postmodern. In the former, subjects recognised their debt to the great institutions of the state whilst the postmodern: derives its power from a sense that such institutions need to relearn what sovereignty is about in polymorphous sovereign states and transnational business and social milieux that are diminishingly homogenous in demographic terms and increasingly heteroglossic in their cultural competence (Miller, 1993: 25). Citizenship has become an important trope in which civil society is seen to be a powerful agent of social change. The notion of shared rights which citizenship evokes is one that has been advocated by all modern emancipatory movements. For example, it was one of the central arguments mounted by the nationalist movements which sought decolonisation. As Miller points out, equal access to citizenship has not translated into equal justice because of the propensity toward economic anarchy and political oligarchy and because the discourse of justice increasingly presumes a space of autonomy between person, economy, and polity rather than a policy of assurance by the last on behalf of the rst, or some other variant (223). Citizenship in itself has a tendency to universalism and fails to recognise difference. It is this need to recognise difference which has meant the problematising of citizenship by feminist scholarship (Benhabib, 1996; Young, 1990). It is because the discourse of citizenship has a tendency to homogenise that it allows for a limited questioning which only seeks to evaluate the spread of services within a given type of social organization, not to the shape of that society or the means of de ning and dividing it (Miller, 1993: 230). This demonstrates the complexities of citizenship and the dif culty in dichotomising individuals simply into either citizens or subjects. What is clear is that the distinction between citizen and subject is complex and entails questions of responsi-

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bility, participation and entitlement. In short, individuals in all communities are citizen-subjects. In Australia, the manner in which citizenship has been ascribed to the indigenous and non-Anglo-European population in a formal minimalist sense means that they are not citizen-subjects in the same way as their white counterparts. The notion of citizenship for these people is nothing more than the right to vote and hence remains formal and minimalist. It is with this in mind that we need to consider citizenship and identity within a post-colonial context. Citizenship and Subjectivity: Post-colonial Re ections All societies continuously invent and reinvent themselves. Australia is once again trying to come to terms with its identity, particularly in the aftermath of the success of the Mabo case in which the highest judicial body overturned the founding myth of terra nullius upon which the modern nation had been built. In addition, marginalised groups within Australia increasingly are demanding that they be recognised and granted in reality the full entitlements of citizenship. It is these pressures which illustrate the fragility of settler societies where national identity is not homogenous but rather is constantly invented. This is necessarily so, because settler colonial societies such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand have not ruptured their imperial ties. In these societies, there has been no war of revolution or formal rupturing which can be equivocated with the decolonisation process of other colonised societies. It is for this reason that Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman argue for the exclusion of these societies from notions of post-colonialism: That these were not simply colonies was formally recognised at the time by Britain in granting them Dominion status. Economically and politically, their relation to the metropolitan centre bore little resemblance to that of the actual colonies (1994: 4). While it is clear that the experiences of the settler colonies cannot simply be equated to that of other colonies, the distinction that Williams and Chrisman make between dominion colonies and actual colonies is highly problematic. The experience of Aboriginal peoples, migrants and even the settlers cannot be erased by such distinctions. Rather, it is important to recognise the complexities of the colonial experience in a myriad of locations and to note, as Diana Brydon has suggested, that, Postcolonialism is neither a thing nor an essentialized state; rather, it is a complex of processes designed to circumvent imperial and colonial habits of mind (1995: 1112). In the battle over post-colonialism, what is perhaps forgotten is that the very subjects of empire have endured different forms of colonialism and that it is these different forms of power which need to be recovered. For the post-colonial white settler subjects, there is a dual burdennot only do they have to recover their own narratives but they must also recognise that they have blocked the narratives of the indigenous populations which they rendered invisible. It is this double inscription of resistance and authority which constitutes the settler subject. As Alan Lawson has pointed out, the settler subject-position is both postimperial and postcolonial; it has colonized and has been colonized: it must speak of and against both its own oppressiveness and its own oppression (1995: 28). To view the settler

70 P. Ahluwalia subject in this way is important because it illustrates the manner in which these subjects are trapped between the originating world of Europe which they brought with them as well as that other First World, that of the First Nations, whose authority the settlers not only effaced and replaced but also desired (29). It is through an engagement of these two modesthe colonising and the colonised that we begin to understand the interstitial cultural space in which settler subjects are located. The questioning of European forms of knowledge with their universalist prescriptions is a task that has been undertaken by post-structuralism. The liberal humanist conception of the uni ed autonomous subject who had the capacity to determine his or her destiny is one that has been challenged by post-structualism. The subject now is considered meaningless in itself, a mere cocoon, which, once opened, dissolves into a multiplicity of discursive facets. The subject does not speak, but is spoken by, language. The effect of such analysis is often to assign to the subject a position of passivity (90). However, the notion of the subject is one that is central to post-colonial theory, for it affects the manner in which colonised peoples come to terms with the conditions which entrap them. It is this perception of their conditions of domination which is vital to their being able to develop strategies of resistance. Hence, Martina Michel has pointed out that post-colonial theory effectively has reformulated the postmodern notion of the subject, by shifting our attention from the (fractured) Self to processes of subject formation (1995: 89). A major contribution of post-colonial theory has been the reconceptualisation of space and identity. As Edward Said (1978) so stridently demonstrates in Orientalism , space is a construction to which identities are assigned. It is through this insight that Henry Giroux has advocated the notion of border pedagogy. He points out that: the category border signals in the metaphorical and literal sense how power is inscribed differently on the body, culture, history, space, land, and psyche. Borders elicit a recognition of those epistemological, political, cultural, and social margins that distinguish between us and them, delineate zones of terror from locations that are safe, and create new cartographies of identity and difference (1992: 23). The very notion of identity remains tied to the nation. As Said points out, we are de ned by the nation, which in turn derives its authority from a supposedly unbroken tradition (1993: xxviii). As identity is always relational, identity formation is tied inextricably to a process of othering. It is here that post-colonial theory has proved to be particularly important in highlighting the invention or ctitious nature of a culturally pure or homogenous identity. This is where Girouxs notion of border pedagogy is useful because it presupposes an acknowledgement of the shifting borders that both undermine and reterritorialize different con gurations of culture, power, and knowledge (1992: 23). Benita Parry argues that the effect of the recognition of the fractured self, however, is the xing of the marginalised other into a position of silence (Parry, 1987). It is the quest to recover this silenced other which gives post-colonial theory its impetus over other post phenomenon. Ascribing agency to the subject allows post-colonialism in contrast to post-structuralism and postmodernismto insist

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that the subject has the capacity to act. Michel points out that this in itself does not allow the subject to determine her or his own position because, subject positions continue to be seen as constructs; but as agents the subject constantly acts out, reformulates, challenges, and potentially re-locates these constructs/discourses that assign to her or him a place from which to speak (Michel, 1995: 91). The ability to resist is one which is central to the work of both Frantz Fanon and Edward Said (Ashcroft and Ahluwalia, 1999). It is the notion of resistance that lies at the heart of postcolonial debate (Michel, 1995: 92). However, the centrality of resistance does not entail a return to a past essentialised identity, for there is no possibility of such a return. Rather, it is the continual reconstitution of identity under different circumstances which becomes important. It is a process which Said captures in his assertion that the dismantlement of binary oppositions challenges the fundamentally static notion of identity that has been the core of cultural thought during the era of imperialism (1993: xxviii). This is where post-colonial theory is instructive. It suggests that there are other narratives, other histories which have been subsumed and which need to be recovered. Edward Said offers one way in which this process of recovery can proceed. He makes a distinction between the potentate and the traveller in his writing on the role of the intellectual. Said urges intellectuals to adopt the identity of travellers because they suspend the claim of customary routine in order to live in new rhythms and rituals. Indeed, unlike the potentate who must guard only one place and defend its frontiers, the traveler crosses over, traverses territory, and abandons xed positions, all the time (Said, 1991: 81). The modern intellectuals role then is to disrupt prevailing norms because dominant norms are today so intimately connected to the nation, which is always triumphalist, always in a position of authority, always exacting loyalty and subservience (Said, 1994: 27). Said urges the intellectual to push the boundaries, to reconcile ones own identity with the reality of other identities, other peoples rather than dominating other cultures. He argues that, despite a proliferation of the liberal rhetoric of equality and justice, injustices continue in many parts of the globe. It is in this context that the distinction between the settler as citizen and subject as native is interesting for these are tied to space and identity. In Australia, core universal liberal values of equality, citizenship and justice were denied to the aboriginal natives. The granting of minimalist citizenship does not mean that these distinctions can now simply be erased. We are all too familiar with the exclusionary practices which have been utilised in forging a particular Australian identity. Nevertheless, by utilising post-colonialism, we are able to recognise that post-colonial subjects have the capacity for agency and that their identities are contingent and multiple. Indeed, we can see that the binary between the citizen and the subject is problematic. As James Donald points out, the citizen needs to be seen as a position and not as an identity. When viewed from such a perspective, it is a position which can be occupied in the sense of being spoken from, not in the sense of being given a substantial identity (Donald, 1996: 174). The citizen as an empty space in such a conceptualisation entails that the status of citizenship is contingent on an operative symbolic order that needs to be distinguished from any claims to a cultural identity for the citizen (175). Hence, to become a citizen in Australia, as in other post-colonial locations, is therefore to become a subject within this symbolic order (175).

72 P. Ahluwalia Conclusion Mahmood Mamdanis provocative question of when does a settler become a native is one that is problematised by post-colonial theory. It questions the ef cacy of delineating xed categories such as settler and native which were a product of colonialism. Recognising colonialisms domination and subjugation of the native, post-colonialism illustrates the capacity for agency and resistance. In Homi Bhabhas formulation, it is hybridity which challenges colonial domination. This leads to a particular kind of post-colonial subjectivity which functions in an interstitial passage between xed identi cations [and which] opens up the possibility of a cultural hybridity that entertains difference without an assumed or imposed hierarchy (1994: 4). This does not mean that the systems of oppression which exist in relation to Aboriginal peoples and non-whites are irrelevant. Rather, it points to the complexities of post-colonial subjectivity which cannot be captured in the binary citizen and subject. Post-colonialism points to the possibility of re-imagining the nation by creating a crisis of citizenship which arose out of both minimalist and exclusionary practices. In Australia, a simple binary such as citizen and subject is problematic precisely because of the manner in which settlers, as citizen-subjects, have transformed themselves into natives by virtue of simply being born there. Post-colonial theory brings questions of subjectivity to the foreground illustrating the complexities of identity formation. Post-colonial subjects have multiple identities which are shaped continually by the practice of everyday life giving them the capacity to resist, to speak and to act as citizen/subjects. The transformation of the settler into the native cannot be legitimated through conquest but fundamentally must be based on consent. It is a process that is embedded rmly within the imagination. It is through this process that generations of migrants have transformed, adopted or added an Australian identity which renders notions of xed identities, such as settler and native, problematic.

NOTES
1 2

I wish to thank Paul Nursey-Bray for his comments on this paper. See Hage (1998: 4955). It must be stressed, however, that these exclusions have not had the same effect on all these categories of people. For example, to equate the exclusions and oppression of Aboriginal people with that of white women in Australia would be highly problematic. For an excellent analysis of the manner in which the Natal Formula was developed to exclude coloured immigration in the white settler colonies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, see Huttenback (1976). For an example of how the issue of entitlements has affected women, see Johnson (1999).

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